
ETHICS

A Class Manual in Moral Philosophy

By

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B. HERDER BOOK CO.

15 & 17 SOUTH BROADWAY, ST. LOUIS, MO.

AND

33 QUEEN SQUARE, LONDON, W. C.

1949

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Twenty-first Impression

Vail-Ballou Press, Inc., Binghamton and New York

The best and most faithful of friends,
THE REVEREND THOMAS B. LAPPAN
AND
THE REVEREND FRANCIS M. McCARTER,
This little book is affectionately dedicated

PREFACE

This manual in Ethics is intended for class use. It was written, as nearly as could be done, in strict accordance with a set of rules which the author framed for himself at the outset, and which, he feels, are pedagogically sound. These rules are the following :

1. Be clear. You are not writing for experts. Make the scope and plan of the book evident to the least gifted student. Present a logical and adequate division of the matter to be studied. Use a direct style and simple diction.

2. In complex matters, state the essential doctrine in the plainest manner, and leave the rest to the teacher. In matters easy to grasp, some prolixity is permissible.

3. Employ an abundance of illustrations to relieve the strain of abstract reasoning, and to impress principles distinctly upon mind and memory.

4. Be reasonably complete, but make the book one that can be handily mastered in a single school year.

If, then, there appears to be a lack of balance, or inadequacy of treatment, in the following pages, the critic will find the explanation of such matters in the programme that ruled the writing of the book. The

author feels that it is a good programme; and his experience in the classroom gives him great confidence in the hope. The programme itself is not a gratuitous set of regulations thrown together to guide the writer in executing an unalterable determination to turn out a new statement of old doctrine: on the contrary, the four rules express what is felt as a summary of real *needs* in the matter of a new text in Ethics.

It is hoped that this manual will do good service for many young collegians who have the privilege of taking up the interesting and very important study of Christian Ethics.

P. J. G.

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INTRODUCTION

1. Definition
2. Object
3. Importance
4. Division

I. DEFINITION

Ethics is the practical science of the morality of human conduct.

a) Ethics is a *science*. A science is a relatively complete and systematically arranged body of connected data together with the causes or reasons by which these data are known to be true. Ethics squares with this definition, for it is a complete and systematically arranged body of data which relate to the morality of human conduct; and it presents the reasons which show these data to be true. Ethics is therefore a science.

b) Ethics is a *practical* science. If the data of a science directly imply rules or directions for thought or action, the science is called *practical*. If the data of a science enrich the mind without directly implying rules or directions, the science is called *speculative*. A speculative science presents truths that are to be known; a practical science presents truths that are to be acted upon. A speculative science enlarges our knowledge and enhances our cultural equipment; a

practical science gives us knowledge with definite guidance. Now the science of Ethics presents data which directly imply and indicate directions for human conduct. Ethics is therefore a practical science.

c) Ethics is a science of *human conduct*. By *human conduct* we mean only such human activity as is deliberate and free. A deliberate and free act, an act performed with advertence and motive, an act determined (i. e., chosen and given existence) by the free will, is called a *human act*. Acts performed by human beings without advertence, or without the exercise of free choice, are called *acts of man*, but they are not *human acts* in the technical sense of that expression which is here employed. Ethics treats of *human acts*; *human acts* make *human conduct*: Ethics is therefore a science of human conduct.

d) Ethics is the science of the *morality* of human conduct. Human conduct is free, knowing, deliberate human activity. Such activity is either in agreement or disagreement with the dictates of reason. Now the relation (agreement or disagreement) of human activity with the dictates of reason is called *morality*. Ethics studies human activity to determine what it must be to stand in harmony with the dictates of reason. Hence, Ethics deals with the *morality* of human conduct.

e) The name *Ethics* is derived from the Greek word *ethos*, which means "a characteristic way of

acting." Now the characteristic mark of human conduct is found in the free and deliberate use of the will: in a word, this characteristic is found in *human acts*. Thus we perceive that the name *Ethics* is suitably employed to designate the science of human acts, of human conduct.—The Latin word *mos* (stem: *mor-*) is the equivalent of the Greek *ethos*. Hence we understand why Ethics is sometimes called *Moral Science* or *Moral Philosophy*.

2. OBJECT

Every science has a *Material Object* and a *Formal Object*.

The *Material Object* is the subject-matter of the science: the thing, or things, with which the science deals. The *Material Object* of Ethics is *human acts*, that is to say, *human conduct*.

The *Formal Object* of a science is the special way, aim, or point of view that the science employs in studying or dealing with its *Material Object*. Now Ethics studies *human acts* (its *Material Object*) to discover what these must be in order to agree with the dictates of reason. Hence the special aim and point of view of Ethics is the *right morality*, or *rectitude*, of *human acts*. We assert, then, that the *Formal Object* of Ethics is *the rectitude of human acts*.

3. IMPORTANCE

Ethics employs the marvellous faculty of human reason upon the supremely important question of

what an upright life is and must be. It is therefore a noble and important science.

Ethics furnishes the norm by which relations among men (juridical, political, professional, social) are regulated. It shows what such relations must be, and indicates the reasons that require them to be so. Thus, Ethics is fundamental to the sciences of Law, Medicine, Political Economy, Sociology, etc. It is, in consequence of this fact, a very important science.

The principles of Ethics are in perfect harmony with the morality of Christianity, and this fact appeals to many minds when employed as a means of approach to the demonstration of the truth of the Catholic Religion. Hence, Ethics has a large significance for the Catholic apologist—that is to say, for every educated Catholic.

Faulty ethical theories, as well as the lack of definite ethical principles, have been and are still the cause of great disorders in the political and social world. This fact is apparent in such things as Bolshevism, Nihilism, Socialism, Birth Control, Eugenics, Companionate Marriage. Sound Ethics supplies the scientific knowledge which evidences the unworthiness and unreason of such things. Ethics is therefore a science deserving of careful study.

4. DIVISION


Ethics has two major parts, viz., *General Ethics* and *Special Ethics*.

General Ethics presents truths about *human acts*, and from these truths deduces the general principles of morality.

Special Ethics is *applied* Ethics. It applies the principles of General Ethics in different departments of human activity, individual and social.

The following scheme presents the plan upon which the present study of Ethics is developed:

I. GENERAL ETHICS



Following this scheme, we divide the present treatise into two *Parts* (viz., General Ethics, and Special Ethics). Part First is divided into *Chapters*. Part Second is divided into two *Books* (which deal respectively with Individual Ethics and Social Ethics), and the Books are divided into *Chapters*. The Chapters are divided into convenient *Articles*.

PART I

GENERAL ETHICS

The following sentence should be memorized, for it explains the sequence of this entire *Part*:

Human acts, directed to their last end by law applied by conscience, are moral acts, and as such are imputable to the agent, and beget in him habits of action.

Notice how the sentence serves as a key to the arrangement of the Chapters into which this *Part* is divided:

Human acts..

Chapter First defines *human acts* and classifies them. It analyzes *human acts* to discover their constituent elements, and considers the things that may modify them or make them less *human*. The Chapter is called "Human Acts."

*directed to
their last end.*

Chapter Second discusses the *ends* of human activity. It defines and classifies ends in general. It determines the last end of *human acts*, and shows that this exists as an objective thing towards which man tends, and that it is attainable. The Chapter is entitled, "The Ends of Human Acts."

*by law applied
by conscience.*

Chapter Third discusses the existence and character of the rules of action by which *human acts* are directed to their last end, viz., Law and Conscience. In particular, The Eternal Law, The Natural Law, and Positive Law are studied. The Chapter is entitled, "The Norms of Human Acts."

are moral acts

Chapter Fourth deals with morality. It explains the intrinsic good or evil of *human acts*, and the extrinsic factors that influence or determine the morality of such acts. Certain false doctrines in the matter of objective morality are refuted. Subjective morality (i. e., the relation of *human acts* to the individual conscience) is studied. The Chapter is entitled, "The Morality of Human Acts."

*are imputable
to the agent
and beget
habits*

Chapter Fifth discusses the properties of *human acts*, viz., imputability, merit, demerit. It also studies the consequences of *human acts*, viz., the habits called Virtues and Vices. The Chapter is entitled, "The Properties and Consequences of Human Acts."

This *Part*, viz., General Ethics, is thus divided into the following five Chapters:

- Chapter I. Human Acts
- Chapter II. The Ends of Human Acts
- Chapter III. The Norms of Human Acts
- Chapter IV. The Morality of Human Acts
- Chapter V. The Properties and Consequences of Human Acts

CHAPTER I

HUMAN ACTS

This Chapter studies the human act itself, defines it, classifies its varieties, discerns its essential elements, and discusses the things that may modify the human act and make it less human.

The Chapter is conveniently divided into the following Articles :

Article 1. The Human Act in Itself

Article 2. The Voluntariness of Human Acts

Article 3. The Modifiers of Human Acts

ARTICLE I. THE HUMAN ACT IN ITSELF

a) Definition b) Classification c) Constituents

a) DEFINITION OF THE HUMAN ACT

A human act is *an act which proceeds from the deliberate free will of man.*

In a wide sense, the term *human act* means any sort of activity, internal or external, bodily or spiritual, performed by a human being. Ethics, however, employs the term in a stricter sense, and calls *human* only those acts that are proper to man as man. Now man is an animal, and he has many activities in common with brutes. Thus, man feels, hears, sees, em-

ploy the senses of taste and smell, is influenced by bodily tendencies or appetites. But man is more than animal; he is *rational*, that is to say, he has understanding and free will. Hence it is only the act that proceeds from the *knowing* and *freely willing* human being that has the full character of a human act. Such an act alone is proper to man as man. And therefore Ethics understands by *human acts* only those acts that proceed from a deliberate (i. e., advertent, knowing) and freely willing human being.

Man's animal acts of sensation (i. e., use of the senses) and appetite (i. e., bodily tendencies), as well as acts that man performs indeliberately or without advertence and the exercise of free choice, are called *acts of man*. Thus, such acts as are effected in sleep, in delirium, in the state of unconsciousness; acts done abstractedly or with complete inadvertence; acts performed in infancy; acts due to infirmity of mind or the weakness of senility—all these are *acts of man*, but they are not *human acts*.

It is to be noticed that acts which are in themselves *acts of man* may sometimes become *human acts* by the advertence and consent of the human agent (and by *agent* is meant the one who does or performs an act). Thus, if I hear words of blasphemy as I walk along the street, my act of hearing is an *act of man*; but the act becomes a *human act* if I deliberately pay attention and listen. Again, my eyes may fall upon an indecent sight, or upon a page of obscene reading mat-

ter. The act of seeing, and even of reading and understanding the words, is an *act of man*; but it becomes a *human act* the moment I deliberately consent to look or to read.

Ethics is not concerned with *acts of man*, but only with *human acts*. Human acts are *moral acts*, as we shall see later on. For human acts man is *responsible*, and they are *imputed* to him as worthy of praise or blame, of reward or punishment. Human acts tend to repeat themselves and to form *habits*. Habits coalesce into what we call a man's *character*. Thus we find verified the dictum of Ethics: "A man is what his human acts make him."

b) CLASSIFICATION OF HUMAN ACTS

Human acts may be classified under the following heads: i. Their complete or adequate cause; and ii. Their relation to the dictates of reason.

i. *The Adequate Cause of Human Acts*.—While all human acts have their source in man's free rational nature, there are some acts that *begin and are perfected* in the will itself, and the rest *begin in the will* and are *perfected by other faculties* under control of the will. Thus, some human acts find their adequate cause in the will alone (always remembering that we speak of the will of advertent, knowing man, i. e., of the *deliberate will*); and these are called *elicited acts*. Other human acts do not find their adequate cause in the simple will-act, but are perfected by the action

of mental or bodily powers under the control of the will, or, so to speak, *under orders* from the will; and these acts are called *commanded acts*. To illustrate: I intend to go to my room and study. My *intention* is a simple will-act, begun and completed in the will. It is therefore an *elicited act*. But to carry out the intention, *commanded acts*, of body and mind, must be exercised. Thus, I walk to my room, turn on the light, sit at my desk, take down a book, turn to the lesson, bend my eyes upon the page. All these bodily acts are (if done advertently) human acts, *commanded*, so to speak, by the will for carrying out its intention. Now I start to study: I control the imagination, keeping out distracting fancies; I focus my mind upon the matter to be understood. These internal mental acts are also acts *commanded* by the will.

Under the head of "Adequate Cause" we therefore consider:

- (A) Elicited Acts
- (B) Commanded Acts

(A) Elicited Acts are the following:

(a) *Wish*: the simple love of anything; the first tendency of the will towards a thing, whether this thing be realizable or not. Every human act begins with the wish to act. Wish is exemplified in the will-act which enables one truthfully to say: "I wish it would rain;" "I do so long to see you;" "I should like to go to Europe next summer."

(b) *Intention*: the purposive tendency of the will towards a thing regarded as realizable, whether the thing is actually done or not. We find intention expressed in the following sentences: "I am going to Europe next summer;" "The cause is in my will; I will not come: that is enough to satisfy the Senate."—Intention is distinguished as *actual*, *virtual*, *habitual*, and *interpretative* intention. We shall study these degrees of intention in the Article on the Voluntariness of Human Acts.

(c) *Consent*: the acceptance by the will of the means necessary to carry out intention. Consent is a *further intention* of doing what is necessary to realize the first or main intention. Thus, if I intend to go to Europe, I *consent* to the necessary preparation for the journey. I cannot really intend a thing honestly unless I consent to the means of carrying it out or realizing it. If I make an Act of Contrition, I make an *intention* (usually called a resolution of amendment). Now I am not honest in my act, if I do not *consent* to avoid the near occasions of sin; for these are necessarily to be avoided if the intention is to be realized. Here we see justified the ancient saying: "He that wills (intends) a thing, wills (consents to) the means required to accomplish it."

(d) *Election*: the selection by the will of the precise means to be employed (consented to) in carrying out an intention. Thus, while I may go to Europe either by ship or by airplane, I cannot go by both simulta-

neously, but must *elect* or select one of the means. By *election* I choose to sail on a certain day, from a certain port, etc.

(e) *Use*: the employment by the will of powers (of body, mind, or both) to carry out its intention by the means elected. Thus, if I intend to go to a neighboring town, and elect to walk thither, I exercise the will-act of *use* by putting my body in motion. True, the movement itself is a *commanded act*, but the commanding, the putting to employment of bodily action, is the elicited will-act of *use*.

(f) *Fruition*: the enjoyment of a thing willed and done; the will's act of satisfaction in intention fulfilled.

Of the elicited acts listed, three appertain to the objective thing willed, and three to the means of accomplishing it. Suppose the thing willed is a trip to Europe. Then :

I wish	}	a trip to Europe
I intend		
I enjoy when accomplished.		
I consent to	}	the means required to make the trip
I elect		
I use my faculties on		

(B) Commanded Acts are :

(a) *Internal*: acts done by internal mental powers under command of the will. Examples: effort to re-

member; conscious reasoning; netting oneself to meet an issue; effort to control anger; deliberate use of the imagination in visualizing a scene.

(b) *External*: acts effected by bodily powers under command of the will. Examples: deliberate walking, eating, writing, speaking. Such acts as walking and eating are very often *acts of man*, but they become human acts when done with advertence and intention.

(c) *Mixed*: acts that involve the employment of bodily powers and mental powers. Example: study, which involves use of intellect, and use of eyes in reading the lesson.

Of course, all human acts are *internal* inasmuch as all originate in the will which elicits or commands them. Again, all external acts are *mixed* inasmuch as the outer activity which perfects them is but the expression and fulfillment of the interior act of will. But, for sake of simplicity, we call those human acts *external* which are perfected or *completed* by the exterior powers of body; and we call *mixed* only those acts which involve the use of bodily powers as well as internal powers distinct from the will.

ii. *The Relation of Human Acts to Reason*.—Human acts are either in agreement or in disagreement with the dictates of reason, and this relation (agreement or disagreement) with reason constitutes their *morality*. The subject of the Morality of Human Acts

is to be dealt with in detail in a later Chapter, but passing mention of the matter is required here for the proper classification of human acts. On the score of their morality, or relation to reason, human acts are :

(a) *Good*, when they are in harmony with the dictates of right reason ;

(b) *Evil*, when they are in opposition to these dictates ;

(c) *Indifferent*, when they stand in no positive relation to the dictates of reason. Indifferent human acts exist in theory, but not as a matter of practical experience. A human act that is indifferent in itself becomes good or evil according to the circumstances which affect its performance, especially the *end in view* (or motive or purpose) of the agent.

c) CONSTITUENTS OF THE HUMAN ACT

In order that an act be *human*, it must possess three essential qualities : it must be knowing, free, and voluntary. Hence we list the essential elements, or constituents, of the human act as : i. *Knowledge*; ii. *Freedom*; iii. *Voluntariness*.

i. *Knowledge*.—A human act proceeds from the deliberate will ; it requires deliberation. Now “deliberation” does not mean quiet, slow, painstaking action. It means merely *advertence*, or *knowledge in intellect of what one is about and what this means*. An act may be done in the twinkling of an eye, and still be deliberate. Consider an illustration : A hunter flushes game ;

the birds rise; the hunter whips up his gun and fires. The act of firing is the work of a split second, and yet it is a deliberate act. The hunter adverts to what he is doing, and, so adverting, wills and does it. In a word, the hunter *knows* what he is doing. His knowledge makes the act deliberate. For the purposes of Ethics, then, *deliberation* means *knowledge*. Now, a human act is by definition a deliberate act; that is, it is a *knowing* act. No human act is possible without knowledge.

The will cannot act in the dark, for the will is a "blind" faculty in itself. It cannot choose unless it "see" to choose, and the light, the power to see, is afforded by intellectual *knowledge*. I cannot will to go to the island of Mauritius unless I *know* that there is such an island. I cannot choose to eat oranges or not to eat oranges, if I have never seen nor heard of oranges. I cannot will to play the sacbut if I know of no such musical instrument. I cannot will to love and serve God if I do not know God. Knowledge, then, is an essential element of the human act.

ii. *Freedom*.—A human act is an act determined (elicited or commanded) by the will and by nothing else. It is an act, therefore, that is under *control* of the will, an act that the will can do or leave undone. Such an act is called a *free* act. Thus every human act must be free. In other words, freedom is an essential element of the human act.

iii. *Voluntariness*.—The Latin word for *will* is *voluntas*, and from this word we derive the English terms, *voluntary* and *voluntariness*. To say, therefore, that a human act must be voluntary, or must have voluntariness, is simply to say that it must be a will-act. This we already know by the very definition of the human act. Voluntariness is the formal essential quality of the human act, and for it to be present, there must ordinarily be both knowledge and freedom in the agent. Hence the term *voluntary act* is synonymous with *human act*. In the next Article we treat of the voluntariness of human acts in some detail.

To illustrate the place of the constituents just considered in a particular human act, the following example is proposed: A Catholic is aware that to-day is Sunday and that he has the obligation of hearing Mass (*knowledge*). He is free to attend Mass or to stay away—not, indeed, free from duty in the matter, but physically free to perform the duty or leave it unperformed (*freedom*). He wills to do his duty and to hear Mass (*voluntariness*).

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

We have defined *human act*, and have contrasted it with *act of man*. We have noticed in passing that the human act stands related to the dictates of reason, and is, in consequence, a *moral act*.

We have classified human acts as *elicited* and *com-*

manded acts, and have viewed them in their moral aspect as *good, evil, and indifferent* acts.

We have seen that the human act is essentially the product of the will (*voluntary* act) acting with native *freedom* in the light of intellectual *knowledge*.

ARTICLE 2. THE VOLUNTARINESS OF HUMAN ACTS

- a) Kinds or Degrees of Voluntariness
 - b) Indirect Voluntariness

a) KINDS OR DEGREES OF VOLUNTARINESS

i. *Perfect and Imperfect*.—Perfect voluntariness is present in the human act when the agent (i. e., the doer, performer, actor) fully knows and fully intends the act. Imperfect voluntariness is present when there is some defect in the agent's knowledge, intention, or in both. Thus, a deliberate lie is a perfectly voluntary act; while a lie of exaggeration in a lively narrative, in which the narrator, full of the story, adverts only partly, or in passing, to the fact that he may be stretching matters a little, is a human act imperfectly voluntary.

ii. *Simple and Conditional*.—Simple voluntariness is present in a *human act performed*, whether the agent likes or dislikes doing it. Conditional voluntariness is present in the agent's wish to do something other than that which he is actually doing, but doing with repugnance or dislike. Example: The commander of a distressed vessel lightens cargo by throwing valuable

merchandise overboard. He wills to do it, and does it, and the act is *simply* voluntary. Still, he dislikes doing it, and *would not do it* if there were any other way of escaping shipwreck. He wishes to keep the goods, but the wish is an inefficacious will-act, for, as a matter of fact, he does not keep the goods, but throws them away. In this inefficacious will-act, there is *conditional* voluntariness. Inasmuch as the inefficacious will-act influences the efficacious act, the latter is said to be *involuntary*. Hence, the act of throwing away valuable goods is *simply voluntary* and *conditionally involuntary*.

iii. *Direct and Indirect*.—Direct voluntariness is present in a human act willed in itself. Indirect voluntariness is present in that human act which is the foreseen result (or a result that *could* and *should* have been foreseen) of another act directly willed. Example: A man kills a rabbit for dinner. He directly wills the act of killing as a *means* to an *end to be achieved*, viz., the dinner. He also directly wills the dinner as the end to be achieved by this means. We have direct voluntariness in each aspect of the act. Now suppose the rabbit was a tame animal that had played about the man's grounds and had given his children pleasure. The man knows that by killing the rabbit he will deprive his children of pleasure and cause them sorrow. This, indeed, he does not directly will, but, inasmuch as this is the foreseen consequence of his directly willed act, he wills it *indirectly*, or *in its cause*. In other

words, he directly wills the *cause* of his children's sorrow, and thus *indirectly* wills the sorrow itself. A human act that is directly willed is called voluntary *in se* (i. e., in itself), while a human act that is indirectly willed is called voluntary *in causa* (i. e., in its cause).

Indirect voluntariness is a subject of first importance, and we shall study it in detail in the second section of this present Article.

iv. *Positive and Negative*.—Positive voluntariness is present in a human act of doing, performing. Negative voluntariness is present in a human act of omitting, refraining from doing. Examples: A Catholic goes to Mass on Sunday (*positive* voluntariness). A Catholic deliberately misses Mass on Sunday (*negative* voluntariness).—Of course, when a person omits an act, he must really be doing something positive. But the special positive thing that he does is not of the essence of the omission as such. Thus, the man who remains away from Mass on Sunday omits a duty; but, while remaining away from Mass, he must really be *doing* something—lying abed, reading the morning paper, walking about, playing a game, eating his breakfast, or doing any one of an indefinite number of possible things. But the point is that no special and particular positive act, or series of acts, enters into the essence of the omission, for this consists simply in *willing not to do* an act.

v. *Actual, Virtual, Habitual, and Interpretative*.—

Actual voluntariness (or *actual intention*) is present in a human act willed here and now. Virtual voluntariness (or *virtual intention*) is present in a human act done as a result of (or *in virtue of*) a formerly elicited actual intention, even if that intention be here and now forgotten. Habitual voluntariness (or *habitual intention*) is present in a human act done in harmony with, but not as a result of, a formerly elicited and unrevoked actual intention. Interpretative voluntariness (or *interpretative intention*) is that voluntariness which, in the judgment of prudence and common-sense, *would be actually present* if opportunity or ability for it were given. Examples :

(a) A man makes the morning offering. He actually, here and now, intends to live for God, and to serve Him in all the thoughts, words, and deeds of the day. The act of offering is an *actual intention*; it is a will-act in which there is *actual voluntariness*.

(b) A man makes the morning offering, but during the day he completely forgets it. Nevertheless his day is without sin which would contradict his pious intention, and we say that the power or *virtue* of the intention endures, and that, as a result of the intention, all the thoughts, words, and deeds of the day are really done for God. The man takes breakfast, goes to work, attends to business duties, spends time in recreation, etc. In all these acts he has no actual ("here and now") intention of doing them for God, but he has the *virtual intention* of so doing them. Hence all the acts that the

man performs throughout the day—even those that are in themselves *acts of man*—are *human acts* of service by reason of their *virtual voluntariness*.

(c) A man makes the actual intention of becoming a Catholic. Years pass, and he does not carry out the intention; neither does he revoke it. He is taken suddenly ill, and lies unconscious at death's door. A priest administers Baptism. Here the act of receiving the sacrament is in agreement with the actual intention once made and unrevoked, and the man is said to have a *habitual intention* for that act. The act, however, is not the *result* of the original actual intention, for the virtue or power of that intention cannot reasonably be presumed to endure throughout a long period of neglect and unfulfillment. For, if one makes an intention of doing a thing, and fails to do it throughout years of continuous opportunity for its accomplishment, it is obvious that the virtue or power of the original intention is null. Still, as long as the original intention is not revoked, it remains with its author, and is worn, so to speak, like a forgotten portion of his dress or habit, powerless actively to produce a result, but remaining as the mark or symbol of an attitude of mind. It is a mark of *habitual voluntariness*.

(d) A person known to be unbaptized is unconscious and in danger of death. No knowledge is available of his habitual inclination or disinclination for the act of receiving the sacrament of Baptism. The sacrament is nevertheless administered. Here the act of receiving

the sacrament is prudently presumed to be in line with the will of the recipient, so that, if he could but know its great value, he would certainly wish to receive it. Thus is his will *interpreted* by sound common-sense. In the act of receiving the sacrament the man is said to have an *interpretative intention*. Such an intention, then, is an intention that may be prudently presumed, not indeed as *present*, but as an intention that *would be present* if proper knowledge and freedom were available to him in whom it is presumed.—Similarly, infants are baptized, and the receiving of the sacrament is in them a human act, by reason of *interpretative voluntariness*.—Again, the small boy who has literally to be carried to school and kept there against his will, has an interpretative intention of going to school. For parents and teachers know that, if the lad could but realize the value of schooling, he would certainly will to attend.

b) INDIRECT VOLUNTARINESS

Indirect voluntariness, or voluntariness *in cause*, is present in that human act which is an effect, foreseen or foreseeable, of another act directly willed.

We have not yet made a detailed study of the moral character of human acts nor of their consequent imputability. But we have seen that human acts are acts under the free control of the will. It is clear that, since the will controls such acts, the will is *responsible* for them. In other words, human acts are *imputable* (as

worthy of praise or blame, reward or punishment) to their author.

Now the moment we bring together the matters of *indirect voluntariness* and *imputability*, two supremely important ethical questions present themselves. The questions are :

- i. *When is the agent (doer, actor, performer) responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly willed?*
- ii. *When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, which has two effects, one good, one evil?*

i. *The First Question* : When is an agent responsible for the evil effect of a cause directly willed?—The agent is responsible for such an effect when three conditions are fulfilled, viz. : (1) The agent must be able to foresee the evil effect, at least in a general way. (2) The agent must be free to refrain from doing that which is the cause of the evil effect. (3) The agent must be morally bound not to do that which is the cause of the evil effect.

This is an ethical principle of great moment. Let the student apply it in the following cases :

(a) Michael knows that if he drinks liquor, he will drink to excess, and will use blasphemous language, which will scandalize those that hear it. He declares, and truly enough, that he hates intemperance, and that he dreads the evils of blasphemy and scandal. Nevertheless he drinks liquor, and the foreseen evils occur.

How far is Michael responsible for these evil effects? When does he incur their guilt?

(b) John says, "If I go to the meeting and hear Jones say sharp things about our party, I know I'll lose my head and reveal some very damaging facts about Jones' career that I alone know." John goes to the meeting; the evil of detraction follows. Determine John's responsibility, and the moment at which his guilt is imputed to him.

(c) Mary knows that by persistent company-keeping with a non-Catholic she will encourage the weak-willed Jane to a similar course and to the consequent danger of an invalid marriage; for Jane idolizes Mary and imitates her in every way. Mary believes, foolishly but sincerely, that she herself is in no danger, but she is keenly aware of the danger in which Jane is placed through her example. Nevertheless she persists. Jane imitates, and eventually commits the sin of an attempted marriage outside the Church. How far is Mary to blame? Why?

(d) Thomas has been repeatedly warned by prudent persons against attendance at a secular university, and he has been shown that he will there encounter grave dangers to his faith. He declares, in foolish pride, that nothing can shake his faith. He attends the university, gradually loses his fervor, and becomes but a nominal Catholic. At what time does his lapse become imputable to him? Why?

(e) Timothy goes to bed on Saturday night, forget-

ting to set the alarm. Before falling asleep he recalls the omission, but he does not rise to adjust the clock. He knows that he is a very heavy sleeper, and that he will probably not awake in time for Mass on Sunday. This is precisely what happens. When does Timothy incur the guilt of missing Mass? Why?

(f) The same Timothy deliberately neglects the clock on another Saturday night. But, contrary to all his experience, he awakes in time for Mass on Sunday morning, and he attends very devoutly. Does Timothy have any fault in the matter? Why?

(g) Again, Timothy deliberately neglects to set the alarm on Saturday night. Again, by an almost miraculous repetition of the unexpected, he awakes in time for Mass on Sunday. But, he reasons, since he has already missed Mass *in cause*, there is now no obligation incumbent upon him of attending. He stays at home and does not hear Mass. —Here Timothy was altogether wrong. He willed an evil *in cause*, and his will-act stopped there. Through no merit of his own, the cause failed to function as a cause, and he awoke in time for Mass. Now, by a *new* and *direct* will-act he wills to miss Mass. Here is a new evil, directly willed.

In the foregoing cases we see that the agent is bound to avoid the cause of the evil effect, and his obligation arises *from the very fact that the effect is evil*. Why, then, did we list *three* conditions for the imputability

of *evil willed in cause*? Why not simply say that *two* conditions are requisite for such imputability, viz., that the agent be able to foresee the evil effect, and that he be free to avoid the cause? Is not the fact that the effect is evil always a prohibition obliging the agent to refrain from the cause of that evil? Not always. Sometimes there is a *good effect* as well as an *evil effect* proceeding from a single cause. This brings us to the second question:

ii. *The Second Question*: When may one perform an act, not evil in itself, from which flow two effects, one good, one evil? —One may perform such an act when three conditions are fulfilled, viz., (1) The evil effect must not precede the good effect. (2) There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for the act in its good effect. (3) The intention of the agent must be honest, that is, the agent must *directly intend* the good effect and *merely permit* the evil effect as a regrettable incident or “side issue.” To explain these conditions in detail:

The evil effect must not precede the good effect. If the evil effect comes ahead of the good effect, then it is a *means* of achieving the good effect, and is *directly willed* as such a means. Now it is a fundamental principle of Ethics—a clear dictate of sound reason—that evil may never be willed directly, whether it be a *means* or an *end to be achieved*. We cannot do evil that good may come of it. The end does *not* justify the means.

There is no good, however great, that can justify the direct willing of evil, however slight. If a lie—even a “harmless” lie—will save a life—even an innocent life—that lie may not be told. Notice well that the principle here discussed requires that the evil effect *do not precede* the good effect; we do not say that the good effect must precede the evil, but that the good effect must either *precede* the evil or *occur simultaneously with it*.

There must be a reason sufficiently grave calling for the act in its good effect. If this condition be not fulfilled, there is no adequate reason for the act at all, and the act is prohibited in view of its evil effect. The sufficiency of the reason must be determined by the nature, circumstances, and importance of the act in question, and by the proportion this reason bears to the gravity of the evil effect.

The intention of the agent must be honest. If the agent really wills the evil effect, there is no possibility of the act being permissible. Direct willing of evil, as we have seen, is always against reason, and hence against the principles of Ethics. But, unless the agent directly wills the good effect, he is really willing the evil effect—else he has no adequate motive for performing the act at all.

Let the student consider the following cases in the light of the principle just explained:

(a) The general of an army storms an enemy city. He foresees that many non-combatants will be killed.

Yet to take the city will be a big step towards winning a just war. Is the general's act allowable? Notice the two effects here: that taking of the city as a step towards ending the war with victory for the just cause—a good effect; and the killing of non-combatants—an evil effect.

(b) The general of an army knows that by laying waste the farms of the enemy's country, he will seriously inconvenience the enemy by cutting off the source of supplies. At the present time the enemy is well supplied, but destruction of the crops will destroy future supplies. Such destruction will mean present starvation to many a farmer and his family, but ultimately it will help win a just war. May the general lay waste the farm-lands?

(c) In view of your answer to the foregoing question, would you justify or condemn the havoc wrought by Sherman in his march to the sea?

(d) A doctor can save a mother's life by destroying that of her child. May he do so? Why not?

(e) A child's life can be saved by destroying the life of the mother. May this be done? Why not?

(f) A patient is dying in awful agony. Medical relief there is none. Life cannot last beyond a few hours at most. May a drug be administered to bring death quietly and quickly? Why not?

(g) A student of very frail health has been promised a lucrative position upon graduation. He needs the situation to support his aged and impoverished par-

ents. He knows he must study hard, else he will fail in his examinations, lose his degree, and, in consequence, will not secure the promised position. Still, he is aware that earnest study may seriously impair his health. May he study hard and run the risk of permanent infirmity?

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have studied the subject of voluntariness in human acts. We have distinguished voluntariness as perfect and imperfect; simple and conditional; direct and indirect; positive and negative; actual, virtual, habitual, and interpretative. We gave special study to the subject of indirect voluntariness, stating and exemplifying two important ethical principles, viz., 1. the Principle of Imputability of Evil Indirectly Willed, and 2. the Principle of Imputability of a Twofold Effect.

ARTICLE 3. THE MODIFIERS OF HUMAN ACTS

- a) Ignorance b) Concupiscence c) Fear d) Violence
e) Habit

By the *modifiers* of human acts we mean the things that may affect human acts in the essential qualities of *knowledge, freedom, voluntariness*, and so make them less perfectly *human*. Such modifiers lessen the moral character of the human act, and consequently diminish the responsibility of the agent.

There are five modifiers of human acts that call for

detailed study, viz., ignorance, concupiscence, fear, violence, habit.

a) IGNORANCE

Ignorance is the absence of knowledge—and, for our purpose here, it may be defined as the *absence of intellectual knowledge in man*. Ignorance is thus a negation of knowledge; it is a *negative* thing. But when it is absence of *knowledge that ought to be present*, the ignorance is not merely *negative*, but *privative*. Thus, ignorance of the higher mathematics in a structural-steel worker is merely *negative*; but such ignorance is *privative* in the architect or engineer who designs steel structures such as bridges and the framework of buildings. Again, ignorance of Catholic belief and practice is *negative* in a Hottentot, but *privative* in a Catholic collegian.

Ignorance has, indeed, a positive aspect when it consists not merely in the absence of knowledge, but in the presence of what is falsely supposed to be knowledge. Thus, if I see a stranger in the street, and realize that I do not know him, my ignorance of his identity is merely *negative*. But if I am misled by poor eyesight or by a resemblance in the stranger, and judge him to be a well-known acquaintance, my state of mind is *positive* towards him: I have what I judge to be positive knowledge of his identity. Such positive ignorance is called *mistake* or *error*.

We are to consider ignorance in its effect upon hu-

man acts. Before stating the ethical principles which our study will justify, we shall make a preliminary study of ignorance itself, considering it in three ways, viz., i. *in its object*, i. e., in the thing of which a person may be ignorant; ii. *in its subject*, i. e., in the person in whom ignorance exists; iii. *in its result*, i. e., with reference to the acts that are performed in ignorance.

i. *Ignorance in its Object*. —The thing of which a person may be ignorant is a matter of law, fact, or penalty.

(a) *Ignorance of Law* is the ignorance of the existence of a duty, rule, or regulation. Examples: A motorist drives at the rate of forty miles an hour, not knowing that the local speed-limit is twenty miles an hour. A hunter shoots game in early October, unaware that the game-laws forbid such an act. A young Freshman leaves the campus during noon-recess, not knowing that his action is a violation of the college rules.

(b) *Ignorance of Fact* is ignorance of the nature or circumstances of an act *as forbidden*. Examples: A motorist knows the speed-limit, but unknowingly violates it because of an inaccurate speedometer. A hunter knows the game-laws, but reads his calendar amiss, and kills game one day before the season opens. A freshman knows that he must not leave the campus, but goes out of bounds through misinformation about the extent of the college property. —Thus ignorance of *fact* is lack of knowledge that what one is actually doing comes under the prohibition of a known law.

(c) *Ignorance of Penalty* is lack of knowledge of the precise *sanction* (i. e., an inducement sufficient to make reasonable men obey the law) affixed to the law. Examples: A motorist knowingly violates the speed-law, not knowing that, in that particular locality, the set punishment for such an offense is a short prison term, in lieu of which no amount of money will be accepted. A hunter violates the game-laws, believing that, if apprehended, he will be merely fined, whereas the established penalty for his offense is the revocation of the license to hunt. A freshman wilfully leaves the campus, thinking that he will escape with an admonition not to do so again, whereas the fixed penalty for his offense is the suspension of all student-privileges for a period of two weeks.

ii. *Ignorance in its Subject*.—In the person in whom it exists, ignorance (of law, fact, or penalty) is either *vincible* or *invincible*.

(a) *Vincible Ignorance* (i. e., conquerable ignorance; ignorance that can and should be supplanted by knowledge) is ignorance that can be dispelled by the use of ordinary diligence. Such ignorance is, therefore, due to lack of proper diligence on the part of the ignorant person, and is his *fault*. Vincible ignorance is, in consequence, *culpable* ignorance. There are degrees of vincible ignorance: If it be the result of total, or nearly total, lack of effort to dispel it, it is called *crass* (or *supine*) ignorance. If some effort worthy the name, but not persevering and whole-hearted ef-

fort, be unsuccessfully employed to dispel it, the ignorance is *simply vincible*. If positive effort is made to retain it, the ignorance is called *affected*. To illustrate: A freshman who has been in college a month and does not know the college rules of order, is in the state of *vincible ignorance* in the matter. If he has made no effort, or scarcely any, to know the rules, his ignorance is *crass* or *supine*. If he has positively avoided learning the rules so that he may have a ready excuse for faults, and may be able to say when taken in violation of order, "I did not know the rule," his ignorance is *affected*. If he has made some inquiries about the rules, or has tried once or twice, without success, to procure a copy of the rule-book, his ignorance is *simply vincible*.

(b) *Invincible Ignorance* is ignorance that ordinary and proper diligence cannot dispel. This sort of ignorance is attributable to one of two causes, viz.: either the person in whom the ignorance exists has no realization whatever of his lack of knowledge, or the person who realizes his ignorance finds ineffective his effort to dispel it. Hence, invincible ignorance is never the fault of the person in whom it exists, and it is rightly called *inculpable* ignorance. Invincible ignorance has two degrees, viz.: If no human effort can dispel it, it is *physically* invincible. If such effort as good and prudent men would expend to dispel it—taking into account the character and importance of the matter about which ignorance exists—is found

to be ineffective, the ignorance is called *morally* invincible.¹ To illustrate: A Catholic eats meat, wholly unaware that the day is Friday. Here his ignorance is *invincible*—even though in itself it could be easily dispelled by asking the nearest person for the day of the week—and even *physically* invincible, because no effort can be used with effect where there is no realization whatever that effort is needed. A further illustration: A man is seeking for a seventeenth century pamphlet to which he finds himself constantly referred in learned books on the subject of economics. After months and months of searching through libraries and following elusive clues, the man discovers that there is only one copy of the pamphlet in existence; that this copy is in the library of a recluse who resides in a foreign country, far across the sea; and that, although one may be permitted to read it, the pamphlet may neither be borrowed nor copied. The man is in the state of *invincible ignorance* with regard to the contents of the pamphlet. His ignorance is not *physically* invincible, for he could make a voyage to the land of the recluse, and study the pamphlet in the latter's library. Still, this course would involve difficulties and inconveniences out of all proportion to the

¹ The word *morally* has no direct relation in the present use to *morality*, but to *characteristic action* of men. Thus, ignorance is morally invincible when such effort as would be truly characteristic of good and prudent men in the circumstances, is found powerless to dispel it. In common language, ignorance is morally invincible when it would be *extremely difficult* to dispel it.

importance of the matter about which ignorance exists. We say, therefore, that the man's ignorance of the contents of the pamphlet is *morally* invincible.

iii. *Ignorance in its Result*.—Here we consider ignorance (of fact, law, or penalty) with reference to acts performed while ignorance exists.

(a) *Antecedent Ignorance* is that which precedes all consent of the will. A man, wholly unaware that to-day is a holyday of obligation, misses Mass. He would certainly not miss Mass if he were conscious of his obligation. His ignorance is *antecedent* to his act of missing Mass, and we say that the act is done *through* or *in consequence of* ignorance. Antecedent ignorance does not differ from *invincible* ignorance.

(b) *Concomitant Ignorance* is that ignorance which, so to speak, accompanies an act that would have been performed even if the ignorance did not exist. A nominal Catholic misses Mass, not aware that the day is a holyday. Yet, even had he known, he would have missed Mass. His act of missing Mass does not come from ignorance, but happens *in company with* his ignorance, and we call the ignorance concomitant. An act done in concomitant ignorance is non-voluntary.

(c) *Consequent ignorance* is that which follows upon an act of the will. The will may directly *affect* it, or *supinely* neglect to dispel it. Thus, consequent ignorance does not differ from *vincible ignorance*. A careless Catholic suspects that the day is a holyday but deliberately refrains from making sure, and *does*

upon knowledge of the field of free choice. Ultimately, then, voluntariness depends upon knowledge, and is impossible without it. Now, invincible ignorance is an inevitable absence of knowledge. Therefore, an act, in so far as it proceeds from invincible ignorance, lacks voluntariness, is not a human act, and is not imputable to the agent. —To illustrate: A good Catholic, wholly inadvertent to the fact that the day is Friday, eats meat. In so far as the act is an act of eating meat, it may be both voluntary and free; but in so far as the act is an act of violation of the law of abstinence, it is neither voluntary nor free. The act of eating meat, *in so far as it is a violation of the law of abstinence*, comes from invincible ignorance, and is therefore not a human act for which the agent is responsible. —A further illustration: A Catholic child uses very evil language, totally unaware that such language is sinful. Later in life, the child realizes the sinfulness of foul speech, and carefully avoids it. The child also begins to worry about the past. Yet such worry is unjustified, for the past evil was committed in invincible ignorance, and therefore it lacked voluntariness, was not a human act, and is not imputable to the child.

SECOND PRINCIPLE: *Vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.*

Vincible ignorance is not an inevitable lack of knowledge. On the contrary, it supposes knowledge in the agent of *his own lack of knowledge* and of *his duty*

of dispelling ignorance. Hence, the agent has knowledge which bears indirectly upon the act which he performs in ignorance, and the act has, in consequence, at least indirect voluntariness, and is a human act imputable to the agent.—To illustrate: A careless Catholic suspects that the day is Friday, but fails, through sheer negligence, to make certain; and he eats meat. Now, while the agent does lack knowledge that the day is Friday, he has knowledge of his own ignorant state of mind and of his obligation to acquire knowledge. Failing to make proper effort to dispel his ignorance, he wills to keep his ignorance. But his ignorance is, in some sense, the cause of his violation of the law of abstinence. Hence, he wills this violation *in cause*. His act has indirect voluntariness, and is a human act for which he is responsible.

THIRD PRINCIPLE: *Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act.*

While vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act, it lessens voluntariness, makes the act less *human*, and diminishes the responsibility of the agent. The agent knows that he is in ignorance, and ought to dispel it, but, none the less, he lacks direct and perfect knowledge of the act itself which is done in ignorance. Hence, his act, while possessing voluntariness, does not possess direct and perfect voluntariness. Voluntariness is, therefore, impaired or *lessened*.

FOURTH PRINCIPLE: *Affected ignorance in one way lessens and in another way increases voluntariness.*

Affected ignorance is that vincible ignorance which is directly willed and positively fostered. Yet, in spite of the bad will which it implies, it is still a lack of knowledge, direct and perfect, and, in so far, it lessens the voluntariness of the act that proceeds from it. On the other hand, affected ignorance, being deliberately fostered to serve as an excuse for sin against a law, shows the strength of the will's determination to persist in such sins. It is thus said to increase the voluntariness of an act, or, more accurately, to indicate an increased voluntariness in the act that comes from it.

b) CONCUPISCENCE

The term *concupiscence* is often used to signify the frailty, or proneness to evil, which is consequent in human nature upon original sin. Ethics does not employ the term in this sense. Here *concupiscence* means those bodily appetites or tendencies which are called *the passions*, and which are enumerated as follows: *love, hatred; joy, grief; desire, aversion or horror; hope, despair; courage or daring, fear; and anger.*

We treat here of the passions in general. In the next section of the present Article we shall study in particular the passion of *fear*.

The passions are called *antecedent* when they spring into action unstimulated by any act of the will ; that is, when they arise antecedently to the will-act. They are called *consequent* when the will, directly or indirectly, stirs them up or fosters them. To illustrate: the feeling of joy that arises upon the suddenly revealed view of a splendid landscape; the anger that surges in resentment of unjust and offensive treatment; the first feeling of the attractiveness of a suddenly presented fancy or thought, good or evil; the leaping desire for revenge for an unexpected act of cruelty; the first feeling of hatred that comes with the thought or sight of a bitter enemy; the shrinking in aversion from an unpleasant task; the urge to "give up" in despair in the face of crowding difficulties—all these are examples of antecedent *concupiscence* or passion. These movements or bodily appetites become *consequent* when they receive the approval of the rational will. Thus, the passion of anger that arises antecedently when one is insulted, becomes consequent when the feeling is deliberately retained. Thus, the first movement of pleasure (*love, joy*) in an unwholesome thought or fancy, becomes consequent when the will consents to retain that thought or fancy.

Antecedent concupiscence is an *act of man*, and not a *human act*. It is therefore a non-voluntary act, and the agent is not responsible for it. Consequent concupiscence, however, is the fault of the agent, for it is *willed*, either directly or indirectly, that is, either *in*

itself or in cause. The agent is, in consequence, responsible for it.

But what of *the acts that come from concupiscence*? We state the ethical principles in the matter :

FIRST PRINCIPLE: *Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act.*

Some ethicians use "voluntariness" to mean will-force, vehemence or intensity of will-act. These assert that concupiscence increases the voluntariness of an act, and they are right, for concupiscence gives a strong urge to action, and the act that comes from it is more vehement and intense by reason of the concupiscence. But we do not use the word *voluntariness* in the sense of will-force, or will-intensity; we use the term to indicate the *human* character of an act, the essence of a *human act*. We keep *human act* and *voluntary act* as synonyms.

We say that antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act that comes from it. Voluntariness depends upon knowledge and freedom. Antecedent concupiscence disturbs the mind and thwarts, more or less completely, the calm judgment of the mind upon the moral qualities of an act; hence it impairs the *knowledge* necessary for perfect voluntariness. Again, antecedent concupiscence is a strong and sudden urge to action, and thus it lessens the full and prompt control which the will must exercise in every perfectly voluntary act; hence it impairs *free-*

dom. Therefore, on the score of both knowledge and freedom, antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act, and, in consequence, diminishes the responsibility of the agent.

SECOND PRINCIPLE: *Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.*

Although knowledge and freedom are lessened by antecedent concupiscence, they are not destroyed; and the agent's responsibility, while diminished, is not cancelled. A man may sin, and sin gravely, even though strongly influenced by antecedent passion. Still, his sin is less grave than it would be if committed dispassionately and, so to speak, "in cold blood." To illustrate: Jones, under the influence of antecedent anger, strikes Smith and injures him seriously. While the voluntariness of this act is lessened by antecedent concupiscence, and while Jones is less responsible than he would be if he struck the blow in cold deliberation, still the act is truly voluntary, and Jones is responsible for it. The reason is that Jones, while upset and disturbed by strong passion, is still master of his acts; he knows what he is doing, and does it freely. Passion may make the control of his acts more or less difficult, but it does not make such control impossible. If the antecedent passion is so great as to make control of the agent's acts impossible, then the agent is temporarily insane, and his acts are not *human acts*, but *acts of man*. Here, how-

ever, we speak only of *human acts* as influenced by antecedent concupiscence.

THIRD PRINCIPLE: *Consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the voluntariness of an act.*

Consequent concupiscence is *willed*, directly or indirectly. Hence the acts that proceed from it have their proper voluntariness, direct or indirect. To illustrate: Jones wishes to be revenged on Morris. He plans the act of revenge. He broods upon his wrongs in order to stir himself up, to nerve himself to action. He attacks Morris and injures him seriously. Here we have direct voluntariness throughout. Jones directly wills the act of revenge, and directly wills the anger as a means to the accomplishment of that act. Now, even if he be insane with rage at the moment of performing the act, he is none the less doing what he directly willed to do, and his concupiscence cannot affect the full voluntariness of that act. Again: Smith broods upon wrongs suffered at the hands of Jenkins. He foresees (or can and should foresee) that if he continues to nurse his anger, he will probably be stirred to acts of violence against the person of Jenkins. Nevertheless he continues to brood. He becomes wild with passion, seeks out Jenkins, and seriously injures him. Here the anger was directly willed, and the act of violence was willed *in cause* with the anger, and *in itself* at the mo-

ment of attack. Even if Smith's passion was so vehement as to overwhelm his rational control of his acts, —even if, that is to say, the attack itself did not proceed from Smith as a *human act*,—it was nevertheless willed *in cause*, and has its proper voluntariness as such: an indirect voluntariness which is in no wise diminished by concupiscence.

c) FEAR

Fear is one of the passions, and is included under the general denotation of the term *concupiscence*, but it is usual to give it special mention in Ethics, because it is a very common passion, and we should know in detail its relation to the morality of acts, and because it has a characteristic distinctive among the passions, viz., that it usually (when it is the *cause* of an act) induces the will to do what it would not do otherwise. We may, however, present the ethical doctrine on the subject of *fear* in very short space.

Fear is the shrinking back of the mind from danger. More accurately, it is the agitation of mind (ranging from slight disturbance to actual panic) brought about by the apprehension of impending evil.

Actions may proceed *from fear* as their cause, or may be done *with fear* as an accompanying circumstance. Thus, a soldier who runs to shelter from a dangerous position acts *from fear*, while his bolder companion who stays at his post may be affected *with*

fear, but it is obviously not this fear that keeps him in the position; on the contrary, he remains in spite of fear.

The ethical principle in this matter is:

PRINCIPLE: *An act done from fear, however great, is simply voluntary, although it is regularly also conditionally involuntary.*

The principle speaks of an act performed from a motive of fear, an act proceeding *from* fear, not an act performed *with* or *in* fear. A person may have full and unconditioned voluntariness in that which is performed *with* fear, as, for example, a thief, full bent upon taking valuables from a house at night, proceeds *with* fear that he may be apprehended; but he does not commit burglary *through* or *from* fear.

An act performed from fear, however great, is simply voluntary. Of course, we speak of a *human* act done from or through fear. If fear is so great as to make the agent momentarily insane, the act done from fear is not voluntary at all, for it is an *act of man* and not a *human act*. But as long as the agent has the use of reason, his acts performed from fear are simply voluntary. For the agent effectively chooses to perform such an act rather than undergo that of which he is afraid: he chooses the act as a lesser evil, and effectively chooses it. But the act is also regularly involuntary inasmuch as the agent would not perform it in other circumstances; were

it not for the presence of an evil feared, the act would not be performed. To illustrate: A man denies his faith to escape torture and death. His denial comes from fear. Hence, according to our principle, the act is simply voluntary, and the man is responsible for the sin of apostasy. Still, since the man would not have denied his faith except for the influence of fear, we discern a conditional involuntariness in his act which renders it less sinful (though it still remains a very grave sin) than it would be were it done in cold deliberation, apart from the influence of fear.

The practical conclusion is this: Fear does not excuse an evil act which springs from it. Fear does present a difficulty, but human acts are not necessarily easy acts. Still, the influence of fear makes an act less perfectly *human* in character, although never to such an extent that the agent is enabled to act humanly and still escape responsibility for his act.

The positive ("statute") law of Church and State usually provides that an act done from grave fear, unjustly suffered, and excited directly in order to force the agent to perform an act that is against his will, is an *invalid act* or one that may be *invalidated*. Even though such an act is simply voluntary, it would not be for the common good to allow an act extorted by fear to stand as valid and binding. Thus, a man who is required to sign a contract at the point of a gun, or under threat of blackmail, would not be bound, in positive law, to fulfil the contract.

d) VIOLENCE

Violence or *coaction* is external force applied by a free cause (i. e., by a cause with free will; by man) for the purpose of compelling a person to perform an act which is against his will. Thus, the martyrs suffered violence when they were dragged to the altars of idols in the effort to make them offer sacrifice to false gods.

Violence cannot reach the will directly. It may force bodily action, but the will is not controlled by the body. Still, the will has the command of bodily action, and since this command is limited or destroyed for the moment by violence, the will is said to be *indirectly* affected by violence. Hence, if the will does not exert its command to make the bodily members offer due resistance to violence, it concurs, in so far as such resistance is lacking, in the act done under violence.

PRINCIPLE: *Acts elicited by the will are not subject to violence; external acts caused by violence, to which due resistance is offered, are in no wise imputable to the agent.*

e) HABIT

By *habit* Ethics understands *operative habit*, which is a lasting readiness and facility, born of frequently repeated acts, for acting in a certain manner. Thus, a man who has always endeavored to speak

the truth, has a *habit* of truthfulness, and it goes against his habit—"against the grain"—to lie. Such a man finds it necessary to make a distinct effort in order to utter a deliberate falsehood. Again, a man who has the habit of lying, finds it very easy to falsify or evade the truth, and it is difficult for him to tell the truth when a lie would prove convenient. Again, a man who has the habit of cursing finds profane words slipping from him with great ease and readiness, while it requires a special watchfulness on his part to avoid uttering them.

PRINCIPLE: *Habit does not destroy voluntariness; and acts from habit are always voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure.*

Habit does not destroy voluntariness. The agent is fully responsible for human acts done from what is called *force of habit*. Even if such acts be in themselves *acts of man*, the habit itself, so long as it is not disowned, and a positive and enduring effort made to overcome it, is willed as a human act, and its effects are voluntary in cause, and hence are human acts. To illustrate: John has the bad habit of using profane language. He is conscious of this fault. Being conscious of it, he has *knowledge* of it; and he is *free* to determine upon overcoming it, or to allow it to endure. Hence, both knowledge and freedom are present, and there is nothing to balk

voluntariness. John is therefore responsible for the bad habit as such, and, since it is the cause of the profane words—many of which are uttered without advertence—he is responsible *in cause* or indirectly for each profane utterance. Now, if John determines to overcome his evil habit, he disowns it; he wills not to utter profane speech. But “He that wills the end wills the means to that end.” Hence, John, to be honest in his will to reform, must consent to ceaseless watchfulness over his tongue. While his good intention endures, and while his watchfulness continues, the profane utterances that “slip out” are *acts of man* and not *human acts*, since their cause is no longer willed; and hence they are not imputable to John. But the moment John ceases to be watchful, that moment he consents indirectly to let the habit continue, and his evil words become again imputable, even if they slip from him unnoticed.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this lengthy Article we have studied the modifiers of human acts, and have endeavored to determine their general influence upon human acts. We have studied the following principles, learning how and why each is valid:

- i. Regarding *ignorance*
 - i. Invincible ignorance destroys the voluntariness of an act.

- ii. Vincible ignorance does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
- iii. Vincible ignorance lessens the voluntariness of an act.
- iv. Affected ignorance in one way lessens the voluntariness and in another way increases it.

2. Regarding *concupiscence*

- i. Antecedent concupiscence lessens the voluntariness of an act.
- ii. Antecedent concupiscence does not destroy the voluntariness of an act.
- iii. Consequent concupiscence, however great, does not lessen the voluntariness of an act.

3. Regarding *fear*

An act done from fear, however great, is simply voluntary, although it is regularly also conditionally involuntary.

4. Regarding *violence*

Acts elicited by the will are not subject to violence; external acts caused by violence, to which due resistance is offered, are in no wise imputable to the agent.

5. Regarding *habit*

Habit does not destroy voluntariness ; and acts from habit are always voluntary, at least in cause, as long as the habit is allowed to endure.

CHAPTER II

THE ENDS OF HUMAN ACTS

A human act is always performed for an *end*. This Chapter discusses ends in general, and the ultimate end of human acts in particular. The Chapter is accordingly divided into the following Articles:

Article 1. Ends in General

Article 2. The Ultimate End of Human Acts

ARTICLE I. ENDS IN GENERAL

a) Definition

b) Classification

a) DEFINITION OF END

An *end* is both a termination and a goal. In other words, an *end* is that which completes or finishes a thing, and it is that for which the thing is finished. A sculptor has reached the end of his work on a statue when the last bit of marble has been chipped away; and he has reached the end in another sense, inasmuch as the finished statue is the goal he set out to attain when he started the work. By an *end* we mean the end of an activity. We do not speak of *end* in the sense of boundary, or edge, or rim, or side of a bodily object, but as *the termination and goal of ac-*

tivity. In the example given, the work of the sculptor, the activity of making the statue (both in itself, and as coming from interior plan and purpose) is the activity considered.

Every activity tends toward an *end*. A tree tends to grow to full stature, maturity, and fruitfulness: and this is the *end* of its activity of growth. A hungry dog seizing a bit of beef evinces an activity of instinct for the meat as a good thing to have, as an *end* to be achieved. Even lifeless things have activities proper to their nature, and these tend toward ends by reason of what we call *natural laws*. Thus, fire tends to burn, bodies tend to fall toward the center of the earth, bodies at rest tend to remain at rest, bodies in motion tend to remain in motion of the same direction and velocity.

Every activity *tends* toward an end; and thus every activity is a *tendency*. Now, every tendency may be called *an appetite*, or more properly, *appetency*. When appetency exists without any sort of knowledge—as in plants and lifeless things—it is called *natural* appetency, in a special limited, and technical sense of the term “natural.” When appetency comes of knowledge, it is of two kinds, just as knowledge itself is of two kinds. Appetency which is stirred into action by *sensation* (i. e., by knowledge acquired by the senses) is called *sense-appetency* or *sensual appetite*. We have an example of such appetency in the hungry dog seizing meat. Appetency

which is stirred into action by *intellectual knowledge* is called *the will* or *rational appetency*. We have an example of such appetency in the act of the sculptor described above. The sculptor knows the statue to be desirable (for one or many reasons: it may bring fame, or money; it may express devotion to art; it may express love of the personage represented, and so on), and he *wills* to make it. We have already learned in our study of Human Acts that the will springs into action only when intellectual knowledge presents something desirable, satisfactory, or simply *good*, to be achieved by action. Every will-act, that is, every human act, is the expression of *rational appetency* or *will*: it is an act directed to an end known as desirable, that is to say, as *good* to attain.

In Ethics we speak of *the ends of human acts*. Here, then, *the end* is that which is apprehended as *good*, as desirable, and which attracts the human agent to the performance of the act. It is the agent's motive and reason for acting. It *causes* the agent to act, and, in so far, the end is the *final cause* of a human act—a cause called *final*, from the Latin word *finis*, which means *end*. The agent is the *efficient cause* of his acts, for it is he that effects or performs them; but he would not effect them were he not attracted by the end or final cause. No human act can exist, therefore, without a final cause, that is to say, without an end apprehended by the agent as de-

sirable or *good* enough to attract the agent to action and to serve as his *motive* in the act.

The end or final cause of human acts must be apprehended as *good*. Evil cannot be willed as such or for its own sake. Evil is done only when it assumes the aspect of *good*, as something that will bring satisfaction or will lead to it. This does not mean that a sinner thinks he is acting virtuously when he commits a sin. On the contrary, he knows that the sin is morally evil and that he is responsible for it. But the point is that the sin to which he consents is apprehended as something that will bring present satisfaction, or will lead to it, and this is judged by the agent as a greater good than that which is required by the moral law which forbids the sin. Notice that it is as a greater *good* that the sin is chosen. Of course, the agent's judgment in the matter is not sound; his sin will not lead to ultimate happiness or satisfaction, but inasmuch as it is a judgment of the sin as *good*, it explains what is meant by the statement that evil is not chosen as such, nor for its own sake, but only when it assumes the aspect of *good*. In our sense, good is that which answers tendency or desire.

To define *end*: An end is a termination and goal of activity. In a human act the end is the *final cause*, viz., that on account of which, or to attain which, the act is performed, and which is, in consequence,

apprehended as a *good* sufficiently desirable to motivate the agent in performing the act.

b) CLASSIFICATION OF ENDS

Here we distinguish:

- i. The *end of the act*, and the *end of the agent*;
- ii. *Proximate* and *remote* ends;
- iii. *Intermediate* and *ultimate* ends.

i. The *end of the act* is the end toward which the act of its own nature tends. Thus, the act of giving food and shelter to destitute persons tends of its nature toward the relief of distress, and we say that the relief of distress is the *end of the act*.—The *end of the agent* is the end which the agent intends to achieve by his act. Thus, the act of giving food and shelter to destitute persons may be performed by the agent to increase his merit before God, or as an act of impetration to obtain a grace or favor, or as an act of penance for sins committed. Again, the agent may perform the act in order to have it noticed by others, so that he may gain the reputation of a beneficent person. Again, the act may be performed by an agent who merely wishes to relieve distress. In the last case, the *end of the agent* coincides with the *end of the act*. In the other cases, the *end of the agent* is different from the *end of the act*. When we speak of *the end* in Ethics, we usually mean the *end of the agent*.

ii. The *proximate* end is the end intended as the

immediate outcome of an act. The *remote end* is that which the agent wishes to achieve later on, and toward the attainment of which he employs the present act as a means. Thus a politician who gives money to the poor, wishes his good deed to be recorded in the newspapers: his *proximate end* is favorable publicity. However, he does not desire publicity for its own sake, but for the votes it will gain him in the coming elections; and he wishes for votes as a means to office. Thus, while publicity is his *proximate end*, votes and election to office are *remote ends*.

iii. An end, whether *proximate* or *remote*, is willed either for its own sake or as a means to an end more remote. If it is willed for its own sake, it is a *last* or *ultimate end*, and if it is willed as a means to a further end, it is an *intermediate end*. To illustrate: A man gives money to the poor. He gives the money to gain favorable notice in the newspapers (*proximate* and *intermediate end*); he wills publicity as a means to votes (*remote* and *intermediate end*); he wills votes as a means to election (*remote* and *intermediate end*); he wills election for the prominence, power, and wealth which the office will give him (*remote* and *ultimate end*). This example shows us a chain or series of ends; and, since the ultimate end of the series is not the general or unconditioned end of the man's whole life and all its human acts, but ultimate only *in relation* to the present series of ends, the ultimate end of the series is called *an end relatively*

ultimate. Now, there must also be an end which is unconditionally and unlimitedly the ultimate end of *all* human acts; and this we call *the absolutely ultimate end*. We shall discuss this end in the next Article. We notice here that it is the *ultimate end* which gives meaning to the *intermediate ends* that lead to it. The intermediate ends are subordinated to the ultimate end, just as the steps of a stairway are subordinated to the top step. And as a man who wishes to reach the top of a stairway must take many intermediate steps before reaching the top, but would not take any of them except to reach the top, so in a series of ends, the agent must attain intermediate ends before achieving the ultimate end, but he would not try to attain any of them except on account of the ultimate end. Thus, we repeat, the ultimate end of a series of ends gives meaning and motive to the whole series.

An ultimate end is both *objective* and *subjective*. The objective ultimate end is that *thing*, that object, which, in last analysis, motivates a human act. The subjective last end is the *possession* of the objective end and the satisfaction or happiness that is apprehended as belonging to that possession. Thus, the politicians's last end (in the series of ends which we studied above) is a political office with its power, prominence, and good wages. This is the *objective* ultimate end. The *subjective* ultimate end which the agent seeks to achieve is the *possession* of the office

and what it will bring. In other words, the *object* sought is office; and the *subjective* desire of the agent (the acting *subject*) is satisfaction in the possession of the office.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this article we have discussed the meaning of *end*, and have described it and defined it. We have seen that an *end* is always the object of appetency, and we have discovered that the rational appetency of man is his *will*. Since the will is necessarily exercised in every human act, it follows that every human act comes from appetency, or tendency toward an end: and thus every human act is performed on account of an *end*. We have called the end of human acts their *final cause*. We have seen that the end of human acts is always sought because it is desirable, satisfactory, or *good*; and that *evil as such* is never the end of human acts.

We have classified the ends of human acts, distinguishing the *end of the act* and the *end of the agent*, the *proximate* and *remote* ends of human acts, and the *intermediate* and *ultimate* ends of such acts. We have indicated the fact that there is *one absolutely ultimate end* of human action. We have distinguished the ultimate end as *objective* and *subjective*.

ARTICLE 2. THE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS

- a) The Objective Ultimate End
- b) The Subjective Ultimate End

The ultimate end of human acts is that which, in the last analysis, serves as a sufficient reason and motive for the acts. This end, considered as an objective thing toward the attainment of which the acts are directed, is the *objective* ultimate end of human acts. The possession of this objective end and the happiness which the agent seeks in that possession, is the *subjective* ultimate end of human acts.

We have seen that a human act is always done on account of *an end*, and an *ultimate* end. We now assert that all human acts are performed for a single *absolutely ultimate* end.

a) THE OBJECTIVE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS

A human act is a deliberate and knowing act; it is an act performed by the knowing agent who wills to perform it. And why does he will to perform it? Because he has a motive, a reason, a final cause sufficiently attractive to induce him to perform it. And this reason, motive, or final cause amounts to this: it appears *good* to the agent to perform the act and attain its end. Even when the human act is difficult or undesirable in itself, it becomes desirable in view of a further end to which it is directed as a means. Thus, a man freely consenting to a serious operation,

wills the operation, and his will-act is a human act. But the operation is not willed for itself, but in view of relief from affliction or in the hope of prolonging life, and in this aspect it is desirable and good, no matter how dangerous and fearsome it may be in itself. Now, it may be that the man who submits to the dangerous operation is a poor man; it may be that the prospect of prolonged life which the operation affords is also the prospect of a hard and even destitute life; it may be that the life to which the patient looks forward is a life inevitably filled with woes and miseries. And yet he *wants* it, he wills it as an end. Why? Because he apprehends life with all its hardships as a *greater good* than the loss of life. Again, the suicide (supposing him sane when he performs his horrible act) destroys life by a human act. He does so because he apprehends the cessation of life as a *greater good* than the continuance of life with its miseries. Thus it clearly appears that human acts are always done for an end apprehended as *good*, and as *the greater good* when there is question of sacrificing one thing in view of another.

More: the driving power back of human acts viewed all together—or, more accurately, the power of attraction that calls human acts into being—is not only the good, or the greater good, but the *greatest* good, the absolutely illimitable, all-inclusive, and all-perfect good. This is the *summum bonum*, which, considered in itself, we call the *absolutely ultimate ob-*

jective end of human acts. It will not be difficult to prove this assertion.

Man seeks *happiness*. Whether he seeks it in riches, in pleasures, in power, in prominence, in honors attained, or even in license and sin, the fact remains that what he is seeking is that which will *please* him, that which will *satisfy* his wants and desires, that, in one word, which will make him *happy*. This quest of happiness is a tendency of man's very nature of which he finds it utterly impossible to free himself. Man is free in his choice of objects in which he hopes to find happiness, and we call this the freedom of the will, or the freedom of choice; but man is not free to seek unhappiness for its own sake. Even the "cantankerous" individual who does mean things in a mean way, and hurts himself in doing them, and, so to speak, cuts off his nose to spite his face, is nevertheless doing what he *wants* to do, and in the achieving of that want he apprehends some *satisfaction*; otherwise, there could be no conceivable motive for the acts, and motive there must be, for the acts exist.

Now, there is an object towards which the whole tendency of human action is ever directed; an object that will satisfy all tendency, fill up all capacity for desire, leave nothing further that can be the end of human acts. And this we call the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts. We may define this end as *that object, the possession of which will give perfect happiness to man by completely filling up his*

capacity for desire, and leaving nothing unpossessed toward which man could, by any possibility, continue to tend as towards an end.

This absolutely ultimate objective end must be one, must be a single object. For consider: this end is so perfect a good that nothing beyond it can be desired. Therefore, it must be the *infinite* good. Nothing finite could meet the requirements of such an end. The greatest happiness thinkable, short of the possession of the infinite good, is imperfect and fleeting. The largest fortune might still be larger; the serenest peace of life must quickly give place to care or be lost in death; the highest honors man may achieve leave other honors still unwon. And over all human achievements, over the bliss of abounding health and the rapture of the presence of loved ones, over fame attained and glory worthily won, over ambition fulfilled and high hope realized—over all that is finite hangs a cloud, a menace, a threat that is certainly to be fulfilled: *all must pass—and soon!* Hence all finite good is imperfect, if only that it will not last always. But it is imperfect also in scope, in extent. A finite thing is, by its very definition, a thing with limits. Can any limited thing satisfy in fullest measure of perfection the unlimited desires of man? No, for these pass all bounds; there is no line that can be drawn to mark the limit of the possibility of desire. Only the *infinite good* can be the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts. And there can

be but *one* infinite object. For an infinite object contains all possible perfection, and there is, so to speak, no perfection left over for another object to possess. Hence we rightly maintain that the absolutely ultimate objective end of human acts is *one*.

Now the infinite good is God. Ethics must leave to the philosophical science of Theodicy (i. e., Natural Theology) the proof of the existence of the one God, infinitely perfect, creator, conservator, and ruler of the universe, the efficient and final cause of all. Ethics assumes the existence and attributes of God as proved. We assert that the infinite good is God; that God is the only object, the possession of which will give perfect happiness to man by completely filling up his capacity for desire, and leaving nothing unpossessed toward which man could, by any possibility, continue to tend as towards an end. Hence we see that St. Augustine enunciated a solid philosophical truth, and not a mere pious sentiment, when he wrote: "O God, Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is not at rest until it rests in Thee."

But, you object, there is such a thing as sin, and such a thing as sinful desire. Does the sinner tend in his human act of sin toward God? Is sinful desire to find perfect fulfillment in the possession of the All-Perfect? Of course, the sinner does not tend towards God, nor is sinful desire as such satisfied with possession of the All-Perfect—to say so would be foulest blasphemy. Yet the sinner, in his human

act of sin, does not exhibit a tendency away from what is *apprehended* as good; on the contrary, the very sin is a tendency toward that which is, through perversion of reason, adjudged as good, as satisfying. The sinner knows that his act is evil; but passion invites, immediate satisfaction is promised, the fleeting pleasure of his act is ready at hand; the true good is not perceived as ready, prompt, present; it is farther off; it presents certain difficulties, not only in the matter of waiting longer for its satisfaction, but also in the effort required to put down the present allurements which draw to sin. And so the matter is *put to the judgment* of the agent; and, judging freely that the present satisfaction outweighs the remote real satisfaction, he sins. Of course the judgment is perverse; but the point here is that the sinner does not tend away from *the good*—and the *ultimate good*—as such, but wrongly judges that the present object is good. And he is responsible for this judgment, and so sin is no mere mistake. Remember that the tendency of the human agent is towards the good, and the infinite good, *in general*; but the agent may make perverse judgments about what is good *in particular*. Psychology clears up this matter in its thesis that “Man is capable of objectively indifferent judgments,” i. e., man can view what is really evil under the aspect of good, and can view what is truly good under the aspect of evil. Thus sin which is foul promises a present pleasure, and *in so far* may

be judged as good; while virtue *inasmuch as it is difficult to acquire*, may be adjudged as evil.

An example will help to clarify the whole matter: Esau, returning hungry from the hunt, and finding himself a long way from home, was able to judge a present dinner as most desirable and good, even though the eating involved the loss of a great and valuable patrimony. He knew the value of his inheritance; he knew that the present dish of paltry food was not to be compared in real value to the smallest part of that inheritance; and still he gave up the patrimony for the food. Why? Because the food was ready, present, alluring, promising satisfaction. By perverse judgment he was able to focus his consideration upon the desirability of that which was present to satisfy bodily appetite, and to turn his mind away from the consideration of the surpassing value of the inheritance that would be his if he denied that appetite. His judgment was wrong, *was perverse*; yet it was his own fault. And so it was no mere mistake for which he was not responsible. He was *fully* responsible, as all will admit. While following the inevitable human tendency towards what is good in general, he perversely allowed his attention to dwell upon the attractiveness of what was offered to please and flatter a bodily appetite, and kept his mind from the consideration of the true attractiveness of what was really good, and thus a perverse and culpable judgment fixed upon that as good which was

relatively evil, and upon that as evil which was really worth while.

Men may set various ends as *ultimate* by perverse judgment. Some look for the ultimate good in wealth, some in honor, some in pleasure, some in the mere adapting of oneself to one's environment; and thus there are many objects set up by personal preference (and by wrong judgment) as the really ultimate end towards which all human action tends or should tend. But in all these objects we perceive that it is their *good* which is attractive, viz., that which is adjudged as good, as satisfying, as ultimately desirable. And hence, while there may be many philosophies of life, many theories about what is the best thing towards which man should bend his efforts, there is, none the less, no disagreement in point of fact: man inevitably tends towards the *illimitable good*. And in itself, as we have seen, this object is God. When men do not live in accordance with reason, they are perverse; and perversely they set up false gods. Scripture is philosophical and scientific when it declares that those who live for the pleasure of fleshly appetites have made a *god* of their belly.

To sum up: The objective ultimate end of human acts is that which really in itself is the crowning and perfect fulfillment of rational desire; it is the limitless good; it is God. Towards good *in general* all human action, even sinful human action, tends. But action is sinful by reason of man's abuse of free

will; and sinful action is possible because man may freely focus his attention upon the desirability of that which satisfies minor or inordinate appetites, to the exclusion of that which is supremely desirable and infinitely good in itself.

b) THE SUBJECTIVE ULTIMATE END OF HUMAN ACTS

We have learned that the subjective end of an act consists in the possession of the objective end. The name *subjective* is given to this end to indicate its possession by a *subject*, that is, by the person who has it or strives to have it.

The absolutely ultimate end of human acts, considered in itself or *objectively*, is the limitless good. The absolutely ultimate end of human acts, considered with reference to the person who strives to possess it (that is, considered with reference to its *subject*), is *the perfect happiness* which consists in the possession of the limitless good. In a word, the absolutely ultimate subjective end of human acts is *happiness*.

In considering the objective end of human acts we found it necessary to speak much of happiness. We saw that man acts for happiness in acting for the limitless good which is the objective ultimate end of human action. Here we are to consider happiness more directly, and to discuss the kinds of happiness, the nature of desire for happiness, and the manner in which happiness is to be possessed. But first we must face an obvious difficulty.

The difficulty is this: man, acting in a *human* manner, is seldom conscious of the fact that he is acting for happiness. The upright man acts virtuously, the sinner acts viciously, the ordinary man lives his ordinary life, without thinking directly of happiness as an end to be attained. How is it possible then to say that man always acts for happiness? We must recall our distinction, made in an earlier chapter, between an *actual* and a *virtual* intention. An actual intention is an intention elicited here and now with direct consciousness of that which is intended. Happiness is seldom the object of such an intention; a man seldom, if ever, says to himself: "In this action I intend to achieve happiness." But a man always acts for happiness, at least by a *virtual* intention. A virtual intention is an intention which exists in an act performed *in virtue of* a formerly elicited actual intention. We have seen that man always tends towards *the good* in general; and his connatural bent of will for the good involves a virtual intention for that good. And as the possession of good means happiness, we conclude that man acts for happiness by a virtual intention. But, it may be said, this sort of virtual intention does not exist by reason of an actual intention formerly elicited. It does, if we consider that an actual intention may be *implicit* as well as *explicit*. A man who shoots at a rabbit does not, in order to have an actual intention, require a moment's pause in which to elicit the will-act of actual intention; he

may not be aware of his intention as an intention; he simply does what he wants to do; he simply raises his gun and fires; but we say, and rightly, that his actual intention is *implied* in his action. And similarly we declare that a man, in his more serious and deliberate actions of life, makes up his mind to do what he adverts to as best, and here, at least *implicitly*, we have an actual intention to act for good (objective end) and for the possession of the good (subjective end, i. e., *happiness*). Then, in the less thoughtful acts of life, the *virtue* of this implicit actual intention endures, and a man's acts are, in consequence, performed for happiness.

Now we must consider: i. Kinds of happiness; ii. The nature of man's desire for happiness; iii. The manner in which happiness is to be possessed.

i. *Kinds of Happiness*.—Happiness is *natural* when it comes of man's possession of that which he finds achievable by his unaided natural powers, or which is not beyond the reach of his nature. Thus, a man's happiness in the possession of sound health is *natural happiness*. Happiness is *supernatural* when it consists in the possession of that which is of a value surpassing all that natural powers can achieve unaided. Thus, man's happiness in possessing the grace of God is *supernatural*. Now, man tends toward the limitless good, and since this is infinite,—and hence beyond man's finite powers,—man tends to-

ward something which is beyond the reach of unaided nature. Man tends towards supernatural, eternal happiness. The appetite of man's very nature is for the supernatural. Still, this tendency and appetite for the supernatural is only indicated in Ethics. As a purely rational science, independent of divine revelation, Ethics cannot investigate the matter of supernatural happiness, nor describe the manner in which it is to be attained. But this science can and does show that man's tendency is to the limitless good, the infinite good, and we know that natural powers can achieve only limited things. Yet, to confine our study within its proper limits, we must consider the limitless good, and happiness in its possession only *in so far as this is achievable by natural powers*, that is, by the perfect natural life, by a life which fully agrees with the dictates of right reason.

ii. *The Nature of Man's Desire for Happiness.*—Man's desire for limitless good, and consequently for perfect happiness, is not illusory; it is not a deceitful and vain desire. It is a desire capable of fulfillment; it is *realizable*. We may, with St. Thomas, reason to this conclusion in the following manner: Nature does nothing in vain. Now, nature has implanted in man the desire for perfect happiness. Therefore, this desire is not vain; in other words, this desire is realizable.—Again, Ethics may prove the same truth by assuming as demonstrated the facts which are scientifically evidenced in the science of Theodicy. Now,

Theodicy proves that there is one God, the Creator, who is all-wise, and all-good. But an all-wise Creator could not implant in His rational creature a fine and worthy desire that cannot be realized; else the all-wise God would be the author of a futility. Nor could the all-good God mock man by causing him inevitably to desire the unattainable. Hence, we conclude that man's desire for perfect happiness is not illusory, but is realizable in very fact. We cannot assert that each man will actually attain to perfect happiness; we only declare the scientific truth that each man may attain that happiness. Certainly, this perfect happiness is not attainable in this world here and now; then—since its attainment has been shown possible—it must be attainable in another world hereafter.

iii. *The Manner in which Happiness is to be Possessed.*—Man's absolutely ultimate subjective end is the *act* of perfect happiness. Powers or faculties are that by which action is accomplished; the *act* is the crowning fact, the perfection of the faculty. Now, how is the act of happiness to be exercised? Man has the following faculties: the senses, intellect, will. The senses are not man's highest faculties, but serve the intellect during bodily life. All knowledge begins somehow in sensation (i. e., in the act of the senses) for man in bodily life; but sensation is not, in itself, essential to intellectual knowledge as such. Obviously, perfect happiness, as an act, is the act of man's highest and best faculties. Hence, the essential act of happi-

ness (which, of course, will eventually and in proper measure include the satisfaction of the senses) is not an act of sensation. Nor is it an act of will: for the will either tends towards an end (and then the end is *not yet* attained) or, by *fruition*, delights in the end (and then the end is *already* attained). The act of attainment, the act of happiness, is, in consequence, neither a sense-act nor a will-act. It remains that it must be an act of intellect. But here again we must consider a twofold act of intellect: the intellect either knows a thing to do (practical intellect) and this must be knowledge that *leads to* an end to be achieved; or the intellect knows a thing to hold in contemplation (speculative intellect). This latter act is the crowning perfection of man's highest faculty of knowledge. We assert, then, that the ultimate act of perfect happiness is an act of the speculative intellect, it is an act of contemplation of the limitless good; and this act of the intellect will be accompanied by the delight of the will, and by the perfect satisfaction of the senses according to their proper place, order, and capacity.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

We have seen in this article that man acts for the attainment of an absolutely ultimate end, and that this end is, objectively, the infinite good or God, and, subjectively, the possession of the limitless good, the

possession of God, and that the act of possession is an act of perfect happiness. We have established the truth that man, in every human act, acts for perfect happiness, by at least a virtual intention.

We have defined two kinds of happiness, have seen that man's desire for perfect happiness is not a futile, vain, illusory desire, but is realizable in fact by an act of the speculative intellect accompanied by the act of full fruition on the part of the will, and by fullness of sense-satisfaction in so far as the senses can have a part in the attainment of man's end.

CHAPTER III

THE NORMS OF HUMAN ACTS

Let us view man as a traveler standing at a point where many roads converge. The traveler wishes to reach the City of Limitless Good. This city is the goal toward which the traveler tends by a connatural and inevitable bent of his will. Now, the tendency of the traveler will remain the same, even if he should choose a wrong road. In other words, man, the traveler, will choose a road for the purpose of reaching the City of Limitless Good, even if, as a fact, the chosen road leads away from his goal. It is obvious, then, that the traveler needs guidance; he needs direction, lest perverse and mistaken judgment thwart his purpose and render impossible the attainment of his goal. In a word, the traveler needs a map. More: he requires ability to read the map, and to interpret it rightly where the road seems to fork or byways open invitingly. Now, the map, the guiding direction, is supplied to man, the traveler, by *law*; and the application of law in individual acts—the reading and interpreting of the map at particular curves and corners—is achieved by *conscience*. Human acts are directed to their true end by law, and law is applied by conscience. Hence *law* and *conscience* are the directives or norms of human acts. The present Chapter treats of these matters in two articles, as follows:

Article 1. Law

Article 2. Conscience

ARTICLE I. LAW

a) Definition b) Classification c) Important Classes

a) DEFINITION OF LAW

St. Thomas defines *law* as *an ordinance of reason, promulgated for the common good by one who has charge of a society*. To explain this definition in detail:

i. A law is *an ordinance*, i. e., an active and authoritative ordering or directing of human acts in reference to an end to be attained by them.

ii. A law is an ordinance *of reason*, and not an arbitrary or whimsical decree of the legislator's *will*. A law does, of course, come from the will of the lawgiver, but from his *reasonable will*, that is, from his will illumined by understanding of an end necessary or useful to be attained, toward which the law serves as a proper direction. Hence, law must be *reasonable*, and this means that it must be *just, honest* (not contravening a higher law), *possible of fulfillment* (not exacting undue or extraordinary effort on the part of those bound by it), *useful*, and in some degree *permanent* (not a fleeting or whimsical decree). To be reasonable, to be a *true law*, a law must have all the qualities here enumerated. Besides it must be *promulgated*, that is, made known to those who are bound by it. Hence, the essential qualities of a true

law are these : it must be just, honest, possible, useful, relatively permanent, and promulgated.

iii. A law is *promulgated*, i. e., made known to those bound by it, and these are called its *subjects*. This is a requirement of law *as reasonable*, as already explained. By promulgation a law is put in application as an authoritative ordinance.

iv. A law is promulgated *for the common good*. This is the purpose of law. In this point a law is distinguished from a *precept*, which is an ordinance issued by public or private authority for the particular or private good of one or several persons. A law also differs from a precept in the fact that a law is *territorial* and applies to subjects only while they are in a certain place ; while a precept is *personal* and binds its subjects wherever they may be. Again, a law is always enacted by public authority, while a precept may be issued by either public or private authority. Finally, a law endures in force until it is repealed by the authority that enacted it, even though the actual persons who framed it be dead or removed from office ; but a precept ceases to bind with the preceptor's death or removal from office. To illustrate all this : A mother forbids her little child to accept money from adults. Here we have a precept, not a law. It is *personal*, not territorial, and binds the child wherever he may be. It is *private*, since it is for the

individual good of the child and a part of his individual training. It is binding, unless revoked by the mother, as long as the child remains under the mother's direction in such matters, or until the mother's death, in case she dies before the child comes of age. Now, on the other hand, the civil ordinance forbidding the hunting of game at certain seasons is a law, and not a precept in the strict technical sense of the word. It is *territorial* not personal, and binds its subjects only while they are in the place in which the law applies, and not when they go into another territory where a different law in the matter prevails. Further, the law in question is for the common good; it is *public*, not private, and is meant to insure the opportunity of finding game to all citizens, and to maintain a supply of game as common property. Finally, the law binds its subjects until it is repealed by the public authority that enacted it, even though the actual legislators who passed the law be dead or have passed from office.

A law, then, is for the common or public good. This is the purpose of law. Law is not meant to impose hardship or needless restriction upon its subjects, but to promote their good, and hence to protect and promote true liberty among them. When a law is truly a law, that is to say, when it has all the requisite qualities of law, and is just, honest, possible, useful, relatively permanent, and duly promulgated—then it

inevitably acts as a liberating agency and not as an enslaving one. True law tends to make men good, and tends to liberate them from the perverse and mistaken judgments that would lead them astray in the quest for their ultimate end. The man who accepts the direction of true law is the man who is free to attain his goal, just as the man who accepts direction when seeking the road to a city he wishes to reach is the man who is really free to go to that city. He who refuses direction—although he refuses, as he thinks, in the name of freedom—is enslaved by his own liability to error. Such a man is like a traveler who says, "I wish to go to a certain city, but you must not tell me how to get there; I refuse to be enslaved by maps; I maintain my freedom to try all the roads in the world." We should not consider such a traveler reasonable. We should not regard as very favorable his prospect of reaching the desired city. We should not esteem his idea of liberty as anything short of an absurdity. The purpose of law, therefore, is to protect and promote true freedom among members of a society in common, by insuring the unhampered and unthwarted exercises of free acts which will carry man forward to his proper end.

v. A law is promulgated *in a society*. This is evident from the fact that law is for the *common* good, and hence supposes a commonality or *community* of sub-

jects ; and a community is a society. Law in the fullest sense can exist only in a *perfect* society, for such a society alone has the full and perfect right to legislate (i. e., full *jurisdiction*) for all subjects. Now, the supreme and perfect society in the natural order is called *the State* (that is, a body of people politically united under one government), and the supreme and perfect society in the supernatural order is *the true Church*. In the fullest sense, therefore, human laws can come only from Church or State.

vi. A law is promulgated by *one who has charge of a society*. By "one" is meant *a person*, whether this be a single human being (*physical person*) or a body of men united to form the governing power (*moral person*). Here we have indicated *the author* of law, that is, the *lawgiver* or *legislator*. A legislator has *jurisdiction*, which means, literally, "the saying of what is right." One who has the just authority of "saying what is right" in a community is empowered to enact and promulgate true laws. Almighty God is the Supreme Lawgiver, and properly constituted human legislation has its power and authority, directly or indirectly, from God.—The author of law enacts laws as ordinances of reason, and hence he must have a direct care and concern about their observance. To insure observance the author of the law establishes *sanctions* for law, i. e., inducements (rewards and punishments) sufficiently strong to lead reasonable men to follow the prescriptions of the law.

b) CLASSIFICATION OF LAWS

i. According to their immediate author, laws are distinguished as *divine laws*, which come directly from God (such as the Ten Commandments), and *human laws*, which are the enactments of Church or State. Human laws enacted by the Church are called *ecclesiastical laws*, while human laws enacted by the State are called *civil laws*.

ii. According to their duration, laws are *temporal* or *eternal*. The Eternal Law is God's plan and providence for the universe. We shall speak of this law in detail in the next section of this Article. All human laws are in themselves *temporal*, although some of them give expression to requirements of the Eternal Law.

iii. According to the manner of their promulgation, laws are distinguished as *the natural law* and *positive laws*. The natural law, in widest sense, is that which directs creatures to their end in accordance with their nature, and, so understood, it coincides with the Eternal Law. Usually, however, the laws that govern irrational creatures in their being and activities are called *physical laws*, while the moral law which is apprehended by sound and matured human reason is called *the natural law*. In this restricted sense we shall understand the term, *the natural law*; and we shall define it as the Eternal Law as apprehended by human reason. *Positive laws* are laws enacted by positive act of a legislator, and these fall under the classi-

fiction already made as *divine* and *human*. Thus, the Ten Commandments are divine positive laws, and the laws of Church and State are human positive laws.

iv. According as they prescribe an act or forbid it, laws are *affirmative* or *negative*. Negative laws are also called *prohibitory laws*. Affirmative laws bind *always, but not at every moment*. Thus, the Commandment of hearing Mass on certain days binds only on those days, and the requirement of this law may be satisfied at any hour at which Mass is offered. The law binds *always* (that is, it remains constantly in effect) but *not at every moment* (that is, its subjects are not required to perform continuously, and without intermission the act which it prescribes). On the other hand, negative laws of the natural order bind *always and at every moment*. Thus, the law, "Thou shalt not kill," remains continuously in force, and must be obeyed at every moment without exception and in all circumstances.

v. According to the effect of their violation, laws are distinguished as *moral* (violation of which is fault or sin), *penal* (violation of which renders the violator liable to an established penalty, but does not infect him with sin), and *mixed* (violation of which involves both fault and penalty).

c) IMPORTANT CLASSES OF LAWS

Here we are to consider: i. The Eternal Law; ii. The Natural Law; iii. Human Positive Law. The

discussion of Divine Positive Law belongs to Theology and not to Ethics.

i. *The Eternal Law* is God's eternal plan and providence for the universe. God, decreeing from eternity to create the world for an end (which is Himself), eternally plans and directs all things toward that end. Thus there is from eternity a "plan of Divine Wisdom as director of all acts and movements"—and this is *The Eternal Law*. St. Augustine defines the Eternal Law as *the Divine Reason and Will commanding that the natural order of things be preserved and forbidding that it be disturbed*. The Eternal Law extends to all acts and movements in the universe. Thus, bodies obey the tendencies of their nature and follow the laws of cohesion, gravity, inertia, etc.; plants grow; animals follow the guidance of instinct; the earth turns upon its axis; the heavenly spheres swing through their mighty orbits; all in accordance with the Eternal Law, powerless to reject its influence or to disobey. Of all bodily creation, man alone may refuse the direction of the Eternal Law *in matters of free choice*. For the Eternal Law applies to all creatures and directs them in a manner consonant with their nature; and man's nature, in its rational part, is *free*. As a bodily being man acts in accordance with physical laws; so he does also in those animal and vegetal functions which are proper to his nature but not under the control of his

will. But in matters that lie under man's free control—in a word, in human acts—man may be perverse and disobedient, refusing the direction of the Eternal Law as known to him by his reason. Thus, the Eternal Law governs all things except human acts *by necessity*, that is, allowing the things governed no choice in the matter; the same Eternal Law directs human acts by *suasion*.

ii. *The Natural Law* is the Eternal Law as known to man by his reason. It is, in some sense, man's participation in the Eternal Law. Man knows *naturally*, by the light of his understanding, that there are some things evil in themselves, and some things which are necessarily good. Thus, man knows that lies and murder are evil; and he knows that truthfulness and respect for life and property are good. In a word, man inevitably recognizes an *order* in things. That which is in line with this order is good, and that which is out of line with it is evil. But man has more than an unconditioned knowledge of things as good and evil: he has the knowledge of good as a thing *to be done*, and of evil as a thing *to be avoided*; for man's reason shows him the natural order as a thing to be conserved and not disturbed. Hence by his rational *nature*, man is aware of a general law: "Conserve the natural order," or, in other words, "Do good and avoid evil." This is the fundamental expression of *the natural law*. Now, the natural order of

things is the order established by the Eternal Law. Hence, the natural law, which commands the conserving of the natural order, is a law unchanging and unchangeable. Even in its subjective aspect (i. e., viewed from the standpoint of its subjects), the natural law presents itself to our understanding as unchangeable, for it is a direction to guide men to their proper ultimate end, and all men at all times and in all circumstances have the same nature and the same ultimate end; therefore, the direction toward that end must be constant and unchanging. No man of sound and mature reason can be invincibly ignorant of the natural law in its general principles and obvious applications: that is, every sane adult must know that good is to be done and evil avoided, and must recognize the obviously good things as good and evident evils as evil. However, the exact nature of certain duties, and the manner in which certain duties are to be performed, is sometimes derived from the natural law by an involved process of reasoning; such duties are *remote* derivations of the natural law; it is therefore possible that untaught or savage men may be ignorant of them, and *invincibly* ignorant.—The natural law has its proper *sanction*. To deny this fact would be to deny the wisdom of the lawgiver; for surely the legislator who frames a law wants the law fulfilled, else it is an absurdity; and a *sanction* fitted to the nature of the law and of its subjects is the one means of giving the law force. The author

of the natural law is God, the All-Wise. Hence, *a priori*, we conclude that the natural law has its sanction. This sanction consists in the peace and happiness consequent upon the observance of the natural law, and in the remorse and unhappiness which follow its violation. Though the sanction of the natural law is necessarily imperfect in this life, it is perfect in the life to come, and consists primarily in the final achievement or loss of man's ultimate end—God, the *Summum Bonum*, and endless happiness.

iii. *Human Positive Law* is law enacted by Church or State. When such a law is truly law—that is to say, when it is just, honest, possible, useful, and duly promulgated—it derives its binding force from the natural law, and so ultimately from the Eternal Law, from God. We may define a human positive law as *an ordinance of reason, derived from the natural law, or making a concrete and determinate application of the natural law, promulgated for the common good by a human agency in charge of a society*. That such a law derives from the natural law is easy to see, for the natural law requires the observance of the natural order; and the obviously requisite order for life in society is the observance, by all members of society, of just laws. Hence, the natural order itself requires the observance of laws. But what of unjust laws? What of laws that contravene laws of a higher order? What of civil laws that conflict with ecclesi-

astical laws? Where there is injustice, there is no law : justice is an essential quality of true law. Again, laws which contravene other laws of a higher order are not honest; and honesty is an essential quality of true law, and without it the so-called law is no law at all. Finally, where laws of Church and State clash, there is injustice on the one side or the other; and, in case of dispute, presumption favors the higher, the supernatural community, i. e., the Church. Human positive law, when it is truly law, binds the conscience of its subjects, for it is rooted in the natural law, and remotely in the Eternal Law of God Himself.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined *law*, and have explained every word of the definition. Thus we have learned much of the *nature* of law, its essential *qualities*, its points of distinction from *precept*, its *purpose*, its *relation to liberty*, its *author*, the field of its application, or *society*, and its *sanction*.

We have classified laws, and have given special study to the Eternal Law, the Natural Law, and Human Positive Law.

ARTICLE 2. CONSCIENCE

- a) Definition
- b) States of Conscience
- c) Forming One's Conscience

a) DEFINITION OF CONSCIENCE

Conscience is the practical judgment of reason

upon an individual act as good and to be performed, or as evil and to be avoided.

i. It is a *judgment of reason*, that is, it is a *reasoned conclusion*. Although the term *conscience* is also used to designate the *act of reasoning out the right and wrong of a situation* before choosing what to do, it is more properly employed, as in our definition, to signify the judgment which is the conclusion of that act of reasoning. Now, an act of reasoning requires a *principle*, or *set of principles*, from which the process of reasoning proceeds. By *principles* we mean *things known with certainty* with which we may compare new facts or proposed actions and so discover new truths—new applications of the principles. Thus, before we can reason out the truth that the angles of a triangle are equal to 180° , we must have a grasp of certain *mathematical principles*: we must know, for instance, that when parallels are cut by a transversal, the alternate interior angles are equal, and that opposite angles are equal. Knowing these facts, we can proceed to the proof of the theorem in question. These facts are *principles*, that is, starting-points whence one may reason to further truths or to individual application of the original known data. Similarly, in matters of right and wrong, we must have *moral principles* to start with. We acquire these principles,—many of them,—in early life, and when we have a workable grasp of them, we become responsible for our conduct, we cease to be infants, and

we are said to have "come to the use of reason." Now, this acquired equipment of moral principles is called *synteresis*. Synteresis is the starting-point of the reasoning process which ends in the judgment of *conscience*. This reasoning process may proceed so smoothly and swiftly that we are not aware of it as a reasoning process at all; indeed, this is ordinarily the case. Still, the process is always a fact, if only an implicit fact. Thus, when we are confronted with a possible course of action, we compare it mentally with our moral principles, and conclude that it is good and hence to be done (or at least permitted), or evil and hence to be avoided. For example: suppose I am face to face with a difficulty from which I might extricate myself by a clever and fictitious explanation of my conduct. My moral reasoning goes on as follows:

Lies are never allowed (principle from synteresis);
 The explanation which suggests itself to me is a lie;
 Therefore, this explanation *is not allowed* (judgment of *conscience*).

ii. Conscience is a *practical* judgment. This means that it has reference to something *to be done*, i. e., either the performance or the omission of an act. The reasoning process always ends in a judgment, but not always in a practical judgment. When, for instance, one concludes the proof of the theorem which states that the angles of a triangle equal 180° , one expresses

that conclusion in a judgment; this judgment, however, does not indicate a course of action (*practical* judgment), but enriches knowledge by the addition of a newly recognized truth (*speculative* judgment). It is obvious that conscience is a practical judgment. It is a judgment that commands, forbids, allows, or advises, according as it declares an individual act obligatory, prohibited, permissible, or prudent. It is a judgment which says: "Do this!" "Avoid that!" "You may do this!" "It would be well to do that!" In a word, conscience is a *dictate*.

iii. Conscience is a judgment *upon an individual act*, here and now, in these present circumstances, to be performed or omitted. It is also a judgment upon an individual act after it has been performed or omitted. But it is always an individual judgment upon an individual act; it is not a general moral judgment or principle (for such judgments belong to synderesis), but it is the reasoned judgment, drawn from a general principle and an individual act; it applies the general moral principle in individual action. *Before* action, conscience judges an act as good and to be performed (i. e., as something obligatory, advisable, or permissible), or as evil and to be omitted. *After* action, conscience is a judgment of approval or disapproval.

b) STATES OF CONSCIENCE

i. When conscience is a judgment in accordance with fact, that is, when it judges as good that which

is really good, and as evil that which is really evil, then it is *correct* or *true*. Strictly speaking, there is a distinction between correct conscience and true conscience, but for practical purposes the terms may be regarded as synonymous. Conscience that is not true is *erroneous*. Conscience that is erroneous without the knowledge or fault of the agent, is called *invincibly erroneous* or *inculpably erroneous*, while conscience that is erroneous through the agent's fault, is *culpably erroneous*.

ii. When conscience is an altogether firm and assured judgment, in which the agent has no fear whatever of being in error, it is called *certain conscience*. Conscience, when certain, must be obeyed, whether it be correct or invincibly erroneous. For reason demands that we obey law as manifested with certainty by the intellect, and the dictate of certain conscience is such a manifestation, even though the conscience be invincibly erroneous.—Conscience that is not certain, i. e., that is hesitant, that is a judgment in which the agent is aware of the possibility of error, is called *doubtful* or *dubious conscience*. The agent whose conscience is dubious is said to be *in doubt*. If the doubt concerns the existence or applicability of a law or moral principle, it is called *speculative*; but if the doubt concerns the lawfulness of an individual act to be performed or omitted, it is a *practical* doubt. Now, it is never permissible to act while in the state of practical doubt. Such doubt must be resolved, must

be dispelled and replaced by certitude, before action can be good. To act while in the state of practical doubt about the good or evil of an action, is to "take a chance" of the action being evil, and in so far to approve of the action even as evil; but reason requires that evil be positively avoided. When conscience is doubtful, but grounded upon solid reasons, it is called *probable conscience*, and the agent is said to have a *probable opinion*. We shall discuss the matter of probability (the doctrine of which is called *probabilism*) in the next section of the present Article.

c) FORMING ONE'S CONSCIENCE

To "form" one's conscience is to get rid of doubt and achieve certainty; it is to make up one's mind clearly and definitely on what is required in a given individual instance; it is to reason out the right and wrong of a given situation.

Now, it is not always possible to have *absolute* certitude (i. e., certitude so perfect as to exclude even the *possibility* of error) in matters of conscience. But it is always possible, directly or indirectly, to achieve *moral* certitude, i. e., such certitude as excludes all prudent doubt. Moral certitude is sufficient and requisite for the guidance of the conscience-judgment when there is question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act here and now to be determined upon. One may never act in a practical doubt, but must banish the doubt and achieve moral certitude.

How is this to be done? Either *directly*, by studying the act itself and its moral determinants and so gaining a clear knowledge of its moral quality as good or evil, or, when such study is not feasible or is found fruitless, *indirectly*, by applying the reflex moral principle: *A doubtful law does not bind*. To illustrate:

i. John finds among the effects of his deceased father a valuable set of books which, on the testimony of various receipts for payment, were bought upon the installment plan from a publishing company which is no longer in existence. From records available to John it appears that his father died owing the publishing company one hundred dollars. John asks himself: "May I keep the books and do nothing about the matter of payment, or must I give one hundred dollars to pious causes so that I shall not remain in unjust possession of that which does not belong to me?" Here is the situation, the doubt. John attempts to solve the matter *directly* by investigation. He knows that his father was a strictly honest man, that he paid his bills promptly as they fell due. Could he have paid the bill, and mislaid the receipts? Hardly, for he was as careful to preserve receipts as to pay his bills. Could the bill have been paid and no receipts rendered by the publishing company? Not likely, for John's father was not the man to make continued remittances and receive no official recognition of payment. John makes inquiries about the publishing company, and learns that it failed through mismanagement;

that much money was paid into its offices and left unaccounted for, and that many of its outstanding dues were not received. The doubt remains. On the one hand, John has the incomplete record which seems to indicate his father's indebtedness. On the other hand, the character of John's father, and the fact that he never made mention of this indebtedness, seem to indicate that the bill was paid. Evidently, then, the matter is not to be composed by direct study and investigation. Then, and only then, is John free to apply the reflex principle: *A doubtful law does not bind*. Notice that the law here is found by diligent inquiry to be doubtful—not, indeed, in itself, but in application. Thus, John may say: "I have made due inquiry, and my doubt remains. The law which requires me to give to every man his due is here of doubtful application, and, in that sense, a doubtful law. Now, a doubtful law does not bind. Hence, I am not bound to pay out one hundred dollars, but may remain in justified possession of the books." Thus does John banish doubt and achieve moral certitude.

ii. Jones has a valuable hunting-dog which so annoys the neighbors by baying at night that several of them have threatened to poison it. Smith, a neighbor of Jones, is annoyed by the dog, but has no intention whatever of killing it. Smith puts poisoned food about his stables for the purpose of killing rats. Later, Jones finds his dog dead, accuses Smith of poisoning it, and demands payment. In a law-suit,

Smith is vindicated, but he is an altogether upright man and wishes to do no injustice by taking advantage of a court decision. He is in a state of doubt. On the one hand, it is altogether possible that the dog came to grief by eating the poisoned food which he had placed for rats. On the other hand, it is quite as possible that some other distraught neighbor directly poisoned the animal. Studying over the question brings Smith no nearer to its solution; and, of course, it would be futile to inquire among the neighbors about the real cause of the dog's death, since none of them offered any evidence when Smith was under trial. The doubt remaining insoluble or *invincible*, it becomes permissible for Smith to apply the reflex principle: *A doubtful law does not bind*, and so, with moral certitude, to decide that he is free from obligation towards Jones.

It is possible, then, to achieve moral certitude in one of two ways: i. by direct study and investigation which clears away doubt and gives certain knowledge, or, *this failing*; ii. by application of the reflex principle: *A doubtful law does not bind*.

Now, it may be asked, when is a law *doubtful*? A law is doubtful when there is a solid and prudent reason for uncertainty as to its existence or applicability in a given case. And such reasonable uncertainty may arise either from the fact that there is no discoverable reason *for* the existence or applicability of a law, or from the fact that there is an actual and positive

reason *against* the existence or applicability of a law. When a law is doubtful, then its dubious state is due to the existence of a *solidly probable reason*, which, negatively or positively, makes for uncertainty in the matter of the law's existence or applicability. Now a solidly probable reason is a reason that would be regarded as sound and sufficient by a good and prudent man; in complex matters, we should require such a reason as would meet the approval of a good, prudent, and *learned* man. One who relies upon such a reason is said to have a *probable opinion*. Out of this situation emerges a doctrine for forming one's conscience, —a doctrine called *Probabilism*. Probabilism teaches that when there is mere question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness of an act, a solidly probable reason favoring its lawfulness suffices for moral certainty and renders the act permissible. The reasoning upon which Probabilism is based may be set forth as follows:

A doubtful law does not bind;

But a law against which a solidly probable reason militates is a doubtful law :

Therefore, a law against which a solidly probable reason militates does not bind.

Probabilism is of great use in dispelling doubt and forming one's conscience, but its use is best limited to matters of business and to the field of human

positive law. In the more abstract questions of morals there is grave danger of applying Probabilism too quickly and without proper justification. It must always be remembered that Probabilism is deduced from a *reflex* moral principle which has no place in the legitimate formation of conscience unless the *direct* method (of positive study and investigation of the actual situation) proves impossible or fruitless in the matter of dispelling doubt.

There is one case in which Probabilism cannot be made to serve at all, viz., in the case of *a certain end absolutely to be achieved*. Thus, even when there is a solidly probable reason that a convert to the Catholic faith has been validly baptized, the sacrament will be administered conditionally upon his reception into the Church. For Baptism is *absolutely* necessary to salvation, and *probability* has no service to render in the matter, since *certainty* is directly achievable.

Let the student consider the following cases and judge where Probabilism may serve :

i. A physician has a *sure* remedy for a certain disease. He has also a second remedy which, he has very strong reasons for believing, will effect a cure more rapidly, and with less discomfort to the patient, than the first. May he use the second remedy ?

ii. Pasteur found his anti-toxin for hydrophobia most effective when used on animals. No other remedy for the dread disease was known. A child that

had been bitten by a mad dog was brought to Pasteur. Could he administer the anti-toxin, although it had never before been used in the treatment of a human being?

iii. A nurse knows that a certain physician—a skillful and capable man—has once, through hurry and the mistake of a lay attendant, caused the death of a patient by administering a lethal drug. She doubts whether she is obliged to declare the matter and have the physician dismissed from the hospital staff. She realizes that the death of the patient was a most unfortunate accident, and that the physician will most probably be very careful to avoid such accidents in future. Still, the man destroyed a human life, and perhaps the persons who employ him should be made aware of the fact. How is the doubt to be resolved?

iv. A tenant doubts whether he has paid his rent for a certain month. His landlord, a careless man in his accounts, is also in doubt. Must the tenant pay the rent? If he decides to do so, may the landlord accept it?

v. A hunter sights an animal far off among the trees. He feels sure that it is a deer; still he realizes that it is possible that the animal may be a horse or cow belonging to a farmer of the neighborhood. May he fire? May he fire even if he is willing to pay handsomely in case of error?

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined conscience and have explained every phrase of the definition. We have distinguished conscience from synderesis, and have explained it as a practical judgment, distinguishing it on this score from speculative judgment.

We have studied the states of conscience, and have learned what is meant by a true or correct conscience, an erroneous conscience, an invincibly erroneous conscience, a certain conscience, a doubtful or dubious conscience, and a probable conscience.

We have discussed what is meant by "forming one's conscience," and have discovered the situation in which it is lawful to apply the reflex principle that a doubtful law does not bind. We have studied Probabilism.

We may sum up the principles explained in the Article as follows :

1. A certain conscience is to be obeyed, even when invincibly erroneous.
2. It is never lawful to act while in practical doubt ; moral certainty must be acquired.
3. Only when direct means are unavailable, or fail to lead to certainty, may one employ the reflex principle that a doubtful law does not bind.
4. In question of the lawfulness or unlawfulness

of an act to be performed or omitted—direct certainty being unachievable, and the reflex principle being employed—one may follow any *solidly probable* reason (opinion), even to the neglect of a *more probable* one.

5. One may not follow a probable opinion, even a *most* probable opinion, when there is question of a definite end to be achieved, and sure means to its achievement exist.

CHAPTER IV

THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTS

This Chapter deals with the good and evil (i. e., the *morality*) of human acts, explains the nature of morality, and studies the criterion or norm by which the morality of acts is known. It then establishes the *determinants* of morality, i. e., the points of contact which human acts have with their measure or norm and according to which the acts are known as good or evil.

The Chapter is accordingly divided into two Articles, as follows:

Article 1. Morality and its Norm

Article 2. The Determinants of Morality

ARTICLE I. MORALITY AND ITS NORM

a) Description b) Norm c) Definition d) Division

a) DESCRIPTION OF MORALITY

Morality is that quality of human acts which leads us to call some of them *good* and some *evil*.

Now why do we call anything good or evil? We have already seen the answer to this question, but we must here recall and enlarge our knowledge of the matter.

A thing is good inasmuch as it can answer a tendency, appetite, desire. In other words, it is good

inasmuch as it serves as an *end* of such tendency. Thus, I call my coat a "good coat" if it furnishes me what I *want* in a coat, viz., warmth, style, fit, good cloth, good tailoring, etc. I call my automobile good if it does what can be reasonably *expected of it* in the way of speed, comfortable riding, rich appearance, etc. What I expect of my coat and automobile are the *ends* I wish to achieve by means of the garment or the motor car. Inasmuch as the coat or the car serves any or all of the ends desired, it is *good*; inasmuch as it fails to serve these ends, I say it is *not good*.

Now in the matter of human acts—where *moral* good or evil is the point in question—there is always a last end towards which the action tends. Objectively, this is the Summum Bonum, the Limitless Good, God. Subjectively, the last end of human acts is perfect happiness in the possession of the Summum Bonum. Such being the end of human action, it follows that human acts are *good* inasmuch as they serve to carry the agent on towards the attainment of this end, and not good, or *evil*, inasmuch as they fail to lead towards the last end, or even lead away from it.

b) THE NORM OF MORALITY

In the Article on Law we learned that there is an eternal plan for the ordering or government of all acts and movements in the universe, and that this plan directs things towards their last end. But, as we also learned, man is free and rational; he is not coerced

(in the field of free choice) by the plan, but is meant to recognize it by his reason and freely follow it in all his free or human acts. Human acts which are in harmony with the eternal plan are *good*; those not in harmony with it are *evil*. Now, the eternal plan is *the Eternal Law*, which is the Divine Reason (and Will) expressing itself in the ordering of the universe. Thus human acts are good or evil inasmuch as they agree or conflict with the Divine Reason. Now how is the Divine Reason recognized by man? Obviously by human reason, which pronounces on individual human acts—in a word, by *Conscience*. Hence, the *Eternal Law* (Divine Reason) on the one hand, and *conscience* (human reason) on the other, constitute the *Norm of Morality*. From this it will be seen that we were right when we said that human acts are good or evil inasmuch as they agree or conflict with *the dictates of reason* (divine and human).

The Divine Reason, or the Eternal Law, is the *ultimate* Norm of Morality. But that which serves man immediately in action, that which is available to his *proximate* use, is human reason pronouncing upon the good or evil of individual human acts: in other words, conscience is the proximate Norm of Morality.

Summing the matter up, we say that the Norm of Morality is, remotely and ultimately (but primarily), the Eternal Law; while proximately (but secondarily) it is conscience. In reality, then, there are not two norms but only one; for conscience is the judg-

ment of human reason recognizing and applying the Eternal Law in individual human acts.

c) DEFINITION OF MORALITY

Morality is the relation of human acts to their norm.

Morality is that quality (or property) of a human act whereby it measures up to what it should be as a step towards the objective last end of human action, or fails so to measure up. It consists therefore in the relation existing between human acts and the norm of morality.

The morality of an act, its character as good or evil, is not a mere external denomination or classification; it is not a mere label pasted on arbitrarily. It is something that belongs inevitably to the human act as such, either to the act considered objectively as a deed performed, or to the act considered as characterized by its circumstances, particularly the circumstance called *the end of the agent*.

Some ethicists have placed the essence of the morality of human acts in freedom. This doctrine is false. It is true that a human act is a free act; and, in a true sense, it is a *moral* act (i. e., has morality, is right or wrong, good or evil) because it is free. But freedom does not constitute morality. Morality is the *property* of a free act, that is, it is an inevitably present characteristic of a free act. But it consists formally, as we have said, not in freedom itself, but

in the relation which the act bears toward the norm or measure of what it should be—toward the Norm of Morality.

d) DIVISION OF MORALITY

i. *Material and Formal*.—A human act considered in itself as a deed performed stands in relation to the Norm of Morality as *materially* good or evil. A human act considered as conditioned by the agent's understanding and will, stands in relation to the Norm of Morality as *formally* good or evil. Sometimes the terms *objective* and *subjective* are used respectively for *material* and *formal* in this connection. Thus, a lie is objectively or materially evil: it is a thing that is evil in itself, as a deed done, for it conflicts with the Norm of Morality. But a lie which a person mistakenly deems to be permitted and justified in certain circumstances, is, while materially evil, not subjectively or formally so.

ii. *Intrinsic and Extrinsic*.—Material or objective morality is *intrinsic* when the human act, as a deed performed, stands *by reason of its very nature* in relation to the Norm of Morality as good or evil. Material or objective morality is *extrinsic* when the stand or relation of an act to the Norm of Morality is determined, not by the nature of the act itself, but by the prescription of positive law. Thus, murder is intrinsically evil. Eating meat on Friday is extrinsically evil.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this short Article we have learned much that is of prime importance. We have described morality; we have studied the Norm of Morality; we have defined morality and have explained the force of the definition. We have distinguished the morality of human acts as material and formal (or objective and subjective), and material morality as intrinsic and extrinsic.

ARTICLE 2. THE DETERMINANTS OF MORALITY

a) The Object b) The End c) The Circumstances

Since the morality of human acts consists in their relation to their norm (the measure of what they should be), it becomes necessary to ask, what points of contact exist between human acts and this norm. In other words, it is necessary to understand what phases of the human act may be measured by the norm. These points or phases, when measured by the norm, show the act as measuring up or not measuring up to that norm; in a word, these points *determine* the good or evil of the act. Hence they are called the *determinants* of morality.

Now the human act may be considered in itself as a deed done, i. e., as an *object*, and in its *circumstances*. These, then, are the determinants of the morality of the human act. In studying the act in its circum-

stances, one circumstance stands out as most important, and we give it special consideration apart from all other circumstances of the act: this is the circumstance called *the end of the agent*. Thus we list three determinants of morality, viz., (a) the act itself (i. e., the object); (b) the end of the agent; (c) the circumstances other than the end of the agent.

A human act, to be a morally good act, must be found in agreement with the Norm of Morality on all three points, i. e., it must be good in itself or objectively, in its end, and in its circumstances. A human act is evil if it fails to conform with the Norm of Morality *in any one* of the points or determinants. This is expressed in the ancient axiom: "*Bonum ex integra causa, malum ex quocumque defectu,*" i. e., "A thing to be good must be entirely good; it is vitiated by any defect." We may see the justice of the axiom by a rough analogy: A man to be a healthy man must have *all* organs functioning properly; while he is unwell even if *only one* organ (the heart, for example, or the stomach, or the liver) is diseased or deranged. Similarly, in human acts we find goodness dependent upon the agreement of the acts with the Norm of Morality on the score of *all* determinants; it is not enough that an act be good in itself; it must also be good in its end and in the circumstances that affect it as a moral act. But it is evil if it conflict with the moral law on *any* of the three points.

a) THE OBJECT

By *the object* is meant the human act performed, the deed done. If an act as object (i. e., in itself) is good or evil, we say—as we have learned—that it has objective morality. If an act, considered abstractly, is indifferent (i. e., neither good nor bad), its morality is determined by *the end* for which it is performed and by *the circumstances* which affect it. Now certain actions are in themselves, or objectively, good, and certain others are objectively evil: and this morality is *intrinsic*, i. e., resides in the act independently of positive law prescribing or forbidding the act. This assertion recommends itself at once to the normal mind as a true statement; yet some moralists have denied it. It is therefore necessary to prove briefly that some acts are intrinsically good, and some intrinsically evil.

Now those that deny the intrinsic morality of any human act must admit, as all other men do, that there are certain acts which have always and everywhere been regarded as good, and others which have been universally considered as evil. The acceptance of these acts as respectively good and evil is a fact to be explained. We explain it by stating the doctrine of intrinsic morality: men have always regarded certain acts as good in themselves because, as a matter of fact, they are good; and they have regarded others as intrinsically evil, because they are evil. Our opponents declare that what we call intrinsic morality is

merely the result of long established custom among men, or of special human legislation, or of the arbitrary decision of God's will that some acts are good and some evil. In the inadequacy of these explanations we find the negative proof of our own position. Let us consider the matter in detail.

i. Custom cannot account for the universal acceptance of some acts as good in themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. How did the custom come into being? If as a dictate of right reason, because all people saw that certain things were in line with their rational desires and certain other things opposed to these, then the argument falls to nothing, and is merely an indefinite restatement of the true doctrine that certain acts are perceived by right reason as good and other acts as evil—in a word, that certain acts are perceived as intrinsically good or evil. If the custom did not arise as a dictate of right reason among men, then it arose out of circumstances. Since circumstances can be artificially arranged, it would be possible to get current a movement to change the present moral views of men. It would be possible, for example, to form a society, and to spread its influence generally throughout the human race, for the furtherance of murder and theft as virtuous acts! It would be possible to train men to the state of mind in which they could behold themselves robbed of their possessions not only without resentment, but with positive approval of the theft, and with veneration for the

thieves' as saintly men! It would be possible to have parents generally (always excepting a very few reactionaries) delighted with the ingratitude of their children. It would be possible to have those in authority reward disobedience and punish obedience; to throw the honest man in jail, and to elevate the malefactor as the model citizen. Then we should see men and women standing trial for murders they impiously failed to commit, for degradations to which they failed to sink, for slanders they failed to utter. But, you say, these things are utterly impossible. Then it is utterly impossible that the universal conviction of men concerning the intrinsic good and evil of human acts is a mere outgrowth of custom.

ii. Human legislation cannot account for the universal acceptance of some acts as good in themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. If human *legislation* means *law* in the true sense, then we are back in our own position, for true human law is an ordinance *of reason* in line with the Eternal Law, and it exists because there really are acts good in themselves to be prescribed, and acts evil in themselves to be forbidden. Acts are not good because true law prescribes them; they are prescribed by law because they are good. Nor are acts evil because true law forbids them; the law forbids them because they are evil. Certainly there are some acts (such as hunting out of season, driving at a certain rate of speed, etc.) which are not good or evil in themselves, and which fall under penal laws;

but our question does not concern these. We are merely proving that *some* acts are intrinsically good, and others intrinsically evil; while our opponents deny *all* intrinsic morality of any and every act.—Now, if *legislation* be taken to mean, not a reasonable ordinance, but the whimsical and arbitrary decree of a ruler or ruling body, then legislation may change the whole scheme of morality. A “law” may be passed to-morrow making it imperative for sons to kill their fathers, for servants to rob their masters, for men to curse God, for spouses to be unfaithful; and such a “law” would not only make these crimes imperative, but *virtuous*. Then men, in time, would come to regard these acts of virtue in their true light, and we should find that murder would be everywhere regarded as noble. Fathers would embrace the slayers of their little children; mothers would rejoice in the shame of their daughters; employers would thank Heaven for the favor of dishonest employees! Such an impossible topsy-turvydom could not be created by legislation. Then neither could the existent moral scheme have been so created. If legislation be not guided by reason—which does not *make*, but only *recognizes* good and evil in human acts—then it might just as well and as easily produce the topsy-turvy morality described as the morality we actually acknowledge.

iii. The arbitrary decision of God’s will cannot account for the universal acceptance of some acts as

good in themselves and of other acts as intrinsically evil. God is infinitely perfect; His acts are therefore infinitely right and reasonable. Hence an arbitrary decisions of the Divine Will without reference to the Divine Reason is so impossible as to be absolutely unthinkable. We have learned that God directs all acts and movements in the universe to their last end by the Eternal Law. Now, the Eternal Law is an ordinance of Divine *Reason*, and is put in effect by the Divine Will, not arbitrarily or gratuitously, but precisely because the Divine Reason recognizes it as right and reasonable. We speak of God in weak and inadequate human language, of course, and thus seem to separate the Divine Reason and Will; but as a matter of fact these are not separated, but are identical with the Divine Essence. Thus it follows that all the acts of God are infinitely reasonable; no divine act can be severed from Divine Reason. Thus to assert that God has *unreasonably* decided that certain things shall be good and other things evil, is to enunciate an absurdity.

In view of the truth established—viz., that there is such a thing as intrinsic morality—we are forced to reject many moral theories as false. Among those so rejected we find:

i. *The Theory of Moral Instinct or Moral Sense* (called Moral Intuitionism or Moral Sensualism), which asserts that we discern good and evil by a blind

instinct or by a sense faculty, and not by our understanding. We have seen that we know good and evil by the conscience-judgment, by reason. When we do good or evil as a human act, we *know*, we *understand*, that we are doing good or evil. Therefore, we do not act by blind instinct. Nor is our conscience a sense-judgment. For the relation of acts to the Norm of Morality is an abstract relation, not a material or bodily thing such as the senses require for their object.

ii. *The Theory of Usefulness* (called Utilitarianism), which asserts that what is discerned as useful (to individual men or to human society) is *good*, and what is found harmful is *evil*. It is true that good is ultimately useful, and evil harmful; but the usefulness comes from goodness, not goodness from usefulness; and harmfulness comes from evil, not evil from harmfulness. Certain human acts are, as we have proved, intrinsically good or evil; and hence their usefulness or uselessness can have nothing to do with their nature. Further, the theory of utilitarianism would make the code of morals as changeable as the stock-market rates; for what is useful (in a merely temporal and material sense) is variable and differs for times and persons: but the Norm of Morality, to be a *norm* or law, must be a stable thing. Again, how would the test of usefulness be established? Acts would have to be "tried out" first without any rule at

all to discover which acts might be listed as useful, and hence *good*, and which as harmful, and hence forbidden as *evil*.

To sum up: The *object* of a human act, the act itself as a deed done or to be done, that is, the act *considered as a fact*, has often its own intrinsic morality. Even if the act be in itself indifferent, it may have extrinsic morality, which is still *objective*, that is, as an object, the act may stand in harmony or in disagreement with the prescriptions of positive moral law. Hence, in determining whether any human act is good or evil, we look first to *the object*. The object is the primary *determinant* of morality. If the object be evil, our quest ends there; the act is definitely evil and forbidden; nothing can make it good. But if the act is good as an object, it may still be vitiated by its circumstances, particularly by that circumstance called "the end of the agent." Hence, if we find an act good in itself as an object, we have still to look to *the end of the agent* and to the *other circumstances* before pronouncing it good and permissible as an individual act.

b) THE END OF THE AGENT

By *the end of the agent* we mean that which the agent (doer, performer of an act) intends or wishes to achieve by his act. It is the end he has in view, his purpose, his motive in performing the act.

A human act which is good in itself (i. e., as *object*) may still be evil by reason of the end (of the

agent) for which it is performed. But a human act which is evil in itself cannot be made good by reason of the end for which it is performed. In other words, the influence of *the end of the agent* can be strong enough to swerve an act out of line with reason, but it cannot be strong enough to bring a bad act into line with reason. A daub of black paint will ruin a good picture, but a daub of white paint will not improve a bad picture. Thus, a man who spends money for the relief of poverty, but with the intention of fostering political corruption among his beneficiaries, performs an act which is objectively good—that is, an act good in itself, or good as an object; but the act is evil inasmuch as it is done with a bad purpose—that is, it is evil inasmuch as it is influenced by the end of the agent.

Now the question arises: How far does the influence of the end of the agent extend? Is a good act ruined entirely by a bad end? Is a bad act made worse by a bad end? What if there are several ends, or many, some good, some evil? The answer to these questions may be easily discerned in the following principles:

- i. An objectively good act performed for a good purpose (i. e., a good *end of the agent*) takes on a new goodness from the good end; and if it have several good ends, it takes on a new goodness from each. Thus, a man who gives alms to relieve distress, to honor God, and to do penance, performs an act which has a threefold goodness: objectively, it is an act of

mercy; and in its ends it is an act of religion, and an act of the virtue of penance.

ii. An objectively evil act performed for an evil purpose (i. e., an evil *end of agent*) takes on a new malice or evil from the evil end; and if it have several evil ends, it takes on a new malice from each. Thus, a man who steals money in order to buy liquor with which to get another intoxicated and have him sign an unjust contract, performs an act in which there is a threefold malice or evil objectively, it is an act of injustice; and by reason of the evil ends it is an act of intemperance in cause, and an act of injustice to the signer of the contract.

iii. An act which is objectively good, but done for an evil end, is *entirely evil* if the evil end is the whole motive of the act; likewise the act is *entirely evil* if the evil end is gravely evil (i. e., mortally sinful), even though it is not the whole motive of the act; but the act is only *partially evil* if the evil end is neither gravely evil (i. e., is not mortally sinful) nor the whole motive of the act. Thus, to give money to a poor man in order to wean him away from the true faith, is an act entirely evil. Likewise, to assist in extinguishing a destructive fire with the purpose of stealing valuable property from the burning building, is an entirely evil act. But to give alms to the poor for the purpose of relieving distress and with the added intention of gaining a little prominence as a

beneficent person, is an act partially good and partially (but not gravely) evil.

iv. An objectively evil act can never become good by reason of a good end. The primary determinant of morality is the object, the act itself. If an act in itself is evil, it *is* and *remains* evil in spite of every circumstance. *The end does not justify the means*. The end does *specify* the means: that is, supposing a choice of different means *all of which are good*, the nature of the end in view will determine which of the available good means is to be chosen as most suitable or practicable. But there is no end, however good, that can justify an evil means, however slightly evil. Thus we see that there is nothing but folly in expressions like the following that too often fall from the lips of thinking men (perhaps even from the lips of graduates of Catholic colleges): "It's all in one's intention;" "I do not look at the matter as you do; I do not consider it wrong; therefore it is not wrong for me;" "There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so."

v. An act which is indifferent objectively becomes good if done for a good end, and evil if done for an evil end. Thus, to sing in order to praise God, or to please one's guests, or even to charm one's own ears, is a good act. But to sing in order to annoy a person who desires quiet is an evil act, being an offense against charity.

c) THE CIRCUMSTANCES

Circumstances are conditions that affect an act—and may affect it morally—although they do not belong to the essence of the act as such. In other words, circumstances are conditions without which the act could exist, but which happen to affect or qualify it in its concrete performance. Examples of circumstance are place, time, company, etc., in which an act is performed.

We enumerate seven circumstances. These are usually set forth in the mnemonic Latin line: *Quis, quid, ubi, quibus auxiliis, cur, quomodo, quando?* Which may be freely translated as follows:

Who, what, where, with what ally,
In what condition, when, and why?

To explain these circumstances in detail:

WHO? Circumstance of person. Who is the agent? To whom is the action done? John strikes a man; the act is evil; but it takes on an added evil, and here a *new* evil, for the person struck is John's father.

WHAT? Circumstance of quantity or quality of the object (i. e., the act). What is the extent of the act? Was the injury inflicted serious or slight? Was the amount stolen large or small?

WHERE? Circumstance of place. A theft committed in the presence of the Blessed Sacrament is theft plus sacrilege, the latter evil coming from the circumstance of place.

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WITH WHAT ALLY? Circumstance of means or instrument. (This "ally" does not mean "companion," for the latter circumstance is that of person.) A sin of drunkenness committed through the expenditure of stolen money takes on an added evil from the circumstance of means, i. e., *stolen* money.

IN WHAT CONDITION? How? Circumstance of manner. Was the agent in good faith or bad? Was the agent's evil disposition intensely malicious or only slightly so?

WHEN? Circumstance of time. Did the agent miss Mass on Sunday, or on a day when he was not obliged to attend? How long did the agent retain an evil thought or intention, for a long period or momentarily?

WHY? Circumstance of *end of the agent*. This circumstance has already been discussed in detail.

Some circumstances merely increase or diminish the good or evil of the object (i. e., act as such). Other circumstances add to the act a new good or evil, differing in nature or species from that of the act. Thus, the circumstance of time in the case of an evil intention long entertained merely increases the evil, merely makes the act worse, but leaves it unaltered, or rather, with no new kind of evil added. Robbing a church, however, adds to the evil of theft the new evil of sacrilege, thus changing the nature of the evil act from a simple to a complex one. The

circumstances which merely increase or diminish the moral quality of an act, leaving it in the same species or nature, are called *circumstances which make the act better or worse*. The circumstances that add a specifically new moral character to the act are called *circumstances that change the nature of the act*.

The ethical principles involved in the matter of circumstances as determinants of morality are the following:

i. An indifferent act becomes good or evil by reason of its circumstances. That is to say, an act which is indifferent in itself as object, takes its moral quality from its circumstances. Thus, to eat meat is an act in itself indifferent. But to eat meat on a day of abstinence is evil; and the evil comes from the circumstance of time.

ii. A good act may become evil by reason of circumstances. Thus, to pray to God is a good act objectively. But to pray to God for misfortune to befall an enemy is an evil act by reason of *the end of the agent*—a circumstance already fully considered. Further it involves evil from the circumstance of person, for such a prayer is an insult to the All-Perfect God.

iii. A good or evil act (objectively) may become better or worse by reason of circumstances, and may even take on specifically new goodness or malice from its circumstances. This matter has been treated in the paragraph on *circumstances which make the act*

better or worse, and circumstances that change the nature of the act.

iv. An evil act can never be made good by circumstances.

v. A circumstance which is gravely evil (mortally sinful) destroys the entire goodness of an objectively good act. Thus, to do charity with stolen money is evil by reason of the circumstance of means or instrument.

vi. A circumstance which is evil, but not gravely so (not mortally sinful), does not entirely destroy the goodness of an objectively good act. Thus, to pray carelessly and lazily does not entirely destroy the goodness of the act of prayer, although the full goodness of the act is injured by the circumstance of manner.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have learned what is meant by the *determinants* of morality, and we have found these to be *the object* and *the circumstances* of the human act. Of the circumstances we distinguished *the end of the agent* as a matter of special importance to be studied in detail.

We asserted the existence of objective morality, and showed that many acts have intrinsic morality—that they are good or evil in themselves as such. In this phase of our study we perceived that the moral

schemes called Utilitarianism and Moral Sensualism are utterly inadequate, nay, insane. We found, too, that the theory which traces morality to the absolute and gratuitous decree of the Divine Will, without reference to the Divine Reason, involves an essential contradiction.

In our study of *the end of the agent* as a determinant of morality the following principles came to light:

i. A good act done for a good end takes on an added or a new goodness from the end, and from each good end that influences the act.

ii. A bad act done for an evil end takes on an added or a new malice from the end, and from each evil end that influences the act.

iii. A good act done for an evil end is wholly evil if the end is the complete motive for the act or if the end, while only a partial motive, is gravely evil. A good act done for an end slightly evil and not the whole motive of the act, is only partially vitiated.

iv. An evil act can never become good by reason of a good end.

v. An indifferent act is good if done for a good end, evil if for an evil end.

We have studied the influence of circumstance upon the morality of human acts, discerning the following principles in the matter:

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i. An indifferent act becomes good or evil by reason of its circumstances.

ii. A good act may become evil by reason of circumstances.

iii. An act may become better or worse, or may take on a new goodness or evil by reason of circumstances.

iv. An evil act can never be made good by circumstances.

v. A gravely evil circumstance entirely vitiates a good act.

vi. A slightly evil circumstance does not entirely vitiate a good act.

CHAPTER V

THE PROPERTIES AND THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS

A *property* or *attribute* of a thing is a quality, characteristic, or capacity, which belongs by natural necessity to the thing, yet forms no essential part, no constituent element, of the thing as such. Thus, the Church has the property or attribute of infallibility. The Church being what it is by nature—an institution divinely commissioned to teach all men of all times the truths that lead to salvation—must of necessity be infallible, must be free from the possibility of teaching men error in the truths that pertain to salvation. Else the Church would be an anomaly and a contradiction in itself; it would be face to face with the possibility of destroying itself and of falsifying its nature. Hence, while infallibility is not a constituent element of the Church, it is something necessarily consequent upon its nature; and thus we call infallibility a property or attribute of the Church.

This Chapter deals with the attributes or *properties* of human acts, that is, with the things that belong by natural necessity to human acts without forming an essential part or constituent element of the acts as such. We enumerate as such properties: *imputability*, *merit*, and *demerit*.

Further, the Chapter considers the human act in its consequences as touching the doer of the act, that is, in its effect upon the agent. For a human act once performed “lends a kind of easiness” to a repetition of itself. In other words, human acts tend to form *habits of acting* in the agent.

Since the human act, as an individual deed done, always has its morality as good or evil, the habit-forming tendency of human acts will be in the direction of good or evil. Good moral habits are called *virtues*, evil moral habits are called *vices*.

The Chapter deals with imputability, merit, demerit, virtues, and vices, in two Articles, as follows:

Article 1. The Properties of Human Acts

Article 2. The Consequences of Human Acts

ARTICLE I. THE PROPERTIES OF HUMAN ACTS

a) Imputability

b) Merit and Demerit

a) THE IMPUTABILITY OF HUMAN ACTS

A human act is, by definition, both knowing and free. It proceeds entirely from a knowing and free agent, from a rational being. Thus it *belongs* to the agent; it is *his* act. This is what is meant by saying that a human act is *imputable* to its agent, or that a human act has the property of *imputability*.

Now, as we have seen, every human act has its morality; every human act, either objectively or in its end or circumstances, is, as an individual deed done, a *good* or an *evil* act. Hence it follows that, when an act is imputed to the agent, it is imputed to him as good or evil. Thus imputability involves the notion of praiseworthiness or culpability.

Human acts are imputable, and hence the agent is responsible, accountable, *answerable* for them. He is answerable for them as *good* or *evil*, that is, he is answerable for them on the score of their morality,

and, logically, his answer must be made to Him who imposes the Norm of Morality. Imputability, therefore, means the accountability that man must bear for his human acts before Almighty God.

God has established an Eternal Law for his creatures, an eternal ordinance of the Divine Reason to direct and guide all things to their proper last end, which is Himself, His own external glory. All bodily creatures except man are *necessitated* by this law ; but within the field of application of the Eternal Law there is a special place for God's *free* creatures ; and here man, while obligated by the Law, is not *forced* or *necessitated*. Now man has reason, and very early in life he acquires an equipment of reasoned moral principles which are really *recognitions* of the Eternal Law, and these his conscience applies in individual acts, so that he knows his obligation in evident moral matters even when he disregards it. By these acts, then, man must stand ; he cannot disclaim them ; they are his. And so we say that for every human act man stands liable to answer at the bar of Reason—of human reason (conscience) here, and of Divine Reason (God) hereafter. This, in fine, is the doctrine of the imputability of human acts.

The *extent* of imputability has, of necessity, been treated as a matter pertinent to the very nature of human acts. The student is referred in particular to Chapter I, Article 2, b.

b) THE MERIT AND DEMERIT OF HUMAN ACTS

The dictionary defines *merit* as the quality, state, or fact of deserving well or ill. We may divide this definition, and describe *merit* as the quality, state, or fact of deserving well; and we may describe *demerit* as the quality, state, or fact of deserving ill.

Nor is merit (or demerit) only a "quality, state, or fact" of human acts. It is a *property* of such acts, since it belongs to them by natural necessity. For human acts being what they are—free, knowing, imputable—it follows that good human acts "deserve well," while evil human acts "deserve ill" at the hands of the Ruler of human acts. The Ruler of human acts is God. In the field of free choice God rules men by suasion, not by force; and His rule is the Norm of Morality, that is Divine Reason (the Eternal Law) and human reason (conscience). Thus, as the obedient subject of a true law deserves well of the lawgiver, and as the disobedient subject deserves punishment, so the agent of good human acts deserves well of God, the Divine Lawgiver, while the agent of evil human acts deserves punishment. Thus we see that *merit* and *demerit* are really extensions of the property of *imputability* in human acts: for such acts are imputed to their agent as worthy of praise or blame, of reward or punishment. Still, while a man "deserves well" for his good acts, he has in that fact no strict title to reward; nor does the subject

of human law look for a premium from the State for being a good citizen. Something more is required to establish a *claim* to reward. The human act which is good, and which confers a *benefit* upon him from whom reward is looked for, a benefit not already due, and a benefit for the conferring of which it is somehow understood that reward will be forthcoming—such is the human act which establishes a *claim* to reward.

Now, God has established his Eternal Law. He has made *sanctions* for it, i. e., inducements to lead reasonable men to obey its prescriptions, and punishments to deter men from violating them. By this very fact He has given *promise* of reward and *threat* of punishment. Man cannot, indeed, confer a benefit, strictly so-called, upon God, for man cannot give to God anything that is not already His; the most loving and devoted service man can render throughout his life is already owed to God. Still, by our good acts we can honor God, although it were possible, by abuse of free will, to dishonor Him; and thus, in some sense, we can do what is “beneficial” to God, and hence we can establish a sort of “claim” to reward. Certainly, in our bad acts, by denying God what is due Him, we render ourselves liable in strict justice to punishment at His hands. But the real foundation of human merit before God is the perfection of God Himself. God is necessarily true to His promises; and He who

has implanted in the heart of man a quenchless thirst for happiness, will not allow that thirst to exist in vain; that thirst will be satisfied unless man, by evil human acts, rejects God who alone can satisfy it.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this brief Article we have dealt with matters already spoken of passingly throughout the whole of General Ethics. We have singled these out for a short special consideration merely for the sake of completeness in our work.

Here we have learned what is meant by the imputability, merit, and demerit of human acts, and we have seen how these belong to human acts by natural necessity and are therefore *properties* of human acts.

The practical value of our study of this matter lies in the fact that it affords us a clear scientific knowledge of our responsibility for what we deliberately think, do, and say. No longer dare we outrage reason by attempting to shift the responsibility for our acts to others. No longer dare we say, "The others made me do it;" "I couldn't help it;" "You know, it really wasn't my fault that I did this." Now we know, know definitely and scientifically, that we must stand by our human acts! They are *our* acts, not to be disclaimed!

ARTICLE 2. THE CONSEQUENCES OF HUMAN ACTS

a) Virtues

b) Vices

A man does more easily that which he has done before, and the more frequent the repetition of an act, the easier becomes its performance. In a word, human acts tend to form *habits*. Since human acts have morality, the habit of performing any human act will be a moral habit. If it is a good moral habit, it is a *virtue*. If it is an evil moral habit, it is a *vice*. Vice and virtue are not matters of a single human act, nor of an act once or twice repeated, but of an act frequently repeated. Frequent repetition of an act makes the agent strongly inclined towards that act, and in this strong inclination lies the active or operative *habit* of so acting.

Now the word "habit" is only the past participle of the Latin verb *habere*, "to have." Literally, it is "thing had," a thing possessed. It also involves the notion of some *permanence* in the possession. A habit is something that is close to one, that is, so to speak, carried about with one ordinarily, like a uniform dress—and, indeed, a uniform dress is called "a habit." Habits may affect a thing in its substance (*entitative* habit) or in its active powers (*operative* habit). Thus, beauty or fatness is an entitative habit; painting or typewriting is an operative habit. Virtues and vices are operative moral habits.

a) VIRTUES

The word virtue comes from the Latin word *virtus*. This Latin word was military and meant the courage, the bravery of the soldier. The word is itself derived from the noun *vir*, a man. Hence, *virtue* is, quite literally, *manliness*; it is the mark and characteristic of the true and upright man. In Ethics, virtue signifies that habitual manliness and power for good acts which arises from the frequent performance of such acts. It has a special signification, too, and while we speak of virtue in general, as when we mention "a virtuous person," we also speak of *virtues*, using the plural advisedly, and referring to different habits of acting well the special name of different virtues. Thus we speak of the virtues of prudence, justice, etc. Thus, too, we speak of this or that virtue, or of *a* virtue.

A virtue may be *natural* or *supernatural*; it may be *infused* into the soul by God, or *acquired* by repeated acts; it may be a *physical* virtue, an *intellectual* virtue, a *theological* virtue, or a *moral* virtue. Thus, the native disposition one may have for study is a natural virtue; divine Faith is a supernatural virtue; fortitude is an acquired virtue; bodily strength or perfection is a physical virtue; wisdom is an intellectual virtue; faith is a theological virtue; fortitude is a moral virtue. In Ethics we deal only with acquired moral virtues.

An acquired moral virtue is a morally good opera-

tive habit. It is a moral habit of acting in accordance with the dictates of reason.

The chief moral virtues are: prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These are called *cardinal virtues*, and the name derives from the Latin *cardo*, a hinge; for as a door depends for its proper action in opening and closing upon its hinges, so do all moral virtues depend upon the "hinges" of the cardinal virtues. We shall say a word of each of these four virtues.

i. *Prudence* is that virtue of the understanding which enables one quickly and clearly to know, in concrete circumstances, the best means to an end, and it further inclines one to take these means promptly and accurately. Strictly, then, prudence is an intellectual virtue, not a moral (or "will" virtue), but we list it with the moral virtues because it has an immediate connection with the actual willing of the *means to an end* which this virtue enables the understanding to grasp. The marks of prudence, as we may learn from its definition, are a certain watchfulness and clear-sightedness, on the one hand, and cautious promptitude and precision on the other. A prudent man is never precipitate or headlong; he does not embroil or entangle a situation; he is not cock-sure, headstrong, or self-confident. Nor, on the other hand, is he weak, hesitant, or over-cautious. For the Christian, prudence, raised to the supernatural plane by grace, is a thoroughly fundamental virtue. The ancients counselled prudence in their axiom, "Virtue stands in the

middle," that is, virtue does not run to extremes; prudence preserves the "*meson*" or sane balance of Aristotle, and makes human action avoid the evil of falling too short or of overreaching its object; it makes human action *fall just right* according to the norm of right reason.

ii. *Justice* is the virtue which inclines one with constancy always to render to everyone his own. Man has, by his rational nature, a clear knowledge of something *owed* to God, to his country, and to his fellow-men. Justice is the virtue which steadily inclines man to recognize and pay this debt. A just man, therefore, is a religious man, an obedient, peace-loving, kind, grateful, and truthful man.

iii. *Fortitude* is the virtue which inclines one to face dangers with intrepidity, especially such dangers as threaten life. Fortitude, like all virtues, observes the "*meson*" or balance. It is not rashness, over-boldness, or presumptuous love of danger for its own sake or for ostentation; nor, on the other hand, is it supineness or dead submission. It involves a largeness of mind and soul, and combines with these the power of fadeless endurance.

iv. *Temperance* is the virtue which controls one in the pursuit and use of the pleasures of life, especially of those pleasures that attract most strongly, and in which there is a consequent danger of excess and disorder. Temperance keeps the desire and use of sense-pleasures particularly, within the bounds of right and

reasonable action. Temperance, therefore, is not insensibility nor the extinction of natural tendencies. It is the regulation of tendencies, the sane self-mastery which reason (conscience) dictates.

b) VICES

A vice is a morally evil operative habit. A single evil human act is a *sin*. Vice is the habit of sin. We distinguish different vices inasmuch as different habits of sin stand opposed to virtues. For vice is a habitual lack of virtue; and it stands opposed to virtue either by defect or by excess. Virtue stands in the middle, being neither defective nor excessive when measured by the requirements of right reason; while vice lies upon either hand.

To give but a few examples of vice as opposed to the cardinal moral virtues:

Opposed to prudence *by defect* we find, among other vices, imprudence, precipitateness, lack of docility, carelessness, improvidence, etc. Opposed to prudence *by excess*, we find the vices of over-solicitude, smartness, trickery, fraud, etc.

Opposed to justice we find the vices of injustice, irreligion, impiety, irreverence, mendacity, ingratitude, cruelty, etc.

Opposed to fortitude we find weak-spiritedness, inconstancy, impatience, etc., as vices *by defect*; while we find the following as vices *by excess*: presumptuous boldness, stubbornness, insensibility, etc.

Opposed to temperance *by defect* we find pride, lust, anger, gluttony, etc. ; while we find opposed *by excess* the vices of fanatical rigorousness, too great self-effacement of self-abjection, affectation, morose and gloomy conduct, etc.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

This Article has taught us the meaning of *virtue* and *vice*, and has shown us how virtue preserves the sane balance of right reason, while vice sways the scale either to the side of defect or of excess.

The practical value of this present study should be the intellectual recognition of the value of good habits—of virtues. If reason requires man to act rightly, surely the same reason indicates the value of that which will make right action easy, natural, and “a second nature”—and this value is seen in virtues. Conversely, reason discerns the danger of that which makes right action more difficult, viz., vices. Thus, while it is not the first function of Ethics to furnish motives or appeals for upright living, but to give a cold scientific demonstration of what right living is, and merely to say *what* is to be done without explaining *how* it is to be done, still we cannot but take from the study of sound Ethics an urge to upright conduct. As Christians, we take an especial pleasure in finding the scientific exposition of the bases of morality and of the rational nature of good human action.

No student of the science of Ethics, at least no Catholic student, can ever give intelligible utterance to such phrases as, "Oh, that's old-fashioned morality!" "That is a bit of mid-Victorianism!" "People do not look at the matter so in our day!" "When in Rome, one must do as the Romans do!" and so forth.

—END OF GENERAL ETHICS—

PART II

SPECIAL ETHICS

The following sentences should be memorized, for they explain the sequence of this entire *Part*:

1. *Man, as an individual person, has rights and duties which affect and determine his proper conduct with reference to God, to himself, and to his fellowmen.*

2. *Man, as a member of human society, has rights and duties which affect him in the family, in civil, professional, and religious society, and in international relations.*

Notice how the sentences serve as a key to the arrangement of Books and Chapters:

Man, as individual

BOOK FIRST
INDIVIDUAL ETHICS

has rights, duties

Chapter First deals with Rights and Duties in general, defining and dividing them, indicating their attributes, and establishing their proper subject. The Chapter is called, "Rights and Duties."

to God

Chapter Second treats of the nature of religion, of man's obligation of practicing it and fulfilling the duties of internal and external worship. Certain false theories in the matter are refuted. The Chapter is called, "Man's Duty Towards God."

to himself ...

Chapter Third treats of man's duties towards his own soul and body. The Chapter is called, "Man's Personal Office."

to fellowmen.

Chapter Fourth treats of man's duties towards his neighbor. These duties concern the love of neighbor and respect, for his rights of soul, body, good name, and property. The Chapter is called, "Man's Duty Towards His Neighbor."

Man, as member of society.

BOOK SECOND
SOCIAL ETHICS

has duties . . . in family

Chapter First treats briefly of Society in general and then of Domestic Society in particular, defining its nature, purpose, permanence, and authority. The Chapter is called, "The Family."

in civil, professional, and religious society

Chapter Second deals, in separate Articles, with man as a member of the State, of a workman's association or profession, and of the Church. The Chapter is called, "The State, Man's Work, and The Church."

in international relations

Chapter Third treats of the rights and duties of nations, and of peace and war. The Chapter is called "The World-Family of Nations."

This *Part*, viz., Special Ethics, is thus divided into the following Books and Chapters:

BOOK FIRST
INDIVIDUAL ETHICS .

- Chapter I. Rights and Duties
- Chapter II. Man's Duty Towards God
- Chapter III. Man's Personal Office
- Chapter IV. Man's Duty Towards His Neighbor

BOOK SECOND
SOCIAL ETHICS

- Chapter I. The Family
- Chapter II. The State, Man's Work, and The Church
- Chapter III. The World-Family of Nations

BOOK FIRST
INDIVIDUAL ETHICS

CHAPTER I
RIGHTS AND DUTIES

This Chapter discusses the matters of *right* and *duty*, defining and dividing them, indicating their properties, designating their subject, and considering their relation to each other.

The Chapter is divided into two Articles, as follows:

Article 1. Rights

Article 2. Duties

ARTICLE 1. RIGHTS

a) Definition b) Division c) Properties d) Subject

a) DEFINITION OF *RIGHT*

A *right*, considered in general, is *that which is just*, whether this be a just *law*, a just deed, a just debt, or a just claim. Our use of the adjective *right* may show all these senses. Thus, we say that a law, a deed, a debt, or a claim is "right," or, colloquially, "all right," or "just right."

Taking the word *right* as a substantive, we may

view it objectively, or as *a thing*, as when we say, "This is my right;" "That is his right;" "The wise man will see that he gets his rights." In this sense, *right* is defined as *that which is owed* or *that which is due*. Again, we may view the term *right* subjectively, i. e., as residing in the one who possesses it (its *subject*), and thus considered, it is *a moral power residing in a person,—a power which all others are bound to respect—of doing, possessing, or requiring something*. It is in this subjective sense that we use the term *right* in Ethics.

Right is founded upon *law*. For the existence of a right in one person involves an *obligation* in all others of not impeding or violating the right. Now, it is only law that can impose such an obligation. And whether this law, upon which right is based, be the natural law or positive law, it is (as all true law) founded ultimately upon the Eternal Law. Hence, the ultimate basis of right is the Eternal Law.

b) DIVISION OF *RIGHT*

i. Right is *natural* or *positive* according as it is founded upon the natural law or positive law. Again, as positive law is both divine and human, we distinguish *divine right* and *human right*. Further, according to the division of human law, we have *ecclesiastical right* and *civil right*. The right to preserve one's life is a *natural right*; the right of the Church to teach is a *divine right*; the rights established by Canon Law are

ecclesiastical rights; the right of citizens to vote is a *civil* right.

ii. Right is also distinguished as *right of property* (or possession) and *right of jurisdiction*. The right of property is the power one has of disposing of a thing possessed according to one's own wish or benefit: to sell, to keep, to lend, to change, to give away. The right of property is called a right *in* property or possession when goods are actually in hand; while the same right is called a right *to* property or possession when goods are owned, but not in hand. Thus, my right to my books is a right *in* property; while my right to books bought and paid for, but not yet delivered to me, is a right *to* property.—The right of jurisdiction is the lawful power of a duly constituted superior to make laws and to govern his subjects.

iii. Right is *alienable* when its subject (i. e., its possessor) may lawfully cede or renounce it. Thus, I may renounce my right of eating meat on a non-abstinence day; thus, too, I may renounce my right in property by giving it away.—Right is *inalienable* when its subject is not free to renounce, but must retain it. Such is my right to life.

iv. Right is *juridical* (or *perfect*) when it is a legal right, a right strictly enjoined by law, natural or positive. In other words, it is a right which must be respected, allowed, fulfilled, as a matter of strict justice. Thus, the right of my grocer to the amount I owe him is a *perfect* or *juridical* right; so also is the

right of parents to the respect of their children.—Right is *non-juridical* (or *imperfect*, or *moral*, or “*a claim*”) when it is founded on a virtue other than justice. Such a right is very often founded upon the virtue of charity. Thus, the right of a benefactor to gratitude, or the right of a poor man to alms, is an imperfect or moral right, or a claim. The things that are required by *seemliness* or the *fitness of things* are the object of imperfect right. Thus, it is seemly and fitting that we be liberal and kindly in our dealings with others: and we say that others have an imperfect right, a claim, to such conduct on our part.

c) PROPERTIES OF RIGHT

Since right is an *inviolable* moral power by its very definition—for we have defined right as a moral power which *all are bound to respect*—we do not list inviolability as one of the properties of right. Inviolability belongs to the essence of right as such. We list three properties of right, as follows: *coaction*, *limitation*, *collision*.

i. *Coaction* is the power which right enjoys of *forcefully* preventing its violation, and of exacting redress for unjust violation. Ordinarily the moral power called coaction must be exercised through process of law. Between man and man (not between man and society) coaction may be exercised by *personal* force or violence only when all other means have failed.

ii. *Limitation* is the natural terminus of right, beyond which it cannot be exercised without violating the right of another. A right ceases to be a right at the point where it impinges injuriously upon another's right. If I wish to remove my old house and to build a better one in its place, I may not burn my present house, though that would be the easiest way to get rid of old and useless lumber; such an action would endanger the houses of my neighbors, that is, such an action would violate my neighbors' right to the secure and unmenaced possession of their property.

iii. *Collision* is the *apparent* conflict of two rights in such wise that one cannot be exercised without violation of the other. We say it is an "apparent" conflict; for a real conflict of rights cannot exist; when rights collide, the greater prevails and the lesser ceases to be a right. All right is founded on law; all law is an ordinance of reason (when it is strictly and truly law); and there can be no conflict between the ordinances of reason, for "it would not be reasonable for reason to contradict itself." In apparent collision of rights, that is the prevailing right, to which the other cedes (or in face of which the other disappears), which: (1) belongs to the more universal order; or (2) is concerned with the graver matter; or (3) is founded upon the stronger title or claim. Thus, a soldier may place the welfare of his country ahead of his private right to life; thus, the right to life which belongs to a man trespassing on my grounds is a greater

right than my right to privacy, and I may not take his life for the act of trespass; thus, the claim upon my charity possessed by poor relatives is stronger than the claim possessed by other poor persons.

d) THE SUBJECT OF *RIGHT*

By the *subject* of right we mean the person who possesses right.

The subject of right is a *person*. It is not an irrational creature. For right is a *moral power*, and belongs only to those that can exercise moral acts. Therefore brute animals have no rights. Again, we may argue, creatures that have rights have obligations; and no creature can have rights which is incapable of assuming and discharging obligations. But animals have no capacity of assuming or discharging obligations (i. e., *moral* obligations, duties). Therefore, animals have no rights.

What of cruel treatment of animals? Such treatment is immoral, not because it violates any rights that animals may have, but because it outrages reason. Cruelty is not in accord with the dictates of reason. Cruelty to animals does not square with the right and reasonable order of things which reason (and ultimately the moral law) demands. For this reason cruelty to animals is immoral and evil.

What of vivisection? Animals are created to man's use. Now it is a most valuable use of animals to employ them for the furtherance of biological knowl-

edge. Hence, vivisection is not illicit in itself. But to inflict injury or pain upon animals where no necessity or use is served, is not reasonable; nay, it is contrary to reason; and hence is evil.

As to sentiment about animals, especially pet animals, it is to be said that the sane treatment of them, the treatment required by reason, is ordinary care for their needs; and with this may be associated a certain pleasure and amusement in having them about. Two extremes are unreasonable and hence evil: the extreme of cruelty on the one hand, and the extreme of excessive care or consideration for animals, on the other.

The subject of rights, we have said, must be capable of assuming and discharging obligations, i. e., duties. This is true in the order of *creatures*. God, the All-Perfect Creator has perfect rights, but He has no obligations, for He made all creatures and all they have is His: He owes them nothing. But God's rational creatures have rights and duties; and His rational creatures are men and angels. But in Ethics, the science of *human* acts, we consider *man* as the person who is the subject of rights; and, indirectly, we must consider God as the subject of rights when we come to consider man as having *duties* towards God.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

We have learned in this Article the nature of *right*, have studied it subjectively as a moral power residing

in a person, and have seen that its basis is law, and ultimately the Eternal Law.

We have divided rights as natural, positive, divine, human, ecclesiastical, civil; as right of property and right of jurisdiction; as alienable and inalienable; as juridical and non-juridical.

We have studied the properties of right, viz., coercion, limitation, and collision, and have discussed, under the last named subject, the solution of an apparent conflict of rights.

We have expressed and justified the true doctrine of the subject of right, and have seen that this must be a person, and only a person.

ARTICLE 2. DUTIES

- a) Definition b) Division c) Exemption

a) DEFINITION OF *DUTY*

A *duty* considered objectively, i. e., as an object or *thing*, is anything one is obliged to do or to omit. Thus we speak of our daily work as our *duty*. Thus too we say, "It is your duty to do this;" "It is one's duty to avoid evil companionship;" "My duties are very numerous."

Ethics takes the term *duty* subjectively, i. e., as affecting the subject bound by it, and so considered *duty* is defined as *a moral obligation incumbent upon a person of doing or omitting (avoiding) something*.

Duty is a *moral* obligation, i. e., an obligation rest-

ing as a requirement upon a free-will. Hence, the subject of a duty is a person, and only a person. Brute animals do not have duties. We distinguish *moral* obligation from *physical* obligation. A Catholic is morally obliged to assist at Mass on Sundays; he is, however, not bound and carried to Mass by force. A moral obligation binds the will; and, as we saw in General Ethics (Chap. I, Art. 3, d), the will is not subject to physical compulsion.

A duty is the correlative of a right. A right in one imposes a duty on all others of respecting it, of not violating it. Duty, like right, is based on law.

b) DIVISION OF DUTY

i. A duty imposed by the natural law is *natural*; a duty which comes from positive law is *positive*. The duty of worshipping God is a natural duty; as also is the duty of preserving one's life. The latter example shows us that an inalienable right is also a duty. The duty of hearing Mass on certain feast-days is a positive duty, as is the duty of paying taxes.

ii. A duty which requires the performance of an act is *affirmative*; a duty which requires the omission or avoidance of something is *negative*. The primary requirement of the natural law, "Do good; avoid evil" gives us, in a single example, an instance of both positive and negative duty. Again we have the matter exemplified in the Decalogue: "Honor thy father and thy mother" is an affirmative law enjoining an af-

firmative duty; while negative duty is enjoined by the law, "Thou shalt not kill."

iii. A duty which obliges in strict justice, and so corresponds to a perfect right, is a *perfect* or *juridical* duty. A duty which does not obligate according to justice, but according to charity or some other virtue, and so corresponds to a non-juridical right, is a *non-juridical*, an *imperfect*, or a *moral* duty. The obligation of paying to an employee the wage agreed upon is a perfect duty, while the duty of giving alms to the needy is a moral duty.

iv. There are *greater* and *lesser* duties, and where these seem to conflict, the lesser ceases to be a duty, and the greater prevails. That is the greater duty (in an apparent collision) which comes from the higher power, the higher law. Thus duties towards God come before duties towards men, and if a parent forbids his child to hear Mass on Sunday, the duty of obeying parents ceases, in this instance, to bind the child, while the duty towards God prevails. Similarly, if a superior command his subject to steal, the subject has not, in this instance, the duty of obedience, for the duty which comes from the natural law—the duty of justice—prevails. Again: where there is an apparent conflict of duties, that which is concerned with the graver matter prevails, while the other ceases to be a duty. Thus, while one has the duty of giving ordinary care to bodily health and integrity, one ceases to be bound by this duty when the welfare of the soul requires that

the body be exposed to danger and even to death. Thus the martyrs violated no duty in allowing themselves to be killed, even though they might have saved their lives by a single word declaring their apostasy: on the contrary, they were strictly bound not to utter that word: the greater duty prevailed; the lesser disappeared and ceased to be. Finally: when there is an apparent conflict of duties, that duty prevails—the other ceasing to be a duty—which arises out of the more solid title or claim. Thus, obedience to parents is a greater duty than obedience to other elders of the household.—To sum up: In an apparent conflict of duties the greater prevails and the lesser ceases to be a duty; and that is the greater duty which comes from the higher law, or is concerned with the graver matter, or is grounded upon the more solid title or claim.

c) EXEMPTION FROM DUTY

Duty is founded upon law. Now there is an old saying that "Necessity knows no law." What of the value of this saying in moral matters? When there is an imminent evil that cannot be avoided except by a violation of duty, is one exempted from the duty? In other words, does necessity exempt from duty?

We shall presently state principles which answer these questions. But first we must distinguish grades or degrees of necessity, and we must recall a principle enunciated in General Ethics about the binding force of different laws.

There are three degrees of necessity. By necessity, in the present instances, we mean the conflict of a duty and a danger; or, more accurately, we mean the state in which one finds oneself when the performing a duty means enduring an evil. Now, since there are degrees of evil to be endured, there are degrees of necessity. Thus we distinguish *extreme* necessity, *grave* necessity, and *common* or *ordinary* necessity. One is in *extreme* necessity when one's choice lies between duty and death, or between duty and an evil fairly comparable with death. Thus, the Christians taken prisoner by the early persecutors, and faced with the alternative of death or denial of their faith, were in extreme necessity.—One is in *grave* necessity when one's choice lies between duty and a notable evil less than death, such as loss of health, good name, or very valuable property. Thus, a man who will be considered an embezzler unless he secretly and unlawfully employs a fund which he holds in trust for another, is in grave necessity.—One is in *common* or *ordinary* necessity when one's choice lies between duty and the enduring of ordinary evils or common hardships. Thus, a man of sound health who must disregard the Lenten fast or endure some weakness and occasional headaches, is in common or ordinary necessity.

A word now about law. In General Ethics (Chap. III, Art. I, b, iv) we learned that a *negative* law of the natural order binds always and at every moment, i. e., admits of no exception in any circumstances

whatever. We also learned that an *affirmative* law binds always, but not at every moment, i. e., its prescription is to be fulfilled, but not in all circumstances; such fulfillment may, in certain circumstances, be postponed till the adverse circumstances are changed.

We come now to the principles concerning the exempting force of necessity:

i. *Common or ordinary necessity never exempts from duty.* This principle needs no proof. It is evidently true. If it were otherwise, there would be no such thing as duty at all. For duty is obligation, and obligation ordinarily involves some measure of difficulty or self-denial. If common necessity exempted one from duty, one might escape every duty, for it is quite the easiest thing in the world to find a difficulty or an inconvenience in anything one does not feel inclined to do.

ii. *No necessity exempts from a negative natural duty.* A negative natural duty is a duty that comes from a negative law of the natural order. Now, the natural law is, as we have seen, the Eternal Law, inasmuch as this is known to sound human reason. The Eternal Law itself is the ordinance of All-Perfect Reason, and the things forbidden by the All-Perfect Reason are forbidden because this infallible Reason sees that they are evil in themselves. And it is a basic principle of Ethics, a primal demand of reason, that what is intrinsically evil may never, under any circumstances, be lawfully done. Hence if a man is faced

by the alternative of death on the one hand, and blasphemy, slander, murder, or other naturally forbidden evil on the other hand, the man has no lawful choice but to accept death.

iii. *Extreme or grave necessity exempts from a natural affirmative duty, provided there is no involved violation of a negative precept of the natural law.* The affirmative prescriptions of the natural law require definite acts of virtue as means to man's last end. But the achieving of man's end does not require precisely *this* positive act of virtue at *this* exact moment of time or in *these* precise circumstances. Hence, when extreme or grave necessity presses, man may defer the act of virtue until the circumstance of necessity has been changed. Thus, a man is required by the natural law to restore ill-gotten money. But if the original money has been spent and present restitution would mean extreme or grave evil; if, for example, it would mean extreme poverty for the man and his family, loss of social position, and loss of good name, the restitution might be deferred until happier times, or, at least, full payment might be so deferred while the man in question does all that he can to make partial payments and to prepare himself, even at the continuous cost of common hardships and sacrifices, to make restitution in full. If, however, the deferring of restitution would put the *person to whom it is due* in extreme poverty, then the withholding of payment would be itself a violation of the negative law that forbids us to in-

jure others, and in this case restitution, even at the greatest cost, would have to be made.

iv. *Extreme or grave necessity exempts from duty imposed by human positive law, provided there is no involved violation of negative natural law.* This is quite obvious in view of the principle just explained. For certainly that which is sufficient to exempt from a prescription of the natural law, is *a fortiori* sufficient to exempt from human positive law.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have learned the nature of duty. We have defined duty as a moral obligation binding a person to do or to omit something. We have seen that duty is the necessary correlative of right.

We have distinguished duty as natural, positive, affirmative, negative, perfect, and imperfect. We have also considered greater and lesser duties, and have seen that where these come in conflict, the lesser ceases to be a duty. We have noticed the criteria or tests by which one decides, in a conflict of duties, which is the greater.

We have studied the matter of exemption from duty and have vindicated the following principles :

- i. Common necessity never exempts from duty.
- ii. No necessity exempts from a negative natural duty.
- iii. Extreme or grave necessity exempts from af-

firmative natural duty, provided there is no involved violation of negative natural law.

- iv. Extreme or grave necessity exempts from the prescriptions of positive law, provided there is no involved violation of negative natural law.

CHAPTER II

MAN'S DUTY TOWARDS GOD

This Chapter deals with the special duties man owes to God. In a general way, *all* man's duties are owed to God, for all true duties are imposed, directly or indirectly, by God, and their faithful fulfillment leads man to God, his last end. In the present study, however, we treat only of the duties of man that have God as their direct object. Such duties are included in the term religion.

This Chapter deals with *religion*, not only in the abstract, but also as practically accepted and expressed in *worship*. The Chapter is accordingly divided into two Articles, as follows:

Article 1. Religion

Article 2. Worship

ARTICLE I. RELIGION

- a) Definition and Division
- b) Obligation
- c) Relation to Morality

a) DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF *RELIGION*

Religion taken subjectively, i. e., as resident in the person (*subject*) possessing it, is *a moral virtue which inclines the will to give to God the worship which is His due*. Religion taken objectively, i. e., as *a thing* or object, is *the sum-total of truths and laws which establish and regulate man's duties to God*. Thus we see

that religion is divided into *objective* and *subjective religion*.

Ethics is primarily concerned with objective religion. We have already offered our definition of objective religion, but we may add another accepted definition here, a definition that is perhaps more free and practical than the one given above. Religion is thus defined as "A system of truths, laws, and practices, which regulate divine worship."

We see that religion is directly concerned with duties that require the exercise of man's noblest faculties, viz., his intellect and will. Man's *intellect* must assent to the *truths* of religion: to some on account of their clear demonstrability; to others man must assent by faith which is grounded upon the solid basis of credibility. Man's *will* must conform with *laws* which constitute an essential part of religion.

Our little catechism is, in many respects, a very scientific book, and never more so than when it explains the purpose of man's existence by outlining the essence of religion as the knowledge, love, and service of God in view of man's last end, which is God and eternal happiness. Man, by his understanding or intellect, must *know* God and the things of God. By his will he must *love* that God which his intellect knows as all-perfect and hence all-lovable. By all powers of mind and body, under control and command of the will, man must render to God an unfailing *service*.

We have already distinguished religion as *sub-*

jective and objective. Now we distinguish objective religion as *natural* and *supernatural*. Natural religion is the sum-total of religious truths and laws which are known, or can be known, by sound human reason, unaided by divine revelation. Supernatural religion, or *revealed* religion, is the sum-total of truths and laws divinely revealed to regulate man's duties towards God. The two forms of religion are not separate, but supplementary; for revealed religion contains all natural religion and adds to it those truths and laws which man could not discover unaided, even though, after revelation has been made, man finds in such truths an utter reasonableness and a marvellous evidence of God's goodness and providence for his salvation.

b) THE OBLIGATION OF RELIGION

Man is bound to render to God the duty of religion. This truth is a certainty known by man's natural power of reason. For, by the basic precept of justice, "Render to every one his due," it is rationally certain that honor is owed to excellence, obedience is due to superiors, love is exacted by that which is good and lovable, gratitude is to be paid to benefactors. Now, God is perfect excellence; He is the supreme ruler of the universe; He is all-perfect and hence all-lovable; He is the giver of all good gifts. Therefore, the highest honor, obedience, love, and gratitude are owed to God. In other words, it is man's duty to honor, obey, love, and thank God. But this is only saying that it is man's

duty to practise religion. Hence, man is bound to render to God the duty of religion.

All men of all times have recognized the obligation of religion. And even where the religion was a false religion, even where its practices were barbarous, nay, monstrous, there was present to the minds and hearts of the devotees some notion of divinity, some dim groping after the truth about God. This is a fact of human history. Plutarch truly testifies: "No one ever saw a city without gods and temples;" and Cicero declares that "Nature herself teaches us that God is to be venerated; and there is no man free of the law which exacts this." Some men have tried to find evidence for the existence of tribes and peoples who had no knowledge of divinity and were without the sense of obligation to practise religion. Their investigations have amply proved that no tribe ever existed without some knowledge of a higher being to whom the duty of religion is owed. Truly has Cicero said, "No race is so uncultured, no nation so inane, as to have minds unimbued with the notion of God." Hence religion, regarded as a duty owed by man to God, is a *primitive, universal, and constant* fact in all human history. Now the unanimous agreement of all men of all times concerning a matter pertinent to the rational conduct of life is a testimony to truth that cannot be denied. It is the very voice of nature, and if it be false, then there is no certitude achievable by the powers of nature—and there is an end of all human knowledge, of all science,

Man, then, would have no alternative but to lapse into the eternal silence of scepticism. Thus we conclude that man, by a clear requirement of his rational nature, is bound to render to God the duty of religion. Obviously, man is further bound to exercise his rational powers in the discovery of the *true* religion. It is not an act of reason to accept as religion any dim sentiment, any established practice, perhaps a barbaric practice, that expresses some sort of belief in some kind of divinity. But it is reasonable, and a thing *required* by reason, to discover *the actual truths and laws* which do, as a matter of fact, establish and regulate man's duties to God.

Not only must man render to God the duty of religion, but he must regard this duty in its true light as *the most important affair of life*. For man exists to achieve his last end, and religion is the duty which bears him directly to this achievement. Again, man exists as the creature of the all-perfect God, Who is not only his efficient cause, but his final cause: man depends wholly upon God, and exists only to give glory to God. Hence, the duty of religion, which means a practical grasp of the true state of affairs between man and God, is *the* essential duty of every human being.

From the nature, obligation, and importance of religion certain corollaries follow, viz.:

i. Religion is a *duty* to be rendered to God, a *natural debt* of our nature. It is not merely something

to satisfy certain tender sensibilities of spirit; nor is it a mere matter of *utility* for man as contributing to his earthly peace, prosperity, and comfort.

ii. Religion is founded in man's rational nature, which is one and the same in all men; and hence religion is not a relative thing, to be varied for different men and different times; the individual requirements of religion are one and the same for all men of all times.

iii. *Religious indifferentism* is intolerable to sound reason. Indifferentism is the doctrine which asserts that religion is a matter about which man need not be concerned. We hear this doctrine popularly expressed in such remarks, as, "All religions are equally good. Though they contradict one another, what of that? They are all trying to make the world a better place to live in;" and, "Religions are only different roads to the same heaven; some take one, some another; but all tend to the same end." Now, if a man were to adopt any such loose and contradictory theory about the mode of conducting business, his neighbors and fellows in trade would justifiably consider him mad. Suppose an office manager should say: "Well, we have many different systems of book-keeping here in our office; we get crossed up a great deal in our accounts, and have no end of trouble and argument; but what of that? All the clerks are working for the welfare of the house, and so all are working to the same good end!" There is no answer to that remark

except to say that it is inexpressibly silly. But suppose the same man should explain further: "True, our systems are not all proper systems. Some of our clerks like to subtract, some like to add, some to multiply, and, I regret to say, some will be contented only with the more difficult problems of long division. But we do a great deal of figuring among us, one way or another, and so we'll all be sure to come out right in the end." Just such insanity as that is taught by the smug apostles of religious indifference. And more: to say that contradictions in religion do not matter, is to say that lies do not matter. To say that lies do not matter, is to say that it does not matter *that God has lied* in revealing contradictory religions, and *that God is pleased with lies* in tolerating such religions. There is no greater blasphemy than to say, "All religions are equally good." That is only saying, "No religion amounts to much." Sound reason faces a question of *fact* and of *truth* when it looks at life and wrestles with its meaning: it is merely asphyxiating reason and deadening thought to minimize the importance of religion or to make the choice of religion a matter of indifference to man.

We have been talking of the *theory* of indifference. There are many men who *practise* indifference without theorizing about it. Such are those who simply neglect the duty of religion, and show by their lives that they consider it a matter of small moment, a pleasing sentiment perhaps, a thing to be thought of on rainy

Sundays now and then, but not an active issue of daily life.

Both theoretical and practical indifference in religion is a horrible repudiation of man's first and foremost duty; each is a prostitution of human life with its eternal purpose; each is an active and terrible blasphemy against God. We must not acquiesce in the lazy indifference of the man who says: "I do not harm anyone; I pay my debts; I live at peace with my neighbor; that's religion enough for me." We must answer such a man; we must shake him from his lethargy; we must say to him: "You *do* harm someone: you harm God in so far as you can by insulting and blaspheming Him; you harm your neighbor by bad example and by your silly theory of indifference which lulls him to sleep; you do not live at peace with your neighbor, you only laze about as he does; and if that's religion enough for you, God help you!" Again, when we hear the cry that there are so many religions that one may not hope to find the true one, we must answer, "What if the finding of the truth does mean a search? Are you not a man, with a manly eagerness to live your life worthily? Make the search; find the truth! Would you stand perplexed and indifferent at the cross-roads when going to a certain definite town to do a piece of important business? I fancy not! You'd be active enough then! You'd get about and make inquiries; you'd find out *for sure* the road that would take you

to your destination. Well, do that now!" And when we hear that persistent cry of indifference: "It's all a matter of what a man is born to; I follow my father's religion; it was good enough for him, it is good enough for me!"—we must have our answer ready. We may say: "I grant that early training gives a powerful direction to life; but when a man comes to the use of his own reason, he is bound to follow reason. Do you take your politics from the accident of birth? Do you take your historical and scientific knowledge from the accident of birth? If your father had a poor method of business, would you follow it as good enough for you?" Then, finally, comes the question, "Must every man analyze his own religion; must every man inquire into the truth of what he has learned to believe?" The answer is: "No, if he is sure he is right. But if he has sound reason for doubting the truth of his religion, he must dispel that doubt and achieve certainty. And surely the religious indifferentist has every reason to doubt his position, for it is an utterly unreasonable one." Indifferentism is the insane refuge of the person who has no time for God. It is very often the by-product of a feverish pursuit of unworthy ideals. Hence it is rife among persons who live for business, for a career, for success, for their health's sake (and there are thousands who do just that!), for bodily perfection, for social prominence, for pleasure, for comfort, or even for sin.

c) THE RELATION OF RELIGION TO MORALITY

There can be no morality without religion. Morality consists in the relation which exists between free human acts on the one hand, and the Eternal Law, Divine Reason, God Himself, on the other. Hence, morality itself is religious; its norm is the line within which man must keep to make his actions carry him towards his last end; and this last end is God. Now, if we take away God, the line or norm of human acts is removed. But to take away religion is to take away God; at least it is to remove God from definite relation to human acts, and that is the destruction of morality.

Conversely, there can be no religion without morality. For if there is no morality, there is no right and wrong; if there is no right and wrong, there is no duty and no neglect or refusal of duty; if there is no duty, there is no duty of religion.

Thus we see that religion and morality stand or fall together; they are perfectly and essentially correlated.

Now, some philosophers have put forward the theory that there can be morality without God. They speak of this as *independent morality* or *lay morality*. But not only is independent morality impossible; it is a contradiction in terms and in fact, for it destroys morality while giving itself the name. For, as we have repeatedly seen, morality, or moral duty, arises from a bond which necessarily exists between human acts and the end which these are to achieve, viz., God. This bond is not made by man, but by God, who has estab-

lished the necessary relations between human acts and the last end. Man's reason avails him in the *discovery* of the last end and of the bond which holds him to its achievement; but human reason does not *create* either the end or the bond, nor can human reason *change* these. Hence, moral duty *depends* upon God and to speak of *independent* morality is to speak absurdly; it is like speaking of non-moral morality. And thus the theory of independent morality keeps the name of morality while it destroys the essence of morality.

In one of Mr. H. G. Wells' novels the somewhat inhuman hero puts forward the theory that there is no God, no hereafter, and hence no morality. Still, this interesting gentleman has a code of action. He declares that one must not be a cad. We presume, then, that one must be a gentleman. One must preserve the appearance of what is called ordinary decency. This, again, is independent morality. The answer to the rules of this code, viz., one must not be a cad, one must be a gentleman, one must be decent, etc., is simply, "Why?" and "Who says so?" If there are human tendencies towards decency of conduct, there must be some measure which determines what decency is. In General Ethics (Chap. IV, Art. 2, a.) we saw that mere custom or human law cannot be such a measure. What is the measure? It simply does not exist, once true morality has been ruled out of existence. And suppose one should accept the Wellsian ethic, what then? One might violate the code, one might be a cad; and what

would come of it? Thus, we perceive that independent morality has no *sanction* for whatever baseless prescriptions it may make to rule men's actions. Independent morality is impotent to enforce its code. Now, true morality, and true morality alone, has a sufficient and efficacious *sanction*, a sanction established by the all-knowing God who reads men's minds and hearts as well as their exterior actions, a sanction sufficient to restrain cupidity and to sustain the afflicted, a sanction which consists in the eternal possession of the supreme good, or, alternatively, in its loss and eternal misery.

Independent morality would upset the social order. Take God away, destroy objective morality, and what is left but self-seeking and egoism? In a self-seeking and egoistic society all bonds would be down, morality would be a mere name, society would become a warring mass of men acting upon the principle of "Every man for himself, and the devil take the hindmost!" A wise philosopher has written, "Experience shows, history testifies, that, when God is removed (by denial, theoretical or practical), the family is destroyed, and the State falls in ruins because of crimes committed, particularly by youths." In these days of unbelief—days of practical independent morality, which means no morality—we find that the family is indeed being destroyed by infidelity and by the prevalence of divorce, while the peace of civil society is upset by the activities of "gangsters and racketeers." Our civil

life is in a bad way "because of crimes committed," and—how true and how sad the words!—"committed particularly by youths."

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined religion in subjective and objective aspects, and have distinguished it as natural and as supernatural. We have learned that man is bound to render to God the duty of religion as his most important duty; and we have seen the scientific proof of this truth. Henceforth, then, we shall never be so unlearned as to make remarks such as, "Don't bring religion into this question," or, "Of course, I realize that your sentiment of religion in the matter is fine and delicate." Since religion is man's all-important duty, it is not to be excluded from any activity worthy of human attention or proper for human performance; nor is this outstanding duty a matter of sentiment only, even of delicate and fine sentiment: it is a matter of fact, a matter of truth, and is fraught with issues of everlasting import.

Further, we have seen that the duty of religion is dictated by no mean utility or selfishness, but is a natural debt which rational man owes to God. We have seen that the duty of religion is ever one and the same for all men, and we have shown that those who shake off their responsibility in the matter with a shrug and a statement that "one religion is as good an another,"

act in a manner wholly unreasonable, and are guilty of a terrible blasphemy.

Finally, we have discussed, in this Article, the relation of religion and morality, and have seen that the so-called *independent morality* is absurd in theory and disastrous in practice.

ARTICLE 2. WORSHIP

a) Definition and Divison b) Obligation c) Acts

a) DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF *WORSHIP*

By *worship*, taken in its general signification, we mean honor and homage paid to a person. We use the word in this ordinary sense in poesy, and we find it so used in the rituals of various societies : thus we have "worshipful masters" and "worshipful grand outside guards," and so on. Thus, too, the British use the word *worship* objectively, meaning a person to be worshiped or honored, when they call their magistrates "Your Worship." But in Ethics we employ the term *worship* to signify the expression of religion, and in this use it is more properly called *divine worship*.

Divine worship, then, is defined as *the sum-total of all acts by which a rational creature shows to God the honor and the homage that is His due*. We distinguish divine worship as *internal* and *external*. Internal worship consists in the acts of mind and will by which due honor and homage are paid to God. External worship consists in the acts which sensibly express this honor

and homage. External worship is called *private* when it is performed by, and in the name of, individuals. It is called *public* or *social* when it is performed in the name of a society.

b) THE OBLIGATION OF WORSHIP

Man is bound to render to God the duty of worship, both internal and external, both private and public.

Man is bound to *internal* worship of God. We have already proved that man has the duty of religion towards God. Now internal worship is inseparable from the performance of the duty of religion. Hence, given the existence of the first duty (i. e., religion), the second (i. e., worship) necessarily follows.

Man is also bound to *external* worship of God. Man is bound to show to God due honor and homage because God is his Creator, Preserver, and Master. Now God is the Creator, Preserver, and Master of the body as well as of the soul of man. Hence man is bound not only to the homage of soul (i. e., acts of intellect and will), but to homage of body (i. e., external bodily acts of worship). Homage of body, homage shown by bodily acts, is external worship. Therefore, man is bound to external worship. Again: internal worship itself requires certain external acts for its perfect performance. For it is in accord with the requirements of man's nature that he express internal acts in sensible signs; and man's internal acts depend, in a measure, upon things external, since all intellectual knowledge

has its first beginnings in the action of sense, and will-acts depend upon intellectual knowledge. Hence it is connatural to man, and therefore requisite, that he give some external expression to internal worship.

It is clear, then, that *individual* man has the duty of internal and external worship. But it is also true that *man in society* has this obligation. For human society (as we shall see later) is not an artificial thing; it is *natural* to man, and therefore carries the requirements of man's nature. Society itself is the work of the Creator, and, like individual man, must recognize and express its dependence upon Him in worship. Therefore, man is bound to *public* worship.

c) THE ACTS OF WORSHIP

The chief acts of internal worship are *devotion* and *prayer*, while the most notable acts of external worship are *adoration* and *sacrifice*.

i. *Devotion* consists in a readiness of the will to elicit acts that belong to the worship of God. True and sincere devotion comes from the *knowledge* and *love* of God. Man, of course, is strictly bound to *know* God, and for this purpose he has been given power of reason and has, moreover, been enlightened by divine revelation. For if a man do not know God, how shall he discharge the obligation of religion? Again, man must *love* God. This follows from the fact that man must, and can, know God. For to know God is to know the all-lovable, the supremely good, the all-perfect efficient

and final cause of all creatures. And reason demands that what is known to be all-lovable, must, in fact, be loved. Given, then, the knowledge and the love of God, the will must be ever in readiness to render *service* (homage and honor) to God; and in this readiness consists the act of *devotion*. Devotion is obviously essential to proper internal worship of God.

ii. *Prayer* is the elevation of the mind to God to praise Him, to thank Him, and to ask His blessings. Among the blessings asked will be that of pardon for sins, and so we may say that prayer also includes *penance*, or *reparation*, since by God's free pardon of faults the relation of man and God, injured by these faults, is, so to speak, repaired. Prayer is either *mental* or *vocal*, according as it is perfected in the mind without exterior signs, or is expressed in words. Prayer is an act of internal worship when mental; when vocal, it is an act of external worship. Some men have denied the need and utility of prayer, saying that God's immutability, or changelessness in eternal perfection, makes the answering of prayers impossible. But this is a short-sighted and unworthy objection. For, as St. Thomas says, prayer is not meant to change the eternal decrees of God, but to fulfill these decrees. For God, from eternity knowing all possible prayers, has from eternity decreed to answer them and to bless the man who prays. Hence, the answer to our prayers is eternally prepared for us *if only we will pray*. Our prayers *do* make a difference! There is no prayer that we can

offer to God but has its answer, prepared from eternity, to take effect in time. The placing of the necessary condition for the fulfillment of the eternal decrees to answer prayers rests with us, is a matter of our free-choice to pray.

iii. *Adoration*, as an act of external worship, is an exterior manifestation of subjection to the divine excellence. Thus, a kneeling posture at prayer is an act of adoration. Adoration, as an internal act, is much at one with devotion. Adoration is the normal external expression of acknowledgment of God's supreme control of the universe. It is an act of honor proportioned to the dignity of the Creator, on the one hand, and to the utter dependence of the rational creature on the other hand. Hence man owes to God the duty of adoration.

iv. *Sacrifice* is an external act by which a bodily object is offered to God, and destroyed (really or equivalently) to manifest the supreme dominion of God over creatures and the utter dependence of creatures upon God. It is the highest act of divine worship. Sacrifice has always been found wherever religion and worship are found, that is to say, among all men of all times. It is a rational necessity of man to give practical expression to his appreciation of the relation between the Supreme Being and dependent creatures by destroying, with symbolic ceremonies, something that is of value to himself. Even when, in false cults, sacrifice assumed monstrous forms, the

impulse back of it was rational. Passion and the degradation of human nature through sins, may pervert the right understanding of sacrifice, but the idea of sacrifice as a duty is sound. When we speak of "sacrifice" as the giving up or "destroying" of our own convenience, or of our goods, for motives of religion, we use the term in an extended sense: and then it is but the normal expression or actualization of devotion.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have learned the meaning of divine worship, and we have distinguished this as external and internal. We have established the obligation borne by rational man of performing the duty of worship, internal and external, private and public. We have mentioned and discussed the chief acts of worship, viz., devotion, prayer, adoration, and sacrifice.

CHAPTER III

MAN'S PERSONAL OFFICE

By *office* we mean duty or system of duties. And by *personal* in our caption we mean that which is done *by* and *to* the acting person, the human agent. In a word, this Chapter discusses man's duties towards himself. These duties are concerned with matters of *soul* and of *body*. Hence the Chapter is divided into two Articles, as follows:

Article 1. Duties of Man Towards His Soul

Article 2. Duties of Man Towards His Body

ARTICLE I. DUTIES OF MAN TOWARDS HIS SOUL

a) The Intellect

b) The Will

The soul of man has two *faculties* or powers or capacities for action, viz., the knowing faculty or *intellect*, and the choosing faculty or *will*. Duties are obligations, things to be done. Hence man's duties of soul consist in things to be done by intellect and will.

a) DUTIES OF THE INTELLECT

Man is bound to use his faculties for the achievement of his last end; this is the law of nature; for this purpose were faculties given, as is evident from their nature and function. Hence, man has the duty of exercising his intellect and of perfecting it. Now the

intellect is perfected by knowledge of truth. Some truths must be known if man is to achieve his last end as a rational being, and some truths are not of this necessary character. Thus we distinguish *necessary knowledge*, and *free or non-necessary knowledge*.

Man must, of necessity, know the truths that relate to the last end and the means of achieving it. Man did not establish this last end; he is not free to change it. The end is there to be achieved; man exists to achieve it: hence it is distinctly "up to man" to discover this last end and the means of reaching it. Now, the last end of man is *God*; and the means of reaching God and eternal happiness in the possession of God are *morally good human acts*. Therefore, man must know God, and must know what makes human acts morally good, and he must know how he himself is to maintain such goodness in his acts. This is the body of *necessary knowledge* that man is bound to acquire. Hence, man must know God and the basic prescriptions of the natural law, and his intellect must be equipped with the virtues of wisdom and prudence. Further, man must know the special duties of his state of life and the bearing these have upon his actions towards others—for all this is required by the general ethic in the matter, viz., "man must know *what* makes human acts morally good, and *how* to maintain such goodness in his own acts."

Matters of *free knowledge*, matters in which, absolutely considered, man has no natural obligation, are

history, science, letters, and "book-learning" in general. Still, reason *counsels* (but does not *command*) the acquiring of such knowledge, for it is rational to perfect one's faculties in every possible way. Thus, all studies of a speculative or practical nature which have no direct bearing upon the achievement of man's end, are matters of *free knowledge*. Excessive devotion to such studies, however, a devotion that would divert man from acquiring the essential and necessary knowledge which is pertinent to the achieving of his last end, is forbidden by the natural law. In all this we are speaking *absolutely*, i. e., without taking conditions or related considerations into account. When such considerations are brought to bear, we see that certain matters of free-knowledge become obligatory. Thus, a boy who would refuse to learn his letters or to go to school would violate the natural law which requires obedience to parents. Again, a man who would refuse to learn a trade, business, profession, or even the manner of performing acts of common labor, would violate the natural law which requires him to take ordinary care of bodily life and health in himself and in his dependents, and hence to have some means of gaining a livelihood.

b) DUTIES OF THE WILL

As the intellect is perfected by the knowledge of *truth*, so the will is perfected by the quest of that which is *good*. Now the foremost good is the good of

the last end. This good is, objectively, God; and subjectively it is eternal happiness in God. Hence the first obligation of the will is to tend towards the achieving of happiness in the possession of God, and therefore the will must tend towards or *love* God as the Supreme Good.

To attain the last end, the will must follow the rule of right reason, and must acquire a *readiness* in this matter. Such readiness is acquired in the moral virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance. These virtues are necessary to keep the will prompt in its choice of good, and in its repression of the sudden impulses of inordinate passion which would thwart the achievement of the limitless good and happiness.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this very brief Article we have learned some important matters. We have seen that the rational science of Ethics makes clear the fact that man has great duties with regard to himself. Thus, man "owes it to himself"—and strictly *owes*—to know God, the duties imposed by the natural law, and the duties of his state in life. Further, man must, as science proves, tend constantly and diligently towards Almighty God and eternal happiness, and to this end he must cultivate the virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

Let the student pause upon this matter and realize

fully that he is learning a *scientific* thing. He is not being told mere pious truisms; he is not being exhorted with platitudes. Let him know that such matters as the love of God, the cardinal virtues, the study of religion, and the things that pertain to God, are *requirements of rational nature*. And let him be prepared, as every Catholic above others should be prepared, instantly to resent the suggestion that there is anything soft or sentimental in living one's life religiously. We are living in an age that delights in saying that it is a very wise age, that it is concerned with the big, vital things of life! Well, the big, vital things of life are not matters of business, or industry, or rapid transportation, or skimming through the clouds, or radio and television, or anything glorified in newspapers and magazine articles. The one big, vital thing of life is God and the attainment of God. And this is not the dictum of a book of devotions, it is the reasoned conclusion of science!

ARTICLE 2. DUTIES OF MAN TOWARDS HIS BODY

- a) Life b) Other goods

a) LIFE

With regard to bodily life man has a twofold duty, viz., the duty of conserving it in integrity, and the duty of avoiding death, mutilation, and needless danger. These two duties are really only two views—one

positive and the other *negative*—of the same duty.

Man does not own his body. God owns it. God alone has the right to dispose of it and of its life and health. Life and health have been given to man as great blessings, as *goods* to be conserved and used. Like all true goods that man may possess, life and health, and all that pertains directly to these goods, are to be used for the achievement of man's last end. Therefore, absolutely speaking, man is bound to exercise ordinary care for the conservation of life and health. Thus he is obliged to maintain the integrity and perfection of his members, to take such nourishment as is required for the proper development or maintenance of bodily life, to observe the requirements of reason in matters of cleanliness and proper dress, to keep the senses strictly under control of reason, and to cultivate the virtues—particularly temperance and fortitude—which give one readiness in keeping the appetites of the flesh under due and proper control. These are man's *positive* duties with regard to his body.

Man's *negative* duties with regard to bodily life and health oblige him to avoid suicide, the needless mutilation of his members, intemperance, and all unreasonable use of objects or practices that could be harmful to life or limb or bodily health.

A special word must be said on the subject of *suicide*. Suicide is self-murder. It is the *direct* taking of one's own life upon one's own authority. And suicide can never, under any circumstances, be permitted.

Of course, a soldier going to certain death in a desperate charge is not a suicide; for he does not directly take his own life, but permits it to be sacrificed while his direct aim and effort is to perform a good work for the defence of his country. But suicide, clearly regarded as simple and direct self-murder, is absolutely contrary to the natural law, and is never permitted. The reasons for this truth are not far to seek: suicide is an injury done to God, to society, and to the person committing it. It is an injury to God, for it usurps the right of God, who alone is "Master of life and death." It is an injury to society, for man is an integral part of society and is bound to promote its welfare; and the suicide, by removing himself from society, destroys its integrity, and, moreover, sets a horrible example to others, an example which would mean the extinction of society, were all to follow it. Finally, suicide is an injury to the person who commits it, for such a person acts against the plain dictates of nature, and halts the achievement of perfection that might have been his.

It is interesting to note here the vast distinction between the suicide and the martyr. In Mr. G. K. Chesterton's "Orthodoxy" (p. 133) we find the following remarks upon the point: "About the same time I read a solemn flippancy by some free thinker: he said that a suicide was only the same as a martyr. The open fallacy of this helped to clear the question. Obviously the suicide is the opposite of a martyr. A martyr is a

man who cares so much for something outside him, that he forgets his own personal life. A suicide is a man who cares so little for anything outside him, that he wants to see the last of everything. One wants something to begin; the other wants everything to end. In other words, the martyr is noble exactly because (however he renounces the world and execrates all humanity) he confesses this ultimate link with life; he sets his heart outside himself; he dies that something may live. The suicide is ignoble because he has not this link with being: he is a mere destroyer; spiritually, he destroys the universe."

There have been philosophers who called suicide a noble, bold, and courageous act. But rashness is not boldness; a veritable coward may summon up enough blind rashness for a moment's thrust or the pressing of a trigger. Besides, the suicide is a soldier of life who fears the battle; he is a coward who runs from his post. He chooses self-destruction, not as a courageous thing, but as a mean method of slinking away from what he regards as a state of affairs more intolerable than death. Seen in true light, the act of suicide is the act of a sneak and a poltroon.

But may not suicide be permitted for virtue's sake? May not a man who is confirmed in habits of unnatural sin do better to cut off life than to continue it in such offences? This is not a case of better or worse; it is a case of plain right and wrong. We may *never* do evil that good may come of it. We may never do

directly that which is evil in itself, and suicide *is* evil in itself. Besides, a sinner *can* cure himself of a sinful habit; he is free in this matter. But he is not free to dispose of his life.

St. Paul desired "to be dissolved and to be with Christ." May not such a desire justify the killing of oneself so that God and eternal happiness may be possessed the sooner? No, for God would not be possessed by a bad act, an act that would turn man positively away from the achievement of his last end. Nor can one desire God who is willing to offend Him so gravely by usurping His right over the lives of His children.

May a man be his own executioner? Some man must serve in this ugly capacity, and, since the condemned must die in any case, why not spare living men the stigma that attaches to the office of executioner; why not let the office die with the condemned? No civil power can oblige a condemned man to be his own executioner. But if he be willing, may he be permitted to destroy himself? There is some discussion among moralists on this point, but the more probable opinion seems to be that no man may execute himself. It is unnatural for a man to destroy his life, even if that life be forfeit.

We have stated that man is bound to exercise ordinary care in the conservation of life and health. Thus, a sick man is bound to use proper available medicines, to avoid foolhardiness and risks, etc. But

no one is obliged to undergo an operation, at least an operation of major character, even to save his life; for such an operation is regarded as an *extraordinary* means to preserve life or restore health, and no one is bound to take extraordinary care of his body.

Again, proper food, cleanliness, clothing, sleep, etc., are required in the ordinary care of life and health. What of the extreme fasts, the long vigils, the disregard of mere bodily cleanliness, the poor and insufficient clothing of many of the great Saints? Here we have the lesser goods of the body given up for the greater good of the soul, viz., the increased knowledge, love, and service of God; and in this there is nothing inordinate. Far from being opposed to reason, this is a thing that reason approves.

Would it be right, then, for all Christians to go unwashed and clad in rags, to fast and abstain excessively, to spend long sleepless hours of prayer? The answer to this difficulty is quite obvious. It would be quite right if it were possible, and if such practices were for the good of the soul. But for the rank and file of Christians such practices are "food of giants" which they would quickly find themselves unable to digest. To attempt to go far in such acts of penance would be—without spiritual counsel—a presumptuous effort. Let the ordinary man try to reach the eminence gradually, let him practice the penances required by God's Church, let him add other practices recommended and approved by his spiritual guide, let him

ceaselessly advance, and meanwhile ask no idle questions about his fitness to take on, all at once, the heroic works of the great Saints. True, the Saints are to be imitated, not merely admired. But imitation must begin with the interior disposition and the high enduring resolve to live for God alone: the external practices of penance will then come naturally into being, each in its own way and at its own time.

In passing, it may be well to mention that the modern mood of the world with regard to excessive personal daintiness and bodily cleanliness is a pagan fad. It is the cult of mere externals. We hear that "cleanliness is next to godliness," but that is not true; nor is it true that mere cleanliness in itself leads to godliness. There is a vast difference between soap and sanctity. Mr. G. K. Chesterton has some strong remarks upon this subject in "What's Wrong With the World" (p. 297 f.): "There are distinguished public-school men, bishops, dons, headmasters, and high politicians, who, in the course of the eulogies which from time to time they pass upon themselves, have actually identified physical cleanliness with moral purity. They say (if I remember rightly) that a public-school man is clean inside and out. As if everyone did not know that while saints can afford to be dirty, seducers have to be clean. As if everyone did not know that the harlot must be clean, because it is her business to captivate, while the good wife may be dirty, because it is her business to clean. As if we did not all know that whenever God's

thunder cracks above us, it is very likely indeed to find the simplest man in a muck cart and the most complex blackguard in a bath."

b) OTHER GOODS

Besides the goods of soul and body there are others, such as prosperity, good name, honor, external liberty, etc. These are usually required, in greater or less measure, for the full perfection of bodily life. They are also required by the man who has dependents. Hence, a man must have employment or some means of livelihood. He must take care of those dependent upon him and provide for their future. He must earn a good name and achieve an honest place in the estimation of his fellows. Thus, ordinarily, a man must exert himself to obtain a sufficiency of the goods of this world.

But, apart from the necessity imposed by the duties of one's state of life, man is quite free to neglect the matter of worldly prosperity, nay, he may find it much to his advantage to do so. For the absence of care about worldly possessions ordinarily favors one's progress in virtue, and removes many obstacles from the path in which one must walk to attain one's last end. Of course, it does not follow that the pursuit of honest prosperity, good name, etc., is wrong. As long as both the matter and the manner of such a quest is kept within the moral law, it is quite licit. Goods of fortune, fame, honor, liberty, etc., are gifts of God,

though they are not gifts of the first rank. As long as they are used according to reason, and not abused, they can be made to serve man's purpose in attaining his last end, notwithstanding the fact that they are likely to be abused and to be a hindrance to man's true work rather than a help.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

We have learned in this Article that man has positive and negative duties in the matter of preserving life, health, and bodily integrity. We have studied some of these duties, and have given special attention to the subject of self-destruction or suicide. We have explained the difference between the suicide and the martyr. We have met and solved some difficulties pertinent to the absolute prohibition of suicide.

Further, we have considered some matters that touch the question of the proper conservation of health, and we have discussed the subject of mere external cleanliness.

Finally, we have studied the question of man's duty to acquire a sufficiency of worldly goods.

CHAPTER IV

MAN'S DUTY TOWARDS HIS NEIGHBOR

This Chapter treats of the duties which every individual man owes to his fellowmen. Some of these duties are founded upon the natural law of charity, which is expressed in the formula, "*Love thy neighbor as thyself*"; while others are based upon the natural law of justice, which may be expressed thus: "*Injure not thy neighbor nor his goods.*" This Chapter, therefore, deals with the duties of *charity* and the duties of *justice* which a man owes to his neighbor, i. e., to all other men, even his enemies. The Chapter is accordingly divided into two Articles, as follows:

Article 1. Duties of Charity

Article 2. Duties of Justice

ARTICLE I. DUTIES OF CHARITY

a) Definition

b) The Duty of Love

c) Duties Consequent upon Love

a) DEFINITION OF *CHARITY*

Charity is a word derived from the Latin, and *love* is a word derived from the Anglo-Saxon, and both have the same meaning. Charity means love. Now love is not a mere affection or emotion. Love, strictly speaking, is an act of the will and it may or may not be associated with affection or emotion. Love is actively

disposed to become an enduring thing, a habit, a virtue. But affections and emotions are, of their nature, passing. Affections and fine emotion are flowers that bloom sometimes upon the sturdy plant of love, but they are not the substance of the plant. Many of us must recall the pointed lesson contained in a school reader of a day when such textbooks were not entirely given over to butterflies and robins and John and Lucy and their nice dog, Fido. It is the story of two little girls and their mother. One daughter made a show of affection, and, with many a lusty hug, declared that she loved her mother very much; after which pious declaration she issued forth to play with little friends. The other child said never a word about love, but she washed the dishes and swept the floor before going out to play. The obvious point is that the second child was the one who had true love for her mother. Love is a will-habit that naturally tends to translate itself into action. Our Lord said, "If you love me, keep my commandments." Which (saving reverence) is equivalent to saying, "If you love me, love me; show it in action; don't merely talk about it."

Now, love may be *love of concupiscence* or *love of benevolence*. The love of concupiscence (and the word *concupiscence* has no evil meaning here: it means *desire*) tends to the possession of the object (person or thing) beloved. The love of benevolence tends to seek the welfare of the object beloved. The

first seeks to win or have its object; the second seeks to do good to its object.

b) THE DUTY OF LOVE

A man is bound to love his neighbor as himself.

This ethical principle expresses a law of nature, a law of natural charity. It means that every individual man is in duty bound to love every other man, even his enemy, with the *love of benevolence*. Further, the principle means that this love of neighbor must follow the pattern of the love one has for oneself. The word "as" in the principle does not indicate *equality*, but *similarity*: it indicates love of self, not as the exact measure, but as the exemplar or model of love of neighbor. Man, to act according to reason, must wish for the goods that help him to achieve his last end. The principle of charity means that man must wish goods *of this kind* for his neighbor also.

Of course, a man *cannot* love his neighbor with the same directness, the same intensity of interest, or to the same extent that he loves himself. For each man has an individual work to do, viz., the achieving of his own last end, God. This is his first, his special, and his greatest work; for this he was created; in this he must succeed, or fail the purpose of his being. Hence, he is bound, first and foremost, to do good to himself, to wish good for himself, inasmuch as he is bound by means of such "good" to reach his last end. Therefore, a man's love for himself is

greater than his love for his neighbor. This, as is obvious, is a requirement of rational nature. Consider it as illustrated in analogy: A kindly merchant is well disposed towards all the other merchants of his city. He wishes them well; he desires their success. He is willing to give them the benefit of his own experience in advice; he is willing to help them, within reasonable limits, by loans of money, goods, equipment. But he does not let his own business go to ruin,—and it is not in nature to expect him to be willing to ruin his business,—even to save the business of another merchant. Thus, it appears, the merchant in question has a greater concern, a *greater love*, for his own business than for that of his fellow merchants. And reason sees that it *should* be so.

What, then, of heroism? Does not the fireman who rescues an invalid from a burning building—giving up by his act a sound, stalwart life for one that is broken and failing—love his neighbor more than himself? Not at all. The act of heroism procures a greater good for the hero than for the person saved by it. For the hero gains a greater good (provided his ordinary life has not thwarted it) than the life he gives up, and a greater good than life is to the rescued person. For one heroic act of charity merits a greater good in the life to come than a prolonged life of ordinary rational (i. e., virtuous) human conduct.

But, though man must love himself more than he

loves his neighbor, he must, as a matter of fact love his neighbor. This fact, already stated and explained, needs a short proof. All men are one in nature; all are made to achieve the same last end; they constitute one great family. Now, in this solidarity of human nature is rooted the duty of love of neighbor. A man is a traitor to his humanity if he wishes his neighbor to fail where he himself hopes to succeed. There is no competition in the quest of man's last end; the success of one does not mean the failure of another; therefore, there is nothing in reason which can justify the wish that a neighbor fail; on the contrary, reason requires that each man, as an integral part of the great army or family of human beings, must wish that success to each and all that he seeks for himself. Such a rational wish is the love of benevolence fashioned upon the love of self—and this is precisely what the law of charity commands.

Again: a man, as we have seen, has the duty of loving God, his last end. Now, a man cannot love God unless he loves those that God loves, i. e., all men. Therefore, a man must love all his fellowmen. But a man cannot love his fellowmen—an enormous multitude which is, for the most part, personally unknown to him—except by the love of benevolence. Hence a man must love his fellowmen by the love of benevolence. But the love of benevolence consists precisely in the wish and the will for goods profitable to one's fellowmen in their work of attaining their

last end, that is, in such goods as a man must rationally wish for himself. Therefore, a man must love his neighbor as himself.

c) DUTIES CONSEQUENT UPON LOVE

We fulfill the duty of love towards our neighbor by acts of *humanity*, *beneficence*, and *gratitude*. Our duties in these virtues may be called duties consequent upon love, or perhaps it would be more accurate to call the acts of these virtues the normal expression of love of neighbor. Just a word on each:

i. *Humanity* is expressed in such acts of kindness as are easily performed, and of which the refusal would be a monstrous meanness. Examples of acts of humanity are: the giving of kindly advice, the indicating of a road or direction, the giving of a drink of water to one who asks for or needs it, the lending of aid in case of fire or sickness, etc. A man who would without reason refuse such kindnesses would deserve to be called "*inhuman*."

ii. *Beneficence* finds expression in the giving of alms, the lending of active aid or assistance which requires more effort or self-sacrifice than the works exacted by *humanity*. We see that the Spiritual and Corporal Works of Mercy are works of humanity and beneficence, and hence are duties required by rational nature.

iii. *Gratitude* or thankfulness is the due and equal recognition and return for benefits bestowed. It be-

longs to the equality and fitness of things, the sane balance required by reason.

Other special duties (some of which touch justice, and will be mentioned again) should be indicated in this place: Man is bound to avoid leading his neighbor into *error*, especially into error as regards religion; nor dare a man do his neighbor harm by *scandal*, whether this be done by word of mouth, by writings and books, or by bad example. On the contrary, man is bound to help his neighbor to know *truth with certainty*, especially such truth as pertains to religion, and hence directly to man's last end. Further, man must give his neighbor the benefit and encouragement of *good example* in all his words, writings, and conduct. In a word, man must obey the Golden Rule, which is positively expressed as, "*Do unto others as you would have them do unto you.*" The same rule, negatively expressed, is, "*Never do to others what you would not have them do to you.*" Notice that one of these principles is a positive prescription of the natural law; the other is a negative prescription of prohibition. Recall what we have learned about the binding force of affirmative and negative natural laws.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have learned the meaning of *love of neighbor* and have explained what is meant

necessary self-defence. It comes under the prohibition of the natural law, and therefore is never licit in any circumstances. As suicide is wrong because it is an offence against God, against society, and against the suicide himself, so homicide is wrong because it offends God, injures society, and violates the right of the victim. For consider: homicide usurps the unique rule which God holds over the life and death of His children. Further, it removes an integral member of society; it arouses fear among men, and so destroys the peace and sense of security to which men have a right, and which are needed for the proper conduct of social life and for prosperity. Finally, homicide violates the right to life which the victim possesses with regard to all other men, even though he has not the right to life with reference to God. Thus we see that homicide is not only forbidden by the divine positive law of the Fifth Commandment, but also by the natural law.

Man has rights—with reference to other men—to life, bodily integrity, and health. Hence, a right is violated and the natural law outraged if these goods are taken away or *harmed*. It follows that harmful bodily acts less grave than homicide are also forbidden. Thus it is against the natural law to wound, mutilate, or strike one's neighbor. Thus, too, parents and superiors offend against the natural law if they fail to provide the necessary food, clothing, and care for those under their charge. Physicians, too, offend

against the natural law by undertaking the treatment of serious maladies of the nature of which they are culpably ignorant; and so do surgeons who perform operations without accurate knowledge and requisite skill. Merchants offend against the natural law, who adulterate foodstuffs with substances harmful to human health.

Going back now to the matter of taking a neighbor's life, we consider the case of necessary self-defence. The fact that a man has the right to life and the duty to exercise ordinary care in its preservation implies the further fact that he has the right to *defend* his life against unjust attack. The principle in the matter may be expressed as follows: *It is lawful to defend one's life against unjust attack even at the cost of the life of the aggressor, provided there is nothing inordinate in the time or the manner in which the fatal defensive act is performed.* We must study this principle in detail:

i. The attack must be *unjust*, i. e., it must come from the private authority of the attacker, or of other private citizens, and not from justly constituted civil authority. Hence a criminal who is about to be executed by public authority would not be allowed to kill his executioner on the plea of self-defence.

ii. The attack must be of a *serious* nature, one that involves danger to life or limb. A man set upon by an enemy, who evidently intends merely to strike

him, is justified in repelling force with force, but not in killing his aggressor.

iii. There must be nothing inordinate in the *time* at which the fatal act of defence is performed. If I know that a certain man has threatened to kill me on sight, and know further that he will keep his word, I am not thereby justified in seeking him out and killing him *before* he has an opportunity to attack me. Such an act would be plain homicide. Nor may I kill one who has murderously attacked me, *after* I have escaped from the danger, or even as I lie in the death throes. Such an act would be one of vengeance, and would also be homicide. It is plain, then, that the act of self-defence which involves the taking of an aggressor's life must be performed at the moment of the attack or during its continuance, and neither *before* nor *after* the attack itself.

iv. There must be nothing inordinate in the *manner* in which the fatal act of self-defence is performed. Thus a person attacked must do no more in the way of violence than is requisite and sufficient for preserving life. If the person unjustly attacked can save himself by running away, or by crying for help, or by lightly wounding the aggressor, he is bound to take such means and is not justified in killing the aggressor.

We have stated and explained man's right to self-defence when unjustly attacked. But how *prove* that which we have asserted and explained? The proof

rests upon a principle studied in General Ethics (Chap. I, Art. 2, b), which may be called the Principle of the Twofold Effect of an Act not Evil in Itself. The student is urged to turn back and read the paragraph indicated. Here we may present but a summary proof of our *principle of self-defence at the cost of the aggressor's life*: In repelling unjust aggression, which can be withstood only by killing the aggressor, a man aims directly at *saving his own life*. That is his direct end and purpose. Indirectly he causes the death of the aggressor; but he does not directly intend that death. He does not kill as a *means* to self-preservation; he preserves himself, and through his efforts in that direction, his aggressor is killed. Thus we have the matter: An act good in itself, viz., the act of defending one's rights. And we have a twofold effect, one good, viz., life preserved, and one bad, viz., the aggressor's death. Now it is lawful to perform an act (indifferent or good in itself) from which such a twofold effect comes provided, (1) the evil effect does not precede the good effect; (2) there is a reason proportionately grave calling for the act in its good effect; and (3) the end of the agent is honest. These conditions are verified in the case here considered, for (1) the death of the aggressor does not precede the safety of the person attacked: it either occurs simultaneously with the escape to safety, or follows it; (2) the right to self-preservation, the right to life, is a reason very grave,

and is proportioned to the situation in which the outcome is to be the loss of life on the one hand or the other; (3) the end of the agent is honest, for the agent directly intends *to save himself*, even though self-preservation be accompanied by the death of the aggressor.

It is clear, then, that a man has the *right* to defend his life against unjust attack even at the expense of the aggressor's death. But has he the *duty* of so defending himself? No, unless his life be necessary to others (wife and children, for example), to whom he would do an injury by allowing himself to be killed. He is bound to take ordinary care of life and health, but self-preservation at the cost of such effort as involves an aggressor's death is extraordinary, and therefore not obligatory. It may even be that the higher good for a man attacked lies in permitting himself to be killed, rather than kill another. Thus a man in the state of grace might well allow himself to be killed rather than cut off the aggressor in the very act of sin. One who so nobly sacrifices himself is a hero, and while he is not bound to such heroism, it is surely reasonable and permissible.

The right to life is not the only right that may lawfully be defended, even if the defence involves an aggressor's death. Public security demands that men be permitted so to defend their very valuable goods, the integrity of their members, their personal virtue, their individual liberty against one who

would take them into slavery, etc. The reason for this is obvious from what has been said above. Public security and the intrinsic value of the goods defended make the reason for the fatal act of defence sufficiently grave. The other requisite conditions are present also, as in the case of defending one's life, viz., the evil effect of the act of defence does not precede the good effect so as to be a means thereto, and the end of the agent is honest.

Before leaving the present discussion of duties respecting life, it may be well to say a word on *dueling*. A duel is a privately arranged combat with deadly weapons. It is entirely against the natural law, for it involves in itself the malice of both homicide and suicide. It involves the malice of homicide, for it is a privately authorized attack upon the life of another; and it has the malice of suicide, for the duelist exposes his life to danger without reasonable and just cause. The Catholic Church has wisely placed the ban of her excommunication upon those of her members who fight duels, promote them, act as seconds to duelists, or deliberately witness a duel.

b) DUTIES REGARDING OUR NEIGHBOR'S SOUL

The faculties of soul are intellect and will. The intellect seeks, and has a right to, the *truth*; the will inclines to, and has a right to, *goodness*. Hence, no man may lawfully withhold the truth which his neighbor has a right to know, nor may he deprive

the neighbor of the good which he has a duty to achieve. Against the duty of truthfulness man offends by *lying*. Against the duty of goodness man offends by *scandal*, and by imposing *servitude* which tends to destroy human personality and hampers the liberty necessary for the free and proper quest of good. The illicit character of *scandal* and *servitude* is obvious, and needs no special study here. We must discuss the matter of *truthfulness*, however, and we shall do this negatively by studying and proving the intrinsic evil of lying.

A *lie* is a serious statement at variance with the knowledge or belief of the speaker. It is a disagreement between what one says and what one knows, or thinks one knows. It differs from a mere *error* (called a *material lie*, although strictly it is not a lie at all), which is a sincere statement of a mistaken mind. Thus, one may affirm something as true, and with the sincere conviction that it *is* true, while as a matter of fact it is false; and, conversely, one may sincerely declare something to be false which is really true. This material falsity is not the falsity of a *lie*. The *formal* falsity of a lie consists in its disagreement with the mind of the speaker.

Some persons describe a lie as "a statement of an untruth uttered with intent to deceive." This is no true definition. The intention to deceive does not belong to the essence of a lie; such an intention merely gives the lie a certain "perfection," as St. Thomas

says. Granted that such an intention is usually present in the teller of lies, it is not an essential element of the lie itself. Thus, if the fabled office-boy invents the excuse of "attending his grandmother's funeral" for the purpose of getting an afternoon's pleasure at the ball-park, he is telling a lie, even though he knows quite well that his employer is not to be deceived by his well-worn story, and hence does not *intend* to deceive him.

There are three types of lies: (1) The *jocose* lie, a fallacious statement made "for fun" and understood, or easily understandable, as a joke. This lie does not square with the definition of lie, because it is not a serious statement. However, there is such a thing as a joke "going too far"; and a jocose lie that is not easily understood in true character may become a real lie. (2) The *officious* lie, which is a lie of excuse or convenience. It is a cowardly refusal to meet the issues of life; it is the mark of a weak, unmanly, crawling soul. It is a full and formal lie, and has all the malice of perfect mendacity. (3) The *pernicious* lie, which is a lie meant to do mischief or injury. It is the lowest and worst of lies.

Together with the lie proper we associate all outward evidences or signs which falsify one's inner knowledge, condition, or spirit; and thus we condemn with lies: *simulation* or *pretence*, *hypocrisy*, *adulation* or *flattering speech* or *conduct*.

The sound ethical doctrine in the matter of lies is

summed up in the following principle: *A lie is intrinsically evil, and can never, under any circumstances, be considered lawful.* A lie is *intrinsically* evil, that is, evil *in itself*. This is evident from the fact that a lie as such is an injury to right reason, to our neighbor, and to society at large. A lie outrages right reason because it upsets the due order of nature; it is the prostitution of speech which is given to men for the purpose of expressing what their minds hold as true. A lie is an injury to our neighbor who, while he has no strict right to know all that is in our minds, has a right *not to be deceived*. In just this way our neighbor has a right, not to all the money in our pocket, but to payment of what is due him, *in good coin, not counterfeit*. Finally, a lie is an injury to society, for society cannot exist without mutual faith and reliance among its members; and if a lie be permissible, such faith and confidence become an utter impossibility.

It is never permissible, then, to lie. But it may well be permissible to *conceal the truth*. Concealing the truth is just as different from lying as the act of refraining from purchasing goods is different from paying out counterfeit money. No one is *obliged* to buy; what he is obliged to do is to pay for his purchases with good money. So no one is obliged to open his mind and pour out a continuous declaration of all he knows; what he is obliged to do is to avoid lies *when he does speak*. Thus, as long as concealing

the truth does not involve an indirect lie, and does not injure the right of another to know the truth, and there is a good reason for such concealment—so long the concealment of truth is perfectly lawful. Indeed, concealment of the truth is sometimes a strict duty, as, for example, in the keeping of secrets.

One of the means of concealing truth is the so-called *mental reservation*. A mental reservation is a restriction placed upon the sense of a statement, so that this statement is true only when understood according to the mind of the speaker. In other words, a mental reservation is a reserving of the meaning of one's statement (in which a *double* meaning can be discerned) to apply only to one sense, and that the less natural and obvious sense, of the words spoken. There are two types of such reservation, viz., *the mental reservation strictly so called*, and *the mental reservation loosely so-called*. In the former, the hearer is given no real clue to the true sense in which the words of a statement are used. Such a reservation is, therefore, to all intents and purposes, a lie; for the hearer is not given an opportunity to adjudge the statement as anything other than a serious expression of the speaker's mind. Thus mental reservation strictly so called is never permissible. But when there is a good reason for concealment or secrecy, the second type of reservation, viz., reservation loosely so called, may be used. For this consists in the use of a statement of ambiguous or "double"

meaning which the hearer can—from the words, manner, or circumstances in which it is uttered—readily understand as being employed in the less obvious and natural sense. Whether, as a matter of fact, the hearer *does* so understand it, does not enter into the question. A normally intelligent person *could* so understand it, and in this lies its permissibility. For, even if deception in the hearer actually results from such a statement, this is an evil effect indirectly willed of an act licit in itself (for the statement is not a lie), and performed for a reason proportionately or properly grave. It is supposed, of course, that the end of the agent is honest; that is to say, the speaker must directly intend to conceal the truth, not to deceive the hearer. However, if the hearer has a right to know the full truth, a right which concealment would violate, the mental reservation loosely so called becomes illicit. Similarly, it becomes illicit if there is not a sufficient reason for concealment. Those that find they must occasionally resort to licit reservation are, above others, priests, doctors, diplomatists, and other professional men. All the world knows that the seal of the confessional is inviolable, and if a priest should be put on the witness stand in court and questioned about a matter of which he has only “confessional knowledge,” he would answer, “I do not know.” This statement has two meanings: an obvious meaning, “I really do not know,” and a less obvious meaning, “I do not know for publica-

tion; I am not free to tell." From the fact that the witness is a priest, this second meaning would, or easily *might*, be taken from his words. Here we have an example of licit reservation (loosely so called), for the statement is not in itself a lie (it has two meanings easily understood), there is a grave reason for concealment, and the intention of the agent is honest, for he merely intends to keep his sacred secret and does not directly intend to practise deception.—Another example of reservation is found in the words of the housemaid to an unwelcome caller, "My mistress is not at home." This expression has two meanings: the obvious meaning, "My mistress is really not at home," and the less obvious meaning (but one easily understood from the circumstances, and from the ordinary use of this phrase by those who wish to avoid an interruption of their privacy), viz., "My mistress is not at home to callers," or, "She is not at home to you."

In addition to reservation there is another common means of concealing truth, and this is called *evasion* or *equivocation*. This consists in avoiding the direct answer to a question, and making a non-committal reply. It is in no sense a form of lying, but a kindly way of sparing the feelings of our neighbor when a full and direct answer would wound him. Thus, Jones, who abhors the country, is asked by Smith to give an opinion of the latter's place in the remote suburbs. Jones answers, "You must find the

rural life interesting," Jones tells no lie, and Smith is pleased. Were Jones to say, "I don't like it here," he would merely show himself to be one of that abhorred class of "candid" people who seem to take delight in saying things that hurt, and then explaining that they are straightforward persons who always speak the truth.

To sum up: It is never lawful to tell a lie, no matter what great good would come of it; for a lie is intrinsically evil. It is licit to conceal the truth when the hearer has no right to know the truth and when there is a sufficient reason for the concealment.

Closely associated with goods of the soul to which everyone has a right—a right that cannot be violated without offending against the law of nature—are the external goods called *good name* and *honor*.

Good name is the reputation one bears among others for uprightness and honesty. "Good name is better than great riches." It is of inestimable value in the making of friends, the establishing of credit, and the promoting of business. Hence good name is to be classed with those goods that a man rightfully seeks to acquire and to preserve. The ethical principle in the matter is: *Every man has a right to his good name*. Good name is "the immediate jewel of the soul"; it is a thing acquired and *owned*; to steal it is to commit an act of injustice which demands reparation and restitution in so far as this may be

possible. Good name in others is injured by rash and suspicious judgment, by calumny or slander, and by detraction. These evils are, therefore, contrary to natural law.

Honor is the natural or official dignity of a person which rightfully calls for esteem, respect, or consideration on the part of others. The ethical principle in the matter is: *Every man has the right to that honor which is normally due to his nature and position.* This is a natural right, for it concerns a matter which is of importance and advantage to a man in achieving and in tending towards his last end. Respect for our fellowmen as men, and respect for superiors in the measure required by their place and dignity, is an absolute requirement for harmonious and profitable existence in private life and in society. Therefore, to injure a man in point of honor is to offend against the natural law by an act of injustice which requires due requital or reparation in as far as this is possible. Honor is injured by disrespect, mockery, derision, caricature, contempt, scornful insolence, etc.

c) DUTIES REGARDING OUR NEIGHBOR'S PROPERTY

Under this head we are to consider the following matters:

- i. The Right of Ownership
- ii. Erroneous Theories about Ownership

iii. The Acquiring and Transferring of Ownership

i. *The Right of Ownership*.—The right of *ownership*, or *property right*, is the right of disposing of property at will and of excluding other men from its use or disposition.

By *property* is meant any external goods that are capable of distribution among men to serve their utility. In the main, these are material or bodily goods. And these are divided into *movables* and *immovables* according as they can or cannot be transferred from place to place without injury to their substance: thus, animals and furniture belong to the first class, while lands, houses, etc., belong to the second. Movable goods are distinguished as *fungible* and *non-fungible*, according as they can take the place of other goods of the same kind, or are incapable of such substitution: thus, goods that can be borrowed and returned in kind, like a pound of sugar or a measure of corn, are fungible; while goods that must be returned in proper identity, such as a borrowed horse, are non-fungible. Goods are also distinguished as *fruitful* (*productive*) and *consumptible*, according as they produce new goods, or are consumed or destroyed by their use: thus, a field is productive, while food is consumptible.

Ownership of goods involves the right to use or dispose of them at will. Thus, an owner has the

right to sell his property, to give it away, to change it, or to destroy it. In all this, however, *the collision of rights* (cf. this Book, Chap. I, Art. 1, c, iii) is to be taken into account, and it is understood that the right ceases if its exercise would violate the rights of others or the common welfare.

Ownership of goods is *exclusive*. The owner has the right to refuse to other men the use and disposition of his property.

The right of ownership belongs to a *person*, whether this be a *physical* person (i. e., an individual human being), or a *moral* or *juridical* person (i. e., a unified group acting as one, such as Church, State, community, corporation). Ownership is *private* if the person in whom it is vested is a physical person; *corporate*, if vested in a moral person. There is also a form of ownership called *public*, and this is the right of the civil power, the State, to use the property of private citizens, even without their consent, when public necessity or great utility requires such use. This right is called *the right of eminent domain*. Thus, for example, the State may build a public road through a farmer's field, even though the farmer is unwilling and refuses to sell the field. Thus, too, the State, in times of war, may commandeer privately owned commodities. This is not the right of ownership strictly so called, for the State has not the right to dispose *at will* of the property of citizens, and is ordinarily required to indemnify the citizen whose prop-

erty is taken over by the right of eminent domain. That the State has the true *right* to make proper use of its eminent domain is clear from the fact that the public welfare is of a higher or more universal order than private ownership of material goods, and when these two rights collide, the greater prevails.

The right of ownership is a natural right. Man has the natural right to preserve life, and he cannot properly preserve life without private ownership of property; hence, the natural right to own property is a corollary of the natural right to life. Why cannot man preserve life without owning property? Because the proper conservation of life not only involves the use of food and clothing and shelter necessary for the hour or the day, but it involves a permanent and stable title to these things; for a man must provide for the future, for times of ill-health, unemployment, age; he must provide for those dependent upon him, or those to become dependent, and have a stable and permanent means of caring for such dependents. All this is saying that man cannot fulfill the requirements of normal life unless he has the right to own (i. e., permanently to possess for his own use and disposition) the goods called private property. We conclude that the right of ownership is a natural right, that is, a right which is founded upon the natural law.

Again: *the right of ownership is a natural right* because, without it, man cannot exercise properly

his natural right to perfect his powers. If a man cannot earn anything to have and to hold *as his own*, where will he find inspiration and incentive for work, for study, for the development of his rational faculties? And where will he find the independence required for study and research? If the right of ownership perishes, progress in the arts and sciences must perish with it.

Further: *the right of ownership is a natural right* because man has a natural right to the fruits of his own labor. Man (under God) owns his own bodily and mental powers. With these powers he perfects objects. In perfecting objects, man, in a true sense, projects into them something of his own personality, something of himself. Hence, to take away these objects from man is to take away, so to speak, part of himself, an action clearly contrary to natural law. Therefore, to deny the right of private ownership is to come in conflict with the natural law. Let this matter be illustrated: Suppose a man works in his garden. His work is truly something of his own, and it is as truly something given to the garden and henceforth inseparable from it. Man's work gives to the garden a fruitfulness it did not have; for his labor removed choking weeds, loosened soil for the ready admission of moisture, supplied the chemicals necessary for fertilization, killed the insects that would harm or destroy the yield. Hence the man has put something of his own, something even of him-

self, into the garden. To say that he does not, or cannot, own the garden is to say that he does not or cannot, own what is indubitably *his*, and what he has put into the garden and is now inseparable from it. This is wholly unjust. Therefore it is unjust, and contrary to natural law, to deny the possibility of man's ownership in the garden. It does not follow, of course, that because a man works upon a plot of ground, he owns the ground. We presuppose the original title by which the man holds the garden as his own, and of the validity of this title we shall soon speak. But even if a man works in a neighbor's property, he will work for wages or as a kindness, and so by a wage-contract or a gift-contract he will transfer to his neighbor his natural right to the fruit of that labor; for that which he has given to the land he will accept what is adjudged an equivalent—money, or the sense of well-doing (and the spiritual merit for a life hereafter) in the interests of a fellow-man.

ii. *Erroneous Theories about Ownership*.—The theories which deny or limit the right of private ownership are, in general, *communistic* theories, and they may be called, collectively, *Communism*. Communism denies or limits *private* and *individual* ownership, and asserts *common* ownership of property. Communism has several forms, and of these the most notable are *Anarchism* and *Socialism*.

Anarchism holds that all productive goods (lands, mines, machines, etc.) must be seized by force and given into the permanent ownership of independent bands or companies of workmen, and all State authority is to be utterly destroyed. Socialism holds that all productive goods should be owned by the State, and to this end men must work, not by the violent means of seizure and destruction, but by political action and legislation. We shall treat of Socialism in some detail.

Socialism has two chief forms, *Democratic* (or *Industrial*) Socialism, and *Agrarian* Socialism. Of the first form, the chief exponent is Karl Marx (1818-1883), and this form of Socialism is often referred to as Marxian Socialism, or Marxian Collectivism. Of the second form, two notable exponents are Henry George (1839-1897) and John Stuart Mill (1806-1873).

Democratic Socialism (Marxian Socialism, Industrial Socialism, Collectivism) may be defined as a system of political economy which makes all means of production common property, places it permanently in the possession of the democratic State, and leaves to the State the care of organizing collective production and the distribution of riches. We see, then, what Socialism of this type aims to do: (1) To dispossess individual owners of productive goods—buildings, machines, factories, lands, raw materials—and to make these the inalienable property of

civil society; (2) To make civil society a purely democratic State in which there will be no special privileges or social inequalities; (3) To keep all legislative and judicial rights in the hands of the people, who will exercise their control by direct suffrage.

Agrarian Socialism would not have the State own *all* means of production, but only the land and the soil, and would leave other productive goods available for private ownership.

Socialism is proposed as a remedy for the hardship and injustice of the conditions ordinarily imposed upon workingmen. It regards private property, private ownership, particularly in productive goods, as the root of all such hardship and injustice. But in this it is wrong. Socialism would not improve the condition of the ordinary workman, but would make it immeasurably worse. This is obvious if we contrast the workman's present condition with that which Socialism promises him. As things are, the workman is paid for his work, and his wages are his own to use as he likes. If the workman is sober and honest, he will usually be able to save at least a little of his earnings, and so to work towards bettering his condition, gaining a greater and greater independence for himself and his dependents, and, in some cases, will be enabled to establish a business of his own. Now Socialism would take all this opportunity away from the workman; it would allow him no salary; it would give him a place fixed and perma-

ment which would admit of no improvement, no enlargement of opportunity for independence and ease of life; it would stifle worthy ambition and kill all incentive to excel; it would make the workman a veritable cog in a machine; it would make the State an impersonal and heartless owner of its very citizens; it would turn the workman into a State slave. Thus, granting that the workman is often badly used and underpaid (evils that are indeed unjust), Socialism would use him in a manner unbearably worse. Hence, Socialism is to be rejected as *inept*, that is, as a theory that can in no wise work out as it promises and seeks to do.

Further, Socialism is *unjust*. We have seen that the right of ownership is a natural right; and this right Socialism violates. Even Agrarian Socialism is unjust, for, as Pope Leo XIII points out in his famous Encyclical on the Conditions of Labor, "Man . . . the master of his own acts . . . governs himself by foresight under the eternal law and power of God. . . . Wherefore, it is in his power to exercise his choice not only on things which regard his present welfare, but also on those which will be for his advantage in time to come. Hence man not only can possess the fruits of the earth, *but the soil itself*, for of the products of the earth he has to lay up provision for the future. Man's needs do not die out, but recur; satisfied to-day, they demand new supplies to-morrow. Nature, therefore, owes to man

a storehouse that is unfailing in supplying his daily wants. And this he finds only in the inexhaustible fertility of the earth." Man cannot be forced to turn to the State as his "storehouse," for man is older than the State, and held private property, in goods productive as well as non-productive, before the State existed. The State, therefore, cannot come into possession of man's rights in these goods without the unjust act of taking them away from man whose possession and title to them is prior to any claim of the State. Hence, Socialism is a theory which stands in disagreement with the natural law, and is to be condemned as unlawful.

Finally, Socialism is a theory *subversive of peace and morals*. It would lead, if put into practice: (1) To violent upheavals and disturbances occasioned by the change of social order and the seizure of private property; (2) To a hard and odious slavery of men by forcing all to accept imposed labor without any choice as to its kind or conditions, without any direct return for, or control over the fruits of labor, and without an alternative of refusal or acceptance in the distribution of commodities produced by labor; (3) To hatred and envy among men because of the assignment of some to agreeable, and some to distasteful and even odious tasks; (4) To a general laziness and indifference by killing the incentive for individual excellence in quantity and quality of goods produced; (5) To dire poverty and "an equal-

ity of misery" which would necessarily be produced by the "drying up of the springs of riches" through the state of affairs brought about by the causes enumerated above, viz., social discord, the dead numbness of slavery, evil passions rampant among workmen, general laziness, and indifference. Thus would Socialism ruin peace among men and the social virtues, and consequently it is to be condemned as *subversive of peace and morals*.

To sum up: Socialism is futile as a means of bettering the conditions of workmen. These conditions, as Christian Sociology and Economics demonstrate, are to be bettered; but Socialism would make them worse. Socialism is unjust, and falls under the prohibition of the natural law. Finally, Socialism is impossible of execution, for it would lead to disturbances that would ruin society itself; and on this score also it is opposed to the natural law.

iii. *The Acquiring and Transferring of Ownership*.—Man acquires property rights, or ownership of private property, first of all by *occupation* of property which does not belong to anybody else, and, secondarily, by receiving property by way of lawful *transfer* from the owner. The most ordinary form of transfer is *the contract*. We are here to study (1) the *acquiring* of property by occupation and associated modes of acquisition, and (2) the *transferring* of property by contracts.

1) *Ownership in private property is acquired by first occupation.* By *occupation* is meant the taking possession of something capable of being privately owned and which does not belong to another person. This mode of acquiring ownership is valid, although it can be employed very little at the present day, when nearly all the property available upon earth is in the hands of lawful owners. That first occupation is a lawful and valid mode of acquiring ownership is almost self-evident; and it is admitted by all except the Communists, whose doctrines we have already shown to be contrary to natural law: for we have proved Socialism fallacious and unlawful, and Socialism is but a modified form of pure Communism. Still, it is distinctly in order to present a concise proof of the validity of occupation as a mode of acquiring ownership.

We have proved that man has the right of private ownership by the natural law. But such a right would be illusory if first occupation were not a valid title for ownership: for man may acquire ownership by purchase or gift or other contract from the present owner; and the present owner might have acquired his property in the same way from the former owner; and the former might have so acquired it from a previous owner; and so on; but one must come at last to a *first* owner, who could not have acquired it from another because another did not own it: and so the right (natural to man) of ownership

could never have been established at all if *first occupation* did not establish it. Therefore, first occupation is a valid mode of acquiring ownership.

Besides *first occupation* there are other modes of acquiring ownership, and the most notable of these are: *finding*, *accession*, and *prescription*. *Finding* of lost articles entitles the finder to appropriate and own them *if the true owner cannot be discovered* by an effort proportioned to the value of the articles. Hidden treasure found without clue to the true owner, and goods left by intestate persons who die without natural heirs, are disposed of according to the laws of the country in which such goods exist.—*Accession* is an increase of property already owned, and a valid title to the ownership of the newly added property. Thus, if I own a piece of land on a river's bank, and the land is extended by alluvial deposits, the newly formed soil is mine by title of accession; thus, too, the young of cattle and poultry belong by title of accession to the owner of the parent animals and fowls. Again, if a neighbor builds on my ground, and so improves my property, the improvement is mine by accession. Out of the last case disputed claims may emerge; and these are to be settled by civil law.

Prescription is a title to ownership based on the undisputed and uninterrupted possession of property which the holder honestly believes to be his own (although as a fact it is not) for a period of time fixed

by law. The common good requires that this title be valid when due conditions are fulfilled; else there would be no tranquil possession of one's own property, for trickery could easily dispossess a man of his established rights. Thus, if my home has been "in the family" for generations, and now it is discovered for the first time that my great-grandfather's title to the property was not "clear," the right of *prescription* would make me the lawful and true owner and would rule out the ancient claim as unreasonable and "outlawed." Thus, too, if a public path across a certain field has been used for many years (the number to be set by law) without any complaint or hindrance on the part of the owner of the field, it becomes public property by prescription, and the owner of the field can no longer close the path. The conditions requisite for the validity of prescription as a title to ownership are summed up in the following jingle:

Fit goods; good faith; a title, too;
Due time—the thing belongs to you.

To explain: *Fit goods*, i. e., the property must be such as can be lawfully acquired and owned by a private person. *Good faith*, i. e., the person holding the property must honestly think that it is his own during the whole time required for the prescription. *A title*, i. e., an apparently valid basis for the holder's good faith. *Due time*, i. e., an uninterrupted term of years

(the number being fixed by civil law) of undisputed possession.

2) *A transfer of ownership in property is lawfully effected by valid contract. A contract is an agreement between two (or more) persons which begets an obligation in one or both contractors.* Thus, a man hires a servant. The agreement of both centers upon the work to be done. The man agrees to pay for the work, the servant, to do the work. Thus, we have a contract, and one which lays an obligation upon both contractors, or, as they are called, both *parties* to the contract. For a contract to be valid, to be a true contract, the following requirements are essential:

The *matter apt*; the *persons fit*;
Consent, and *formal note* of it.

To explain: The *matter apt*, i. e., one must not, and cannot, contract to do what is physically or morally impossible, or what is unlawful. The *persons fit*, i. e., the parties to the contract must be of suitable age (not infants or minors indicated as such by pertinent law) and must have the right freely to dispose of the matter contracted for. *Consent*, i. e., that is the parties must agree fully, freely, truly, and mutually, and must manifest this agreement by external sign. *Formal note*, i. e., a suitable document which follows the form of contract required by

civil law; for without this formal expression the contract would hardly be recognized as such in a court of law.

A special word must be said on the matter of *consent*. As we have stated, this must be full, free, true, and mutual. For such consent *freedom* is requisite in the contracting parties, and for freedom, *knowledge*. Freedom is not destroyed, but it is affected, by *fear*, and contracts procured under duress (i. e., under threat which excites fear) are often void or voidable in civil law. Knowledge is balked by *ignorance* or *error*. If one who makes a contract is ignorant of the matter contracted for, he is incapable of true consent, and hence there is no contract. If one is in error about the substance of the thing contracted for, or about the actual terms of the contract itself, the error is *substantial*, and the contract is void. Error about unimportant qualities of the thing contracted for does not affect the contract; and such error is called *accidental*. But if error is the result of misrepresentation or fraud, the party guilty of the misrepresentation or fraud must release the other from the contract—for the natural law forbids any man to take benefit from an act of his own which does and perpetuates an injury to another. If a man *mistakenly* misrepresents a matter contracted for, his misrepresentation is innocent; nevertheless he is bound to release the party injured by the misrepresentation, and to restore whatever

benefit he has received by reason of the misrepresentation. If a man *fraudulently* misrepresents a matter contracted for, he is bound to release the party injured by fraud, and to make full restitution for such injury, whether he has received any benefit or not. Let us consider some examples: A man buys what he believes to be wine, stating his order for wine; and when the goods are delivered he finds vinegar in the bottles. The sales-contract is void, for the error is substantial.—A man buys wine, expecting it to be delivered in quart bottles; but it is delivered in litre bottles, five to the gallon. The contract stands, for the error is *accidental*.—A man buys wine, stating plainly that he *must* have it in quarts, and that he would not enter upon the contract unless it is to be had in quarts. This makes the mere accident of the size of bottles a *necessary condition*, and so renders what is itself accidental a matter of the substance of the contract. If the bottles are found upon delivery to be litre bottles, the contract is void, and the purchaser is free to refuse the delivery.—Again: A salesman offers cloth for sale. The purchaser thinks it is good linen, although the salesman says nothing about the kind or quality of the cloth, but simply shows it and states the price. The sale is effected. Later the purchaser finds the cloth is not linen, and goes to the salesman to demand restitution. Here the purchaser is in the wrong. The contract stands. For the salesman showed cloth, nothing

more. The purchaser mistakenly thought the cloth was linen, and a good bargain at the price offered. But that mistake was the purchaser's fault. The contract really was for "this cloth;" and "this cloth" was duly delivered upon payment of the price; and so the contract was forever closed.—A salesman mistakenly offers a cotton mixture as linen, and the purchaser pays for it as linen. The purchaser is a dressmaker, and she uses the cloth to make garments which she represents to a customer as linen. The customer finds out that the garments are not linen at all. The dressmaker's reputation suffers; she loses many customers. She has recourse to the salesman who sold her the cloth. He is bound to restore to her the extra price he received from her in the first instance, that is, he is bound to restore the benefit that accrued to him through the selling of cotton goods as linen. There, however, his obligation ends. But if the salesman was *fraudulent*, if he deliberately represented as linen what he knew to be an inferior cloth, then he is bound to make restitution for all that the dressmaker suffered by reason of the fraud, that is, the payment of an unjust price in the first purchase, and the loss of customers and reputation.

There are several varieties of contracts, and the most important distinctions are: The *unilateral* contract, which begets an obligation in one party only: such, for example, is a *promise*. The *bilateral* contract begets an obligation in both parties: such, for

example, is a *wage-contract*, for in this the employer is obligated to pay wages, and the employee is obligated to do a certain work. Again we have the *gratuitous* and the *onerous* contract: in the former only one party receives a benefit (such, for example, is a *promise, a gift, a loan*); in the latter both parties receive a benefit (such, for example, is the contract between buyer and seller, between lessor and lessee).

The important ethical doctrine on contracts is this: *A contract is a valid mode of transferring property.* We have already seen that the right of ownership is a natural right. Ownership gives to the lawful owner the faculty of lawfully disposing of his property at will, provided no injury is done to his neighbor or to the community at large. Therefore, a man may dispose of his property by contract, if he choose, provided there is no injury done to his neighbor or to the common welfare. But if a man may lawfully dispose of his goods by contract, it follows that the persons to whom he transfers it may lawfully acquire and own it. Hence, contract is a lawful and valid means of transferring ownership.

From all that we have said about ownership, it follows that injuries against the right and fact of ownership, or against valid modes of acquiring it, or against lawful modes of transferring it, are injuries against justice which demand equal restora-

tion or restitution. Such injuries are, for example, theft, wilful damage, noxious trespass, fraud and its evil effects.

A final word must be said about the contract known as *last will and testament*. Like other contracts, this is a valid means of disposing of property. It is the right of an owner to transfer his goods by last will and testament, and this is not a *civil*, but a *natural* right. The civil law may, and should, determine the formalities of willing, and arrange the disposal of the property of a man who dies intestate (i. e., without having made a will), but the right of willing itself comes from the natural law. A man may leave his property to others of his choice, provided he does not thereby effect an injury. Such an injury would be effected if a man left his natural heirs destitute and bequeathed all his property to others. In such a case, the natural right of the heirs would prevail, and the will (with due process of civil law, as required for the common welfare) would be set aside.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this very lengthy Article we have considered the *goods of life and body*, the *goods of soul*, the *goods of reputation and honor*, and the *goods of fortune*, which our neighbor possesses, or may law-

fully possess, and with regard to which we have special obligations.

Goods of life and body: We have seen that homicide is always contrary to the natural law, as is all injury to body, health, limb, and personal physical liberty. We have studied the peculiar and precise circumstances in which it becomes lawful to take the life of another.

Goods of soul: We have seen that scandal and enslavement are contrary to the natural law as contravening our neighbor's rights of *will*; and that his rights of *intellect* are outraged by lying. We have justified the principle that a lie is never lawful. We have seen that the concealment of the truth, which involves no lying, is licit and, in certain circumstances, a duty owed in charity.

Goods of reputation and honor: We have stated and proved that man has a right to his good name, and to the honor regularly due to his nature and position; we have seen these rights to be based upon the natural law.

Goods of fortune: We have learned that the right of ownership is a natural right, and that the doctrines which limit or deny this right are fallacious and unjust. Of such doctrines, we have singled out Socialism for special study. We have discussed the valid modes by which property is acquired (occupation, finding, accession, prescription), and the modes

by which property is lawfully transferred from one owner to another (contracts). We have made a brief study of the contract known as *the last will and testament*.

BOOK SECOND

SOCIAL ETHICS

CHAPTER I

THE FAMILY

Society rests upon the family. This Chapter treats briefly of society in general, and of domestic society (or the family) in particular. Since the family is founded by marriage and parenthood, the Chapter must discuss the subjects of marriage and the rights and duties of parents.

The Chapter is therefore divided into the following three Articles:

Article 1. Society

Article 2. Marriage

Article 3. Rights and Duties of Parents

ARTICLE I. SOCIETY

a) Definition b) Division c) Social Authority

a) DEFINITION OF *SOCIETY*

A society is *a stable moral union of a plurality of persons for the purpose of achieving a common end by the use of common means.*

It is a *stable* union, not a mere loose assembly or group; it is a more or less *permanent* group, bonded in a common effort to achieve a common end. It is

a *moral* union, not, on the one hand, a flock or herd, nor, on the other hand, a number of individual human beings held by a *physical* bond, as a line of prisoners are held by a chain. It consists of a *plurality of persons*, i. e., of some or many human beings, and these are allied together for *the achievement of a common end by the use of common means*.

When we speak of society in general we mean the human race, for humanity is a society permanently bonded by the common nature of its members, and tending by the use of means available to all, to the common end, which is, objectively, God, and subjectively, eternal happiness. Man is social *by nature*, and not, as some philosophers have taught, by free choice. Human society is therefore a natural institution, or, more properly, an institution of God, the author of human nature. It is not the result of a *free compact* or *social contract* entered into for the benefit of peace, mutual helpfulness, and prosperity (as Rousseau, Hobbes, and others have said). That society is natural to man is easily proved. Man cannot exist without others. Not only does a man need parents in order to be born, but he needs the care of others for a very long time after birth—something that is not true of brute animals, which are quickly able to look after themselves. Again, a child must be supported and educated by others; he needs the guidance and control of mature minds; he needs association with cultivated persons if he is to de-

velop his powers of soul; he needs society for the exercise of splendid tendencies (called "social virtues"), such as benevolence, pity for the distressed, love of virtuous and heroic conduct, etc. Finally, man needs society in his old age; wretched indeed would be his condition if he had to battle through life as a solitary, and to lie down at the last to starve and die when his poor strength was spent and his shrunken body unable to procure the means of its support. The *needs* of man call for society, not merely the *conveniences* of man, as the "social-compact theorists" teach. These needs are *natural*; and hence society, in answering natural needs, shows itself a natural institution. We may sum up the whole argument thus: Man has the natural right to life, health, integrity of members, goods of reputation and honor, goods of soul, and certain goods of fortune. But it would be altogether impossible for man to procure and preserve these things without society, and his natural right to them would be therefore an illusory thing, a thing without meaning. Therefore, the very voice of nature which proclaims man's rights, proclaims the necessity of human society.

b) DIVISION OF *SOCIETY*

i. A society is *natural* or *free*, according as it is a requirement of human nature or the result of free agreement among men. Human society achieves its reality in the Family and the State; hence the Family

and the State are natural societies. A debating club, or a workman's union, is a free society.

ii. A society is *simple* or *composite* according as it is or is not joined in confederation with other societies. A confederation is a composite society, and its purpose is not to absorb the minor societies (simple societies) which make it up, but to protect them and keep them working harmoniously and according to order. Thus, an independent literary society is a simple society; while the Catholic Students' Mission Crusade is composite, being composed of various individual Units, each of which preserves its own proper identity. If the confederation of societies is such that the minor societies which make it up are fused into such union that their proper identity is lost, the result is not a composite society, but merely a larger simple society.

iii. A society is *perfect* or *imperfect* according as it contains in itself all that its nature demands, both as to end and means to the end, and is self-sufficient and independent; or, on the other hand, lacks such self-sufficiency. Civil society (i. e., the State) and the Church are perfect societies. All other societies are imperfect.

iv. A society is *equal* or *unequal* according as authority in the society is vested in the entire social group, or is vested in one or more persons to whom the others are subjected. Thus a literary club which decides all matters by votes is an equal society, while

the Family is an unequal society with the chief authority vested in the father.

c) SOCIAL AUTHORITY

Authority is *the right and power of ordering others to act in a certain manner, and of exacting obedience*. Such a right and power is a natural requirement of society. Authority is necessary. For human society is a group of *free* beings who are made for the same end, but are not necessitated or compelled in any particular action. Thus we find the world full of varying and opposed opinions, of men of entirely different dispositions, of selfish men, of ambitious men. If there were no authority among men, what a disorder there would be! The human bond of a common nature, and common natural requirements, would remain, it is true, and would continue to make clear the *natural* character of human society; but the ends of that society would be defeated; men would be at all manner of cross purposes, hindering and thwarting one another in every conceivable way. Surely, if society is to serve its normal purpose of getting men on towards their last end, of helping them to work together to this common end, there must be *order*, there must be *peace* in the main, there must be *forbearance*, there must be *endurance*. Society is futile without these things. But nature is never futile, being the expression of the Eternal Reason and Wisdom. Hence, as nature

requires society, nature requires order in society. And as order is impossible without authority, nature itself requires authority in society.

Social authority, then, must exist. What of its extent or its limits? It is obvious that its limits are fixed by its purpose. Social authority exists alone for the right ordering of those things that are necessary to the attainment of the end of society, and which could not exist without authority. Hence, the government of a community, and the individual persons in authority, may not make use of place and power to enforce decrees that are mere whims. They may not abuse their office. It is true indeed that "a public office is a public trust." An office, i. e., a place of authority in society, demands of the officer honesty and honor, prudence and fidelity, courage and enduring attention to duty. The abuse of authority, by extending its limits beyond their due and proper place, is injustice and tyranny, and against such abuse the subjects of authority have the right to protest, and, when there is no other way of achieving justice, to revolt.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this brief Article we have considered the nature of society. We have shown that man is a "social animal" and that society is a requirement of his nature, and not the result of a free agreement or convention among men. Further, we have shown

the divisions of society, and have noticed the important fact that the only perfect societies are the Church and the State.

We have seen what authority is, and have demonstrated its necessity in society.

ARTICLE 2. MARRIAGE

- a) Definition b) Unity c) Indissolubility

a) DEFINITION OF *MARRIAGE*

We may speak of *the married state* and of the *act of marriage*, i. e., *the act of being married*. The *married state* constitutes *conjugal society*, and it is obviously of this that we speak in the present Article.

Conjugal society is *the stable union entered into by a man and a woman for the procreation and education of children and for mutual support and helpfulness*.

From this definition we learn that the parties to the marriage contract must be a man and a woman, and these *must be free* to make the marriage contract. When we speak of the indissolubility of marriage, we shall see that the existence of one such marriage contract renders another impossible for either of the parties while both are alive. We also learn from the definition that the *primary end* of marriage is the generation and education of children, for it is by these means that the human race is kept

in existence and brought to the proper development of its mental and moral powers. Finally, the definition indicates the *secondary end* of marriage, viz., the mutual love and helpfulness that the married persons are to find in this state. Of course, both primary and secondary ends of marriage are subordinate to the last end of man, viz., God, and everlasting happiness, and marriage is meant to help men towards this great ultimate end.

The ends of marriage indicate that it is a *natural* institution. Marriage is natural because rational nature inclines man towards it. It would not be necessary for the mere begetting of children, but it is necessary for the proper care and training which rational nature inclines man to give to his children. For it is *the good* of offspring that constitutes the primary end of marriage, and this includes not only birth, but rearing and training. Parents naturally incline to the work of rearing their children safely *to full maturity*. Hence, nature inclines man to a *stable* union; men are inclined by reason to *marry*, not merely to *mate*. In the second place, nature indicates the necessity of marriage in the fact that the sexes are not identical but supplementary, so that there is a general and normal need of one for the other. The strength, wisdom, and firmness proper to man need the tempering of the grace, tenderness, and deference of woman. Without the normal association of the sexes, to which nature inclines

mankind, the tendency of man would be towards coarseness and brutality, while woman would tend towards weakness and shrewishness; at the same time both would develop an utterly inhuman selfishness. But the saving association of man and woman, to which rational nature inclines, would not be found in any degree in mere animal promiscuity; it is found only in a stable union of man and woman in marriage.

Marriage then is *natural*, and conjugal society is a *natural society*. But it is not natural as breathing is natural; it is not a thing absolutely required of every man and every woman. It is natural, inasmuch as nature is evidently framed for it, and inclines man towards it; but its actualization, the fulfillment of the natural inclination, is a matter of individual man's free choice. The primary end of matrimony, viz., the generation and education of children, is sufficiently achieved without requiring every man and every woman to marry; and hence nature does not impose it as a universal and individual duty. Exceptions are not only in accord with the requirements of nature, but are sometimes very desirable and even necessary. Mankind taken *collectively*, i. e., as a group, is bound by the obligation of the natural law to marriage and the conjugal society; but taken *distributively*, i. e., as individuals, mankind is not so bound. Hence, it is lawful for anyone (otherwise free) to marry or to remain single. Those who

choose to remain single are bound to the life of *celibacy* in perfect personal continence.

Among Catholics, marriage is *a sacrament*. Christ raised this holy office of nature to the supernatural and sacramental order. Now, it is not only the *right* of the Church to fix the conditions for the reception of a Sacrament; it is her *duty*. Hence, the Church is bound to legislate upon the subject of marriage, and that in such a way as her great wisdom understands to be necessary and useful for the eternal welfare of her children, and, indeed, of all mankind. The Church faithfully fulfills this obligation. If her marriage laws seem to cause inconvenience; if persons not of the faith (and persons cold in the faith) are heard to grumble and complain about the matter; if thwarted human perversity speaks out against the Church as meddlesome—then it is to be remembered that the Church is doing the thing that Christ gave her to do, and that those who complain of the Church in such a serious matter are, whether they know it or not, complaining of Christ Himself.

b) THE UNITY OF MARRIAGE

By the *unity* of marriage is meant the stable union of one man and one woman. States opposed to unity are *polygamy*, or plurality of wives, and *polyandry*, or plurality of husbands. Both polygamy and polyandry are opposed to the natural law. This fact is evident from the ends of marriage as a nat-

ural office. Marriage, as we have seen, is a *natural* state, established for the achievement of certain ends. Anything, therefore, which opposes the attaining of these ends, is opposed to the natural office and state of marriage. But what is opposed to a natural office and state is opposed to the natural law itself. In speaking of polygamy and polyandry, therefore, we shall show that they are opposed to the ends of marriage, and this will demonstrate the fact that they are opposed to the natural law, and hence always unlawful and forbidden.

Polyandry would give several heads to one family; it would render doubtful, and insolubly doubtful, the matter of determining the father of each child; the duty of educating the children could (and would) be shirked and neglected by all the husbands, for none of them could know with certitude that he had a duty towards this or that child. Thus, polyandry defeats the primary end of marriage. It also defeats the secondary end of marriage, for who is there that can even imagine a wife and several husbands bonded together in love, and lending one another mutual support and help?

Polygamy is opposed to the natural law as a degradation of woman, for it makes wives little (if anything) more than slaves. Again, it thwarts the secondary end of marriage, for it would lead (and has led, wherever practiced) to bitterness, jealousy, domestic strife, and great unhappiness.

Another reason why polygamy and polyandry must be considered unnatural is found in the fact that they cannot endure; human nature simply will not stand them for any length of time. Speaking of the reputed disappearance of polygamy from among the Mormons, Mr. G. K. Chesterton has an interesting word to say (cf. "The Uses of Diversity", p. 184): "Seriously speaking, however, I have little doubt that Elder Ward speaks the substantial truth, and that polygamy is dying, or has died, among the Mormons. My reason for thinking this is simple: it is that polygamy always tends to die out. Even in the East I believe that, counting heads, it is by this time the exception rather than the rule. Like slavery, it is always being started, because of its obvious conveniences. It has only one small inconvenience, which is that it is intolerable."

To conclude: The unity of marriage is a requisite of the natural law. Unity is a property or attribute of true marriage, i. e., a quality that is necessarily consequent upon the very nature of marriage.

c) THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF MARRIAGE

The *indissolubility* of marriage means its perpetuity. To say that marriage is indissoluble is to say that that the marriage-contract, once validly made, cannot be broken, but remains in effect until it is naturally dissolved by the death of one of the parties. Indissolubility is a property or attribute of

marriage, and thus belongs to marriage by natural necessity. Married people may, under conditions that make living together humanly impossible or at least trying in the extreme, bring about *a separation from bed and board*; but such a separation does not dissolve marriage, and neither of the separated parties is free to marry as long as the other lives. In a word, then, indissolubility of marriage means that there is no such thing as lawful divorce.

The proof of this position on the perpetuity of marriage may be undertaken in two ways: first, by showing positively that marriage, to fulfill its natural ends, must be indissoluble; and secondly, by a negative demonstration, showing the evil of divorce. We offer the two proofs:

i. Marriage is a natural office, which has for its primary end the procreation and education of children. Now, while the procreation of children does not continue throughout the whole of the normal married life, the training, the education of children continues until the parents are well advanced in years. But it is when the children are reared that marriage, in a particular way, begins to fulfill its secondary end, and gives to the aged couple the consolation and support of mutual and enduring love. Hence, properly to fulfill its ends, marriage must be "a world without end bargain."

ii. That is an evil, and opposed to the natural order, which leads to disturbances and unhappiness

among men and gives rise to social discords. Now—as the records of courts, schools, reformatories, and prisons, amply prove—the breaking up of homes through divorce is one of the greatest, if not the very greatest, of causes of these social ills. Therefore, divorce is an evil, and is opposed to the natural order.

It is no answer to our argument to say that God permitted divorce, as we read in Holy Scripture. God made the bond of marriage; God can take it away. The point is that *man* cannot dissolve marriage. God has reserved this right to Himself, and the divine dictum, “What *God* hath joined together, let not *man* put asunder,” has taken the matter wholly out of human hands.

Marriage, then, is, and must be, indissoluble. It follows that divorce, so-called Companionate Marriage, and Trial Marriages of all descriptions, are contrary to the natural law. No civil law can justify these things. The State did not institute marriage; therefore, the State cannot abolish or essentially change it. But to attempt to change a thing in its properties is to attempt to change it essentially, for properties flow necessarily from the essence of a thing. Therefore, the State cannot validly declare any true marriage invalid. Divorce is impossible.

We may close this matter by quoting the words of a writer quoted in Muntch and Spalding’s “Introductory Sociology,” pp. 184 f.: “The law against

Divorce was repromulgated by Christ, not as a new law, but as a primeval law given in the infancy of the race. The command, 'What therefore God hath joined together let not man put asunder,' is at once a law given by the Divine Founder of Christianity and a law given by the Divine Creator of nature. It is a law which applies to Christians, Jews, and pagans, to lawyers and newspaper editors, to voters and legislators. It is a natural law. . . ."

It may be well to add a word here, by way of supplement to the Article on Marriage, upon the subject of "Birth Control." This horrible device is strictly against the primal end of marriage, and is an unspeakable degradation of human beings. It levels the sexual relation, which God meant to be decent, honorable, sacred to true marriage and subservient to the ends of that institution, to the level of brute instinct. What Birth Control is, and its evil character, may be learned from this brief citation from Muntsch and Spalding ("Introductory Sociology," p. 419): "Frequently non-Catholics misunderstand our position on birth control, for they seem to believe that Catholic married couples are bound to have children to the utmost capacity of the mother for child-bearing. This is not the fact. It is perfectly ethical to limit the family, if the method is self-control by abstinence and continence. What the Catholic Church absolutely forbids is the

limitation of the family or contraception by chemical, mechanical, and other artificial means. She considers it under all circumstances an unnatural and immoral vice, prohibited by the Fifth and Sixth Commandments." It must be recalled that the Fifth and Sixth Commandments—like all the Commandments of the Decalogue, with the exception of the day prescribed for special divine worship in the Third—are precepts and prohibitions of *the natural law*. Normal human reason could have discovered the Commandments without Divine Revelation; it was the kindness of God to man that led to the positive formulation of those laws which man *needs* to fulfill his natural duties, but which he could learn only by study and reflection, during years in which he should be diligently observing them.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined marriage, and have drawn from the definition the knowledge of the primary and secondary ends of this holy natural office. We have seen that marriage is truly a natural institution, obliging mankind collectively, but not distributively. We have shown the reasonable position of the Church in the matter of marriage legislation.

We have studied the two properties of marriage, viz., unity and indissolubility, and have demonstrated the illicit character of practices opposed to these

properties, viz., polyandry, polygamy, and divorce.

We concluded the Article with a brief but direct word upon the subject of "Birth Control."

ARTICLE 3. RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF PARENTS

a) Parental Authority b) The Education of Children

a) PARENTAL AUTHORITY

We have seen that authority is a natural necessity in any society. Hence, we may conclude at once that it is a necessity in conjugal society. The ends of marriage cannot be served if there is disagreement and strife between parents upon the matter of procreation and education of children; and, obviously, such discord is the direct frustration of the love and mutual helpfulness which marriage is naturally meant to give to husband and wife. Therefore, there must be authority in the family.

What is the source of this authority? It is nature, and not the State. Individual men and women existed upon earth before there was any such thing as civil society, and at that time they had the rights which were obviously the heritage and the intention of their nature, and which could be fulfilled perfectly without civil society. These men and women had the right to marry, the right to have children, and the right and duty of educating children. These rights, then, belong to mankind by a title that is valid prior to any claims of civil society in the matter. It is true, indeed,

that the State itself is a natural society, and as such is necessary to man. But this necessity is not lodged in the individual man as such, but in individual men as members of a considerable group. As soon as the number of persons in any locality or territory is large enough to make civil authority an evident natural convenience; as soon as the number of human beings is large enough to make possible the violation of one another's rights, the working of men to cross purposes, the rise of discord and turmoil, the existence of bullying, domineering, injustice, and enslavement; so soon does civil society become a natural requirement of mankind in that place. But the fact remains that conjugal society is a natural requirement, prior to that other natural requirement called the State. The family is the foundation and the fountain source of the State; for from the family come the citizens that constitute the State. Hence, it is an absurd and topsy-turvy piece of thinking that essays to trace the origin of domestic authority to the State.

Granted, then, that there must be authority in the family, and that this authority comes from the natural law, a further question arises. In what member or members of the family does this authority reside? In the parents, and not in the children; so much is obvious. But in which of the parents? The parents themselves, while not a family, constitute conjugal society; and in this society there must be authority. Is that authority lodged equally in husband and wife?

It could not be so; for, although husband and wife are equals, and are meant to achieve the ends of their state by harmonious effort, it is evident that, where there are but two members in a society, equal authority could bring about a deadlock on any issue, and could thwart the very end for which the society exists. It is unreasonable to think that a society, which is a *stable* union, could be marked by essential *instability*; it is absurd to suppose that a society, which is a union of persons working for a common end, could be so constituted as to render impracticable and even impossible the achievement of any end at all. Yet this is precisely what those must think and suppose who assert the equal authority of husband and wife in conjugal society. One of the couple, therefore, must have the first place of authority. There must be one head of conjugal society and of the family.

“The husband is the head of the wife,” says St. Paul, and this is not only a revealed truth; it is a postulate of human reason. The husband is fitted by his more robust physique, by his normal function of provider and defender, and by his capacity as founder of the family, to be the head of the household. His work in the home is no whit more important than that of the wife and mother. But we are not considering mere importance of duties here. We are investigating the question of place, of authority, in the home, and of what nature (the expression of God’s

will) manifestly intends in this matter. The wife and mother is the full equal in dignity, in duty, and in destiny, of the husband and father ; the point is, however, that she has not been placed in the position of command. The mother bestows upon her family the care and tenderness, the love and sympathy, that is necessary for her children and her spouse ; and these special and holy offices would not be normally acceptable from the father, even if he were naturally qualified to bestow them. Now, it is inconsistent, nay, repugnant, to combine with the sweet and beautiful (and very arduous) duties of the mother, the sterner part of the last and highest authority in the home. Still, the mother is second in authority only to her husband ; and she has true authority over her children. In normal circumstances, the mother's authority is exercised without the strictness and even severity that is sometimes exacted of the father ; and she may keep her rule without reproach by referring all matters that require stern measures to him whose place it is to enact and execute them. The wife is second in command ; and she must obey her husband in all lawful things that pertain to the common life and state. Only thus can peace and harmony rule the home ; and if these blessings be absent, the home is a poor one indeed.

Parental authority, like all authority, must be exercised according to the dictates of reason. It has its limits. It is itself an authority subject to the author-

ity of God. Hence, parents cannot require their children, and the husband cannot require his wife, to do anything that is contrary to the law of God, of nature, or of God's Church. Authority that is exercised for injustice ceases to be authority, and has no binding force whatever.

b) THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN

By the *education* of children we mean much more than their schooling. We mean their thorough training and development in things bodily, mental, and spiritual, from infancy to maturity. For this reason we speak of education as *physical*, *intellectual*, and *moral*.

Physical education is achieved by due development of bodily powers and health. Hence, those in charge of education must see that children are properly fed, suitably clothed, and sufficiently sheltered. They must see that children get air, and sunlight, and exercise. They must care diligently for children who are sick.

Intellectual education is achieved by instruction in the truths that man must know, and in those that he finds of use and of grace and culture. Those in charge of education must impart such truths patiently and perseveringly. They must train children in the knowledge of God and of duties; they must impart such knowledge as will enable the children to make their way in life, to support themselves according to the measure of their physical needs; and they must

give to the children such opportunities of cultural enlightenment as are suitable to their condition and to the proper perfecting of mental powers.

Moral education is achieved by training the will to embrace and fulfill the great duties which intellectual education makes known to the mind. The child must be shown how to do the thing for which life was given him. He must be trained to the practical love and service of God, and to the love of his neighbor as himself.

Those who have charge of education must see to all these matters. Now, who are "those in charge of education"? We answer: the parents, first, last, and exclusively!

What of the State? Has not the State the right to control education and the duty to impart it? Consider: The State does not beget children; infants are not committed to the State, but to their parents. If the parents do not care for the life and training of the child, the whole world is unanimous in condemning them. No one condemns the State. Now, if there is just condemnation for neglected duty, there is a *right* to exercise that duty. Therefore, parents, and not the State, have the right to educate their children. This right is inalienable, it is a right that parents *must* see through to effective realization: and that is only saying that it is a duty. Parents have the right and the duty to educate their children.

But how is the State to assure itself of good citi-

zens if it does not train them up? Let the State do all it can to encourage sound education, especially moral education. But let it not invade the home, and try to make itself superior to the family, the primal society upon which the State itself is founded. For the State may just as well and as lawfully tell a man what his children shall have for breakfast, and how they shall eat it, and at what particular table, as it may lawfully decide upon a set form of education and thrust this upon the children.

But illiteracy is a great crime; and unless the State direct and conduct the education of children, illiteracy will be the rule. It is denied that illiteracy will be the rule. It is denied that illiteracy is a crime. It is a disadvantage in modern life, and a person may have a hard time securing suitable employment if he cannot read or write. But some of the noblest men and women who ever lived would be called "illiterate," and that by many a sick-brained modern who never had an original thought in his life, and whose whole claim to learning is founded upon the fact that he has amassed a certain number of "points" and "credits" by sitting for a required number of hours upon hard oaken school-benches.

But surely school training, college training, and university training are the big things in life! Surely these supply man with true culture! Without these man would be dull and brutish, little better than an animal! School, college, and university may supply

a very valuable, but not indispensable, part of intellectual education. These institutions, valuable as they may be, are not the signs and monuments of the "big things in life." The big thing in life is the achievement of the end of life. To speak as a Christian, and that is to speak as a fully rational and reasonable man, the big thing in life is the saving of one's soul—that, and nothing else! Culture? What is it? Is there any university student, aye, or professor of our times, that can formulate a true and generally acceptable definition of it? True culture is doubtless true development; but true development is true education; and true education fits a man for the achieving of the end of life, for God and eternal happiness. Schools, colleges, and universities offer to a man—or may offer to man when they are what they should be—opportunities for learning that will make his life on earth more pleasant, and his way to eternity more clear. This is indeed a noble service. But when we come to the schools and universities as they are, especially the secular and State universities, we find them stressing this life, praising mere worldly success, forgetting all about the life to come, or denying its existence. And for the last complaint, viz., that man without schooling would be dull and brutish, and little more than an animal—is it not the whole purpose of many a secular university course to make man believe that he is little more than an animal? "Education" and "culture" are words easy

to say, pleasant on the tongue, delightful in the ear, but they are abused much more in our day than they are properly used. For these words indicate noble processes that are properly and perfectly conducted in the home, and by the parents. At least they *are to be* so conducted, and this is the requirement of the natural law.

The part of the State, then, is to furnish opportunity for learning; to foster it; to be its patron. If parents neglect the education of their children, the State may compel them to look to their duties, and this is all. If the parents decide that this or that child shall learn a trade, that is their business; no wrong is done to the child; no obstacle is placed in the way of that child to thwart the achievement of its last end; and the State has no right to interfere.

In this matter of the relations of the individual man, and the individual family, to the State—and it is a very serious and important matter—we must keep level heads and clear eyes. On the one hand, the State is needed by man for suitable life in society; it brings him security and many other blessings. On the other hand, it is the individual man who is the image of God; it is the individual family that is the basic natural society. The State is meant to minister to the needs of man, as individual, and in the family; it is not meant to be his owner or unreasoning master. In sober fact, the individual man is the more important thing, and the State the less important.

Of course, the individual man and the individual family belong to the lesser order, if one considers mere size, space, and numerical extent; and the State belongs to the larger order. But the State is not, therefore, the superior of men. The whole of human society is only a repetition of the individual man, just as the number 435,678,965 is only a repetition of the unit. Human society is not different from the men that make it up; it *is* the men that make it up; just as the large number mentioned is not different from the units that make it up, it *is* the units that make it up—only looked at collectively. And the State is only a section of human society, a section that has assumed proper identity, as distinct from other sections, by the adoption of a certain form of government. Therefore, we must not conceive of the State as a vaguely defined, but gigantic and all-powerful force, distinct from individual men, and keeping them in subjection. We are too apt to think of it in this way, and many of the men who rise to places of control in the government are too apt to think of it in this way. Their shadowy giant becomes a terrorizing agency; his mere size and strength tend to make him a bully. But the individual citizens ought to be alert, and they ought not to be cowed by this shadow-giant. This does not mean that individual men should feel free to disrupt social life; it only means that they should keep clear and sane their sense of values. Now, the State is the more easily conceived of as

man's master from the fact that it can imprison a man, and even put him to death. This, however, is not done to vindicate the rights of the State, but to vindicate the rights of *the individual men* that live in the State. Once we have that clear, once we grasp the truth that the State is not something inhuman and monstrous, taller than the mountains and resistless as the sea, a thing surrounding man, and forcing man, and ruling man as it pleases, we shall be on the way to the proper understanding of the complicated relations of the individual man and the individual family to the State. We shall be in a fair way to judge properly the inanity of many remarks that fall each day from the lips of persons who suppose themselves educated, such remarks, for instance, as, "Why isn't there a law against this? Why doesn't the government *force* these people to keep their children clean?" or, "Why doesn't the legislature pass a law compelling this subject to be taught in the schools?" and so on. There is a place for State laws; these are required for the safety of men living together in numbers as a society; these laws are to be respected and obeyed; they are meant to be a *help* to the individual men that live in civil society. But if State authority is defined by these high purposes, it is also limited by them. When the State interferes with the natural rights of individual men or of individual families, it is doing as unjust and immoral a deed as the father (the seat of parental authority) would do

were he to outrage the conscience of his children or injure their health or interfere with their normal development. What should we think of the father who would say, "I like bow-legs. All my children must have bow-legs. This interesting little device of unyielding iron must be clamped upon them to insure the desired result, the proper parenthetical curve"? What should be thought of a mother who said, "I find that roast beef is very good for the complexion; therefore, I shall stuff my babies with roast beef, and nothing but roast beef, until their little cheeks bloom like June roses"? These absurd examples do not make us think that fathers and mothers are wrong in exercising their authority; it only makes us understand that their authority has limits, and that it can be horribly abused. So we are to understand, not that State authority is wrong, or an evil, for it is a necessary good; but we are to understand that State authority has limits, and that it can be horribly abused. It is so abused when the State violates the natural rights of individuals and of families. It is so abused when the State seeks to assume the full control and dictatorship in the matter of education. The imposition of a set form of State education upon a child is as unreasonable and as evil as iron clamps fixed upon its body. The cramming of the child's mind with subjects chosen by the State is as unreasonable as the stuffing of babies with roast beef. We conclude: Parents have the right and

duty of educating their children. This they must do in accordance with the natural law, the law of God, and with the prescriptions of true religion and morality.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

We have seen, in this Article, that authority is necessary in conjugal society, which is established by husband and wife, and in the family, which is established by father, mother, and child. We have justified the declaration that the normal and natural seat of that authority is the husband and father.

We have defined the education of their children as the first and most important duty of parents. We have learned what such education is, and have shown that the work of conducting it belongs to the parents of the children, and to no other agency. We have discussed in some detail the fallacy of "State Controlled and Compulsory Education."

CHAPTER II

THE STATE, MAN'S WORK, AND THE CHURCH

This Chapter deals with the nature, origin, and ends of civil society, i. e., *the State*. Next, it takes up man's professional life, his life as a worker, and considers his right to form workmen's associations or unions, his right to work and to a just wage, his rights and duties in the matters of strikes, lockouts, and boycotts. Finally, the Chapter treats very briefly of the Church, its nature, and its relation to the State.

The Chapter is divided into three Articles, as follows:

Article 1. The State

Article 2. Man's Work

Article 3. The Church

ARTICLE I. THE STATE

a) Definition and Origin b) The Extent of State Authority

a) DEFINITION AND ORIGIN OF *THE STATE*

In earlier Chapters we have spoken frequently of *the State* or *civil society*, but there is need for a direct and summary discussion of the subject here.

Aristotle defines the State as a perfect natural society. The definition may be amplified and expressed as follows: *The State is a perfect natural union of*

families, established for their common temporal good under a definite government.

To explain the definition. The State is a *natural* society, for men, by an impulse and urge of nature, form civil groups and establish governments. The State is a *perfect* society, for it requires no other society upon which it depends for its peculiar function; *in its own sphere* it is self-sufficient and independent. The State exists for *the common temporal good* of those that make it up, and these members are, first, families, and, secondly, the individuals that compose families; and the State is meant to serve its members in temporal and external things. On this score the State differs from the Church, which serves the eternal and spiritual interests of men. Finally, the State is constituted *under a definite form of government*, that is, the members of the State are under the same *authority* in civil matters (i. e., temporal and external matters); and this is only saying that the State is a society, for authority is essential to any society; and the State must therefore have authority and a *seat of authority* or *government*, whether this be in the form of monarchy, democracy, aristocracy, oligarchy, or any other governing power.

The *origin* of the State is indicated in the definition we have given, for we have called the State a *natural* society. The State has its origin in the natural urge and impulse of rational man to form civil society and set up government; it is a requirement of reason for

life in society. Those who deny this doctrine declare that man has established the convenience of civil society by free agreement, and that the State is not naturally necessary to man. The agreement, say these theorists, was a *social contract* or *social compact* made by primitive men for the sake of securing peace and security, and to this end they sacrificed, in the terms of the contract, the great freedom and advantages that were theirs in solitary life. The chief exponents of the *social contract theory* are Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679), an English philosopher, and Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712-1778), the French materialist, although these two philosophers are not entirely at one in their manner of explaining and defending the theory. It seems needless to enter upon a detailed refutation of the *social contract theory* here. Suffice it to say that it has no historical foundation whatever. Over against it as a mere theory stands the unquestionable *fact* of the existence of civil society; and this fact is a primitive, universal, and constant phenomenon among men. Now, a primitive, universal, and constant phenomenon existing among men who are different in every way except in their nature—for men are different in talent, in ability, in character, in tastes, in dispositions or temperament, not to mention the mere external differences which are so marked that no two men are precisely alike in all particular bodily features, not even in one such feature—such a phenomenon, we say, has no ex-

planation except in the one changeless thing about man, that is, his *nature*. Hence we assert that civil society, i. e., the State, is natural to man, and that the tendency or impulse of men which brings the State into being is a tendency which expresses a requirement of rational nature for life in human society.

Of course, the actual form of government is not a thing naturally necessary, but is chosen and established by agreement or arrangement on the part of men. If the individual forms of governing power (monarchy, democracy, etc.) were of natural necessity, then there would be but one form in all communities or countries. The question may be asked, "Which is the best form of government?" Aristotle, four centuries before Christ, and St. Thomas Aquinas, in the thirteenth century, have both declared that this question has no absolute answer; and we are unable to answer it absolutely to-day. The question has a conditioned or qualified answer, however, and it is this: that form of government is the best for any given people or time which is found best suited to achieve the ends of government (i. e., the external and temporal welfare of the governed, and, *indirectly*, the promotion of men towards their eternal last end) among that people at that time. We Americans are likely to declare that our republican form of government is the best; and it probably is—for *us*, and *in the conditions that mark our time*. But there are

possible conditions and times in which our form of government could neither be established, nor, if established, be made effective. Hence we may not declare *absolutely*, i. e., apart from all conditions and qualifications, that our form of government is the best.

b) THE EXTENT OF STATE AUTHORITY

Authority is essential to society; hence it is essential to *civil society* or the State. The nature of this authority is indicated by the ends which the society exists to achieve; and the same ends limit and define the extent to which such authority may be lawfully exercised. Now, the State exists to promote man's material and temporal welfare. But material and temporal welfare itself is a good subordinated to the eternal and spiritual welfare of men. Hence the State in pursuing its ends must not contravene the higher good, the eternal interests of man. On the contrary, the State must, in its own sphere, render to men such service as may be helpful to them in the attainment of their last eternal end.

The authority of the State comes from God. For, every natural requirement is created by the God who created nature; and the answer to such requirement is a thing divinely given. Now, civil society is a natural requirement of men, and is from God; and this requirement is met by authority in the State, and this, too, must be from God. But God does not work

at cross purposes ; He does not make State authority a thing to contradict His own eternal plan and providence. Hence State authority has very definite limits beyond which it cannot lawfully go. We have seen some of these limits in previous chapters, and notably in our discussion of the right to educate children. We are now to assert more generally the limits of the good and necessary thing called State authority.

The State must not interfere with the rights of the individual or the family in matters strictly personal and private. It must not, therefore, interfere with the rights of parents to educate their children, nor with the conduct of the home, nor with the personal practices of any citizen, except in so far as it may (and should) accurately define what the natural law already requires in cases of a collision of rights (cf. Book I, Chap. I, Art. 1, c). The State should protect, stimulate, and help its citizens in the proper exercise of human liberty. It should strive to remove obstacles which hamper the activity of liberty—such as war, excessive taxes, political dissensions. It should take repressive measures against violations of the rights of citizens ; and, where the natural law is not definite, it should clearly define these rights. It should help individual liberty by doing for its citizens what they cannot do for themselves, as individuals or as groups : and thus the State should open and improve ports and canals ; conduct public works such as im-

proved means of transport on a large scale, model factories, etc.; promote technical instruction in all branches of industry; help necessary or useful individual efforts by generous subsidies; and so on. To do all this well, the State should exact a certain and equable sacrifice of money from all citizens (*taxation*).

Our own American Declaration of Independence sets forth sound ethical doctrine in the matter of the due limitation of State authority: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these ends governments are instituted among men . . . that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it. . . ."

State authority, with noble ends and due limitations, comes from God. It resides in the people by the gift of God, and by them is conferred upon a chosen ruler. The ruler is responsible to God and to the people. God confers authority upon the whole people, not by any special act, but by creating them; for He creates them men, as free and rational agents who are to live together in human society, and the authority is a plain essential required by reason in these circumstances.

Such being the character of State authority, it

follows that the true laws which it enacts, i. e., laws that are ordinances of reason for the common good, laws that are just, honest, possible of observance, useful, permanent, and promulgated, are binding upon the conscience of men. Men cannot disregard such laws without moral guilt; for they are due enactments of authority which comes from God, and in so far they are particular expressions and applications of the Eternal Law, which is the Norm of Morality.

When civil authority is abused, an injustice is committed against the members of the State. In this case the rulers—who are responsible to God and to the people, and who are in office to protect, inspire, and help the citizens of the community—falsify their trust, and become oppressors and tyrants. Redress in such circumstances cannot be had through courts that are the allies of tyrannous rulers. How are the people to obtain redress? By due resistance. Of course, if the tyranny is not extreme, prudence counsels a long and patient sufferance. But if, in the words of the Declaration of Independence, “a long train of abuses and usurpations . . . evinces a design to reduce them (i. e., the citizens) under absolute despotism,” then it is the right of the people to resist. In this case, the tyrannous government is an *unjust aggressor*, and resistance is the one lawful means of overcoming it. Notice that such *resistance* is not *rebellion*. Rebellion is an unjust aggression on

the part of citizens against the State as duly constituted and established; and as such, rebellion is always a direct violation of the natural law. But resistance, even *armed* resistance, is justified self-defence. As long as the State is not wholly corrupt, wholly faithless to its natural purpose of caring for the common material welfare of its people, it continues to be the State, and an attempt to overthrow it is rebellion, a thing always wrong. But when the State has become the oppressor of its citizens, when it has ceased to be in any sense an institution working for the welfare of the citizens, then it is the enemy and the aggressor of the citizens, and may be *resisted*, and lawfully resisted, even to the extent of war and bloodshed.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined the State, and have determined its natural origin, rejecting *the social contract theory* as unsound. We have remarked upon forms of government, showing that there is no form that is *absolutely* the best, and that the *relatively* best form is that which is suited to the time, the place, and the people, in any given instance.

We have shown that authority is necessary in the State. This means that the citizens must be governed; that there must be some form of established power in control. We have investigated the duties of the

State, and the limits to which the exercise of its authority may lawfully extend. We have shown the divine source of just State authority, and the binding force of true laws enacted by such authority.

We have discussed the abuse of State authority, and the means of redress lawfully available to citizens under a despotism or tyranny. We have shown that *resistance* is justified in case of outright tyranny, while *rebellion* is always wrong and is opposed to the natural law.

ARTICLE 2. MAN'S WORK

a) Labor b) Associations c) Wages d) Coercive Measures

a) LABOR

Labor or work is man's effort applied to production of goods. It is the effort of mind or body partially or wholly applied to the production of utilities. While the term *labor* is ordinarily used to denote *hired labor*, and sometimes *manual* or *bodily labor*, it really signifies the effort of the professional man (clergyman, lawyer, physician, surgeon, actor, journalist, business man) as well as that of the mechanic, the "day laborer," and the farmer. All human effort unites in different proportions the activities of body (muscular effort), intellect (mental effort), and will (moral effort). And any human effort, no matter what proportion of muscle, mind, and will be involved, which tends partially or entirely to the production of

goods, utilities, commodities, values, results—in a word, that can *in any manner* be translated into terms of dollars and cents—is *labor* or *work*.

Labor is a means of attaining to man's last end, and indeed, speaking generally, an indispensable means. For man's faculties of body and mind were given him for the attainment of his last end; these faculties require the maintenance of bodily, mental, and moral life and effectiveness; and to this maintenance labor, or its fruit, is a direct means.

To the Christian, labor is at once a penance and a blessing. It is a penalty imposed upon man for original sin; and it is a blessing, for, given original sin and its disastrous effect upon the intellect and will, man would quickly become the prey of inordinate passions, and so would come to moral ruin and the loss of his eternal last end, were he not occupied with the necessity of activity, of labor. That "the devil finds some mischief still for idle hands to do," is an ancient saw; but one may dispense with the devil in this matter, and declare, as a postulate of reason and experience, that human nature, wounded by the Fall, finds in idleness the deep and full flowing spring of moral evil.

Labor is man's right and duty. Speaking generally, it is a necessary means to his last end, and therefore his inalienable right. Speaking particularly, labor of some kind is the duty of each and all, for it is the opportunity of gaining merit for the life to come.

Further, labor is a solace, a source of interest and pleasure, of peace and happiness—at least for the man who undertakes it with willing spirit in imitation of Our Divine Lord.

If labor be a thing productive of fruits that can be, in any manner whatever, translated into terms of dollars and cents, what of intellectual and spiritual labor? What of the hard study of the student? What of the continuous prayers of the contemplative? The student prepares himself, ordinarily speaking, for gainful occupation; and even the recluse, the finished scholar who studies and writes, pours out the wealth of his mind that takes shape in manuscripts and books, and is transferred and circulated among men by buying and selling. The contemplative, the rare soul called to “the better part,” wins countless favors for humanity; in example and through the fruits of active divine worship, such a soul keeps the world from forgetting the high principles of the Christian religion and morality which alone make labor possible among the mass of men to whom it is a hardship in itself, a thing that requires effort and perseverance. And from labor so encouraged come the goods of material wealth. Thus, there is a distinctly traceable relation between the highest and most spiritual occupation, and the labor that leads to material goods. Still, practically speaking, we need not go to such lengths to establish the justice of our definition of labor. In Ethics we consider *labor* chiefly in the sense

that the term carries to the economist and the sociologist. We mean the work that is done, wholly or partially, for self-support or gain, by the professional man, the business man, the farmer, the mechanic, and the man who uses bodily effort on "a job." In a word, we mean that which is done, wholly or partially, or in any manner, *for a wage*.

b) ASSOCIATIONS

Association is the active gathering together of men to form a society. Here, we do not speak of the natural association inseparable from the family and from the human race (human society) as such; nor do we mean by association the formation of the natural and perfect society called *the State*, nor the higher perfect society called *the Church*. We mean the coming together of men to form a *private* society for the better achievement of private ends. Thus we have associations that are *religious*, such as a sodality; *political*, such as a party committee, or a party itself; *scientific*, such as a society for research; *industrial*, such as a labor union; *commercial*, such as a board of trade; *literary*, such as a study circle or debating club; etc.

To form associations with his fellows for the better achievement of lawful ends that the associates as individuals could not achieve, or could not achieve readily, is the right of man, and a *natural* right. For man is inclined by nature towards the orderly devel-

opment of his faculties, and to realize this natural disposition he needs to conjoin his powers with those of others in association distinct from domestic and civil society. Such association masses and focuses the powers and the efforts of individuals; it coördinates, combines, intensifies, and directs these efforts for the achieving of a lawful end. Thus the end is achievable, and readily achievable, by the conjoined work of the associates, whereas, though a lawful good towards which each may, or even must, strive, it would not be so achievable by individual and separate effort. Hence, association is often a better means to a lawful end than individual effort; just as "two heads are better than one," and just as ten hands will lift a greater weight than two. Now, man has a natural right to achieve lawful ends; hence he has the natural right to the use of the means, and of the better means, to that achievement. It follows that the right of association is a natural right. Again: as a single person requires the union of head and hands and tools to accomplish a piece of work, and as he has the natural right to combine these things in the production of the work, so, by a true parity, Tom and Dick and Harry may unite to achieve a certain end, and they have the natural right so to unite; and in uniting they constitute a *moral person*, a single moral personality, which has rights that are not to be limited more than those of physical persons.

Now, if men may lawfully unite in association for

the achievement of a lawful end, workers may so unite. And thus "professional associations" may lawfully exist. Of such associations, the more important for Ethics (as being the most common, and as presenting the most obvious field of application for matters of right) exist among industrial workers, and are known as "labor unions", or, collectively, as "organized labor." With such associations we shall deal in brief detail.

Workers are not machines, not tools, not work-horses. They are men. As men they have rights to goods of soul, of body, and of fortune. They have duties too: duties to God, to self, to fellowmen. When these facts or their implications are ignored by those that have the control of the means of production (capitalists and employers), an injustice is done, and this is an injustice against the natural law. So much is evident. Now, individual workmen are powerless to combat such injustice if it exists, and to prevent its existence if it threatens. Organized labor can resist or prevent such injustice. Hence organization of labor is lawful as a necessary means to protect natural rights.

Labor unions must strive to obtain for workers that fulness of rounded human life, that orderly development of faculties, and seemly use thereof, that belong to individual men by right of nature. Therefore, the effort of such unions must be to secure to men *true freedom* in the making of wage contracts,

and there is no true freedom when the worker has the alternative of accepting this sort of work, or wage, or working condition, or hours of work, or of starving. Hence labor unions must seek to establish and maintain decency in work, justice in wages, humanity in the working schedule, sanitary conditions in the places of employment. In a word, labor unions must seek to fix the conditions of labor justly, so that the workman may be kept out of servitude, and may live free to do "all that may become a man," neither attempting more, nor accepting less.

Labor unions, like other moral and physical persons, must not exceed their rights. They must fulfill their duties. If labor unions are not used for lawful ends, they are abused. They must not, therefore, demand exorbitant returns for work, nor unreasonable hours, nor bring to naught their efforts for a just wage and decent living conditions by prosecuting accidental and trifling demands. Nor must they be too quick to employ coercive methods in gaining their just ends, but must reserve such methods (strikes, boycotts) as the last reluctant resort.

c) WAGES

Wages are *the price of work*. Wages are the sum of money, or money equivalent, exchanged for a certain amount of work, or for a certain time of service. The *nominal wage* is the *sum named* in the wage contract; the *real wage* is the exchange value of this

sum. In other words, the nominal wage is the face value of the money paid, and the real wage is the amount of goods this money will buy. Thus a man whose wage is ten dollars a day in 1930 has a much higher *nominal* wage than a man whose wage was five dollars a day in 1905; and still the latter's *real* wage is the greater of the two, for one could procure more with five dollars in 1905 than with ten in 1930.

Workman and employer agree on the wage to be paid; the workman gives his labor, in terms of *products* (piece work) or of *time* (day-work, monthly work, etc.), and the employer pays money. Thus between the employer and the laborer there is a *contract* made, and this contract is *bilateral*, since there is an obligation imposed by the contract upon both parties to it. Now, as we have seen, a true contract requires *freedom* in the parties. But if the workman is forced to accept the employer's terms, or starve, he has no real freedom in the matter; and unless the terms offered are humanly liberal, an injustice is done to the worker. Out of this situation arises the question of *a just wage*. Certainly, the worker is entitled to justice; hence he is entitled to a just wage. But *what, precisely, is a just wage?*

If men were free to regard human labor as a material good to be disposed of like any commodity; if they were free to buy and sell it as they are free to buy and sell tools, or land, or domestic animals; then

the matter of deciding upon the actual amount of a just wage would be comparatively simple. Men would simply look for the market value of labor and dispose of it at that price. Employers would grumble, "Labor is up to-day," or would gleefully concede that, "Labor is down to something like a reasonable rate just now." But labor is not merely a material commodity. It has in it something of the nature and dignity of man. It has a *human* element. It follows, therefore, that a wage contract, a contract in which labor is exchanged for money, must not be an agreement which turns a man into a chattel; it must not be an agreement to the detriment of a man with rights to life, to health, to good moral influences, to the performance of duties of vocation, such as the founding and supporting of a family, the provision for age and sickness in himself and in his dependents. In a word, the wage contract must be such as takes into account at least the minimum essentials of a proper, full, and rounded human life.

A just wage is obviously not to be computed in figures; no *nominal* just wage can be fixed, for nothing is so variable as the exchange value of money. But something like a fixed requirement for a just wage may be established in *real* terms, i. e., in terms of what such a wage should be capable of providing. Certainly a just wage must be a *living wage*, i. e., such as will enable the recipient to live a decent and respectable, if frugal, life, and to pro-

vide something for times of age, ill-health, or unemployment.

Thus far we speak of a *personal* just wage. But what of a *family wage*, i. e., a wage sufficient for the founding, support, and rearing (education) of a family? Sound economists and ethicians are agreed that a family wage is a matter of moral obligation upon the employer, although some of the authorities base this obligation upon *charity*, while others base it upon strict *justice*.

The details of this matter must be worked out by the economist and the sociologist. Ethics lays down basic principles, but cannot discuss all the particulars that must be considered in the actual application of these principles. The elemental principles may be reduced to these: Justice must be done. Justice means giving to every man what is his due. The worker must be given, in the way of wages, what is his due. Now, certainly, it is just that the laborer be able to live in humanly decent circumstances, and to support those who belong to him, by the fruits of his work. In the matter of determining, at any time and in any circumstances, just what *amount* will meet the requirements of justice in the wage contract, recourse must be had to the consensus of opinion among wise, prudent, upright, and experienced men. And the Christian employer will not fail to meet in this matter the full demands of justice and the requirements of Christian charity as well.

But what of the employer? Is he not entitled to a return, to a just profit, to his own "wages" in fact? Certainly, he is. Yet if he cannot obtain a due return without injustice to others, he has no alternative but to leave the ranks of employers and enter upon the state of an independent worker or of an employee.

d) COERCIVE MEASURES

Workers and employers alike have human rights. Sometimes these rights require defence. When there is no adequate defence except coercion, workers resort to *strikes* and *boycotts*, and employers to *lock-outs*. We must say a brief word on each of these coercive measures.

i. *Strikes*.—A strike is a cessation of work by agreement of the workers for the purpose of bettering the conditions of labor. A strike may be for the purpose of enforcing better wages, shorter hours of work, better working conditions, or all of these together. It is a lawful measure when used, under due conditions, for the defence or enforcement of the workers' rights. The conditions requisite for a just strike are: (1) That it be the only available means of reaching a just settlement of the difficulties between employer and employees; (2) That the matter at stake be of an importance sufficient to warrant the hardship and damage that must be borne by the workers, the employers, the families of both, and the community at large; (3) That there be a reasonable

hope of success in obtaining the good for which the strike is called. Hence a strike that is called for the purpose of bettering conditions that are already *just*; or a strike in violation of a just contract which the employer has not first violated; or a strike that means direct violation of the rights of others or of the community; or a strike that is too hastily undertaken where the matter might have been settled by arbitration; or a strike that is obviously hopeless to begin with, and is therefore not an apt means to the desired end—each of these is an unjust and an unlawful strike. Yet, as we have seen, when the requisite conditions are present, strikes are lawful; and the State has, therefore, no right to make a law prohibiting them. Still, the State, within the just limits of its authority, ought to interfere to punish or prevent the *abuse* of strikes. Thus the State may break up a strike that is becoming a menace to society. The State has the further duty of working out means to prevent the perpetual recurrence of strikes, and to this end it should create boards of arbitration before which employers and employees could adjust their relations with the secure hope of being justly dealt with.

ii. *Boycotts*.—A boycott is a refusal to have business (or social) dealings with a certain person or institution. It is, when just, a moral force exercised upon a person (physical or moral) to bring the latter to the practice of justice, or, more accurately, to

make him give up the practice of injustice. A boycott, to be just, must be directed against a true abuse, a truly unjust condition. It must be kept within the limits of justice and charity. It must be a means that is apt; a means that offers solid probability of success in the achievement of its end. It must be entirely without violence or the threat of violence. Like the strike, the boycott is to be regarded as a last resort, to be employed either when other available means have failed, or when there is obviously no other means available.

iii. *Lockouts*.—A lockout is the refusal of an employer to furnish work to employees, and is used to suppress injustice on the part of workers. The employer, like the worker, may suffer injustice. The lockout is his last resource, just as the strike is that of the workers. And, under due conditions—conditions which are, when duly adapted, essentially the same as those required for a just strike—the lockout is lawful. When unlawful, the lockout is a grave injustice against the workers and against the common good.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

Our study of this Article has taught us the meaning of labor. We have learned that man has a right and a duty to labor, and we have seen that the fulfillment of this duty may be made a source of peace and happiness as well as of material goods.

We have discussed the natural right of men to associate for the furtherance of their common welfare. We have dealt in particular with the associations known as labor unions, and have considered their use and their abuse.

We have defined *wages*, and have established the ethical principles involved in the subject, discussing in particular the matters of a personal living wage, a family living wage, a just wage in general, and the means of determining what a just wage is.

Finally, we have considered the morality of the coercive measures adopted by employers or employees for obtaining just treatment. We have dealt briefly with the *strike*, the *boycott*, and the *lockout*.

ARTICLE 3. THE CHURCH

a) Definition

b) Church and State

a) DEFINITION OF *THE CHURCH*

By *the Church* we do not mean the great loose group of men who have any sort of supernatural religion. We do not use the word as a blanket term to cover all the varying and opposed denominational religious groups of the world. Nor do we use the word as a general name for the group of all who are ordinarily considered and called "Christians." By the term *the Church* we mean the true Christian Church; we mean the Church which Christ really established and to which He imparted the authority to teach all men

and to guide and govern them in the way of salvation, i. e., of their eternal last end. In a word, we mean the Catholic Church.

The Church, then, is defined as *the society of all those who, being baptized, profess the faith of Christ, and are governed by their lawful pastors under one visible head.*

The Church is a true *society*, for it is a stable union of a plurality of persons and exists for the purpose of achieving a common end by the use of common means. It is a *perfect* society, for it contains in itself all that its nature demands, and is complete and self-sufficient in its own proper sphere. It is a *natural* society in the sense that all men have a natural obligation to belong to it, although it is *supernatural* in the sense that it teaches truths divinely revealed and is a means of enabling men to reach their last end by the help of grace, a thing which unaided human nature could not achieve.

We say that man has the natural obligation of belonging to the true Church. For consider: Man is bound to exercise the acts of internal and external worship. In a word, man is bound to practise religion. This we have already seen in Individual Ethics (Chap. II). Now, man cannot discharge this natural obligation without the exercise of religion in his whole life, which is *social* as well as *individual*. As man is destined to life in society by natural requirement, so

is he naturally directed to life in religious society, i. e., in the Church.

The true Church is a necessary and divinely established means to man's last end. Now man has the natural duty of attaining to his last end. Hence man has a natural duty of belonging to the true Church.

All men, then, are bound to seek the true Church and to enter it and to live up to its requirements. Those that have the truth know that they have it with a true and absolute certainty. These have the strict duty, in natural law, of communicating that truth to others who do not have it, and they fulfill this duty by word and example calculated to win others to the knowledge of it. The number of those who actually have membership in the true Church constitutes the *body* of the Church. The *soul* of the Church extends to these and also includes those who have not membership in the true Church, but sincerely and honestly and wholeheartedly believe that they have. It is a natural and inevitable duty to belong to the *soul* of the true Church.

b) THE CHURCH AND THE STATE

In this difficult matter we shall merely state *principles* which reason makes evident about the relations existing necessarily between *the true Church* and civil society. There has been much controversy on the matter, and it has all arisen out of a misunderstanding on

the part of those not of the true Church about the necessary character of that institution. If all men were actually in possession of the true religious *facts*; if all were members of the body and soul of the true Church, the matter would be entirely simple. But many do not have any clear notion of what the true Church is; and many are inclined to regard the Catholic Church as merely one of a great group of various and opposed bodies, of which it is the strongest numerically, and among which (as they think) it has the tendency to dominate. These persons regard the Catholic Church as they would regard a strong nation; they are on the alert for "encroachments," they suspect political motives, they approach the subject of Church and State with their defensive forces strictly drawn up, their suspicions keenly aroused, their hostility ready to show itself at the first seeming provocation. They come to this subject armed in impatience; they are ready to burst forth into irritable speech, "Get this Church out of here! Keep it clear of our political business! Let's have absolute separation of Church and State—especially of the State. Let Church and State be equal—particularly the State! Let each keep strictly within its own domain—especially the Church!" And then comes the timid Catholic, a man who knows the truth, and knows he knows it, but who is anxious to avoid irritating the really very irritable gentlemen who object to the union of Church and State—particularly the Church. This

Catholic is apologetic, in the sense that he seeks to excuse, not in the sense that he seeks to offer a defence. And his excuses muddle the issue so thoroughly that, to quote Mark Twain, "The oldest man in the world couldn't understand it," after he has done. And then the irritable gentlemen swell generously up with aerated Babbittism, and concede the right of existence to the Catholic Church, as a special favor not to be pressed too far. The timid and unreasonable Catholic is at the root of the whole difficulty. Hundreds of Catholics who are not timid, and who write and speak plainly, and in accordance with the dictates of reason, are unable to clear the matter because their own timid representative has mixed things up so, and is quoted back against them as having equal authority to speak with themselves. But, after all, it is not a question of authority but of plain reason. Make the case, for the moment, a supposititious one: *if* there is one, and only one, Church to which men are bound to belong; *if* this obligation is made evident by sound natural reason; *if* it is the clear duty of every man to achieve his last end by accepting the teaching and spiritual direction of this one Church—then certainly it will not be denied by the hottest anti-religionist or the smallest-souled Babbitt that civil government must, while having its own special field, keep itself entirely in harmony with, and in subordination to, the one big issue and the one big institution of life and the world. Any other position in the matter

would be untenable. For, life means nothing if it loses its end, its goal, the purpose for which life is made. And, according to our supposition, the Church is the means, and the necessary means, for the achievement of that end. There is nothing a sound mind can, in the circumstances, possibly conclude except that the Church is the one institution among all the institutions that really matters; and that in importance it far surpasses any civil government, any State; nay, a sound mind must conclude that any State is a menace to men if it does not help them to know, to love, to obey the Church which is the necessary means of attaining their eternal end.

Now, this supposititious case is really *not* supposititious, at least in its essential features. True, all men do not *recognize* the fact that there is such a Church, and such a duty of knowing it, belonging to it, loving and obeying it, as we have described; but the fact is a fact for all that. Many in the world know it; millions know it; all Catholics know it. And do Catholics, therefore, seek to subvert civil governments? Of course not! The Catholic Church recognizes the natural necessity of civil governments, and, if truth were only admitted, it is her morality that gives to just governments their solidity, their authority, their power for good. The Church not only does not seek to overthrow governments, but she would establish them. If the whole world were Catholic, if there were not a non-Catholic in existence, then civil govern-

ments would exist, and very probably in the very *forms* in which they now exist, in the various countries; for the Church has no choice in the matter of civil forms or regimens, and no concern with them. Then, as now, the following principles regarding the relation of Church and State would be the true principles in the matter :

i. There can be no true clash between Church and State. The State is a perfect society; so also is the Church. This means that each is self-sufficient in its own sphere. Each has its own immediate end to achieve: that of the Church is the sanctification and salvation of men; that of the State is the material welfare of men, and, indirectly, the prospering of men in the attainment of their last end. Thus Church and State must work side by side, each in its own sphere, neither one ignoring or denying the other, neither trespassing on the other's rights.

ii. Therefore, the Church must not interfere with the State in matters that belong exclusively to its temporal domain. Thus, for example, the Church must leave civil society free to set up what form of just governing power it pleases to choose.

iii. The State must not interfere with the Church by trespassing upon her spiritual domain. Thus, for example, the State must not interfere with the right of the Church to establish schools for religious instruction.

iv. The State must not *ignore* the Church (and

this is what most moderns mean by "Separation of Church and State"), but must, as having its own authority from God, protect and support the Church in its efforts to bring men to God, and must, in the framing of its laws, and in their execution, submit to the morality taught by the true Church of God.

v. The Church must not ignore the State, but must teach her children that obedience to duly constituted civil authority is a matter of conscience and an obligation imposed upon them by rational nature and by God, the Author of nature.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this Article we have defined the Church, and have indicated its character as that of a true and perfect society. We have discussed the obligation, incumbent upon all men by the natural law, of belonging to the true Church.

We have briefly discussed the relations that must exist between a justly established civil society (a State) and the true Church, and we have set down the principles dictated by the natural law in this matter.

CHAPTER III

THE WORLD-FAMILY OF NATIONS

This Chapter deals with the rights and duties of nations, one towards another, a matter which is determined by international law. There follows a special consideration on the subjects of peace and war. The Chapter is accordingly divided into two Articles, as follows:

Article 1. International Law

Article 2. Peace and War

ARTICLE I. INTERNATIONAL LAW

a) Definition and Division

b) The Principle of Non-Intervention

a) DEFINITION OF *INTERNATIONAL LAW*

Man enters at birth into the society of his fellows, not only of *some*, but of *all*. For all men have the same nature, and all are directed to the achieving of the same end. Thus there is a kind of universal community which we may call international society. The immediate members of this international society are *nations*, or civil societies, or States, and, since these are *moral persons*, they are the apt and proper subjects of rights and duties. The body of these rights and duties makes up what is called International Law.

International law is, therefore, defined as *the sum total of rights and duties, natural and positive, by which nations are bound in their relations with one another.*

To explain the definition: We say that international law is the sum total of *rights and duties*, for nations are moral persons and as such can and do have rights and duties. We continue, *natural and positive*, because some of these rights and duties are founded upon the natural law while others are the result of positive law or of international treaties and compacts. Finally we say, *by which nations are bound, etc.*, for international law does not express the rights and duties of individual men one to another, nor the rights and duties of a State or nation with regard to its citizens and the direction of its internal affairs, but of the rights and duties of *nation with regard to nation.*

Now, just as a man, a physical person, has the right to preserve his life, health, and integrity, and to perfect his powers of mind and body by the exercise of free human activity within the bounds of honest and moral conduct, so a nation has the right to preserve and to perfect itself. And, this right being granted, it follows that other nations are in duty bound to respect it, and to refrain from lawlessly violating it. Hence:

i. No nation may lawlessly trespass upon the territory of another; nor may large nations feel free

of this law with regard to small ones. All nations are equal in natural rights; and might does not make right.

ii. No nation may unjustly interfere with the internal affairs of another. Thus no nation may incite citizens of another to rebel against their lawful government.

iii. A nation may interfere to assist a nation unjustly oppressed. The principle of non-intervention is fallacious in theory and impossible in practice. Of this we shall speak in detail later on.

iv. A nation has the right to acquire new territory by accession, by first occupancy, and by treaty; and it has the right of dominion over all of its territory together with water-courses, and over neighboring seas to an extent required for its security; it has the right to develop its natural resources.

v. A nation has the right to recognition and respect on the part of other nations and their citizens; her embassies in other countries are sacred and inviolable.

b) THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-INTERVENTION

Nations are bound in justice *and in charity* to respect all lawful rights of other nations. Against the obligation of charity the so-called "principle of non-intervention" offends. We shall speak of this in brief detail.

The principle of non-intervention may be formul-

lated as follows: *No nation has the right of aiding another which is in the throes of internal dissension or which is attacked by another nation.* This principle is fallacious in theory and impossible in practice.

The principle of non-intervention is fallacious in theory. A nation has the right to self-preservation, and has the further right to use means to this end which are necessary or useful, so long as this use involves no violation of another's rights. Now, one of the licit means of self-preservation is the asking of aid from another when unjustly attacked: this is true of individual men and of nations, nor is there any alien right violated by such a request, or by acceding to such a request. Therefore, a nation in distress may ask for help, and such help may lawfully be given, nor may any third nation licitly prevent such help being given. Similarly, a man unjustly attacked may lawfully cry for help, and help may be given, nor may any third person lawfully interfere to prevent such help being given. And when a nation is in the throes of internal disorder or anarchy, it may ask for help and lawfully receive it, just as a man, suddenly stricken by sickness, may ask the aid of others and the ministrations of a physician. As it would be uncharitable and inhuman to deny the sick man's request, so it would be uncharitable and inhuman for one nation to refuse to help another in taking lawful measures to put down sedition and internal disorder.

The principle of non-intervention is impossible in practice. Suppose nation A is attacked unjustly by nation B. Nation A calls upon Nation M for assistance. Nation M refuses aid. But by its very refusal, nation M is aiding nation B, the aggressor. The principle of non-intervention requires that no favor be shown by either side; and here we have nation M, professing adherence to the principle, yet, in the very act of adherence, contradicting the principle. For not to aid the oppressed is to show favor to the oppressor.

SUMMARY OF THE ARTICLE

In this short Article we have explained the meaning of international law and have indicated the natural right of nations to self-preservation and development. We have mentioned some special points in which this right finds expression.

We have studied the principle of non-intervention, and have found that it is to be rejected as fallacious in theory and impossible in practice.

ARTICLE 2. PEACE AND WAR

a) Peace

b) War

a) PEACE

Peace may be defined as *a state of concord, order, and security among nations*. It is a positive thing,

not to be defined as a mere absence of war. Peace is a term applicable also to a single civil society when its citizens and its governing power are working harmoniously together with mutual trust. Further, peace is the state of the individual man whose life is lived in accordance with the requirements of law, when his conscience is tranquil, his mind and heart unperturbed, yet manfully active. True peace comes to the individual, and through him to the nation and the world, by his steady effort to achieve his last end by the knowledge, love, and service of God in the practice of the true religion.

Peace is not mere quiet, it is not inactivity, it is not repose, it is not laziness. On the contrary, it is found in activity, in free human activity conducted in accordance with the requirements of justice and charity, and marked by prudence, fortitude, and temperance. Peace is the greatest earthly good for which men or nations may strive; it is the essential condition of true development; it is the soul of security; it is the foundation of justice. When God came as Man to save the world, He came as the Prince of Peace, and His peace was given to men of good will. Good will means willingness to work for the attaining of the end for which life was given. Good will is not the mark of the man who is content to sit with folded hands; it is rather the mark of him who is ready to be up and doing, not with the un-

natural fever of mere external action, but with the prudent and persevering effort to live life in all acts as it should be lived. And to such a man is peace apportioned. The Prince of Peace commanded men to watch and pray, to be alert for the doing of good, to rely upon the help of heaven. This does not mean an alertness of eye or body, but an alertness of soul and mind and heart. Such alertness is best cultivated in the aloofness from the distraction that comes from sin and from inordinate efforts exercised in the quest of material goods. One must not think, therefore, that the life of the recluse, the hermit, the contemplative, is a lazy life, or an inactive life: on the contrary, it is a life of the greatest alertness and of the most active strides in the direction of the last end.

As peace in the home is an inestimable blessing, as peace in the civil society is the joy of all families, so peace in the world is an unbounded good to all nations. Nations, therefore, have the right and the duty to foster peace. And peace is not fostered by mere sentimental talk; it is not fostered by the evasions of diplomatists; it is not fostered by jealousies, suspicions, emulations. Peace is fostered by the cultivation of Christian morality. We must leave the statement for the apologist to prove, for it is outside the province of Ethics to deal with the matter in any detail; yet the fact truly is that men and nations will

continue to cry "Peace, Peace!" where there is no peace, until they learn to seek it at the feet of the Prince of Peace and in His Church.

b) WAR

War is defined as *a condition of armed and active hostility between two or more nations.*

War is distinguished from *rebellion*, which is an unlawful uprising of citizens against their government; from *revolution*, which is a justified resistance against tyranny; and from the *public conflict* called civil war; for war is a conflict between *nations*.

Wars are divided into just and unjust, offensive and defensive. (1) A *just war* is one that fulfills the conditions necessary to make war a lawful undertaking. We shall discuss these conditions in a moment. (2) An *unjust war* is one that fails to meet the requisite conditions. (3) An *offensive war* is one that is undertaken without provocation for the purpose of injuring or destroying another State, or for the purpose of enrichment at the expense of another State. Offensive wars are always unlawful. (4) A *defensive war* is one that is undertaken upon provocation to protect the rights of citizens or to uphold the honor of the State. We must notice that it is not always the offensive party that first *declares* war; war may be first declared by the party of the defence. The first offence may be in the nature of acts of hostility and injustice

done before war is declared and enduring in their effects to that time.

The *conditions necessary for a just war* are the following: (1) War must be declared by competent authority, for a just cause, and it must be undertaken with an honest intention. The last named requirement warns us that a war—granted the cause is just and that it is declared by competent authority—is rendered unjust if undertaken for revenge, lust for power, hatred of the opponent, etc. (2) War must be the last resource, undertaken only when all other means of settlement have been found unavailing. (3) The war must offer a reasonable prospect of success; else war would be a greater evil than the wrongs it seeks to right. (4) War must be conducted in a manner approved by civilized peoples. Hence, there must be no wanton slaughter or destruction which has no direct effect on the outcome of the war; there must be no direct killing or maltreatment of noncombatants, there must be no use of inhuman and barbarous methods, such as the poisoning of wells and streams, the using of envenomed weapons, the poisoning of the air by noxious gases; there must be no use of means that are intrinsically evil and against the natural law, such as lies, perjury, inciting to treason, etc.; there must be no continuation of hostile acts after an armistice or peace has been declared.

War is licit when all the conditions mentioned are

met. For, just as an individual has the right to repel force with force, just as a man may defend himself, under certain conditions, by the indirect slaying of his unjust aggressor, so may a nation defend itself. Now, the only means available to a nation for repelling force with force is war. Again, the State has the duty of self-preservation and of defending the rights of its citizens; and it is clear that there are times when this duty cannot be performed by a State without repelling unjust aggression, i. e., without waging war. Hence wars are sometimes licit.

But, however lawful, wars are certainly regrettable. To prevent the great evils that wars inflict upon the peoples of the world, the establishment of an *international tribunal* has long been thought of, and more than once attempted, as a court before which nations could adjust their difficulties without recourse to war. Many have been of the opinion—and of these a great number are non-Catholics—that the Sovereign Pontiff, the Pope, should be the president of such a tribunal. Leibnitz declares: "If we wish to recover the golden age, a tribunal must be established to settle the wars of princes, and at the head of this body the Pope should be placed, as one who aforesaid was truly the judge among Christian powers." Our World Courts and Peace Conferences are beset with difficulties; and, according to recent writings of journalistic but, in the main, reliable character, the nations of Europe, great and small, are even now diligently pre-

paring for another war. It is doubtful, to say the least, whether Courts and Conferences will hold back the storm when the time comes for it to break; but we have reason to think that a truly universal international tribunal, with the Holy Father as President, would have an effect in the prevention of wars such as no other Court or Congress could hope to achieve.

—END OF SPECIAL ETHICS—

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