

THE HISTORY OF
PHILOSOPHY

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

A Text Book for Undergraduates

BY

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Bishop of Columbus

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TO MY SISTERS
CLAUDIA, AGNES, AND ELIZABETH

FOREWORD

BY THE BISHOP OF COLUMBUS

Philosophy, the queen of human sciences, investigates the ultimate causes and reasons of the whole universe of facts and phenomena which presents itself to the inquiry of men's minds. A History of Philosophy is a critical record of man's investigation of reality; it presents an account of the effort of all ages to attain ultimate truth; it describes the various and often conflicting results of that effort; and it indicates, or should indicate, the continuous character of the development of true philosophy through the centuries.

The History of Philosophy is the story of discursive human thought. And the story of man's thought, no less than the record of his deeds, is a constant and unmistakable evidence of the evil that was done to mind and wills afar off in the dawn of time when pride first stirred the heart of man and brought the Fall. Since that day many thinkers have followed the way of pride in darkness, while the path of truth stretches resplendent before the feet of him alone who accepts in humility the guidance of supernal light. Prideful philosophies there have been in too great plenty in the history of human thought; and while the philosophers of all ages have been, in the main, quite sincere in their search after truth, many of them have been all too humanly proud and all too pridefully impotent of achievement.

At no time more than at the present have futile philosophies, bewildering in their continual multiplication, influenced the minds of men. And back of all these futilities there is ever to be discerned the pride which seeks to emancipate mankind from the control of the Creator, to divorce man from his necessary

relations with God, to declare reason or sense, or both together, the sole and sufficient instrument for attaining the fulness of all truth, to deny the necessity of Revelation, and to declaim through the world the horrible falsehood that Faith and Reason stand opposed one to the other. And yet men must have faith. If they will not have faith in God, they will perforce have faith in men; if they will not believe divine records, they will believe human records; if they will not accept the Word of God, they will accept the word of Professor Jones. Modern man is prone to accept the word of Professor Jones—provided his word bears the copyright of the current year. Modernity is become the test of values, and even the serious student and thinker in our day is concerned mainly with keeping abreast of the times, obviously unaware that in much he is far from being abreast of the truth. Books, newspapers, university lecturers, the radio, class text-books—all these sound the praise of human power at the modern moment, while even the sectarian pulpit sometimes delivers a new doxology and chants the glory of modern man in the highest. Yet modern man, when he comes to his philosophizing, is apt to display a vagueness and even a vacuity of thought, though inevitably he does it in a welter of wonderful words. The world of modern thought is still deceived with ornamental language. High sounding terminology, specialized and involved nomenclature, indefiniteness of sense, asymptotic achievement—these large characterizations justly apply to very much of what passes for philosophy at the present time.

Now, the modern mind, in the circumstances of this moment, could find no richer source of remedy and clarification than the plain record of what past ages have achieved. We have need to evaluate anew the philosophical effort of the past. We have need to trace out again the continuous course of development and the inevitable worth of the *philosophia perennis*. We must do this thing in a clear, plain-spoken manner, for those who are to realize and meet the indicated need are, in particular,

the great body of undergraduate students in our colleges and universities—no experts in intellectual subtlety nor in the interpretation of technical complexities.

Doctor Glenn has made a valorous attempt to supply a textbook fitted to the needs of the present-day college and university student. He has avoided involved and ultra-technical expression; he has presented the story of philosophy in concise, clear, and easily intelligible language and in an attractive style; he has set forth the matter of his work according to a plan that is orderly, obvious, logical, and complete. In a word, he has here prepared a book which seems admirably suited to the requirements of the modern undergraduate student.

It is our conviction that Doctor Glenn's History of Philosophy will be productive of a great amount of good in the interest of true philosophy.

JAMES J. HARTLEY
Bishop of Columbus

PREFACE

This book has been prepared as a class text for undergraduate students whose knowledge of philosophy is, *ex hypothesi*, neither extensive nor profound. It is meant to be insistently clear, and, therefore, it employs such pedagogical aids as strict division and correlation of parts and an emphatically plain method of development. On the other hand, it omits litanies of references, lists of readings, sectional bibliographies, distracting documentation; for the book does not attempt to supply or to supplant the function of the teacher. Besides, it is the writer's opinion—an opinion championed by some years of teaching experience among splendidly alert young men and women—that a text-book which tries to be at once a series of professorial lectures, a labyrinth of learned technicalities, and a handy reference library, has sadly overestimated its proper capacity.

The critical remarks appended in this book to the discussion of doctrines have been made from the standpoint of Scholastic Philosophy. In the earlier part of the book these are rather complete. In the later portion, especially in the treatment of Modern Philosophy, criticism has been concentrated into brief compass or omitted altogether. The reason for this abridgement or omission of critical comment lies in the fact that the student must be familiar, by the time he reaches the later portions of the book, with the basic principles of Scholasticism, has seen these applied over and over again, and is presumably equipped for adducing them himself in the formulation of critical judgment or the evaluation of doctrine. The study of the History of Philosophy has as an important fruit the cultivation of the critical power, and this text-book seeks to allow some scope for the exercise of that power.

While research work is properly the function of the graduate

student, undergraduates should have available for the proper study of the History of Philosophy a modest library of the better works on the subject. Students of this manual are recommended for any reading they may wish to do or find necessary, to the following works:

- Turner, History of Philosophy—Ginn & Company;
 Miller, A History of Philosophy—Joseph F. Wagner, Inc.;
 De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy—2 vols.,—Longmans;
 De Wulf, Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages—Princeton Univ. Press;
 Stoeckl, History of Philosophy—Longmans;
 Ueberweg, History of Philosophy—2 vols.,—Scribners;
 Hoeffding, History of Modern Philosophy—2 vols.,—Macmillan;
 Burnet, Greek Philosophy—Macmillan;
 Zeller, Outlines of Greek Philosophy—Longmans;
 Bakewell, Source Book in Ancient Philosophy—Scribners;
 Catholic Encyclopedia—Articles on philosophers and philosophical subjects.

The writer wishes to acknowledge with gratitude the encouragement and counsel given him by many learned friends during the preparation of this work. In particular his thanks are due to the Rt. Rev. Aurelius Stehle, O.S.B., S.T.D., President of St. Vincent College, Latrobe, Pa.; to the Reverend Benedictine Fathers, Ernest Gensheimer, Ph.D., Nepomucene Hruza, S.T.L., A.M., and Gerard Bridge, A.M., of the same institution; to the Rt. Rev. Joseph A. Weigand, LL.D., President of St. Charles Borromeo College, Columbus, Ohio; and to the Rev. John J. Murphy, A.M., Superintendent of Schools in the Columbus Diocese.

CONTENTS

	PAGE
INTRODUCTION	I

PART FIRST

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY, OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRE-CHRISTIAN TIMES

BOOK FIRST

ANCIENT ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS	7
CHAPTER I. PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEMITES	9
Article 1. The Ancient Hebrews	9
Article 2. The Chaldeans	12
Article 3. The Ancient Egyptians	14
CHAPTER II. PHILOSOPHY OF THE ARYANS	16
Article 1. The Ancient Chinese	16
Article 2. The Ancient Hindus	21
Article 3. The Ancient Persians	27

BOOK SECOND

GREEK AND GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS	32
CHAPTER I. PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY	36
Article 1. The Earlier Ionian School	36
Article 2. The Pythagorean School	41
Article 3. The Eleatic School	46
Article 4. The Later Ionian School	51
Article 5. The Atomist School	57
Article 6. The Sophist School	60
CHAPTER II. SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY	64
Article 1. Socrates and the Socratic Schools	64
Article 2. Plato and the Academies	70
Article 3. Aristotle and the Aristoteleans	80

	PAGE
CHAPTER III. POST-ARISTOTELEAN PHILOSOPHY	103
Article 1. The Stoic School	104
Article 2. The Epicurean School	107
Article 3. The Sceptic School	109
Article 4. The Eclectic School	113
CHAPTER IV. GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY	116

BOOK THIRD

GRECO-ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS	122
CHAPTER I. GRECO-JEWISH PHILOSOPHY	124
CHAPTER II. NEOPLATONISM	129
Article 1. The Alexandrian School	129
Article 2. The Syrian School	133
Article 3. The Athenian School	135

PART SECOND

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN TIMES

BOOK FIRST

PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS	141
CHAPTER I. HERETICAL SYSTEMS AND THE APOLOGISTS	144
Article 1. Gnosticism	144
Article 2. Manicheism	148
Article 3. The Ante-Nicene Apologists	151
CHAPTER II. CONSTRUCTIVE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHERS	156
Article 1. Greek and Latin Fathers After Nice	156
Article 2. Saint Augustine	159

BOOK SECOND

MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS	168
CHAPTER I. THE PREPARATION FOR SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY	170
Article 1. The Great Question of Philosophy in the Middle Ages	172
Article 2. The Carolingian Schools and Their Masters	180
Article 3. The First Mediæval Philosophers	184

CONTENTS

xiii

	PAGE
CHAPTER II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY . . .	190
Article 1. Realism and Anti-Realism	191
Article 2. Eclecticism, Mysticism, Pantheism; The Summarists	206
Article 3. Arabian and Jewish Philosophy of the Period	213
CHAPTER III. THE PERFECTION OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY . . .	219
Article 1. The Causes Which Contributed to the Perfecting of Scholasticism in the Thirteenth Century	220
Article 2. The Great Philosophers of the Age of Perfection	225
CHAPTER IV. THE DECLINE OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY	252
Article 1. The Causes Which Induced the Decline of Scholasticism	252
Article 2. Schools of the Period of Decline	254
CHAPTER V. TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY	262
Article 1. The State of Scholastic Philosophy in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Centuries	264
Article 2. The Revival of Pagan Philosophies	268
Article 3. Naturalistic Philosophy of the Period	270
Article 4. Political Philosophy of the Period	273

BOOK THIRD

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS	275
CHAPTER I. PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY	277
Article 1. Seventeenth Century Sensism or Empiricism	278
Article 2. Seventeenth Century Intellectualism	291
Article 3. Seventeenth Century Skepticism	307
Article 4. Seventeenth Century Scholasticism	308
CHAPTER II. PHILOSOPHY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY	310
Article 1. Eighteenth Century Empiricism	310
Article 2. Eighteenth Century Intellectualism	315
CHAPTER III. PHILOSOPHY OF THE NINETEENTH AND TWENTIETH CENTURIES	330
Article 1. Kant and His Successors	330
Article 2. Reactions Against Kantianism	347
Article 3. Other Recent Philosophical Movements	352
Article 4. Scholasticism in Our Times	358
BIBLIOGRAPHY	361
INDEX	363

THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

INTRODUCTION

1. Definition; 2. Importance; 3. Sources; 4. Method;
5. Division.

1. DEFINITION: The History of Philosophy is a scientific and critical account of man's effort to think out the ultimate causes and reasons of all things.

a) It is a scientific account: that is, it is a reliable history set forth in a manner that is systematic, orderly, and relatively complete.

b) It is a critical account: that is, it weighs and judges the doctrines which it discusses.

c) It is an account of man's efforts to think out the ultimate causes and reasons of all things. The human mind has a quenchless thirst for knowledge. Man wants to know all that can be known about God, about humanity, and about the world. Man wants to know everything about everything; he wants to understand all reality. Nor is man content with a list of facts or truths, however long and complete. Man does indeed want facts, but he also wants to know why the facts are so and how they come to be so. In other words, man wants to know facts together with their causes and reasons. Pushing this inquiry to its utmost limit, man comes to certain ideas and principles which he accepts as the roots and bases of all knowledge and of all reasoning. Beyond these fundamental things man finds it humanly impossible to inquire. Upon these

fundamental things man elaborates his interpretation of the universe—of the world, of God, of man. When man has done this, when he has pursued his quest of causes and reasons to the very end and has built up his interpretation of the universe, then he has achieved a philosophy. Philosophy is the science of all things knowable by the human mind and studied in and through their last causes and reasons, their ultimate whats and whys and hows and wherefores. Consequently, the History of Philosophy is the history of man's inquiry into the ultimate causes and reasons of all things.

2. IMPORTANCE: That the History of Philosophy is an important study is evident from the following descriptions of its character and function:

a) Philosophy is the highest human science because it traces out the ultimate causes and reasons of all things. Now the history of the highest human science is obviously a very important branch of study.

b) Philosophy is the font from which all the separate or individual sciences draw their principles, criteria, and methods. In philosophy all the separate sciences find their ultimate unification, their place and interrelation in the entire scheme of human knowledge. Thus it appears that philosophy is the most important of human sciences. Its history is correspondingly important.

c) What men hold to be ultimately true about God, man, and the world, has necessarily an enormous influence upon their conduct of life, their thoughts, their volitions, their actions. In other words, philosophy exercises a large influence upon the activities of men, and this is true of men as individuals and as social groups. It is apparent, then, that the History of Philosophy is the history of a very important factor in the whole of human existence.

d) The History of Philosophy gives the setting and background for the doctrine of great minds on important ques-

tions. It is therefore a study important, and even necessary, for the proper understanding of such questions.

e) If the history of man's deeds is of interest and importance; if the story of human ideals and aspirations, dreams and fancies, is of recognized worth; then, surely, the first and highest value must attach to the history of man's earnest and systematic thought, of man's most far-reaching investigations of reality: and precisely such a history is the History of Philosophy.

f) In its incidental discussion of false doctrines that have been proposed and defended in all ages, the History of Philosophy affords the student the opportunity of profiting by the mistakes of others, and enables him to indicate for the benefit of those misled the illogical nature of erroneous doctrine. Thus the service of the History of Philosophy is practical as well as cultural, and it has, in consequence, a twofold importance.

g) The History of Philosophy is a most interesting branch of study, and it stimulates both the understanding and the memory.

3. SOURCES: The History of Philosophy draws its materials from the authenticated writings of philosophers themselves (primary sources), and from other writings and monuments, the evidence-value of which has been duly tested (secondary sources).

4. METHOD: The History of Philosophy may be developed according to the sequence of centuries or epochs (chronological method), or according to the major problems of philosophy, tracing each singly through its entire course of treatment by different philosophers in different ages (topical method). A combination of these methods is used in this manual: the order of time is followed in the grouping of philosophers, while recurrent and related doctrines are noticed as they appear. This method seems well suited for showing the continuity of philosophy in its movement through the ages.

5. DIVISION: The History of Philosophy is conveniently divided into two main parts, viz., I. The Philosophy of Ancient or Pre-Christian Times, and II. The Philosophy of Christian Times. The major subdivisions follow:

- | | | |
|---|---|--|
| <u>I. THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRE-CHRISTIAN TIMES</u> | { | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <u>Ancient Oriental Philosophy</u> 2. <u>Greek and Greco-Roman Philosophy</u> 3. <u>Greco-Oriental Philosophy</u> |
| <u>II. THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN TIMES</u> | { | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1. <u>Patristic Philosophy</u> 2. <u>Medieval Philosophy</u> 3. <u>Modern Philosophy</u> |

Following such a division the present manual deals with the History of Philosophy in two Parts (I and II of the scheme set forth above), and each Part is divided into three Books (1, 2, and 3, of the scheme).

PART FIRST
ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY
OR
THE PHILOSOPHY OF PRE-CHRISTIAN TIMES

This Part contains three Books:

Book First: Ancient Oriental Philosophy

Book Second: Greek and Greco-Roman Philosophy

Book Third: Greco-Oriental Philosophy

BOOK FIRST

ANCIENT ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Noe, rescued with his children from the Deluge, became the second father of the human race. The families of his sons, Sem, Cham, and Japheth, multiplied rapidly, and at first all lived together in one place. But after the attempt to build the Tower of Babel to the height of heaven and the consequent confusion of tongues, these families separated. The children of Sem remained in the ancestral territory. The family of Japheth moved north and east into Asia. The children of Cham went south into Africa.

There is a close affinity in religion and philosophy between the descendants of Cham and of Sem. This may be due, in some measure, to the invasion of Chamitic Egypt by the Hyksos, who were of Sem, in the 20 century B. C. Because of this affinity the History of Philosophy includes the Chamitic peoples in the class called Semites.

This Book deals with the philosophy of the Semites—Hebrews, Chaldeans, Egyptians—and with that of the Japhethites or Aryans—Chinese, Hindus, Persians. The Book is therefore divided into two chapters of three articles each, as follows :

Chapter I. Philosophy of the Semites

Article 1. The Ancient Hebrews

Article 2. The Chaldeans

Article 3. The Ancient Egyptians

Chapter II. Philosophy of the Aryans

Article 1. The Ancient Chinese

Article 2. The Ancient Hindus

Article 3. The Ancient Persians

CHAPTER I

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEMITES

1. The Ancient Hebrews:
2. The Chaldeans;
3. The Ancient Egyptians.

Article 1. The Ancient Hebrews

The civil history of the ancient Hebrew people is set forth in Holy Scripture. The father of the Jewish race was Abraham, and the name "Hebrew" is probably a derivation from "Heber," the name of one of Abraham's ancestors. For our purpose the history of the Hebrews is divided into two periods, viz., that preceding, and that following the Captivity of Babylon (6 century B. C.).

PRE-CAPTIVITY PERIOD (Earliest times to 586 B. C.)

a) From the first the ancient Hebrew people believed in only one supreme God (monotheism) whom they called Jahve or Yahweh. The pre-Captivity Scriptures describe Yahweh as no mere local or national deity, but as the one and only God, creator of all things, author of the moral law. Yahweh is in no wise identified with the world (pantheism), but is described as distinct from the world and transcendent over it; yet He is present to the world and rules it as His creature.

b) The most ancient Hebrews believed in the immortality of the human soul. They regarded man as an exile on earth in consequence of Adam's sin. Now, the idea of exile involves the idea of a fatherland existing somewhere. If man is an exile on earth—as David often declares in his Psalms—his true home must be somewhere beyond the earth and earthly

existence. Again, the pre-Captivity Scriptures mention the dead as "gathered to their fathers" or "gathered to their people." From this we must infer that the Hebrews of most ancient times believed in a place and state beyond this life where the souls of the dead continue in existence. In other words, the most ancient Hebrews believed in the immortality of the soul.

ε) The earliest Hebrews believed in the retributions of a life to come. *Sheol* is the place where souls abide after death. The wicked dwell there forever (Psalms xlvi, 15-16; lxxii, 24 sqq.) but the just shall be delivered thence unto glory (Isaias xxvi, 19; Osee xiii, 14).

POST-CAPTIVITY PERIOD (End of the Exile to Christ)

After the Captivity the spirit of religion and philosophy revived among the returned exiles. In the Scriptures of this period the fundamental truths of the Hebrew religion are clearly set forth; the nature of God is discussed; creation of the universe by the simple fiat of the Divine Will is asserted; the spirituality and immortality of the human soul is taught; the rewards and punishments of the life to come are described. During this period commercial and social relations with the Greeks introduced new elements into Hebrew thought. Some Hebrews came to know and to admire the language and the lore of the Greeks, and to adopt from them both speculative doctrines and practical norms. Other Hebrews, regarding the Grecian influence as dangerous to their holy traditions, clung the more tenaciously to the old faith and rejected the infidel philosophy with horror. Thus divisions were created among the Hebrews. The most important groups of opposed philosophers and religionists were the Pharisees, the Sadducees, and the Essenes.

, a) The Pharisees held firmly to all traditional doctrines. They insisted particularly upon the spirituality and immortality of the soul, and upon the rewards and punishments of a

life to come. They made all things utterly dependent upon the will of God, yet they taught that man has free-will, nor did they offer any explanation of this apparent contradiction. They held that the Pentateuch (Books of Moses) contains the moral and ceremonial law, but insisted that the true interpretation of that law had been given by God to their own ancestors and handed down by oral tradition. They continually invoked this tradition in inventing endless new obligations and formalities of observance which they imposed upon the faithful orthodox Hebrews.

b) The Sadducees denied the existence of all spirits (materialism). They taught, therefore, that the human soul is neither spiritual nor immortal, and that the resurrection of the body is impossible. They acknowledged no Divine Providence ruling the world (deism). Inconsistently they rejected the doctrine of fate or necessity in the affairs of men (determinism) and held that the human will is free. The Sadducees taught that the great end of human life lies in such pleasures as can be enjoyed in this world (hedonism).

c) The Essenes retired from commerce with men and lived a community life under strict religious discipline. They professed the strange doctrine of the pre-existence of souls. Each human soul, they asserted, existed before its union with a body. It hovered about in the air, where it was somehow affected by sensuality and was, in consequence, drawn into a body as into a prison. Death liberates the soul, which is an immortal spirit, from the body-prison. After its liberation the soul will enter upon a life of happiness or woe in accordance with the manner in which life in the body has been conducted. To live rightly and win happiness hereafter the soul in the flesh must not be of the flesh; hence man must rid himself of fleshly concerns and bodily delights. The cloistered and disciplined life of the Essenes was the natural consequence of their doctrines.

Remarks: The Hebrew philosophy is essentially religious.

Its chief note of interest for the student of the History of Philosophy is the fact that it shows monotheism to be a really primitive form of belief. It stands in flat contradiction to the rationalist and evolutionist doctrine that belief in one supreme God (monotheism) was gradually evolved out of cruder beliefs.

Article 2. The Chaldeans

The ancient Chaldean people lived in the lower Tigris and Euphrates valley. In course of time this people was divided into branches more or less distinct, and of these the most notable were the Babylonians and the Assyrians. These two tribes formed great and strong empires. Holy Scripture often speaks of the Chaldeans, referring chiefly to the Babylonians and Assyrians, and testifies that they were well advanced in learning, that they cultivated the mathematical sciences and dealt in magical and astrological arts. The chief cities of the Chaldeans were Babylon of the Babylonians, and Nineveh of the Assyrians.

Up to the middle of the 19 century only secondary sources were available to the student of Chaldean philosophy. Of these the most valuable was a fragmentary relic of an historical work written by Berossus, a Babylonian priest of the 3 century B. C. This work was quoted by Eusebius and Tatian, and a few portions of it are still extant. The Chaldeans left a great many inscriptions impressed in wedge-shaped characters upon bricks (cuneiform writings), and the key to these was discovered in the last century. From the cuneiform writings we gather much valuable information about the life, religion, and philosophy of the ancient Chaldean peoples.

a) Of God and the Origin of Things.—The primitive religion of the Chaldeans was certainly monotheistic. One divinity, called El, was regarded as supreme. But this pure belief

soon deteriorated, for we know from the Book of Josue that belief in a plurality of gods (polytheism) was common in the Tigris and Euphrates valley before Abraham. The cuneiform writings also tell us that there was a well-developed and complex Chaldean mythology thirty centuries before Christ. The gods of this mythology were, for the most part, personifications of the heavenly bodies and of the natural elements, air, earth, water, and fire. Among the Babylonians the chief divinity was Marduk; and Assur held the highest place among the divinities of the Assyrians. There are varying Chaldean accounts of the origin of the world, but that most commonly accepted teaches that the universe emerged from an eternal primordial chaos of waters. Perhaps some god was co-eternal with this chaos, but all else came from it.

b) Of Man and Moral Duties.—Man was created by Marduk either to help him in a war which he was waging with another divinity called Tiamat, or simply to supply worshippers for the gods. In either case man stands in close relationship with the divinities. Man must, therefore, worship and serve the gods; and the gods in turn must help good men and punish those that do evil. In addition to the duty of worship man has the obligation of obeying constituted authority; he must be at peace with his neighbor; he must shun hatred, envy, discord, lies, murder; he must practise marital fidelity, not coveting the spouse of another. For the rest, ancient Chaldean ethics prescribes rules of mere external conduct.

Remark: Like the Hebrew philosophy that of the Chaldeans is religious in character. El, the unique divinity of the primitive Chaldeans, was neither a local deity nor a collective personification of many gods; He was the one God, supreme and peerless. In the cuneiform writings El is consistently described as transcending all, superior to all. Monotheism, therefore, came first with this ancient people; the lapse into polytheism was a later event.

Article 3. The Ancient Egyptians

The most ancient Egyptian people lived in the lower Nile valley. Their history is very obscure. Our knowledge of Egyptian philosophy is gathered from the sacred writings, or hieroglyphics, left in picture form on monuments and papyri, from the "Book of the Dead," of which various versions are extant, and from accounts given by Greek writers.

a) Of God and the Origin of Things.—The most ancient Egyptians were monotheists. The one supreme God was called by different names in different localities—Atum, Horus, Knum, Amon, Thot, Phath—but everywhere, and under any name He was regarded as supreme. In Heliopolis, the ancient intellectual centre of Egypt, the supreme God was called Atum. He was thought to reside in a primordial chaos of waters, whence He emerged under the form of the sun (Ra). Thus He came to be called Atum-Ra, and sometimes simply Ra. He generated a son and a daughter, and from these came another pair of divinities, and from these came Osiris, Isis, Set, and Nephthys. All these divinities except Ra were personifications of the elements or of parts of the universe. To these many lesser gods were added, as time went on, but Ra remained supreme. Ra was the creator of heaven and earth and of all things produced on the earth.

With the mighty religious revival which occurred in Egypt when that country regained its ancient splendor under the Sais kings (7 century B. C.) such fervor attached to the making of oblations that the very animals of sacrifice came to be revered and even worshipped. This was the beginning of animal worship (zoölatry) in Egypt—a practice utterly unknown to the most ancient Egyptians.

Later, Greek elements were incorporated into the religious-philosophy of the Egyptians, and, in the time of Alexander the Great (4 century B. C.), Jupiter was worshipped along with Amon and Osiris.

b) Of Man and Moral Duties.—The ancient Egyptians believed that man is composed of three elements: body, soul, and Ka. Ka was regarded either as an invisible genie, a kind of guardian angel attendant upon man, or as an intermediate element linking body and soul. In course of time, every living thing was believed to have its Ka. Ka required a material dwelling place, and the Egyptians took great pains that it might not go homeless; to this end they preserved bodies as mummies, or set up monuments to harbor the Kas of deceased men and of sacred animals.

The Egyptians always believed in the immortality of the human soul, in the retributions of a life to come, and in the resurrection of the body. The gods were thought to reconstruct the body for the separated soul, and the resurrected man had to appear before Osiris and forty-two judges to receive sentence of reward or punishment for his life on earth. Transmigration of souls (metempsychosis) was no part of the most ancient Egyptian belief; it appeared in Egyptian religion about the 7 century B. C., but we can only conjecture as to the occasion or manner of its origin.

The ideal of human conduct among the ancient Egyptians was of a high order. The practice of virtues, particularly of charity and benevolence, was regarded as necessary for obtaining happiness in the life to come. But, as a matter of fact, Egyptian morality was of no remarkable quality. The people trusted to magical arts to deceive the gods; and sometimes magical formulas were written in the Book of the Dead and buried with the body to help out the deceased at judgment. The living also believed that they could assist their dead by recourse to magic, deceive the judges, and so enable even the unjust man to escape punishment for his misspent life.

Remark: The Egyptian philosophy, like that of the Hebrews and the Chaldeans, offers clear evidence that monotheism was man's primitive belief and that polytheism was a deterioration and a lapse.

CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHY OF THE ARYANS

1. The Ancient Chinese; 2. The Ancient Hindus; 3. The Ancient Persians.

Article 1. The Ancient Chinese

It is not certain that the Chinese are of Aryan stock, but they seem more closely related to the Aryans than to the Semites.

As early as the 25 century B. C. the Chinese were established in eastern Asia. Their civil history is divided into various rules or dynasties. The first historic dynasty was called Hia, and it lasted from the 22 to the 18 century B. C. Next came the Chiang-yn dynasty, which endured from the 18 to the 12 century B. C., and was supplanted by the Ceu dynasty, which terminated in the 3 century B. C. The Tsin dynasty lasted from the 3 century B. C. to the 3 century after Christ, and was followed by the Han dynasty. Thereafter the Chinese were sometimes united in one kingdom, sometimes divided into several. In our own day the ancient absolute monarchy of the Chinese has been made a republic.

Chinese literature of religious-philosophical character is of two classes. To the first class belong the so-called King Books—Yi-King, Shu-King, Shih-King, Li-Ki—which were written before the 6 century B. C. These books were collected and arranged by Kun-fu-tse (Confucius) in the 5 century B. C., but parts of them were composed as early as the 12 century B. C. To the second class of writings belong the works of the great Chinese teachers who flourished after the 6 century B. C., chief of whom were Kun-fu-tse and Lao-tse.

CHINESE PHILOSOPHY BEFORE THE 6 CENTURY B. C.

a) The most penetrating historical investigation reveals the fact that the Chinese of remotest times were monotheists and worshipped one supreme Being called Shang-ti. Shang-ti was one, personal, distinct from the world, absolute in power. In the later books there is mention of another supreme Deity called Tien or Thian. Historians are unable to determine whether Shang-ti and Tien were distinct divinities or merely two names for the one supreme God.

b) Besides the supreme Being the Chinese worshipped a multitude of inferior spirits called collectively Shan or Chen. The Shan were regarded as the protectors of men. When a good man died, it was said that his soul had gone to join the Shan, and, in course of time, the honors paid to the Shan were given also to souls received into their company. Thus ancestor-worship arose in China.

c) With the coming of the Ceu dynasty in the 12 century B. C., a new people mingled with the old Chinese, and under their influence religion retrograded. Tien came to be regarded as a divinity distinct from Shang-ti, and was commonly identified with the material universe, particularly with the firmament. The worship of the sun, moon, and stars (sabæism) was thus introduced among the Chinese. Ancestor-worship received a new impetus at this time, and divination and magical arts—things scarcely known among the most ancient Chinese—were much practised.

CHINESE PHILOSOPHY AFTER THE 6 CENTURY B. C.

This was the age of the great teachers, a) Kun-fu-tse, b) Lao-tse, and c) Others.

a) KUN-FU-TSE (about 551-479 B. C.)

Life: Kun-fu-tse, or Confucius, was born of noble parentage. He lived with his mother until her death, and thereafter

spent three years in solitude, studying with great earnestness the traditional religion and laws of his people. At this time religion and morals were in a deplorable state among the Chinese, and Kun-fu-tse set out to restore purity of belief and conduct. He travelled through China, preaching a return to the old life and virtues. Received with some esteem, he was placed in public office; but the fate of the reformer was his, and he drew about his ears a hornet's-nest of abuse and calumny. Forced to resign his office, he retired to his native place and resided there until his death.

Works: The doctrines of Kun-fu-tse are found in four books, which are held in great reverence by the Chinese. These books are: Ta-hio (great science), Ciung-yung (the invariable medium), Lun-yu (philosophical discussions), and Meng-tse (the book of Mencius). Of these books Ta-hio alone is regarded as the work of Kun-fu-tse; the others reflect his mind well enough, but were probably written by his disciples.

Doctrine: Kun-fu-tse's doctrine is largely moral (ethical). He is limited in the scope of his ethics, for he does not assert the immortality of the soul and the fact of retribution in a life to come. Hence he is forced to find the motive for right conduct in such good as can be acquired in the present life. The highest good, he teaches, is perfection of self. To achieve self-perfection a man must practise self-control, universal charity, justice, sincerity, love of truth; he must carefully observe ancestral customs and ceremonies; he must reverence authority and those in whom it is vested, particularly the Emperor.

Remarks: Kun-fu-tse's philosophy told men what to do (Practical Philosophy), but discouraged the effort to think out the causes and reasons of things (Speculative Philosophy). His ethics is relatively pure, for it does teach men to live an upright life; but it lacks sanction, i. e., an inducement adequate to make reasonable men follow its prescriptions. There is no

complete sanction for the moral law except a firm belief in eternal retribution in a life to come.

b) LAO-TSE (born about 604 B. C.)

Life: Lao-tse was born in the Province of Hunan. He was of a solitary and studious disposition. He liked to think things out for himself, and clung stubbornly to his own conclusions, caring nothing whether these agreed or disagreed with what others had taught. He had no reverence for tradition. Thus his attitude towards life and philosophy was squarely contrary to that of Kun-fu-tse. The fruits of Lao-tse's self-training were enriched by some travel and contact with peoples other than his own, for he made several journeys into western Asia.

Works: Lao-tse wrote a book called Tao-te-king (book of life and virtue), in which he set forth his philosophical doctrines.

Doctrine: While Kun-fu-tse wished to restore traditional religion and morals, Lao-tse desired to build up an entirely new system of doctrine. Tao-te-king is, however, a very difficult book to understand. The word "Tao" is variously translated as way, reason, life. But, whatever its proper translation, Tao means a Being changeless and eternal, creator of heaven and earth—in a word, Tao means God. Lao-tse describes the production of things in this obscure manner: With Tao all began. Tao produced The One. The One produced The Two. The Two produced The Three. The Three produced the world and all things in the world. It is not likely that Lao-tse meant these productions to be understood as so many emanations or outpourings of Tao (pantheism), but his followers, nevertheless, did interpret his doctrine in that way.

The ethical doctrines of Lao-tse are vague. He does not name God as the ultimate end of man, nor does he mention the sanctions of a life to come. But he teaches that Tao is the

great model after which man must pattern himself. Now, Tao is perfectly serene. "Though Tao does all things," says Lao-tse, "he remains quiet and silent as though he did nothing." In imitation, therefore, of Tao, man must cultivate serenity, must keep an even and undisturbed mind in all circumstances and at all times. Man may acquire this serenity by ridding himself of the desire for earthly goods, particularly for riches and honors. For the rest, man must follow his natural instincts, and he will be happy. Science, laws, arts, learning—these are useless lumber. Life itself is nothing. Yet life may be made worth while by securing it for eternity. To make himself eternal, a man must not only keep serenely aloof from external things, but he must labor to acquire the art of proper breathing, which will create in him a sort of embryo of a being which will endure eternally. To neglect this respiratory art is to lose the chance of living forever. In Social Ethics, Lao-tse teaches that the ruler of men should care for his subjects by keeping them in ignorance and by supplying them with food; he should appear among them but seldom.

Remarks: The rules of Lao-tse's ethics are pure enough, but, like those of the ethics of Kun-fu-tse, they lack sanction. Lao-tse was much more of a philosopher than Kun-fu-tse, for he thought deeply about the world and its origin, and about man's duty of harmonizing himself with creation by imitating Tao. The effect of Taoism—as Lao-tse's doctrine is called—was, however, not good. His teaching was vaguely expressed, and his followers readily turned his account of the origin of things into materialistic pantheism. His doctrine of high serenity was quickly debased into a theory of pure inactivity and of indifference to all things, even to the prescriptions of common decency. Interesting and very curious is Lao-tse's doctrine on the art of breathing with its astonishing efficacy.

c) Other great Chinese teachers of the period following the 6 century B. C. were: Yang-chu (5 century B. C.); Mih-tse

or Mak (5 century B. C.); and Meng-tse or Mencius (372-289 B. C.), the distinguished exponent of Confucianism.

Remark: We find in the doctrines of the most ancient Chinese an indisputable monotheism, which quickly deteriorated into inferior forms of religion. Here then, as among the Semites, belief in one supreme God was a primitive thing, and not an evolutionary product of lower religion-forms.

Article 2. The Ancient Hindus

That ample portion of Asia which lies like a great triangle with its base at the Himalayas and its apex thrust into the Indian Ocean was inhabited in remotest times by a people called Indi, a name derived from that of the Indus River. Indi is transliterated as Indians, Hindoos or Hindus.

The history of the ancient Hindus is very obscure, but it is certain that they were making headway in literature and the sciences at no long time after the founding of Egyptian and Chaldean culture. For ages the Hindus lived in villages with no centralized government. It was not until the 7 century B. C. that states were formed and kings set up to rule.

The most ancient sources of Hindu philosophy are certain sacred books called by the name of Veda (science), some of which were composed as early as the 15 or the 12 century B. C. In course of time the living language of the people grew to be very different from the language of the Vedas, and other books were written to explain and interpret these; such books were the Brahmanas and the Upanishads. In the 6 century B. C. still other writings appeared, and these led to the forming of different kinds or schools of philosophy: these schools were called Orthodox or Heterodox Schools in accordance with their agreement or disagreement with the doctrine of the old Vedas.

Following the periods of religio-philosophical literature

in old India, we shall discuss: a) The Vedic Philosophy; b) The Brahmanistic Philosophy; c) The Orthodox Schools of Philosophy; d) The Heterodox Schools of Philosophy.

a) THE VEDIC PHILOSOPHY.

The sacred books called Vedas are four: ¹Rig-Veda, ²Sama-Veda, ³Yajur-Veda, and ⁴Atharva-Veda. These books contain a vague system of religion and very little philosophy. The following points are to be noted by the student of the History of Philosophy:

1—There are traces of an indubitable monotheism in the Vedas, but only traces. Belief in many gods, who are personifications of parts of the world or of natural phenomena, is openly taught (materialistic and naturalistic polytheism). The chief gods are ¹Agni, light; ²Varuna, dawn; and ³Indra, the firmament. Of these, Varuna is the most notable, and, indeed, is sometimes described as having attributes possible in a supreme Being only.

2—The Vedic account of the origin of things is so mixed and vague that contradictory doctrines can be drawn from it. Thus we have, on the one hand, a kind of material evolution of things from a primordial chaos; and, on the other hand, we find the world described as an outpouring or manifestation of the Absolute, i. e., of an infinite Being.

3—The human soul is sometimes described as the principle of breathing in man, and sometimes as the principle of thought. It is immortal, and is destined for reward or punishment in a life to come in accordance with its good or evil conduct during earthly life. The soul does not enter into retribution immediately upon being released from the body by death. For a time it hovers about the corpse and about places it frequented during fleshly life. The Hindus sometimes represented the hovering soul under the figure of a bird. This is the first hint of metempsychosis in Hindu philosophy—that later and crude belief in transmigration of souls and renewed existences. When the

soul has completed its time of hovering, it is admitted into a heaven of sensual delights, or is banished to a place of torment.

4—Moral laws come from the gods, and sin consists in a violation of these laws. Sin is a bodily rather than a spiritual matter: it is not necessarily dependent upon man's will, and it may be transmitted by generation. Sin is absolved by rites and sacrifices prescribed in the Vedas.

b) THE BRAHMANISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

The Brahmanistic Philosophy is contained in the Brahmanas and the Upanishads—books written between the 8 and the 5 century B. C. to explain the Vedas. The Brahmanas are mainly religious ritual; the Upanishads, while thoroughly Brahmanistic in doctrine, attack problems of philosophy. In its earliest form the Brahmanistic doctrine involved the notion of a supreme and personal Deity called Prajapati, but this Deity soon gave place to deified powers of nature, which were considered to be outpourings or manifestations of a supreme, but impersonal and indeterminate, being called Brahma. The following points are to be noted by the student of Brahmanistic Philosophy:

1—A hidden power called Brahma is latent in all things. Man's soul or breathing-faculty—called Atman—while seemingly a separate being, is really identified with Brahma, as is all else in the universe.

2—There are two doctrines to account for the origin of things. One explains the world as the literal outpouring of Brahma (materialistic pantheism); the other explains the world as an illusory manifestation of Brahma. The latter doctrine declares that the world as such is *maya* or illusion, and has no real existence, Brahma being the one and only reality.

3—Each man feels that he is an individual, and that other men are individuals. To man's natural view the world is a vast collection of individual things. All this is a lamentable mistake. There is no reality except Brahma, one and absolute;

individuality is a painful illusion. As long as a man allows himself to be deceived by the illusion of multiple individuality in the world, he will suffer; and this suffering will go on through successive reincarnations. The conviction of individuality accounts for all the woes of man. That a man feels aches and pains, that he has worries and mental distress, that he is grieved by bereavements, is altogether due to his mistaken conviction that he is an individual among other individuals.

4—Brahmanistic ethics teaches a man to sink the deceiving conviction of individuality and to realize that self and all things are one in Brahma. This is done by prayers and good works as prescribed in the Brahmanas, by certain sacrificial rites, by abstinence from carnal delights which stress the conviction of individual existence. The whole ethical idea of Brahmanism is liberation from pain. Now, since pain is born of the conviction of individuality, the one ethical effort of this system is the suppression of such conviction. Strangely inconsistent with all this is the Brahmanistic doctrine that all Hindus must recognize the absolute distinction of castes, and must strive for the maintenance of the ancient social order.

c) THE ORTHODOX SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY.

The general doctrine of the Vedas was interpreted by six schools or systems of philosophy, which set out their teachings in sutras or aphorisms. These schools were called "orthodox" because they did not openly disagree with the Vedas. The Orthodox Schools were:

1—The Vedanta, called also Uttara-Mimansa.

2—The Purva-Mimansa.

3—The Sankhya.

4—The Yoga.

5—The Nyaya.

6—The Vaisheshika, which is notable for offering the first attempt of the Hindus at formulating categories or funda-

mental classifications of reality. The categories here proposed are: substance, quality, action, universality, particularity, relation.

d) THE HETERODOX SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY.

There were in India several schools of philosophy called "heterodox" because of their disagreement with the Vedic doctrine, and of these the more important were Carvakaism and Buddhism.

1—Carvakaism teaches that nothing exists but that which is bodily (materialism). Soul and spirit are names without meaning. Even intellectual activity is material in its nature. Carvakaist ethics agrees with that of all Hindu systems in positing extinction of pain as the great end to be achieved by man, but it differs in its prescriptions of means for the attaining of that end. Pain, according to Carvakaism, is not extinguished by self-repression, austerities, or meditation on the oneness of self with Brahma. The sole means for extinction of pain lies in free indulgence in all fleshly pleasures. Carvakaism did not endure long in India; it could not in the nature of things, for the Hindus were strongly spiritualistic, and were tenacious of traditions with which Carvakaism was in direct conflict.

2—Buddhism, unlike Carvakaism, had a widespread influence among the Hindus. It originated with Sakya-Muni, who is thought to have lived about the 5 century B. C. This man was of the kingly line of Gautama. From youth he was given to solitude and meditation, and for many years he sought in silent introspection the answer to the essential question of all Hindu philosophy: "What will liberate men from the pains of existence?" When he had achieved what he believed to be the true answer, he took the name Buddha—the Enlightened—and set out to preach his doctrine far and wide. From the first he had many followers.

Buddhism may be summed up thus: Man strives for happi-

ness, but cannot attain it in this changing and illusory world, for happiness means changelessness, evenness of being, peace. Man's soul—which is a real collection of thoughts and acts, and not an illusion like the world—is subject to change, and until this subjection has been ended, there can be no happiness. Now, the thing that makes man subject to the thrall of change and keeps him from happiness is the desire for existence. Because man clings to passing things and mourns their loss, he is ever supplied with new things to cling to, and is ever newly pained by seeing them pass away. Man clings to his own existence, and therefore new existences are continually given to him. He dies, but is straightway born again. He lives in pain, dies once more, and is again born to painful life. And so the despairing round goes on. Obviously, the thing to be got rid of is the desire for existence. Once that desire is perfectly stifled, renewed existences will cease; man will be at peace; pain will have been forever put away; the soul will have achieved the changeless state of Nirvana. Nirvana is the only state of happiness; in that blessed state desire is dead, emotions are annihilated; eternal quiet and peace enwraps the weary soul and forever stifles every movement or yearning. The way to Nirvana through the extinguishing of the desire for existence is indicated in the ethical rules of Buddhism. Man must strive to bring absolute calmness into his life, his will, his conduct. There must be no hatred, no anger, no great loves, no looking up to some and down upon others,—therefore, no castes! Let a man dwell meditatively upon the pains of the world, keeping himself aloof the while from worldly things such as wealth, honors, the comforts of easy living, emotional attachments to others. Let him be always grave, mild, deliberate. Let him practise bodily austerities that he may loose his hold upon fleshly existence. For the rest, let a man kill no living thing; let him not steal, or lie, or covet the spouse of another; let him not crave wine or other strong drink. In all these forbidden things there is something to feed

the desire for existence, which desire it is man's chief business to kill.

Remarks: All Hindu philosophy is pessimistic, that is, it regards life as pain, and teaches that the greatest good man can hope to attain is release from this pain. Such relief is not to be sought in the simple remedy of self-inflicted death, for re-birth follows death and enters man upon a new round of pain.

The old Vedas present some evidences of a primitive monotheism, and thus the Hindu religion-philosophy agrees with that of other ancient peoples in that it contradicts the evolutionist and rationalist theory that monotheism is an outgrowth of inferior religion-forms.

Buddhism omits the idea of God and of positive happiness in a life to come; hence, while it is a philosophy, it is not a religion. Popular Buddhism, however, differs by a world of divergence from the philosophical Buddhism described above. Popular Buddhism, to which many thousands in Asia still cling, is nothing but an idolatrous cult which fosters the hope of sensual delights in a life to come. Nor is Popular Buddhism the same throughout Asia; it differs in different localities. Hence, while Popular Buddhism is a religion, it is not one religion.

Article 3. The Ancient Persians

Originally the name "Persians" was given to the people that inhabited the territory about the Gulf of Persia, but the name was later extended to all who belonged to the Kingdom of Cyrus in the 6 century B. C., thus including the peoples of Susiana, Media, Hyrcania, and all the territory between the Gulf of Persia and the Caspian Sea. In the History of Philosophy, however, we understand by the name "Persians" only that ancient people which settled in Persia proper after the diffusion of the Aryans through the East.

Up to the last century only secondary sources were available to the student of Persian philosophy. But in the 19 century some canonical writings of this ancient people were found. These writings are called Zend-Avesta, or simply Avesta. This work, as far as we know it, is divided into the Great Avesta and the Small Avesta. The Great Avesta has three books,—called Vendidad, Yasna, Visparad,—which contain religious teachings, ritual, and doctrine on the origin of things. The Small Avesta is merely a collection of hymns, yet is of great importance for the light it throws upon matters imperfectly expressed in the Great Avesta. Max Mueller's "The Sacred Books of the East" contains both Avestas (see vols. 4, 31, 33).

The author of the Avestas, according to Persian tradition, is the great teacher Zarathustra or Zarates, whose name is better known in the Greek transliteration as Zoroaster. The historicity of this man was once much questioned, but is now commonly admitted. His times, however, are not known. It seems probable that he lived in the 8 or the 7 century B. C. Historians are of the opinion that Zoroaster did not write the whole of the Avestas; but it is likely that he composed parts of them, or, at least, that he is the originator of the religious system which the Avestas contain. This system is called Mazdaism from the name of its chief divinity, Mazda (Ormazd, Ormuzd).

a) Of God and the Origin of Things.—Ancient inscriptions assure us that the first Persians were monotheists. They had one supreme Deity called Ahura-Mazda, who received the ministrations of inferior spirits, called Bagas. Among the Bagas was Mithras, who received much prominence as a divinity in a later age. In the earliest evidences of Persian religion there is no suggestion of belief in two "supreme" beings, one good and one evil, who wage war upon each other (Religious Dualism). Such belief, however, is part of the Avesta system.

In the Avestas we read that a supreme Good Being—the old Ahura-Mazda, whose name is more commonly found in the

Greek transliteration as Ormazd or Ormuzd—wages war with a supreme Evil Being called Angra-Mainyu—whom the Greeks called Ahriman. Ormuzd is the cause of all good things; he is the source of light, the creator of men, the maker of the bright heavenly bodies. Ahriman is the author of all evil, the source of darkness, the creator of disease and death, of evil spirits, of animals unfriendly to man, of noxious plants, and of destructive storms. Ahriman was originally good, but jealousy of Ormuzd made a rebel of him. Between Ahriman and Ormuzd there is ceaseless war. This conflict began before the creation of the bodily world. Ormuzd created good spirits; Ahriman created evil spirits to war with these. Eventually, Ormuzd created the material world, and made the first bull, which contained in itself the germs of all earthly life. Ahriman invaded the newly made world, spreading darkness and impurity everywhere. He won part of the world for himself, and this he still retains. After a determinate number of centuries Ormuzd will definitely conquer the ancient enemy, and Ahriman will be confined with his hosts in a prison of darkness. Perhaps Mithras will intercede with Ormuzd for Ahriman and his subjects, and the humbled enemy will be forgiven and restored to his pristine goodness.

b) Of Man and Moral Duties.—Man and woman were made most pure by Ormuzd. They were quickly deceived by Ahriman, and led to eat certain forbidden fruits. Thereafter they despised Ormuzd and served Ahriman. This primal sin made humanity impure at its source. Every man is bound to strive after the original perfection, expelling impurity from soul and body.

Man's soul is immortal, and after this life it goes to a place of reward or punishment according to its merits. The just will go to a beautiful mountain where they will dwell in light and enjoy all manner of pleasures. The reprobate will go to a prison of darkness where pains will afflict them. These states, however, are not eternal. At the end of time the souls of men

will be reunited with their bodies, and the good will enter into endless happiness. The evil who have suffered sufficiently in their prison will be declared absolved and will join with the good in heaven. Those who are still evil and impure will be tortured for three days, and then a sudden flame will leap from heaven into their midst to purify them perfectly; whereupon they will enter into eternal felicity.

In this life each man feels within himself the war of good and evil forces, the counterpart of the struggle waged by Ormuzd and Ahriman. Man must oppose the inner tendency to evil, the urge to sin, and must make himself like Ormuzd by cultivating purity of thought, word, and deed. The most potent means for securing such purity are certain ceremonies, prayers, bodily ablutions, good works, etc., which are prescribed in the Avestas. The same sacred books also mention evil things against which man must be ever upon his guard; these are almost identical with the sins forbidden by the Ten Commandments of God, except that certain offences against chastity are not included among them.

Remarks: Mazdism is the oldest systematized religion which exhibits itself as revealed—for it is claimed that God made known to Zoroaster the account of things which the Avestas contain. This explains the relative perfection of Mazdism as contrasted with the so-called natural religions formed by tradition.

Notice that the primitive Persians were monotheists. Notice also that even the dualism of the Avesta system is monotheistic, for Ahriman is not the full equal of Ormuzd, and eventually he will be conquered, and Ormuzd will rule alone.

The account of the origin of the world (cosmogony) is more perfectly presented in the Mazdistic religion than in any other except the Hebraic. Direct creation is not, indeed, clearly taught; but there is no mention of a primordial chaos of water or other material substance out of which the world emerged.

In the Mazdistic account of the origin and nature of man (anthropology) we find something strangely suggesting a survival of the primitive revelation made by God to our first parents.

BOOK SECOND

GREEK AND GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

In the latter 14 century B. C., a people called Hellenes came from the north and spread through the Grecian Peninsula. This people was divided into four tribes—the Achæans, the Ionians, the Dorians, and the Æolians. The Ionians settled in southern Greece—a region called the Peloponnesus—but were driven thence in the 12 century B. C. by the Dorians. Many of the Ionians went across the Ægean Sea to Asia Minor, where they founded the first and most important of the Greek colonies, later known as Ionia. Colonization progressed rapidly, and by the 7 century B. C. Greece was the whole circle of shores and islands of the Mediterranean Sea with its dependent gulfs and bays. In the motherland, as well as in the great brood of colonies, the government was that of independent city-states, which were kingdoms at first, and then free republics. The Persian wars of the early 5 century B. C. taught the Greeks the value of union and organization, and the states leagued together in federation. This league strengthened the Greeks as a nation, but it led to the jealousies of the great Dorian city-state called Sparta, and the powerful Ionian city-state called Athens. Frequent wars were waged between the two cities. Sparta ultimately triumphed, but died slowly of her wounds, and in the 4 century B. C. Greece was conquered and brought under the rule of the Macedonians. Then came the march of the Roman eagles through all the world, and in the

2 century B. C. Greece was reduced to the status of a Roman Province under the name Achæa.

Archæological investigations conducted during the last century give us certainty that the Greeks of pre-Homeric times—i. e., before the 9 century B. C.—were imbued with the idea of one supreme God. But this monotheism quickly deteriorated into a belief in a plurality of gods (polytheism). The gods were regarded at first as parts of the universe (naturalistic polytheism), and of these Zeus, the firmament, was the most powerful. Later, the deities were personified and made a kind of super-men (anthropomorphic polytheism); they were thought to be multiplied by human generation, and swayed by human weaknesses and passions. Indeed, the poems of Homer and Hesiod, which give an account of the gods of Olympus, seem to make the superiority of gods over men consist chiefly in the fact that gods cannot die and men must. The human soul, however, was regarded as immortal, and the Homeric poems tell of sacrifices offered for the dead, of Achilles praying for the soul of the dead Patroclus, of the souls of the dead appearing to Ulysses, etc. The soul was regarded as a subtle material thing, a sort of shadow-image or shade of bodily man. After death the souls of men, good and bad alike, went down to Hades. This was not so much a place of retribution as a mere residence of departed shades or souls. However, the souls of those guilty of atrocious crimes were punished in Hades, while souls of signal merit were taken to the abode of the gods. In moral notions the Greeks did not differ largely from other ancient peoples. Zeus was the supreme giver of laws; he protected the good, and his anger fell heavily upon the wicked, especially upon unjust judges. The Greek code of morals demanded assiduous worship of the gods, justice, benevolence, love of country. These religious and moral notions remained unchanged for ages. Philosophers railed at the silliness of polytheism, but with small effect; and little wonder, for even the thinkers who found poly-

theism absurd were quite likely to take a full and willing part in the external worship of the gods, particularly at festivals.

The first Greek philosophers were "wise men" or "sages" who delivered maxims of prudent counsel in epigram, such as: "Know thyself." "Nothing to excess." "Be slow to decide but swift to execute," etc. Seven of the sages achieved such a reputation for wisdom that they have passed into history as "The Seven Wise Men of Greece." The famous seven were: Solon, Thales, Pittacus, Bias, Chilon, Periander, and Cleobulus. Instead of the last two, Myson and Anacharsis, are sometimes named. The Wise Men were not philosophers in a true sense, but they bridged the gap historically between religion-philosophy and philosophy properly so called.

The Greek mind was strikingly original and the development of Greek thought owes little to Oriental influence. Of course, the traditional notions of God, the soul, and fundamental moral principles came to the Greeks as a natural human heritage from the older civilization of the East. But it is only in this sense that Greek philosophy can be said to owe anything to the Orientals.

In Greece alone of ancient countries true speculation achieved its greatest approach to perfection. The reason for this fact is twofold: first, the native talent and disposition of the Greeks favored sustained philosophical inquiry into the nature of things (speculation); and, secondly, certain extrinsic circumstances favored the development of Greek thought. Such circumstances were:

I—The geographical situation of Greece. The Mediterranean made communication between Greek colonies and the motherland easy and convenient. The colonists were spread far and wide and came in contact with many and varied types of peoples. Since all the Greeks spoke the same language, the findings of the several quickly became the possession of all. Thus the Greeks quickly learned all that other peoples had to teach

them in arts, science, and the forming and managing of civil institutions. Thus the Greek cultural equipment was extended.

2—The social regimen in vogue in Greece. Between the small city-states of Greece there existed a constant friendly rivalry, which extended to matters intellectual. There was opportunity for exhibition of excellence in the things of the mind as well as in bodily agility at the frequent games and gatherings for religious festivals. Rewards were offered for achievement on such occasions, and this increased in contestants the desire to excel.

3—The schools and theatres which existed everywhere in Greece. These furnished the teacher and playwright the opportunity of getting theories broadcast and of wielding influence. Here again was a field of competition and rivalry which gave impetus to the development of Greek thought.

The greatest of all Greek philosophers were Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. About these men we group our divisions of the history of Greek philosophy. The present Book discusses the Greek and Greco-Roman Philosophy in the following four chapters :

Chapter I. Pre-Socratic Philosophy

Chapter II. Socratic Philosophy

Chapter III. Post-Aristotelean Philosophy

Chapter IV. Greco-Roman Philosophy

CHAPTER I

PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

640-440 B. C.

This Chapter discusses the Greek philosophy of the time preceding Socrates (mid-5 century B. C.). It is divided into six articles, each of which deals with a particular school, i. e., a group of philosophers who have common elements in their teachings. The articles are:

Article 1. The Earlier Ionian School

Article 2. The Pythagorean School

Article 3. The Eleatic School

Article 4. The Later Ionian School

Article 5. The Atomist School

Article 6. The Sophist School

Article 1. The Earlier Ionian School

a) Thales:

b) Anaximander:

c) Anaximenes.

Ionia, first and most important of the Greek colonies, was situated in Asia Minor on the shores and islands which look westward towards the Grecian peninsula across the Ægean Sea. The most notable city of Ionia was Miletus, birthplace of all three philosophers here discussed.

The problem investigated by the Earlier Ionians was that presented by the material universe. They inquired, "What, in the last analysis, is the world made of?" They saw a world around them which evidently remained the same world, and yet was full of change, motion, and of variety. There were

dawns and sunsets, births and deaths, storms and calms, running streams and enduring mountains, moving planets, the solid earth, and the ever restless sea. There were various kinds of things in the world—minerals, plants, brutes, men. Now the Ionians felt that, back of all changes and varieties in the world, there must be some one thing which is the fundamental material out of which all things are made—some “world-stuff,” of which different things are the variants and manifestations. The Earlier Ionians tried to answer the question, “What is the world-stuff?”

a) THALES (about 624–545 B. C.)

Life: Thales was born at Miletus. He was a mathematician and an astronomer. He also showed ability as a man of business, a military engineer, and a philosopher. He was one of “The Seven Wise Men of Greece.” What we know of him is traditional history which was consigned to writing long after his time and was recounted by Aristotle in the 4 century B. C.

Works: It is probable that Thales wrote nothing. At any rate, no writing of his survives.

Doctrine: The world-stuff is water. All things are made of water. The world emerges from water, returns again to water, and repeats this process continually at stated periods (infinite series of worlds). Water is infinite and alive. Hence the whole universe lives (hylozoism).

Aristotle gives some interesting conjectures upon the probable reasons that led Thales to his belief. There are two points in this doctrine: first, all things are of the same basic nature; and, secondly, this basic nature is that of water. That all things are of the same basic nature is suggested by the fact that the earth nourishes plants, plants nourish animals, brute animals nourish men; therefore men, brutes, plants, and earth must possess a common fundamental element, a common basic nature. This nature is that of water, for water alone can assume the conditions of solid (ice), liquid, and gas (mist or

vapor) ; and all things in the world are solid, liquid, or gaseous. That water (and hence the universe) is alive, is suggested by the fact that moisture supports life. Living things are always moist ; plants require moist soil ; animals and men require moisture to make food digestible. When things lose moisture we say that they die—and yet all things live, for moisture is never absent from them. Even the driest land contains moisture, as one may discover by digging into it. Fire itself, though seemingly the farthest thing removed from moisture, requires it, and we see the sun drawing up moisture from the sea.

Thales is said to have taught that the earth floats on water like a leaf upon the surface of a pool. When the pool is disturbed we have earthquakes.

If one be disposed to doubt that all things live, let him be convinced by considering the lodestone (magnet), which is seemingly the most inert and lifeless of things, but shows its life-force by its action in attracting particles of iron.

Remarks: The idea that the world emerged from a chaos of waters was common among all ancient Oriental peoples, but Thales extended it so as to include not only the world's origin but also its material structure.

The only point certainly taught by Thales is that the world-stuff is water. The reasons given above which may have led him to this view are traditional, but they are only conjectures, and we have no certainty that Thales himself offered them or even that he was aware of them.

Thales' service to philosophy was not that he answered the question, "What is the world-stuff?" but that he asked the question. Thus he drew the attention of thinkers to a most important matter. That branch of philosophy which studies the nature and causes of the material world is called Cosmology ; and the fact that Thales raised the cosmological inquiry entitles him to the name which history has bestowed upon him—"The Father of Cosmology."

b) ANAXIMANDER (about 611-547 B. C.)

Life: Anaximander was born at Miletus. It is probable that he was a pupil of Thales. He was a student of physics, astronomy, and geography.

Works: Anaximander wrote a treatise "On Nature" of which only two sentences survive. What we know of his doctrine is taken from the works of Theophrastus and Aristotle (both 4 century B. C.).

Doctrine: The world-stuff is an infinite, living, material substance called "The Boundless." This infinite substance is to be conceived as a sort of spray or mist which in the beginning contained particles of every kind of body found in the world, and elements of heat and cold, wet and dry. Bodily things were separated out from the Boundless by the action of its heat elements. Through the action of heat the warmer particles drew off from the colder, and both were condensed. The condensed warm elements took shape as the sun and the heavenly bodies, while the cold elements condensed into the earth and its waters. The sun beat upon the earth, gradually drying it and causing the waters to run off the surface of the land to form the ocean which surrounds the earth. Continued action of heat upon the drying earth raised bubbles upon its muddy surface, and presently these broke from their moorings and became fishes. The fishes evolved into animals and ultimately into men.

The earth is a cylinder poised in the centre of the universe. The sun and other bright heavenly bodies are great rings of fire which surround the earth, and what we see of them is but apertures in the rings. When these apertures are wholly or partially stopped up, we have eclipses.

The world will eventually be reduced to the spray-form of the primal Boundless, and then it will emerge as before, and this process will go on repeating itself indefinitely (infinite series of worlds).

40) GREEK AND GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY

Remark: Anaximander's doctrine had a powerful influence upon the current of subsequent thought. We may be astonished to find that the theory of material evolution is so very old. But, after all, evolution is an almost childish explanation of the universe, and it could scarcely fail to suggest itself to an untaught mind trying to account for the wonderful world of things as they are.

c) ANAXIMENES (about 588–524 B. C.)

Life: Anaximenes was born at Miletus. He is said to have been a pupil of Anaximander.

Works: Anaximenes wrote a scientific treatise on the nature of the world, but of this work only one sentence remains and it is not of certain genuinity. What we know of this philosopher is taken from Theophrastus (4 century B. C.).

Doctrine: The world-stuff is air or vapor. This vapor is an infinite, living mass. It is marked by a thickening and thinning process (condensation and rarefaction) which causes different things—winds, clouds, water, fire, earth—to emerge. The earth and the heavenly bodies float in the boundless air like leaves. Anaximenes probably held the infinite series of worlds theory.

Remark: Anaximenes owes much to his two predecessors in the School of Earlier Ionians. From Thales he took the notion of a single world-stuff, and from Anaximander he took the idea of a process of "separating out" the bodily universe from the original boundless mass of air.

Remarks on the Earlier Ionians.—These philosophers tried to unify their knowledge of the world with its bewildering variety and multiplicity. They took the most direct way to their end by unifying all things in a common structural source. But they did not teach that different things in the world remain the same in their intrinsic constitution after being separated out from the primal world-stuff. Had they taught this,

they would have been monists; but, as a matter of fact, they were pluralists, and taught that things in the world have their proper individuality and their essentially different qualities in spite of a common origin and destiny. They believed that the world-stuff and the welter of things separated out from it are alive (hylozoism), and that the world-stuff has its own power of developing into different things (dynamism). They tried to give an account of the nature of the world (cosmology), and did not merely describe the origin or actual emergence of the world (cosmogony). The service of the Earlier Ionians to philosophy lies in the fact that they presented the world-problem to the minds of men.

Article 2. The Pythagorean School

a) Pythagoras;

b) Notable Pythagoreans.

While the cosmological inquiry was developing in Ionia, a different School of Greek philosophers made its appearance in Crotona, a Greek city in southern Italy. This was the School of the Pythagoreans.

Like the Ionians, the Pythagoreans tried to discover the nature of all the world, but the particular point of their inquiry was the order, unity, and proportion observable in the world.

The Pythagoreans also sought a rule of life and conduct, and the School of Crotona was a religio-philosophical society which followed a community life under strict discipline. Members of the School were¹ required to hold their goods in common, ¹to practise simplicity of dress and diet,² and to preserve chastity. The connection between the philosophy of the Pythagoreans and their moral-religious code was slight, if it existed at all.

a) PYTHAGORAS (about 582-497 B. C.)

Life: Pythagoras was born on the island of Samos, a part of Ionia. Though Ionian by birth, it is said that he was of

Dorian ancestry. Legendary accounts say that Pythagoras travelled extensively in Egypt and in Asia, where he became acquainted with Oriental learning. He was particularly given to mathematical study. About 530 B. C. he went to Italy and founded the Crotona establishment, a "school" which lasted about twenty years, and was then dispersed because of its increasing political influence. After the breaking up of the Crotona school, Pythagoras retired to Metapontum, in southern Italy, and died there about 497 B. C.

Works: We have no writings of Pythagoras. The work called his "Golden Sayings" is a forgery. What we know of this philosopher is taken largely from Philolaus, a prominent Pythagorean of the latter 5 century B. C., and from Aristotle (4 century B. C.).

Doctrine: The doctrine here given is that of the Pythagoreans. There is no means of discerning the special tenets of Pythagoras from those of the school at large—and there was no such means even as early as the 4 century B. C. when Aristotle wrote.

The Pythagoreans were men of decided mathematical bent, and the order, unity, and proportion in the world appealed to them as a thing capable of expression in mathematical formulas, and, indeed, as mathematical in nature. They taught that all things are numbers. It is well to remember when taking up the study of this unusual theory that the Pythagoreans were men of unpractised thought who made no nice distinction between numbers and things arranged according to number. Numbers appealed to these philosophers by their exactness. Stated movements, capable of being numbered, appeared in the heavenly bodies, and were observable in the succession of seasons, of days and nights, of births and deaths. And everywhere the accompaniment, if not the result, of regular, proportioned, numbered existence was observed to be harmonious, or simply harmony. Number and harmony are the two notes that characterize the Pythagorean philosophy.

There are two series of numbers—odd and even, and these come from the unit. The unit is both odd and even, for units make up every possible number of either series, and a unit added to an odd number makes it even, and added to an even number makes it odd. The unit thus contains all numbers in itself potentially, i. e., all numbers can be developed from the unit. Now the contrariety of the odd-even series of numbers has its counterpart in nine other contrarieties. Altogether, then, there are ten contrarieties in the universe; and ten, for some mystical reason, was a Magic Number to the Pythagoreans. Totaling to the Magic Number appeared to these philosophers a proof of value in the process so resulting. The ten contrarieties are:

odd	even
the limited	the unlimited
singularity	plurality
right	left
male	female
rest	motion
straight	crooked (curved or bent)
good	evil
light	darkness
square	oblong

These lists are not mutually exclusive in their entirety; they are not an odd list and an even list respectively. The analogy to the odd-even relation is found in each pair of contrarieties taken alone and without respect to the other pairs.

The bodily universe is expressed in numbers, and is actually made of numbers.

The universe is expressed in numbers. Let a block of wood represent the bodily world. The block has ends or limits; these are points: the unit is the point. Each dimension of the block is measured by two termini or points, and is conceived as a line

running between the two points: the number two is the line. The smallest number of lines that meet to form an enclosed surface is three (the triangle): the number three is thus surface. The solid with the smallest number of surfaces is the triangular pyramid which has four points and four faces: the number four is the solid. Adding the numbers one to four we find that they total ten, and ten is the Magic Number.

The universe is actually made of numbers. Numbers are the essence of things. We have seen that points, lines, surfaces, and solids are properly expressed in numbers. It remains to be shown that the bulk or mass or bodiliness of things enclosed and limited by points, lines, and surfaces, is also number. Points, lines, and surfaces are the limiting element in bodies; the mass or bulk of bodies which these limiting things enclose is called the unlimited element, or simply the Unlimited. Different numbered combinations of the Unlimited and the limiting element constitute the variety of things that exists in the universe. In the beginning there was a primordial mass of points (the limiting) and intervals of a substance (the Unlimited), all mingled together. Then the limiting drew off from the Unlimited, and the two came together again in such wise that five fundamental essences emerged. The Unlimited in definite numerical intervals met with and joined the limiting to form these essences, which are so many geometrical figures. The five essences are: the pyramid (fire); the cube (earth); the octohedron (air); the icosahedron (water); and the dodekahedron (ether). Of these five essences all bodily things are made; these are the elements of all things. Fire is the noblest of the elements. It occupies the centre of the universe. About the central fire ten great bodies or planets swing in regular, numbered movement. These bodies are: the earth, the counter earth, the sun, the moon, the firmament of fixed stars, the planets, Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Venus, and Saturn. The "counter earth" is an invention to fill out the Magic Number of worldly spheres. In their movement about the central fire

these bodies produce a most wonderful harmony of sound; but our ears do not perceive this "music of the spheres," either because it is too subtle for human hearing, or because it is ceaseless, and sound is noticed only by contrast with preceding or subsequent silence.

The Pythagoreans believed in God—and in one God. Their theology, however, is very obscure. They taught that God permeates all, yet transcends all. In external practice they accepted the current mythology.

It was a positive doctrine of Pythagoreanism that man has a soul, and that his soul is a number. It is the principle of motion in man; nay, more: it is the principle of motion in anything, and anything that can move has a soul. Man's soul is imprisoned in the body by reason of some sin. The soul must purify itself from sin by virtuous living, else it will pass, after death, into another body (metempsychosis or transmigration) and then into another and another, until purification is achieved or found utterly impossible of achievement. The hopelessly vile soul will be banished to Tartarus, while purified souls will enter a world of happiness, where they will continue to live without being rejoined to their bodies. Besides souls, the Pythagoreans admitted the existence of an unseen world of demons which lived under the earth or in the air. Some of the demons were good and helped men, others were evil and wrought harm to mankind.

Remarks: Pythagoreanism was a step forward in the development of philosophy. The Earlier Ionians taught that all things in the world have a single basic nature and a common source, that different things are but different forms or manifestations of the world-stuff—granted that the forms are essentially different in their present being. The Pythagoreans taught that all things are made of numbers. The idea of number is a more abstract idea than that of a bodily world-stuff. The Earlier Ionians achieved a physical idea; the Pythagoreans attained to a mathematical idea. Before philosophy

There exist parts of one of his poems, in which he expresses his opinions concerning the gods, and for this reason he is sometimes referred to in history as "The Theologian." His philosophy is known from secondary sources, chiefly from Aristotle (4 century B. C.) and from the collection of Simplicius (6 century after Christ).

Doctrine: There is only one being. One is all, and all is one (monism). This unique being is God (pantheism). There is no becoming, i. e., no passing from cause to effect, no change, no motion. The multiplicity and variety observable in the world is an illusion.

Xenophanes sometimes forgets his fundamental philosophy and discusses the multiplicity which it denies.

Remark: Xenophanes' service to philosophy lies in the fact that he raised the question of *being* and *becoming*. The true philosophical ideas for which these terms stand were first grasped and explained by Aristotle (4 century B. C.)

b) PARMENIDES (Born about 540 B. C.)

Life: Parmenides was born at Elea. It is said that he was a pupil of Xenophanes. He was an ardent student of philosophy, yet found time to take an active part in political affairs. He was the ablest and most celebrated of the Eleatics.

Works: Parmenides wrote a poem *On Nature*, in which he set forth his philosophical doctrine; 155 lines of this poem are extant. We learn much of Parmenides' teaching from Aristotle (4 century B. C.)

Doctrine: All is being. We cannot even think of non-being, i. e., nothingness. For if we try to think of non-being, we are forced to conceive it as something, i. e., as being. Hence non-being is impossible, and to speak of it is silly.

Being is one, eternal, unchangeable. The variety and change observable in the world is illusory. Multiplicity is likewise a deception.

Still, we may profitably study the apparent variety, change,

and multiplicity of the world. Parmenides makes such a study, and gives us his Cosmology and Anthropology of the Apparent, in which he sets forth what he would believe of the world and of men if he believed in multiplicity of being.

Remarks: Parmenides, like Xenophanes, is monistic, and, in consequence, pantheistic. He makes being a bodily thing. He teaches that sensation is illusory and that its testimony of the varied and multiple world is wholly untrustworthy. Still, he asserts the validity of thought, for he offers as true his system of philosophy, which is a product of thought, and besides he declares that being alone can be thought of, and is, in consequence, real. It follows that whatever can be thought of is real being. Here we discern a positive service rendered by Parmenides to philosophy—the assertion of the validity of thought.

c) ZENO OF ELEA (Born about 487 B. C.)

Life: It is probable that Zeno was born at Elea. He was a pupil of Parmenides. Like his teacher, he was active in civic affairs. Accused—perhaps unjustly—of political conspiracy, he endured torture and death rather than disclose information harmful to others.

Works: Zeno wrote certain treatises, of which fragments are preserved in the collection of Simplicius (6 century after Christ). Our knowledge of the man and his doctrine comes largely from Aristotle (4 century B. C.)

Doctrine: Zeno of Elea held the doctrine of Parmenides, and his place in the History of Philosophy is due to his novel defence of that doctrine. He introduces the use of dialectic, i. e., of logical argument and connected reasoning. He spins out tricky arguments, one after another (eristic method), to show that multiplicity and change is impossible, and that our senses are not to be trusted in the evidence they give us of variety in the world. Thus he is a champion of Parmenides'

theory by indirection—i. e., he does not directly prove his position, but tries to show the absurdity of the contradictory doctrine. Zeno's arguments are very famous. Here are specimens:

Being is one; multiplicity is impossible. If you admit multiplicity in the world, you must admit a number at once finite and infinite—an obvious contradiction. For consider: a body—let us say a tree—has parts, you say. There is a multiplicity of parts in a tree. Very well. Now a tree has its certain size, its shape, its determinate constituents. Thus it must have a certain, definite, limited number of parts to make it precisely the tree that it is. There is your finite number. But you can do more than divide the tree into these parts. You can divide each part into other parts, and each of these into other parts, and so on without limit, unto infinity. And there is your infinite number of parts in the tree. Thus, you see, you cannot admit multiplicity without involving yourself in a contradiction.

There is no such thing as change. The most obvious form of so-called change is local motion or change of place. Such motion may be fairly taken as representative of change; and if local motion be proved impossible, it can be inferred that all change is impossible. Now, as a matter of fact, local motion is impossible. If a body could move from place to place it would have to traverse an infinity of space—a clear contradiction, since an infinity of space cannot be traversed. A body moving from one place to another would pass over one-half the distance to be covered before passing over the entire distance; it would cover one-fourth the distance before covering one-half; and one-eighth the distance before one-fourth; and one-sixteenth before one-eighth, and so on. In other words, the moving body would have to pass through an infinite number of fractions of the distance to be covered in order to cover the entire distance. But an infinite number, having no end, cannot be got through. Therefore, motion is demonstrably impossible.

Remarks: Zeno's arguments are sophistries, i. e., arguments only seemingly valid. Aristotle demonstrated the fallacy of these arguments by distinguishing—as Zeno failed to do—between actual and potential infinity.

Zeno abused dialectic, but taught its use even while abusing it. His futile arguments—valueless in themselves—were of inestimable value in drawing the attention of subsequent philosophers to matters that required explanation, and to a method that needed to be appraised.

d) MELISSUS OF SAMOS (Born about 500 B. C.)

Life: It is probable that Melissus was born on the island of Samos, a part of Ionia. Like Zeno of Elea, he was a pupil of Parmenides. He was probably the Melissus who commanded the fleet of Samos which defeated the Athenians in 442 B. C.

Works: Melissus wrote a book *On Nature* or *On Being*, of which a few fragments are preserved in the collection of Simplicius (6 century after Christ).

Doctrine: Zeno of Elea had offered indirect defence of the doctrine of Parmenides; Melissus undertook the direct defence of the same doctrine. He offered positive argument to prove that being is one, eternal, and unchangeable. He went a step farther than Parmenides and made the explicit assertion that being is infinite. Since the idea of being was still a physical idea, this doctrine could mean only that being is a bodily mass of infinite bulk.

Remarks: Melissus rightly reasoned that, if being is eternal, it must be infinite; but he is illogical in deducing infinity of size or bulk from infinity of duration—i. e., eternity. Infinite bodiliness or size is really an impossibility, for it involves a contradiction—a fact which Melissus did not perceive.

Melissus served the progress of philosophy by his insistence upon the problem of being, and his mistaken position in the matter was the occasion of the subsequent study which revealed the true doctrine.

Remarks on the Eleatic School. The Earlier Ionians and the Pythagoreans tried to explain the source and the constitutive causes of the world as they found it. The Eleatics did not take the world as they found it; they denied it. They did not seek origins and causes; they denied them. They taught that nothing originates or is caused, for there is no becoming. The world is not to be taken at face value, for it presents the illusions of variety, change, multiplicity.

All is being. And being is one. Thus we perceive that the Eleatics were both monists and pantheists. Since the Eleatic idea of being meant the sum-total of bodily reality, we may characterize the pantheism of this school as materialistic pantheism.

The service of the Eleatics to philosophy lies in the fact that they took a single view of the universe as being. While their notion of being was limited, and in so far erroneous, their method was a fundamentally correct one, and constituted a positive step in the direction of the achievement of the metaphysical concept of being—which concept is the root and basis of all true philosophical speculation.

Article 4. The Later Ionian School

a) Heraclitus; b) Empedocles; c) Anaxagoras; d) Others.

These philosophers have been grouped by historians as “The Later Ionians” for the reason that they attacked the problem raised by the Earlier Ionian School, and also because the most notable philosophers of the group were Ionians by birth or descent.

Like the Earlier Ionian School, these philosophers sought the answer to the question, “What is the original world-stuff?”

a) HERACLITUS (Born about 530 B. C.)

Life: Heraclitus was born at Ephesus. It is probable that he studied under Xenophanes, the Eleatic. He was a man of in-

dependent mind, stubborn in his opinions, and well pleased with the title of self-made philosopher. He had little but contempt for the authority of earlier and contemporary teachers.

Work: Heraclitus wrote a book *On Nature*, of which parts survive. He expressed his doctrine in such a vague manner that he merited the sobriquet of "The Obscure." We have an account of his teachings from Plato (5-4 century B. C.) and from Aristotle (4 century B. C.)

Doctrine: The world-stuff is a subtle substance, ethereal and invisible, which has the nature of fire. Of this fire all things are made by a downward or quenching movement of condensation. To the primal fire all things tend to return by an upward or kindling movement of rarefaction. These processes are going on continuously; things are in a constant flux; nothing is stable. Therefore, all is becoming; there is no stable being.

The change which produces things from the primal fire is attended by strife, i. e., by the clash of opposites, viz., the thing from which the change is made, and the thing to which the change is made. But the change which reduces things to the primordial fire is harmonious, as things conciliated fuse in the unity of their original source.

The world which we now behold will be reduced to the primordial fire, and another world will emerge; this, in turn, will be reduced to fire, and still another world will be produced, and so on indefinitely through the endless process of perpetual becoming (infinite series of worlds).

The primordial fire is living and intelligent. It is the Logos, or world-soul, as well as the world-body. It is the Deity. It is a sort of world-governing, all-pervading reason, as well as the substance which makes the bulk or mass of the bodily universe. Though intelligent, the primordial fire is not personal nor free; its transformations go on by blind necessity.

The human soul is a particle of the purest form of the

primordial fire. It must be kept dry. The dry soul is wise. When it is moistened, reason is dethroned. Reason is to be trusted, but the senses are not reliable, for the senses show us an apparent stability in many things in the world, whereas there is no such thing as stability in anything. The soul does not survive death, but fuses with the primordial fire and is unified with it. Sometimes Heraclitus forgets this doctrine, and speaks of the rewards and punishments awaiting man's soul in a life to come.

Remarks: Heraclitus agrees in one point with the Eleatics: he denies the validity of sense knowledge and asserts the trustworthiness of reason. For the rest, his doctrine is flatly opposed to the Eleatic theory. The Eleatics said, "All is being; there is no becoming." Heraclitus said, "All is becoming; there is no stable being."

Heraclitus did not conceive the primordial fire as a mere mass of matter shaped into various accidental forms (mechanistic monism), but as an all-pervading reason operating by its own power (dynamism) according to fatalistic necessity (determinism), forming bodies that differ essentially (pluralism), and reducing these again to its own substance.

We discern in the doctrine of Heraclitus the old Ionian notes: the quest for the original world-stuff; the theory of an infinite series of worlds; the notion of wet and dry elements in the world-stuff; the doctrine of a living universe (hylozoism).

The influence of Heraclitus on subsequent philosophers, and in particular upon Plato, was very great. His service to philosophy, like that of most pre-Socratic Greek philosophers, was not that he formed a theory about things, but that this theory stressed the necessity of finding the true explanation of things. His service was not that he answered questions in a fantastic manner, but that he asked questions in a pointed manner.

b) EMPEDOCLES (about 495-435 B. C.)

Life: Empedocles was born at Agrigentum in Sicily, and is said to have lived sixty years, but we have no certain knowledge of the time or place of his death. He was skilled in the medical and magical arts and took an active interest in matters political.

Works: Empedocles wrote two poems, the one philosophical, *On Nature*, and the other theological, *Purifications*. These works together make up some five thousand verses, of which about 450 survive. Empedocles is revealed in his work as a man of vivid imagination, possessed of a polished style. Aristotle (4 century B. C.), from whom we learn much about this philosopher, calls him "chief of rhetoricians."

Doctrine: The world-stuff is not a single homogeneous substance, but contains four fundamental essences or *elements*, viz.: air, earth, water, and fire. These elements, changeless in themselves, by their commingling and separation, compose the varied and changing world. Two forces play upon the elements—a unifying force (love) and a separating force (hate). At first love held all together in a sphere; then the centrifugal power of hate caused the sphere to break up. Love exerted its force anew, and drew together the parts or atoms of the scattered elements, mingling these in various combinations, and thus the things in the world were formed. The *love* and *hate* of Empedocles do not appear to be mere qualities inherent in matter, but separate and substantial realities. The forming of things produced through the clashing of love and hate was not a reasoned or planned production, but the outcome of mere chance.

Plants appeared as the first of living things on the earth. Then heads, arms, legs, and trunks of animals were formed, and these drew together into various monstrous combinations, some of which were all heads, some all legs, etc. Many of these combinations were not fitted for life, and they died.

Other combinations were well balanced, and they survived as animals. Man, like other animals, was formed in the manner described.

All living things have sense-knowledge (sensation) and intelligence. And all living things grow—a phenomenon which Empedocles explains by declaring that the elemental fire in them continuously strives to reach the fire which is in the sky.

Man has a soul as well as a body: but Empedocles draws no nice distinction between these two essential human parts: each seems to be composed of the elements. When a man dies, his soul breaks up into its molecules, and then these reassemble to form a new soul for a new organism. Man's duty is to preserve in himself the force of love, and to resist the force of hate; but the precise nature of this duty and the manner of accomplishing it are not explained in the teaching of Empedocles.

What Empedocles thought about God is obscure. According to Aristotle, he taught that all the elements are contained in God, but that the force of hate does not affect them there. Still, Empedocles does not make God master of the universe, for hate prevails sometimes in the bodily world. If God is identified with love and the four elements, we must call Empedocles a pantheist, or, at least, a semi-pantheist.

Remarks: It is not easy to classify Empedocles. Some call him Eleatic, for he proposes changeless elements as the world-stuff and denies the theory of perpetual becoming. Some call him Pythagorean, for he teaches a kind of transmigration or reconstruction of souls. He might be classed with the Atomists—of whom we are to speak in the next Article—for he taught that the elements were shattered into particles and that these came together to form things. Certainly we can call him a mechanist, for he taught that things are formed by the accidental union of elements moved by a force outside themselves. We have listed Empedocles with the Ionians because of his

quest for the world-stuff, and because he accepted the world of reality at face value.

This philosopher is important for his influence upon later philosophical discussion, especially that conducted by the Atomists.

In passing it is to be remarked that Empedocles taught a peculiarly Darwinian type of evolution. Notice his "survival of the fittest" theory. It may also be mentioned that his "four elements" were accepted by philosophers as the final classification of elemental substances for almost sixteen centuries.

c) ANAXAGORAS (about 500-428 B. C.)

Life: Anaxagoras was born at Clazomenae in Ionia. He settled at Athens, where he conducted a school. He was a friend of the great Pericles, and the dramatist Euripides was his pupil. He was once charged with impiety—usually a fatal imputation—but Pericles somehow saved him from condemnation and got him out of Athens. Anaxagoras retired to Lampsacus in Ionia, where he established a school and resided until death.

Works: Anaxagoras wrote a book *On Nature*, of which some fragments have been preserved in the collection of Simplicius (6 century after Christ).

Doctrine: The original world-stuff was a mass of tiny particles of all the things that are found in the world—flesh, bones, metals, etc. This mass was inert; it existed in a state of rest. Then a whirling motion was given to it by the action of a divine mind. By force of this motion the particles of matter were separated out, and then came together, each with its kind, to form the things found in the world. The divine mind which moved matter is simple, i. e., not composed of parts. It knows all things, and has power over all.

Remarks: Anaxagoras represents an immense stride forward in the development of philosophy. He introduces a dualistic doctrine (matter and mind) to supplant the old theories of

a purely material and dynamic world-stuff, and he escapes the mechanism and semi-panteism of Empedocles. True, Anaxagoras does not make the Divine Mind the creator of the universe, but only its intelligent mover. Still, the greatest credit is due this philosopher for his getting at the idea of something above the nature of bodily things intelligently controlling the world.

d) OTHER LATER IONIANS.

Historians usually include in this School:

1—Diogenes of Apollonia, and

2—Archelaus of Athens.

These philosophers did not contribute to the development of philosophy, but reverted to the hylozoism of the Earlier Ionian School.

Remarks on the Later Ionian School. Anaxagoras was, by all odds, the most important member of this School. The others, even Empedocles, were important mainly for the influence they exerted upon later philosophers. Anaxagoras offered a new and striking theory of separate mind to which matter is subjected. He was the first known philosopher to introduce such dualism into the interpretation of the universe, although, according to Aristotle, he had a predecessor in the unknown Hermodotus of Clazomenae.

Article 5. The Atomist School

a) Leucippus;

b) Democritus;

c) Others.

The Atomist School represents a retrograde movement in philosophy. These philosophers made all things consist of a single kind of matter broken into tiny particles (atoms) and moved into diverse combinations by a necessary and unreasoned force. Thus the Atomists professed a doctrine of a cruder sort

than the old Ionian hylozoism, which explained the universe as living and self-forming. The Atomists were out-and-out mechanists.

a) LEUCIPPUS.

Leucippus is regarded by Aristotle and Theophrastus (both 4 century B. C.) as the founder of the Atomist School. Little or nothing is known of Leucippus, however, and some historians have questioned his existence. It is, nevertheless, fairly certain that he did exist, and that he was the predecessor and teacher of Democritus, the ablest exponent of atomism among the ancient Greeks.

b) DEMOCRITUS (Born about 470 B. C.)

Life: Democritus was born at Abdera, an Ionian colony in Thrace. He was well learned in the mathematical and physical sciences.

Works: An ancient catalogue attributes many writings to Democritus, and of these *The Great Order* is the most celebrated. Of this and other works some fragments survive. Aristotle (4 century B. C.) gives an account of the doctrines of the Atomists, assigning these to Democritus and Leucippus together.

Doctrine: The world-stuff is simply a collection of minute particles of matter, all of which have the same nature, but differ in size, shape, and weight. These particles or atoms do not adhere together contiguously, but are held apart by vacuoles or intervals of vacuum. Atoms and vacuoles compose all bodies. That the vacuoles exist is proved by the phenomena of bodily movement, rarefaction, condensation, expansion, and contraction.

The variety in the world finds its explanation in the diverse unions of atoms which vary in weight, shape, and size. The atoms are eternal: they have been in motion from eternity and are perpetually shifting into new combinations. Sky and

earth were formed by natural necessity, the lighter atoms moving upwards to form the firmament, and the heavier atoms sinking downwards to form the earth.

Man's soul is made of the more subtle atoms. These are spherical in shape, and permeate the body, penetrating everywhere, and causing it to live. The soul-atoms produce different effects in different bodily parts: in the head they produce thought; in the heart, love and anger; in the liver, sense-appetite; etc. When the soul-atoms leave the body, death results. The respiratory duct is the only channel through which the soul-atoms can escape from the body, and as long as this is blocked by the passage of air—as it is in breathing—the soul-atoms cannot depart. Therefore, a man lives as long as he can breathe. Brutes and plants, as well as man, have souls.

Man's knowledge is of two kinds, sensation and thought. Sensation is obscure and unreliable, but thought is trustworthy. Sensation is produced in man by the fact that objects in the world throw off images of themselves like shells or cast skins, and these enter the sense-organs through pores and so penetrate to the soul. But the shells or images of things do not correspond perfectly with their originals; sense-knowledge is therefore unreliable—a fact attested by the disagreement of men about the sense-qualities of things. Thought means the grasping of things as they are by the soul; it is the understanding of the very atoms and vacuoles which compose things. Thought is therefore reliable. The Atomists do not explain the manner in which thought is achieved.

Man's highest good is rest and tranquillity of soul. This good must be obtained during earthly life, since the soul loses its personality at death. To gain rest and tranquillity of soul man must cultivate pure thought, using the things of sense with the greatest moderation.

Remarks: The atomist doctrine maintains that nothing exists except bodily reality (materialism), and that the world is a great collection of atoms and vacuoles shaped into different

things by force of natural necessity (mechanism). Sensation is declared obscure and untrustworthy, and thought, while asserted as valid, is not clearly or convincingly described: hence the atomist theory involves a latent skepticism.

c) OTHER ATOMISTS.

The following pupils of Democritus deserve mention in the History of Philosophy as exponents of the atomist doctrine:

1—Metrodorus of Chios;

2—Diogenes of Smyrna;

3—Anaxarchus, the companion of Alexander the Great.

Article 6. The Sophist School

a) Protagoras;

b) Gorgias;

c) Others.

A backward glance through the systems of doctrine already discussed makes three facts strikingly plain: 1) There was disagreement among schools and teachers on the solution of problems discussed, chief of which were the questions of the original world-stuff and of the character of the visible world; 2) No single philosopher or school had proposed anything like a harmonious system of philosophy approximating completeness; 3) Doubt had been cast repeatedly upon the reliability of sense-knowledge.

There could be but one outcome of this condition of things. Persons given to thought and study despaired of achieving truth. They said, "Who can be sure of anything? Behold, the masters disagree! They tell us not to trust our senses; why, then, should we believe reason? No one can know anything with certainty." This is the assertion of skepticism.

There existed at this time (5 century B. C.) no great mind, superior to the skeptical surrender, to lead men on in the work of thinking out a right and valid solution of the problems with which the schools had dealt. Even had there been such a mind, it

is highly improbable that the temper of the times would have submitted to its influence. The intense physical and mental activity which had been a marked characteristic of Greek life in times past had given place to relaxation and inaction. The cities were at peace, the people in easy circumstances. Love of luxury prevailed—notably at Athens—and with the growing tendency towards ease and softness of living came mental debility and moral corruption. Skepticism spread like a contagion.

Then arose leaders suited to the mood of the times—smooth, plausible talkers; lovers of ease and indolence; exquisites, for the most part, in dress and manner; men with a ready cynical smile for the honest arguments of a sincere seeker after truth. These leaders of the fashionable thought asserted that wisdom is not a matter of truth as discerned from falsity. Truth and falsity, they said, are simply not discernible. He is wise, therefore, who seeks to achieve leadership of minds by his ability to argue plausibly and to convince an opponent in argument by any arts at his command, caring not a whit about the so-called truth or falsity of his argument. The teachers of this skepticism called themselves the true *sophoi* or wise men; and thus the word sophist has come to mean one who can offer glib argument, apparently valid, without regard for truth. The sophists of Greece cultivated the arts of dialectic and rhetoric as the only acquirements worth while. The philosophy of these men was skepticism; sophistry was their method.

a) PROTAGORAS (Born about 480 B. C.)

Life: Protagoras was born at Abdera in Thrace, the native place of Democritus the Atomist. He lived in Sicily, and later at Athens. After teaching for a time in the latter city, he was accused of atheism, and was forced to flee. It is said that he met death in a shipwreck.

Works: Protagoras wrote a book On That Which Is, of which a few fragments survive. Knowledge of the doctrines

of this philosopher comes to us largely from Plato (4-5 century B. C.) and Aristotle (4 century B. C.)

Doctrine: Nothing is; all is becoming. Even becoming is relative. For example, the eye does not see unless a colored object acts upon it, nor is the object colored unless the eye sees it. Objects present themselves differently to different individuals; but each individual beholds them truly—for himself. What I behold in the world is true—for me. What you behold is true—for you. There is no truth to be had about any object as such; there is no state or condition of objects, no objective truth. What we call the truth of things is truth relative to each individual beholder (relative truth); that is true which each beholder subjectively accepts as the truth of the thing which he perceives (subjectivism). The individual is thus the measure of truth in the objects perceived or known. Man is the measure of all. By reason of this doctrine, Protagoras is sometimes called "The Individualist."

Remarks: Protagoras adopted the doctrine of becoming which had been promulgated by Heraclitus, and developed the skepticism latent in it. If things are becoming, they are in a perpetual state of flux, and are not the same at any two consecutive moments nor from any two points of view. Thus objective truth is destroyed. Protagoras did not express doubt about the common principles of morality, yet such doubt belongs logically to his doctrine; for if nothing is certain, there can be no certain moral duties.

b) GORGAS (Born about 480 B. C.)

Life: Gorgias was born at Leontini in Sicily. He practised the art of eloquence (rhetoric) in various parts of Greece, carrying on meanwhile his teaching of sophism. He had at first adhered to the Eleatic philosophy, but threw this aside for skepticism.

Works: Gorgias wrote a book *On Nature or the Non-Ex-*

isting, which survives in the collection of Sextus Empiricus (2-3 century after Christ).

Doctrine: Nothing exists. If anything could exist, it could not be known as existing. If anything could be known as existing, the knowledge would not be communicable among men. Thus Gorgias bankrupts all knowledge, and, logically, all morality. This philosopher was deservedly called "The Nihilist."

Remarks: Like Protagoras, Gorgias was a destructive philosopher. He spun out arguments of sophistry (eristic method) to prove his impossible position. Like all skeptics, he is full of self-contradiction. Thus, he teaches with certainty that there is no certainty, and he uses reason in dialectic argument to prove that there is no use using reason.

c) OTHER SOPHISTS worthy of mention were:

- 1—Hippias of Elis,
- 2—Prodicus of Ceos.

Remarks on the School of the Sophists. The Sophists turned the question of philosophy away from the objective world and investigated, or rather discussed, the validity of human knowledge. They served in this the development of philosophy, for, after all, the conditions of human knowledge must be determined and vindicated before a system of knowledge—a philosophy—can be built up. Of course, the doctrine of the Sophists is not in itself a contribution to philosophy; on the contrary, it makes philosophy impossible. We may agree with all the harsh things that Plato and Aristotle said of the Sophists; but we must remember that—destructive and retrograde as their doctrine certainly was—they opened the critical question, i. e., the question of the nature, extent, and validity of human knowledge. This question received due attention in the Golden Age of Greek Philosophy, which followed hard upon the times of the Sophists.

CHAPTER II

SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

440—300 B. C.

This Chapter discusses the Greek Philosophy of the Golden Age, the period of its perfection. During this time splendid minds reacted against the destructive theories of materialism and skepticism rampant in Greece, and developed true philosophy into an almost flawless system. This work was begun by Socrates, furthered by Plato, and perfected by Aristotle.

With Aristotle the Golden Age came to an abrupt end. The worth of the Aristotelean system was not appreciated either by philosophers contemporary with its formulation or by those who might have held it as an immediate priceless heritage. Centuries elapsed before this almost perfect system was recognized in its true character: Aristotle did not come into his own until the Middle Ages.

After Aristotle, Greek Philosophy retrograded, and the minds of thinkers were dominated by the old pre-Socratic systems in various forms.

This Chapter is divided into three articles:

Article 1. Socrates and the Socratic Schools

Article 2. Plato and the Academies

Article 3. Aristotle and the Aristoteleans

Article 1. Socrates and the Socratic Schools

a) Socrates; b) The Socratic Schools.

a) SOCRATES (469—399 B. C.)

Life: Socrates—son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and

Phaenarete, a midwife—was born in Athens. In youth he learned his father's art, but abandoned it for the opportunity of studying astronomy, geometry, and philosophy, which was offered him by Criton, a rich Athenian. He had a brief military career, in which he bore himself with credit. Moved by what he conceived to be a divine call to improve the intellectual and moral conditions of his time, he became a teacher. He discarded the arts and airs of the Sophists, and met his pupils in familiar converse, showing himself as ready to learn as to teach. His honest and energetic stand upon political questions brought him into disfavor with the powers of civic control. The politicians accused him of impiety, i. e., of corrupting the youth of Athens by teaching them things not in accord with the popular mythology. Condemned to die, he drank the deadly hemlock in the year 399 B. C.

Works: Socrates taught orally and wrote nothing. His pupils, Xenophon and Plato, wrote an account of Socrates and his teaching. Xenophon tells us much of the man, but very little of his philosophy. Plato gives us much philosophy, sometimes interweaving doctrines of his own with those of his master. The combined accounts of Xenophon and Plato give us a fairly reliable and complete knowledge of the Socratic philosophy.

Doctrine: To the doubts of the Sophists Socrates opposed an unshaken faith in reason. Man, he asserts, can know things with truth and certainty. The human mind is a storehouse of truth waiting to be developed, or, more accurately, the mind is pregnant with conceived truth, and its concepts need only to be brought to birth (i. e., recognized and realized) and man will have true and certain knowledge fitted to all his needs. Let a man but know what is in his mind, let him know himself, and he will be wise. "Know thyself!" was the great Socratic precept.

Socrates' method is called the *heuristic* or finding method because it is designed to find the truths latent in the mind.

This method involves two processes, called, respectively, the *ironic* and the *maieutic* process.

1—The first, or *ironic*, process serves to make the seeker after knowledge “clear his mental decks for action”; it rids the mind of prejudice and misinformation which block the realization of truth: it leads to a humble and sincere confession of utter ignorance. Such a confession is prerequisite to the realization of knowledge. Applying the ironic process, Socrates would assume a very humble air when a subject of discussion was raised, and would put to the speaker many respectful questions, as though he were struck with admiration at the wisdom of the speaker and had perfect confidence in his ability to impart information. But the questions were always shrewd and wily, and the speaker would presently find himself involved in a maze of self-contradictions. Socrates would then gently point out the state of affairs and force the speaker to admit that he had been talking nonsense, that, in fact, he knew nothing of the matter he had been glibly discussing. Thus the ironical questioning of Socrates would lead to the necessary confession of ignorance.

2—Having cleared the ground by the ironic process, Socrates would employ the second, or maieutic, process to draw truth out of the mind of the pupil. The subject would be freely discussed in dialogue or conversation. Dialogue, according to Socrates, is the only proper means of working truth clearly and recognizably out of the mind. Suppose, for instance, that the pupil wished to know the nature of virtue. Socrates would use the ironic process to clear the mind of the inquirer of all hazy, inadequate, and mistaken notions already formed on the subject. Then, applying the maieutic, he would engage with the pupil in dialogue, directing the discussion in such a manner that various examples of what is called “virtue” would be considered, examined, compared, studied in their points of resemblance and difference. During this discussion the mind would delve beneath mere appearances, and seeming resemblances in the examples studied would be cast aside as of no consequence,

while essential resemblances would be retained for further study. Gradually there would emerge a clear and precise notion of "virtue." This manner of working out an idea by the study of various exemplifications of it is called *induction*. An idea once so worked out can be accurately *defined*. Knowledge made up of things clearly known and accurately defined is unchangeably true, and constitutes *science*. Here at once we ask: Where did the mind get the concepts which the maieutic process brings to birth? Were these concepts stored in the mind by the Creator and born in man? Probably that is what Socrates believed, although he never declared in so many words that concepts are inborn in man (innatism).

Socrates taught the existence of one God, supreme and all-perfect, the efficient (producing) cause and the final cause of the universe. In religious practice, however, he seems to have conformed to the ritual of the current mythology. It is probable that Socrates believed that God made the world out of matter which existed without beginning (eternal matter). Still, he does not identify God with the world (pantheism). He teaches that God is everywhere present in the world, and that He directs and governs it (Providence). He also teaches that the world is the best possible world (optimism).

Man is made of body and soul. The soul is distinct from the body, and is like to God in memory, understanding, indivisibility, and immortality. Man's highest good is happiness, and this is to be achieved by the practice of virtue. Now, knowledge and virtue are one and the same. Sin is always the product of ignorance; if a man knows what is right and true (knowledge) he cannot help but choose it and act in consistent accordance with it (virtue). Thus all study, all striving after knowledge, is also striving after virtue; all study is ethical study. "Know thyself!" is not only the fundamental intellectual principle; it is also the basic moral precept.

Remarks: Socrates makes self-knowledge the foundation of all true and certain knowledge (science). For, he says,

self-knowledge means knowledge of the concepts latent in the mind, and in these there is changeless truth. Here, at least by implication, Socrates teaches the mistaken doctrine of innatism. Knowledge is not inborn in man, nor is it the product of the mind's spontaneous activity, but it is formed in the mind by the power of intellect elaborating the findings of the senses.

Socrates mistakenly identifies knowledge and virtue, for the will, and not the understanding, is supreme in the choice of moral right and wrong. Nevertheless, Socrates deserves great credit for his attempt to build up a system of ethics (moral science) and to give it a rational foundation.

↓ The service of Socrates to philosophy was very great. He sanely discussed the critical question raised by the Sophists, and tried to determine the manner in which the mind can have truth and certainty—in a word, he tried to fix the conditions of knowledge. He introduced the valuable philosophic process called induction, and showed the value and the necessity of clear definition. He taught that science is the sum-total of human knowledge which is changelessly true. He tried to establish a rational basis for ethics. He was the first Greek philosopher to offer a rational refutation of pantheism, materialism, and skepticism; as he was the first in Greece to assert the existence of one supreme God, distinct from the world, and ruling it by His Providence. He rightly taught the immortality of the soul, determined the last end of man, and the rule of conduct.

For all its errors, the Socratic philosophy was an enormous step forward in the development of the philosophic method (speculation), and we may say that Socrates laid the foundations of true philosophy.

b) THE SOCRATIC SCHOOLS.

The followers of Socrates are grouped into several Schools. The Major Socratic School was the Academy of Plato, which will be discussed in the second article of this Chapter. The

Minor Socratic Schools commingled the doctrines of Socrates with those of earlier philosophers. Such Schools were the following:

1—THE MEGARIAN SCHOOL, founded by Euclid of Megara, combined the Socratic doctrine of concepts with Parmenides' theory of changeless being, and so made the essences of things represented in concepts the only reality, and the world of sense an illusion. This School used dialectic to excess; its members were wont to spin out long chains of subtle and specious arguments (eristic method) in proof of their theory. For this reason the School is sometimes called the Eristic School. Exponents of this School were: Eubulides, Stilpo, Diodorus Cronus.

2—THE SCHOOL OF CYNICS combined the ethical doctrine of Socrates with the theory of Gorgias the Sophist. It held that virtue alone is good, and it made virtue consist in absolute indifference to things external. The Cynics scoffed at noble birth, honor, riches, marriage, government, and even common decency. The name "Cynic" is derived by historians from the Greek *kyon*, a dog,—for the Cynics were a snarling set,—and also from Cynosarges, the city in which the School was established. The chief exponent of the Cynic philosophy was Antisthenes, disciple of Gorgias and then of Socrates. Other names associated with this School are: Diogenes of Sinope, Crates, Menippus.

3—THE ELEAN SCHOOL was much at one with the Megarian School. It taught a sophistical doctrine in which there was latent pantheism. The School was founded at Elis—a fact which explains its name—but was removed in the 3 century B. C. to Eretria, and thereafter it was known as the Eretrian School. The founder of the School was Phædo, a pupil of Socrates. Menedemus was a notable exponent of the doctrines of the School.

4—THE CYRENAIC SCHOOL, named from the city of Cyrene where it was founded, took the dictum of Socrates that "happi-

ness is man's highest good" and interpreted it to mean that man must seek his last end in the refinements of sensual pleasure. Pleasures of mind are, indeed, to be cultivated and enjoyed by those who have the capacity for such enjoyment, but the obvious pleasure which lies within reach of all is that of the senses. Virtue is to be practised; but "virtue" means no more than moderation in the enjoyment of pleasures. Without moderation, pleasures of sense soon cloy, and become the cause of pain and not of happiness. Virtue requires a man to overcome in himself all fears, hatred, superstition, as things which impede enjoyment. This School is known also as the Hedonist School from its doctrine of pleasure (hedonism). Its chief representative was Aristippus, a pupil of Socrates. Other names associated with the School are: Theodorus Atheus, Hegesias of Alexandria, Anniceris.

Remarks: The Minor Socratic Schools do not deserve the name "Socratic" at all. Although these Schools incorporated some Socratic doctrines into their teaching, they commingled these with other and sometimes opposed tenets, and not infrequently they professed theories which Socrates had expressly condemned. They contributed little to the development of philosophy beyond the influence they may have exerted upon the studies of subsequent philosophers. Plato visited the Megarian School, and we find in his doctrine traces of the teachings of Euclid of Megara.

Article 2. Plato and the Academies

a) Plato:

~~c) The Academies.~~

a) PLATO (427-347 B. C.)

Life: Plato was born at Athens. His father, Aristo, was a descendant of the regal line of Codrus; and his mother, Perictione or Potone, was descended from Dropides, a near relative of Solon. Plato's real name was Aristocles. It is said that

the nick-name "Plato" was given him because of his broad shoulders—the Greek word *platos* meaning "breadth." As a youth, Plato studied the arts, particularly poetry, and he wrote some tragedies before he was twenty—works unfortunately lost, for when the author assumed the deep seriousness of a student of philosophy he destroyed them. But, though he burned his plays, Plato remained a poet even when he was most earnestly a philosopher. He began the study of philosophy under Cratylus, a pupil of Heraclitus, and then for eight years sat at the feet of the great Socrates. When his master died, he went to Euclid of Megara, then travelled in Italy, where he heard the more celebrated Pythagoreans, and proceeded to Cyrene to study geometry under Theodorus. It is said that Plato spent several years in Egypt, but this seems unlikely, for his writings do not show any profound knowledge of Egyptian manners and culture; if he went to Egypt at all, he probably remained there but a short time. It appears that Plato made three journeys to Italy, but the time of these is uncertain. He visited Sicily also, and there incurred the displeasure of the Tyrant Dionysius the Elder, and was sold as a slave; but he was quickly rescued by Anniceris, a generous nobleman. He returned to Athens and opened his School in the grove of Academus, from which it took the name, "The Academy." Plato died in Athens at the age of eighty years.

Works: Plato is the first Greek philosopher whose works have all endured to our time. Some of the thirty-five dialogues attributed to him are of doubtful genuinity and some are certainly spurious. Of the works commonly admitted as genuine, the following are important: *Gorgias, The Banquet, Phaedo, Phaedrus, The Republic, Timaeus, Laws, Letters* (except the first), and *Theaetetus*.

Plato wrote in dialogue form in a style elevated, elegant, and sometimes sublime. He is often poetic and even dramatic. St. Thomas (*de Anima*, 8) says of him: "Plato had a bad way of teaching, for he spoke in figure and symbol, intending some-

thing by his words which these of themselves do not signify." Some critics think there was method in this obscurity, believing that Plato wished the doctrines so expressed to be secret, esoteric, reserved for the cultured few; and that the plainer elements of his teaching were common, exoteric, public. Whatever the value of this opinion as applied to certain individual works of Plato, it cannot be accepted as true of Plato's writings generally.

Doctrine: Plato tried to do two things: to reduce to a synthesis the doctrines of his predecessors, and to harmonize the opposed elements of these doctrines. To realize the first purpose he studied the philosophies of the ancients, and to achieve the second aim he invented his remarkable Theory of Ideas under the magic of which his system assumed a notable unity.

We will treat of Plato's philosophy in three "sections," which deal in order with his Dialectic, Physics, and Ethics.

i. Plato's Dialectic

Plato's dialectic is not merely the art of correct reasoning (Logic), but it is also the explanation of the manner in which man's soul rises from the things of sense to the things of mind, from the material to the immaterial, from things created to the increate, from opinion to the true and certain knowledge that is properly called science. Thus, as we shall see later, Plato's dialectic includes matters treated by Aristotle in his metaphysics. Of the subjects discussed in Plato's dialectic we consider: 1—the Platonic Doctrine of Knowledge, and 2—Plato's Theory of Ideas.

1—Human Knowledge. Our senses grasp individual things, things that can and do change. But our understanding grasps things in an unchangeable and universal manner. To illustrate: suppose a person employs sense (sight) to grasp ten representations of the circle drawn on a blackboard. No two of the pictures are identical in size, color, location. But what the senses perceive is precisely size, color, location—things that

can change (and which are changed or varied in the ten pictures) without the thing represented ceasing to be what it is, or changing in any way. The understanding perceives something changeless represented in the different pictures, something which makes each picture the representation of a circle, something which is identical in all ten of the pictured circles, and which must constitute every conceivable circle. In the understanding, then, there is a changeless representation of the circle as such, and not merely a representation of this or that circle as an individual picture. In other words, the understanding has a *universal* grasp of circle, a representation which expresses universally—i. e., without exception—what every circle must be if it is to be a circle at all. Briefly, the understanding has a *universal idea* of circle. In like manner, it has universal ideas, or essential representations, of other things. Now, where does the understanding get its universal ideas? Socrates called the universal ideas by the name of concepts, and intimated that they were inborn in the understanding, having been stored there by the Creator (innatism). Plato, too, says ideas are inborn in men, but he explains that they were acquired by the understanding in a previous separate existence of the soul. He teaches that the soul existed before it was united to the body. It lived in a state where it directly or intuitively perceived Things-As-They-Are, and not mere exemplifications of things. In that state, for example, the soul did not merely perceive this or that individual circle, but it perceived Circle-In-Itself, a reality which all individual representations of the circle seen in bodily life merely participate. Again, for further example, the soul in its previous separate existence did not merely perceive a beautiful thing, but perceived Beauty-Itself, which the beautiful things of sense merely participate, or share and express in a limited way. Now the separate soul, favored with the clear and direct view of Changeless-Things-As-They-Are, fell into sin, and for sin was imprisoned in the body. And at the moment of this imprisonment

the soul lost all its splendid knowledge, the vision of Things-As-They-Are was forgotten. Now, however, in bodily life, the senses present things to our knowledge, and the understanding is stirred to activity by sensation. The objects of sense participate and imperfectly express the Things-As-They-Are which the soul formerly knew, and naturally, therefore, sensation stimulates the understanding *to remember* the wonderful knowledge it lost when the soul was put into its body-prison. Hence, to know is to remember.

2—Theory of Ideas. The Things-As-They-Are which the soul knew by direct vision in its separate state before being joined to the body are Universal Ideas. These Ideas are not mere representations of things; they are things themselves; they are real, spiritual, subsistent entities. This, then, is the meaning of the word “idea”; a real, subsistent, spiritual entity, existing objectively apart from the mind which grasps or knows it. In a secondary sense “idea” means the universal representation which exists in man’s mind as a result of beholding the real Idea in the previous separate existence of the soul, and of remembering it in bodily life. In the world of objective and subsistent real ideas the highest and most important idea is the idea of the Good—i. e., Goodness-Itself-Existing-As-A-Real-Spiritual-Substance. This Idea is identified by Plato with God, the Supreme Being, the Creator.

ii. Plato’s Physics

Physics deals with the bodily world around us. It treats directly of those changing things which the senses perceive.

There is some world-stuff of which all bodily things are made, a kind of basis or substratum, which has been determined or formed into the material objects that make up what we know as the world. This basic substance is known as Platonic Prime Matter—a term that ought never be used without the proper adjective, for Prime Matter is a name usually employed

to designate Aristotelean Prime Matter, a thing very different from the Platonic. Platonic Prime Matter is a determinate kind of bodily substance in itself; whereas the Prime Matter of Aristotle is a wholly indeterminate part-principle of bodies.

This world is the best world possible (optimism), for it was formed out of the world-stuff or Platonic Prime Matter by God (i. e., by the Subsistent Real Idea of the Good), and God could produce nothing inferior. But if it be the best world possible it must be alive (hylozoism), for life is better than non-life. Now if the world be alive, it must have a life principle, a soul; there exists, in consequence, a world-soul. The world-soul is seated in the very centre of the universe, but its activity penetrates all bodily substance.

The fundamental elements of bodies are earth and fire, the one giving solidity to bodies, the other giving light and heat. Since, however, these two elements have nothing in common, they do not fuse or unite together; and for this reason God made two other substances to bring them into union, viz., air and water. The four elements—earth, fire, air, and water—united in variously proportioned mixtures under the action of the world-soul, make up the whole material universe. The elements themselves are composed of the primordial world-stuff (or Platonic Prime Matter) and are determined in being by God. The universe consists of seven major parts or planets, of which the earth is the central body; the other planets move about the earth in regular and perfect order (geocentric system). Plato does not say whether the earth has any motion.

God—the Subsistent Real Idea of the Good—did not make the world directly, but indirectly through the action of subordinate powers which He had created. Plato speaks of a *Demiurge*, and some critics think that this was the chief of the subordinate powers; but it is fairly certain that Plato's *Demiurge* is only another name for God or The Good. God found in Himself the exemplars, or ideal patterns, according

to which things were made; that is to say, the Subsistent Idea of the Good contains all other ideas which are participated or imperfectly expressed in worldly realities.

Man's soul is the immediate product of God's action, and the subordinate powers had no part in its making. Souls were created in determinate number in the beginning (pre-existence of souls). The soul is spiritual, rational, self-moving, immortal. Souls are joined to bodies in consequence of some sin, which they contracted by coming into contact with matter. Matter is the source of evil because it resists the action of God—i. e., the basic elements of earth and fire resist the action of God that would form them into bodies, and other elements had to be created to effect their union. Contact with matter was, therefore, a damaging thing for souls, and amounted to sin. On account of this sin, souls were joined with bodies, and reside in them as in prisons. The first human body was prepared by the powers subordinate to God; it was a male body, and from it emerged a female body and the bodies of brute animals. Thereafter bodies were prepared for souls by the process of generation. Soul and body are not united into a single human substance (substantial union), but the soul is in the body and controls it as a rower is in a boat and controls it (accidental union). The spiritual soul is the thinking principle in man, the elements of thought being supplied to it by recollection or remembrance, as already explained. Besides the spiritual soul there is a sensation-soul. There is also a third or "courageous" soul called *thymos*. It is not clear whether Plato taught that there are three souls in man, or that there is but one soul with three distinct faculties or capacities for distinct kinds of activity. At all events, the sensation-soul and *thymos* are not described as immortal; only the thinking, spiritual soul is deathless.

If a man live well on earth his soul will go to a place of delights when death has liberated it from the prison of the body. If he live badly his soul will be united with a female

body, and continue earthly existence. If evil be persisted in the soul will next be joined to the body of a brute, and eventually to that of a plant (transmigration or metempsychosis). Hopelessly vile souls will be banished to a place of torments; purified souls will join the souls of the just in the heavenly state. Sometimes Plato seems to teach the eternity of both rewards and punishments in the future life, and sometimes he speaks as though all souls will eventually reach their original purity and be happy forever.

iii. Plato's Ethics

Plato's Ethics may be conveniently divided into the ethics of the individual man and the ethics of society.

1—Individual Ethics. The will chooses what the understanding proposes to it as good. But the understanding is clouded by sensuality and cannot always avoid mistaken judgment in the matter of good and evil. Sin is therefore inevitable. Yet the will is free; for it freely fell into the primal sin which caused its union with the body, and hence it is responsible "in cause" for the inevitable sins committed in the flesh. Happiness is the end which man seeks to attain. Happiness is not found in the things which merely serve man's use (utilitarianism), nor in the pleasures of this earthly life (hedonism), but in making the soul like to God by the contemplation of the Idea of the Good and by the exercise of virtues. Plato discusses virtues ably, and may be said to outline the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance.

2—Social Ethics. The State (civil society) takes its character from its members. Harmony among the members makes a stable State. The greatest harmony prevails when each citizen performs the office for which his physical and mental powers best fit him. There are three main classes of citizens: (1) Philosophers, whose duty it is to rule, to make and execute laws. These constitute the head of the social organism.

(2) Soldiers, whose duty is the defence of the State. They are the heart of the social organism. (3) The Populace—merchants, farmers, slaves, and others—who furnish the material goods necessary for all citizens. These constitute the arms, legs, and trunk of the social organism. The duty of citizens is to preserve harmony, and so to serve the State. Education must discover the abilities of each child, and fit him for the office he is qualified to hold. For this reason the State has the right and duty of directing education. As to the form of government in the State, the best is the aristocratic, or rather sophocratic, in which a few wise men (or even one) hold the place of power. The second-best form of government is timocracy, or military rule. Bad forms of government are oligarchy—the domination of the State by a few families—democracy, or popular rule, and tyranny, the rule of one man unfitted for the responsibilities of single rule.

Remarks: Plato's doctrine exhibits throughout an exaggerated dualism, i. e., the holding of two combined or closely related things in separation. We find such dualism in his doctrine of human knowledge, for he minimizes the relation between sensation and understanding, and denies that the intellect can rise from the individual data of sense to the representation of essences (ideas). Plato extends his dualism to physics, and teaches that man's soul and body are not in substantial, but only in accidental, union. Even in the ethical doctrine of Plato a sort of dualism is distinguished, for he teaches that the soul must strive for liberation from the body-prison to become like God.

In Social Ethics Plato gives to the State the character of a human organism, and this leads him to regard individual men as mere members of a greater and superior body. Hence, as members of the human body do not exist for themselves alone but for the weal of the entire body, so individual citizens do not exist for themselves merely, but for the welfare of the State. This doctrine is false and pernicious. While individual

men have duties and must make many and often great personal sacrifices for the benefit of life in civil society, it must never be forgotten that the State is the servant of its citizens; that the individual image of God is the more important thing, and the State the less important.

For the rest, we merely remark that Plato's doctrine of the pre-existence of souls and his Theory of Ideas are gratuitous assumptions made for the purpose of explaining away certain difficulties which face the man who seeks to understand the universe. These doctrines show the fertile fancy of the poet, but they do not exhibit the penetration of the philosopher.

Perhaps Plato's best service to philosophy was his stand on the changeless character of science.

b) THE ACADEMIES.

1—THE OLD ACADEMY, Plato's School, did not long maintain its proper character, for the death of the master brought many changes. Plato's doctrine of God, of the World of Subsistent Real Ideas, and of the world of sense, was too subtle for his intellectual grandchildren and was but vaguely understood. The Academians came to regard everything as numbers after the fashion of the old Pythagoreans; and God was more or less perfectly identified with the bodily world (pantheism). The germ of both these departures was latent in Plato's own philosophy, with its numbered Ideas, its numbered souls, its harmonious universe, and its world-soul. The chief philosophers of the old Academy were Speusippus, Xenocrates, Heraclides of Pontus, Philip of Opus, and Crantor.

2—THE MIDDLE ACADEMY flourished in the late 4 century B. C., and showed a tendency towards absolute skepticism, i. e., the belief that man can have no certain knowledge of anything nor even a probability. Its chief representative was Arcesilaus (316-241 B. C.).

3—THE THIRD ACADEMY flourished at a later period, and taught a doctrine of mitigated or moderate skepticism. allow-

ing that man may achieve probability, but denying the possibility of absolute certainty in anything. The chief representative of the Third Academy was Carneades (about 210–129 B. C.).

4—THE NEW ACADEMY flourished in the 2 and 1 centuries B. C. and professed a doctrine which is a mélange of Platonism, Aristoteleanism, and Stoicism. Its chief representatives were Philo of Larissa and Antiochus.

Remark: Only the Old Academy and the Middle Academy have a right to be mentioned here. The other Academies belong to later periods in the History of Philosophy. But, since their importance is not great, they are mentioned here for the purpose of avoiding confusing reference later on.

Article 3. Aristotle and the Aristoteleans

a) Aristotle;

b) The Aristoteleans.

a) ARISTOTLE (384–322 B. C.)

Life: Aristotle was born at Stagira—hence he is called “The Stagirite”—on the shore of the Adriatic in Thrace. His father was Nichomachus, physician to King Amyntas of Macedon. His mother was named Phaestida. When Aristotle was about twenty-two years of age he went to Athens, and for the next twenty years he studied philosophy under Plato. Meanwhile he carried on researches in the natural sciences. After Plato’s death Aristotle spent some time in travel, and then was called by King Philip of Macedon to be tutor to the young Alexander the Great, then a lad of thirteen. When Alexander succeeded to the kingdom, Aristotle returned to Athens and began to teach philosophy in the Lyceum of Apollo. It was his custom to walk up and down the shaded walks of the Lyceum while discoursing to his pupils, and, since the Greek verb *peripatein* means “to walk about,” he and his pupils were called “The Peripatetics.” Aristotle carried on his work of teaching for twelve or thirteen years. After that period his fame and in-

fluence were so great that the Athenian politicians found his removal desirable, and accordingly had him accused of impiety, a fatal charge. Aristotle escaped condemnation by fleeing the city. He retired to Euboea, where he resided until his death in 322.

Works: Aristotle wrote many works, some in dialogue form, some in form more scientific. The dialogues, saving a few fragments, have all perished, but the other writings survive. Some parts of Aristotle's works are of doubtful genuinity, and some changes and interpolations have certainly been made in the original text. Another unfortunate circumstance is that Aristotle's writings are mere hurried notes written probably as sketches in outlining his lectures. Some critics are of the opinion that all the works of Aristotle in our possession are class notes made by pupils of the great philosopher. At all events, these works may be grouped under four heads, viz., Logic (Organon), Physics, Metaphysics, and Ethics.

Doctrine: In accordance with the classification of Aristotle's works we discuss his Logic, Physics, Metaphysics, and Ethics in four sections.

i. Aristotle's Logic

Aristotle was the inventor of Logic, or Analytic, as he called it. Not only did he invent this science, but he brought it to such perfection of development that very little of essential importance has been added to it since his day. Logic teaches men to come by correct thinking to conclusions that can and must be held with certainty as true. As may be seen from this description of the science, Logic is subdivided into two branches or sub-sciences, viz., 1) the science of correct thinking (Formal Logic), and 2) the science of true and certain knowledge (Material Logic).

The human mind has three distinct operations: apprehending, judging, reasoning. A knowledge of the nature of these operations enables the philosopher to formulate the laws ac-

ording to which they function, and these are called the Laws of Thought. We discuss each of the operations of the mind very briefly.

(i) *Apprehension.* The senses present their findings to the mind. Say, for example, that the sense of sight reports ten representations or pictures of the circle, no two of which are alike in size, position, color. Now it is precisely the size, position, and color that the senses perceive. But the mind pierces beneath the sense findings and sees that each of the pictures represents *a* circle, one as truly as another, one exactly in the same manner as another, in spite of the differences in size, position, color. In a word, the mind finds that size, position, and color do not signify in the *actual thing* that is represented (i. e., circle), and it therefore *abstracts* from such things as accidental and non-essential. Yet the accidental and non-essential things (size, position, color) really have a function; they distinguish one individual picture of circle from all other individual pictures. They are called, therefore, the individuating marks of the pictured circles, and, inasmuch as they are the marks by which the mind knows or notes that one individual picture is not another, they are called *individuating notes*. The mind in apprehending abstracts from individuating notes, lays hold of, grasps, or apprehends the essential thing or the essence which these notes clothe. The result of the abstraction and apprehension is the *idea*. The idea, then, or "simple apprehension" of a thing, is the essential representation of that thing in the understanding. It is well to remark here that when the mind has completed the abstracting process, cutting away (i. e., neglecting to consider) the individuating notes, the essential thing, the essence, which remains is called "an intelligible species." Inasmuch as this "species" is put into the understanding, or impressed upon the understanding, it is called the impressed species or *species impressa*; inasmuch as the mind reacts to the impression, grasping or apprehending it, the species is called the expressed species or *species expressa*. The

species expressa is the idea proper. Notice, then, that, according to Aristotle, the understanding has the power of forming its ideas by abstraction, i. e., by elaboration of sense findings. Contrast this true doctrine with the theory of Socrates that ideas are inborn and are to be worked out of their latent and obscure condition by the ironic and maieutic processes of discussion. Contrast this doctrine also with that of Plato, who taught that the formation of ideas is a mere recollection or remembrance of Subsistent Real Ideas known directly by the soul in a former existence. Neither Socrates nor Plato admitted the abstractive power of the intellect by which it rises from the findings of sense to essential representation by ideas.

(ii) Judgment. Ideas or simple apprehensions are representations in the understanding of the essences of things. Ideas are simple, i. e., they involve no affirmation or denial, they represent *simply*, without mental comment on what is represented. Now the understanding has the function of comparing its ideas, of noting identities and distinctions, likenesses and unlikenesses, and of pronouncing or judging upon these relations. This judgment of the understanding upon the agreement or disagreement of its ideas is a basic thought process. In judgment the mind pronounces upon the agreement (affirmative judgment) or disagreement (negative judgment) which is found, upon examination, to exist between two ideas. In affirmative judgment the mind asserts that a certain idea agrees with or is to be predicated of another idea. The former idea is the predicate-idea, the latter is the subject-idea. For example, the understanding examines the content of two ideas, viz., *man* and *animal*. It finds these ideas in agreement, though not coextensive and identical. It sees that the idea *animal* is to be predicated of the idea *man*. The judgment follows: Man is an animal. Here we have an affirmative judgment or predication. Now there are five possible modes of predication, and these are called the Five Heads of Predicables, or simply *Predicables*. These are the following: Genus, Species, Specific

Difference, Property (or Attribute), and Accident. Notice most carefully that these are modes in which the mind predicates one idea of another; they are not classes of things existing as such outside the mind. The latter classification will be explained later on, but here it is necessary constantly to remind oneself that one is dealing with a matter of mind and not of extramental reality, granted always that there is an extramental basis for all here considered.

A—GENUS. When a predicate-idea is affirmed of a subject-idea as constituting something which the subject-idea holds in common with another idea, the predicate-idea is the Genus of the subject idea. Take the judgment, "Man is an animal." Here the predicate-idea (animal) is affirmed of the subject-idea (man) as constituting that part of the subject (i. e., animality) which the latter has in common with another idea (i. e., brute animal). "Animal" is therefore the Genus of "Man."

B—SPECIES. When the predicate-idea is affirmed of the subject-idea as constituting it completely, so that subject and predicate are identical in content, or, in other words, so that the predicate completely defines the subject, then the predicate-idea is the Species of the subject-idea. Take the judgment, "Man is a rational animal." Here the predicate-idea (rational animal) is affirmed of the subject-idea (man) as constituting it entirely and essentially and as completely defining the subject-idea. "Rational animal" is therefore the Species of "Man."

C—SPECIFIC DIFFERENCE. When a predicate-idea is affirmed of a subject-idea as constituting that part of the latter by which it is distinguished from another idea with which it has a common Genus, then the predicate-idea is the Specific Difference of the subject idea. Take the judgment, "Man is rational." Here the predicate (rational, i. e., being) is affirmed of the subject (man) as constituting that part of the idea *man* by which it is distinguished from another idea (i. e., brute animal) with which it has a common Genus. "Rational" is therefore the Specific Difference of "Man."

D—PROPERTY OR ATTRIBUTE. When a predicate-idea is affirmed of a subject-idea as constituting no essential part of the latter, but as belonging to it by natural necessity, then the predicate-idea is the Property or Attribute of the subject-idea. Take the judgment, "Man is risible, i. e., has the faculty of laughing." Here the predicate (risible) is affirmed of the subject (man) as constituting no part of the idea *man*, but as belonging to that idea by natural necessity, since man, if wholly and perfectly constituted, inevitably has the faculty of laughing. "Risible" is thus a property of "Man."

E—ACCIDENT. When a predicate-idea is affirmed of a subject-idea as constituting no part of the latter, and as having no natural and necessary connection therewith, but simply as something that may be present or may be absent from the subject-idea without affecting it in essence or properties, then the predicate-idea is the Accident of the subject-idea. Take the judgment, "Man is a reading being, i. e., knows how to read." Here the predicate (reading) is affirmed of the subject (man) as something that may belong to the latter, but by no force of essence or of natural necessity. "Reading being" is therefore an Accident of "Man" in the given judgment.

The Five Predicables are the only modes of predication possible. When one idea is affirmed of another, the judgment or predication will always be generic, specific, specifically differential, attributive or proper, or accidental. As to negative judgments we may merely remark that the denial will be on all five scores, or the judgment will be so qualified as to make clear the precise modes of predication excluded or denied. Aristotle called the Five Predicables by the name *Categoremata*.

But what of the extramental realities which the ideas represent? In what classes do understandable things exist in nature outside the mind? There are ten such classes or *Categories*, also called *Predicamentals*.

The Predicamentals or Categories are: *Substance*, and *Nine Accidents*. Every object of knowledge, every thing of which an

idea can be formed, must be conceived either as a substance or as one of the accidents.

A—SUBSTANCE is that which can exist in its own right without requiring some other thing as a foundation or substratum in which to inhere, i. e., without requiring some subject-reality which it merely characterizes, modifies, qualifies, or affects. Of course, excepting God, the Infinite Substance, every substance requires a creating and conserving cause; this is not the point, however. Granted the necessary creating and conserving cause, substance is conceived as something which can have its own proper existence as distinct from other things. Examples of substance are: body, man, angel, earth, air, water, fire, house, tree, hill.

B—ACCIDENT (i. e., Predicamental Accident, not the Predicable Accident described above) is that reality which is not suited for independent existence like a substance, but regularly requires a subject-substance in which to inhere. Examples of accident: color (of a body), size, shape, temperature, motion, speed, temperament. There are nine accidents and these are called: Quality, Quantity, Relation, Place, Time, Posture, Habit, Action, Passion. Definitions of the accidents may be found in any manual of Scholastic Philosophy. Here it will suffice to offer an illustration. Consider the ideas expressed in the following sentence, and look to what extramental things each represents:

“An old slave, six feet in height, and clothed in scanty rags, stood singing in his doorway at evening, his body swayed by the melody.”

Here we find the expression of all the Predicamentals:

substance: slave, i. e., a man, a human substance;

quantity: six feet in height;

quality: old;

relation: slave (implies relation to master, i. e., servitude);

place: in his doorway;

time: at evening;

posture: stood;

habit: clothed in rags (note that *habit of mind* is quality);

action: singing;

passion: swayed (passion means submitting to or affected by action).

Aristotle does not always enumerate all ten Predicamentals, but from his ex-professo treatment of the subject and from his usual manner of speaking we know that he understood that there are ten.

(iii) Reasoning or Inference. The third and most complex operation of the mind is that of reasoning. Reasoning is, loosely speaking, a round-about way of arriving at a judgment. In judging of the agreement or disagreement of two ideas the understanding is sometimes balked and cannot make pronouncement. It then employs a third idea, known in relation to each of the two about which judgment is sought, and so *reasons out* the judgment. Call the two ideas A and B, and the third idea C, and the process may be represented as follows: The mind cannot pronounce upon the agreement of A and B. Comparison of the two ideas, because of their obscurity, fails to make clear their agreement or disagreement. The mind therefore cannot pronounce A is B, nor can it declare A is not B. But the mind knows A is C. It also knows that B is C. Therefore it reasons out the judgment A is B:

A is C

B is C

Therefore, A is B.

A—DEDUCTION. When reasoning proceeds upon the principles: "Whatever is true of a class as a whole is true of the members of the class" (*Dictum de Omni*); and "Whatever is to be denied of a class as a whole is to be denied of the members of the class" (*Dictum de Nullo*), the reasoning is called deductive reasoning or simply deduction. Examples of deduction are:

All fruits are wholesome (i. e., the *whole class* of fruits is wholesome) ;

But oranges are a fruit (i. e., a *member of the class*) ;

Therefore, oranges are wholesome.

No fruits are harmful (i. e., harmfulness denied to the *whole class* fruits) ;

But oranges are a fruit (i. e., *member of the class*) ;

Therefore, oranges are not harmful.

B—INDUCTION. When reasoning proceeds upon the principle: "What is true or false of the individual members of a class is true or false of the class as a whole," the reasoning is called inductive reasoning or simply induction. Induction is called *complete* when that which is known to be true or false of *each and every individual member* of the class is inferred as true or false of the class as a whole. If, for example, I find by experiment that every one of the known metals is heavier than water, and infer that "All the known metals are heavier than water," I have a piece of complete induction. Induction is called *incomplete* when that which is found to be true or false of *some members* of a class is inferred as true or false of the class as a whole. Now if these members of the class be thoroughly representative of the class, and if they be tested and examined under varied conditions and circumstances, so that it becomes apparent that the point affirmed of them must belong to the very nature of such members, then the induction is *incomplete but sufficient*. This sort of induction is obviously the only sort of reasoning available in the experimental sciences, and its conclusions must be accepted as scientific certainties. If, however, induction is based upon experiment or study of some non-representative members of a class, or if the study and experiment is not thorough and varied, or if the specimens or members studied are very few, then the induction is called *incomplete and insufficient*, and its conclusions have no scientific value beyond the impression which they may

create in the mind of the investigator to carry him on to closer study and experiment. Aristotle does not deal professedly with *incomplete but sufficient* induction, but he teaches its value implicitly and incidentally. Here it is to be noticed that Deduction and Induction are not opposed methods of reasoning. They are supplemental. Induction seeks to establish a general truth so that individual scientific truths may be *deduced* therefrom.

The three operations of the mind, viz., apprehension (forming the idea), judgment, and reasoning, are expressed respectively in the Term, the Proposition, and Argumentation. The most perfect form of Argumentation is the Syllogism, which is a form of argumentation consisting of three propositions so connected that when the first two are given, the third necessarily follows. The examples given above in explanation of deduction are syllogisms. Aristotle treats of the syllogism at length, describing its *Figures*, or various valid arrangements of its terms, and its *Moods*, or various valid arrangements of its propositions with respect to their scope or extension. He also states the Laws of Syllogistic Reasoning. In all this Aristotle did a wholly original thing. He asserts that he learned nothing of the syllogism from any teacher, but worked out the entire doctrine by his own study.

ii. Aristotle's Physics

Physics is the science of that being which is subject to change. There are four kinds of change: change of substance (corruption and generation); change of quality (alteration; as, for example, from hot to cold); change of quantity (growth and diminution); and change of place (local motion).

Since the bodily universe is the most changeable of beings it is the foremost object of the science of Physics. Aristotle admits change and multiplicity in the world as realities, and thus he contradicts the Eleatics, who declare that change and variety are illusions.

Now all bodies—solid, liquid, gaseous, living, non-living—are at one in this point: they are *bodies*. There is something, therefore, in all bodies, some substratum, some substantial principle, which is common to them: it makes bodies bodies. There is also in bodies something substantial which distinguishes them into different species or essential kinds of bodies. By reason of the first substantial principle each body is *a body*; by reason of the second substantial principle each body is *this essential kind of body*. The first substantial principle is called Prime Matter; the second is called Substantial Form. To illustrate all this: Consider a boy seated on a rock under a tree. Here are three bodies: boy. rock. tree. They are all *bodies*, each as truly as the others: hence they have some common substantial principle. This is Prime Matter. Yet the three bodies are essentially different kinds of bodily substance; they are, respectively, human substance, mineral substance, vegetal substance. In other words, the Prime Matter in each of these three bodies is *determined* in such a way that the bodies are essentially or specifically different kinds of bodies. This determinant in each of the bodies is its Substantial Form. The doctrine of Prime Matter and Substantial Form is called "Hy-lomorphism" from two Greek words which mean, respectively, "matter" and "form."

Prime Matter does not exist separately. It exists only with Substantial Forms in bodies. In other words, it exists only in an in-formed condition as the universe of all bodies. Prime Matter and Substantial Forms come together as substantial co-principles to form bodies; neither is a complete substance; together they form a complete bodily substance. Prime Matter is not increased or diminished; it is indestructible unless God annihilate it. It is called *indifferent*, that is to say, it has no propensity, no leaning, no preference for union with any one Substantial Form rather than another. When a body is changed substantially—as wood, for example, is changed by being burned up—the Prime Matter is not destroyed. What

happens is that one Substantial Form is displaced by another, the Prime Matter remaining the same. In the example of burned wood, the Substantial Form which made the body wood and not metal or other substance, is displaced by the Substantial Forms of ash and the various chemical bodies known collectively as wood-smoke; but the Prime Matter remains unchanged. The Substantial Forms of all potential bodies (i. e., bodies not actual, but which may become actual if existing causes be put into action) are latent in the "Potentiality of Matter," that is to say, such Forms are latent in the capacity of Prime Matter to become any sort of possible body. From this general statement is excluded the Substantial Form of the human body, which is the soul, a spiritual being, not latent in the potentiality of matter nor reducible thereto as other Substantial Forms are when they cease to in-form matter in bodies. The human Substantial Form (i. e., soul) can exist separately from matter, without in-forming matter, and when it leaves the body at death it continues in separate existence.

Prime Matter is "pure potentiality"; it is purely indeterminate; it is not at all a determinate *kind* of bodily being in itself; it is only that substantial substratum which is common to all bodies, which is the basis of change in bodies without being changed itself. Prime Matter, therefore, has no distinct existence in itself. It is a reality, but not an *actuality* in the strictly philosophical sense of that word. To be made actual, to be actuated, it requires that a Substantial Form unite with it or in-form it. The two incomplete substantial principles of a body (i. e., Prime Matter and Substantial Form) come together to make a single complete substance, not a dual or double one. Prime Matter and Substantial Form are incomplete substantial co-principles which together constitute complete bodily substance. Prime Matter is one; but there are as many Substantial Forms in kind as there are specifically different kinds of actual and possible bodies.

Aristotle teaches that the bodily universe has always existed in the condition in which we now find it (*eternity of matter*). The heavenly bodies, he says, are naturally incorruptible, being of a nature superior to that of earthly bodies. The earth is the crudest of all the great cosmic bodies, and is therefore at the bottom (or centre) of the universe. The heavenly bodies move about the earth (*geocentric system*). The earth itself has no movement. Aristotle speaks in some detail of the figure and movements of the heavenly bodies, and of their arrangement and mutual relations.

In speaking of earthly bodies Aristotle expounds the doctrine of generation and corruption, condensation and rarefaction, and discusses the nature of a mixture of elements. The elements of bodies here on earth are air, earth, fire, and water—things intensely contrary in qualities. From the proper mixture and balance of these contrary elements different kinds of bodily things emerge. The heavenly bodies, as already explained, are different in essential structure from earthly bodies; they are not made of the four elements; they constitute a fifth element or “fifth essence” (*quinta essentia, quintessence*). Notice, however, that these structural differences do not affect the basic nature of all bodies, terrestrial and celestial; for all are ultimately composed of Prime Matter and Substantial Form, even the elements.

The soul is the Substantial Form of the human body. It is spiritual and immortal. It possesses understanding or intellect, by which it forms and expresses ideas, judgments, reasoning. The intellect has an active and a passive power; the former (Agent Intellect) abstracts understandable essences or intelligible species from the findings of sense: the latter (Passive Intellect) recognizes and expresses the abstracted mental images as *ideas*. The soul is immediately created by God; it had no pre-existence before being united to the body.

Animals and plants have a life-principle or soul (*psyche*) as well as man. Man has the functions of plant life and animal

life as well as his own proper function as a reasoning and willing being. Yet he has not three souls or life-principles, but only one, which is spiritual and rational, and which is the principle of all man's vital functions, vegetal, animal, and rational. The life-principle of plants and brutes is reduced at their death to the potentiality of matter, while man's soul is deathless.

iii. Aristotle's *Metaphysics*

Metaphysics deals with being as being. The idea of "being" is the most abstract of all ideas. "Being" may be described as "Anything that exists or can exist in the order of mind (logical order) or of extramental reality (ontological or real order.)" Everything that exists or can be thought of as existing is "being." All things come together in a common point, or on a common basis, as "being." "Being" is the most universal idea; it is the basis of all ideas; everything of which we can form an idea is represented to the mind as some thing, i. e., as being.

The idea of being is transcendental, that is to say, it soars above the reach of understanding when we would classify it as different *kinds* of being; it *transcends* such classification. We cannot say, for example, that bodily being and spiritual being are different kinds of *being as being*; for a body is *being* quite as truly as a spirit is *being*.

It has been said that the universal idea of *being* includes in the class of things which it denotes (i. e., in its *extension*) all things actual and possible. Now the things which a universal idea denotes, the things included in the extension of a universal idea, are called the *inferiors* of that universal idea. Thus the inferiors of the universal idea "man" are each and every human being that exists, has existed, will exist, or could exist. Again, the inferiors of the universal idea "animal" are all brute and rational animals, actual or possible. Hence, the inferiors of the universal idea *being* are all things that are or can be, all things that can be thought of as existing. Now there are obviously very great differences among the things that

are and can be. A body is very different from a spirit; yet we have said that each is truly *being*: still, a body and a spirit are not beings in the fullness of identity. Again, finite being is very different from infinite being (God); both are being, but they are not being in completeness of identity. For this reason we have the Aristotelean principle: "The universal idea *Being* does not apply to its inferiors *univocally* (i. e., in precisely the same measure of exactness, which would make all inferiors identical in essence) but *analogically* (i. e., in a manner not precisely the same in each case, yet not wholly different in any two cases)." Thus *being*, which defies classification into different *kinds of being as such*, is nevertheless distinguished analogically.

From the idea of being Aristotle develops certain self-evident principles. The chief of these principles is *the Principle of Contradiction*, which may be expressed thus: "A thing can not be and not-be at the same time in the same manner." Another principle is *the Principle of Identity and Difference*, which may be thus expressed: "A is A; not-A is not-A; i. e., that which is, is; that which is not, is not." Still another self-evident principle derived from the very idea of being is *the Principle of the Excluded Middle*: "Either a being is or it is not; there is no middle state between being and not-being." These principles, drawn from the idea of *being*, which is the root and basis of every idea, may appear so obvious as to be ridiculous; yet they are the foundation of all valid thought and reasoning. Like the first axioms of geometry, these principles appear so evident that it seems a bit silly to state them with all the importance of emphasis. Yet the axioms of geometry make geometry possible as a science; and, in like manner, the self-evident principles derived from the idea of *being* make all science possible.

In his metaphysical writings Aristotle discusses and defines such things as: principle; cause, material cause, formal cause, efficient cause, final cause; nature; element; the necessary; the

contingent; unity; substance; identity; diversity; likeness; difference; unlikeness; opposition, contrary opposition, contradictory opposition, etc.; *being per se* and *per accidens*; *being* with reference to the true and the false; the ten categories; *being in actuality* and *in potency*. The last topic is of the greatest importance, and must be noticed here.

Potentiality (*being in potency*) signifies capacity to receive perfection not at present possessed. Act (*being in actuality*) signifies perfection now possessed. An *existing* being possesses the perfection of its present existence; it is actually what it is: yet it may be modified in its nature or accidents so that it becomes something else. Towards this something else, towards this new substantial or accidental perfection, the existing being stands *in potency*. Thus we may say that an existing being is *actually* what it is, *potentially* what it may become. The capacity for modification (perfection) in an existing being is called *subjective potency*. The capacity of a non-existing being to receive existence is called *objective potency*, i. e., pure possibility. The more actuality a being has, the more perfect it is, for actuality means possession of perfection; and, correspondingly, the more a being is in potency, the more imperfect it is. Now a being that has the fullness of actuality, that is, actually so perfect that no perfection can be even thought of which it does not possess, is *pure act* or *pure actuality*. Such a Being is obviously infinite. Aristotle therefore defines God as Pure Actuality or Pure Act (*Actus Purus*). Conversely, a being which has in itself no determinate actuality at all, a being that is simply and solely in potency to all that it may become, a being that has not even a determinate leaning or inclination towards one sort of actualization rather than towards another—such a being is *pure potentiality*, it is purely potential being. And for this reason Aristotle defines Prime Matter as pure potentiality.

God alone is Pure Actuality. Prime Matter alone is pure potentiality. All other things are made up of actuality and

potentiality. God is *simple*, that is, He has no parts, is not divisible. God is one, infinite, eternal, immutable, distinct from the world. In speaking of God's knowledge Aristotle is somewhat obscure; he seems to say that God does not know the world, since inferiority in the object of knowledge would be an imperfection in the All-Perfect—an obvious impossibility. But St. Thomas rightly interprets Aristotle as teaching that the inferior things are not the formal object of God's knowledge, but that God knows all things *in* the formal object of His knowledge, and this formal object is God Himself. Indeed, if any sort of knowledge were outside the Divine Intellect, God would stand *in potency* towards such knowledge; and Aristotle's definition of God excludes all potency from the Divine Being.

Of God's operations outside Himself (i. e., of creation, conservation of creatures, providence) Aristotle speaks at some length in his *Metaphysics*. Some interpreters say that while Aristotle makes God the *final cause* of the universe (i. e., the end for which the world was made), he does not make God the *efficient cause* (i. e., the creating, producing cause) of creatures. This view of the Aristotelean position must be challenged directly. In the first place, Aristotle never expressly states that God is not the efficient cause of the world. On the contrary, he makes use of God's final causality in illustration of His efficient causality. It is true that Aristotle denied *transient activity* in God; and rightly, since this would involve imperfection in the All-Perfect. But he asserted God's efficient causality in *moving* (eternally) the eternal matter of which the universe is composed (according to his doctrine). Eternal matter does not mean uncaused matter; that matter is eternal does not do away with the necessity of an *efficient cause* acting *ab aeterno*. Again, in the second place, the citations made from Aristotle's text in proof of the position here assailed, are all readily understood as denials of *transient activity* in God, that is, of activity which would be a mere actualization of potency

in God—and in God there is, of course, no potency at all. In the Fifth Book of his *Physics* Aristotle touches this matter of causes of the world; and, while he says he does not intend to speak of the “substantial origin” (creation by efficient cause) of the world, he does so, none the less, by implication; and he calls God the First Cause and the First Principle of all things. And, obviously, “First Cause” and “First Principle” mean the first *efficient* cause.

Besides God, Aristotle admits secondary motors or causes in the world. These are “separate intelligences,” and each has been assigned charge of one of the heavenly spheres, which it rules and moves.

In the last two books of his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle mentions and refutes the ancient doctrine of “separate substances,” especially the Platonic doctrine of Real Subsistent Ideas.

We must notice here, before passing on to the study of Aristotle’s *Ethics*, that the *Metaphysics* of this old master is a body of profound doctrine, true in almost every detail. Omitting certain vague doctrines about God and the existence of separate intelligences ruling the spheres by efficient action, the Aristotelean *Metaphysics* appears to be altogether reliable. Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* is the most disorderly of his treatises; for it is nothing more than a collection of class-notes, hastily jotted to be elaborated later before his pupils. His division of his matter is not accurate nor logical; he introduces much discussion extraneous to the subject in hand. Yet for all these defects, Aristotle’s pages on *Metaphysics* are some of the most valuable ever written.

iv. Aristotle’s Ethics

Ethics, or moral science, treats of man’s free activity in relation to an end which he is to achieve. Aristotle divides the subject into departments called Monastic, Economic, and Political, which treat respectively of the individual, the domestic, and the civil functions of applied moral principles.

Man tends towards happiness; he seeks happiness. Now happiness consists ultimately in the knowledge and contemplation of truth, and particularly divine truth. This is the end, the Great Good, the *summum bonum*, which man must strive to attain. The measure of man's progress or retrogression in the work of achieving this end, or, in other words, the *norm of morality*, the test of good and evil, is only vaguely hinted at in the writings of Aristotle. Moreover, Aristotle mistakenly limits the objective happiness of man to the present earthly life. To achieve the *summum bonum* man must practise the moral virtues; nor can he be fully happy without the proper functioning of all the bodily organs and members. Aristotle makes a thorough study of the moral habits called *virtues*.

Man is *by nature* a social animal. He is, first of all, inclined towards conjugal society, marriage. This society must be stable and permanent, for the ends of marriage demand its indissolubility. With conjugal or domestic society Aristotle considers the *societas herilis*, or the master-and-slave society. He teaches that some must rule and some must serve, and says that this is a requirement of nature itself. But he does not advocate slave *ownership*. He perceives the evils of slavery, and declares that master and slave should be *friends*, and that slaves should never be compelled to suffer violent or inhuman treatment.

Aristotle defines the State as "a multitude of men sufficing to procure for themselves the necessaries for living well." The State is not the *owner* of its citizens, nor their *superior*. Aristotle denies and refutes the Platonic doctrine of *State absolutism*, and holds that the State exists only to promote the happiness and the virtue of its citizens.

Speaking of forms of government in the State, Aristotle mentions three forms which he calls good, and opposes to these three evil forms. The first good form of government is *Monarchy*, or the rule of one properly equipped for the office. To this he opposes the evil form of *Tyranny*, or the rule of one

who conducts the government in such wise as to serve his own individual ends, and cares not for the public utility. The second good form of government is *Aristocracy*, or the rule of a few wealthy and noble citizens who have the common good at heart. Opposed to this is *Oligarchy*, or the rule of a few who make the government the instrument of the rich citizens to the detriment of all others. The third good form of government is the *Free Republic*, in which representatives of all classes of citizens conduct the rule. Opposed is *Democracy* or the rule of the many who despise the interests of the wealthy and noble citizens and serve only the others. There is no *best* form of government suited to all times and conditions; the circumstances and character of a people will determine what is the *relatively best* form of government, i. e., the form best suited for that people at that time. But, seemingly pressed for an opinion, Aristotle says that he regards a Monarchy tempered by an intellectual aristocracy as the nearest approach to an *absolutely best* form of government.

No pagan philosopher dealt so profoundly and scientifically with moral matters as did Aristotle. He easily outstrips all predecessors in his doctrine on the happiness of life, the nature and the division of moral virtues, the nature of human passions and free-will, the natural tendency of man to life in society, the stability and permanence of marriage, the right of ownership and other natural rights, and many additional matters. Yet Aristotle's splendid moral edifice is incomplete, for he does not treat of the beatitude of the life to come, nor of the eternal sanctions of the moral law; and he omits the all-important matter of the *supreme norm of morality*, that ultimate rule to which man's free activity must conform to be *good*, and from which any defection is *evil*.

Remarks: Aristotle was the greatest philosopher of the ancient world, and, indeed, it is not extravagant to say that his was the greatest merely human mind that the world has ever known. Though lacking the guiding light of the true Faith,

he brought philosophy to such perfection that he achieved an almost flawless system of scientific truth. He missed the truth, for the most part, only in such matters as cannot be rightly investigated without the light of revelation as a guide to study. In the Middle Ages Christian philosophers found Aristotle's philosophy in singular harmony with their Faith, and it has served ever since, as it served the great Aquinas, as a scientific basis for the exposition of religious doctrine.

Every age honored Aristotle as one of the truly great and learned men of the world, a man for the ages. But it was not until the twelfth and the following centuries that he came fully into his own. From the twelfth century onward Aristotle may truly be called the greatest factor in the intellectual development of Western Christian peoples.

Aristotle's philosophy is almost wholly his own. In principle he is traditional and Socratic; but in method and presentation of doctrine he is thoroughly original. He was the first to employ the analytic-synthetic science of Logic. He was the first to give due recognition to the value of *induction* from facts of internal and external experience; and since induction is the all-necessary instrument of the natural sciences, Aristotle is justly called "the Father of Natural Science." Aristotle deserves this title not only for his metaphysical theory which serves as a basis for natural science, but also for his investigations and studies in the department of this science itself; his treatise *On Animals*, for example, shows how accurately he studied living beings, and what wonderful things he was the first to discover about them.

b) THE ARISTOTELEANS, OR THE PERIPATETIC SCHOOL.

Among the more important Aristotelean philosophers must be mentioned:

i. Theophrastus of Lesbos (about 375-288 B. C.), who wrote many works, best known of which are his *Treatises on Botany*,

and his *Ethical Characters*, or lifelike delineations of types of human personality. He completed and enlarged Aristotle's Natural Philosophy, devoting special attention to the department of botany. In Ethics he insists upon the *choregia* (plenitude, abundance, or sufficiency) secured to virtue by possession of material goods.

ii. Eudemus of Rhodes (4-3 century B. C.), who studied under Aristotle. He wrote the so-called *Eudemian Ethics*, which is a summary of Aristotle's teaching in this field. He shows in his writings a leaning towards the Platonic theology.

iii. Strato of Lampsacus (3 century B. C.), who made studies in the science of physics. His general doctrine shows a latent atheism and materialism. He died in 270 B. C.

iv. Aristoxenes of Tarentum, who wrote of music, and taught that the soul is the harmony of the body and originates in the body as sound in the strings of a lyre.

v. Dicaearchus, who accepts the theory of Aristoxenes, and argues therefrom that the soul is not immortal.

vi. Other Aristoteleans were: Lycon, Ariston, Critolaus, Diodorus.

To avoid confusion later on, we may mention some Aristoteleans by anticipation:

vii. In the first century after Christ, the following commentators on Aristoteleanism were notable: Andronicus of Rhodes, who put the text of Aristotle's works in order; Boethius of Sidon; Nicholas of Damascus, who edited a compendium of Aristotelean doctrine differently arranged from the work of Andronicus; Demetrius of Phalerus; Alexander of Aphrodisias, a celebrated commentator, but Aristotelean only in name, for he denies the immortality of the soul, rejects divine providence as incompatible with man's free-will, teaches that the active intellect is one with God and calls the passive intellect an *acquired* faculty: and in all this he profoundly influenced the later Arab philosophers and those of the Alexandrian Renaissance.

viii. Porphyry (3 century after Christ) and Galen (2 century after Christ), as well as Philoponus and Simplicius (6 century after Christ) are counted important commentators on Aristotle and interpreters of his doctrines.

CHAPTER III

POST-ARISTOTELEAN PHILOSOPHY

(300 B. C. to Christ)

This Chapter discusses the Greek Philosophy of the period of decline. With Aristotle the Golden Age came to an abrupt end; no definite progress was made in the philosophy of the succeeding age, and the body of accumulated doctrine was not kept in integrity. Greek Philosophy retrograded. Skepticism, Materialism, and Pantheism became widespread once more. Two causes may be assigned for this decline in philosophy: First, the great teachers, and particularly Plato and Aristotle, were not popular in the sense that their doctrine was generally known and easily understood; and the followers and pupils of the masters were too few and of too meagre intellectual capacity for the work of keeping the inherited doctrine intact and pure. Secondly, external circumstances furthered the decline. In 338 the yoke of Macedonian rule was imposed upon liberty-loving Greece, and in the 2 century B. C. came the subjugation to Rome. The cultivation of the arts and sciences, so favored in the days of liberty, fell off and finally disappeared under foreign domination.

The one common question discussed by post-Aristoteleans of different schools was the *ethical question*, i. e., the question of man's happiness and the objective thing in which happiness is to be found.

The chief Schools of this period (omitting the Aristotelean or Peripatetic School discussed at the end of the last Chapter) were the following, which we shall treat in separate Articles:

- Article 1. The Stoic School
 Article 2. The Epicurean School
 Article 3. The Skeptic School
 Article 4. The Eclectic School

Article 1. The Stoic School

a) Name; b) Doctrine; c) Chief Stoics; d) Remarks.

a) NAME: The name "Stoic" is taken from "Stoa" or "porch," a portico in Athens in which Zeno of Citium, founder of the School, was accustomed to meet his pupils.

b) DOCTRINE: Philosophy is the science of virtue. It is divided into three departments, Logic, Physics, and Ethics, but the first two parts are of value only in as far as they help in the elucidation of Ethics.

Logic was studied by the older Stoics, but was neglected by the later members of this School, and by the Romans who adopted the Stoic Philosophy. The chief questions of Stoic Logic concern the origin of ideas and the criterion of truth. The Stoics teach that ideas are acquired through sensation plus a spontaneous activity of the mind. This doctrine is vaguely expressed, and is capable of various interpretations. Obviously it *can* be understood as the Aristotelean doctrine of abstraction by the active intellect from the data of sense; but such an interpretation is not consistent with other Stoic tenets. Probably the real meaning of the doctrine is that universal ideas are collections of sensations. The criterion of truth is described as the power of a representation in the intellect to win the unwavering assent of the knowing subject. Why and how such representations can exact assent was not, so far as can be discovered, explained by the Stoics. But we do know that these philosophers attributed no objective value whatever to universal ideas, and that they sought a criterion of truth as a norm

of judging the validity of knowledge about extra-mental things.

Physics was discussed by the older Greek Stoics; the Roman followers of this philosophy omit the subject, or accept the doctrine of the Greeks in its entirety. Matter alone is real. What we call spirit is a subtle form of matter (*materialism*). God is the soul of the world, and is to be conceived as a primordial fire, which is the principle of all activity and intelligence. The human soul is a spark of the divine fire. The world and God, its soul, act according to fixed and necessary laws (*determinism*). Most Stoics deny the personal immortality of the soul; but all admit that the soul will endure always because nothing in nature can wholly perish.

Ethics, or philosophy proper, is the science of virtue. The great fact and principle is that virtue is to be practised, not, indeed, with any forward-looking view towards reward in a life to come, but as the sole means of achieving happiness in this life. Virtue consists in action which consistently accords with reason. Man is not the possessor of a free-will, since the science of Physics establishes the fact that all things follow necessary laws; yet man's passions can interpose in action an *unwillingness* or repugnance to reason which shows man the laws to which he must submit. To allow passion to have sway is to act against reason, and therefore to act unvirtuously. One must be utterly *apathetic*, passionless. Only in apathetic action does man conform to reason and the cosmic laws. Therefore man must bear all things evenly, and abstain from the mere pleasures of sense. *Abstine et sustine*, bear and forbear, is the Stoic rule. One might express this principle as "Grin and bear it!" except that one would be obliged to omit the grin.

c) CHIEF STOICS: i. Zeno of Citium (about 350–264 B. C.) founded the School of Stoics at his native place, Citium on the Isle of Cyprus. In early life Zeno followed the Cynic philos-

ophy, and his own doctrine is an apparent development of this.

ii. Cleanthes, of Assus in Troas (331–233 B. C.), who succeeded Zeno as principal of the School or *scholarch*, was a less able philosopher than his predecessor, but his zeal for Stoic doctrine and his dogged persistence in defending it made him a notable influence. Only a “Hymn to the Most High God” has survived as a specimen of Cleanthes’ writings.

iii. Chrysippus of Soli or Tarsus in Cilicia (about 282–209 B. C.) succeeded Cleanthes as scholarch, and under him the Stoic School reached the height of its achievement. Chrysippus is said to have written more than seven hundred books or treatises.

iv. Succeeding Chrysippus as scholarchs came the following in order: Zeno of Tarsus, Diogenes of Babylon, Antipater of Tarsus.

v. Other Stoics worthy of mention are: Panætius of Rhodes (about 180–110 B. C.) and Possidonius of Apamea (Famit) in Syria, both of whom professed a mitigated Stoicism, intermingling with the tenets of their School the doctrines of non-Stoic philosophers.

Of the Roman Stoics we shall speak in the Chapter on Roman Philosophy.

d) REMARKS: The Stoic School marks a retrograde movement in Greek Philosophy. It harks back to old errors refuted by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. It teaches that all things are material or bodily (*materialism*); that the world is moved by a soul indwelling in it (*dynamism*); that God is identified with the world-soul and the activity of matter (*pantheism*); that man has no free-will, but acts, as does the rest of the universe, by the force of necessary laws (*determinism and fatalism*). Stoicism has always appealed to those who refuse the doctrine of immortality and the eternal last end of man to be achieved fully in a life to come, but who shrink from the grossness of hedonism, i. e., of the cult of sense-pleasures.

Article 2. The Epicurean School

a) Name; b) Doctrine; c) Chief Epicureans; d) Remarks.

a) NAME: The Epicurean School takes its name from Epicurus, its founder, who lived at Athens 342-270 B. C.

b) DOCTRINE: Like the Stoics, the Epicureans divide philosophy into Logic, Physics, and Ethics. Of these Ethics is philosophy proper; the other branches of science serve only in as much as they elucidate ethical doctrine.

Logic gives the rules for knowing and testing truth. Knowledge is divided into *sensation* and *representation*, the latter being mere collections of remembered sensations. Thus all knowledge is reduced to sensation or sense-knowledge (*sensism*). Now we cannot know even the objects of sense in a true and adequate manner—we cannot know things as they are. There is, indeed, some resemblance between objects of sense and the sensations which they produce in us, but this resemblance is not perfect, for reasons that are discussed in Epicurean Physics. Universal ideas have no objective value whatever; they are merely the *names* we give to collections of remembered sensations (*nominalism*). Every sensation is productive of pleasure or pain; and this fact is, as we shall see presently, the origin of the Epicurean norm of morality.

Physics is developed by the Epicureans after the fashion of the Atomism of Democritus. The world is formed by a sort of rain or mist of an infinite number of tiny particles of matter (*atoms*). All the atoms have the same nature. Falling downwards in the fashion of raindrops, they collide with one another, impinge upon one another, and cling together to form all the variety of bodily things that make up the world. The deflection and collision of falling atoms is the result of pure chance. There is therefore no design in the world, no *end* for which it was made. Chance made it as it is, and chance may at any time change it radically. The world could not be

the creature of an all-perfect God, for it is full of imperfections and of evil; besides, the labor of making the world would require an effort on the part of the creator, and this is incompatible with the completeness and perfection and happiness of Divinity. But while Epicurus and his School deny God, they admit the existence of certain gods or supermen, who are above the reach of want or sorrow. Outwardly, however, the Epicureans accepted the current mythology as a matter of policy. The School teaches that man's soul is made of the more subtle atoms; it dissolves at death. The soul is the seat of sensation in man. Sensation is produced by emanations of bodies, i. e., by outpourings of their own images which bodies cast off. These emanations come through the air, affect the senses, and through the senses enter the reach of the soul. But the emanated images are modified by their passage through the air, and hence do not accurately correspond with their prototypes. For this reason, we cannot know things in the world precisely as they are.

Ethics is philosophy proper. The last end which man has to achieve is *pleasure*. That end man must attain in this life, for the soul is not immortal and it is therefore futile to look for happiness hereafter. Now *pleasure* does not mean the mere passing delight of the senses; for this is often followed by pain. *Pleasure* means the sum-total of those enjoyments which keep the mind peaceful and satisfy all desire. Positive sense pleasure is to be sought only when unsatisfied desire (which is pain) demands it; it is never to be indulged for its own sake. To achieve the peace of mind in which true pleasure consists, man must employ great moderation. Man must learn to limit his desires within the bounds of possibility; he must learn to desire only what he can readily attain. He must fear nothing, for fear is pain; he must not even fear the gods, for these, like himself, are subject to the cosmic laws and have no power over him.

c) CHIEF EPICUREANS: i. Epicurus, founder of the School.

lived from 342 to 270 B. C., and taught at Athens. He was a superficial philosopher, but was quite prolific as a writer. Only a few fragments remain to us as examples of his style and manner. He attracted many followers because he offered the allurements of moral sensualism as a philosophy. His doctrines, transplanted to the Roman Empire, endured to the 4 century after Christ.

ii. Other important Epicureans were Hermarchus of Mytilene, Polystratus, Zeno of Sidon, and Phaedrus.

Roman Epicureans will be mentioned in the Chapter on Roman Philosophy.

d) REMARKS: As the Stoics are connected in Ethics with the Cynic School, so the Epicureans are related to the Cyrenaics. Thus this system, like Stoicism, was a retrograde factor in Greek philosophy, slipping back to the errors of the pre-Socratics. Epicurus, however, was logical, for his ethical doctrine is the inevitable outcome of his materialism. Though wholly false, this doctrine is praiseworthy in that it advocates moderation in the use of things of sense. Epicureanism is not, however, so temperate a thing in practice as in theory.

Epicureanism denies the existence of anything but bodily atoms and the things made of atoms (*materialism*). It holds that all the atoms of the world are of the same nature (*monism*). It maintains that atoms are arranged in bodies according to no plan and by no force (*dynamis*) of their own, but merely by an external dropping motion and the results of chance (*mechanism*). Epicureanism also denies God (*atheism*).

Article 3. The Skeptic School

- a) The Pyrrhonian Skeptics; b) The Academic Skeptics;
c) The Neo-Pyrrhonians.

Socrates and Plato refuted, but did not eradicate, the Skepticism of the old Greek Sophists. We have seen that the Minor

Socratic Schools lapsed into Skepticism, and that the skeptical tendency showed itself in the Middle Academy and the Third Academy. Even among the Peripatetics there was that disorder and disagreement which favored the spread of frankly skeptical opinion in matters intellectual.

The Skeptics of this age were concerned, like the Stoics and the Epicureans, with the ethical question—the question of man's happiness and the means of attaining it.

Three branches of the Skeptic School are to be discussed: The Pyrrhonian, the Academic, and the Neo-Pyrrhonian.

a) THE PYRRHONIAN SCHOOL was founded by Pyrrho (about 360–270 B. C.). His doctrine, and that of his School, may be summed up thus: We can know nothing of the nature of things, nor can we be sure that sensations give us a true report of objects in the world. Therefore it is useless to dispute about the object of knowledge; wisdom dictates that we suspend all judgment about matters that can never be settled with definiteness and certainty. Argument merely upsets the mind, and reaches no conclusion in any case. The one thing worthy of the interest and labor of the philosopher is the matter of happiness and the means of attaining it. Now happiness consists in *ataraxia* or imperturbability of mind, and for this man must strive. Argument and speculation in which non-skeptical philosophers indulge so freely is not only futile, as has been noted, but is ethically wrong, since it prevents man from achieving *ataraxia*.

Members of the Pyrrhonian School were, in addition to its founder, Timon of Phlius (325–235 B. C.), called “The Sillographer” because he wrote satires (*silloi*) on the old non-skeptical philosophers; and Philo of Athens.

b) THE ACADEMIAN SCHOOL has already been mentioned among the Academies after Plato, as the *Third Academy*. Arcesilaus (about 316–241 B. C.) introduced skepticism into this Academy when he was its scholarch. He taught a doctrine

of *mitigated skepticism*, declaring that, while clear certitude cannot be attained, one may reach *probably certain* knowledge by the use of the knowing faculties. To support the doctrine that pure certainty is impossible, this School proposed many arguments in demonstration of the thesis: "Nothing can be proposed and proved which will not admit of *contradictory* proof also." That probable certainty is attainable is a concession; and no good reason is offered for making it, except that the practical circumstances of life require one to take at least the things of sense pretty much at face value. This doctrine of probability is extended to Ethics; one is assured that one need not take pains to know what is objectively right and wrong, since this cannot be known with certainty; one may be satisfied to accept the prescriptions of law and custom in the matter of morals, for these give *probable certainty* about right and wrong.

Notable members of the Third Academy were: Carneades (about 210-129 B. C.); Clitomachus the Carthaginian (died about 110 B. C.); and Philo of Larissa (1 century B. C.), with whom the New Academy originated.

Remarks: The theory of probability proposed by the Academians is illogical and unstable; sooner or later it must develop into some positive doctrine of certainty, or it must lapse into absolute skepticism. The Academic Skepticism gave place to Eclecticism, of which we are to speak in the following article.

c) THE NEO-PYRRHONIANS (1 century B. C.) tried to offer a rational basis of argument for the old Pyrrhonian theory. They argued, for example, that a man will perceive an object differently at different times. The object presumably remains the same, but different subjective dispositions in the beholder (youth, age, sickness, health, etc.) as well as varying conditions in the object perceived (proximity, distance, motion, rest, etc.) will cause perception to vary. Thus one does not perceive a wheel in the same way when it is at rest

and when it is revolving rapidly; a distant mountain is perceived as something different from the same mountain seen close at hand; a thing perceived in youth will appear different to the same beholder in myopic old age. How then can one ever be *certain* that one perceives a thing as it is? Again, the Neo-Pyrrhonians argue, the question of certainty involves the doctrine of *causation*. If men claim certainty in anything, they claim it in the cause-and-effect relation of things; and they feel that they thoroughly understand a thing when they know it in its causes. Now, as a matter of fact, there is no such thing as a cause. If there were a cause, it would necessarily occur at one of three points of time, viz., before its effect, simultaneously with its effect, or after its effect. But a cause cannot occur before its effect; else it is a cause before it is a cause! A cause cannot follow its effect—the notion is obviously absurd. And if a cause concur simultaneously with its effect, no one can tell which is cause and which is effect in the concurring events.

Of course, the Neo-Pyrrhonians apply their doctrine in the field of Ethics. If there is no certainty, there is no certain right or wrong, no certain good, no certain evil. The moral effort must be directed towards *ataraxia*, imperturbability, evenness of life, peace. Peaceful surrender to the inevitable fact that certainty is not to be had is the best that can be hoped for in the sphere of intellect and in the sphere of action or conduct which depends upon understanding.

The Neo-Pyrrhonian denial of causality does away with the causes of the world, notably with the efficient and final causes. Thus the existence of God and His Providence in the world are denied.

Notable Neo-Pyrrhonians were Aenesidemus of Crete; Agrippa; and Sextus Empiricus of Nicomedia (2 century after Christ). The last named was the greatest and the last of the Greek Sceptics.

Article 4. The Eclectic School

a) Name; b) Doctrine; c) Notable Eclectics; d) Remarks.

a) NAME: Eclecticism takes its name from the Greek word, "ek-legein" which means "to pick out," "to choose out." The Eclectics are those philosophers who professedly hold that true science is contained in no one system, but is scattered through the doctrines of all schools and philosophers. Truth is found by sifting out its elements from various and even opposed philosophical systems. Practically all the philosophy of this time was eclectic in a measure. The Eclectic "School" is a convenient invention of the historian for the ready grouping of those philosophers of all Schools who were of pronounced or professed eclectic views. Most of those we are to name hereafter as Eclectics will be recalled as members of one or other of the Schools already discussed.

b) DOCTRINE: Certitude cannot be attained by reasoning upon the data of experience (*speculation*). Immediate and uncriticized knowledge, i. e., such knowledge as squares with everyday experience and meets the practical requirements of life, is the only truth. The tests of such truth is the direct experience of the individual and an inner voice which attests the truth or falsity of that which presents itself to thought or sense perception. The body of philosophical truth is organized by drawing into some sort of harmony and unity the various elements of truth which are sifted out by the "test" from the doctrines of all philosophers.

c) NOTABLE ECLECTICS were Philo of Larissa, the Academician (1 century B. C.); Antiochus of Ascalon (1 century B. C.); Plutarch of Chæronea (1 century after Christ), the author of the famous *Lives*; Apuleius of Madaura in Africa (2 century after Christ); Numenius of Apamea in Syria (2 century after Christ); Celsus (2 century after Christ), against

whose anti-Christian teachings Origen wrote eight books; Galen (2 century after Christ), the famous physician and philosopher of the Peripatetic School.

Cicero (1 century B. C.) was one of the greatest Eclectics. His doctrine will be discussed in the Chapter on Roman philosophy.

Other Eclectics—called Neo-Pythagorean because they revived in their system certain parts of the Pythagorean doctrine—flourished in the Roman Empire during the first two centuries after Christ. Among these were, Nigidius Figulus, Quintus Sextius, Apollonius of Tyana, Moderatus of Gades, Nichomachus of Gerasa, Secundus the Athenian.

d) REMARKS: Eclecticism is only a phase of Skepticism. It may be regarded also as a well-meant but futile attempt to save philosophy from the utter destruction to which absolute Skepticism doomed it. It postulates a purely gratuitous test of truth; it is illogical throughout; it is wholly unstable, and a thinking mind could not hold long by its doctrines without lapsing into utter Skepticism or adhering to some positive theory of truth and certainty as possible.

The systems of philosophy discussed in this Chapter have much in common. They are all skeptical; they are all more or less eclectic; they all propose the question of happiness and the object in which it is to be sought, and all solve the question in pretty much the same fashion. Their solution of the ethical question is, in every instance, a surrender—a surrender to the conviction that certainty is not attainable, and sometimes a surrender to the allurements of moral sensualism. The result of such a surrender was inevitably a loss of the spirit of systematic study and a weakening of scientific method. Naturally, the exact or mathematical sciences broke from philosophy in this circumstance. During the weary period of surrender, decline, and decay in Greek philosophy, the mathematicians and astronomers went busily on with their work, es-

pecially in the Greek colonies on the Mediterranean islands and in Egypt. In Sicily, during the 3 century B. C., Hicetas and Archimedes taught a system of astronomy far superior to that of Plato and Aristotle. About the same time Aristarchus of Samos advanced the theory that the earth moves about the sun—a doctrine branded as impious by the Stoics, and later rejected by Ptolemy (2 century after Christ). In Alexandria there developed under the influence of the Ptolemies a new phase of philosophic thought which belongs to the Greco-Oriental philosophy of which we have yet to speak. Side by side with this new philosophy grew up a science, of which Euclid (3 century B. C.) is the chief representative and exponent. Euclid wrote “The Elements of Geometry” and other treatises of a mathematical nature. Ptolemy (Claudius Ptolemæus), who lived about the middle of the 2 century after Christ, belonged to the Alexandrian School, and his writings on astronomy were authoritative until the time of Copernicus (15 century).

CHAPTER IV

GRECO-ROMAN PHILOSOPHY

(1. century B. C. to 2 century after Christ)

This Chapter discusses the philosophy which the Romans adopted or adapted from the Greek systems. Although Italy and Sicily had been the home of celebrated Greek philosophers as early as the 6 century B. C., when Pythagoras settled at Crotona, the Romans had developed no philosophy of their own. And it was not until the 2 century B. C. that Greek philosophy achieved notable influence in Rome. Even then Rome did not accept the foreign intrusion without protest, for in 161 B. C. the Senate decreed that no philosopher or rhetorician should reside in Rome. The conquest of Greece, and the military expeditions of Cæsar, Pompey, Antony, and Augustus widened the Roman contacts and made the people of the Capital more susceptible to the beauty and value of even foreign things. Then came the inflow of Greek learning and the establishment in the Eternal City of teachers of Greek philosophy.

The Romans were of practical mind. Statecraft and conquest and all the activity of the building of a great empire they could understand and appreciate. Even after they accepted philosophy, they asked of it no deep speculation, but practical rules of action. Thus such philosophical systems as developed among the Romans are largely ethical. It is, however, only fair to the Romans to notice that when Greek philosophy came to be an influence among them, it was already in its decline, and was engaged chiefly with questions of Ethics.

Some Roman Philosophers were mentioned in connection

with the Post-Aristotelean Schools discussed in the last Chapter, and their names may be repeated here. But, with the exception of Cicero, no Roman philosopher will be dealt with in any detail. For the others, it will suffice to notice the Greek School to which each belongs. The present Chapter will treat, therefore, of a) Roman Stoics; b) Roman Epicureans; c) Cicero, the Eclectic.

a) ROMAN STOICS of note were the following:

- i. Marcus Annæus Lucanus (Lucan) A. D. 39-65.
- ii. Aulus Persius Flaccus (Persius) A. D. 34-62.
- iii. Lucius Annæus Cornutus (Cornutus) died A. D. 68.
- iv. Athenodorus of Tarsus, teacher of Augustus (I century B. C.-I century after Christ).
- v. Attalus, teacher of Seneca (I century B. C.-I century after Christ).
- vi. Lucius Annæus Seneca (Seneca), teacher of Nero. A. D. 1-65. Seneca wrote several treatises on Physics, twelve books of Dialogues, and 124 Letters to Lucilius. He is one of the most famous of Roman Stoics.
- vii. Musonius Rufus (Musonius). Born A. D. 40.
- viii. Epictetus, first a slave, then a freedman; disciple of Musonius. About A. D. 50-138. There are extant four dissertations of his so-called "Moral Theology." He, like Seneca, was a very famous Roman Stoic.
- ix. Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (Marcus Aurelius), Emperor of Rome. A. D. 121-180. He wrote a book *To Himself*, a meditative work, Christian rather than pagan in character. Some critics declare that the book is the work of some medieval Christian and is falsely ascribed to the Emperor-philosopher.

b) ROMAN EPICUREANS of importance were:

- i. Titus Lucretius Carus (Lucretius), 95-51 B. C., whose poem *De Rerum Natura* (On the Nature of Things)

- lauds Epicurus and his godless hedonism. Lucretius was the first philosopher to propose a theory of *atheistical evolution* as an explanation of the universe.
- ii. Publius Ovidius Naso (Ovid), about 43 B. C.—17 A. D., the poet famous for his *Metamorphoses*.
- iii. Quintus Horatius Flaccus (Horace), 66–9 B. C., the still greater poet and author of the *Carmina* and *Satires* and *The Art of Poesy*, who confesses himself “Epicuri de grege porcus”—a swine of Epicurus’ herd.

c) **MARCUS TULLIUS CICERO (106–43 B. C.)**

Life: Cicero was born at Arpinum in Latium. In his youth he went to Rome, where he studied philosophy under several famous masters, among whom was Philo of Larissa. He journeyed to Greece, and later to Asia. In Greece he studied under Antiochus, the Academician, and Possidonius, the Stoic. After his return to Rome he became a very prominent figure in public life. His political history is well known and needs no mention here. He met death in the year 43 B. C. at the command of Antony, whose tyranny he had freely criticized.

Works: Notable among the works of Cicero are: *Libri Contra Academicos*, or Books Against the Academians; *De Natura Deorum*, On the Nature of the Gods; *De Divinatione*, On Divination; *De Fato*, On Fate; *Disputationes Tusculanae*, Tusculanean Disputations; *De Officiis*, On Duties; *De Legibus*, On Laws; and *De Republica*, On the State.

Doctrine: Cicero accepts the Platonic division of philosophy, viz., Logic, Physics, and Ethics.

In Logic, Cicero contents himself with the quest of a criterion or test of truth. He believes sensations valid; they move the senses and the mind so vividly that they can hardly be illusory; yet he says that the objective validity of sensations cannot be *proved*. Sensations, then, are not an absolutely certain test of truth. Following his quest for such a test, Cicero

investigates the facts of consciousness or internal experience. Here he finds certain matters—such as the common principles of morality—made very plain to the mind; but the facts of consciousness, like those of sense, lack absolute proof. Cicero then studies the “general consent of mankind” as a criterion or test of truth, and, while he finds it of the greatest value as a practical norm, he concludes that it must be listed with sensation and consciousness as incapable of thorough-going proof. He concludes that the criteria discovered are quite sufficient for practical needs, but since they are not absolute, he aligns himself with the moderate Skeptics, and declares the possibility of attaining *probability*, but not perfect *certainty*.

In Physics, Cicero does not deal with bodily nature, but views the world in its relation to God and man. He declares that the contemplation of nature is food for the soul, even though one can only achieve *probability* about it as the richest fruit of study. He gives eloquent and cogent arguments for the existence of God. He declares that while we can know *that* God is, we cannot know *what* He is; in other words, that we can know the existence of God, but not His nature. Inconsistently, he describes with some accuracy the divine attributes. In point of God’s spirituality, Cicero’s doctrine is obscure. He teaches that God rules the world by His Providence, yet asserts that some things occur by pure chance; and these latter he excludes from the knowledge of God, saying that if God knew them, they would occur of necessity and not fortuitously. The human soul is from God; it is immortal; in the life to come it will have a more perfect existence than here on earth; it will never suffer pains. Cicero asserts free-will in man, but his arguments do not cover the whole field of the question; he is obviously moved to assert the freedom of the will because he is not prepared to accept the ill consequences that come of its denial. In all matters Cicero is careful to state that, however fully he is convinced of the truth of

what he teaches, there is no absolute proof and no perfect certainty to be had.

In Ethics, Cicero distinguishes a twofold end to be achieved by man, viz., happiness in this life and happiness hereafter. To gain the first, man must perfectly exercise his knowing faculty; and, since he teaches that the noblest object of knowledge is God, he implicitly states that the greatest happiness to be had here on earth consists in the knowledge of God. Happiness in this life has no essential reference to happiness in the life to come; that is to say, effort after knowledge here will not merit happiness hereafter: that will come in any case, for every soul will be happy after death. Cicero rebukes the sensualism of the Epicureans, criticizes the rigor of the Stoics, and declares that moderate pleasures and the possession of goods of life and fortune are aids to happy living. It is not clear whether Cicero made a distinction between the knowledge which leads to happiness and the *means* by which such knowledge is achieved; if he did not, his Ethics is certainly utilitarian. In speaking of the *norm of morality* Cicero says that we have *from God* a natural endowment for judging right and wrong: ultimately, then, this norm is the Divine Reason. If Cicero had been consistent he would have seen the necessity of teaching the *sanctions* (reward and punishment) of the life to come as the natural corollary of his doctrine on the norm of morality. Cicero agrees with the Stoics in regarding the *passions* as bad in themselves, and hence as things to be utterly suppressed and eradicated.

Remarks: Cicero's doctrine is a perfect example of eclecticism. He borrows from the Sceptics and Stoics and other systems of philosophy. Yet he is not afraid to do his own reasoning on the adopted elements of his doctrine—but always with caution! Note his hesitancy, or, if you will, his diplomacy. He never makes an assertion with ringing positiveness; he tempers everything with the remark that, after all, one may not be too positive. Cicero was a politician as well as a philosopher,

and the politician shows in all that he wrote. Leaving this weakness out of account, the philosophy of Cicero has about it a nobility that cannot fail to win the admiration of every reader.

BOOK THIRD

GRECO-ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

We have seen that Greek Philosophy retrograded after Aristotle into Skepticism and Eclecticism. The causes of this decline we discovered to be a lack of philosophers of the first talent, and the relaxing of the effort which true speculation exacts. Inadequate minds, wearying of the quest for truth, gave up the search, and spread the noxious doctrine that certainty is not to be had in anything, and that philosophy can serve men only by pointing out the best manner of living peacefully on earth.

Now the desire for truth cannot be quelled in the souls of men; it is a driving power that can be made to suffer a lull, but never extinction. The Stoic, Skeptic, Epicurean, and other eclectic systems could not long satisfy either human minds or human hearts. Something new inevitably developed.

Alexander's conquests and those of Rome brought into intimate political and commercial relations the peoples of the East and the West. Naturally the new urge for learning, the reaction from Skepticism and Eclecticism, resulted in combinations of Oriental religion-philosophy and Greek speculation. Such syncretic systems flourished during the last two centuries before Christ, and were in existence in parts of the Roman Empire—notably in the larger cities—for the first three centuries after Christ. Indeed, some syncretists did not hesitate to weave elements of the Christian Revelation into their fabric of pagan philosophy.

Of the Greek philosophies that of Plato was best adapted

for blending with Oriental mysticism; and for this reason the
Greco-Oriental Systems of Philosophy are markedly Platonic.

Of these systems we shall treat in two Chapters:

Chapter I. Greco-Jewish Philosophy

Chapter II. Neoplatonic Philosophy

CHAPTER I

GRECO-JEWISH PHILOSOPHY.

Greek influence made itself felt among the Hebrew people as early as the 5 century B. C., but it was not until the 2 century B. C. that systematic efforts were made to syncretize Greek philosophy and Jewish religious doctrine. The first attempt of this kind was made in the rich Jewish colony at Alexandria in Egypt. Two reasons explain the movement: the Alexandrian Jews admired Greek learning, and, secondly, they steadfastly adhered to their religion as revealed by God. Slowly the idea gained currency that the Greek philosophy was derived from Holy Scripture, and was therefore God's work rather than that of men. Naturally this conviction led to the harmonizing of Scripture and Greek philosophy. It must be added that where disagreement between the two appeared, the syncretizers were always ready to explain Scripture by allegory in such wise as to dispel the discrepancy; in other words, they were ready to fit Scripture to philosophy, but not disposed to bring their philosophy into agreement with Scripture.

Two notable Jewish syncretizers will be discussed in the present Chapter: a) Aristobulus, and b) Philo Judaeus.

a) ARISTOBULUS (flourished about 150 B. C.)

Life: Aristobulus was a Jewish priest of Alexandria in the 2 century B. C. He is numbered among the teachers of Ptolemy Philometer.

Works: Aristobulus wrote *Commentaries on Scripture* in an effort to harmonize the sacred writings with Greek philosophy.

Doctrine: Homer and Hesiod and Orpheus had some knowl-

edge of Revelation, as a study of their poems reveals. Now all Greek philosophy has its roots in the doctrines of these ancient poets. Therefore Greek philosophy is itself derived from the Scriptures, and, in particular, from the Books of Moses. Even the mythologies of the old Greeks were derived from Revelation. The seeker after truth must therefore value Greek philosophy as a thing revealed; and he does well who shows in detail the agreement existing between these related and complementary bodies of truth, Scripture and Greek speculation. Aristobulus throughout his syncretic work holds to the doctrine of the unity of God, distinct from the world, the creator and ruler of all. He also teaches the spirituality and immortality of the human soul.

Remark: Aristobulus is important only as the originator of the Greco-Jewish movement in philosophy. Others seconded his efforts, but of most of these we know little or nothing. It was left for Philo Judæus to erect the Greco-Jewish syncretism into a system of philosophy.

b) PHILO JUDÆUS (born about 25 B. C.)

Life: Philo was born of noble parents at Alexandria. 25 B. C. is the probable date of his birth; and we know he was alive in A. D. 40, for in that year he was sent to Rome to vindicate Jewish rights and religion before Caligula. Thus he was a contemporary of Our Lord. We know little of his life, and the date of his death is uncertain. Eusebius writes of him (*Hist. Eccl.*, II, 4): "In the time of Herod the king flourished Philo, a man held in great esteem not only by our own people, but also by those of heathen education. Of Hebrew birth, he conceded nothing in splendor of race or dignity to any in Alexandria. The value of his labors in sacred and traditional learning his writings declare. It is needless here to say how great was his knowledge of philosophy and letters, for he is known to have surpassed all of his age in his zeal for the study of Plato and Pythagoras."

Works: Philo wrote many books in Greek, most of which deal with the interpretation of Scripture. The more philosophical of these books treat of *The Making of the World*, *The Allegories of the Law*, and *The Immutability of God*.

Doctrine: Sacred Scripture is the genuine font of truth, and from it are derived all true doctrines found in the philosophies of men. Now Scripture has an obvious sense, which is suited to the needs of uneducated minds; but it has also a latent allegorical or mystical sense, which can be grasped only by those who have risen, by learning and virtue, to the contemplation of things divine. Everything in Holy Writ—historical data, genealogies, visions of prophets, etc.—contains latent sublime truths which philosophers must interpret. Philo proceeds to the work of interpretation. Where Scripture seems to disagree with his philosophy, its latent mystical meaning is developed in such a way that the disagreement disappears. Philo adheres in the main to Platonic philosophy, but at times he introduces doctrines of the Pythagoreans, the Stoics, and the Peripatetics. His teachings can be summarized under four heads: God; The Word of God or Divine Logos; The World; Man and His Duties.

i. God is wholly perfect. Description of God's perfection in human language is hopelessly inadequate: God is ineffably or inexpressibly perfect; hence we cannot express *attributes* proper to God. But Philo inconsistently mentions attributes of God, calling Him eternal, immutable, most happy, lacking nothing, wholly simple (i. e., indivisible), all-just, all-wise, all-merciful, etc. God's absolute distinction from the world is stressed by Philo to such an extent that he declares it impossible for the All-Perfect directly to produce or operate upon matter, which is all-imperfect.

ii. God, by a mysterious generation, begot the Logos or Divine Word. Though divine, the Logos is distinct from and inferior to God. The Logos contains in itself the patterns or exemplars of all things, and the power to produce these

things. The Logos is therefore the power that produced the universe. Nay, more: Philo seems to say that the Logos is not only the *efficient* (or productive) cause of the world, but that it is also the *formal* cause, interpenetrating and vivifying all the universe as a *world-soul*.

iii. Matter is so imperfect a substance that it should be called non-being rather than being. It is wholly independent of God, and has existed from eternity. It is a *potential* principle, capable of uniting with *forms* to make up the bodily universe. The forms are contributed by the Logos, which either gives off forms or joins itself with the world and causes the universe to exist actually by reason of the forms of things contained in itself. The account of creation given in Genesis is forced by Philo into agreement with this theory.

iv. The souls of men existed before their bodies as forms in the Logos. All were happy, but some sinned by a leaning towards sensuality, and were put into body-prisons. The soul in the body must wage continual war with evil tendencies. If victorious, the soul goes after death to heaven and happiness; otherwise it moves by transmigration into another human body. No soul is punished in a place of torments, but the wicked soul lives apart from God and endures continuous transmigrations. Man is meant to attain to the intellectual possession of God by contemplation. For contemplation peace and evenness of spiritual life is absolutely requisite; therefore must a man practise virtue and quell his passions and bodily appetites, for these disturb the soul and rob it of the calm necessary for contemplation. Philo follows Plato in the division and description of the virtues. As for contemplation, there are several stages of it, the highest of which is usually achieved only in the life to come, but *may* be attained here on earth by unceasing diligence in the practice of virtue, the quelling of the passions, and the study of philosophy, that divinely bestowed gift. One who achieves the highest form of contemplation on earth is rapt in continuous ecstasy.

Remarks: The striking feature about Philo's system is its evident eclecticism. He borrows from Plato his doctrine of the absolute aloofness of God from direct concern with the world: here we see clear indications of the influence of the Platonic doctrine of Subsistent, Real Ideas; and the same influence is shown in Philo's account of the forms or powers resident in the Logos. He takes from the Stoics the notion of a world-soul, and that of indifference to worldly delights. From the Pythagoreans he takes the doctrine of transmigration. The remote origin of Philo's ethical doctrine of contemplation is found in the old Hindu philosophies. All the points of this mingling of philosophical theory are drawn into unity and given authority by forcing the sense of Scripture to support them.

Philo's influence on subsequent pagan thinkers and upon the heretical philosophers of early Christian times was very pronounced. His principle of a double sense in Holy Writ started a movement which reached its height in the publishing of a work called Caballa (or Kabalah), which promulgates the doctrine that every word and even every letter of the sacred text contains a latent allegorical sense. This work appeared in the 2 century after Christ.

CHAPTER II

NEOPLATONISM

The same dissatisfaction with the inadequate philosophies of post-Aristotelean times which gave rise to the Greco-Jewish movement also produced Neoplatonism. Greco-Jewish philosophy blends Greek philosophy and an allegorical version of Old Testament Scriptures; Neoplatonism blends Greek (and especially Platonic) philosophy with the pagan religion-philosophies of the Orient, and with certain notions derived from Christian Revelation. Neoplatonism is listed here with the pre-Christian philosophies because it belongs to pagan times in spirit, and because it is a terminal philosophy and not an inspirational one. It belongs to the end of an age—the pre-Christian age—even though it comes historically within the era that dates from the birth of Our Lord.

This Chapter will discuss three phases of Neoplatonism as it exhibited itself in three Schools, namely:

Article 1. The Alexandrian School

Article 2. The Syrian School

Article 3. The Athenian School

Article 1. The Alexandrian School

a) Ammonius Saccas; b) Plotinus; c) Others.

1) AMMONIUS SACCAS (A. D. 176–242), founder of Neoplatonism, was a native of Alexandria. He was reared in the Christian Faith, but apostatized and adopted Greek philosophy as his rule of life. About the beginning of the 3 century he

opened a school at Alexandria and lectured to pupils both Christian and pagan. He has left no writings. His school is important because it developed Plotinus, who promulgated the doctrines taught orally by his master. From the esteem in which Ammonius Saccas was held by Plotinus we may judge that he was a teacher of more than ordinary ability.

b) PLOTINUS (204-269).

Life: Plotinus was born at Lycopolis in Egypt. In youth he went to Alexandria and attended the school of Ammonius. He joined a military expedition of the Emperor Gordian against the Persians, but it seems that his purpose in so doing was not so much the service of the Empire as the desire of gaining some first-hand knowledge of Oriental philosophy. Upon his return from war he began teaching in Rome, and in a very short time his fame as a teacher and philosopher spread through the Roman world. He died at Minturnæ, a town in Latium.

Works: Plotinus wrote 54 little works, which his pupil, Porphyry, collected and arranged in six series of nine each, and for this reason the books are called the Enneads (i. e., literally, "The Nines"). All these works survive.

Doctrine: The amalgam of philosophy taught by Plotinus is markedly Greek, although it is not hard to trace certain oriental influences in it. It contains much Platonic theory, but there are elements in it taken from the Stoics, the Peripatetics, the Pythagoreans, and even the old Ionians. We may conveniently discuss Plotinus' system in three paragraphs, dealing respectively with metaphysics and physics, psychology, and ethics.

i. Above all determinate, finite essences, there is a supreme Being which is the first principle and fountain head of all things. This Being embraces in itself all reality, and yet it has no determinate nature. In itself this Being is formless; it has no attributes such as intelligence, no accidental determina-

tions such as rest or motion. It is *The One*. From *The One* emerged *Mind* or *Intelligence (Nous)*; and from *Nous* came the *World-Soul*. When *The One* gave off the first of these beings, this being looked back upon *The One*, contemplated the perfections there contained, and became intelligent, became *Nous*. But *Nous* does not behold *all* the limitless perfections of *The One*; for *Nous* is a lesser being, inferior to *The One*. What *Nous* beholds in *The One*, it conceives, or receives, as *ideas*, and these are the exemplars or essential models of things in the world. Still *Nous*, the container of the exemplars or ideas of things, did not directly produce the world in accordance with these. *Nous* communicated to the *World-Soul* (which is also intelligent) the exemplar-ideas, and the *World-Soul* (called also *Demiurge*) made the world of sensible things, i. e., bodily images of the exemplar-ideas. The whole universe lives, and this world-life is manifested differently in different parts of the cosmos; more perfectly, for instance, in the stars, and less perfectly here on earth. Of the manifestations of life on earth the most perfect and important is that of man—human life.

ii. Man's soul is totally independent of his body; the body is merely the instrument of the soul. Human souls pre-existed in the *World-Soul* until the cosmic development demanded their union with matter. Human souls are really all one substance, one with another, one with the *World-Soul*, one with *Nous*, and, ultimately, one with *The One*. Still, there exists a sort of multiplicity of souls. Just as the soul of an individual man produces different operations in different members of his body, so the great human-soul-substance produces different operations in different individual men. Inconsistently with this doctrine, Plotinus holds that human souls are no mere accidental manifestations of the *World-Soul*, and offers argument to prove that they were *personally* pre-existent, and that they have personal immortality.

iii. Matter is the substance most remote from the Great

Source, i. e., *The One*. Thus the human soul, joined to a material body, is far removed from its ultimate source, and is likely to forget its divine origin and become subject to the fleshly appetites. These material appetites must be curbed; man must despise bodily pleasures; he must allow the body barely what is necessary to sustain effective life. Thus will the soul cast off the yoke imposed by the body, and will be able to reason and to reflect until it understands that it is in intimate union with the *World-Soul* and *Nous*; and ultimately it may rise to the ecstatic contemplation of *The One* itself. In the intuitive or direct vision of *The One* the soul will find endless delight and all sweetness. This vision is not perfectly achieved in this life, but is reserved for purified souls in the life to come. Souls unpurified and sensual will be subjected to new births (*transmigration*) until they accomplish their purification and so fit themselves to look eternally upon *The One*.

Remarks: Notice in the doctrine of Plotinus the accommodation of Plato's theory of ideas, especially in the end of man as the contemplation of *The One*. Plato said that man was meant for the happiness of contemplating the idea of the Good; but he is vague as to the character of the contemplation. Plotinus, on the contrary, clearly teaches that such vision is to be *intuitive*—a direct *vision*. Where did Plotinus get this doctrine? Certainly, from the Christian dogma of the Beatific Vision. Recall that his teacher, Ammonius, was an apostate Christian. Plotinus must have been taught much about the details of Christian belief. For the rest, notice the Oriental cast of this philosophy with its asceticism and its theory of rapt ecstasy. Notice also the old Ionian hylozoism, the Stoic doctrine of a world-soul, the Pythagorean theory of transmigration or metempsychosis. We may briefly characterize the Neoplatonism of Plotinus by calling it eclectic, mystical, and pantheistic.

c) OTHER NEOPLATONISTS of the Alexandrian School were:

i. Porphyry, born in Syria in the year 233. He was the most illustrious of Plotinus' pupils. He wrote *Commentaries on the Timaeus of Plato*, *The Isagoge* or *Introduction to Aristotle's Categories*, and *Sentences* or teachings in exposition of the doctrine of Plotinus. Porphyry tried to popularize the mystical Neoplatonism of his master, and introduced into the Ethics of Plotinus some practical directions which involve the use of magic and superstitious practice. He made an earnest effort to show that there is no disagreement between Neoplatonism and the philosophies of Plato and Aristotle.

ii. Amelius, an Etruscan, flourished about 250. All his writings are lost. Secondary sources assure us that Amelius knew much of Christian doctrine, and that his description of the Neoplatonic trio (*The One, Nous, World-Soul*) brings this into clear resemblance to the Blessed Trinity.

Article 2. The Syrian School

a) Iamblichus; b) Other Neoplatonists of the School.

a) IAMBlichus (died about 330)

Life: Iamblichus was born in Syria. He came to Rome and studied under Porphyry, whose doctrines he afterwards opposed. He returned to Syria as a teacher and reformer; he was regarded by many as a wonder worker.

Works: Iamblichus wrote some commentaries on the doctrines of Plato and Aristotle. He also wrote a *Life of Pythagoras*, a fabulous narrative purporting to show that Pythagoras was divine and worthy of worship.

Doctrine: *The One, Nous, World-Soul* are each divided into three beings, and each of these into three others, and these into other threes, and so on, until a vast multitude of divinities is formed (*polytheism*). To these gods Iamblichus gave names

taken from the Greek, Roman, and Oriental mythologies.

Man must be in communion with the gods if he is to be happy. Communion is attained by purifications, abstinence from sense-delights, mysterious words, expiations—in a word by cultivating ascetical practices which culminate in rapt ecstasy. The signs which show that the soul is in direct communication and communion with the gods are elevation of the body or levitation, agitation of bodily members, sounds of mysterious voices in the air, the spirit of prophecy rejoicing the soul, etc. To explain these phenomena, Iamblichus says that the soul of man has a twofold life, viz., inseparable and separable. In ordinary existence man is vivified by the inseparable soul-life; but when communication with the gods is established, the separable soul-life possesses man and its activities (in separation from ordinary functions of bodily life) with the divinities cause reactionary agitation in the body and the other sensible signs of communication with deities.

Remarks: The Neoplatonists after Plotinus fell into the use of theurgic practices, oracles, incantations, sorcery. Iamblichus was perhaps the originator of this downward movement; certainly, he was the most important influence in it. The reason for this debasing of philosophy is found partly in the inadequacy of the theories of Plotinus to satisfy the religious cravings of common men, and partly in the impatience of the Neoplatonists to set up immediate communication with *The One*, and to enter into joy-giving union with him.

b) OTHER NEOPLATONISTS of the Syrian School were: Ædesius, successor of Iamblichus as leader of the School; Chrysanthus, successor of Ædesius, and formulator of the "laws of divination"; Maximus of Ephesus, a reputed worker of miracles; Julian the Apostate, Emperor of Rome 361–363, who tried to uproot Christianity and restore paganism and polytheism; Priscus; Sopater; Eusebius of Myndus; and Dexippus.

Article 3. The Athenian Schoola) Proclus:b) Other Neoplatonists of the School.

Neoplatonism was almost extinguished by the beginning of the 5 century. It made a final stand for paganism against Christianity in the so-called Neoplatonic School of Athens. Proclus was not the first Athenian Neoplatonist, but he was the most important member of the School. What is here given as his doctrine is also that of the School generally.

a) PROCLUS (410-485).

Life: Proclus was born at Constantinople. He studied first at Alexandria, and then at Athens under Plutarch and Syrianus, succeeding the latter as scholarch. He died at Athens.

Works: Proclus wrote commentaries on the religious and philosophical doctrines of the Chaldeans, Persians, and Egyptians. He also wrote *On the Theology of Plato, Fate, The Nature of Evil*, and other works. Many of his writings are extant.

Doctrine: There exists a first principle, indeterminate and unconscious, from which emanates Intelligence, and from Intelligence comes the World-Soul. From the World-Soul comes matter, and also the forms which give to matter its determinate or actual existence. Man's soul, which comes from the World-Soul, is to be purified by ascetical practices and by the exercise of virtue, until it can cast aside the body and return to the spiritual source (World-Soul) whence it came. The members of the original triad (First Principle, Intelligence, World-Soul) are each divided into three other beings. Each of these nine beings is divided into *seven* others, and thus the number of gods is filled up.

Remark: The doctrine of Proclus is an eclectic combination of the Neoplatonism of Plotinus and that of Iamblichus.

b) OTHER NEOPLATONISTS of the Athenian School were:

i. Plutarch, son of Nestor, who flourished in the 5 century, and revived Neoplatonism in his school. He was a teacher of Proclus.

ii. Syrianus, successor of Plutarch as scholar, is remembered for his commentary on Aristotle's *Metaphysics*; this work is an effort to harmonize Neoplatonism and Aristoteleanism. Syrianus was also a teacher of Proclus.

iii. Marinus of Siche, successor of Proclus as scholar. He wrote a biography of Proclus.

iv. Heliodorus.

v. Ammonius, who taught at Alexandria, and tried to harmonize Aristoteleanism and Neoplatonism.

vi. Isidorus, successor of Marinus at Athens.

vii. Damascius, pupil of Ammonius at Alexandria. He was scholar for ten years (520-530), and is known in history as "The Last Scholar of Athens," for in the year 529 the Emperor Justinian issued an edict forbidding the public teaching of philosophy in Athens.

viii. Simplicius, a Neoplatonist, who went to Persia when the Edict of Justinian was promulgated, and tried to continue his school. Doomed to disappointment, he wrote bitterly of the Persians, calling them "a barbarous and savage people unfitted to receive the Greek philosophy."

During the 6 century there was a back-to-Aristotle movement, but not on a large scale nor publicly, due to Justinian's Edict. Ammonius, the Athenian Neoplatonist at Alexandria, set forth some Aristotelean doctrine in his commentaries. Another Aristotelean was John Philoponus, the Grammarian. Another was David the Armenian, who translated works of Aristotle into the Armenian language. Somewhat earlier (about the middle 5 century) Martian Capella of Africa wrote his encyclopedic *Satyricon*, which is a compendium of peripatetic-

stoic logic. Still earlier (end of 3 century) appeared the works of the so-called Hermes Trismegistus ("thrice great Hermes"), which are a blend of Stoicism and Platonism, and which deserve mention for their influence on the age.

During these early Christian centuries, while the philosophy of the pagan spirit was slowly dying, the Christian theology wrought an enormous change in the world of thought. Although it required centuries for Christian philosophy to work itself out as a science distinct from theology, we find the beginnings of it in the period of the Church Fathers, whose doctrines in things philosophical we are to discuss in the first pages of the Second Part of this manual.

PART SECOND

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CHRISTIAN TIME

This Part contains three Books:

Book First: Patristic Philosophy

Book Second: Medieval Philosophy

Book Third: Modern Philosophy

BOOK FIRST

PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHY

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Philosophy is a continuous growth until it has reached the perfection of maturity. New systems of philosophy are, therefore, never wholly new; they are built upon the achievements of the past.

The philosophy of pagan times furnishes the foundation upon which the philosophical systems of Christian times were built.

Now the coming of the Religion of Jesus Christ was a tremendous occurrence in the world of thought. Upon all philosophies it had an enormous influence; in many it was a revolution. Christianity, while contributing immeasurably to the development of the true philosophy by reason of the new and steady light which it threw upon the pathway of the earnest thinker, was set for the fall of many philosophies, just as its Divine Founder was set for the fall of many in Israel. Its coming marked the time for men and minds to get in line with truth. That many have refused to hear the summons of the time—and still refuse—is only an evidence of a truth too obvious to need special evidence: that man has free-will, and is often wilful; in the good and bad sense the advent of Christianity showed that man has a will of his own. But just as sincere pagans groped for truth before the coming of Our Lord and His deathless Church, so pagan philosophies groped for truth. Pagans and pagan philosophies had sometimes come near to truth, had sometimes grasped it in part. Now that Christ had come, the sincere pagan had need to grope no

longer, for the fullness of religious truth came to him and offered him its certitude, and he was no longer a pagan when he accepted it. And sincere pagan philosophy, freed from the baffling questions of origins in the world and of purpose in human life—things inevitably bound up with religion—was moved by a powerful influence of development, and began a steady growth towards maturity. Henceforth philosophy was to have a guide in the certainty of religious knowledge, a guide of which true philosophy took immediate advantage, but which false philosophies refused, as they continue in the present age to refuse, to recognize or employ.

In early Christian times some philosophers subordinated the Christian Revelation to pagan science, and these developed *heretical* systems of philosophy. Other Christians made proper use of their philosophic heritage, and employed its principles as the basis of their expositions of revealed truth. These *orthodox* writers are called "Fathers of the Church." The Fathers are theologians rather than philosophers, yet, for two reasons, some of them must be given a place in the History of Philosophy. First, these men made an earnest study of philosophy to equip themselves for the task of controverting such heresies as had a philosophic cast. The Fathers whose chief effort was the refutation of heresy by a clear exposition of the reasonableness of Christian Faith are known in religious history as "Apologists." Again, the Fathers cultivated philosophy that they might use it as a scientific instrument in the investigation and elaboration of revealed truth. Thus many of the Fathers of the Church were true philosophers, philosophers whose influence upon contemporary and subsequent thought was far from negligible. We include, therefore, the more notable of these theologian-philosophers in the History of Philosophy.

The first Chapter of the present Book deals with the *heretical* systems of philosophy, or rather the heretical religious systems of a philosophical character; and with the Fathers

(Apologists) whose work was the refutation of heresy. The second Chapter treats of those Fathers who made positive and constructive advance in the development of theology and philosophy.

Because the more notable of the philosophers here discussed were Fathers (*Patres*) of the Church, the present Book is called a history of *Patristic* philosophy.

The Chapters to follow are:

Chapter I. Heretical Systems and the Apologists

Chapter II. Constructive Patristic Philosophers

CHAPTER I

HERETICAL SYSTEMS AND THE APOLOGISTS

(1-325 A. D.)

The heretical philosophies against which the Apologists of the first three centuries waged intellectual warfare were, above others, *Gnosticism* and *Manicheism*. There were other and, in some cases, larger heresies than these in the early days of the Faith, but the two mentioned deserve notice in a History of Philosophy because they were philosophies as well as heresies; the others have a prominent place in the History of the Catholic Religion, but need not be mentioned here.

The Fathers or Apologists of this period (1-325) are often called "The Ante-Nicene Fathers" because they lived and worked before the momentous Council of Nicæa or Nice (in Asia Minor) which took place in the year 325. This was the first General or Oecumenical Council of the Church; and its canons or decisions definitely settled much that was open to free discussion during the days of the Apologists here considered.

We divide this Chapter into three articles:

Article 1. Gnosticism

Article 2. Manicheism

Article 3. The Ante-Nicene Apologists

Article 1. Gnosticism

a) Name; b) Doctrine; c) Chief Gnostics; d) Remarks.

a) NAME: The Greek word "gnosis" (knowledge), from which the Gnostics take their name, was employed by these

heretics of early Christian times to signify a *special illumination* claimed by themselves, but not given to ordinary men, for the study and contemplation of things divine. The syncretic or harmonizing movement which resulted in the Greco-Jewish and the Neoplatonic philosophies also affected certain pagans newly converted to Christianity and imperfectly instructed in the truths of Faith. These men tried to warp Christian dogma into agreement with their pagan philosophy, and justified their procedure by claiming that a special illumination or *gnosis* guided them in the work.

b) DOCTRINE: The fundamental principles of Gnosticism are:

i. There can be no contact between the all-perfect and the wholly imperfect; therefore there is no immediate relation between God and the bodily world.

ii. God made certain spiritual beings; these made others less perfect; these made others still less perfect, and so on. From the least perfect of these beings came the bodily world as a creature.

iii. Matter is vile; it is the root of evil. Man must subjugate his body and its tendencies to the control of the soul, so that, when the body is cast away by death, the soul may return to the world whence it came.

iv. Christ is one of the spiritual beings that intervene between God and the world. Jesus is another. Jesus assumed an *apparent*, not a *real* body, and came on earth to perform a certain work for human weal.

To amplify somewhat these points of doctrine: Basilides, Marcion, and a few other Gnostics teach the absolute transcendence of God over matter (*dualism*); but most exponents of this doctrine profess a pantheism of emanation, explaining the universe as the outpouring of God, or as His manifestation. Such a pantheist was Valentinus, the chief Gnostic, and

it is from his teachings that we draw the the following elaboration of the Gnostic outline given above :

All things came from an infinite and invisible *Abyss*, a being of limitless perfection, and wholly beyond the grasp of any understanding. From the Abyss, as rays from light, came certain manifestations or powers called *Aeons*. Some of these Aeons were *Thought, Mind, Truth, The Word* or *Logos, Wisdom, Jesus, Christ*. Wisdom burned with such a passionate desire of beholding the Abyss that her wish took substantial form and was born of her as a daughter called *Achamoth*. Because of the strong desire wherein she was conceived, Achamoth was subject to passions and pains. Christ, moved by mercy, sent Jesus to liberate Achamoth from her afflictions. Freed from pains, but not utterly released from the thrall of passions, Achamoth bequeathed these to her own son, who is called *Demiurge*. Man is the creature of Demiurge. It was not the intention of Demiurge to communicate anything of a spiritual nature to man, but Achamoth, wishing man to share the divine (spiritual) nature, infused into Demiurge the germ of the spiritual, and Demiurge unknowingly transmitted this to man. When he discovered that man had a spiritual element in his nature, Demiurge was angry. He dismissed man from the paradise in which he had been placed, and made humanity the heir of passions and the pains of sense. So great was man's distress that the merciful Aeon called Jesus took an apparent human body from the Virgin Mary and lived among men on earth. When Jesus was baptized in the River Jordan, the Aeon called Christ joined itself unto Him, and together they worked for the redemption of mankind from pains. In the Passion, Christ withdrew from Jesus; and Jesus alone suffered pains and death in His apparent body.

The spiritual element in man (soul), when purified and relieved of the body, will dwell in the supernal world with the Aeons and the Abyss. There will be no resurrection of the body, for the body is material and matter is evil, and nothing

evil can enter the supernal world. Unpurified souls will be debarred from the presence of the Aeons and the Abyss. Some Gnostics leave the matter there; others teach transmigration until the necessary purification is achieved. Now how is such purification accomplished? By contemplation of the supernal world. But man cannot learn to enter into this purifying contemplation if he is forever distracted by a war between the tendencies of the flesh and those of the spirit. Man must, therefore, not try to subdue his passions; he must give in to them, and quiet them by perfectly satisfying them. The soul must indeed overcome and subjugate the body, but it does this by flattering the body, and by apparent submission, not by warring with the body.

c) CHIEF GNOSTICS:

i. Valentinus (2 century), a Christian Oriental, probably an Egyptian, aspired to the episcopacy, and, when disappointed, abandoned the Faith for Gnostic philosophy. He is the chief representative of pantheistic Gnosticism. He taught at Rome 136–160. He wrote many books, among which were commentaries on the Gospel of St. John, and the so-called *Gospel of the Truth of Valentinus*. This philosopher excelled in talent, elegance of expression, and orderliness of development in his doctrine.

ii. Marcion of Sinope in Paphlagonia (flourished in the middle of the 2 century) was second only to Valentinus in ability, and was first of his School in the ardent propagation of its doctrines. He wrote commentaries on the Gospel of St. Luke and on some of the Epistles of St. Paul. He also composed the *Antitheses of Marcion*, and certain other works.

iii. Basilides, an Alexandrian, taught in his native city 120–140, and was, on the testimony of St. Epiphanius, the chief propagator of Gnosticism in Egypt. Another Alexandrian Gnostic, contemporary of Basilides, was Carpocrates.

iv. Bardesanes (154–223), a pupil of Valentinus, was a minor Gnostic, but one of some influence.

iii. With the Gnostics must be aligned Simon Magus, mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles; Menander the Samaritan, disciple of Simon Magus; Cerinthus the Jew, against whose doctrines the Gospel and Epistles of St. John were directed, as St. Jerome asserts; Nicholas and the Nicholaites. These older Gnostics did not, indeed, profess systematic Gnosticism; but they began opposition to Apostolic doctrine, and professed some theories that the Gnostics later adopted.

d) REMARKS: The horrible doctrine of Gnosticism is a mixture of Neoplatonism, Christianity, and pure paganism. Its history is short. For a time it was accepted by many as true because it satisfied the syncretizing tendency of the times, and because it pleased vicious men by teaching that the lower passions are to be given free sway. But it failed quickly because it had no foundation in reason, being a purely gratuitous theory and supported only by grotesque interpretations of Scripture, and also because its Ethics conflicts with the common sense of normal men. Gnosticism was extinct by the end of the 3 century, although its influence endured in gradually weakening measure for some time longer.

It is to be noted that some of the more diplomatic of the Christian Apologists took the *terminology* of Gnosticism, in part at least, and used it in expressing the truths of Christian Revelation.

Modern Theosophy is something of a reversion to Gnosticism.

Article 2. Manicheism

While Gnosticism was on the wane, a new religious movement originated in Persia and swept westward throughout the Roman Empire. This was Manicheism, a doctrine no less hostile to pure Christianity than Gnosticism. It takes its name

from its founder *Manes*, or rather from the Latin transliteration of that name, *Manichæus*.

MANES (about 215-277).

Life: Manes was born in Persia and educated in the traditional religion and religious philosophy of his people. He had the impulses of a reformer and was convinced that he had a divine mission to do for the whole human race what Zoroaster had done for Persia and what, as he had heard, Christ had done for the West. He inaugurated a new religion, but the civil and religious authorities of Persia opposed him so effectively that he was forced into exile. He preached his doctrine in the Roman Empire with moderate success; and, after thirty years he returned to Persia, where he gained a considerable following. The Persian powers, displeased at the increasing influence of the reformer, took him prisoner, subjected him to punishments, and finally caused him to be crucified.

Works: Manes left no writings. His doctrine is known from secondary sources only, largely from the works of the Fathers (Apologists) who state his teachings for the purpose of controverting them. St. Augustine gives us our most complete account of Manicheism, and the Saint speaks with authority, for he had followed this heresy in his youth.

Doctrine: Manes first taught a doctrine essentially Persian. But in Rome he added some elements of Christianity, and the result was a body of doctrine of the syncretic or mongrel type of which Greco-Judaism, Neoplatonism, and Gnosticism are the most notable examples. Thus the accurate historian who discusses this system will distinguish the original or Persian Manicheism from the later Manicheism of the West. It is from the latter system of doctrine that we draw the elements of the following outline:

There are two fundamental—one might say two *supreme*—principles of all things. The one is good; it is spirit, light, *God*.

The other is evil; it is matter, darkness, *Satan*. Each of these independently evolved complexities of elements and powers, and all these things together make up the universe. The world is, in consequence, a mixture of good and evil; and even individual things in the world show this composite nature. Man, like everything else, is such a mixture; he is made of two parts, one rational and pure (soul), the other irrational and sensual (body). In man, as in the whole world, the good and evil elements are in constant warfare. If the good part of man (soul) conquers the evil part (body), it will go, after death, into happiness and light. If the body conquers, the soul will suffer transmigrations until it achieves victory over its body and thus purifies itself.

Christ is the spirit of light. He assumed an apparent human body, and came to teach men how to deliver themselves from the yoke of the flesh. This is what is meant by Redemption. Liberation from the control of the body is the great end to be achieved by man. The means of liberation are contemplation and bodily denial. One who perfectly practises these things will show the three signs of the *perfect Manichee* in himself. These signs are: (1) The Sign of the Mouth, i. e., abstinence from evil speech, and from forbidden articles of diet, such as flesh meat. (2) The Sign of the Hands, i. e., abstinence from contact with bodies considered impure. (3) The Sign of the Bosom, i. e., abstinence from any carnal relationships. Notice that these are the signs of the *perfect Manichee*. Perfection is not within the reach of all, however, especially as the manifestation of all three "Signs" must be accompanied by numerous severe fasts, long and frequent prayers, and other difficult practices of devotion. The common people who feel that such perfection is not within their power to attain, may spare themselves the effort to acquire it—may, in a word, live as they please. Thus very frequently the ordinary Manichee was as vicious as the average lay Gnostic.

Remarks: Manicheism proposed nothing new or original. It

was the last effort of the syncretizing tendency rampant everywhere in the last two centuries before Christ and in the first three centuries of our era. Originating outside Christianity, Manicheism tried to absorb the latter. It also incorporated within itself the remnants of Gnosticism still acceptable in parts of Western Europe. In this sense Manicheism is really the heir of Gnosticism.

Article 3. The Ante-Nicene Apologists

- a) The Greek Apologists; b) The Alexandrian Apologists;
c) The African Apologists.

a) THE GREEK APOLOGISTS of the period before the Council of Nicaea (325) included the following:

i. Aristides, an Athenian Philosopher, who wrote an *Apology* about the year 140.

ii. St. Justin (died 166), a native of Palestine, who wrote a *Major Apology*, a *Minor Apology*, and a *Dialogue with Tryphon*.

iii. Athenagoras (2 century), probably an Athenian, who wrote a *Message for Christians*, and *On the Resurrection*.

iv. St. Theophilus of Antioch, who wrote a book *To Autolytus*, a pagan philosopher.

v. St. Irenaeus (140-202), Bishop of Lyons, whose work *Against the Heresies* is one of the greatest of apologetic writings.

vi. St. Hippolytus (or Hippolyte) (died about 235), of unknown origin, a disciple of St. Irenaeus, wrote many books of Scripture Commentary and many apologetic treatises; chief of the latter is his *Philosophumena*, or refutation of all heresies, a monumental work in ten volumes.

The Greek Apologists taught that the Greek Philosophy had prepared the way for the Christian Revelation, that it was the *praeambula fidei*, or "preamble of the Faith." They maintained also that Greek Philosophy was an apt instrument for setting

forth the truths of Revealed Religion in scientific order. These Apologists, therefore, go about their work in strictly logical fashion. They offer precise arguments for the existence of God, for the truth that all things were created by God out of nothing, for the fact of Divine Providence, for the truth that God is in no wise identified with the world, etc., SS. Justin and Irenaeus took up the Stoic doctrine of the *Logos* and gave it a Christian interpretation. These early Fathers prove the immortality of the soul and the free-will of man. Some of them, however, went to such extremes in their opposition to the Gnostic doctrine which would make the soul an emanation or outpouring of the Divine Substance, that they made the soul *material*, and hence not naturally immortal, but immortal by the special gift and dispensation of God.

b) THE ALEXANDRIAN APOLOGISTS.

The precise time of the founding of the Alexandrian School is not known, but it enjoyed some fame as early as the middle of the 2 century. It was then under the leadership of Pantaenus, who had been a Stoic before his conversion, and whose renown rests largely upon the fact that Origen and Clement were his pupils. The Alexandrian School was inaugurated to teach the Gentiles the Christian Religion and to prepare them for Baptism; hence it is often mentioned in history as "The Alexandrian School of Catechetics." But it was soon apparent that something more was needed by the pupils of this School than a simple statement of the truths of the Christian Religion. Alexandria was at this time a great intellectual centre; noted pagan philosophers lived there, as well as leading Gnostics and Manichees. Many pupils of the School of Catechetics had philosophical difficulties to overcome, especially those who had been under Gnostic or Manichean influence. Hence the teachers of the School studied philosophy with great earnestness; their work grew more and more scientific in method; they di-

rected their best efforts against pagan philosophy in general and against Gnosticism and Manicheism in particular.

It must be mentioned that some of the teachers in the Alexandrian School, Fathers though they were, did not always succeed in avoiding Gnostic and Manichean errors in their own expositions of doctrine. This does not mean that they were not full-fledged Christians; it merely means that they were fallible men, and that they made mistakes in their explanations of some of the dogmas of the Faith in which they believed with all sincerity.

Of the more famous teachers in the Alexandrian School, we have available a full account only of St. Clement and Origen.

i. St. Clement of Alexandria (about 150–214) was born either at Athens or Alexandria, was converted to Christianity, and became a priest. He studied under Pantaenus in the Alexandrian School, and succeeded his master as its principal. His most notable work is his *Miscellany*, or eight books of discourses partly religious and partly philosophical, in which he tries to establish a rational basis for the doctrines of Christianity. Other works are *Exhortation to the Gentiles*, a criticism of heathen religion and philosophy, and a presentation of the doctrines of Christianity as the only true religion; and *The Pedagogue*, a presentation of Christ as the Divine Teacher of men. In the *Miscellany* St. Clement proposes three grades of knowledge with respect to the highest or religious truths. The first grade is philosophy, which is the *praeambula fidei* preparing the way for faith; the second grade is Faith in the Christian Revelation; the third grade is the scientific systematization of dogmatic truths. The last or third grade is the true *Gnosis*, the *Christian Gnosis*, and its possessor is the perfect Christian philosopher who adheres to truth by faith and understanding, by will and intellect. St. Clement is regarded by many as the founder of Christian philosophy properly so-called.

ii. Origen (185-254), called "The Adamantine Philosopher," was born at Alexandria of Christian parents (his father, Leonidas, was a martyr and is a canonized Saint). He studied under St. Clement in the School of Catechetics, in which he was afterwards a master. He was a man of splendid talent and wide learning, but he lacked prudence. Ever a sturdy Christian, he threw himself headlong into the work of controverting false doctrines; and over-eagerness led him into errors. He wrote a very great number of books, the most of which are lost. His chief work, *On Principles*, has come down to us in a Latin translation. Besides this he wrote numerous treatises of an exegetical nature, and works of apologetics and controversy. He adopted from Philo the opinion that Greek philosophy derives from Revelation. He held the world to be an eternal creature, and admitted the doctrine of an indefinite series of worlds. He declares matter to be indestructible, and asserts that, outside God, there is no creature free of an admixture of matter. The matter which is in angels is most subtle and pure; that which is in the sidereal spirits is less pure; and that which is in man is crass. All intellectual creatures inhabited the heavens when created. Some of them retained their perfection, and these are the angels. Others lost their perfection and their material elements became more heavy and more crass; the devils did not lose their subtlety and lightness, and hence are invisible; the sidereal spirits or stars became visible; man became the least subtle of all the spirits. Thus Origen taught the eternal creation of all spiritual substances and the inseparability of a creature-spirit from matter—doctrines that we may formulate as *pre-existence of souls*, and *materiality in angels*. All intellectual creatures will be restored through Christ to pristine perfection; yet even after their restoration the possibility of sinning will not be taken away from them. Notwithstanding his errors, Origen ever believed himself a thorough Christian. His mistakes can be traced to no perversity of will, but to his love of Platonic philosophy

and to his excessive zeal in controverting doctrines opposed to his beloved Faith.

c) THE AFRICAN APOLOGISTS who have a place in the History of Philosophy are the following:

i. Minucius Felix, born in Africa, flourished as a notable orator and lawyer in Rome at the end of the 2 century. He wrote an apologetic work called *Octavius*, a dialogue between a Christian, Octavius Januarius, and a pagan, Caecilius Natalis.

ii. Tertullian (about 160–245), born a pagan, and converted to Christianity by the heroism of the martyrs. We have the testimony of St. Jerome that Tertullian became a priest. About 202 he fell into the heresy of Montanism, and it is not known whether he retracted before his death. Before his defection, however, he did notable work in the field of Christian Apologetics. Among other writings we may mention his *Apologetic*; his two books *To the Nations*, a severe attack upon paganism; *On Idolatry*, an admonition against participating in idol worship. Tertullian was an ardent controversialist, an extremist in everything, and an iron rigorist. Notable among his erroneous doctrines are the theory that the soul is derived from the parents by generation, that it is immortal, but not spiritual; and the doctrine that soul and body in man are not substantially united.

iii. Arnobius (died about 325) wrote seven books in refutation of paganism and in defense of the Christian Faith.

iv. Lactantius (died about 330), a pupil of Arnobius, was the teacher of Crispus, a son of Constantine the Great. Lactantius wrote instructions in the Christian Faith and refuted heresy in such elegant Latin that he was called "The Christian Cicero."

CHAPTER II

CONSTRUCTIVE PATRISTIC PHILOSOPHERS

(325-7 century)

The First General Council of the Church—if we except the Apostolic Council of Jerusalem—was held at Nicæa or Nice in Asia Minor in the year 325. It condemned the heresy of Arius (*Arianism*), who denied the Divinity of Christ and the doctrine of the Incarnation, thus striking directly at the dogma of the Holy Trinity. Other matters of doctrine were cleared up in the Council, and the authoritative decisions of the great synod gave a new impetus to the slowly developing science of theology, which was closely wedded to philosophy.

The present Chapter deals with the development of philosophy after the Council of Nice. It discusses the philosophical doctrine of the Greek and Latin Fathers of the period. Augustine, a Latin Father, was the greatest philosopher of the age, and one of the greatest of any age. For this reason the philosophy of Augustine is given special attention in a separate article.

The Chapter has the following articles :

Article 1. Greek and Latin Fathers after Nice

Article 2. St. Augustine

Article 1. Greek and Latin Fathers after Nice

a) The Greek Fathers;

b) The Latin Fathers.

Some of the Fathers named in the following lists were not philosophers in any strict sense. Yet the Fathers here mentioned constitute the group of learned men who kept and trans-

mitted to posterity the body of philosophico-theological learning achieved in their age; and the philosophers among them added to this body of doctrine, directly continuing its development.

a) THE GREEK FATHERS who flourished after the Council of Nice, and who have a more or less prominent place in the History of Philosophy are:

i. St. Athanasius (about 295–373), Archbishop of Alexandria. He is known for all times as the champion of truth against the errors of Arianism.

ii. St. Basil (331–379), Archbishop of Cæsarea in Cappadocia. He was a man of unusual ability, and was well versed in letters, sacred and profane.

iii. St. Gregory of Nazianzen (about 330–391), Bishop of Sasima, a friend of St. Basil.

iv. St. Gregory of Nyssa (about 332–395), brother of St. Basil, and Bishop of Nyssa.

v. Synesius (about 370–413), Bishop of Ptolemais.

vi. Nemesius of Phoenicia (5 century), author of a work *On the Nature of Man*.

The works of the foregoing Fathers are largely theological and deal in the main with the doctrines of the Trinity and the Incarnation. Yet their writings are examples of applied philosophy. Their philosophy is Platonic in cast, after the type of that of the Alexandrian School. St. Gregory of Nyssa is more markedly Alexandrian than the others, and comes close to Origen in his philosophical doctrines. Progress in philosophy was made, in this age, in the department of Ethics; the questions that received close study being those of the duties and rights of man, and of the nature of virtue and vice. In Psychology, the spirituality of the soul was discussed and established; Nemesius taught the pre-existence of souls.

With the Greek Fathers may be mentioned Sergius of Rainsain and Paul the Persian, Christian philosophers who flourished in Syria in the 5 and 6 centuries.

Here also may be mentioned "Pseudo-Dionysius," a writer of the 5 century, who edited his writings under the name of Dionysius (or Denis) the Areopagite, a convert of St. Paul. His philosophy is Neoplatonic, his reasoning mystical and obscure, but his fundamental doctrine is clearly Christian. The Pseudo-Dionysius extended its influence through the Middle Ages. Wherever Neoplatonism appears in the post-Patristic centuries (up to and including the 13) it is almost invariably traceable to Pseudo-Dionysius or to commentaries written on his works.

b) THE LATIN FATHERS of the post-Nicene period who should be mentioned in the History of Philosophy are:

i. St. Hilary (about 320-366), Bishop of Poitiers, the author of 12 books *On the Trinity* against the Arian heresy.

ii. St. Ambrose (about 340-397), Bishop of Milan, author of theological works and ethical writings.

iii. St. Jerome (about 331-420), the great translator of Scripture and author of commentaries thereon.

iv. St. Augustine (354-430), Bishop of Hippo, the greatest philosopher of the period. The next article is devoted to a discussion of his teachings.

v. St. Leo the Great (about 400-461), Pope.

vi. St. Prosper of Aquitaine (died about 463).

vii. Claudius Mamertus (died about 473) wrote in vindication of the spirituality and immortality of the human soul.

viii. Boethius (about 480-522), a Roman senator and patrician, translated the *Isagoge* of Porphyry and some of the works of Aristotle. He wrote commentaries on Cicero's *Topica* and composed *The Consolations of Philosophy*, an ethical work of lasting fame. Boethius is the most notable link in the chain of philosophers that unites the Patristic with Medieval philosophy, and, although he is not a "Father," we mention him here for this reason.

ix. St. Gregory the Great (540-604), Pope.

x. St. Gregory of Tours (539-594), Bishop of Tours.

- xi. St. Leander (534–601), Archbishop of Seville.
- xii. St. Isidore (570–636), Archbishop of Seville, brother and successor of St. Leander.
- xiii. St. Ildephonse (died 667), Archbishop of Toledo.
- xiv. St. Bede the Venerable (674–735), an English monk, famous for his achievements in the fields of history, exegetics, and dogmatic theology.

Article 2. St. Augustine

AURELIUS AUGUSTINUS (354–430).

Life: Augustine was born at Tagaste in Numidia, November 13, 354. His father, Patricius, was a pagan nobleman, who was converted to Christianity towards the end of his life. His mother, Monica, was a lifelong Christian and a Saint. Great in talent, noble in mind, and favored by the pious watchfulness of a holy mother, Augustine, nevertheless, fell a prey to the influence of the evil example of the companions of his youth. His habits became dissolute, and he refused to heed his mother's prayer that he seek in Christianity the truth to satisfy his mind, and the ideals and strength necessary for an upright life. He joined the Manicheans, who boasted that theirs was the perfect science—the truth that did not enslave the intellect as Christianity did. A short association with these sectaries convinced his alert mind that they were not at all so sure of the truth of their doctrines as they pretended to be. In his doubts he consulted Faustinus, a Manichean Bishop, and came away from the conference more doubtful than before. Finally, he broke with the Manicheans and adopted a skeptical or agnostic philosophy. He was, during this time, a teacher of rhetoric and grammar at Tagaste, and afterwards at Carthage. In 383 he went to Rome, and a year later to Milan, whither his saintly mother followed him. His love of rhetoric (oratory) moved him to hear the great St. Ambrose, Bishop of Milan, who was esteemed a most eloquent preacher. The sermons

of the Saint, together with his mother's prayers, opened Augustine's heart to the power, the grace, and the truth of Christianity. He was baptized by St. Ambrose in 387. He decided to return with his mother to Africa, but St. Monica died before they set sail from Italy, and Augustine remained in Rome for another year. In 388 he went home, sold his property, gave the proceeds to the poor, and took up the life of a solitary, dividing his time between exercises of piety and literary work. Ordained priest despite his fears of the dignity and responsibility of that great office, he discharged his sacred duties with exemplary exactitude and zeal. Four years after his ordination (395) he was made coadjutor-bishop of Hippo, and a year later succeeded to the office on the death of Valerius, the incumbent. He died in office, August, 28, 430.

Works: Omitting letters, the works of St. Augustine are ninety-three in number, and these are distributed in 232 books. These works may be divided into philosophical, apologetico-dogmatic, and exegetical treatises. Important for philosophy are the following: *Of the Beautiful and the Becoming*; *Refutation of the Academians*; *Of the Happy Life* which is found in the knowledge, love, and service of God; *Of the Immortality of the Soul*; *Of the Quantity of the Soul*, a dialogue on the origin and nobility of the immortal soul, and on its relation to the body in man; *Of Free Choice*, a treatise on free-will in refutation of the Manichean theory of evil. Of the apologetico-dogmatical works, the philosopher must notice: *On the True Religion*, a philosophical treatise showing that reason and authority point the way to the Catholic Church as the true Church of God; *Confessions*; *Retractions* or revisions of his works; *Of the Trinity*; *The City of God*, a refutation of paganism and its philosophy, and a rebuttal of the heathen theory that Christianity was the cause of the fall of the Roman Empire; this book also contains a summary of Christian Doctrine and a discussion of the Kingdom of God in this world (the Church) and the next (Heaven).

Doctrine: We may divide Augustine's philosophical teachings, and discuss them under three heads: Logic, Physics, Ethics.

i. In Logic, St. Augustine asserts the possibility of acquiring certitude, thus contradicting the doctrine of the skeptics. He maintains that the field of human certitude is very restricted, many mysteries being outside its proper scope. He teaches that the conditions necessary *in the will* that it may give perfect assent to things that are certain, are uprightness, purity, humility. Of the conditions necessary for certainty *in the intellect* we must speak more in detail: Our senses give us knowledge, and the senses are reliable; when they seem to err and to deceive us, the error is in our judgment and not in the report of the senses. And how shall we correct mistaken judgment; how shall we come to a proper knowledge of things in the world of sense? By cultivating the knowledge of God; for when we have once acquired a clear idea of God, this idea lends an illumination to the mind which makes it understand the creatures of God which our senses make known to us. In sensation and in intellection the knowledge of God is a light that shows us truth with certainty. God contains in Himself the *rationes aeternae*, i. e., eternal models or patterns of the natures of things He creates; and these are created as planned. Now to know God more and more thoroughly is to advance more and more in the real understanding of the *rationes aeternae* of things which are in God and one with Him. Thus to know God is to know His creation. Our ideas, therefore, which are the elements of knowledge, and of *certain* knowledge in much that we know, come to us by abstraction of the intellect from sensations; but, as has been said, once the idea of God has been acquired, it serves as a great light to the mind, enabling us to form other ideas clearly and to make true and certain judgments.

ii. St. Augustine includes in the field of Physics what is usually assigned to that of Metaphysics; in this department

he discusses God, the world, and man. He proves the existence of God from the fact that the world is *contingent*, i. e., does not explain itself, and is not in itself a reason for its own existence. Such a being must have come from a creative cause which is non-contingent (or *necessary*), and this is God. Other proofs for God's existence are drawn from the nature of our soul, and from the nature of our knowledge. St. Augustine speaks eloquently and profoundly of the *attributes* of God, proving that God is one, all-perfect, infinite, eternal, simple. He teaches that God's knowledge is one with the divine essence. God knows changelessly and from eternity all things actual and possible; and these "ideas" (in God and of His essence) are the stable and unchanging exemplary forms of things. Note that these forms are not in the divine intellect *accidentally*, as a modification of the divine mind, but are the exemplary cause of things and formally one with the essence of God. St. Augustine thought that this was Plato's meaning in the famous Theory of Ideas, for Plato makes the Subsistent Real Idea of The Good (God) contain all ideas. The divine will is the divine essence, immutable, eternal, wholly free. God was not moved to produce things by necessity; His infinite *goodness* diffused itself in creation. God created all things outside Himself from nothing. He did not create all things in the same state of perfection, but in various grades of perfection. Here St. Augustine contradicts the pantheism of the Gnostics and Manicheans. He declared that the soul is not an emanation of the divine substance, and rejected the world-soul theory as impious and utterly unreasonable. In creating, God called all things into existence at one and the same moment. The Hexahemeron (or six days of creation mentioned in Genesis) has not a *time* significance, but indicates the causal order in creation. All species of living things, therefore, existed *in germ* from the beginning. This means that God gave to determinate particles of matter a preternatural power or seed-force (*rationes seminales*), so that

they would develop into determinate species of living things at a moment foreordained by God. God did not endow matter with the seed-force of developing into *man*; from eternity He decreed to create man from the slime of the earth, and the particles of earth from which Adam's body was made existed from the moment of creation: in this sense Adam pre-existed invisibly and potentially before his actual appearance as man upon earth. But there was no planting of the *ratio seminalis* of man in brute matter, as there was the planting of *rationes seminales* of non-human living things in brute matter. The world exhibits in itself a perfect order and unity. The world is perfect in the sense that its perfections came from God and are conserved by Him. It is not, absolutely speaking, the most perfect world that God could make but it has all the perfections it needs for the purpose for which God made it. Augustine did not know Aristotle's doctrine of Prime Matter, but he unknowingly agrees with it. He teaches that the substratum of bodies (Prime Matter) is the lowest thing in the order of entity or being in the world, and has in itself no actuality. Prime Matter is determined by various *forms* and so constitutes the determinate bodily universe. Prime Matter existed antecedently to forms, not *in time* (for Prime Matter cannot have actual existence in itself and independently of forms), but *by nature*, as, for example, the sound of the voice is antecedent to singing. In the visible world *man* holds the chief place; reason (by which man exhibits the Divine Image) makes him superior to all other things in the visible creation. Man is, however, inferior to the angels because his bodily life is mortal. The soul of man is a spiritual substance, wholly present in every part of his body. It is immortal. St. Augustine proves the immortality of the soul from the nature of our knowledge: We know things as *eternally true*, changelessly the same (as, for example, that two and two are four). But eternal truths cannot be present in a being as in a subject unless that being is eternal. Therefore the eternal truths in the soul as in

a subject indicate that the soul will endure eternally. Augustine is not sure of himself on the subject of the origin of the soul. He admits in one of his letters to St. Jerome (No. 166) that *Creationism* (the doctrine that God creates and infuses each individual soul directly) satisfies the intellect better than *Traducianism* (the theory that the soul is derived from the souls of the parents, as a candle is lighted from other candles without diminishing their flame or taking anything from their substance), but that he finds difficulty in explaining the inheritance of original sin on the creationist principle. In the *Retractions* St. Augustine says (I, c. 1), "what the origin of the soul is I did not know then [at the time of writing what he now revises], and I do not know now." Most historians call St. Augustine a *Traducianist*, and it is certain that he did incline to the Traducianist theory. His only reason for doing so was the fact that he believed it the clearest explanation of the doctrine of original sin; yet we must not omit to notice his hesitancy in advocating this theory. He calls the union of body and soul *accidental*, and declares the body-soul relation to be inexplicable. Had he abandoned this Platonic error, he would have had no difficulty in explaining original sin on the basis of creationism.

iii. In Ethics St. Augustine teaches that man has a free-will, and that human freedom is in no wise limited or thwarted by God's foreknowledge of man's free acts. Man tends necessarily to happiness, but he chooses freely the objects in which he reposes the expectation of happiness. The true object of happiness, i. e., the object whose possession will bring true happiness, is God alone; and St. Augustine cites Plato in support of this doctrine. Now God is possessed in the most perfect way by the highest of man's faculties; man is to possess God by *intellect* (knowledge) and *will* (love). In the life to come, man is to achieve heaven, and possess God by immediate perception of the divine essence in the Beatific Vision. The whole of man's earthly life is meant to be di-

rected towards the achievement of the Beatific Vision in the life to come. How is life to be lived in view of this desired result? By conducting it according to the Eternal Law, the divine reason which ordains that the natural order of things be conserved and forbids that it be disturbed. The law of the natural order (i. e., the Natural Law) is written in our hearts by the Creator. Thus, the ultimate norm of morality is the *Eternal Law*; the proximate norm is the Natural Law written in our hearts, i. e., *Conscience*. He who lives in accordance with the Norm of Morality acquires *virtue*, which is a stable quality of the soul by which one lives rightly and uses nothing in an evil way. Besides acquired virtue, there is infused virtue, "which God works in us, without our coöperation." Virtue is an *operative habit* (i. e., a stable disposition of soul which inclines to *action*) for the active avoidance of evil and the active accomplishment of good. The chief virtue is Charity (i. e., love of God and neighbor), and all other virtues are based upon this. Even the Cardinal Virtues (Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, Temperance) are but modifications of Charity. The *Passions* are movements of spirit morally indifferent in themselves, and become good or bad according as they are ruled or not ruled by right reason. The chief passions are: joy, or expansion of spirit; sadness, or contraction of spirit; cupidity, the fore-reaching of spirit; and fear, the retraction or drawing back of spirit. *Evil* is not a being in itself; it is rather a non-being; and it consists in the loss or privation of good. *Physical* evil is the privation of a physical perfection that should be present: loss of sight, for example, is a physical evil. Moral evil is the privation of a moral perfection that should be present: sin is a moral evil, being the privation of that conformity which should exist between man's free act and the Norm of Morality which is Conscience, and, ultimately, the Eternal Law (Divine Reason). God is not the author of evil; He is sometimes *accidentally* the cause of physical evil, i. e., He does not will such evil (physical) for its own sake, but for the con-

servation of the universal order. God is neither the accidental nor the direct cause of moral evil; this comes from the free-will of creatures; and God permits moral evil because He will not destroy free-will even in those who abuse it, and besides He knows how to draw good out of evil.

Remarks: In St. Augustine's Logic we see a hint of *Ontologism*, the doctrine that man does not rise from the knowledge of creatures to the knowledge of the Creator, but, vice versa, descends from the knowledge of the Creator to that of creatures; or rather, that man has some direct or *intuitive* grasp of God, and, by reason of this knowledge, can form ideas of creatures. But St. Augustine is not an Ontologist, for he teaches that ideas are acquired through the senses and the activity of the intellect; even the idea of God is acquired in this way; and once this idea is acquired, he teaches, it serves as a great illumination to the mind, and aids it in the formation of other ideas and judgments. Faith is also a means of possessing God intellectually, and is therefore a factor in the "intellectual illumination" which the knowledge of God brings to man. And, finally, God is the efficient cause of the light of understanding possessed by man, and for this reason also God is justly called the "intellectual illumination" of men. This interpretation goes flatly against the judgment of most historians of philosophy, but it seems the true one, for it is the only explanation that squares with the following loci in St. Augustine's writings: *De Genesi ad Literam*, IV, 40, 41, 49; *Confessiones*, VII, n. 23; *De Trinitate*, VIII, 1; *De Trinitate*, XV, 5.—In Physics St. Augustine asserts the *rationes seminales* theory, which is to be rejected as gratuitous, and because it involves a continual miraculous intervention of God in the development of things. Notice that the theory is not one of Transformism or Evolution. St. Augustine does not speak of one species developing by its seed-force into another species; he teaches that brute matter is endowed with the germ or seed-force needed to develop it into a determinate species, and that

there are as many seed-forces (*rationes seminales*) insown from the beginning in matter as there are to be species of things; nowhere does he teach that a species develops outwardly into another species. His doctrine on the origin of man is not in open conflict with truth; it may be regarded as a somewhat fantastic and inadequate expression of true doctrine. But we must reject *Traducianism* or the doctrine that souls of children are derived from the souls of their parents. This doctrine is in contradiction to the very nature of simple spiritual substance, and, moreover, it was favored by the Saint because he *mistakenly* believed it necessary for the proper understanding of the doctrine of inherited original sin, and not because his keen intellect found it a satisfying theory in itself.

St. Augustine was the outstanding philosopher of the Patristic age. He was blessed with splendid talent and with unflagging energy. The number of his works is simply astounding, and they are marked by a keenness of penetration and a depth of thought that set them above the rest of the scientific literature of the times. No important problem of philosophy was left uninvestigated by the Saint, and even when he failed of achieving the truth, he carried his quest of it deeper than did the other Fathers. Philosophy owes much to the great Bishop of Hippo. Among other matters of value, we must mention his clear doctrines on the nature of the soul, the reliability of human knowledge, and the distinction between sensation and intellectual knowledge. Most of St. Augustine's errors are traceable to his Platonic training; had he known Aristotle well, we should have had an Aquinas before the 13 century.

BOOK SECOND

MEDIEVAL PHILOSOPHY

(8 to 17 century inclusive)

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

Although the philosophy of St. Augustine was discussed at the end of the last Book, it must be recalled that he was not the latest Father in point of time. Fathers of the later centuries—up to the 8—were mentioned in the Chapter preceding that on St. Augustine. It is true that these later Fathers did nothing great in the field of philosophy, but they kept tradition intact and thus served to bridge the long gap that stretches, in intellectual history, between the 4 and the 8 centuries.

Scholastic Philosophy was the outstanding system of the Medieval Period. Indeed, the history of Scholasticism is the history of philosophy of the Middle Ages. In tracing the progress of this great system, the historian must discuss incidentally all the other and minor philosophies of the age, for all of these have a more or less distinct bearing upon Scholastic Philosophy. The most important of such minor systems were certain Arabian and Jewish philosophies. Direct anti-Scholasticism among Europeans belongs integrally to the history of Scholastic Philosophy itself.

The present Book deals, therefore, with Scholastic Philosophy, that splendid and perfected system of speculation which alone, of all the systems formulated by men in the continuous course of philosophical endeavor, meets at all points the requirements of a complete rational inquiry into knowable things.

This system had its earliest beginnings in the late 8 century; its proximate origin is assigned to the 9, 10, and early 11 centuries; it developed into proper form in the late 11 and the 12 centuries; and in the 13 century it appeared in full perfection in the marvellous synthesis of Aquinas. Afterwards it declined—in favor, that is to say, not in itself, for it is a system of principles perfected once and for all time. By the 17 century, Scholasticism had disappeared, and new philosophies, the first of the modern systems, had the field of philosophy to themselves. Scholasticism was regarded as an outworn system, and as a philosophy which had been cunningly, not to say craftily, devised to supplement and support Catholic Theology. This opinion has endured to our own day among most non-Catholic philosophers, many of whom feel free to offer this cheap criticism of Scholasticism without knowing anything about it. Catholic scholars, however, have recently undertaken—and are at the present moment bravely forwarding—the revival of Scholastic Philosophy. They are applying its unchanging principles to the scientific problems of our day. Scholasticism is slowly emerging as *Neo-Scholasticism*, and promises to recover its ancient splendor.

The present Book is divided into five Chapters, as follows:

- Chapter I. The Preparation for Scholastic Philosophy (800–1050)
- Chapter II. The Development of Scholastic Philosophy (1050–1200)
- Chapter III. The Perfection of Scholastic Philosophy (1200–1300)
- Chapter IV. The Decline of Scholastic Philosophy (1300–1450)
- Chapter V. Transition to Modern Philosophy (1450–1600)

CHAPTER I

THE PREPARATION FOR SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

(800-1050)

Even during the Golden Age of the Roman Empire barbarian hordes had made incursions into western Europe and had been thrust back again and again by the imperial cohorts. But Rome weakened and fell; the barbarian inroads continued. Successful at last, the savages spread through Europe, and as early as the 5 century Italy itself was under their control. All institutions of civilization and culture failed in this crisis—all but one. The Church of Jesus Christ endured when the greatest and most powerful of the works of man were laid in ruins. True to her divine mission, the Church set to work to convert the barbarians. She sent out missionaries; she founded monasteries; she opened schools. In time her labors bore fruit, and in the 8 century the new Europeans had been brought into some semblance of civilization and spiritual culture: the Church had taught them priceless lessons; they had come to know something of their dignity, their destiny, and the necessity of living virtuously for supernatural motives. Only when this work had been done could the Church implant and foster in the minds of her new and warlike children that love of learning which has always been the mark of her influence.

Before the end of the 8 century the Church had set on foot a strong tendency in the direction of education. The influence of the monastery schools began to be generally felt. Kings, fired by zeal for learning, favored the new movement. None was more earnest among the royal patrons of learning than

the first monarch of his time, Charlemagne, King of the Franks. This great ruler labored as tirelessly for the welfare of his subjects as for the extension of his kingdom, and his efforts for the revival of learning were earnest and persevering. There had been a school at the palace of the Frankish kings from the days of the Merovingians, but it was an aristocratic institution, meant to prepare for Church and State the scions of leading families. This was the so-called Palatine or Palace School. Charlemagne made this institution the centre of the new learning. He imported teachers from the north (England and Ireland), where the lamp of learning had continued to glow during the days of the prostration of Europe; he collected the relics of classical literature, Christian and pagan; he collaborated with Alcuin, chief master of his School, in securing the coöperation of abbots and bishops everywhere throughout his realm in the work of establishing schools. It is to this new movement for education, this "Revival of Learning" of the 8 century, that we must trace the very earliest beginnings of Scholastic Philosophy.

In medieval language the word "scholastic" meant any scholar of recognized ability, but the word was used in a special way to designate the *head of a school*. Now the heads of medieval schools were generally men who had not only mastered the *seven liberal arts* (i. e., the *trivium*: grammar, rhetoric, dialectic; and the *quadrivium*: arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music), but were versed also in philosophy and theology. As the name of a *special system of philosophy*, "Scholastic" designates that system of doctrine which originated in the *Schools* during the Revival of Learning and reached perfection with St. Thomas Aquinas in the 13 century. Its characteristic marks are two: first, it is thoroughly *rational in method*, using the light of reason alone for the investigation of truth. In this it follows the best of the philosophies of antiquity, the Greek, and the best of the Greek philosophies, the Aristotelean. Its second characteristic mark is that it uses Christian Faith

or Revelation as a directive norm. Revelation is not used as a source of argument, but only as a test of conclusions. Since Faith is certain, and known with absolute security as the truth, it can be used as a criterion or test; and the philosopher can use its light as a guide in the fields of research. As the light of strong lamps guides the motorist, but turns no wheels, so Revelation illumines the way of the Scholastic Philosopher, but does not serve him as a font of argument or proof. And the philosopher, be it noted, is like the motorist also in this: that he courts disaster if he moves forward without light upon his path.

Now, before taking up the beginnings of Scholasticism, it will be well to make a preliminary study of the great question that, directly or indirectly, engaged the best efforts of even the earliest Scholastics,—the question of Universal Ideas, or simply “Universals,” as they are called. After discussing this question, the student can go on intelligently to trace out the course of Scholasticism, its rise, development, perfection, decline. Therefore the present Chapter is divided into the following three articles:

Article 1.—The Great Question of Philosophy in the Middle Ages.

Article 2.—The Carolingian Schools and Their Masters.

Article 3.—The First Medieval Philosophers.

Article 1. The Great Question of Philosophy in the Middle Ages

The most important, though by no means the only question that engaged the minds of medieval philosophers was the question of Universals. The famous controversy in this matter did not appear in full flare until the 11 century, but the earliest Scholastics touched the question at least indirectly. It seems best, therefore, to give some account of Universals before taking up the beginnings of Medieval Philosophy.

The student of the History of Philosophy must be able to answer the following questions:

- i. What is meant by Universals?
- ii. What doctrines on Universals are possible?
- iii. Why is the question of Universals important?
- iv. What made this question so prominent in the Middle Ages?

i. What is meant by Universals?

A *Universal* means the object of a universal idea or concept. I have, for example, a universal idea of *man*, i. e., *human being*. This is a representation in my intellect. It is the representation of an *essence*. This essence is found verified in each and every individual human being that exists, has existed, will exist, or could exist. The differences which distinguish one human *individual* from another—differences of age, sex, size, color, nationality, etc.—have no part in the *essential representation* in the intellect which is called a universal idea: such differences are not essential but *accidental*. Hence the baby, the adult, the male, the female, the scholar, the dullard, the sane, the insane, the saint, the sinner, the Negro, the Mongol, the Indian, the Caucasian, the normal man, the misshapen and deformed—in a word, each and every human being, past, present, and to come, and each and every human that can be even imagined as existing, squares precisely with my universal idea *man*. Each is conceived as *a man*, as *a human being*. No matter how individual men may differ, each must be conceived as having the same essence. My universal idea *man* represents that essence.

Now an idea is called *universal* because it can represent each and every member of a class universally, without exception. The universal idea (or, as it is usually called, simply the Universal) is a *single* representation in the intellect which can represent *many* in an essential manner. The *many* which the Universal can represent are called the *inferiors* of the Uni-

versal and make up what is called the *extension* or *denotation* of the Universal. If the Universal represents its inferiors completely, it is called the *Species* of its inferiors. If the Universal represents only an essential *part* which its inferiors have in common, though they differ essentially in other points, it is called the *Genus* of its inferiors. Thus the Universal *man* is the *Species* of its inferiors, and these are *individuals*, not being distinguishable into further *Species*. Thus the Universal *animal* is the *Genus* of its inferiors, since it represents brutes and men according to a common part of their essence, though brutes and men also differ essentially. A Universal is said to be *predicated* of its inferiors by the judgment of the intellect. For a fuller account of predicability consult the article on Aristotle's Dialectic.

The Universal, then, is a representation in intellect of an essence which is predicable of many (individuals or species). The chief Universals are Genera and Species. Now the question is: what are these Genera and Species? Are they *things*? Or, more precisely, do Universals (Genera and Species) represent things as they are outside the mind? What in the order of extramental reality corresponds to Universals? These questions the great medieval philosophers sought to answer.

ii. What Doctrines are Possible in the Matter of Universals?

Are Genera and Species things? What corresponds to these Universals in the order of reality outside the mind? There are four answers possible, and only four; and only one of the four can be the true answer. Thus there are four possible doctrines in the matter of Universals. These are:

(1) EXAGGERATED REALISM (called also EXTREME REALISM or ULTRA-REALISM). In the world of extramental reality there exist *universal essences*. These are represented by Universals. Thus there is a universal human essence, a universal essence *man*. Human individuals merely participate this universal essence. Some Ultra-Realists say that each human

individual possesses the whole human essence. To the question, therefore, "Are Universals (Genera and Species) things in the order of reality outside the mind?" the Ultra-Realist answers, "Yes." Ultra-Realism is a false doctrine.

(2) MODERATED REALISM (called also QUALIFIED REALISM or MODERATE REALISM). Outside the mind there are no universal essences; there are only individual things. The individual things are conceived by the mind to be classes or groups of beings of the same essence, and the mind represents each group or class by the single representation of that essence. In other words, the mind can represent by a Universal that essence which is found in each of the members of a class or group. And when such classes or groups have essential points in common, though essentially distinguished by other points, the mind can represent by a further Universal a plurality of classes or groups by the single representation of the point or part of their essence which is common. Thus it is seen that the *universality* of the Universal comes from the mind, and is in the mind. But it is not a gratuitous contribution of the mind to the function of knowing. There is a reason, a foundation, a basis in extramental reality for the universality of the idea in the mind. This basis in reality for the mental universality of the idea (Universal) is seen in the fact that the Universal can be verified in each and every member of the class called its inferiors. Thus the idea (Universal) *man* is verified in every human individual, actual and possible, outside the mind. Thus the Universal *circle* is verified in each and every circle that can be conceived, or graphically represented outside the mind. In answer, therefore, to the question, "Are Universals (Genera and Species) things in the order of extramental reality?" the Moderate Realist answers: "No; but Universals have a *basis* in reality outside the mind, for they are verifiable in a multiplicity of things in the order of extramental reality." Moderate Realism is the true doctrine in the matter of Universals.

(3) **CONCEPTUALISM.** Outside the mind there are no universal essences; there are only individual things. But the individual things are grouped by the mind, and each group is represented by a universal idea or concept. There is no essential basis in reality for such grouping. Such grouping is due to the mind's mode of conceiving things, of forming *concepts* (ideas) of things. The mind may, indeed, use the mere *relation* of material resemblance in things as a basis for its grouping them and forming concepts or universal ideas of them; but such relation is *accidental* and not *essential* in the things so grouped. Therefore, to the question, "Are Universals (Genera and Species) things in the order of reality outside the mind?" the Conceptualist answers, "No; they are modes of the mind's conceiving (concept forming), and are based on no essential reality outside the mind." Conceptualism is a false doctrine.

(4) **NOMINALISM.** Outside the mind there are no universal essences; there are only individual things. But it is clearly impossible to have a separate idea or mental representation of each and every individual thing. Hence the mind arbitrarily groups individual things, and labels them, so to speak, with group names (i. e., mental names). Universals are merely mentally applied *names*, nothing more. Their value is wholly *subjective*; they represent nothing whatever in the *objective* groups of things for which they stand. Universals are a mere convenience—albeit a necessary one—for thinking out the world of reality in anything like an adequate or orderly fashion. And the name "universal" is itself a misnomer; for universals have no *universality* either in themselves as essential names (which they are not) or in reality. Therefore, to the question, "Are Universals (Genera and Species) things in the order of reality outside the mind?" the Nominalist answers, "No; nor are they really 'universals' at all; they are mere arbitrary group-names, nothing more." Nominalism is false doctrine.

Notice in the above explanation of the different doctrines

concerning Universals, the reason for the following dicta, which are often quoted as the respective summaries of the four doctrines: (1) Ultra-Realism is expressed in the saying, "Universalia ante rem" (Universals before the individual reality). That is, universal essences exist; they do not require that individual things participate them; they are prior to and independent of the individual things. Thus if there were no men, the *universal essence man* would still be a reality. Individual things come, in nature or in time or both, *after* the universal essence, and participate it. Therefore: Universals before the (individual) reality.

(2) Moderate Realism is expressed in the formula: "Universalia ante rem, post rem, et in re" (Universals before the reality, after the reality, in the reality). That is, Universals *before* the reality in the mind of God, who contains the exemplary causes of all things, knows them as they are essentially; *after* the reality in the mind of man, who forms Universals by abstraction of the intellect after sensation of extramental realities; *in* the reality, inasmuch as the essence represented in the mind by the Universal is found verified in each of its inferiors extramentally.

(3) Conceptualism is summed up thus: "Universalia post rem" (Universals after the reality). That is, the mind must know extramental realities first, and then it groups, or conceives, these in collections by reason of its own natural function.

(4) Nominalism is also expressed in the formula: "Universalia post rem," for the mind, says the Nominalist, must first experience contact with individual things and then it groups them arbitrarily and gives the groups the mental name called a "Universal."

The great controversy over the nature of Universals which was waged in the Middle Ages did not clearly define the camps of the Ultra-Realist, the Moderate Realist, the Conceptualist, and the Nominalist. The dispute was between the Ultra-Real-

ists and the Anti-Realists. The Anti-Realists were sometimes Nominalists, sometimes Conceptualists, sometimes Moderate Realists.

iii. Why is the Question of Universals Important?

This question is important because it touches the basis of all rational knowledge. If Nominalism or Conceptualism is true, then there can be no science. I cannot, for example, take up geometry and study "The Circle" unless I know essentially what "circle" is and must eternally remain. If "circle" is a mere arbitrary name, or if it merely expresses the mind's mode of forming concepts of similar things, then I cannot know that "the circumference is equal to the diameter times 3.1416." I might indeed discover the ratio of circumference and diameter in an individual circle, having found the matter true by experiment; but I could not—in the hypothesis of Nominalism or Conceptualism being true—declare the proposition true of *all* and *any* circles. To have a universal truth, there must be universal ideas which really represent changeless essences of things.

On the other hand, if Ultra-Realism be true, then I cannot rely upon my senses. My senses assure me of the existence of individual things in the extramental world, but not of universal things. And if the universal essences are there, and the senses cannot even remotely come at their presence, I must regard my sense-knowledge as inadequate, and I have some grounds for doubting its validity. Now, if my senses are not certainly reliable, I cannot reason reliably on sense findings. Thus the validity of thought itself is put in doubt. So, on *speculative* grounds, I find Ultra-Realism a doctrine that would destroy science and lead, if logically developed, to skepticism. The doctrine of Ultra-Realism is no less destructive on *practical* grounds. If there is a reality, universal in its nature, which corresponds to my universal idea, what am I to say of the reality corresponding to my universal idea "substance"?

Clearly, I must assert the real existence of a universal substance. This can be no other than the necessary substance, or God, in last analysis. But this is pantheism, a doctrine subversive of all morality. Therefore, I must reject Ultra-Realism on both speculative and practical grounds.

These examples show only a small part of the far-reaching effects of the doctrine of Universals. Yet they are sufficient to indicate the importance of the question in philosophy. It is to be remarked here, however, that the early Scholastics did not discuss (nor perhaps realize) these ultimate consequences of the doctrines controverted.

iv. What Made the Question of Universals so Prominent in the Middle Ages?

The question of Universals was discussed by the Greeks. It had its beginnings in pre-Socratic times, but Plato was the first to teach a definite doctrine in the matter. He professed Ultra-Realism of a special kind in his theory of Subsistent Real Ideas. Aristotle taught Moderate Realism. After Aristotle nearly all Schools dealt with the question, reaching one of the four possible conclusions outlined above. The Fathers scarcely touched the question; even St. Augustine did not take a definite stand, although he wrote much on the validity and objectivity of our knowledge. The Fathers, however, discussed theological questions, such as the *Trinity* and the *Incarnation* and the *Real Presence*. Such theological questions were taken by the Scholastics and studied in the light of philosophy, and these matters have a direct or indirect reference to the question of Universals. Thus the theological questions studied by the Fathers and handed down as the heritage of the new philosophers of the Revival of Learning introduced the matter of Universals to the Middle Ages. No clear line of demarcation had been drawn at this time between the field of theology and that of philosophy; and, indeed, more than one of the early Medieval philosophers taught that the truths of Revelation constitute

the proper object of the philosopher's study. Another reason for the prominence of the question of Universals in Medieval Philosophy is found in the fact that the early Schoolmen studied Aristotle's *Dialectic*—wherein Universals are discussed—but did not possess his metaphysical works, and so lacked a thorough grasp of those principles (drawn chiefly from Cosmology and Psychology) without which the matter of Universals cannot be perfectly understood. Hence the knowledge of Universals was incomplete and inadequate in the early Scholastics, and it was but natural that disagreements and controversy on the subject should occur.

Article 2. The Carolingian Schools and Their Masters

- a) The Schools; b) Alcuin; c) Rhabanus Maurus; d) Fredegis;
e) Remarks.

a) THE SCHOOLS.

As early as the 6 or 7 century there had been a Court School at the palace of the King of the Franks. This school was established, very probably, through the efforts of the Irish monks who labored as missionaries in Gaul. This Palace School—or Palatine School—was meant to fit the children of the nobility for their place in Church or State. Charlemagne himself was trained in the Palace School of Pepin, his father; and now the Palace School was made the nucleus of the great educational plan which Charlemagne inaugurated and got thoroughly under way before his death.

Alcuin with a staff of teachers came from the School of York in England at Charlemagne's invitation, and took charge of the Palace School in 782. With the coöperation of bishops and abbots throughout Frankland, schools were opened in monasteries, and at cathedrals and parish churches. By the beginning of the 9 century there was a great system of these schools, all busily employed with crowds of students. At the

head of the "system" was the Palace School, the official centre of culture. Below this were, in order, the monastery schools, the cathedral schools, and the parish schools.

The parish schools taught the *elements*, i. e., reading, writing, elementary arithmetic, and religion. The cathedral and monastic schools usually taught (in addition to the elements) the so-called *liberal arts*, or seven subjects divided into the *trivium* (grammar, rhetoric, dialectic) and the *quadrivium* (advanced arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music). The larger cathedral and monastery schools gave to the graduates of the "arts course" an opportunity of learning the natural sciences: medicine, history, philosophy, theology, and law, civil and ecclesiastical.

The most important Schools founded in the time of Charlemagne were those of Tournai, Fulda, Tours, Auxerre, Chartres, and several in Paris (St. Genevieve, St. Victor, etc.)

The master or teacher in these schools would "read" (i. e., explain) a text: this was the *lectio*. Then the matter explained would be discussed in the question-and-answer method: this was the *disputatio*. In this we see the beginnings of the *Scholastic Method* developed to such perfection at a later day. Teachers and students used the Latin language—very poor Latin, for the most part, up to the 11 century; for this was the time when Medieval Latin was being formed, a Latin that differs greatly from the *classical*, yet has a beauty of its own. It may not be out of place here to remark that the modern student who affects dismay or amusement at Medieval Latin does not know that language. Medieval Latin is a language as different from classical Latin as modern pure English is different from Shakespeare's English. As we do not call modern pure English barbarous, so we must not call pure Medieval Latin barbarous.

The library of the Medieval School was not large. The most important works available for the student were certain books of Plato and Aristotle; the *Isagoge* of Porphyry in transla-

tions by Boethius and Marius Victorinus; works of Macrobius, Apuleius, Cassiodorus, Hermes Trismegistus; something of Cicero, Seneca, Lucretius, Galen, Hippocrates, Martian Capella; the genuine works of St. Augustine as well as many spurious works attributed to him; works of Origen, St. Clement of Alexandria, Lactantius, St. Ambrose, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Nemesius, Pseudo-Dionysius, and, near the end of the period, St. John Damascene.

Louis the Pious (*Le Débonnaire*) son and successor of Charlemagne, shared his father's interest in learning, and furthered the work of the Schools.

b) ALCUIN (about 735–804).

Life: Alcuin was born in Northumbria in England, and from youth was connected with the Benedictine School which was maintained in the Monastery of the Order at York. Summoned by Charlemagne in 782, he took charge of the Palatine School of Charlemagne. This School moved about as the king changed his residence, but for the most part it was maintained in Aachen (*Aix-la-Chapelle*). Alcuin was a powerful factor in the movement which established monastic, cathedral, and parish schools. In 796 Alcuin was made Abbot of the Benedictine Monastery in Tours, and under his rule Tours became a notable centre of learning.

Works: Besides strictly theological works, Alcuin wrote the following, which belong, in part at least, to the domain of philosophy: *On Grammar, On Rhetoric and the Virtues, On Dialectic, On the Soul, Disputation of Pepin with Albinus the Scholastic.*

Doctrine: In philosophy Alcuin follows St. Augustine. He was not a great nor an original thinker, but he was a scholar and a zealous promoter of the movement for learning which brought Scholastic Philosophy into being. For this reason he deserves a place of prominence in the history of this period of the beginnings of Scholasticism.

c) RHABANUS MAURUS (or Rhaban Maur) (about 776–856).

Life: Rhabanus was born at Mainz (Mayence), and became a Benedictine monk in the great Abbey of Fulda, in central Germany. In 802 he was sent by his Abbot to study under Alcuin at Tours. So great was the esteem and affection of Alcuin for the young Rhabanus that he gave him the surname "Maurus," after St. Maurus, the beloved disciple of St. Benedict. After a year's training under Alcuin, Rhabanus Maurus returned to Fulda and was placed in charge of the monastic school there. Later he was elected Abbot, and Fulda became famous as a centre of learning under his rule. In later life Rhabanus Maurus was made Bishop of Mainz, and died in that office.

Works: Rhabanus Maurus wrote *On the Universe*, a great work in 22 books. This was a kind of encyclopedia of the knowledge current in his time. He wrote other works also, but none of these has a philosophical significance. It is said, but without much authority, that he wrote a *Commentary on Porphyry*.

Doctrine: Although he was a man of more independent mind and of more vigorous views than Alcuin, Rhabanus Maurus developed no philosophy of his own. His writings contain expressions that smack of Nominalism, but he did not deal expressly with the matter of Universals.

d) FREDEGIS (9 century), successor of Alcuin at Tours, is another figure of note in the Revival of Learning. He wrote a speculative treatise *On Nothingness and Darkness*, in which he offers argument to prove that these things are not mere negations consisting, respectively, in the absence of being and of light, but are somehow positive entities in themselves. The work contains expressions that are obviously ultra-realistic. Still, Fredegis' ultra-realism was probably unconscious, for

he did not directly undertake the discussion of the question of Universals.

e) REMARKS.—None of the famous teachers of the early Schools originated an independent system of philosophy. The little philosophical doctrine which we find in their writings is but a restatement of Patristic teaching. As philosophers, these early Schoolmen were not innovators, but preservers of the past. Their place in the History of Philosophy is not, strange as it may seem, due to the fact that they were philosophers, but to the fact that they were leaders in that great cultural movement which gave rise to Scholasticism.

Article 3. The First Medieval Philosophers

- a) Erigena; b) Gerbert; c) Eric of Auxerre; d) Remi of Auxerre;
e) Remarks.

The philosophers here considered were all masters or famous students in the Schools of the Revival of Learning. With Erigena, first of these, medieval philosophy proper begins, for he was the first to attempt to formulate an independent system of philosophical doctrine.

- a) JOHN SCOTUS ERIGENA (about 810–878).

Life: Erigena (known also in history as Eriugena, Ierugena, John the Scot, Joannes Scottigena) was born in Ireland. In 845 he went to France, where he was well received by Charles the Bald and placed in charge of the Palace School. Erigena was the outstanding scholar of his age. It is not known whether he was a priest or a layman.

Works: Erigena's great work is his *On the Division of Nature*. He also wrote a *Commentary on the Pseudo-Dionysius*, and a treatise on *Predestination*, a subject much agitated during the 9 century.

Doctrine: Philosophy is the science of reason. Now the noblest task that reason can perform is the task of investigating

and explaining Divine Revelation, and for this task reason must have an illumination from God, a supernatural light. Thus Erigena identifies the fields of philosophy and scientific theology.

There is one God. All things are necessarily contained in God, and proceed from Him by substantial emanation or out-pouring (*pantheism*). All things, God included, come together to constitute *Nature*. Now Nature is fourfold, and the four divisions may be called *Four Natures*. The Four Natures are:

- i. Uncreated Nature that Creates (i. e., God, the Source);
- ii. Created Nature that Creates (i. e., Primordial Causes);
- iii. Created Nature that Creates Not (i. e., the creatural universe);
- iv. Uncreated Nature that Creates Not (i. e., God, the Goal).

These Four Natures of Erigena require a further word of explanation:

i. The First Nature (Uncreated Nature that Creates) is God, the all-perfect, who transcends all knowledge. God is so perfect that He does not even know Himself: for if He knew Himself, His knowledge would be determinate, and in so far *limited*, and the idea of limit connotes imperfection. All things are from eternity substantially contained in God. God does not produce things by pure creative act: if He did, the things produced would be new even to God, and to know them would mean an increase in the perfection of God's knowledge—an obvious impossibility. For the same reason, it must be asserted that God did not produce things *in time*. When we say that God "creates," we mean that He subsists in all things as their essence. Thus creation is eternal.

ii. The Second Nature (Created Nature that Creates) consists of certain eternal conditions in and of the Divine Essence. We may call these Genera and Species (or Universals) in the Divine Essence; or we may call them *Primordial Causes*. These are called "created" because they have no independent existence apart from the Divine Essence; and we say that they "create"

because the world of individual things exists by reason of the Primordial Causes: these causes are the *forms* that constitute the essence of individual things.

iii. The Third Nature (Created Nature that Creates Not) is the universe of what are usually called creatures—bodily and spiritual individuals constituted in being by the Primordial Causes.

iv. The Fourth Nature (Uncreated Nature that Creates Not) is God considered as the Term or Goal of the universe, the end for and in which all things have their being.

As to *man*, Erigena teaches that there is one universal human nature existing in God (*Ultra-Realism*) and of this individual men are the participants or determinations. Man (the individual) has body and soul. Soul and body together have the knowing faculty called *sensation*, a single faculty served by five instruments commonly called the five senses. To the soul alone belong the faculties of *internal sensation* (by which individual things are known), *reason* (which apprehends Primordial Causes), and *intellect* (which knows God in His changelessness). The three soul-faculties make up a kind of trinity, so that the individual soul is the image of the Blessed Trinity. As to the future lot of the soul, Erigena inclines to the doctrine that all souls will ultimately reach felicity and attain to God the Goal; he even holds that some souls will be especially blessed in such wise as to bring them "deification."

Remarks: Erigena's pantheism is wholly *realistic*. It gives existence to Genera and Species (*Ultra-Realism*) and makes individuals part and parcel of the Divine Essence. Erigena insists that God is immutable; but his doctrine contradicts this thesis; for individuals (which are ultimately one with the Divine Essence) are constantly changed. Erigena tried to avoid this contradiction by introducing Primordial Causes (and not God directly) as constituting causes of individuals: but the difficulty remains, for the Primordial Causes are identified with the Divine Essence. Hence, Erigena's doctrine is reduced to real-

istic pantheism, a pantheism of real outpourings (emanations) of God.—Eriгена is right in asserting a distinction between sense and intellect; and in asserting the unity of body and soul as the subject of sense-knowledge. But his doctrine of a *universal human substance* is as absurd as that of the Four Natures itself. His error is one of principle, not of logic; for his conclusions are logical in view of his assumption—which, as has been noticed, is realistic pantheism.

b) GERBERT (about 945–1003).

Life: Gerbert was born at Aurillac, Auvergne, France, of humble parents. He was educated at the Benedictine Monastery of his native place and became a monk there. He was sent to Spain to study mathematics and physical science under Arab teachers. He is said to have been the first to introduce *Arabic numeration* into Christian Europe. In 982 he was made Abbot of the Monastery at Bobbio; in 991 he was made Archbishop of Rheims; he was transferred in 997 to the Archbishopric of Ravenna; and in 999 he was elected Pope, taking the name Sylvester II. In his mild and pleasant manner he remarked, “Rheims, Ravenna, Rome—I always mount by the letter R.” Gerbert was a versatile, almost a universal, genius. What Eriгена was to the 9 century, Gerbert was to the 10—the one outstanding figure of the time. He filled the great office of Supreme Pontiff for four years; his death occurred in May, 1003.

Works: Gerbert wrote mathematical treatises and commentaries on the dialectical works of Aristotle. The only work of his in our possession is a little book on *The Reasonable and Using Reason*. In this book Gerbert exemplifies the Scholastic Method for the first time: he defines his terms, proposes objections to his thesis, proves his proposition, and then answers the objections in the light of his proof.

Doctrine: Philosophy means knowledge—the whole body of truth, human and divine. This great world of truth is investi-

gated by the philosopher and the results of his findings gives us two kinds of sciences, viz., *theoretical* (metaphysics, mathematics, dogmatic theology) and *practical* (logic, ethics, economics, civics).

Gerbert's book on *Reasoning* is ultra-realistic in expression, but he did not discuss the *nature* of Universals, but only their *use* in logic. Therefore his language is not to be taken as evidence that he professed a doctrine to which he probably never gave any direct thought.

Remarks: There is nothing in the doctrine of Gerbert to entitle him to a prominent place in the History of Philosophy. But in the Period of the Beginnings of Medieval Philosophy we must consider more than doctrine. Gerbert stressed the importance of logical reasoning, and he developed the Scholastic Method. The dialectic movement (attention to fine logical reasoning) and the use of the Scholastic Method was a strong characteristic of the philosophy of the two centuries that followed Gerbert's time, and had much to do with the splendid achievement of Scholasticism in the 13 century.

c) ERIC OF AUXERRE (about 840-881) was a Benedictine monk of the Abbey of Auxerre, a town in France, about one hundred miles southeast of Paris. He studied at Fulda. Elected Abbot of Auxerre, he brought its monastic School into great prominence. His writings include glosses on the works of Aristotle, Porphyry, and St. Augustine. His doctrine is a reaction against the Ultra-Realism of Erigena. He is called simply an "Anti-Realist"; perhaps he is most accurately classified as a Nominalist.

d) REMI OF AUXERRE (about 841-908) was a pupil of Eric, and, like his teacher, a monk of the Benedictine Order. He had some fame as a professor of grammar, music, and dialectic in the Schools of Rheims and Paris. He wrote a theological treatise on the Psalms and certain dialectical glosses and commentaries. In doctrine he held a middle stand between the

Ultra-Realism of Erigena and the Nominalism of Eric, but he did not give the question of Universals thorough study.

e) REMARKS: The Period of the Beginnings of Medieval Philosophy presents the following points for notice and remembrance:

i. The most important philosopher of this age is Erigena. He alone of the first medieval masters originated a system of speculation. Although this system is false, and essentially anti-Scholastic, it gave impetus to speculation and so contributed to the Scholastic movement.

ii. The masters of the age were all at one in their unwavering conviction that there can be no contradiction between Faith and Philosophy. They all believed that reason and rational science should be used in the exposition of matters of Faith. Hence the age developed what is called *theological reasoning*.

iii. The age inaugurated the use of the *Scholastic Method*.

iv. This age presents—not expressly, but implicitly—the beginnings of the disagreement on the nature of Universals which developed into a raging controversy in the late 11 and in the 12 century, and was not thoroughly composed until the 13 century. Thus we notice Ultra-Realism in Erigena, and probably in Gerbert; Nominalism is implied in the writings of Eric, and a sort of compromise stand is made by Remi.

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

(1050-1200)

The famous *Controversy on the Nature of Universals* was the most notable feature of the Period of Development in Medieval Philosophy. Out of this lengthy dispute emerged the clarified and perfected doctrine of *Moderate Realism* held by the latest and greatest of the Schoolmen.

During this Period *Realists* and *Anti-Realists* wrangled on the question of Universals; *Eclectics* proposed diluted compromise doctrines; *Mystics* minimized the value of philosophical study and made the culture of the spiritual life the end of all education; *Pantheists*, whose debased doctrine originated in the extravagances of both Ultra-Realism and Mysticism, propounded their world-old folly as the true philosophy. During this time there were notable developments also in *Arabian* and *Jewish Philosophy*.

Among the philosophers of the Period of Development must be numbered those authors who wrote systematic treatises or compilations of theology and tried to show the place of philosophy in the sacred science. These writers are known as the *Summarists*.

The present Chapter treats of all these matters in the following articles :

Article 1. Realism and Anti-Realism.

Article 2. Eclecticism, Mysticism, Pantheism; the Summarists.

Article 3. Arabian and Jewish Philosophy of the Period.

Article 1. Realism and Anti-Realism

- a) Roscelin; b) St. Anselm; c) William of Champeaux;
 d) Odo of Tournai; e) Abelard; f) The School of Chartres;
 g) Remarks.

a) ROSCELIN (about 1050–1121).

Life: Roscelin was born at Compiègne, a town on the River Oise about fifty miles northeast of Paris. He was educated in the Schools of Soissons and Rheims. He was a monk, and a Canon of the Cathedral Chapter of his diocese. He taught at Compiègne, Loches, Besançon, and Tours. Abelard, of whom we have yet to speak, was his most famous pupil. Roscelin was a notable teacher, who attracted multitudes of students by his learning and eloquence.

Works: The only writing of Roscelin's that survives is a *Letter to Abelard*. What we know of the character of his teaching is gathered from the testimony of those who opposed him in controversy, notably St. Anselm, Abelard, and John of Salisbury.

Doctrine: Roscelin is called a Nominalist, and even "The Father of Nominalism"; but all that can be said of him with certainty is that he took a definite stand against Ultra-Realism. He did not believe that Genera and Species exist as *things*, universal realities, of which individuals are but the manifestations or participants. He declared that every reality sufficient in itself for existence is *individual*. Roscelin used, indeed, expressions savoring of Nominalism, and Abelard said of him, "I recall that my teacher, Roscelin, held the silly doctrine that nothing is made of parts, for parts like species are only matters of words." (*Opera inedita d'Abelard*, by Cousin, *Liber de def. et divis.*, p. 471.) Still, this may mean that Roscelin merely insisted upon the fact that individuals are individuals, not mere groupings of separable and even separate things; in other words, it may merely mean that Roscelin insisted upon the

substantial unity of individuals as such. It is likely that his hostility towards the doctrine of Ultra-Realism made him incautious in his choice of expressions and somewhat inaccurate in his declarations of anti-realistic doctrine. His forerunners, the anonymous John the Sophist and Raimbert of Lille, taught Dialectic in nominalistic fashion, and Roscelin's terminology may have been borrowed from them. At all events, Roscelin was an Anti-Realist. Whether he was a Nominalist, Conceptualist, or imperfect Moderate Realist is hard to determine. In any case, his importance as a partisan in the controversy on Universals is vastly overestimated.

What really called attention to Roscelin was his philosophical teaching on the subject of the Blessed Trinity. He is said to have taught that the Three Divine Persons are not one God, but three Gods (*Tritheism*). Some historians, however, say that he did not actually teach Tritheism, but merely said that he did not understand how one Divine Essence could be common to three Persons. Roscelin was forced to retract his heretical doctrine—or what was charged against him as his heretical doctrine—at the Council of Soissons in 1092. There is a historical account of a second abjuration of heresy made by Roscelin before the Council of Rheims in 1094; but this account is not quite reliable. At all events, Roscelin was restored to his standing in the Church, and was allowed to teach after the time of the Rheims Council.

Remarks: The enthusiasm of this energetic Anti-Realist may have carried him too far, but no one may say how far. Certainly, he did a positive service for philosophy in his antagonism to Ultra-Realism, and his strong partisanship brought the whole question of Universals insistently to the attention of subsequent philosophers. On the other hand, Roscelin did an injury to philosophy inasmuch as he brought discredit upon it as an instrument for the exposition of matters of Faith. His Tritheism (real or imputed) went to confirm the suspicion already haunting the minds of many that philosophy, and

especially dialectic, had no service to render to theology. Predecessors of Roscelin—among whom were Fulbert of Chartres (d. about 1030), Otloh of Regensburg (d. 1083), St. Peter Damian (998–1073), and Lanfranc, Archbishop of Canterbury (d. 1089)—had condemned the use of dialectic in theology. And Berengarius of Tours (999–1086), condemned by four councils for his heterodox views on Transubstantiation, had served theology ill by his dialectic. Now Roscelin, by his supposedly nominalistic teaching on the Blessed Trinity, brought further suspicion upon dialectic as an instrument suited to the needs of scientific theology. To this extent, Roscelin hampered the progress of the Scholastic movement.

b) ST. ANSELM (1033–1109).

Life: Anselm was born of patrician parents at Aosta in Lombardy, northern Italy. At the age of 27 he entered the Benedictine Order at the great Abbey of Bec, in Normandy. Here he studied under Lanfranc (1005–1089), whom he afterwards succeeded in the office of Abbot. Called from his monastery to the archbishopric of Canterbury, in England, he spent himself in the service of God, laboring tirelessly for the welfare of souls, the advancement of learning, and the proper recognition of the rights of the Church by the secular power.

Works: Anselm wrote *Monologium*, a treatise on the essence of God as shown by reason; *Proslogium*, a treatise expounding a special proof for the existence of God—a proof called *the ontological proof*; *Against Gaunilo*, a rebuttal of the attacks of the monk Gaunilo on the *Proslogium*; *On the Trinity and the Incarnation*; certain philosophical dialogues; and the famous *Cur Deus Homo?*, a study of the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation.

Doctrine: St. Anselm, while using the rational method in his philosophical inquiries, had the greatest reverence for Revelation and for the authority of the Fathers, particularly St. Augustine. He accurately discerned that the occasion of much

confusion and controversy among philosophers was the lack of a clear line of distinction between the proper fields of theology and philosophy, and also the fact that the theologian-philosophers did not accurately determine the extent to which reason might go in investigating and expounding the dogmas of Faith. St. Anselm tried, with partial success, to avoid the faults here condemned. In treating questions that plainly belong to philosophy, he proceeded from *self-evident rational principles*; while in studying matters of pure theology he proceeded from the *facts of Revelation* in forming his argument. He expressed the relation of philosophy to theology in the formulas, *Credo ut intelligam* ("I believe that I may understand," i. e., I do not seek to understand things in order to justify my Faith; on the contrary I find my Faith a light without which I cannot acquire full science of other things) and *Fides quaerens intellectum* ("Faith seeking to understand").

In his book *Cur Deus Homo?* ("Why a God-Man?") St. Anselm seeks to prove from reason alone that the Redemption and all facts incidental to it had necessarily to occur just as Revelation shows that they did occur.

In his *Proslogium* St. Anselm developed a new argument for the existence of God, an argument which, while certainly invalid, has caused an enormous amount of discussion and controversy since his time. This is the so-called *a priori* or *Ontological Argument*. Anselm fully acknowledged the conclusive power of the *a posteriori* arguments for God's existence (i. e., such arguments as proceed from consideration of certain effects to the necessary and adequate First Cause), but he believed this truth also capable of splendid proof *a priori*. This Ontological Argument may be stated as follows:

God means the most perfect being that can be thought of.

But the most perfect being that can be thought of must exist (else, lacking the perfection of existence, it is *not* the most perfect being conceivable!).

Therefore *God must exist.*

The argument amounts to this: the very fact that we have a thought of God as the most perfect being conceivable asserts the actual existence of God; that we can think of God proves that there is a God.

The Ontological Argument is faulty and inconclusive. If we regard it as a mere logical analysis of the idea of God, we must condemn it because it contains a "leap" from the order of ideas (*logical order*) to the order of extramental reality (*ontological order*). Such a leap spoils continuity, and brings sophistry into the argument. We can think of a being as most perfect, and therefore as existing, whether such a being actually exists or does not exist. In the *order of ideas* the concept of the most perfect being conceivable does imply existence, i. e., implies the *note* of existence in the idea; but the idea or concept of the most perfect being conceivable does not necessarily imply the existence of that being in the *order of extramental reality*. It may be said that this criticism misses the point because St. Anselm did not mean to prove God's existence from a dry logical analysis of the idea of God. Perhaps, it may be said, the Saint proceeded in his argument from the assumption that there is in the soul an intimate and vivid presence of God, and that the first vague *idea* of God arises from this presence, and demands as its explanation the existence of the indwelling God who gives origin to the idea. This interpretation of St. Anselm's Ontological Argument, while proposed by some critics of high standing, seems alien to the mind of the Saint.

In his *Monologium* St. Anselm asserts the spirituality and immortality of the human soul, although, strangely enough, he does not argue its immortality from the fact that it is spiritual. He concludes that the soul is immortal from the fact that it is made to love God perpetually. His argument is essentially the same as that which is founded on man's desire for endless happiness. St. Anselm does not deal professedly with the question of the *union* of soul and body in man, but

incidentally he shows himself inclined to the Platonic theory of *accidental* and non-substantial union. Still, he does not make the soul independent of the body in the acquiring of ideas, for he teaches plainly that ideas are formed by abstraction from sensations.

Remarks: St. Anselm did something new and constructive for philosophy: he tried to show the scope of philosophy as distinct from theology; he studied the truths of the Faith in the light of reason alone, and in the same light defended these truths against heretics. Roscelin, Berengarius, and others had attacked revealed truths by dialectical reasoning; with their own arms St. Anselm routed them. It is easy to understand, therefore, why Anselm was a powerful influence upon subsequent philosophers. He may truly be called the link that joins the greatest of the Fathers (St. Augustine) with the greatest Scholastic (St. Thomas). He was, indeed, called "The last Father and the first Scholastic," and "The Augustine of the Eleventh Century." On the one hand he is closely associated with St. Augustine, for he borrows from this great Father most of his philosophical and theological doctrine; and, on the other hand, he approaches St. Thomas in the method of his attack, and in the abundance of rigid reasonings he brings to the study of the problems he discusses.

St. Anselm has been called an Ultra-Realist, but unfairly. Some of his expressions do, indeed, admit of ultra-realistic interpretation, but the whole tenor of his philosophical writings shows that the Saint was inclined towards Moderate Realism. The only reason for hesitancy in stating plainly that he *was* a Moderate Realist is the want of accurate terminology in his works—but it must be remembered that this terminology had not yet been formulated in Anselm's day. The critics who call him an Ultra-Realist appeal to the Ontological Argument, saying that it indicates a transference outside the mind of the real as conceived by the mind. Granting the force of this one

instance, we may safely assert that the whole body of doctrine taught by the Saint shows him rather a Moderate Realist than an Ultra-Realist.

c) WILLIAM OF CHAMPEAUX (1070-1120).

Life: William was born in the little French town of Champeaux, near Melun. At an early age he went to Paris to study under the master Manegold. Afterwards he went to Roscelin's School in Compiègne and to the School of Laon. In 1103 he began teaching in the Cathedral School of Paris. Bitterly attacked by Abelard, his pupil, for his doctrine on Universals, William hesitated, shifted his position, and finally retired from the arena of controversy. He became a monk of the Order of St. Benedict in the Abbey of St. Victor in Paris. Subsequently he became Bishop of Chalons. No one enjoyed greater fame for learning in his time than did William of Champeaux.

Works: We have only a fragment of William's work *On the Soul*, and some portions of his *Book of Sentences* and his *Dialogue Between a Certain Christian and a Jew*; but we learn much of his doctrine from Abelard, his pupil and bitter opponent.

Doctrine: At first William was an Ultra-Realist. He held the *theory of identity*, maintaining that the individuals of the same species have one and the same essence numerically, and differ one from the other only accidentally. Thus Tom, Dick, Harry, et al., are not properly individuals at all, for they have one and the same essence numerically. The whole human essence, said William, is present in each and every individual man. The same is true of individuals of every species. Ridiculed by Abelard for this opinion, William changed it for a *theory of indifference*, a vague doctrine that comes close to expressing negatively what his former teaching expressed positively. Afterwards William adopted a *theory of similarity*, teaching that individuals of a species have each an essence *similar* to

that of the others. In a word, William of Champeaux began as a pronounced Ultra-Realist, and veered from his position into an unstable sort of Anti-Realism.

In his work *On the Origin of the Soul* William refutes the doctrine that souls are somehow derived through generation from the souls of parents (*Traducianism*), and defends the true doctrine that each soul is directly created by Almighty God (*Creationism*). He rightly teaches that the soul is a simple spiritual substance. He wrongly identifies the soul and its faculties; for there is what Scholastics call a *real distinction* (*not* separation, nor separability) between any agent substance and its faculties or capacities for operation.

Remarks: William of Champeaux was the first European philosopher to take an unhesitating stand on the doctrine of the soul's origin: he taught pure Creationism. He also contributed to philosophy by the fact that he was a notable contestant in the controversy on Universals. Although his own doctrine in this matter was unstable, and William seemed confused about the whole question, he really helped towards a solution because he was regarded as a great and a learned man, and his interest in a question could not fail to bring it forcibly to the attention of subsequent philosophers. As a contemporary of St. Anselm, William suffers by comparison, for his worth in the development of philosophy is dwarfed by the power and influence of the great Archbishop of Canterbury.

The History of Philosophy associates with William of Champeaux two professors of philosophy at Paris, Adelard of Bath (early 12 century), and Walter of Mortagne (died 1174), who developed his indifference or non-difference theory in a manner that can be regarded as a step towards the doctrine of Moderate Realism.

d) ODO OF TOURNAI (died 1113).

Life: Odo (Otto, Odon) was a famous teacher at the Cathedral School of Tournai in the second half of the 11 century.

About 1093 he founded in Tournai the monastery of St. Martin, and was made its first Abbot. Afterwards he became Bishop of Cambrai. He was devoted in youth to the study of Plato, but upon reading an apologetic treatise of St. Augustine he abandoned his favorite study for theology. In his theology he makes quaint application of philosophical doctrine.

Works: Odo's chief work is a treatise *On Original Sin*.

Doctrine: Odo is an Ultra-Realist. Using Ultra-Realism in the explanation of the doctrine of Original Sin, he argues thus: The human race is one specific substance. At first, this substance was found in only two persons. They sinned, and being the whole human substance, this entire substance was vitiated by their sin. Hence Original Sin is transmitted by natural necessity to all human individuals. New births are not productions of new substances, but are merely new properties of the already existing human substance. Individual men differ only accidentally.

Remarks: Odo is regarded as one of the principal defenders of Ultra-Realism during the 11 and early 12 centuries. His contribution to the cause of Ultra-Realism is not found in the content of his written doctrine, but came of his wide influence as a teacher. Herman, Abbot of Tournai after Odo's death, declared in 1127 that "people seemed to abandon everything for the sake of studying philosophy" under Odo's direction. A name to remember as associated with the School of Odo is that of Hildebert of Lavardin.

e) PETER ABELARD (1079-1142).

Life: Abelard was born in Brittany, in the little town of Le Pallet near the city of Nantes. He studied under Roscelin at Compiègne, and under William of Champeaux at Paris. William's doctrine on Universals was not acceptable to Abelard, and he argued so successfully with his master that William confessed himself defeated. Only 22 at the time, Abelard was hailed as an invincible master of dialectic. He went

to study theology under Anselm of Laon (not the Archbishop and Saint of Canterbury) and then, in 1114, returned to Paris as Master of the Cathedral School. Here he was so famed, so admired, so attractive a teacher, that multitudes flocked to hear him and hung upon his words. Abelard, drunk with applause, declared himself the only philosopher of his time! He had an unfortunate and disgraceful affair with one Héloïse, and, as a result of it, was forced to leave Paris. In 1119 he entered the Benedictine monastery of St. Denis. He was summoned before the Council of Soissons in 1121, and made to retract his heterodox teachings on the Blessed Trinity. For a time he held the office of Abbot in one of the monasteries of his Order, but relinquished this, and went into retirement at a retreat called *Le Paraclet*. Between 1136 and 1140 he taught at the School of St. Genevieve in Paris, and here his old fame revived. He was still the zealous, hot-headed, impetuous philosopher, and his extravagances brought a second condemnation of certain of his doctrines by the Council of Sens in 1141. After this, Abelard definitively retired from public view. Peter the Venerable, Abbot of the great Benedictine Monastery of Cluny, received him, and he died a pious death in a priory of this monastery (St. Marcellus) in 1142.

Works: Of the many works of Abelard we mention the following: *Commentaries on the Logical Works of Aristotle and Porphyry*; *A Dialogue Between a Christian Philosopher and a Jew*; *Sic et Non* (i. e., Pros and Cons); *Christian Theology*; *Introduction to Theology*; an ethical work called *Scito Teipsum* ("Know thyself!"). The edited and inedited works of Abelard were collected and published in Paris during the late 19 century by Victor Cousin.

Doctrine: Abelard rightly maintains that dialectic (philosophical reasoning) is not worthless in the exposition of matters of Faith, but is, on the contrary, most useful for this service. Some critics call Abelard a *Rationalist*, declaring that he believed all mysteries of the Faith fully explicable by the use of

reason alone. But, although Abelard allowed his impetuosity to carry him into extravagances in expression, he nevertheless declares plainly that not all the truths of Faith can be investigated and explained by reason alone. He says, for example, in his *Introduction to Theology* (Book II, col. 1050) that the Unity of God, and the distinction of Persons in the Divine Trinity, are matters beyond the complete grasp of human understanding. Thus it is unfair to call Abelard a rationalist. It is true, however, that while asserting the value of reason in investigating revealed truth, he did not accurately trace the limits to which reason may go.

In Logic Abelard is to be classed as a Nominalist. He had for teachers Roscelin the Anti-Realist, and William of Champeaux the Ultra-Realist, and he heartily disagreed with both of them. He declared that substantial existence belongs to individuals and not to genera and species. But, even while he asserts that genera and species are more than names, he professes Nominalism, for he says that Universals signify *collections* of individuals; that the Universal is no more *one* than a people made up of many individuals is one. Thus he makes Universals only group names (mental names) of collections of individuals. True, he agrees with Moderate Realism inasmuch as he declares that nature in reality is individual and not universal; but all Anti-Realists profess as much. Professor De Wulf says that Abelard may justly be regarded as the founder of Moderate Realism, and that the doctors of the 13 century did little more than present a logical development of his doctrine. It is difficult to concur in this view, considering the fact that Abelard plainly confuses the Universal idea with the collective concept (cf. *Opera inedita d'Abelard*, by Cousin, p. 524). Still, in calling Abelard a Nominalist, we do not class him with the *Positivist* Nominalists of recent times, who reject the objective validity of our knowledge. Abelard certainly asserted the objective value of ideas. His doctrine is defective in its psychological aspect, wherein it accounts for

the genesis and character of the Universal itself. Nor is this a matter for wonder, for psychological processes were little studied in Abelard's day.

Abelard's metaphysical doctrine is concerned largely with the question of God's essence. He declares that the Divine Essence cannot be adequately conceived and defined since God is outside the categories. God is, in the highest sense, self-existent, but He is not to be called a "substance," for substance is susceptible of contraries, taking on the character and function of a supporting-subject for non-substances (i. e., accidents); and there can be no accidents in God. Therefore, all expressions we use to signify the Divine Attributes are but figures of speech, and are not to be taken literally, as though there could be a similitude between God and creatures. Abelard declares that creation was a *necessary* act on the part of God. For, he says, being is better than non-being, and creation is better than non-creation; and God is compelled by His infinite Goodness to choose the better course in all things. Thus God had to create. And by the same reasoning Abelard concludes that God had to make the world *the best world possible* (*optimism*).

Abelard was one of the very few 11 and 12 century philosophers who dealt expressly with matters of Ethics. He declares that God is the ultimate end of man. For man must strive for happiness, and God is the *object* the possession of which constitutes man in *subjective* happiness. God is to be possessed by knowledge and love. In his ethical work, *Scito Teipsum*, Abelard makes a distinction between *vice* and *sin* and between both of these and *evil action*. *Vice* is that which inclines us to evil, making us prone to sin; *sin* is contempt of God and consent to that which we know we are bound to avoid; *evil action* is the act and operation of sin; it is not sin itself, but the matter of sin. As to the Norm of Morality, Abelard has two opinions: (1) God's arbitrary decision marks off the limits of good and evil; (2) the intention of the agent

(i. e., the person acting) renders an act good or bad; acts being in themselves indifferent.

Remarks: We have listed Abelard as a Nominalist. Learned critics have called him a modified Nominalist, and even a Moderate Realist. In his *Metaphysics* he allows curious reasoning about the infinite God to lead him into extravagances, chief of which is his doctrine that God (the perfectly free) is forced by His Goodness to create, and to create the best world possible. God did not create the best world possible, for that would mean that infinite power and wisdom was *exhausted*, and that the illimitable was extended *to its limits*—an obvious contradiction. The world was suited perfectly at creation for the end for which God made it, and in that sense it is the best world. God was in no sense forced to create, but from eternity freely decreed to create. In *Ethics* Abelard proposes two Norms of Morality, neither of which is the true one. From eternity God's will, the Divine Reason (which is one with the Divine Essence), directed all creatures to their proper end, which is, ultimately, God Himself. The order thus constituted is not, to speak humanly, a whim on the part of God, not an arbitrary decision, but the result of infinitely perfect Reason. The Divine Reason determining from eternity the order of all things and of all activities, is the ultimate Norm of Morality; and that is *good* which harmonizes with this divine order, this "eternal law," while that which is out of agreement with it is *evil*. The second Norm of Morality proposed by Abelard is not the true one either; for the intention of the agent cannot make a good action out of that which is in itself (i. e., objectively) evil. Perhaps Abelard merely meant by his "intention-of-agent" theory that the external activity of man takes its morality from the will, i. e., from within; for it is the will that consents to evil before the external or rather the *subordinate* powers of mind or body carry the action into execution.

Abelard was unquestionably the foremost dialectician and

controversialist of his age. Yet he allowed himself to be carried by enthusiasm and impetuosity into subtleties and sophistries. Too obviously, Abelard was a man bent on winning an argument at any cost. We cannot admit that a man of his keen mind and swift reasoning was deceived by many of his own extravagances. Triumph and truth were, it seems, his object; and when the two could not be had together, Abelard would have triumph. Hence, with the undoubted abilities of this fiery man we must associate a certain levity and fickleness which balked the possibility of large and lasting achievement. There was no philosophical subject that he did not touch upon, just as there was none in which he sounded any depths. Still, he deserves a place of prominence in the History of Philosophy, for his very diffuseness, his swift and superficial flights over the whole field of philosophy, brought many a question to the attention of subsequent philosophers. And his very errors, championed with such burning zeal, aroused interest with opposition and moved the current of speculation to full and rapid flow.

f) THE SCHOOL OF CHARTRES.

The ancient city of Chartres, situated on the River Eure about fifty miles southwest of Paris, was the scene of great philosophical activity in the 12 century. The School there was founded by Fulbert of Chartres (died 1029). Its most famous teacher was Bernard of Chartres (died about 1130). Bernard propounded a Platonic explanation of Universals which makes him an out-and-out Ultra-Realist. His doctrine is but vaguely expressed in detail, but he seems to say that ideas are outside God and perhaps also outside the things which participate them. Generic and specific essences exist, and individuals are only *accidents* of a specific nature.

Bernard's opinions were adopted by many who attended the School, chief of whom was his younger brother Thierry or Theodoric of Chartres (died 1155). William of Conches

(about 1080–1154) was another prominent protagonist of Bernard's doctrine on Universals. These philosophers carried Bernard's Ultra-Realism to the verge of pantheism. Theodoric taught that the Divine Essence is in things, albeit not their formal cause; and William went so far as to make the Holy Ghost the form or soul of the world. William, however, afterwards abjured this heresy.

Thus the School of Chartres was ultra-realistic. Applying the doctrine of Ultra-Realism to God and the world, the members of this School reached erroneous and absurd conclusions. Still, the School helped materially to keep alive the controversy which was threshing out, slowly but surely, the true doctrine on Universals.

Of the School of Chartres, but not of its spirit, was the friend of Bernard and a professor at the School, the Anti-Realist, Gilbert de la Porrée. Gilbert approaches Moderate Realism in his doctrine on Universals. With Gilbert de la Porrée must be mentioned one who felt his influence in a marked degree, Otto of Freising (1114–1158), historian of philosophy, and popularizer of Aristotle's logical doctrine in Germany.

g) REMARKS.—In the present Article we have seen that the question of Universals was induced by the prominence of dialectical study and by the application of dialectic to matters of theology. Controversy on the subject divided philosophers into two main camps: that of the Realists (Ultra-Realists), and that of the Anti-Realists. At this time the Anti-Realists were not clearly distinguished as Moderate Realists, Conceptualists, and Nominalists; such classification of doctrines and doctrinaires came later. But in view of the classification we may retrospectively assign Bernard of Chartres to the Ultra-Realist class; call Anselm (with Adelard of Bath, Walter of Mortagne, and Gilbert de la Porrée) a Moderate Realist; and declare Abelard rather a Nominalist than a Moderate Realist.

The other philosophers of the Period of Development defy more accurate classification than that of Ultra-Realist or Anti-Realist.

The best mind of the Period, and the mind of most widespread and lasting influence, was that of St. Anselm. Perhaps Abelard, skimmer though he was, comes next in importance. The hesitant William of Champeaux may be listed after Abelard, for his influence was enormous, due to his wide reputation as a scholar and teacher. Roscelin, while notable, must not be overestimated; his actual influence was not so great or lasting as some historians seem to believe it to have been.

Article 2. Eclecticism, Mysticism, Pantheism; The Summarists

a) **ECCLECTICISM.** The controversy on Universals waged during the 11 and 12 centuries involved many philosophical problems more or less directly connected with the matter controverted. Philosophers began to give attention to these questions, and the scope of Medieval Philosophy widened in consequence. Still, no 12 century philosopher set out an orderly and systematic treatise on the whole of philosophy. Some developed *eclectic* systems, i. e., loosely constructed philosophies pieced out with bits of Greek philosophy, Patristic doctrines, and teachings of preceding Scholastics. Some of the Eclectics wrote *Books of Sentences* or summaries of doctrine, mainly theological. Of these we shall speak in a special paragraph as Summarists. Here we deal with the Eclectics who did not write such summaries, and whose doctrine is an agglomeration of elements borrowed from different sources plus some reasonings of their own.

The chief Eclectics of this period were:

i. John of Salisbury (about 1115-1180), who studied under Abelard in Paris. He became Bishop of Chartres in 1176. Of his writings we mention *Polycraticus* and *Metalogicus*, works

which show, respectively, the value of Christian culture and the usefulness of Logic.

ii. Isaac de Stella (died 1169), an Englishman, and a monk of Clairvaux. He became Abbot of the monastery of Stella. He wrote a treatise on the soul.

iii. Alcherus, a monk of Clairvaux in the mid-12 century. He wrote on psychological questions.

iv. Alan of Lille (Alanus ab Insulis) (about 1128-1202), was a teacher in the Schools at Paris in the mid-12 century. He was known as "The Universal Doctor." He wrote several theological and philosophical treatises.

The Eclectics, especially John of Salisbury and Alan of Lille, investigated the nature and functions of dialectic. Dialectic was used (and abused) in the war over Universals which waxed more bitter after Abelard than it had been before. Excessive importance was attached to dialectic, and many philosophers wasted time and energy in discussing logical rules in every aspect, working out the exact sense of unimportant terms, making fine and useless distinctions and subdistinctions, and in other minor bickerings, instead of getting at matters of importance. Not a few, wearied of the dialectic skirmishing, declared Logic valueless for scientific investigation. Against these John of Salisbury directed a somewhat vehement attack in the prologue of his *Metaphysics*, and in the body of the same work he vindicated the usefulness of Logic or Dialectic, borrowing mostly from Aristotle and Porphyry in developing his argument. Alan of Lille exemplified the proper use of syllogistic reasoning in his writings, thus giving practical proof of the usefulness of dialectic.

In *Metaphysics*, John of Salisbury discusses the question of Universals and declares that Universals have universality in the mind, although nature is singular in the world of extra-mental reality. This is Moderate Realism. Yet John does not recommend this doctrine as the *truer* theory, but as the more *convenient*, because it squares better with the requirements of

philosophical study. Alan of Lille treats, in his *Metaphysics*, of the Essence and Existence of God, and of the creation of the universe out of nothing, drawing largely from Aristotle in framing his principles.

In Psychology the Eclectics made more headway than other philosophers of the 12 century. They use apt and conclusive arguments for the spirituality and immortality of the soul. They show that the soul has a knowing faculty (intellect) which apprehends spiritual things and knows material things in an immaterial manner; and they argue that such a faculty can belong only to a spiritual substance. From the spirituality of the soul they deduce its immortality. In dealing with the nature of human knowledge, they distinguish sense-knowledge (sensation) and intellectual knowledge and declare that the elements of intellectual knowledge (ideas) are formed by the intellect by abstraction from sense experiences or findings. They are, therefore, Moderate Realists, yet fail to share this character perfectly because they do not explain the manner in which intellectual abstraction takes place. They assert that the union of soul and body is natural in man, and is ordained for the good of the soul; yet they are not entirely free from Platonic dualism (i. e., the belief that the union of soul and body is accidental and not substantial). They rightly teach, however, that the soul does not exist before the body, but is created at the moment it is infused.

b) **MYSTICISM.** Mysticism trains the soul to seek and achieve union with God. Heterodox Mysticism asserts the possibility of being united with God, or assimilated unto God, by the power of intellect and will. Orthodox Mysticism admits that the perfect union with God is attained only in Heaven, where the Beatific Vision is eternally contemplated and possessed by the soul's faculties fortified by the gift called the Light of Glory; but it seeks to cultivate the greater knowledge and love of God on the part of men on earth; it seeks

to make men realize God's presence everywhere, and to have men make their wills one with the will of God in all things. Thus Orthodox Mysticism amounts merely to true Christian culture of soul. But the Mystic, being a fallible man, is very apt to regard as useless—or even to condemn as a sinful distraction—any attention to secular studies or the development of rational science. Philosophy suffered something from such extravagances of Mystics in the 12 century. On the other hand, philosophy profited by the mysticism of the period; for the mystical movement served to check the wild cultivation of dialectic which was spoiling the proper development of true speculation. Some of the Mystics, notably St. Bernard, made invaluable contributions to theological literature. The following Mystics were the most important of their School in the 12 century. It is to be noted that they admitted the use of philosophy in so far as it can be made the preamble of the mystical life. Most of them even acknowledge that dialectic has its proper, if minor, uses. Walter of St. Victor, however, regards dialectic as the devil's own art.

i. St. Bernard of Clairvaux (1091–1153) was a monk of the Cistercian Order. He was made Abbot of the Monastery of his community at Clairvaux. He strenuously opposed heretical doctrines, and stood firmly against the abuse of dialectic which was a characteristic of the philosophy of his time. He is known in History as *Doctor Mellifluus*,—Doctor of Sweetness.

ii. Hugh of St. Victor (1096–1141) was born in Saxony. He entered Religion at the Abbey of St. Victor in Paris, and taught there for the last sixteen years of his life. It will be remembered that it was in this Benedictine Monastery that William of Champeaux founded his School after his defeat at the hands of his fiery pupil, Abelard. The School became very famous under Hugh. He wrote many works of mystical theology.

iii. Richard of St. Victor (died 1175) was a monk of the

Abbey of St. Victor, and a pupil of Hugh. Like his master he composed many mystical writings.

iv. Walter of St. Victor, pupil of Richard, wrote a denunciation of Abelard, Peter Lombard, Peter of Poitiers, and Gilbert de la Porrée, calling them heretics, accusing them of treating with levity and with labyrinthine subtlety the sacred Mysteries of Faith. He calls these four men "The Four Labyrinths of France." Dialectic he denounces as the devil's art.

c) PANTHEISM.—Pantheism is that doctrine which identifies God with the world. Its chief forms are: (1) *Emanationism*, which teaches that all things come from God as the rays come from a candle-light, or the stream from its source; (2) *Phenomenalism* makes God reside in the universe as a kind of world-soul, and accounts for all individual things and happenings as the manifestations or phenomena of God, just as a wave is a manifestation of water, or wind a manifestation of air, or a smile a phenomenon and manifestation upon the face of a man; (3) *Idealistic pantheism*, which makes God an abstract, indefinite, and unconscious Being, slowly defining Himself and reaching concreteness by becoming aware of Himself in individual things. Pantheism, in so far as it makes all things *one*, may be called *monism*.

The Pantheism of the 12 century is traced to several concurring causes or reasons: blundering and excessive Mysticism which seeks literal union of the self with God, thus identifying man and God; a revival of the doctrine of Erigena on the "Four Natures," which is itself mystical pantheism; logical development of the theory of Ultra-Realism into its proper consequences and sequelæ. The three notable 12 century Pantheists mentioned here were all trained in the ultra-realistic School of Chartres:

i. Bernard of Tours (mid-12 century) wrote a treatise on the totality of the world (*De Universitate Mundi*) in which he

professes pantheistic monism borrowed and adapted from Erigena.

ii. Amalric of Chartres, also called Amaury of Bène, (second half of 12 century) was a teacher of theology in Paris, where he was condemned for teaching heresy. He identifies Creator and creature.

iii. David of Dinant (later 12 century) taught that all things are substantially one. In particular he identifies God and Prime Matter. Then he makes three classifications of being: eternal substances, souls, bodies: but he says that these are essentially one. David was a student of Erigena's doctrine, and of the contemporary Arabian philosophy of which we have yet to speak. David wrote a work, *De Tomis*, which was condemned in a council held at Paris in 1210.

d) THE SUMMARISTS.—In the 12 century, *Books of Sentences* or summaries of theology (and, incidentally, of philosophy) began to appear. For nearly four centuries the Revival of Learning had gone on, and the need was felt of reducing to order and synthesis the fruits of its effort. Besides, there was need of a text for students of theology, and even philosophy—these sciences not being divided by a clear line of distinction. These two reasons account for the writing of the Books of Sentences (*Libri Sententiarum*).

The method used in the Books of Sentences was that employed by Abelard in his *Sic et Non*, or Pros and Cons of various questions. A determinate thesis was set, and arguments for and against it were proposed. Such arguments were drawn both from reason and from authority. Sometimes, but not always, a conclusion was reached and a solution set out after the weighing of arguments pro and con.

Christian theology as a science is found, in general outline, in these summaries. Philosophy has a part in them in so far as it helps to explain matters of Faith by determining the laws of valid reasoning, indicating methods of research, etc.

The chief summarists were :

i. Peter the Lombard (died 1164), a native of Lombardy, who studied in France. He was ordained priest and afterwards taught theology at Paris. About 1159 he was made Bishop of Paris. He wrote four Books of Sentences. In the first he treats of God, His Unity and Trinity; in the second book he treats of creation, of angels, of man, of original sin; in the third book he treats of the virtues, and in the fourth of the Sacraments. Peter was the most notable of the Summarists, and is known as "The Master of Sentences." As a philosopher he is an Eclectic, and when he requires philosophical argument he takes it where he finds it with charming indifference as to the source; nor does he concern himself with the task of harmonizing the contradictory philosophical doctrines that are found scattered through his works. But as a theologian, Peter Lombard was the first of his time; his was an enduring fame; and almost innumerable commentaries were written in subsequent years on his Books of Sentences. Peter deserved his fame, for he was the first to compose a systematic and approximately complete treatise on theological questions.

ii. Peter of Poitiers (died 1205), master of theology at Paris, who wrote five Books of Sentences in imitation of Peter Lombard.

iii. Gandulph of Bologna (mid-12 century), who wrote a Book of Sentences in which he summarized the four books of Peter Lombard.

Remarks: A positive service was rendered to philosophy by the Eclectics, who came close to Moderate Realism and advanced in psychological study. Such service was also given by the Summarists, inasmuch as they gave to their age a practical exemplification of the value of system, order, and synthesis—matters required by the philosopher above all others. The Pantheists and Mystics, especially the extravagant and partially

heterodox Mystics, rendered philosophy a negative service by the fact that they aroused a healthy opposition to their doctrines which carried forward the efforts and achievements of saner philosophers.

Article 3. Arabian and Jewish Philosophy of the Period

a) Arabian Philosophy;

b) Jewish Philosophy.

a) ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The Arabians, who are probably of Semitic origin, were made a united power by the religion of Islam which they adopted in the early 7 century. They achieved prominence as a nation, and founded kingdoms on three continents. Important in the History of Philosophy is the Arabian establishment in Spain.

The Arabians made notable achievements in the domain of literature, and especially in poetry. In medicine, too, they were leaders, and *The Canons of Medicine*, a work by Ibn-Sina (Avicenna), was for many years the standard, and indeed the only, text-book of medicine. Progress was made in the natural sciences by Arabian scholars; and they developed a great body of theological speculation based on their sacred book, *Al Koran*. Their philosophy was largely Greek. They possessed translations of the works of Aristotle (made, not from the original, but from Syriac translations) and of Porphyry and other commentators on the Stagirite, who interpolated his teachings with Neoplatonic doctrines. It may be a fair characterization of the Arabian Philosophy to say that it is Aristotelean in form, but largely Neoplatonic in character.

The Arab Philosophy flourished in the Orient and later in Spain. Its period of greatest vigor extended from the 9 to the 12 century. Two causes may be assigned for its disappearance: (1) determined opposition on the part of the lay-Arabs, who

regarded philosophy as subversive of the doctrines of the sacred Koran; (2) the crushing of the Arab (Moorish) power in Spain in the 12 century.

The chief Arabian philosophers may be divided into two groups, the first of which flourished in the Orient, and the second in Spain.

(1) *Arabian Philosophers in the Orient were:*

i. An-Nazzam (mid-9 century), who was the first Arabian philosopher of note.

ii. Al-Kindi (mid-9 century), who was a famous student of philosophy in Bagdad.

iii. Al-Farabi (10 century), who studied in Bagdad under a certain John, a Christian. Al-Farabi wrote commentaries on Aristotle's works. He was held in high repute by the Scholastics.

iv. Ibn-Sina (Avicenna) (980-1037), who was born of Persian parents in Bokhara. He practised medicine in Bagdad, and also taught philosophy there. He was a man of splendid talent. He died in prison, whither he had been sent for conspiring against some local chieftain. He wrote the famous *Canons of Medicine*, and, in the domain of philosophy, he wrote on Logic, on the soul, and *First Philosophy*.

v. Al-Gazali (Algazel) (1058-1111), who was called "The Light and Pillar of Islam" because of his work in defending the orthodox doctrines of Mohammedanism.

(2) *Arabian Philosophers in Spain were:*

i. Ibn-Tophail (Abubacer; died 1185), who was a celebrated physician, mathematician, and philosopher. He wrote a book on the life of a man segregated from society, dealing especially with the development of the cognitive and appetitive life of such an individual.

ii. Ibn-Badscha (Avempace) (died 1138), who spent the

later years of his life at Granada. He wrote a work on the intellect in man.

iii. Ibn-Roschd (Averroes) (died 1198), who was born at Cordova of distinguished Andalusian parents. He was a man of great talent, and was well versed in the liberal arts. He was accused of plotting against Islam, and was exiled to Morocco, where he died. He was the last great Arabian philosopher in Spain. His influence was felt throughout the 13 century among the Scholastics of the Golden Age. He wrote on the happiness of the soul; on the connection of the "abstract intellect" with man; on the substance of the world; and composed three commentaries on Aristotle.

The origin of ideas was a subject much discussed by the Arabians. They held the strange doctrine that there is an active intellect subsisting in itself and common, in its functions, to all men. Aristotle had taught that man's intellect has an active and a "passive" function: the active intellect abstracts the *intelligible species* (abstracted mental representation of the essence) from sense findings, and impresses this upon the passive intellect, which reacts to the impression and expresses the *idea*. Now the Arabs did not admit an active function in the intellect of each individual man. Individual intellect, they said, is only passive. The active intellect which abstracts the *intelligible species* is one, self-subsistent, and common to all—or rather, communicates its function to all. This "abstract intellect" furnishes intelligible species to individual men upon the occasion of their sensation, and thus they are enabled to *express* ideas by their personal and individual passive intellect. Thus far Avicenna and his followers. But Averroes taught that the "abstract intellect" is *both active and passive*; and limited the mental possession of individual men to the fancy, or imagination-faculty, whereby they form sense-images of things. The general abstract intellect gets its materials from the sensa-

tions of men, renders them *intelligible* (suitable to be grasped by the understanding), and re-impresses them upon the minds of individuals as *ideas*. Upon this doctrine Averroes bases his proof that individual immortality of souls is impossible, since everything in individual men (including the material faculty of imagination) is material and must perish. But he teaches the contrary in his theological writings based on the Koran. Here we find in Averroes himself the origin of that later doctrine of a *twofold truth*, taught by the Averroists of the 13 century.

In Metaphysics, the Arabians are fairly Aristotelean except in the matter of the origin of things. The range of entities, they teach, is like a ladder. On the top rung is God, the Perfect Intelligence, the Absolute Good. On the bottom rung of the ladder of being is Prime Matter. Between the two is a series of intelligences, descendingly imperfect, the lowest intelligence being that which (as we saw above) is common to all men. This intellect (*agens*) not only puts intelligible species into human minds, but impresses forms in Prime Matter and so constitutes the universe of real genera and species. Now, whence came the intelligences that hold the intermediate position between God and Prime Matter? Arabian philosophy furnishes a sufficiently complex answer to this question, but, ultimately, it amounts to this: the intelligences *emanated* from God (*pantheism*). Some Arabian philosophers teach that Prime Matter also emanated from God. Averroes denies this doctrine, and declares that Prime Matter is eternal and self-existing, and in its nature opposed to God. God did not act upon Prime Matter through the medium of intelligences *in time*, but from eternity. Averroes feels that creation *in time* would mean mutability in the immutable God. Hence, the emanated intelligences, the forms these impress in matter, and Prime Matter itself are all eternal, and their mutual relations and activities are also from eternity.

Remarks: This doctrine of the origin of things is obviously

false. It falsely supposes the impossibility of creation from nothing. It falsely postulates the eternity of the world. It falsely implies that God needs secondary causes in His action upon the world. It falsely supposes that creation in time would mean a change in God.

b) JEWISH PHILOSOPHY.

After the dispersion of the Jewish race, learned Hebrews devoted themselves to the study of Old Testament Scripture, and, if they philosophized at all, they followed their great Philo of Alexandria. Between Philo (1 century) and the 10 century there was no outstanding Jewish philosopher. But the History of Philosophy must mention some Hebrews of the 10, 11, and 12 centuries. These lived among the Arabians of the East or in Spain, and show Arabian influence in their doctrines. The chief Jewish philosophers of the period were:

i. Saadias (about 892-942), who was born in Egypt. He wrote a philosophical treatise dealing with Old Testament truths.

ii. Solomon Ibn Gebirol (called Avicebron or Avicebrol) (1020-1070), who was born at Malaga. His work, *The Fount of Life*, had considerable fame among the Scholastics.

iii. Moses Maimonides (1135-1204), who lived in Egypt and Palestine. He wrote a *Guide for the Perplexed*, designed to confirm the Faith of those racked by doubts.

The doctrine of these Jewish philosophers, like that of the Arabians, is a commingling of Aristoteleanism and Neoplatonism. Avicebron follows the Arabians in his doctrine of a universal soul emanating from God. This world-soul, consisting of matter and form, produced forms both spiritual and bodily. The world-soul itself interpenetrates everything. Maimonides remained unaffected, for the most part, by Arabian influence. He treats skilfully of the nature of God, of creation, and of the Divine Law. He errs, however, in asserting that we cannot make even a distinction of reason among the

attributes of God because of the Divine Simplicity (i. e., indivisibility). He declares creation from nothing as a revealed truth, and says rational science is powerless to prove such creation impossible. In treating of the Divine Law, Maimonides introduces the subject of freedom in man and the origin of evil. He rightly teaches that the human will is free, and that sin is to be ascribed to the freely willing sinner, and is in no sense necessitated.

Here we must mention the Greek philosophers of the 9 and succeeding centuries, who settled in Constantinople after being banished from Athens by the Edict of Justinian (529). These philosophers are sometimes grouped into what is called the Byzantine School, a name which derives from the ancient *Byzantium*, later called Constantinople. Byzantine philosophers of the 9 century were Michael Psellus, the Elder; and Photius. 10 century: Suidas, Arethas, and Nicetas. 11 century: Michael Psellus, the Younger. 12 century: Michael Ephesius, Joannes Italus, and Anna Comnena, daughter of the Emperor Alexis. 13 century: Nicephorus Blemmydes, and George Pachymeres.

From the Byzantines in the early 13 century, the Scholastics of Western Europe received the original and complete works of Aristotle which they had known hitherto only in imperfect and interpolated Arabic translations of Syriac versions.

CHAPTER III

THE PERFECTION OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

(1200-1300)

During the 13 century Scholasticism had the field of Philosophy practically to itself. There was no notable achievement in philosophy among the Orientals of the time: the Jews and Arabians had no great philosophers after Maimonides and Averroes. Nor had the Greeks of the period more than one or two philosophers of minor importance. There were, indeed, anti-Scholastics in Western Europe, but Scholastic Philosophy so far surpassed all contemporary systems in vigor and perfection that it dominated the age.

In this period Scholastic Philosophy passed through its ultimate stages of intrinsic development and achieved perfection. The speculation of centuries preceding the 13 had advanced from a very limited attempt to set forth the truths of Faith in philosophic fashion to a system of philosophy that pushed rational inquiry to the utmost limit in every branch of the science. During the same period of formation and development attempts had been made again and again to mark off the proper limits of philosophy as distinct from theology. This widening of scope and this persistent effort to define the field of philosophy bore fruit in the 13 century. The limits of philosophy and theology were accurately determined; the relations of these sciences were clearly established; complete and coherent treatises on philosophy were written.

The chief Scholastics of this Period of Perfection agreed in fundamental principles and leading doctrines; hence we rightly say that Scholastic Philosophy is *one* philosophy. Yet each

of the more celebrated masters of the time added his own speculations to the doctrines commonly received by all, and so we distinguish *various systems* of Scholastic Philosophy. Again, all important questions of philosophy were investigated and resolved by the great masters of the 13 century, and so we say that Scholastic Philosophy is *complete*. These, then, are the characteristics of Scholastic Philosophy in the age of its perfection: essentially *one*, yet accidentally *diversified*, and *complete*.

The philosophical works of Aristotle, which came into the possession of Western Europeans through translations held by the Arabs and Jews, exercised a great influence on Scholasticism. Aristotle was admired by all philosophers of this time, and followed by most, although some clung to certain Platonic doctrines which they held as a heritage from Augustine and Anselm. Accordingly, the Scholastics of the age may be divided into two camps, the *Aristotelean* and the *Platonic*. The chief Aristoteleans were Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus. The most notable Platonians were William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, and St. Bonaventure.

This Chapter is divided into two articles:

Article 1. Causes Which Contributed to the Perfecting of Scholasticism in the 13 century.

Article 2. The Great Philosophers of the Age of Perfection.

Article 1. The Causes Which Contributed to the Perfecting of Scholasticism in the thirteenth Century

The perfection achieved by Scholastic Philosophy in the 13 century may be traced to four causes:

a) The state of Scholasticism itself at the beginning of this century;

- b) The diffusion in Western Europe of the works of Orientals;
- c) The rise of the universities, especially that of Paris;
- d) The institution of the Mendicant Orders.

a) THE STATE OF SCHOLASTICISM AT THE BEGINNING OF THE 13 CENTURY. Speculation was strongly astir in the 12 century, particularly after St. Anselm and Abelard had applied the *rational method* of treatment to philosophical and theological questions. Orderly summaries of theology were made. Much progress was also made in philosophy: the great question of the nature of Universals came near its right solution (Moderate Realism) at the end of the 12 century; and many questions of Logic, Cosmology, and General Metaphysics had been thoroughly investigated. Still, no one had succeeded in editing a satisfactory summary of philosophy as distinct from theology. Thus, at the beginning of the 13 century, philosophy lacked an orderly synthesis. But, as it really treated of most of the important questions in its field, it was ripe for such a synthesis. In other words, the body of Scholastic doctrines had been so far formulated in the 12 century that the genius of the new age could complete them and set them forth in a systematic exposition.

b) THE DIFFUSION IN WESTERN EUROPE OF THE WORKS OF ORIENTALS. During the Middle Ages the Christian princes of Western Europe had to wage continual war against the Mohammedans, who had set their hearts on winning all Europe to Islam. In the 9 century the Arabs (Mohammedans) had almost complete control of Spain, and held secure footing also in Italy and Sicily. In the 10 century the Christian rulers joined forces against the common foe, and expelled the Mohammedans from Italy. Sicily was freed of the infidel incubus in the 11 century. Meanwhile the people of Spain had begun to

prevail against the forces of Islam, and at the beginning of the 13 century the dominion of the Arabs in Spain was limited to the little kingdom of Granada.

The long contact with infidels brought to Europeans a knowledge of Oriental philosophy and religion. Islamism had no proper philosophy of its own. We have seen, in our account of Arabian philosophy, that these Orientals took the doctrines of Aristotle (which they possessed in faulty and interpolated translation) as the basis of their own speculations. The quasi-Aristotelean philosophy which the Europeans learned from the Arabs exerted a strong influence upon their own speculation, and—since that philosophy had been warped out of character to be the rational support of Islamism—this influence was not only a menace to sound philosophical culture, but also to the purity of Christian Faith. The Christian doctors of the time gave themselves earnestly to the study of the Arab philosophy that they might combat heretical theology and philosophy upon strictly rational grounds. Thus speculative effort was stimulated. In consequence, then, of the new (if faulty) knowledge of Aristotle, and of the strong energy in speculation, Scholastic Philosophy progressed mightily towards perfection.

In passing, it is to be noted here that even the untrustworthy and interpolated translations of Aristotle were of great value to Scholasticism. However, the Neoplatonic and Arabian doctrines which were interlarded with those of the Stagirite in the available translations, led many serious philosophers to condemn Aristotle himself. The Provincial Council of Paris condemned Aristotle's *Physics* and the Moorish commentaries thereon in 1209. In 1225 the study of Aristotle's metaphysics was prohibited in the University of Paris. But when reliable translations of Aristotle were made from the original text, these condemnations and prohibitions were removed; and in 1255 the University of Paris prescribed the very works it had prohibited thirty years earlier. Direct translations of Aristotle

were begun in 1220; but the translation made by William of Moerbeke in 1260 was long considered the best, and was used for many years in preference to all others.

c) THE RISE OF THE UNIVERSITIES. At the beginning of the 13 century the masters and pupils of all the Schools of Paris formed a league or confederation called *The University of Masters and Scholars*. Little by little this federated body was drawn into four distinct branches according to the different studies followed by the members, viz., Theology, Philosophy or Arts, Law, and Medicine. In the department of the students and masters of Philosophy other groups were formed on a basis of nationality, and these groups were the so-called *nationes*. At the head of the *nationes* was the Rector. The head of the whole University was at first the Chancellor of the Cathedral of Paris, but his place was taken in the 14 century by the Rector of the Philosophy Department. The University of Paris, formed gradually in the manner described, was the model for the formation of many others throughout Europe. But during the Middle Ages the University of Paris excelled all rivals, and in it the most celebrated of the Scholastics achieved renown.

The founding of the Universities, especially that of Paris, aroused a mighty interest in scientific and specialized learning, stirred deep the intellectual currents of Western Europe, and caused Scholasticism to emerge in perfected form.

d) THE INSTITUTION OF THE MENDICANT RELIGIOUS ORDERS. The Religious Orders of St. Francis of Assisi and St. Dominic were founded to root out the evil effects that had come upon Europeans as a result of contact with the infidels. The members of these Orders lived penitential lives, begged their bread from door to door (Mendicants), and preached whenever and wherever they could get a hearing. They won many thousands back to pious Catholic life. But,

finding that they had often to argue points of doctrine with persons learned in infidel philosophy, the monks set themselves at the task of mastering rational science. Soon indeed the Religious of the Franciscan and Dominican Communities were famed as men of profound learning. They secured chairs in the University of Paris, and so wide was their influence and so great their ability that by 1257 the fate of Scholastic Philosophy was practically in their hands. The Cistercians, the Hermits of St. Augustine, and the Carmelites were also factors in the development of Scholasticism, and each of these orders had representation among the teachers in the University of Paris.

The Religious Orders—families that do not die out, bodies that keep traditions intact—gave a solidity and permanence to the notable achievements of the Scholastics that could not have been attained by other agencies. Hence theirs is a notable share in the work of perfecting Scholastic Philosophy.

To sum up: Scholastic Philosophy had been developed in a somewhat diffuse and vagrant fashion during centuries preceding the 13, and the beginning of this century found it ripe for ordering and synthesis. The knowledge of Aristotle—cultivated by Europeans for the purpose of enabling them to meet the Oriental infidels on their own ground—occasioned an earnest and broad speculative movement at the beginning of the 13 century, from which came the ultimate development and organization of Scholasticism. This movement was furthered by the founding of Universities, and by the institution of Religious Orders, those armies of God which assembled under religious discipline to save men's souls through a profound knowledge of the divine science and of its handmaid, philosophy. All these concurring causes contributed to the advancement and perfection of Scholasticism. One thing more was needed, and it was not lacking. This was the "power of the man" which had to be united with the "power of the moment"

(already described above) in order that lasting achievement might be won. Splendid minds, extraordinary talents, met at the flood the current which set, in the 13 century, in the direction of science, and especially of philosophy. Great genius wedded to great opportunity assured by the concurrence of four notable causes, brought Scholastic Philosophy to the peak of perfection. The great philosophers of the time are discussed in the article which follows.

Article 2. The Great Philosophers of the Age of Perfection

The most important philosophers of the Age of Perfection of Scholasticism were:

- a) WILLIAM OF AUVERGNE (died 1249).
 - b) Alexander of Hales (died 1245) *Doctor Irrefragabilis*;
 - c) St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) *Doctor Seraphicus*;
 - d) Roger Bacon (1214-1292/94) *Doctor Mirabilis*;
 - e) Albert the Great (1193-1280) *Doctor Universalis*;
 - f) St. Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) *Doctor Angelicus*;
 - g) Henry of Ghent (died 1293) *Doctor Solemnis*;
 - h) John Duns Scotus (1266/70-1308) *Doctor Subtilis*;
 - i) Raymond Lully (1234-1315) *Doctor Illuminatus*.
- a) WILLIAM OF AUVERGNE (died 1249)

Life: William was born near the end of the 12 century at Aurillac, a town of France about 275 miles south of Paris. He was one of the more celebrated Masters of the University of Paris. From 1228 until his death in 1249 he was Bishop of Paris, and for this reason he is sometimes called William of Paris.

Works: He wrote *On the Trinity*; *On the Soul*; *On the Immortality of the Soul*; and *On the Universe*.

Doctrine: William is a Platonic Scholastic, but not a thorough-going one, for he rejects Plato's doctrine of the pre-

existence of souls and of innate ideas. He also rejects Aristotle's doctrine on the origin of ideas, viz., that the active intellect (*intellectus agens*) abstracts the intelligible essence or species of things from *phantasms* or images in the imagination derived from sensation, and impresses this species (*species impressa*) upon the passive intellect (*intellectus possibilis*), which reacts to the impression by expressing the idea (*species expressa*). William declares that the soul needs no faculty distinct from itself to form species and hence rejects the active intellect. He declares that the soul forms ideas in itself, granted that ideas of *bodily things* come somehow through the action of the senses. The knowledge of what are called *first principles* (that is, *self-evident truths*, like the truth of one's own existence, of one's capacity to reason rightly, and of the Principle of Contradiction) comes, he says, by special illumination of the intellect from God.

In metaphysics William proves the existence of one Infinite God, the sole efficient cause of the world. Creatures are distinct from God, and, although God knows them all in Himself from eternity, their actual creation took place in time. Spiritual creatures are *pure forms*, but bodies are made of *matter and form*. In all this William is correct; but he wrongly teaches that bodies have as many *substantial forms* as they have distinct perfections. William was the first to distinguish the *essence* and *existence* of actual created things.

In Psychology William teaches that soul and body in man are substantially united; but his illustrations are *dualistic* (hence Platonic), for he compares the relation of soul and body to that of the harpist and his harp.

Remarks: William of Auvergne is called the "First Great Scholastic." He was a man of clear thought, and he expressed himself through the medium of a vigorous style. He did not regard himself as a philosopher, but as an apologist whose task was to show the unbeliever the reasonableness of the

Catholic Faith. While there are traces of Platonism in his work, it is Aristotelean at base, and one critic says of him, "In more than one question he is *Thomist* by anticipation." For all that, he is usually listed with Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure as a Platonic Scholastic.

b) ALEXANDER OF HALES (died 1245), "*Doctor Irrefragabilis*."

Life: Alexander was born at Hales, in Gloucestershire, England, between 1170 and 1180. He studied philosophy and theology in Paris, and became a teacher of the latter science in the University. While holding this professorship he joined the Franciscan Order, and continued with his work of teaching after his religious profession. He was the first Franciscan to hold a chair in the University of Paris.

Works: His chief and perhaps only work is a general compendium of theology, called *Summa Universae Theologiae*. This work is framed on the order of Peter Lombard's *Sentences*; and incidentally discusses many questions of philosophy.

Doctrine: In theology Alexander rightly teaches that God is pure actuality, the sum-total of all perfections actually realized without limit, and having no potency or capacity for receiving further perfection (*Actus Purus*). But he mistakenly adds that we can have no knowledge of the nature of God, although we can prove His existence: we know *that* God is, not *what* He is. Creatures are made by God. *All* creatures, even spirits, are composed not only of existence and essence, but also of matter and form. Like William of Auvergne, Alexander admits a plurality of substantial forms in the same *matter*.

In Epistemology (Theory of Knowledge) he holds that universal ideas of *bodily* things are formed by abstraction from sensations in the faculty of *reason*. Besides *reason*, man has two other soul-faculties, viz., *intellect*, by which he under-

stands spiritual substances, and *intelligence*, by which he understands *first principles*. For the functioning of *intellect* and *intelligence* a special divine illumination is required; but this is not needed for the ideas which *reason* abstracts from sense data—the natural power of sense and reason being sufficient here.

In Psychology Alexander stresses the independence of body and soul at the expense of man's composite unity; but he does not teach thorough-going *dualism* (i. e., mere *accidental* union of soul and body.) He teaches not only the existence of the soul, but also its essential properties, its immateriality and indivisibility.

Remarks: In his *Summa* Alexander notably developed the Scholastic Method. His influence upon his great pupil, Bonaventure, was another service rendered to philosophy. We notice in his doctrine a Moderate Realism of a peculiarly limited or qualified sort. We notice also that the "divine illumination" theory in knowledge (a heritage from St. Augustine) appears as it does in the doctrine of William of Auvergne.

With Alexander, the History of Philosophy associates his Franciscan successor in the Chair of the Order in the University of Paris, viz., John de la Rochelle (Joannes de Rupella; 1200–1254). John agrees in the main with Alexander, but he denies that spirits are composed of matter and form. He makes *intelligible species* (i. e., abstracted essential representations which are intellectually grasped and expressed as *ideas*) merely spiritualized imagination-images or *phantasms*. John de la Rochelle established more thoroughly than any other Scholastic of the period, the *real distinction* between existence and essence in creatures.

Alexander of Hales and John de la Rochelle were the most potent influences in the intellectual formation of Robert Grosseteste, great Franciscan master of philosophy in the University of Oxford. Grosseteste was born about 1175. He died as Bishop of Lincoln in England about 1250.

c) SAINT BONAVENTURE (1221-1274), "*Doctor Seraphicus*."

Life: Bonaventure was the religious name of John Fidanza, who was born in the Italian city of Bagnorea, in Tuscany. He came to Paris as a youth, entered the Franciscan Order at the age of seventeen, and studied under Alexander of Hales and John de la Rochelle at the University. There he succeeded John as Franciscan Master. He was afterwards made General of his Order, and then became Cardinal-Bishop of Albano, a suburban see in the Province of Rome. In 1274 he was called by Gregory X to the Council of Lyons, and died during its progress. His cherished friend and companion in the University of Paris, the great Dominican, Thomas Aquinas, died the same year while on his way to attend the same Council.

Works: Bonaventure wrote *Commentaries on the Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard*; *Debated Questions*; *The Breviloquium*, an abridged summa; *The Journey of the Soul unto God*; and a classification of human knowledge called *The Relation of Arts to Theology*.

Doctrine: St. Bonaventure was the chief mystical theologian of the 13 century and merits a place in the History of Philosophy as one of the principal scientific philosophers of his age. He is listed as a Platonic Scholastic, and this for several reasons: (1) he wished to preserve the traditions of his Order, which were Augustinian and Platonic without being anti-Aristotelean; (2) he had studied in an age and in a School (Franciscan) in which Plato and not Aristotle was the chief authority; (3) Bonaventure was a man of mystical mind, a type that turns more readily to the poetic beauties of Plato than to the clear, cold intellectualism of Aristotle.

In *Metaphysics* Bonaventure proves the existence of God (1) from the fact that the reflecting soul feels God's presence; (2) from the changeless nature of truth which is grasped by our changeable and changing faculties; and (3) from the

works of creation which proclaim their Maker. Bonaventure admits the Ontological Argument of St. Anselm as valid under certain limitations. He declares that the world has not been created *ab aeterno*.

Bonaventure makes *matter* synonymous with *potency*, and *form* with *actuality* (act). All finite being is distinct from God, and individual creatures are distinct from one another. All creatures, bodily and spiritual, are composed of matter and form. Bonaventure teaches the "plurality of substantial forms," a doctrine which maintains that, in addition to the substantial form which completes the being of a substance, there are subordinate substantial forms. The *Principle of Individuation* (i. e., that whereby individuals of the same species are distinguished one from another) is both *matter and form*. Prime Matter is potency, but not *pure* potency, indifferent to forms; it has an actual being of its own. In Prime Matter (and in every potential thing) there is a sort of germ or inner energy which coöperates with external agents in working substantial change; and this germ-force is called the *ratio seminalis*. This doctrine of St. Bonaventure is an extension of the "ratio seminalis" theory of Saint Augustine, who taught that God in the beginning endowed anorganic matter with certain vital powers (*rationes seminales*) through which it evolved itself into determinate living things as time progressed. Bonaventure extends this doctrine to all substantial forms which can conjoin with matter. There is, he teaches, resident in matter itself some germ-force, some seedlings of all possible substantial forms which can unite with matter, and this force is brought into actual play by the action of external causes sufficient to produce the substantial change. In other words, there is in matter a coöperative power which goes along with the action of external causes in producing substantial change. For instance, when wood is burned, we have a change from the substance wood to the substances ash and the various chemical substances that make up smoke; the external cause of the change is

fire; and Bonaventure's doctrine would mean that there was in the wood a coöperative or sympathetic power which was roused into activity by the action of fire, and which concurred with fire in producing the substantial change. This sympathetic, coöperative force is the *ratio seminalis* of the new substance (ash and smoke, in the example).

In Psychology Bonaventure teaches that the soul, like all finite things, is made of *matter and form*. The soul is directly created by God. Although it is composed of matter and form, it has no *extension*, nor has it *parts*. The matter which is in the soul is not subject to change, and hence the soul, both as to its matter and its form, is naturally immortal. The faculties of the soul (intellect, will, memory) are indeed distinct from the soul, and these are not accidents in the soul, but *substances!*

In Epistemology Bonaventure rejects the doctrine of inborn ideas (*innatism*), and asserts that ideas of *sensile things* are acquired by sensation and intellectual abstraction. Ideas of spiritual things are acquired directly by the reflection of the soul, the soul realizing itself as existent and endowed with faculties. Both modes of acquiring ideas demand the special concurrence of God.

Bonaventure has been charged with Ontologism, but unfairly. Ontologism is the doctrine that man's first idea is that of God; that man somehow apprehends God directly, though very vaguely, and that in the light of this idea all others are formed. The language of Bonaventure seems at times to suggest Ontologism, but only when severed from its context. When he declares that the idea of God is the *first* idea, he does not mean first in order of time, but the most important, the basic idea in that knowledge which is unto salvation.

Remarks: The metaphysical doctrine of St. Bonaventure is at fault in the following points: (1) He makes spiritual beings composites of matter and form, whereas they are pure forms; (2) He teaches a plurality of substantial forms in finite substances, including man; whereas, as St. Thomas was to prove,

there is in each substance but one substantial form, though there may be many accidental forms; (3) He states the Principle of Individuation as matter and form, whereas it is informed-matter alone; (4) He posits a gratuitous and needless theory of *rationes seminales*.

In Epistemology Bonaventure's distinction of modes of acquiring ideas is futile and without foundation. All our ideas, without exception, come to us through sensation and intellectual *abstraction, comparison, synthesis*, etc.

d) ROGER BACON (1214-1292/94), "*Doctor Mirabilis*."

Life: Roger Bacon was born at Ilchester, Gloucestershire, England, and studied at Oxford and Paris. He entered the Franciscan Order and taught at Oxford, where he achieved great renown. He was a man of fiery spirit and of bitterly critical tongue. Once he was exiled and twice imprisoned for insubordination.

Works: Bacon wrote *Opus Majus* (The Greater Work) in seven parts: (1) The causes of error in intellectual judgment; (2) The relation of Philosophy and other sciences to Theology; (3) tract on language; (4) tract on mathematics; (5) tract on optics; (6) tract on experimental sciences; (7) tract on moral science. Bacon also wrote *Opus Minus* (The Lesser Work), an abridgment of the foregoing; and *Opus Tertium* (The Third Work), a synthesis and commentary on the other two. He also wrote treatises on the multiplication of species, and a compendium of philosophy.

Doctrine: Bacon follows the older Franciscan school in his philosophical doctrines. Thus he teaches the "plurality of substantial forms" theory, spiritual matter, *rationes seminales*, special divine illumination in understanding. In his doctrine on certitude he professes a kind of *Traditionalism*, i. e., he teaches that God gave to our first parents the knowledge of those truths which the mind cannot solve of itself (such as

the question of Universals is, in his opinion) and this revelation was handed down by tradition. Sad to say this primitive revelation has been lost sight of among men; we must apply ourselves diligently to the study of history and of languages (philology) so that we may trace it out and formulate it again. Our knowledge is acquired from three fountain heads: authority, reason, and experience; and experience is prerequisite to the function of authority and reason (divinely illumined). Experience for the student and scientist takes the shape of *experiment*. Hence, experiment is the one valid scientific instrument. Deductive reasoning is unscientific; the only reasoning of value is induction from observation and experiment.

Remarks: Bacon has been aptly called the forerunner of modern *Positivism*, the doctrine which sets scientific value only upon truths ascertained positively by observation and experiment. He is hailed by many as a great philosopher, yet he is vastly overestimated. His erratic views, his fiery advocacy of his own doctrines, and his intolerance of opposition made him an extremist and rendered his actual contribution to philosophy almost negligible.

e) ST. ALBERT THE GREAT (1193–1280), "*Doctor Universalis*."

Life: Albert the Great (Albertus Magnus) was born at Lauingen in Suabia, a member of the family of the Counts of Bollstaedt. The date of his birth is in dispute, being variously given as 1193, 1195, 1206, 1207. He studied at Padua and Bologna. In 1223 he entered the Dominican Order, and taught thereafter at Cologne and Paris. He was made Bishop of Ratisbon in 1260, but resigned his see three years later. He engaged in various activities in the interests of the Faith, but spent most of his later years teaching and writing at Cologne. His contemporaries knew him as Albert of Cologne, and esteemed him the ablest philosopher of the time. His greatest

pupil was St. Thomas of Aquin. Albert died at Cologne in the convent of his Order in 1280. He was canonized and declared a Doctor of the Church by Pius XI on December 16, 1931, and his feast fixed for November 15.

Works: Albert's works constitute a library in themselves. They cover the field of philosophy, theology, natural science, and Scripture commentary. For an exhaustive list of his works consult De Wulf, *History of Medieval Philosophy*, Vol. I, pp. 395-396 (Translation by Messenger; published by Longmans, 1926.)

Doctrine: Albert was called "The Universal Doctor" on account of the great number and variety of his works and the erudition which they display. He is the first Aristotelean Scholastic, as he was the first to recognize the true worth of the Stagirite. He purified the doctrine of Aristotle from much Arabian interpolation, and showed that it was marvellously well suited for the exposition of Christian dogma. Yet Albert did not bring Scholastic Philosophy to the peak of perfection; this work was reserved for his famous pupil, St. Thomas. In the main, the philosophic doctrines of Albert are in agreement with those of St. Thomas.

Remarks: Albert was an original thinker, but he had reverence for the achievements of his predecessors. By his exposition of Aristotle's tract on *Physics*, as well as by his own studies and experiments, he gave a real impetus to the study of the physical sciences. Thus he did far more for the development of natural science than did the erratic Roger Bacon. Albert had an analytical mind and could enlarge grandly upon his findings, but he lacked the genius of synthesis.

f) SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS (1225-1274), "*Doctor Angelicus.*"

Life: St. Thomas of Aquin, called "The Angelic Doctor," was born in 1224, 1225, or 1226, in the town of Roccasecca, Italy, of Landolf, Count of Aquino, and the Countess Theo-

dora Caracciolo. He received his early education in the great Benedictine Abbey at Monte Cassino, and followed the secondary and graduate studies in the University of Naples. Much against the will of his relatives, he entered the Dominican Order in 1243. He studied under Albert the Great both at Paris and Cologne, and in 1252 began his teaching career in the University of Paris. With Bonaventure, his cherished friend, he received the Master's Degree in Theology in 1257. Called to Rome in 1261, he taught in the Eternal City, and afterwards at Bologna. In 1269 he returned to Paris, and after teaching for two years in the University, was called back to Italy. Thereafter he taught successively at Rome, Bologna, Viterbo, Perugia, Naples. He was summoned by Pope Gregory X to the Council of Lyons, but took sick on the way, and was forced to accept the generous hospitality of the Benedictine Monastery of Fossa Nuova near Maienza. He lingered here for some weeks, continuing his studies and instructions in spite of his illness. He died on the 7 of March, 1274. His dear friend, St. Bonaventure, died the same year while in attendance at the Council of Lyons.

Works: Omitting the exegetical, homiletic, and ascetical writings of St. Thomas, we note the following works in philosophy and theology:

- i. *Commentaries on Aristotle* (written 1260-1272);
- ii. *Commentaries on Peter Lombard's Sentences* (1250-1260);
- iii. *Free and Debated Questions* (1260-1272);
- iv. *Opuscula* (Little Works—among which we mention one *On Essence and Existence*) (1256);
- v. *Summa Contra Gentiles* (Four books in exposition of orthodox Faith by the light of reason, and in refutation of infidel doctrines by the same light (1258-1264);
- vi. *Summa Theologica* (Summary of Theology), the monumental work of the Saint. Parts I & II (1267-1271); Part III (1271-1273). The last book was left unfinished.

The *Summae* are remarkable for (1) great scope; (2) clearness of exposition; (3) lucid order of questions; (4) immense authority with philosophers and theologians of subsequent ages.

Doctrine: St. Thomas' doctrine is strictly Aristotelean. Albert the Great had partially purified Aristotle's works of the extraneous and falsified matter with which it was commingled in the translations of the Arabians; Thomas completed the work, and set forth the Aristotelean philosophy in its pure form. This philosophy he developed and completed, clearing away obscurities, and rounding out a unified and perfected system of philosophy. Nor did Thomas, in his devotion to Aristotle, neglect other philosophers. He was well versed in the Greek philosophy then available to Europeans, as well as in the works of the Fathers, the Arabs, the Jews, and preceding Scholastics. Among philosophers who were high in his opinion after Aristotle were Plato, St. Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and Boethius. With all these he is not, of course, in constant agreement, but his was a mind large enough and keen enough to recognize genius and to pay it tribute, even when he could not agree with its doctrinal achievement. In passing, it must be said that, in theology as well as in philosophy, St. Thomas attained the most wonderful order and unification. We shall discuss the doctrine of St. Thomas in some detail in a series of paragraphs.

i. Saint Thomas Aquinas was the first writer to express a full and perfect doctrine in this matter. He says that every science has a *material* and a *formal* object. The *material* object is that with which the science deals, the *subject-matter* of the science. The *formal* object is the special mode of treatment given to the material object. Now theology and philosophy are, in respect of their *material* objects, much at one; for both treat of God, of man, and of this world. But the two sciences are perfectly distinct in their *formal* objects; for theology deals with its subject-matter (material object) under the

light of divine revelation, while philosophy investigates its material object under the unaided light of human reason. Thus the two sciences are clearly distinguished, the scope of each being determined with the determination of its formal object. Philosophy serves theology inasmuch as it enables the theologian to deduce scientific conclusions from articles of Faith. Theology serves philosophy inasmuch as it acts as a guide, a directive norm, or as a light upon the path of the philosopher showing him fields of research and making clear the limitations of his powers. Since both philosophy and theology are *sciences*, their body of doctrines is true and certain, and between two bodies of truth there can never be contradiction. The truths of theology, known by the supernatural light of revelation, are possessed with the double certainty of Faith and (for the most part) reason; and the certainty of theological knowledge has, therefore, a higher character than that of philosophic knowledge. Theology is the Queen of Sciences because its object is divine. Philosophy is the Queen of Human Sciences, inferior and subservient to theology, which is its guide, its test of perfection, and its supernatural complement. Philosophy can be called the handmaid of theology because of its inferior position, and because it lends itself as an apt instrument to the scientific exposition of theology. But theology dictates no truths to philosophy, it builds up no proofs; it merely illumines and guides the philosopher in his purely rational inquiry.

ii. In Formal Logic St. Thomas adds nothing essentially new to the doctrine of Aristotle; but in Material Logic he develops the teachings of the Stagirite to a notable degree. For example, he adopts Aristotelean Moderate Realism in the question of Universals, and proceeds to show that *metaphysical grades* are not *really*, but only *virtually* distinct in the same individual. To illustrate: Man is a rational animal; that is to say, the idea "man" consists of the two notes or *metaphysical grades*, "animality" and "rationality." Now in man there is

not a *real* distinction between his animality and his rationality; one cannot distinguish two *parts* of man corresponding to the ideas "animality" and "rationality," which are the metaphysical grades of the idea "man." Yet these things are *virtually* distinct in man, i. e., the power or virtue of animal functions (nutrition, growth, generation, etc.) is obviously a different sort of thing from the power or virtue of reasoning. Again, St. Thomas gives full expression to doctrines merely indicated or outlined by Aristotle. For example, he explains in detail the transcendental nature of the idea of *Being*, showing that it is not a *genus*, and that it applies to its inferiors *analogically* and not *univocally*, and that the analogy in such application is one of *proper proportion* (i. e., founded on similitude) and not one of *attribution* (founded on a relation other than similitude). (Consult the Article on Aristotle's Logic, *supra*.) In his theory of knowledge, St. Thomas shows that all ideas come from sensation plus intellectual abstraction. He rejects the old Franciscan theory that a special divine illumination is required in the mind for the formation of ideas of spiritual things and the first principles of reasoning. He distinguishes three grades of abstraction, and three corresponding grades of ideas. Thus, the things which are *immediately grasped by the senses* furnish the mind with images (i. e., phantasms in imagination) from which *physical* ideas are directly abstracted. Our ideas of sensible things (man, body, plant, etc.) are, therefore, *physical* ideas. By a further abstraction we acquire ideas of mere *intelligible quantity*, and these are *mathematical* ideas. To illustrate: I have ideas of two, four, one hundred, a pound, a yard, etc., apart from the number or measurement of any particular body. I know that two and two make four, without considering the "two" and "two" as apples, or mountains, or men, or any particular sort of reality. That is to say, I grasp the idea "two" as an *understandable* quantity, and not as a sensible or bodily reality present in a given object or objects. Above the mathematical abstraction, and in the highest place,

comes *metaphysical* abstraction, which prescind from all bodiliness and from intelligible quantity and considers and includes only that which is understandable and predicable of material and immaterial being alike. Ideas formed by such abstraction are called *metaphysical ideas* (e. g., ideas of being, unity, goodness, truth, substance, accident). The mind not only *abstracts* ideas from sensations reflected in imagination (*phantasms*), but it *reflects* upon them, *compares* them, *compounds* them, and so derives further ideas from them (*derivative* or *abstractive* ideas). Thus the mind rises to a knowledge of things spiritual (angel, soul, etc.) and even to the idea of God. In the part of Logic which deals with demonstration, St. Thomas speaks of *science* more profoundly than does Aristotle. He shows the proper relative position and rating of sciences (*subordination of sciences*), and distinguishes these, according to the grades of abstraction, into Physical, Mathematical, and Metaphysical Sciences.

iii. In his writings in the field of physical sciences Thomas teaches that all physical being, all being subject to change, is composed of *act* and *potentiality*. Bodily being is moreover composed of *Prime Matter* and *Substantial Form*. Prime Matter is *pure potentiality*, and has no existence apart from forms; Substantial Form gives to Prime Matter its *first act* (i. e., actuality). Flatly contradicting the Franciscan theory of *plurality of forms*, St. Thomas teaches that more than one Substantial Form cannot actuate (*in-form*) the same Prime Matter simultaneously. Spiritual substances are *pure forms*, and contain no matter whatever. Angels are, then, pure forms; they are substantial, *separate* (non in-forming) forms. The human soul is likewise pure of all matter in itself; it is the substantial, *in-forming* (non-separate) form of the living human body. *The Principle of Specification* (that by which one species is distinguished from others) is the *form*; and the *Principle of Individuation* (that by which one individual is distinguished from others of the same species) is *matter* con-

ditioned by *quantity* (quantified matter). Since angels are free from all matter, they are not individuated, but each is *specifically* distinct from all the others. Here St. Thomas contradicts Albert, for the latter had taught that the Principle of Individuation was both *matter and form*. Of the human soul Thomas teaches that it is the sole substantial form of the body; it is the single principle of man's threefold life activity, vegetal, sentient, and rational; it is spiritual, simple, immortal; it is wholly present in every part of the body which it in-forms; it does not exist before the body, but is created and infused at the same instant; it has faculties of intellect and free-will. St. Thomas defends the doctrine of the Active Intellect in individual men against the Arabian theory of an abstract universal intellect (active, or both active and passive) common to all men, and numerically one in itself. He declares and proves that the human will has freedom of choice, and shows how free choice is exercised and the object upon which it is exercised. He believes the intellect superior to will (*intellectualism*), not the will superior to the intellect (*voluntarism*). Superiority of intellect is shown in the fact that the intellect grasps its object (achieves knowledge), while the will only *tends* towards its object; and also in the fact that the *ultimate practical judgment* of the intellect is the core and basis of the free operation of the will. After discussing these matters of Psychology,—which Thomas with Aristotle assigns to Physics,—he treats of the origin of living things other than man. He agrees with Aristotle in asserting that it is absurd to say that life originated from a chance arrangement of non-living things. Living things come from living things, and ultimately they are traced to the act of the Creator. Thomas errs in one point: he thinks that certain imperfect living things (such as *worms*) may come from rotting matter and not from a proper germ or seed. But, lest he posit an effect without sufficient cause, he explains that rotting matter gets the power to germinate such life from the influence of the

heavenly bodies which are controlled by angels. In points that depend upon mere experiment St. Thomas made errors in his Physics: laboratory science had not yet been developed in his day. But in so far as Physics overlaps the field of speculative philosophy, he treats of it with accuracy.

iv. In *Metaphysics* Thomas notably develops the Aristotelean teaching. Speaking of *being* as it is in the intellect (i. e., of truth, certitude, science), he explains the nature of *logical truth*, of *certitude*, the *causes of certitude*, the aptitude of the mind for achieving truth, and the supreme criterion of truth. He teaches that the knowing faculties are naturally infallible when properly constituted and engaged upon their *proper object*; and thus he declares *formally objective* the qualities of things which the senses perceive.—St. Thomas posits a *real distinction* (and not a mere *distinction of reason*) between the *essence* and *existence* of every created being. This doctrine, which opposes that of the Franciscan School and also that of Albert the Great, is absolutely fundamental in the Thomistic System. Some critics have tried to show that St. Thomas did not hold this opinion, and these have done violence to his expressions that their end might be attained; but the matter is clearly proved from his own works, and from the opposition this doctrine aroused among his adversaries (contemporary and subsequent); it is also proved by the fact that his pupils plainly state that such was his teaching.—Thomas extends Aristotle's doctrine on causes, and deals profoundly with the *efficient cause*, distinguishing this as *principal cause* and *instrumental cause*. The instrumental cause receives its efficiency transiently through the action of the principal efficient cause. Thus even a *bodily* instrument may receive efficiency in a transient manner from a *spiritual* principal cause. Based on this doctrine is St. Thomas' theory of ideas; for abstraction takes place through the transiently communicated efficiency of the active intellect, a spiritual faculty (faculty of the soul) which operates upon, or elaborates, the material images (phan-

tasms) drawn from sensation. In the First Efficient Cause (God) efficiency as act and power is identified with the Divine Substance; but in creatures efficiency as act and power is an *accident* really distinct from the substance of the efficient creature. This doctrine contradicts the common teaching of the 13 century that efficiency as act and power in creatures is not distinct from their substance. Thus *faculties* are really distinct from the substance of the creature which possesses them.—In speaking of Uncreated Immaterial Being (God) Thomas brings Aristotle's doctrine to fullness and perfection, drawing upon the philosophical achievements of the Fathers, and particularly upon that of St. Augustine. He proves that God exists as the *efficient*, *final*, and *exemplary* cause of the universe. He rejects as invalid the Ontological Argument of Anselm, showing that such a *priori* argument presupposes, but leaves unproved, the validity of the idea of God as representative of an actuality; and hence such an argument is inconclusive. Speaking of God's *concurrency* in the acts of His *free creatures*, Thomas teaches that God concurs not only *simultaneously*, but also *antecedently*, moving His free creatures to determinate infallible action which is *in accordance with their nature*, and consequently *free*. God is the First Mover, and movement or action cannot ultimately originate outside of Him. God moves every being to action *according to its nature*. Free being is moved to action according to free nature. Hence God's antecedent concurrence (or *Physical Premotion*, as it is called) does not destroy or contradict free-will in His rational creatures (angels and men).

v. In Ethics St. Thomas greatly perfects Aristotle's doctrine, for he has the guiding light of Christian Revelation to serve his genius, and this the Stagirite did not possess. Aristotle did not go beyond earthly life in fixing his sanctions and norm of morality, and in determining the last end of man. Thomas teaches that man, in every deliberate (*human*) act acts to *an end*, and ultimately to a *last end*, which is perfect happiness. Since man's desire and tendency towards happiness

is unlimited, nothing short of the Infinite Good can satisfy it perfectly. Therefore God, the Infinite Good, is the *Summum Bonum*, the end to be attained. God is himself the Object (*objective happiness*) in which man's happiness (*subjective happiness*) is to be achieved. Man cannot attain perfect happiness in this life, because God cannot be perfectly possessed here; but man can approximate perfect happiness by knowledge and love of God and the exercise of virtue. In the life to come man can achieve and possess God by the aid of the special illumination called the Light of Glory; that is, man can behold God as He is (*Beatific Vision*) and rest for evermore in perfect happiness without the possibility of losing it.—God's understanding joined in the unity of Essence with his will directs all things to Himself as to their proper end. This Divine Reason (understanding and will) is the Ultimate Norm of Morality; it is the ultimate measure of human activity; that which accords with It is good, and that which is out of line with It is evil. The Proximate Norm of Morality (through which the Divine Reason, the Eternal Law, is applied in human activity) is *human reason recognizing the Ultimate Norm*,—in a word, *Conscience*.

Remarks: Only a detailed study of the works of St. Thomas (especially the *Summae*) can give the student of philosophy or its history an adequate idea of their wealth of matter, their enormous scope, their wonderful construction, their concentration in one marvellous synthesis of all the fruits of theology and philosophy. Here we have given only a slight account of the leading doctrines; not even an outline of Thomism could be attempted in such a manual as this. We can only say that St. Thomas perfected Scholastic Philosophy. In his hands it took on its final and perfect form as a body of principles eternally true. These principles have continuously *new application*, as the partial sciences of research unfold new facts and develop new data; but the principles do not change. Therefore Scholasticism, as St. Thomas left it, has been completed

once and for all time. But its *application*, its *extrinsic* growth, admits of unlimited extension.

During the life of St. Thomas many, even members of his own Order, opposed him. Opposition was, indeed, inevitable, and this for two reasons. (1) Thomas was thoroughly Aristotelean, and Aristotle was held in suspicion, and often in dislike, because of the faulty and interpolated translations of his works which Christian Europe had received from the Arabs. (2) Thomas rejected many a tradition reverently preserved in different Schools, such, for instance, as the theories of *plurality of forms*, *rationes seminales*, special *divine illumination* in the forming of the higher kinds of ideas, *subtle matter* as an element in spiritual substances, etc., etc. Of the opponents of Thomas and Thomism we mention the following:

i. *Dominicans*: Roland of Cremona; Robert Fitzacre; Hugh of St. Cher; Peter of Tarantaise.

ii. *Franciscans*: William de la Mare; Richard of Middleton; Matthew of Aquasparta; William of Falgar; Peter Olivi; Roger Marston; John Duns Scotus (of whom we are yet to speak).

iii. *Secular Clergy*: Henry of Ghent (discussed on page 246); William of St. Amour; Gerard of Abbeville.

The opposition of these men caused Thomism to be condemned in the Universities of Paris and Oxford. The Masters of Theology of the University of Paris were assembled in 1277 to condemn false doctrines, and of the 219 propositions condemned as Averroistic some were tenets of Thomism. A few days after the Paris meeting, Archbishop Robert Kilwardby of Canterbury (Dominican) had some Thomistic doctrines condemned at Oxford as *dangerous*. In 1284, and again in 1286, Archbishop John Peckham, successor to Archbishop Kilwardby in the see of Canterbury, renewed the condemnation of Thomism. After 1286 we find no more condemnations, and

Thomism gradually came into its own. Little bands of its defenders appeared among the Dominicans, and then in other Orders and among the secular clergy. In 1278, before condemnations had ceased, there was a General Chapter of the Dominicans convened at Milan, and during its sessions some of the Oxford delegates were reprimanded for their opposition to Thomism; in another General Chapter of the same Order, held at Paris in 1279, it was decreed that Thomism might be taught in Schools of the Order. Credit for the movement in favor of Thomism is due, in part at least, to the following:

i. *Dominicans*: John Quidort; Thomas Jorz; Thomas Sutton; Hervé of Nedellec.

ii. *Secular Clergy*: Peter of Auvergne; Godfrey of Fontaines—although the latter is not thoroughly Thomistic.

iii. Humbert of Preuilley (Cistercian), and Giles of Rome (Augustinian).

Through the efforts of these and many other defenders, Thomism spread through the Schools. After the canonization of St. Thomas in 1324 the opposition of Oxford ceased and the Paris condemnations were formally revoked. By the middle of the 14 century Thomism had full sway in all Dominican Schools, and in very many Schools conducted by other Religious Orders and by the secular clergy.

The influence of Thomism is shown not only in the scholarship of the time, but also in that enduring monument of literature, the *Divina Commedia* of Dante Alighieri (1265–1321), which has been called, "Aquinas in verse."

It is a remarkable and sad circumstance that Scholasticism was waning in influence before it was recognized in its perfect Thomistic form. It has been reserved for a later day (may we not say our own day?) to revive this intrinsically perfect system of philosophy and to give it its proper place. It cannot be doubted that if the modern Neo-Scholastics prove

faithful to their task, Thomism, the stone rejected of the builders, will become at last the glorious head of the corner.

g) HENRY OF GHENT (died 1293), "*Doctor Sollemnis*."

Life: Henry's early life is not known. He was Canon of Tournai in 1267, and was made Archbishop of Bruges in 1276. After 1277, when he was made Doctor of Theology, he was a prominent professor in the University of Paris. He died in 1293; the place of his death was either Paris or Tournai.

Works: Henry wrote a *Summa Theologica* (Summary of Theology), and *Quodlibeta*, discussions of a variety of questions.

Doctrine: Henry teaches that, while philosophy and theology are distinct sciences, philosophy has no claim upon our study except as an aid to the study of theology. He disagrees with St. Thomas in the matter of The Principle of Individuation, which, he says, is not *quantified matter*, but some vague reality, rather a negation than a positive entity, which is distinct from matter and belongs to the individual as such. He denies the *real* distinction between existence and essence in creatures. He admits in man (and in man only) a plurality of forms, viz., the form of corporeity and the soul. He denies Thomas' doctrine of intelligible species (abstracted essences) and makes *physical ideas* mere spiritualized phantasms. He holds that there is no real distinction between the soul and its faculties. He professes *voluntarism*, or the superiority of will to intellect. Lastly, he revives the old Augustinian and Franciscan doctrine of a special divine illumination for the formation of ideas above the physical order.

Remark: We have noted here only such parts of Henry's philosophy as disagree with Thomism; many other parts not mentioned here are Thomistic. Henry deserves credit for an able refutation of skepticism. His influence—reactionary for

the most part—prepared the way for the doctrines of the great Scotus whom we are now to discuss.

h) JOHN DUNS SCOTUS (1266/1274–1308), “*Doctor Subtilis*.”

Life: Scotus was born somewhere in the British Isles, probably in Scotland. He entered the Franciscan Order at an early age, and pursued his studies at Oxford. Afterwards he taught at Oxford, then went to Paris, where the fame of his teaching was unbounded. He received his Doctorate at the University of Paris, and continued to teach there until 1307, when he was called to Cologne to refute certain heretical doctrines which were gaining headway in that city. He died in Cologne in 1308.

Works: Scotus wrote *Commentaries on Aristotle*; *Opus Oxoniense* (“The Oxford Work”), a commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, written at Oxford; *Opus Parisiense* (“The Paris Work”), a theological treatise in four books, written at Paris; *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, discussions of various questions, and other works. Many writings long attributed to Scotus are now recognized as spurious.

Doctrine: Scotus is the founder of the Later Franciscan School, which is, in some respects, more Aristotelean than the Older School, although it retains and exaggerates the Realism of the latter. Scotus exercised a splendidly acute critical talent in examining (and attacking) the doctrines of the Averroists, Thomas of Aquin, Bonaventure, Giles of Rome, Richard of Middleton, Roger Bacon, Godfrey of Fontaines, and Henry of Ghent. Scotus reposes little trust in unaided human reason, and requires Faith as the basis of certitude. He was a man of very subtle mind, and wrote in a style that is concise without being clear. His arrangement of matter follows a definite but very intricate order. For these reasons, his works do not make easy reading. We shall discuss his doctrine very briefly in a series of paragraphs:

i. Scotus stresses *the distinction between philosophy and theology*, and seems to differentiate the sciences on the basis of both Material and Formal Object. He makes philosophy a science very inferior to theology, and holds that a purely rational science cannot deal adequately with many of its own problems, but must look to Revelation for its proofs.

ii. Scotus taught a *formal distinction based on the nature of a reality in which specific grades of being are distinguished* (*distinctio actualis formalis ex natura rei*). This is often called "the Scotistic Formal Distinction," and has been described as a little less than real distinction and a little more than logical or mental distinction. We shall not attempt here to determine the exact character of the Scotistic Formal Distinction. This difficult matter is a delicate and even dangerous point of argument, and available sources of criticism all too frequently quote Scotus' commentators, friendly and unfriendly, instead of quoting and judging the actual doctrine of the great Franciscan himself—a doctrine, it must be admitted, not easy and perhaps not possible to know in its fullness.

iii. The Principle of Individuation according to Scotus, is not *quantified matter*, as St. Thomas teaches, but a reality which is superadded to a being already constituted in its specific nature. This reality is called the *thisness* of the thing (*haecceitas*).

iv. Essence and existence are not distinguished in created being by a *real* distinction, but by a *formal* distinction, which is something more than logical and something less than real.

v. Scotus' doctrine of Universals is a qualified Moderate Realism which was developed logically by his followers into Ultra-Realism.

vi. For the rest, Scotus accepts the plurality-of-forms doctrine, even for man, and declares that there is in man a form of corporeity (or body-form) in addition to the soul which is the substantial form of the living body. He holds will superior to intellect (*voluntarism*). The judgment of intellect in no

wise moves the will, but is a mere condition for the will's free action. The immortality of the soul cannot be proved by reason alone. Scotus declares that the concept of *being* is univocal. In Physics, he rejects the *rationes seminales* theory, but posits direct intervention of God in every generative act.

Remarks: Scotus had a very keen and subtle mind, and his multiplication of distinctions is hard to understand. Perhaps no philosopher in the course of history has called forth such divergent criticisms as has Scotus. Some declare that his doctrine, rightly understood, is wholly in accord with Thomism; others say that it contains the germ of every modern error. Some hold that Scotus clouded the whole science of Metaphysics; others no less ardently aver that he clarified it. Many say that he made philosophy a welter of complexities that no mind can understand; others sincerely believe that he simplified philosophy. Recent critical investigation, however, shows that many works and doctrines, supposedly of Scotus' authorship, and the occasion of controversy, are not truly Scotistic at all.

The influence of Scotus was enormous. The opponents of Thomism turned to him as to a champion. The Franciscans followed Scotus, as the Dominicans followed Thomas. The two Schools are still in existence, especially in matters of speculative theology. The chief Scotists of medieval times were:

- i. Francis of Mayron (died 1325), the "Acute Master of Abstractions." He was a teacher at the University of Paris, and a thorough-going Scotist;
- ii. Antonius Andre (died 1320), "*Doctor Dulciffuus*";
- iii. John of Bassoles, "*Doctor Ornatissimus*";
- iv. Walter Burleigh, "*Doctor Planus et Perspicuus*";
- v. Alexander of Alexandria;
- vi. Nicholas de Orbellis, whose writings served as a text for Scotist students;
- vii. Lychetus of Brescia.

The Thomists who opposed Scotism during the 14 and 15 centuries were the following above others:

i. Hervé of Nedellec (died 1323), who bitterly attacked Scotistic doctrine on the one hand, while on the other he rejected the basic Thomistic doctrine of a *real distinction* between existence and essence in creatures.

ii. John of Naples (died 1336), who took up the defence of the Thomistic theses condemned at Paris in 1277 under Archbishop Stephen Tempier;

iii. Durandus of Aurillac (died 1380), who defended Thomism against Durandus of St. Pourçain;

iv. John Capreolus (1380-1444), a Dominican of the Province of Toulouse, who taught at Paris for some years. His *Book of Defences* was deservedly celebrated as a clear exposition of Thomism and a sharp refutation of opposed doctrine. Capreolus was known as the "Chief of the Thomists."

v. St. Antoninus (1379-1459), Dominican, who was made Archbishop of Florence in 1446. He wrote a *Summa Theologica* in which he treats chiefly of moral matters in Thomistic style.

i) RAYMOND LULLY (1235-1315), "*Doctor Illuminatus*."

Life: Raymond Lully was born at Palma, on the Island of Majorca. He entered the Third Order of St. Francis and devoted himself to the conversion of the Mohammedans and to the overthrow of Averroism. He died a martyr to the truth under the assaults of the Mohammedans. But for the somewhat heterodox character of his doctrines, he would probably have been canonized.

Works: Raymond wrote eleven folio volumes. Of these works we mention as important for philosophy his *Ars Magna* ("Great Art") and his *Twelve Principles of Philosophy*.

Doctrine: Reason cannot attain to the highest truths unless aided by Faith. But once furnished with the aid of Faith, rea-

son can demonstrate all truth, even revealed mysteries. In Universals Raymond was an Ultra-Realist. He held the strange doctrine of a kind of motor-soul indwelling in the world. Raymond invented a *Logical Machine* (a piece of mechanism somewhat resembling a comptometer, with letters and figures to represent the elements of thought), with which he thought he could prove any true proposition.

Remarks: Raymond's exaggerated notion of the power of reason,—granted, divinely illumined reason,—to penetrate all mysteries is a sort of Christianized *theosophy*. His opposition to the paralyzing Averroistic doctrine of a "twofold truth" probably led him to the excess of making *all* truth subject to demonstration. Raymond, like Roger Bacon, is only part Scholastic.

Another prominent part-Scholastic of Raymond's time was the English Franciscan, Roger Marston (died about 1300), Lully's theosophy was revived in the 15 century by Raymond of Sabunde (died 1432).

Raymond's opposition to Averroism was timely, for the pernicious theory of *Twofold Truth* gained a place in the schools towards the end of the 13 century. It appeared in the University of Padua in Italy, introduced by Peter d'Abano (died 1315), its chief exponent in Italy was John of Jandun, who brought his Averroistic tenets from Paris, where the *Twofold Truth* doctrine was taught in the University by Siger of Brabant (died about 1284), Boethius, called the Dacian (died about 1280), and Bernier of Nivelles (died at the end of the 13 century).

The 13 century was a constructive age. It assembled, developed, and synthesized the works of preceding ages in philosophy, theology, and other sciences. It was an age of men rather than of schools; and it was dominated by the great Masters of Scholasticism. It was perhaps the most brilliantly intellectual age the world has ever known.

CHAPTER IV

THE DECLINE OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

(1300-1450)

The present Chapter deals with the causes which induced the decline of Scholasticism and with the more important philosophies that replaced it in favor and influence during the 14 and early 15 centuries. The Chapter is, therefore, divided into two articles:

Article 1. Causes Which Induced the Decline of Scholasticism.

Article 2. Schools of the Period of Decline.

Article 1. The Causes Which Induced the Decline of Scholasticism

With St. Thomas Scholasticism reached completeness and perfection. There was no longer any opportunity for *intrinsic* development in this great System; for indefinite development is not possible in philosophy as it is in the arts. Philosophy—true philosophy—is a body of true principles; and is therefore stable, unchanging; and once perfected, it must remain so forever. The only development which can accrue to it is *extrinsic*, and consists in the extension and application of its principles in the interpretation of the findings of the physical sciences which go on developing indefinitely through every age. And just as true philosophy, once completed, cannot have further intrinsic development, so also it cannot suffer intrinsic retrogression or decline. It may decline *extrinsically*; it may cease to

be valued at its true worth; it may be lost sight of among men. It is important to keep clearly in mind that the decline of Scholasticism was of this extrinsic or external character. Although the opinion of philosophers subsequent to those of the 13 century, and the opinion of non-Scholastic philosophers of the present day, is pretty generally at one in consigning Scholasticism to the philosophical scrap-heap as a thing outworn and forever useless, we who have compelling reason to regard it as the one true philosophy, are certain that it is neither outworn nor useless, although it has been so generally cast away. It is truth; and "Truth crushed to earth shall rise again"; Scholasticism will one day come into its own. But even if that day be far removed—and we have great and reasonable hope that the day is *not* far removed—it can make no change in our appreciation of that which is true and perfect in itself. Scholasticism has long been recognized as the true philosophy in Catholic colleges and universities, and among Catholic scientists and learned men generally. Unfortunately enough, such recognition has, in this day of prejudice and unbelief, only served to prevent or retard the recognition of Scholasticism as the true philosophy by the learned world at large. It is regarded as "Catholic Philosophy," suited only to the needs of those who "force reason to accord with the dogmas of Catholic Faith." This unfair judgment upon Scholasticism is being sturdily combated by the Neo-Scholastics of our day.

The Scholastics themselves were largely to blame for the decline and eclipse of Scholasticism. At the beginning of the 14 century they were divided into two camps, the Thomistic and the Scotistic. This division indirectly favored the protagonists of new doctrines. Again—largely because of the Thomist-Scotist division—quibbling in clever displays of dialectic skill came to be the favorite employment of Scholastics; and this meant time lost for the Schoolmen and time gained for their opponents. Besides, the world of thought and intellectual endeavor had had its fill of dialectic; the Scholastics not

only lost time by their hair-splitting cleverness in debate; they lost sympathy and respect as well.

Two other causes, one remote and one proximate, concurred in the decline of Scholasticism in the 14 century. The remote cause was the diminution of the strong spirit of Faith among the Catholic peoples of Europe, and the relaxation of religious discipline among the regular clergy. The proximate cause or causes may be stated thus: (1) The inauguration of new universities in which a careless order of studies was observed, courses shortened, and degrees easily obtained. Even the great University of Paris failed to live up to its fine traditions in these matters. (2) The continued increase in the number of raw, ill-instructed pupils, who easily became estranged from Scholasticism which their slipshod preparatory studies had not prepared them to understand. (3) The lack of great constructive minds among the defenders of Scholasticism. (4) The relentless zeal of the anti-Scholastics in warring upon the decreasing number of true Scholastic philosophers.

Article 2. Schools of the Period of Decline

a) The Terminist School; b) The 14 and 15 Century Mystics.

a) THE TERMINIST SCHOOL

The Ultra-Realism of the Scotist School and the general craze for dialectic display, and in particular for *subtle distinctions*, induced a reactionary movement among some philosophers of the 14 and 15 centuries. This reaction was quite as excessive as what it opposed. The reactionaries took as their basic principle the so-called *Principle of Parsimony* (commonly called "Ockam's Razor"): *Entities are not to be needlessly multiplied*. They declared that most of the distinctions of the Scotists and the older Scholastics were needless. Applying their Principle in the matter of Universals, these philosophers developed a doctrine of *Nominalism*. Because the idea is a mere

“mental term” which is to be expressed in the “oral term,” this Nominalism is accurately known as *Terminism*. Most of the Terminists were Franciscans. Notable philosophers of the School were:

- i. Peter Aureolus (died 1322), “*Doctor Facundus*”;
- ii. Durandus of St. Pourçain (died 1332), “*Doctor Resolutissimus*”;
- iii. William of Ockam (about 1280–1348), “*Doctor Invincibilis*.”

i. PETER AUREOLUS (died 1322), “*Doctor Facundus*.”

Life: Peter Aureolus (called also Peter d’Auriol, and Aureoli) was a distinguished alumnus and professor of the University of Paris in the early 14 century. He was made Doctor of Theology there in 1318, and the following year he was elected Provincial of the Franciscans of Aquitaine. In 1321 he was made Archbishop of Aix, and died in that office a year later.

Works: Peter wrote a *Commentary on the Books of Sentences of Peter Lombard*; and *Quodlibeta*, a discussion of various matters of philosophy.

Doctrine: Peter was a Scotist who, fired with zeal for the simplification of philosophy, developed a system which is non-Scholastic, and even anti-Scholastic. In the matter of Universals he is a Conceptualist. He denies the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures. He rejects the proofs offered by Scholasticism in demonstration of the fact that the soul is the substantial form of the body in man. He denies the real distinction between the soul and its faculties.

Remarks: Peter Aureolus probably took inspiration for his anti-Scholasticism from Durandus of St. Pourçain, whom we are about to discuss. He is important as a forerunner of Ockam, the most notable philosopher of the Terminist School. While his direct influence upon Ockam was slight (for Ockam testifies that he skipped hastily through the writings of Aureolus,

and this when he had most of his own philosophy formulated), he prepared, with Durandus, a receptive audience for the teachings of the Invincible Doctor.

ii. DURANDUS OF ST. POURÇAIN (died 1332), "*Doctor Resolutissimus*."

Life: Durandus was of French origin. He studied and taught theology at the University of Paris. After spending some years in the Papal Court at Avignon, he became (in 1317) Bishop of Limoux. The following year he was transferred to the see of Puy, and in 1326 to the see of Meaux, in which he died.

Works: Durandus wrote a *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*.

Doctrine: Durandus, at first an ardent Thomist, grew impatient of the current fashion of calling upon the authority of Aristotle, and developed an independent treatment of philosophical problems. While he merely exercised his right in rejecting human authority, he made a scientific error in refusing to study the bases of accepted authority. Durandus was a vigorous and independent thinker, but he was not a deep or systematic philosopher. He freely criticized doctrines which he did not understand. For instance, he misinterpreted the Thomistic doctrine of *sensible* and *intelligible species*, then rejected them as inanities, and so took all value from the Universal as representative of essential reality. Rejecting, in consequence, the *active intellect* which forms *intelligible species*, he taught an implied Nominalism. He makes the *specific nature of things* the Principle of Individuation, i. e., he teaches that the individual is determined by *this matter* and *this form*, and that further identification of the individual is impossible, and would be useless if it were possible. He declares that God does not concur immediately in the actions of His creatures. God, having once and for all equipped His creatures for their proper activity (by creating them in determinate nature), needs to concur with them

no further. God's activity, then, with regard to creatures may be reduced to *creation* and *conservation*. That which is known as *concurrence* is involved in the *creation* of things.

Remark: Durandus has no claim to great achievement in philosophy. His works are strongly reactionary, faulty in matter, superficial in manner. Yet he holds, with Aureolus, a place in the History of Philosophy because of the impetus he gave to the Terminist movement, which had its greatest philosopher in William of Ockam.

iii. WILLIAM OF OCKAM (about 1280–1348), "*Doctor Invincibilis*," "*Venerabilis Inceptor*."

Life: William was born at Ockam in Surrey, England. He entered the Franciscan Order, and pursued his studies at the University of Oxford. He studied under Scotus, but followed no master. He became involved in the disputes between Philip the Fair of France and Pope Boniface VIII, and suffered imprisonment and excommunication for his intemperate and unorthodox views. He was reconciled with the Church and with his Order before his death, which occurred in 1348 or soon thereafter.

Works: William wrote a *Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard*; *Commentaries on Aristotle and Porphyry*; *Quodlibeta*; and a *Dialogue on the Temporal Power of the Popes*.

Doctrine: William's doctrine on human knowledge is the core of his philosophy. This doctrine, known as *Terminism*, appeared in the works of Aureolus and Durandus, but William was the first to give it systematic form and full expression. Hence he is called the "Venerable Inaugurator" of Terminism. Terminism is really Nominalism, or perhaps it is more accurately described as Conceptualism with a cast towards Nominalism.

i. Theory of Knowledge.—St. Thomas had rightly taught that the formal object of the senses is *the individual in concrete*

and material existence; while the formal object of intellect is the *Universal abstracted from individual sense-findings*. Hence the intellect does not directly and immediately perceive the individual as such; this is the function of sense; and from sense findings represented in phantasms the active intellect abstracts the *intelligible species*, which, being impressed by the active upon the passive intellect (*species impressa*), causes the latter to react in the *species expressa* or *idea*. Scotus proposed a doctrine which clouded this clear distinction between sense-knowledge and intellectual knowledge, not hesitating to ascribe direct knowledge of individual or singular realities to the intellect. William of Ockam adopted the Scotistic view and extended it. He distinguishes *sense* and *intellective* faculties, making both *intuitive* of individuals (i. e., making both sense and intellect apprehend singular realities by direct knowledge). Intellect has also an *abstractive* function, and this it exercises in forming its knowledge of something abstract (e. g., "unity") from many individual things (e. g., "units"); and also in using its knowledge of individual reality when the object is absent. In *Quodlibeta* V, q. 5, William says, "The same knowledge can be called *intuitive* when the thing known is present, and *abstractive* when the thing known is absent."—The *act of knowing* is a direct and self-explanatory process, and requires no *species*, either *sensible* or *intelligible*. In consequence of this doctrine William rejects the Universal as understood by the Scholastics, i. e., as an essential representation, or, in other words, as the representation in intellect of an essence common to extramental individuals. He makes the Universal a fiction of the mind, a mere grouping of individual objects of the intellect on a basis of similarity. This fiction, or concept of things, is called the *term*—it is the *conceptual term*, and finds exterior expression in the *spoken term* and the *written term*.

ii. *Physics and Metaphysics*.—William, resting upon the Principle of Parsimony ("Ockam's Razor"), denies the necessity of distinction between the "Metaphysical Grades," be-

tween essence and existence in creatures, between the soul and its faculties. Notice that William does not admit even a rational or *logical* distinction in these cases. He does admit the distinction between matter and form in bodies, and follows Scotus in alleging a plurality of substantial forms in man. He teaches that the soul is spiritual and immortal; but asserts that this cannot be known by reason unaided by Faith. Reason alone can prove neither the existence nor the nature of God; whatever we know of God is a matter of Faith. In offering argument for this last contention, William implicitly impugns the *Principle of Causality*, which demands that every effect must have its proportionate and adequate cause.

Remarks: Terminism had many followers, for it had two attractive features: (1) it dispensed with the endless distinctions and sub-distinctions of Scotism; and (2) it offered a seemingly light and easy solution of the most complex problems of philosophy. Yet these attractive features were deceiving, and Terminism does not justify its claim as a serious interpretation of the universe—the function of true philosophy. On the contrary, Terminism is full of implicit philosophical errors, some of which were openly developed before the middle of the 14 century. For this reason the University of Paris forbade the teaching of Terminism, and it was condemned by Pope Clement VI in 1346. Nevertheless, Terminism had its defenders during the 14 and 15 centuries in the Universities of Heidelberg and Cologne.

The chief Ockamists were:

- i. John Buridan (died about 1360);
- ii. Marsilius of Inghen (died 1396);
- iii. Thomas Bradwardine (1290–1349), a professor at Oxford, who developed Ockamistic Terminism into “Theistic Determinism,” making God’s will the determining cause of all our actions, and so destroying the freedom of the human will;
- iv. Nicholas of Autrecourt (middle 14 century), who de-

veloped a system of radical *subjectivism*, maintaining that nothing can be known for certain but the Principle of Contradiction. Thus he denied the Principle of Causality, the possibility of proving the existence of God as First Cause, and even the possibility of stating as self-evident the fact of our existence, or of the objective existence of the world. Thus, all our certainty (except that of the Principle of Contradiction) comes from ourselves, or *is subjective*, and does not concern things as they are apart from our consideration, i. e., *objectively*. Nicholas merely developed the latent skepticism in Ockam, who had destroyed the quidditative or essential value of knowledge and made our concepts empty terms.

b) THE 14 AND 15 CENTURY MYSTICS.

The 14 and 15 centuries saw a revival of Mysticism, both orthodox and heterodox. The chief orthodox Mystics were:

- i. Blessed John Ruysbroeck (1293-1381);
- ii. John Gerson (1363-1429);
- iii. Peter d'Ailly (1350-1420);
- iv. Denis the Carthusian (1402-1471);
- v. Thomas Hemerken (Thomas à Kempis), author of the famous *Imitation of Christ* (1380-1471).

Among the heterodox Mystics we mention:

- i. Blessed Henry Suso (died 1366), who was not consciously unorthodox in doctrine;
- ii. Master Eckhart of Hochheim (about 1260-1327), a Dominican, who was unorthodox, but not contumacious. He had 22 propositions condemned, but appealed to the Papal Court. He died before adverse decision was rendered.
- iii. John Tauler (1290-1361), who with Suso may be said to have prepared the way for Protestant Mysticism in Germany in the 16 century.

- iv. Nicholas of Cusa (1401-1464), whose doctrine contains latent theosophy and pantheism, although its author

sturdily denied this fact. Nicholas was a Cardinal. He is remembered also as a scientist, and as the originator of the scientific movement which appeared in full flare in the 16 century. He taught the rotation of the earth on its axis, a truth which Copernicus afterwards set forth in scientific form.

CHAPTER V

TRANSITION TO MODERN PHILOSOPHY

(1450-1600)

The study of the Greek and Latin classics was never utterly extinct among Christian peoples. Many of the Fathers of the Church, notably SS. Augustine and Jerome, and many ecclesiastical writers of the Middle Ages, praised the literary monuments of antiquity and imitated their polished style in their own writings. The esteem in which the pagan classics were held was increased in Italy and throughout Europe in the 14 century by the writings of Dante Alighieri, Francesco Petrarca, and Giovanni Boccaccio, the "Fathers of the Italian Language."

Now the Christian writers of the later Middle Ages, especially in centuries following the 13, allowed themselves to grow careless in their expression and to profess a contempt for the niceties of Latin style. The new and popular flair for pagan elegance struck against this indifference on the part of Christian writers, and developed a priggishness which regarded as barbarous not only the style but much of the matter contained in contemporary Christian works.

Greek literature, imperfectly known in Europe before the 13 century, was made available throughout the West during the 14 and 15 centuries. Commerce with the Greeks, the attempts of ecclesiastical powers to unite the Eastern Schismatics with Rome, and, finally, the fall of Constantinople and the settling of fugitive Greeks in Western Europe, were the occasions that led to the intemperate zeal for Greek learning that characterized this time.

Had the return to ancient elegance been kept within due bounds, it would have been a very good thing for Christianity. The truths of Faith would have the more readily won the favor of learned men by being presented with grace and ornateness. But, sad to say, the new "culture" did harm to the Faith, and this for several reasons. First, not only the elegant manner, but also the inelegant and gross matter of pagan classics came to be admired by inferior and ill-disciplined minds—always the majority in any civilization. Again, the exile of the Popes to Avignon in the 14 century, and the schism which followed a little later, lessened respect for ecclesiastical authority and reverence for the teachings of the Church itself. Laxity of morals followed as a matter of course. Christians, lay and clerical, neglected the study of sacred science and became devoted admirers of antiquity and the *works of men* (*Humanism*).

With the cult of pagan classics came the revival of the standards of pagan art. The combined revival or rebirth of ancient art and letters came to be called the Renaissance. And when the movement had reached its height, there occurred the revolution of Protestantism in the 16 century. Thus in art, letters, and religion, the minds of multitudes were turned to doctrines and ideals far removed from the articles of Faith and from Scholastic Philosophy, which was contemptuously regarded as a mere instrument of that Faith. Thus was the way prepared for modern systems of philosophy, which began to appear in the 17 century.

For these reasons the Period discussed in the present Chapter is called the Period of Transition to Modern Philosophy.

The Chapter treats of the Philosophy of the Period of Transition in the following articles :

Article 1. The State of Scholastic Philosophy in the 15 and 16 Centuries ;

Article 2. The Revival of Pagan Philosophies ;

Article 3. Naturalistic Philosophy of the Period;

Article 4. Political Philosophy of the Period.

**Article 1. The State of Scholastic Philosophy
in the fifteenth and sixteenth Centuries**

a) Thomism; b) Terminism; c) Scotism; d) Suarez.

As the cult of classical antiquity increased, the prestige of Scholasticism declined. The adversaries of the great Philosophy of the Golden Age were numerous and violent in their attack; while discords among the Schoolmen rendered weak and futile their efforts at defence. Scotists and Thomists, Terminists and Realists, battled and wrangled, or entertained themselves with dialectic drivel, while the fortress of true Scholastic Philosophy was being laid in ruins. Aroused at last to their dire necessity, the Scholastics made some show of unified effort. Led by the Masters of the University of Paris, earnest philosophers inaugurated a movement for the restoration of pure Scholasticism. A royal decree was passed in France forbidding the teaching of Terminism (Nominalism), and prescribing that Aristotelean Philosophy be taught in the Schools. Among commentators on Aristotle approved in the decree were Thomas and Averroes (!), Scotus, Alexander of Hales, Giles of Rome, and Bonaventure. The Dominicans—who, indeed, had never abandoned Thomism—were a great power in the work of restoration. They applied themselves ardently to the study of the Angelic Doctor, and in the mid-15 century they installed his *Summae* as text-books in their Schools, displacing the long enduring *Sentences* of Peter the Lombard. One of the greatest Dominican Scholastics of this period was Thomas de Vio, called Cajetan (1469–1534), an Italian, who, with Sylvester of Ferrara (1474–1528), led the movement for the restoration of Scholasticism in Italy and Spain.

The movement for restoration bore fruit, but the force of

anti-Scholasticism, aided by the Humanists and the heretics, could not be stayed. Besides, the Schoolmen were unable, on a sudden, to free their camp of all abuses; and the excessive love of dialectical subtlety, the contempt for new findings in experimental and historical sciences, the neglect of elegant letters, were things still to be corrected at the beginning of the 16 century. Hence the Scholastics had not only to revive the doctrines of the Golden Age; they had also to extend the principles of their philosophy in the interpretation of the steadily increasing data of sacred and profane learning and of the experimental sciences; and this work they neglected. Some Scholastics did, indeed, remain true to scientific ideals, trying with unflagging energy to keep abreast of the times. Chief of these was Francis de Vittoria, Italian Dominican (1480-1546), and he had numerous imitators among the Dominicans and in the newly established Society of Jesus. These men tried to teach Scholastic Philosophy in a manner suited to the times, and their efforts bore fruit throughout Europe, especially in Spain and Italy. Yet, in despite of all, the philosophy opposed to Revelation advanced in scope and influence day by day.

a) THOMISM: The Thomists of the 15 century were mostly commentators trying to adapt philosophy to the needs of the hour, and, while they did some service for Scholasticism, they also wrought some harm, inasmuch as they confused the scope of philosophy and theology, and in varying degrees abandoned the form, the method, and the order of the Angelic Doctor.

The principal 15 century Thomists were:

- i. Paul Socinas (died 1494);
- ii. John à Lapide (died 1494);
- iii. Dominic of Flanders (died 1500);
- iv. Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469-1534);
- v. Francis de Sylvestris de Ferrara (1474-1528).

The Thomistic philosophers of the 16 century carried on, under the leadership of Francis de Vittoria, the work of reducing Thomism to its pure form. Chief of these philosophers were:

i. *Dominicans*:

Francis de Vittoria (1480-1546), who taught at Salamanca, where he began the great work and left it to his pupils (*Salmanticenses*) to carry on.

- Dominic de Soto (1494-1560);
- Melchior Canus (1509-1560);
- Bartholomew of Medina (1527-1581);
- Dominic Banez (1528-1604);
- John of St. Thomas (1589-1644).

ii. *Jesuits*:

- Peter Fonseca (1528-1599);
- Francis Toletus (1532-1596);
- Gabriel Vasquez (1551-1604);
- Louis Molina (1535-1600);
- Francis Suarez (1548-1617) (cf. page 267.)

b) **TERMINISM**: Terminism waned rapidly after its condemnation by the King of France in 1474, but its influence extended into the 16 century and it bequeathed some doctrines to the anti-Scholastics of the age; these doctrines were, partially at least, transmitted to modern philosophy. Terminists of the 15 and 16 centuries within the camp of Scholasticism were:

- i. Paulus Pergulensis (died 1451);
- ii. Gabriel Biel (1425-1495), who was a teacher of Martin Luther;
- iii. John Major (1478-1540).

c) **SCOTISM**: The chief Scotists of the 15 and 16 centuries, all members of the Franciscan Order, were the following,

- i. John Faber (end 15 century);
- ii. Peter Tartaretus (end 15 century);
- iii. Joannes Magistri (1432-1482);
- iv. Antony Trombetta (died 1518).

d) SUAREZ. Of all the philosophers mentioned in the foregoing lists, perhaps the most notable, and certainly the most enduring in influence, was Francis Suarez, Jesuit (1548-1617). Suarez denied the real distinction between essence and existence in creatures, admitting only a logical distinction with a foundation in fact (*virtual distinction*). He taught, in consequence, that matter and form in bodies have, neither of them, complete existence, but form a complete existence in their union. He regarded *subsistence* as a perfection superadded to an already existing nature. He rejected the Thomistic Principle of Individuation (quantified matter) and made this the *entity of a thing considered absolutely*. He taught that accidents of a body inhere in the Prime Matter and not in the composite (matter and form) body itself, making exception, however, of some accidents which are fitted to inhere in both matter and substantial form. He asserts that Prime Matter has entitative extension antecedent to its accident of quantity in bodies. He makes the direct and immediate object of intellect concrete and individual reality; teaching that the *species* abstracted by the agent intellect are entitatively immaterial, but *representatively* material and individual. From such singular or individual knowledge the intellect rises to universal concepts, or the formation of Species and Genera. In this last point Suarez is at one with Scotus. Suarez is remembered also for his doctrine on the knowledge of God, the so-called *scientia media theory*, which he adopted from Louis Molina, revising it, however, and expressing it in a manner not consonant with Molina. But this is rather a matter of speculative theology than of philosophy.

Article 2. The Revival of Pagan Philosophies

a) Platonists;

b) Aristoteleans.

a) PLATONISTS.

The genuine works of Plato, newly known in Western Europe in the late Middle Ages, found many admirers among the Humanists for their elegant and polished style, and also for their poetic doctrines. Aristotle, too, came to be known in the original, and had many followers. Many who had no flair for Plato or Aristotle followed Averroes and Aphrodisias as a sort of fad; and some tried to revive Stoicism, and even Epicureanism.

The more important Platonists of the 15 century were:

i. George Gemistus Pletho (1355-1450), of Constantinople, who opened an "Academy of Plato" at Florence in 1440, and taught what he believed to be Platonism, but what was, in reality, mostly Neoplatonism borrowed from Plotinus.

ii. Marsilio Ficino (1433-1499), of Florence, who was a pupil of Pletho, and his successor as principal of the "Academy of Florence." Ficino made a real effort to know pure Platonic doctrine.

iii. Cardinal Bessarion (1403-1472), a disciple of Pletho, but much more moderate in doctrine than his master.

iv. Giovanni della Mirandola (1463-1494), a pupil of Ficino, and a man of wide and profound learning.

The first two (Pletho and Ficino) are the most important Platonists of the late Middle Ages. Pletho taught that God, an absolutely single substance, gave origin to spiritual beings or Ideas by emanation, and that the Ideas gave off human souls. The souls contemplated the Ideas and so gained their intellectual knowledge. God created matter from nothing. The Ideas infused forms into matter and so constituted the bodily uni-

verse. Ficino rejected the emanation theory of Pletho. He taught that God created all things from nothing. First He created the world of subsistent spiritual beings, then the world of souls (world-soul, star-souls, human souls). Finally, He created the bodily universe. Ficino professes Ontologism, saying that the soul (though not pre-existent in time to the body) directly perceives God, not in His Essence, but in the Divine Ideas, which are the exemplars of all things made; and thus the soul comes to intellectual knowledge or understanding of things.

b) ARISTOTELEANS.

The chief Aristoteleans of the 15 and 16 centuries were:

i. Theodore of Gaza (died 1478), a native of Salonica, who translated many books of Aristotle into Latin. He was a spirited opponent of contemporary Platonism.

ii. Alexander Achillini (1463-1518), who followed the Averroistic interpretation of Aristotle.

iii. Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), of Mantua, who interpreted Aristotle in a manner concordant with the theories of Aphrodisias.

iv. Andreas Caesalpinus (1519-1603), physician to Clement VIII.

With the Aristoteleans may be mentioned the Neo-Stoic, Justus Lipsius (Joest Lips; 1547-1606) and the Neo-Epicurean, Peter Gassendi (1592-1655).

These Medieval Aristoteleans were materialists. Most of them denied the immortality and spirituality of the individual soul. Some affirmed a universal soul, spiritual and immortal. Most of this School are Averroistic in their description of the nature and future lot of the human soul. Since this doctrine is flatly opposed to the Catholic Faith, some, not wishing to break with the Church, took refuge in the "Twofold Truth" theory, and professed to be undisturbed by the fact that their philoso-

phy and theology did not agree: both were asserted as true, notwithstanding their disagreement.

Article 3. Naturalistic Philosophy of the Period

The Renaissance fostered love of the fine arts, and aroused interest in the study of *Nature*, the exemplar of all the arts. During the 15 and 16 centuries interest in the sciences which investigate nature increased day by day. The experimentalists discovered many wonderful and valuable truths, but, lacking a stable basis of philosophy, they oftentimes interpreted their findings in a manner harmful to true philosophy and to religion.

We group the experimentalists here as "Naturalists." This does not mean that all professed a philosophy of Nature, complete and concordant, or that each philosopher agreed with the others—on the contrary. We group these scientists as Naturalists merely because they engaged in the study of natural science rather than in that of Logic, Metaphysics, and Ethics.

The more important naturalistic philosophers of the time were:

i. Nicholas Copernicus (1473–1543), who wrote four books *On the Revolutions of the Heavenly Bodies*;

ii. Bernardine Telesius (Telesio; 1508–1588), who instituted at Naples an Academy for the study of natural sciences;

iii. Thomas Campanella (1568–1639), a Dominican Scholastic who was disturbed by the anti-Scholasticism of the time, and tried to reform the whole philosophic system;

iv. Galileo Galilei (1564–1642), a mathematician and astronomer, called by many "The Father of Modern Experimental Science." His doctrine on the heliocentric movement of the earth aroused bitter controversies, even among theologians;

v. Johann Kepler (1571–1631), a famous astronomer;

vi. Paracelsus (1493–1541), a physician, experimentalist, and philosopher;

vii. Geronimo Cardano (1501-1576), a physician and naturalist;

viii. Francesco Patrizzi (Patritius 1529-1597), a follower of Telesius; he abandoned Aristoteleanism for the Platonism of his time;

ix. Giordano Bruno, a Dominican (1548-1600), naturalist; he was a proud and dissolute man, and was expelled from his Order for insubordination and heterodox doctrine. He travelled throughout Europe preaching heretical and immoral doctrines. Taken at Venice and brought to Rome, he was condemned and burned at the stake in 1600.

The foregoing agree in stressing the importance of experimental science, but they differ much in their philosophy. Copernicus, Galileo, and Kepler did not enter the domain of natural philosophy, generally speaking, but kept to experimental physics. Yet their sane use of induction led to the discovery of many natural laws, and demonstrated the value of this philosophic method in the field of experimental science: thus they indirectly contributed to the cause of true philosophy.

Telesius and Campanella proposed a philosophy of nature that may be roughly summed up as follows: God created matter inert, and then gave it two opposed powers, viz., heat and cold. At first these powers divided matter evenly between them. The heated matter became thin, white, and readily movable; while the cold matter became dense, heavy, and opposed to motion. The heated matter, ascending, composed the heavens; the cold matter, remaining below, made the earth. By the action of heat upon the earth, and the reaction of the cold earth, different kinds of things were gradually formed, of which living things are the most perfect. Life itself is due to a heated substance penetrating a bodily organism. Telesius substitutes this heated-life-principle for the substantial form of Aristotle (i. e., in living things), and calls it *soul* in plants, brutes, and men. To save his Faith, Telesius also postulated in

man a strictly spiritual soul created by God, which spiritual soul is the principle of thought and free-will. At this point Campanella leaves Telesius and advances some further theories of his own. He *analyzes human nature*. He declares that man has the power of acting, the power of thinking, and the power of willing. He asserts that these powers are found, in more or less perfect degree, in all existent beings. Everything that exists has its power of acting, it *knows* its entity, and it *wills* the last end towards which it tends. Hence it is the function of true philosophy to investigate the principles of *being, knowing* and *willing* in all things, and to refer these to God, who is Himself constituted in the *infinite grade* of being, power, intellection, and volition. This doctrine of universally extended power, knowledge and will in all beings is called *Pan-Psychism*.

Paracelsus and Cardano were physicians who cultivated experimental science. They proposed nothing of any moment to the philosopher. They professed a kind of mysticism, and practised theurgic and magical arts, seeking to cure the sick and to ward off the bad influence of evil spirits, stars, etc.

Patrizzi and Bruno entered the field of philosophy more directly than any of the "Naturalists." The former wrote *A New Philosophy of All Things*, in which he strikes at Aristotelean doctrine, and professes himself a Platonist. As a matter of fact, however, he is rather a Neoplatonist than a Platonist. He says that in the beginning there existed only the absolute *One*, containing all things in Itself. By successive emanations, the one produces pure spirits, the world-soul, human souls, and bodily nature (*Pantheism*). No bodily being has its own proper activity; all activity in the universe proceeds from the world-soul. Analogously, all activity regarded as proper to man proceeds from the human soul alone. In Physics, Patrizzi follows Telesius. Bruno professes a pantheism of *manifestation*. In the works of Nicholas of Cusa he had read that "God is the complication of all things; He is the coincidence of opposites." Therefore, says Bruno, God is the essence of all things.

Things are but the manifestations or “unfoldings” of God, who is latent in everything. This divine manifestation has two phases, matter and form. Matter is a passive principle; form (which is single and unique in the whole of matter) is an active principle, which functions universally, being the efficient and final cause of all things. The human soul is but a manifestation of the universal form, and thus will never perish. In *Physics*, Bruno follows Telesius.

Article 4. Political Philosophy of the Period

The Renaissance, or, more accurately, the Humanist movement, brought to light the works of ancient legislators and political philosophers, and these were studied with great zeal by the votaries of the new fad of studying and excessively valuing “everything human” in the treasury of the universe. This study, plus the spirit of rebellion against authority, ecclesiastical and civil, which the Reformation induced, as well as a new devotion to the so-called Principle of Nationality (which holds that each nation should constitute its own civil society) occasioned the emergence of many social philosophies in the 16 century. Not a few of these were opposed to the Social Ethics of Scholasticism.

Of the Political Philosophers of the Period we mention only three:

i. Niccolo Machiavelli (1469–1527), who expressed his political philosophy in a work called *The Prince (Il Principe)*.

ii. Bl. Thomas More (1480–1535), English martyr, whose *Utopia* describes an imaginary island-republic so governed as to procure absolute equality for its citizens and to promote universal happiness—an ideal impossible of attainment.

iii. Hugo de Groot (Grotius 1583–1645), a learned Dutch divine (Protestant), who wrote on *The Right of War and of Peace*.

Machiavelli teaches that the chief aim of civil society is

the development of *The State*. The State must be made supreme in all things, and all means are lawful to achieve this great end. The ruler need feel himself bound by no law, natural or human, but may manage things at will, so long as he works consistently in the direction of State supremacy. Machiavelli warred against Christianity, which he found in conflict with his ideal of State apotheosis.

De Groot was much more of a philosopher than either Machiavelli or Thomas More. He distinguishes right as *divine* and *human*, and subdivides human right into *natural* and *civil*. He calls civil or social right *voluntary* because he believes that while man has a *tendency* towards life in society, he has actually assumed social obligations and privileges by a sort of free compact, at least implicitly. He declares that in the state of original innocence community of goods among men was assured; the right of individual ownership became necessary as a consequence of sin; and this necessary right secured recognition in the world by at least a *tacit* agreement or compact among men.

BOOK THIRD

MODERN PHILOSOPHY

(17 Century to the Present Day)

PRELIMINARY REMARKS

The anti-Scholastic movement, which originated in the 13 century and increased in power and scope during the three following centuries, destroyed the prominence and influence of Scholasticism but did not replace it by any complete and comprehensive system of philosophy. Matters philosophical were in a formless ferment.

In the 17 century, however, systematized anti-Scholastic philosophies were formulated by René Descartes in France and Holland, and by Francis Bacon in England. Following the lead of these noted philosophers, thinkers of the 17, 18, 19, and 20 centuries have evolved numberless systems of non-Scholastic and anti-Scholastic philosophy, all more or less unstable and ephemeral. Our own day sees continuous changes in the character and principles of the predominating anti-Scholastic systems.

Negatively to characterize modern philosophy we may say, generally speaking, that it rejects the Scholastic doctrines of knowledge, Universals, matter and form, the substantial union of body and spiritual soul in man, and many other cardinal tenets of Scholasticism. Modern philosophy, impatient of anything resembling authority, holds itself strictly apart from connection with Revelation, and refuses to accept the services of revealed truth as its light and guide. Not all modern phi-

losophers are non-Christian, but most are; and it is fair to characterize modern philosophy generally as un-Christian, if not anti-Christian.

Positively considered, modern philosophy is a welter of disagreeing and contradicting systems. Yet these systems have a common note in the fact that they are mainly concerned with the *critical question*, the question of the origin, character and validity of human knowledge. In solving this and minor questions, modern philosophers are markedly *subjective* in two senses: (1) they show cleverness in formulating plausibilities that pass for philosophy without justifying that character as interpretations of the objective universe; and (2) they repose knowledge upon the basis of the *knowing subject*, rather than upon that of real *objects known* or *to be known*. Naturally enough, in view of the subjectivistic character of the modern philosophic spirit, nearly all modern systems weaken the power and valor of man's cognitive faculties, as well as the objectivity of knowledge.

Scholasticism, submerged as it was at the beginning of the Modern Period, was never extinct. It lost its prestige in the 15 and 16 centuries, and it did not begin to regain its place of recognized prominence until the late 19 century. In our own day its place and power are assured; and the *Neo-Scholastic Movement*, inaugurated by Cardinal Mercier at the Institute of Louvain in 1880, promises to restore Scholasticism to its former influence.

The present Book treats of Modern Philosophy in three Chapters, as follows.

Chapter I. Philosophy of the Seventeenth Century.

Chapter II. Philosophy of the Eighteenth Century.

Chapter III. Philosophy of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.

CHAPTER I

PHILOSOPHY OF THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY

The *Criteriaological* or *Critical Question*—the question of the character and value of human knowledge—engaged the minds of 17 century philosophers. Some of these admit an essential distinction between sense-knowledge (*sensation*) and intellectual knowledge (*intellection*), and some, at least implicitly, deny it. Those who admit such a distinction fall into exaggerated spiritualism or *intellectualism*, denying that ideas are abstracted by the intellect from sense data, and asserting some supersensible origin of ideas. Those who deny the essential distinction of sense and intellect, make intellect and sense alike perceive objects in singular or individual concreteness (*Sensism or Empiricism*). Both Intellectualists and Sensists are *subjectivistic* in their treatment of knowledge, the former holding that the intellect of the thinking subject gives valid knowledge, the latter asserting the validity of the sense of the knowing subject. Because of its subjectivism, the 17 century philosophy is always near to *skepticism*, and the age inevitably developed some varieties of this destructive philosophy. Finally, Scholasticism, diminishing steadily in prominence and influence, had some few defenders of note in the 17 century.

The present Chapter, therefore, treats of its subject-matter in the following articles:

- Article 1. Seventeenth Century Sensism or Empiricism;
- Article 2. Seventeenth Century Intellectualism;
- Article 3. Seventeenth Century Skepticism;
- Article 4. Seventeenth Century Scholasticism.

Article 1. Seventeenth Century Sensism or Empiricism

a) Francis Bacon; b) Thomas Hobbes; c) John Locke.

Lord Bacon inaugurated Empiricist philosophy in England in the 17 century. After him, others made *sense*, or *empirical knowledge*, the basis of all philosophy. After flourishing in England throughout the 17 century, Empiricism spread through Europe, and especially through France, in the 18 century.

a) FRANCIS BACON (1561–1626).

Life: Francis Bacon, Baron Verulam, Viscount of St. Albans, was born in London, and was educated at Cambridge. He spent two years in Paris as companion of the English Ambassador there. Returning to England upon the death of his father, he took up the practice of law. But his native flair for speculation made him devote much of his time to philosophy and theology, and he studied history and letters as well. Made Lord Chancellor under James I in 1618, he was charged with dishonesty in office, and was dismissed and heavily fined.

Works: Bacon's great work is his *Instauratio Magna* (Great Restoration), which consists of two parts: (1) *On the Dignity and Development of the Sciences* (De dignitate et augmentis scientiarum), and (2) *The New Organ of Sciences* (Novum organum scientiarum), which treats (a) of the character and importance of science, and (b) of scientific method.

Doctrine: Bacon wished to remodel the whole structure of science and philosophy. To this end he employed the *inductive method*, i. e., observation and experiment. Deduction he regards as a method wholly inept, and the source of endless confusion in science and of interminable conflicts among philosophers. Having fixed upon *induction* as the one suitable scientific instrument, Bacon revises the division ("subordination") of

sciences. He declares that the logical and natural basis for a division or arrangement of sciences is the faculty in man to which certain groups of sciences specially appeal. First, he distinguishes the faculties of mind as *memory*, *imagination*, and *reason*; to these, he says, correspond *history*, *poetry*, and *philosophy*. History reports the deeds of nature, or of men in civil society, and is accordingly distinguished as *natural* and *civil* history; civil history is subdivided into *civil history proper*, *ecclesiastical*, and *literary* history. Poetry imitates history (*narrative* poetry), or exaggerates it (*dramatic* poetry), or expresses matters intellectual in type and symbol (*parabolic* poetry). Philosophy, or science proper, is divided into *Theology*, founded on revelation, and *Natural Philosophy*; natural philosophy deals with *God*, *man*, the *visible world*. Natural philosophy treats of God's existence; this it can prove; but for anything more than the mere existence of God, one must go to theology, based on divine revelation. Natural philosophy treats of man *in se* (*Human* philosophy) and as a member of society (*Civil* philosophy); human philosophy treats of the bodily structure of man and the means of acquiring goods of body (*Somatology*); of the rational and sensitive soul (*Psychology*); and of the union of soul and body (*Philosophy of human nature*): *civil* philosophy treats of society as a means of utility to man. The philosophy of the visible or sensible world looks to the causes of things (*speculative* philosophy), or to the production of effects (*practical* philosophy); speculative philosophy investigates efficient and material causes (physics), or formal and final causes (*metaphysics*): practical philosophy finds its instrument in *mathematics*.

To present this *division of sciences* in schematic form:

- I. History (memory) {
- 1. Natural..... {
 - i. descriptive
 - ii. inductive
 - 2. Civil..... {
 - i. civil proper
 - ii. ecclesiastical
 - iii. literary

- II. Poetry (imagination) {
- 1. imitates history (narrative poetry)
 - 2. exaggerates history (dramatic poetry)
 - 3. typifies the intelligible (parabolic poetry)

- III. Philosophy (reason) {
- 1. Theology {
 - i. God's existence
 - 2. Natural Philosophy. {
 - ii. The World {
 - a. speculative {
 - physics
 - metaphysics
 - b. practical (mathematics)
 - iii. Man {
 - a. human {
 - somatology
 - psychology
 - philosophy of human nature
 - b. civil (social utility)

Having established his division of sciences, Bacon proposes his *true scientific method*. Rejecting deduction and syllogistic reasoning as unscientific, he affirms that induction is the only serviceable instrument available to the scientist-philosopher. By induction Bacon does not mean the hurried and improperly tested induction such as the old Scholastics (following Aristotle) used in forming their Universal ideas and general principles. Such induction, says Bacon, is wholly unscientific and the source of much confusion of thought. The tendency to follow the old syllogistic reasoning is strong in many men; it must be cleared away from the mind before any advance in science can be made. Besides this useless and hindering tendency for false rules of demonstration, there are other varieties of intellectual lumber that must be banished from the mind as a preliminary clearance for the beginning of true science. Bacon calls this intellectual lumber by the name *idols of the mind*, and these he divides into four classes:

- i. *idols of the tribe*: i. e., defects and limitations of nature;
- ii. *idols of the den*: i. e., individual prejudice;
- iii. *idols of the market-place*: i. e., prejudices arising from the influence of other members of society;
- iv. *idols of the theatre*: i. e., prejudices arising from the authority of philosophers, and from false rules of demonstration.

All the *idols* or mental rubbish cleared away, a man is ready for the acceptance of science. He employs the instrument of induction. He learns first of all that induction, to be scientific, must proceed by way of rejection or exclusion, as well as by inclusion. He learns that induction progresses with very slow and careful steps. He learns that for every act of induction the mind must consider four lists or classes of things. To illustrate: suppose the scientist wishes to investigate the *cause of heat*. He will first make a careful inclusive list of things in which heat is found (*List of presence*). Next, he will make a careful exclusive list of things which have, indeed, an affinity

with heat-possessing objects, but which lack it themselves (*List of absence*). A third inclusive list must be carefully made of things which possess heat in varying degrees (*List of comparison*). Finally, the scientist will make a list of things which not only do not possess heat, but which have no affinity whatever with heat-possessing objects (*List of rejection*). Now the scientist will compare his lists; he will study them with the greatest care and the keenest attention. He will be struck by the fact that heat is, in every instance recorded in the lists, associated with *combustion*. He will observe that where there is no combustion there is no heat, and that heat increases as combustion increases. Then he will rightly and scientifically conclude that *combustion is the cause of heat*.

Remarks: Bacon discussed "science" in general and in detail, but his works show that he did not clearly understand the nature of what he discussed. He continually confuses science (which is knowledge through causes) with knowledge in the general or ordinary sense. His division of sciences is false, for two reasons: (1) He takes the faculties of the *knowing subject* as the basis of this division, whereas, quite obviously, he should have taken the *formal object known*. In other words, he makes the division of sciences subjective, whereas it should be objective. (2) The division of cognitive faculties (memory, imagination, reason) is not coördinate; these faculties are not of the same grade; imagination is a sense-faculty, reason is intellectual and hence spiritual, memory exists in both orders.

There is nothing essentially new in Bacon's inductive method; Aristotle developed everything that Bacon presents in elaborate detail, and Bacon condemned Aristotelean induction without knowing anything about it. Besides his method contains a radical defect in that it dismisses deduction as useless. Without deduction philosophy properly so-called is impossible; and in rejecting deductive reasoning Bacon rejects the basic principles of knowledge which are arrived at by an *a priori* analysis of concepts. In consequence, he may justly be said

to limit the field of philosophy to the natural sciences alone.

Bacon did not achieve his end, which was the restoration or reformation of philosophy. If he deserves praise for his insistence upon painstaking and accurate observation and experiment, he deserves great blame for the harm he did in rejecting metaphysics proper and syllogistic reasoning. His method opened the way to Empiricism, Positivism, and Skepticism. Hence Bacon is the inaugurator of modern Empiricism.

b) THOMAS HOBBS (1588–1679).

Life: Hobbes was born in England, and was educated at Oxford. He lived for some time in France, where he was professor of mathematics and philosophy to the exiled King Charles II. Hobbes was a considerable factor in the contemporary political movements in England.

Works: Hobbes wrote a famous political work called *Leviathan*. His chief philosophical work is *Elements of Philosophy*.

Doctrine: Hobbes was the pupil and friend of Bacon. He adopted his master's philosophy and developed it to the extreme of sensism and materialism. He declares that metaphysical and spiritual entities are myths, since nothing but what is bodily can or does exist. Philosophy is the science of bodily being. Philosophy deals with three sorts of bodies: (1) natural bodies are studied in *Physics*; (2) the human body is studied in *Psychology*; (3) the body politic is studied in *Ethics*.

i. Hobbes' *Physics* contains nothing of note. It is only a re-daction of the physical doctrines current in his time.

ii. *Psychology*. The human body has two elements: bodily organism, and the soul. The soul is made of a more subtle material than the body. The organism has the faculties of nutrition, generation, and motion; the soul has cognitive and appetitive faculties. Knowledge is distinguished into sensation and intellection. The highest sensation act is that of the imagination, which conserves particular sensations and even fuses these

into new images. Intellectual knowledge is a more perfect sort of knowledge. It arises from speech and other external signs of cognition. It is common to men and brutes. As a man is said to *understand* (i. e., to have intellectual knowledge) when he hears another speak (and so recalls the imagination-image of the thing signified by the word spoken), so a dog, taught by custom, *understands* that he is called or sent away when he hears his master's voice. Still, human intellection is superior to brute intellection in that a man can compare his imagination-images, can affirm or deny their agreement, and so reach conclusions which are really new cognitions. Hobbes, of course, denies the doctrine of Universals. He admits universal *terms*, but says they express nothing objective or essential in things, but are simply group names for objects associated on the basis of external resemblance (*Nominalism*).

iii. The Body Politic, or Society, which is studied in *Ethics*, is an artificial, or rather non-natural association voluntarily entered upon by men. For man is not naturally a social being. His natural state is that of a solitary wanderer, even that of a "human animal of the forest." In this independent state—which man held originally before forming society—everything was licit that made for self-preservation, or was necessary or useful to individual man. Therefore, *man was a wolf to man*. But the natural wild state of man did not satisfy his desire for unbroken peace; his wolfish selfishness and that of other individual men made his condition one to demand constant alertness and the ability for sudden predatory action. But man wanted peace. To secure it he entered into alliances with others of his kind, and formed leagues for mutual defence against incursions. Of course, this meant the sacrifice of many advantages and privileges enjoyed in the solitary life, but that was the price of assured peace. Rulers, chiefs, governing boards, came gradually into existence as the needs of the new social life made themselves manifest. And thus *civil society* came into the world, a society that we must define as a union of many who

have freely renounced their rights and privileges as predatory individuals, and have banded themselves together as a unit obedient to governing authority, so that the common benefit of assured peace may be the portion of all. The State, or civil society, once established, is supreme in its authority in all that makes for peace. State authority must regulate all things, even religion (and all citizens must obey at least in external practice); and so long as the general aim of peace is maintained, no individual right can be urged against state authority. There are three forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Of these monarchy is the best, as both reason and history testify.

Remarks: Hobbes' fundamental error is his gratuitous postulate that man is not a social being *by nature*. Indeed, the postulate is more than gratuitous, it goes against the natural social character of man as affirmed by reason, by history, and by revelation. Admitting no natural law for primitive man, Hobbes invents a natural law for the guidance of constituted civil authority, and confuses the data of the natural law or norm and the purely civil enactments of government. Hobbes' Nominalism, like every phase of that theory, is utterly destructive of all science. His materialism (in which he includes his theological notions, making God matter) likewise makes rational science impossible, and destroys the sane basis of morals.

c) JOHN LOCKE (1632-1704).

Life: Locke was born at Wrington, England. He studied philosophy and medicine at Oxford. He held public office under Lord Ashley, but after the latter's downfall, retired to Holland. He returned to England with William of Orange, and died at Oates in Essex, in 1704.

Works: Locke's great work, *An Essay Concerning the Human Understanding*, is divided into four books: the first treats of innatism and refutes it; the second treats of the origin of

ideas; the third deals with language; the fourth, with science and opinion.

Doctrine: At Oxford Locke acquired a sketchy knowledge of Scholasticism, and a rather complete understanding of the theories advanced by Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes; his own philosophy is strongly colored by the influence of these contemporary systems. First and foremost, his philosophy is characterized by its *Sensism*. Again, like that of Bacon, Locke's doctrine is marked by continuous confusion of sensation and intellection. Our outline of Locke's philosophy will treat of his theory of ideas, speech, certitude, and the moral order.

i. An *idea* Locke conceives as any object of knowledge—phantasy, notion, species, sensation, concept. He rejects *innatism*, the doctrine of in-born ideas, and declares that *all* ideas are acquired. All ideas come from *experience*: or, more fully, direct external sensation and internal sensation (reflection) are the sole fonts of human knowledge. Ideas are of two kinds: *simple* or *composed* (compound). Simple ideas are those that are uniformly the same in mental representation, and cannot be analyzed or divided into component idea-parts: such an idea is, for example, that of "whiteness." Compound ideas are merely combinations of various simple ideas.

(1) *Simple ideas* are acquired by sensation or reflection. Those that are acquired by sensation, come from one sense (e. g., color) or from more than one (e. g., extension—from sight and touch). Simple ideas which come through the senses represent *sense qualities* of things. Now sense qualities are themselves of two kinds: some are always found in bodies (e. g., solidity, extension) and these are *formally objective*, and their ideas represent them as they are in nature. Others do not always exist in bodies (e. g., color, savor), and these have nothing *objective* about them except that the object in which they are sensed has a *power of producing sensations of such qualities in us*. Hence, our ideas of such qualities are not conformable to any formally existent object in nature. The

qualities always existing in bodies, i. e., the formally objective qualities, are called *Primary Qualities*. The other qualities, i. e., those only causally objective, are called *Secondary Qualities*. Primary Qualities are: solidity or impenetrability, extension, figure or shape, rest, motion. Secondary Qualities are: color, sound, odor, taste, temperature.

(2) *Compound* (or *complex*) *ideas* are the product of the mind which has the power to combine its simple ideas in various unifications or fusions. Such indefinitely multiple ideas fall into three general classes: *Modes*, *Substances*, *Relations*. *Modes* are ideas which represent what has no proper and independent existence, but depends in being on a substance which it *modifies*. Modes are *simple* in compound ideas made up of ideas of the same species: thus, the number *ten* is a simple mode when it expresses ten units of the same species. Modes are *mixed* when the components of the modal idea are of different species: *beauty*, for example, is composed of color, figure, etc., and so the idea is a mixed mode. The more important modes (modal ideas) are the ideas of space, place, time, active and passive potency.—*Substances*, in the order of ideas, are the mind's postulate of some subject or substratum underlying and supporting sense qualities. In the order of reality, substance is a wholly unknown and unknowable *something* which supports qualities. It exists, but that is all we can know of it; we know *that* it is, but cannot know *what* it is. There are three kinds of substances, *bodily*, *spiritual*, and the *infinite* or divine substance. Bodily substance is the substratum of sense qualities; spiritual substance is the substratum of *reasonings* and *volitions*; the infinite substance is the substratum of our ideas of unlimited knowledge, power, etc.—*Relations* are ideas which arise from the mind's perceiving of an order existing between objects. The chief relation is that of *cause and effect*.

ii. *Of Speech*.—Speech would be impossible if every individual thing in existence had its proper name. But, by pre-scinding from circumstances of place, time, etc., which de-

termine this or that individual existence, we can obtain an idea which represents many individuals. This is called a universal idea, and it is expressed in speech by the *universal term*. Similarly, we may prescind from the differences of many ideas, and so acquire a more universal idea: it is thus that we attain to our universal ideas of body, substance, being, etc. Now our universal ideas of things do not represent the intimate and impenetrable essences of these things, for our knowledge is limited to the findings of sense. *Real essences*, then, are beyond our grasp; that they exist we know, but beyond the fact of their existence we know nothing about them. Our universal ideas represent *nominal essences* of things, i. e., that which the mind perceives by eliminating individual features in many things and grouping them on the basis of what is sensibly perceived as common to them all. Thus Locke—inevitably confused about the nature of intellectual knowledge, and reducing all knowledge, in the last analysis, to the plane of things sensible—mistakes the true nature of Universals, and proposes a *Nominalistic* doctrine on the subject. Universals are for Locke no more than more or less arbitrary groupings occasioned by the necessity for speech; and the universal term is merely a group name.

iii. *Of Certitude*.—We have certitude when we perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas. Ideas agree or disagree on three heads: (1) *identity*, (2) *relation*, (3) *co-existence*. Thus when the mind perceives the reason why one idea is precisely the same as another, we have the certitude of identity; and, contrariwise, when the mind perceives the reason why one idea is not another, we have the certitude of diversity. Again, when the mind perceives a certain order or *habitus* existing between ideas, we have the certitude of relation. Finally, when the mind apprehends one idea as always conjoined with another, we have the certitude of co-existence. We perceive the agreement or disagreement of ideas either *intuitively*, by direct cognition, or *by demonstration*, i. e., indirectly through

reasoning. Now what of the *realities* outside the mind which ideas represent? Can we have certitude of the existence of these? In other words, have we certitude of realities as we have certitude of the agreement or disagreement of *ideas*? Locke seems to incline to the belief that we have such certitude. For, he says, when we consider ideas of things non-existent (of a gold mountain, for example) with ideas formed upon direct sense perception, we must attribute to the latter some objective foundation which is lacking in the former. The most that can be said here is that Locke does not deny the validity of ideas as representative of some objective reality; but he minimizes our certitude of the existence of things, and naturally enough, since his denial of the objective existence of secondary sense qualities makes our senses *fallible* even when engaged upon their *proper objects*; and sense-knowledge is the basis of all knowledge. Locke says that our knowledge of our own existence is *intuitive* (i. e., directly perceived); and that our knowledge of the existence of God is *by demonstration* (i. e., is reasoned out). We do not know with certitude whether our souls (and God) are spiritual or corporeal; we conceive them as spiritual, i. e., as the spiritual substance which is the support and substratum of reasoning and volition, but this is a mental view, and is not necessarily representative of the objective condition of such substance. It may be that *matter* (bodiliness) is endowed with the power of thought, or reasoning and volition; thus we cannot prove that the soul is spiritual because of its thoughts and volitions. Still, Locke distinguishes God from the world, and calls Him a divine and spiritual substance.

iv. *The Moral Order.*—*Good* and *evil* are but the respective causes of pleasure and pain. What begets joy in us is *good*; what gives rise to pain is *evil*. *Moral* good and evil consists in the agreement or disagreement of *human acts* with *certain laws*. This agreement or disagreement brings in its wake reward or punishment (determined by the law-maker), and hence is the cause either of pleasure or of pain. The *laws*

which regulate human acts are : (1) the divine law ; (2) human laws ; (3) the law of opinion. The divine law is made known to men by reason and revelation ; the greatest pleasure or pain follows respectively upon obedience or disobedience to this law ; obedience to it is a *duty*, and disobedience is *sin*. Human or civil law is promulgated by legislators in civil society ; it involves rewards (pleasure) and punishments (pain) ; obedience to this law makes one *innocent of offence* ; an act of disobedience to this law is a *crime*. The law of opinion is the common estimate of men that some actions are worthy of praise, and some of blame ; it involves pleasure (praise) and pain (blame) ; an act in conformity with this law is *virtuous*, an act contrary to it is *vicious*. Notice that Locke makes virtue consist in meriting the praise of men, not in action consistently conformable to the divine law. Again, he says, since not all peoples agree in their estimate of what is praiseworthy, that which is a virtue in one place or time may be a vice in other circumstances.

Remarks: Locke served philosophy by refuting *innatism*. For the rest, his philosophy is destructive rather than constructive. He distorts the notion of *ideas* ; he minimizes the validity of thought ; he tends to skepticism in his theory of the non-objectivity of secondary sense-qualities ; he delivers a *subjectivist* opinion on certitude ; he erroneously regards the norm of morality as a *threefold* law, denies intrinsic good or evil in human activity, and bases morality ultimately upon its causal relation to pleasure and pain ; he wrongly asserts the value of a law of opinion differing in different peoples.

The germ of Locke's errors lies in his confusion of sensation and intellection. His philosophy is sensistic. Now sensism leads naturally to *materialism* ; and Locke proposed a sheerly materialistic doctrine in his assertion of the possibility of thought in matter. Though a sensist, Locke tends to *idealism* in his vague doctrines on substance and causality. He also tends to *skepticism*, as already noted, inasmuch as he denies

the objectivity of secondary sense-qualities. Thus we find in this philosopher an influence that makes for *idealism* and *skepticism* as well as *materialism* and *sensism*.

Article 2. Seventeenth Century Intellectualism

a) Descartes; b) Malebranche; c) Spinoza.

Descartes, whose doctrine won many admirers in Holland and France in the 18 century, may justly be called "The Father of Intellectualism." Though connected with the Intellectualistic School, Malebranche and Spinoza developed new systems of philosophy wholly alien to the mind of Descartes.

a) RENÉ DESCARTES (1596–1650).

Life: René Descartes, whose name in Latinized form is *Renatus Cartesius*, was born in 1596 at La Haye, in Touraine, an ancient province of France, now Indre-et-Loire. He made his studies with the Jesuits at La Flèche, where he showed a special ability in mathematics. His studies in philosophy interested him without convincing him, and, after much puzzling meditation and discussion, he decided to abandon philosophy for a military career. But he could not keep his mind away from the alluring topic of philosophy, and, during a winter's inactivity in camp he sketched a plan for *the complete reconstruction of science*. Withdrawing from the army, he travelled through Europe, and finally settled in Holland, where he spent most of his remaining years in study and writing. His works evoked the most acrid criticism, Protestants and Catholics alike declaring that they savored of atheism, skepticism, and other great errors. To escape the heckling of critics he was glad to accept an invitation from Queen Christina of Sweden to a place in her court. He went to Stockholm in 1649, and died there the following year. Descartes is remembered as the inventor of Analytical Geometry. In passing, English-speaking students should notice that the Latin form of this philosopher's

name (*Cartesius*) is generally used adjectivally in reference to his doctrine, which is called *Cartesian*.

Works: Descartes wrote: *A Dissertation on Method; Meditations on First Philosophy; Principles of Philosophy; Treatise on the Passions.*

Doctrine: Descartes was a great and constructive mathematician and physicist, but we shall speak of him only in his character as philosopher. We find him beset with philosophic doubts even in his student days, and he remained unsettled until he had excogitated an original method of arriving at truth and certainty. Descartes' early skepticism has a threefold explanation: (1) he had a mathematical mind, and he believed that philosophy should be a body of clear-cut, evident, and generally accepted truths, just as mathematics is; (2) he knew Scholastic Philosophy slightly enough to condemn it as a useless muddle of doctrine, while, on the other hand, (3) he found non-Scholastic philosophies a clashing chorus of disagreements. Thus, Descartes felt that existing philosophies could offer him no safe guide to truth; and yet he was convinced that philosophy *could* be formulated with such mathematical clarity and exactness that it must appeal to all minds as indisputably true. Had he known Scholasticism thoroughly, or had he had that sympathy and acumen which would have led him to study it thoroughly, he would doubtless have been a notable Scholastic. He had a very laudable desire of knowing the sure method of arriving at truth; but, unfortunately for himself and for philosophy, he based his doctrine upon a false assumption, and then developed it into a system of absurdities with all the ardor and logic of a wholly sincere and unusually keen mind. That is the tragedy of Descartes. It is to be remembered that Descartes preserved throughout life the deepest reverence for Revelation, and tried constantly (with success, as he thought) to harmonize his theories with Catholic dogma. We speak briefly here of Descartes' Logic or *Method*, his Cosmology, Psychology, and Natural Theology.

i. *Logic or Method*.—Rejecting Aristotelean Logic as useless, Descartes formulates *four rules of method* for the guidance of thought. These rules are: (1) To begin with, nothing is to be taken as true that the deliberate mind does not perceive to be so absolutely certain that it can in no wise be doubted. (2) Difficulties are to be grouped into as many classes as will be helpful to their complete and facile solution. (3) Strict order must be observed in the formulation and expression of true doctrine, the general observance being procedure from the simple to the complex; and from the less complex to the more complex. (4) Nothing is to be omitted; every circumstance that can possibly affect a subject of discussion must have due and thorough consideration. Putting these rules into practice, Descartes looked about for his starting-point, viz., “some fact so absolutely certain in the deliberate mind that it can in no wise be doubted.”

(1) *The Starting-point*.—In youth we have all held opinions as certainly true which maturer experience has shown us to be false. Such opinions were accepted unquestioningly upon authority, or were derived from fallacious sensations. We must not look to authority, then, nor to sensation, as the starting-point of the quest for truth. Of our intellectual possessions, the axioms of mathematics seem, at first glance, to be indubitably true; yet even these can be doubted by an effort of mind (*Methodic Doubt*). The starting-point we seek is, therefore, not to be found in mathematics. Can we formulate a Methodic Doubt, then, of all things? No, we cannot doubt that we doubt; we cannot, even by an effort of mind however valiant, escape from the absolutely certain conviction that we are making an effort of mind. In a word, we are indubitably certain that we *think*. And if we are certain that we think, we are certain of *ourselves as thinking*. The certainty of thought coördinately postulates the certainty of existence of the thinker. Descartes sums this up in the famous formula, *Cogito, ergo sum*—*I think, therefore I exist*. This is not an inference; it does not mean

that the certainty of existence is achieved by reasoning directly from the certain fact of thought: it means that *thinking* and *existent thinker* are equally indubitable in the deliberate mind. The basis of all science and philosophy, the starting-point of the quest for truth, consists in the two truths, *I exist* and *I think*.

(2) *Progress from the Starting-point*.—I know, then, that I exist and that I think. To know more about myself I must analyze and study the thinking process. This process has three acts: formation of *ideas*, consciousness of *affections* (i. e., appetites, emotions, etc., which *affect* the thinking subject), and pronouncement of *judgment*. Now *ideas* are true in themselves; they are what they are; I have certainty of so much. If ideas do not truly represent the things for which they stand, this is the fault of *judgment* which pronounces them representative, and not falsity in ideas themselves. *Affections* are likewise true in themselves; though I consciously experience a tendency or appetite for the impossible, it is nevertheless true that I do experience the tendency. If I err in determining the nature or cause or circumstances of affections, this is an error in the *judgment* I pronounce upon these matters. Affections, like ideas, are to be rated as true and certain in themselves. The possibility and the danger of error consequently lies in *judgment*. If I am to achieve certainty, I must learn to avoid erroneous *judgments*. Such judgments must ordinarily be pronouncements upon the agreement or disagreement of my *ideas* with that which they represent; in other words, if I err, I err most often in pronouncing (*judging*) as objectively real what my ideas so represent, but which, as a matter of fact, is not objectively real. Therefore I must investigate *ideas* so that I may know how accurately and to what extent things in nature correspond to them.

(3) *Examination of Ideas*.—Ideas are *innate*, *adventitious*, or *fictitious*. *Innate* ideas are born in me; they belong to my nature. Such ideas are, for example, those of *being*, *truth*,

thought. *Adventitious* ideas come to me from without; they are formed with the coöperation of sensation. *Fictitious* ideas are those which I consciously "make up," such as my idea of Sinbad the Sailor, the Lorelei, a dragon. All ideas are of the same nature as *modes of the intellect*; but in their character as representations of things they are of diverse values. The ideas that are inborn in me I directly and inevitably recognize as true; *fictitious* ideas I understand as self-caused, but *adventitious* ideas come to me without the interference or coöperation of my own will, and must therefore have a *cause* outside myself. Such ideas are *effects* in me and have their *cause* outside me. Now if there is perfection in the effect (idea) there must be perfection in the cause (the extramental thing which the idea represents). Some adventitious ideas exhibit a greater degree of reality than others. The idea of *substance*, for example, represents a much greater degree of reality than the idea of quality or other *accident*. Therefore *substance* as *object* (represented in idea) must actually have a greater degree of reality than *accident*, considered objectively. But ideas may come from other ideas. Granted, but the chain of such ideas is not infinite; one must attain at the last to the *highest* idea of all, beyond which there is no other idea that can efficiently cause it in the mind. But this highest idea, uncaused by other ideas, is not caused by myself, for its perfection could not come from my obviously imperfect and limited faculties. Therefore, it must come from a really existent object which has the perfection represented in the idea. Now, as a matter of fact, I have the idea of infinity, limitless perfection: and this, by reasons given, must have been caused in me by an infinitely perfect Being who actually exists. This being is God. Therefore God exists. The existence of God is certainly known, and is an important factor in the further development of the doctrine of certitude.

(4) *Corollaries of God's Existence.*—I find myself absolutely certain (after recognizing the fundamental certitude of my

thought and my existence) of the really representative character of many ideas that have no material existence in bodily nature. I know, for instance, what a triangle is and must be. Of other mathematical figures and formulas I have the same certitude. Now this certitude must be genuine, for I find that the very nature of my understanding requires me to accept it, and God, the author of my nature, would be *deceiving* (and *not* all-perfect, which is absurd!) if things which I must naturally hold as true were not actually true. In the matter of sensation, I find that sensations (sense-knowledge of external bodily things) are not self-produced. If I look at an object, for example, I see it, whether I will to see it or not: my will does not affect the perception. Does the object then exist? If it does not, my faculties deceive me, and this, in view of the existence of an all-perfect and non-deceiving God who gave me faculties, is an impossible conclusion. Therefore the external world exists. Does it exist precisely as I perceive it? Not altogether, perhaps, for sense-perception is often obscure and confused. But at least all things exist in external or objective reality which are comprised in the scope of pure mathematics,—e. g., all things which have *extension*.

ii. *Cosmology*.—As the essence of the mind is thought (because *thinking* is that in and by which we are primarily aware of mind) so the essence of bodies is extension according to the threefold dimension. This is so because we can conceive of a body without rest, motion, weight, and other properties; but we cannot conceive of a body without extension. Therefore matter (bodily reality) is extension. But *space* is also extension. Therefore space and matter are identical. It is consequently absurd to regard the world as composed of matter and vacuum intervals—since vacuum means space without matter, and space and matter are identical. It is also absurd to imagine space beyond the limits of the bodily world. But, as a matter of fact, we can and do imagine the limits of the world extended limitlessly; and what is truly imaginable must

be true: hence the world (material world) has no limits. What makes bodies different? Every body is made of atoms of the same nature, form, and size. God set these in motion in the beginning, and they formed swirling groups which came together to form bodies of different weight, size, and movement, and thus the bodily world was formed.

iii. *Psychology*.—The only soul is the thinking soul. Therefore plants and brutes have no souls, no *life-principle*. The seemingly *vital* activity of plants and brutes comes from the harmonious balance of parts in their “organism” and has no intrinsic substantial principle unifying and directing operations. Plants and brutes are only splendid pieces of machinery. Man’s soul is united with the body (which, in itself, is a mechanical union of parts) in an intimate manner, but not *substantially*. The soul directs bodily operations in man, and receives impressions through bodily senses. Although the soul in-forms the whole body, it resides in the brain, and particularly in the pineal gland, whence it directs man’s functions of understanding, imagination, and sensation. Sensation is not the function of soul and body together, but of the soul alone, though the soul requires the services of the body in acquiring external impressions. Different sets of nerves for each kind of sensation (seeing, hearing, taste, etc.) carry these external impressions to the soul.

iv. *Natural Theology*.—Descartes’ theory of certitude involves his (“ontological”) proof of the existence of God. God really exists. God is a substance. More: God is the only true substance, for substance is “that which requires nothing beyond itself in order to exist.” What we call “substance” in reference to matter or spirit other than God is not truly substance, and we call it so metaphorically. All things outside God require His concurrence in order to exist, and thus fall short of the requirements of substance. God is thus self-existing, and absolutely independent. All things depend upon God’s constituting will: e. g., a triangle has three sides, and three angles

equalling 180° because God wills it so; an action is good or bad because God wills it so.

Remarks: Descartes' Method (or Logic) falsely assumes the fact of *thinking* and the coördinate fact of *existence* of the thinker as the one absolutely certain basis of science. Now, he cannot be sure of self-existence, even by thinking, unless he admit the reliability or validity of his thought, and also the Principle of Contradiction. Descartes declares that he doubts (*methodically*, not *really*) everything but the fact of thought and the coördinate fact of existence. Here he contradicts himself at the outset, for he declares that he doubts the veracity or validity of the very thought by which he is aware of himself as a thinking existence. In other words, his universal doubt includes a doubt of his own capacity for *valid* thought at the very moment he asserts thought as validly existent. In his discussion of ideas leading to the proof of God's existence, Descartes employs the *principle of causality*, which, for him, must be of *doubtful* value by his hypothesis of universal doubt. He is guilty of a "vicious circle" in the fact that he proves God's existence by thought, and then proves thought valid by the perfection of the existing God.—In Cosmology, Descartes falsely places the essence of bodily being in extension, for extension defines quantity, and quantity is an accident. Again, he falsely posits *homogeneous matter* and *local motion* as the constituting principle of bodies. This is pure *atomism*.—In Psychology Descartes errs in his mechanistic explanation of animal and plant life; and also in asserting the mere accidental union of soul and body in man.—In Natural Theology (or *Theodicy*) he rightly asserts God's independence; and his doctrine of God's metaphysical essence may easily be interpreted as the true one. But he falsely makes God the only substance, falsely defines substance itself, falsely asserts the will of God instead of the Divine Reason as the ultimate norm of morality, and falsely attributes the essential being and relations of things to the arbitrary decision of God. The falsity of

his norm of morality appears in a contradiction involved in his theories of God's veracity and His arbitrary determination of morality. For if God's arbitrary decision be the ultimate determinant of good and evil, might not such a decision render our *deception* good? Thus the whole Cartesian argument for the validity of thought is destroyed.

Cartesianism was received with enthusiasm by many philosophers of the 17 century. It had much about it to attract. It was new; it seemed exact, clear-cut, logical; it offered at least the possibility of achieving satisfaction of mind and rest in the truth, while older systems had been found inadequate. Scholasticism was imperfectly known and perfectly despised. English Empiricism and Sensism had not yet invaded continental Europe. Thus Descartes' philosophy had no great rival system on the ground to oppose it.

Important Cartesians in Holland and Germany in the 17 century were:

i. Christopher Wittich (1625-1687), professor at the University of Lyons. He rejected the authority of Scripture, made philosophy wholly independent of Revelation, and defended the Physics of Descartes against those who found it in disagreement with Scripture.

ii. John Clauberg (1625-1665), a German philosopher, stressed the Cartesian distinction between soul and body, and minimized their relations or interactions, and so prepared the way for *Occasionalism*, a doctrine which makes God the direct operator in all actions of His creatures, and gives to creatures merely the faculties for arranging the *occasion* for divine intervention. He also perverted Cartesian metaphysics, and made the relation of Creator and creature analogous to that of the mind and its thought (*pantheism*).

iii. Arnold Geulincx (1625-1669), sometime professor at Louvain, denied all relation of activity between body and soul, teaching that the senses do not supply the mind (soul) with external impressions, and attributing these to the direct act

of God. Geulincx inclined towards a type of pantheism that was later explained and professed by Spinoza.

Exponents of Cartesianism in France were: Antony Arnauld (1612–1694) and Peter Nicole (1625–1695). Among French Thomists who show the influence of Cartesianism in their works were the great orators, James Benignus Bossuet (1627–1704), Bishop of Meaux; and Francis Fénelon (1651–1715), Archbishop of Cambrai.

The chief opponent of Cartesianism in Holland was Gisbert Voet (1589–1676), professor of Protestant theology in the University of Utrecht. English Protestants who opposed Descartes' doctrines were: Ralph Cudworth (1617–1688), Henry More (1614–1687), and Isaac Newton (1642–1727). In France, opponents of Cartesian philosophy were: Daniel Huet (1633–1721) and Peter Gassendi (1592–1655).

b) NICOLE MALEBRANCHE (1638–1715).

Life: Malebranche was born of noble parentage at Paris. He studied at the Sorbonne, and at the age of twenty-two entered the Congregation of the Oratory. He was deeply interested in history and philology, but devoted himself to the study of Cartesian philosophy after he had read some treatises of the great Descartes. He wrote much, and had a place of prominence in the scientific controversies of his time.

Works: Malebranche wrote many books. The following are important for philosophy: *The Search for Truth; Tract on Ethics; Dissertation on Metaphysics and Religion; Treatise on the Created Infinite.*

Doctrine: Malebranche rightly perceived that Descartes' proof for the existence of God proceeds from the Principle of Causality—a principle not available for Descartes, since he had made it subject to doubt. Malebranche carefully avoided this blunder and asserted that God's existence needs no proof,

but is directly and immediately (*intuitively*) known by our intellect. This doctrine not only relieved the philosopher of the necessity of formulating a clumsy proof for God's existence, but it simplified the puzzling matter of the origin of ideas. Malebranche emphasized and extended the Cartesian doctrine of mere accidental union between soul and body, and asserted that no creature is the efficient cause of its own operations, all these being the direct products of God's intervention. We may express all the foregoing points by saying that Malebranche's doctrine is characterized by *Ontologism* and *Occasionalism*.

i. *Ontologism*.—Things which have objective being outside the mind are not directly known, but are known only in their ideas. The mind (soul) knows ideas rather than things. Descartes allowed as much, but declared that the senses furnish the soul with external impressions which are used in the formulation of ideas. Malebranche rules out this service of the senses, and makes the soul perceive all its ideas in its idea of God. He reaches this conclusion by way of elimination: he says that there are six possible explanations of the origin of ideas; these he examines, rejecting five, and asserting as true the doctrine already explained. The six possible theories on the origin of ideas are:

(1) Objects outside us give off or exhale something which the soul receives as the material for ideas. False; such exhalations would be material, and could not come into intimate conjunction with the spiritual soul.

(2) Our soul has the power of evolving its own ideas without outside influence. False; for ideas possess reality, and if the soul could evolve such reality, it could *create*, which is absurd.

(3) God, in creating our soul, produced in it the ideas of things. False; for God could not infuse an infinite number of ideas in a finite soul, and the soul can form ideas indefinitely;

besides, even if the soul had an infinite number of ideas, this theory would not explain its determination, its actual conscious acceptance, of certain of these ideas and its neglect or rejection of others.

(4) God successively creates ideas in the soul as often as the soul thinks. False; for sometimes the intellect, being ignorant of a certain object, applies itself to the study of that object; this theory leaves unexplained the actual choice and application of the soul in reference to a definite object.

(5) The soul contains in itself the perfections of all things knowable, and in studying itself it perceives these and so forms ideas. False: for the soul is limited, and obviously does not contain the perfections of all things knowable. The scope of things knowable is unlimited; the soul, on the other hand, is limited.

(6) The soul possesses the idea of the most perfect Being (God), which contains in Itself the representations or exemplars of all things; viewing this Perfect Being, ideally represented, the soul can contemplate all things in It. True; we see (intellectually) all things in God, who is immediately present to every soul. The soul does not create or determine its own activity in viewing God, but is illumined by God to know other things existing (in exemplar and cause) in God. Why assert this doctrine (*Ontologism*) as true? Because it is quite clear that all men wish to know all things; and such a wish is inexplicable unless the soul has an impulse to this wish in a general presence of all things. Again, the objects of abstract ideas (universals) are not found as such in reality about us; only God's presence and illumination can explain such ideas in the soul. Furthermore, we have an idea of *the infinite*; such an idea cannot be developed by adding *finite* to *finite*, and yet the limited soul could not of itself achieve anything but the finite; only the presence and illumination of God in the soul will explain this idea. This doctrine (*Ontologism*) does not mean that

we perceive God's Essence, but that we behold Him as participated in creatures; or, more properly, that in the idea of God we behold the ideas of other things (creatures) which exist in Him as in their exemplary cause.

ii. *Occasionalism*.—Malebranche thinks that belief in any efficient power outside God is a doctrine both pagan and polytheistic. For, he says, the idea of supreme power is the idea of divinity itself; and the idea of inferior powers must be the idea of inferior divinities. All operative activity is directly from God. Man's soul, for example, only seems to move his body; it is God who contributes the actual movement. One body often seems to communicate movement to another; but this is only seeming, for God produces the movement. Creatures then, bodily and spiritual, are without proper activity; they are merely the *occasion* suitable for the communication of activity by God.

Remarks: Malebranche's Ontologism contradicts consciousness and reason, and gratuitously denies the abstractive power of the intellect. It contradicts consciousness, for we are quite aware that we do not perceive God immediately, but reach an idea of God through His creatures. It contradicts reason, for it asserts that we perceive some perfections in God without perceiving His Essence; and reason declares that the infinite Being is indivisible and that all perfections in Him are of His Essence.

Occasionalism conflicts with the infinite power of God in assuming that God could not, as Prime Mover, give to a creature the power of efficiently affecting another. This doctrine leads to ruinous consequences: (1) It easily induces *pantheism*; for if the divine substance alone is active, individual existences may easily be regarded as its mere appearances and manifestations. (2) It leads to the denial of free will in man (*Determinism*), for if man be not the efficient cause of his actions, he is not free, and not responsible for his actions.

c) BARUCH SPINOZA (1632-1677).

Life: Spinoza was a Jew. He was born at Amsterdam. In youth he studied only the Scriptures and Hebrew literature, but later he was instructed in Latin and Greek and in Cartesian philosophy. He rejected his Jewish religion and attacked its tenets. Expelled from the synagogue, and hounded by the civil power for certain expressions of monstrous opinion, he spent some years in rather aimless wandering through European cities. He finally settled at The Hague and adopted a humble employment which was sufficient to supply his few wants and left him time for study and writing.

Works: Spinoza wrote *The Principles of Descartes Expounded According to Geometry*; *Theologico-Political Treatise*; *On the Improvement of the Understanding*; *Ethics Expounded according to Geometry*.

Doctrine: Spinoza's philosophy is *pantheism*. In method he resembles Descartes. Both Spinoza and Descartes are idealistic, putting no trust in sensation, but proceeding *a priori* upon the evidence of ideas. Descartes begins with the indubitable fact of thinking existence and ascends to the idea of God. Spinoza begins with the idea of the Absolute (God) and descends to other things, following a sort of geometric plan. He begins each treatise with definitions; then come axioms; then demonstrations; then corollaries; and finally, scholia. We shall sketch his doctrine on God, the human mind and body, and morality.

i. *God.*—Spinoza defines *substance* as that which is conceived in and of itself; that which does not require the concept of any other thing in order to be understood. This means that the concept of a substance does not in any manner involve the concept of any other thing, even of any other substance. That which constitutes substance is called *attribute*; that which accidentally affects it is called *mode*. Everything existent is

either substance (attribute) or mode of substance. Divine Substance is an absolutely infinite Being; it is made up of infinite attributes, each of which expresses an eternal and infinite essence. Since no substance requires anything of another substance in its concept, there is absolutely nothing in common between substances; therefore one could not have caused another; it follows that all substances are *necessary* beings, and hence *eternal*. Now is there in nature a variety of substances? No, for there can be no two substances of the same essence (attribute), and all attributes are infinitely possessed by God, the Divine Substance. Therefore, *God is the only substance (pantheism)*. All things other than God, in our understanding of them, are merely *modes* of the Divine Substance.

ii. *The Human Mind and Body*.—A *body* is a mode of the unique Divine Substance which expresses in a determinate manner this *Divine Substance as really extended*. *Thought* (mind) is a mode which expresses the *Divine Substance as thinking*. *Thought* and *extension* are attributes of and in the Divine Substance, but what we know as bodies and as our thoughts (processes of mind) are but *modes* expressing these Divine Attributes. Man is, therefore, made up of two *modes* of the Divine Substance, viz., the mode of extension and the mode of thought. All things in the world come from God just as man does. As soon as a mode arises in the Divine Attribute of extension, a mode which recognizes or represents it arises in the Divine Attribute of thought. Thus modes of extension and thought proceed from God in perfect parallels, and make up the bodily universe. Now these *modes* (of thought and extension) have real *existence*. Hence Spinoza teaches a doctrine of pantheistic *realism*, or of *real pantheistic manifestation*. God's manifestations proceed from Him by necessity.

iii. *Morality*.—Since all things come *necessarily* from the Divine Substance, and since all things are in their ultimate nature one with that Substance, there is no room in Spinoza's theory for freedom, responsibility, or action directed to a final

end. In a word, there is no room for *morality*. Still, Spinoza tries to establish a rational basis for Ethics. He says human nature is marked by the desire for continued existence; this desire in the mind constitutes *will*; in the body, it constitutes cupidity or appetite or *tendency*. When the mind achieves a high plane of existence (i. e., when it functions thoroughly in its thinking) it experiences *joy*; contrariwise, it suffers *sadness*. Things are *good* or *evil* inasmuch as they make for *joy* or *sadness*. Now individual man is not self-sufficient; he needs society; therefore he finds that the perfection of existence and its continuance (tendency to which is the basis of morality) involves the necessity of striving for unanimity among men, for such social agreement as would be possible if the whole of society were one body and one mind. Thus Spinoza seeks (on a *utilitarian* basis) to preserve the individual and social virtues. He lauds the moral excellence of learning, for the more we know of things, the more we shall know of God in whom all things are ultimately found, and with whom they are identified. Such full knowledge as learning affords gives man the greatest and most perfect understanding of continued existence in God, and hence arouses the greatest peace and joy—and this constitutes *happiness*.

Remarks: Spinoza's pantheism springs, first and foremost, from his false definition of *substance*. He tried to save certain things from the sweeping embrace of his pantheism, but vainly—and thus his assertion of the immortality of the soul, for example, contradicts his fundamental doctrine of a Single Divine Substance, and also conflicts with his teaching that the soul is only a mode of thought recognizing the body as existent: for when the body perishes, the recognizing mode of thought must also cease.

Spinoza's doctrines brought persecution upon him. He was denounced as an atheist, a blasphemer, an impious and infernal schemer; he was even called "the scourge of the human race." His lot in the acceptance of immediate posterity was not more

favorable; the 18 century philosophers, notably the rationalists and Encyclopedists, rejected his doctrine as atheistic. But after Kant, and particularly in Germany, Spinoza's doctrines were received with favor, and their author was extravagantly lauded by philosophers and poets alike. Goethe was much pleased with his doctrine, and Schleiermacher was so entranced with it that he called Spinoza, "a new incarnation of the Holy Spirit."

Article 3. Seventeenth Century Skepticism

The idealistic spirit of the philosophy current in continental Europe during the 17 century very naturally led to skepticism. Descartes' Methodic Doubt was quickly changed to actual doubt, and many philosophers denied the possibility of achieving certitude by the unaided powers of nature. Even the dogmatic philosophers showed something of the skeptical spirit, inasmuch as they quite generally admitted the possibility of error in the use of natural faculties upon their proper objects.

The more important skeptics of the time did not, however, despair of attaining certitude; they merely declared that this was not to be had by *natural* powers. They turned to the supernatural, to Faith and Revelation, as the ultimate and only reliable criterion of certainty. This spirit of looking to God and to His Word for intellectual illumination was "in the air." It found expression in the Ontologism and Occasionalism of Malebranche and his followers. It even appears in the Pantheism of Spinoza.

Notable among the skeptics of this time were:

i. Joseph Glanville (1636-1680), an Englishman, chaplain of Charles II. He wrote a book called *Scientific Skepticism*, in which he shows the influence of the English Sensists. He allows some validity to sense knowledge, but denies that the in-

tellec can achieve truth and certainty by its own powers. The truths of Christian Revelation, however, are most certain;

ii. François de la Mothe Le Vayer (1586–1672), of Paris;

iii. Samuel Sorbière (1615–1670);

iv. Simon Foucher (1644–1696);

v. Blaise Pascal (1623–1662), a Jansenist, who figured prominently in the religious controversies of his day. His book *Pensées* offers much beautiful argument for the truth of Christianity, but denies the possibility of attaining truth by reason alone;

vi. Daniel Huet (1633–1721), Bishop of Avranches in France, wrote a work on *The Feebleness of the Human Understanding*, in which he draws upon Sextus Empiricus for proofs of the inability of reason to achieve truth by its unaided powers;

vii. Pierre Bayle (1647–1706) defends the thesis proposed by Pascal and Huet.

Article 4. Seventeenth Century Scholasticism

The 16 century saw Scholasticism opposed by many philosophers whose numbers were steadily increasing; but these had no general and coherent anti-Scholastic system. Their requirements in this matter were supplied by Descartes in the 17 century. Many flocked to his standard.

During the 15 and 16 centuries there were some Scholastics who were such merely because they found anti-Scholastic philosophies opposed to their Catholic Faith; these were "Scholastics by reason of Faith." Descartes' anti-Scholasticism consistently endeavored to keep in line with the Faith, and Descartes himself remained always a true Catholic. Hence, the "Scholastics by reason of Faith" went over to Cartesianism almost in a body.

During the 17 century the number of true and able Scholastics decreased more and more, and even the faithful few show,

for the most part, the influence of the new doctrines. The more important of the 17 century Scholastics were:

(1) *Thomists*: i. Jean Baptiste Gonet (died 1681), a Dominican, author of *The Shield of Thomistic Theology*, a book still in use;

ii. Antoine Goudin (1639-1695), a Dominican;

iii. Blaise of the Holy Conception, a Carmelite;

iv. Marsilio Vasquez (died 1611), a Cistercian;

v. Joseph Saenz de Aguirre (died 1699), a Benedictine, sometime professor at Salamanca, and author of a *Philosophy according to the Mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas*;

vi. The Benedictine School of Salzburg in Germany, whose members exerted a great influence for Thomistic theology and philosophy during almost two centuries. Important members of this School were: Paul Mezger (1637-1702); Placidus Renz (died 1748); and Augustine Reding (died 1692). Reding was not Thomistic in his doctrine on the nature of *physical premotion*. The foregoing members of the Salzburg School were theologians rather than philosophers, but they were important in the age of disappearing Scholasticism because they employed this Philosophy as their scientific basis in the exposition of theological doctrine. The School had its philosophers too, chief of whom was Ludwig Babenstuber (1660-1726), who wrote a whole course of Scholastic philosophy, still in use.

(2) *Scotist*: Claude Frassen (1620-1711), a Franciscan, whose exposition and commentary on Scotism is still in use, and is most helpful for the understanding of this difficult system.

Other Scholastics of the time were more or less prominent teachers in the Italian and Spanish universities.

CHAPTER II

PHILOSOPHY OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY

The Empiricism and Intellectualism of the 17 century were developed, during the age which followed, into a variety of systems. The general character, however, of all these permits them to be grouped under the two heads *Empiricism* and *Intellectualism*. This Chapter is accordingly divided into two articles:

Article 1. Eighteenth Century Empiricism.

Article 2. Eighteenth Century Intellectualism.

Article 1. Eighteenth Century Empiricism

a) Sensism; b) English Moralism; c) French Materialism.

a) SENSISM.

Locke's work *On the Human Understanding* had great vogue among his countrymen, and certain Anglican churchmen declared that it was a source of truth and wisdom second only to Holy Scripture. The elegant style of this work was as great a factor in its acceptance as were its philosophical doctrines.

Locke had but lightly touched upon matters of morality and religion in their bearing upon leading philosophical questions, but his followers remedied this deficiency. The great sensist left no well-instructed pupil to carry on his work and develop his philosophy in a manner consistent with its principles. For this reason it is no matter of surprise that some of his ardent followers deduced from Lockian principles absurdities which would doubtless have merited the hearty condemnation of the master. However, it is but just to say that the germs

of these absurdities are really latent in Locke's philosophy, the influence of which, as we have noted elsewhere, makes inevitably for *idealism* and *skepticism* on the one hand, and for *materialism* on the other.

Of those who extended Lockian Sensism to the moral order we shall speak on pages 312 and 313. Here we mention the philosophers who evolved the materialism latent in Locke's philosophy:

i. Henry Lord Bolingbroke (1662-1751) denied the spirituality of the soul and declared that there is no moral or political order which comes of Divine Law.

ii. John Toland (1670-1722) attacked all religion, especially Christianity, and pantheistically identified God with the material world.

iii. Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) denied the spirituality and immortality of the soul, but declared for the existence of a God distinct from the world.

iv. David Hartley (1704-1757) was not a thorough-going materialist, but he professed theories which involve the denial of the spirituality and immortality of the soul. He taught that man's intelligence differs from that of the brutes only by reason of its more vivid impressions.

In Holland, Bernard Mandeville (1670-1733), an admirer and follower of Locke, taught a completely materialistic doctrine, denying the need of religion and declaring that there is no objective distinction between good and evil.

In Spain, Benedict Feijoo (1676-1764), a Lockian philosopher, denied the essential distinction between sensation and intellection, declaring that brutes can reason.

In France, the Deists and Materialists (of whom we shall speak later) praised Locke; of those that followed the great Englishman without falling into sheer materialism, the most important was:

The Abbé Stephen Bonnot de Condillac (1715-1780), a priest of Paris, and the author of *The Origin of Human*

Knowledge and Treatise on Sensations. He asserts the existence of a spiritual soul in man, but limits its knowledge to sensation and material elaboration of sensation. He teaches that the founts of knowledge are sensation and reflection. The mind, receiving impressions through sensation and retaining them by sense-memory *reflects* on them, and arranges the various impressions into harmonious groups of *associations*. In his later work (*Treatise on Sensation*) Condillac revises his doctrine and rejects reflection as a source of knowledge distinct from sensation itself. Thus he makes *sensation* alone the fount of all knowledge. Sensations do not bring us into immediate understanding union with objects outside us (though such objects do exist), but only to a knowledge of *ourselves as affected or modified*.

b) ENGLISH MORALISM.

When Bacon, Locke, Hobbes, and others had spread Empiricism and Sensism throughout England, nearly all immediately subsequent philosophers developed this doctrine into either *materialism* or *deism*, and dealt with the matter of *morality* in the light of their theories. Materialism denies the existence of spirits; hence it rejects the immortality and spirituality of the soul, and the existence of an Infinite Spirit (God). Materialism is thus fundamentally pantheistic. Deism admits the existence of God (and even the existence of the spiritual soul), but denies Divine Providence and God's government of the world. Deism teaches that God, having made the world, has cast it aside as a child abandons a toy and concerns himself no more about it. There is, therefore, no Eternal Law which governs the world; and the actions of free creatures in the world have not to conform to any Divine Standard.

The moralists of this period in England posit the norm of morality in some inrooted instinct, taste, or sense of nature, which causes men to draw a line of distinction between good and evil. This distinction is not born of reason; it is a blindly

subjective norm; it is rather of the sensual than of the intellectual order; or, if it be called an intellectual thing, the word "intellectual" is understood in a sensistic manner.

Notable among the moralists who held "moral sense" as the norm of morality were:

- i. Anthony Ashley Cooper, Count Shaftesbury (1671-1713), a pupil of John Locke;
- ii. John Butler (1692-1752), a pupil of Shaftesbury;
- iii. Francis Hutcheson (1694-1747), an Irish professor at the University of Glasgow;
- iv. Adam Smith (1723-1790), a celebrated economist, professor at Glasgow.

Besides the philosophers who placed the norm of morality in some sense or instinct, there were other English moralists who, without discovering the true norm, rejected the theory of "moral sense." Such were, among others:

- i. William Wollaston (1659-1724);
- ii. Samuel Clarke (1675-1729);
- iii. Adam Ferguson (1724-1816).

c) FRENCH MATERIALISM.

During the 16 and 17 centuries English students and scholars frequently visited France, and spent some time in the French universities. During the 18 century French scholars began, in numbers, to repay the visits of their neighbors across the Channel. Many of these returned to France strongly imbued with the Empiricism and Sensism of the School of Bacon, Hobbes, and Locke. Thus did the English philosophy of the 17 century become current in 18-century France. Nor did this philosophy go undeveloped among the French thinkers; it was quickly evolved into materialism and moral sensualism, and also into skepticism.

Of the French Empiricists and Sensists who lapsed into materialism, or into a doubtful attitude about the existence of a

God distinct from the world, and the immortality and spirituality of the human soul, the more important were:

i. François Arouet, called Voltaire (1694–1778). He was born in Paris, but received part of his education in England. He did immense harm to the cause of Christianity and was so great a factor in the unsettling of the social order that he is justly regarded as one of the “Fathers” of the French Revolution. Voltaire was a deist. He admitted the existence of God—but of a God that had cast off the world. He was a man of keen but shallow mind, and had the diabolical zeal of a complete destructionist;

ii. Charles de Montesquieu (1689–1755);

iii. Jean Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), who presented an extreme social philosophy in his *Social Contract*;

iv. Claude Helvetius (1715–1771), who defended private *utilitarianism* as the basis of ethics;

v. Denis Diderot (1713–1784), who professed on evolutionistic *monism* in natural philosophy;

vi. Jean d’Alembert (1717–1783), who inclined towards *positivism*;

vii. Julian de la Mettrie (1709–1751), a physician, who was a complete materialist.

The foregoing philosophers either make outright denial of the existence of a God distinct from the world, and of the immortality and spirituality of the human soul; or they profess agnosticism in the matter, declaring that certainty as to the nature of God and of the soul is not achievable. For this reason they oppose the Christian religion. They reject the Eternal Law as the supreme norm of morality, acknowledge no last end of man to be attained in a life to come, and lay down a norm of ethical conduct which is reduced to *private utility*, and they determine an action as good or evil in accordance with its power to make for the goods and pleasures of this life, or contrariwise (*Moral Sensualism*).

Rousseau, following Hobbes, states as a fundamental ethical

truth that man is not naturally a *social* being but a *solitary*. Society makes demands upon its members which limit their individual liberty; and, says Rousseau, it would be absurd to say that man was by nature inclined to a limitation of his own liberty. Still, solitary man finds many difficulties which block his way to a continued and comfortable life, and against such obstacles his individual power is often vain. For this reason primitive man sought to increase his power by union with others. This accounts for the origin in the world of *social groups*. Man freely entered society (by *free contract*), and freely remains a member of it, although remaining so spells a limitation of his liberties. He is called upon to obey laws that are imposed upon him without reference to his personal and individual choice in the matter. This is an evil. But, granting that society has its advantages, it should be so constituted as to reduce this evil (the limiting of individual liberty) as much as possible. Therefore, the *people* should determine the form of government under which they live; the *people* should make the laws. Since it is obviously impossible that each and every citizen should have the full of his individual will in these matters, it will suffice if the will of the majority of citizens prevails. We see here that Rousseau makes the same error as Hobbes in thinking that man is not naturally inclined to life in society. But unlike Hobbes he does not exaggerate the power of social government (the State), but, on the contrary, minimizes it, and tries to make individual citizens the real determinants of law and order.

Article 2. Eighteenth Century Intellectualism

- a) Leibnitz; b) English Idealism; c) Thomas Reid and The Scottish School.

The Intellectualism originated by Descartes in the 17 century flourished throughout Europe in the 18. The Intellectualists agree that human knowledge is above the order of sensation, in

fact and in origin, but they disagree very widely and variously in their explanations of it. They disagree also in their doctrine on the objectivity of human knowledge, some declaring that we know things as they are in themselves objectively, and others modifying this teaching or denying it outright. The chief Intellectualist in Germany during the 18 century was Leibnitz. In the British Isles, Berkeley, Hume, Thomas Reid and the Scottish School were the leading exponents of the Intellectualism of the time.

a) GOTTFRIED WILHELM LEIBNITZ (1646-1716).

Life: Leibnitz was born at Leipzig. He studied under Jacob Thomasius, who instructed him in the doctrines of the old Scholastics. Afterwards he read Plato, Aristotle, and Descartes. He was perhaps the most scholarly man of his age, being well schooled in theological doctrines, history, and mathematics. In the field of the last-named science he is forever memorable as the inventor of the Calculus. He was a man of great literary talent, and he was well and widely read.

Works: The following works of Leibnitz are important for philosophy: *New Essays on Human Intelligence*; *Essays on Theodicy*; *Principles of Philosophy*; the last-named book is also called *Monadology*, because it contains the author's doctrine on *monads*, the basis of his natural philosophy.

Doctrine: Leibnitz was a conciliator. He declared for the eclectic principle that truth is scattered piecemeal among various disagreeing systems of philosophy, and that the work of the philosopher is to sift it out and bring it together in a unified body of doctrine. True to this principle, Leibnitz declares that he will offer no new doctrine. But he is not true to his principle in fact as he is in intention. In *Natural Philosophy* he presents original doctrine, and makes this the outstanding feature of his system. For the rest, he is largely a Scholastic, although it would be a grave mistake to call him such simply. He is listed as an Intellectualist because he taught

that the intellect does not draw its ideas from sensation, but evolves them out of itself. We treat here of his *Monadology*, his *Psychology*, and his *Theodicy*. It is interesting to note in passing that he coined the name *Theodicy* (Natural Theology) to distinguish the science of natural or reasoned doctrine about God from revealed theology (Supernatural Theology, or Theology proper).

i. *Monadology*.—Descartes had taught that the essence of bodily substance is extension by three dimensions. Leibnitz finds that this theory leaves unexplained the phenomena of natural inertia and of resistance. If body "a" strikes body "b," for instance, "b" resists and even changes the direction of "a." Therefore, there must be something essential in bodies in addition to pure geometric extension. Besides, Leibnitz perceives that the extension-theory contains the germ of pantheism and occasionalism: of *pantheism*, for extension demands a substratum and foundation, i. e., a *thing* extended; and it is easy to declare this one and divine, as Spinoza did; of *occasionalism*, because the extension-theory leaves the activities of bodies unexplained, and the Occasionalists had recourse to the immediate intervention of God to explain them. Therefore, Leibnitz rejects Descartes' theory of extension as the essence of bodies. He also rejects the general Cartesian definition of *substance* as "that which so exists as to require nothing else for existence," and offers as his own definition, "Substance is being endowed with the power of acting."

It is obvious that bodies are composed of parts, but the parts are not of infinite number; in dividing a body one comes at last to elements or units that are not further divisible (i. e., are *simple*) and so are naturally *indestructible*. These indivisible units are *monads*. God created all monads at once, and they will eternally endure unless He annihilate them. Each individual monad has its own distinct and proper nature; no two monads are of the same essence. Thus the monads have nothing fundamentally in common. One monad cannot transiently af-

fect another monad, but each has the power of in-dwelling (*immanent*) activity and can variously transmute its own qualities. Hence, although each monad is *simple*, it acquires multiple affections, states, dispositions or transformations by its own immanent operation. But each variety or change which occurs in one monad is reflected by a parallel change in every other monad; and this nexus between and among monads is called *perception*; and the change from one intrinsic state to another in monads is *appetition*. Thus all monads, since they operate immanently, are *entelechies*; but not all are *souls*, for, though all have perception and appetite, not all have apperception, i. e., consciousness and memory.

God wished to grade the monads on various levels of perfection, and hence created monads with unconscious perception, and monads with conscious perception (*brute souls*), and monads that have also the power of reflection and can form universal concepts (*human souls*). The human soul, like the brute soul, is a monad residing in a bodily organism (which is itself composed of monads) and differs from other monads only in that its perception attains the grade of rationality and reflection.

Since one monad cannot act efficiently upon another, no monad-composed creature can produce an effect outside itself, i. e., *transiently*. And still there is a reciprocal action among the monads, for change in one is *sufficient reason* for change in all others. The *cause* of such change in others is God. Now, of monads so adapted by God, that is the *more perfect* (at least in the precise formality of the adaptation) which furnishes the sufficient reason for change in the others. A monad is *perfect* in the measure of the distinctness of its perceptions. Distinct perception in a monad is an evidence that God has found in it sufficient reason for determining parallel changes suited to the perception in other monads; confused perception indicates the contrary. Thus in the matter of the human composite, it is obvious that the body which is an aggregate of monads is

adapted by God to the soul because of the distinct perceptions in the latter, and the soul is accommodated or subjected to the body inasmuch or when its perceptions are confused. In the first case the change of the soul is sufficient reason for a change in the body; and vice versa. In other words, God disposes the movements of the body according to the conscious acts of the soul, and, conversely, God regulates unconscious perceptions in the soul according to the motions or actions of the body. The harmony divinely established among monads so that the change of one is an adaptation to the change of others, or is sufficient reason for change in all others, is called the *Law of Pre-Established Harmony*. By this law each monad is so related to all the others that it reflects the whole universe of monads in itself as in a mirror.

All things in nature are composed of Prime Matter and Substantial Form. Every individual existent is an aggregate of monads, of which one monad is a centre or nucleus retaining the others about it, and its modifications constitute the sufficient reason for parallel modifications in the others. The central monad is the *dominant entelechy* or the Substantial Form; the others constitute Prime Matter. The Form is an *active*, the Matter a *passive* principle. The dominant entelechy or Form may be unconsciously perceptive or consciously so (i. e., sentient); if unconsciously perceptive, the subject is a *living thing*; if consciously perceptive or sentient, the subject is an *animal*. Thus, all things are *alive*; and some are *animals*. The Form (dominant entelechy) may continually take new Matter to itself (as in nutrition), and Matter so assumed becomes subject to the Form; and thus the Form of a being remains the same even though the organism be continuously renewed. The *soul* (i. e., Form, or dominant entelechy in sentient things) is never without its cluster of surrounding monads. And since all monads were created at once, every soul has had some sort of organism (body) from the beginning. When an animal is conceived, some matter of the parent organisms is

separated and some sensitive monad of the separated matter becomes the dominant entelechy (Form) of the new organism. When an animal dies, its soul does not perish, but perseveres in existence surrounded by some clustering monads, and may enter another organism where it is subject to the existing Form until it is expelled by the generative process and again becomes a dominant entelechy or Form of a "new" organism. All this holds for men as for lower beings; but man's soul (Form or dominant entelechy), which is only sentient (and not rational) at the beginning, becomes rational at the moment of conception. In other words, the human soul with its body-monads is a small animal existing within the organism of the parent; and when conception separates this animal from its union with and subjection to the parent organism, its soul becomes rational. When a man dies, his soul, keeping certain body-monads about it, does not lose its rational character, nor does it enter other organisms like the soul of brutes, but it enters the "spirit land," the perfect monarchic society ruled directly by God.

ii. *Psychology*.—Man is composed of a soul (a rational monad) and a body (an aggregate of monads). The union of soul and body results in a single individuality, but there is no mutual influence or interaction between soul and body: for Leibnitz denies all transient activity. Therefore, the perceptions of the soul are not caused by the body, and thought does not originate in sensation. Similarly, the actions of the body are not caused by the soul. Both soul and body act immanently and *per se*. But God, by Pre-Established Harmony, has disposed that a perception takes place in parallel correspondence to every change in the body, and for every volition of the soul there is a corresponding bodily action. Soul and body are like two clocks, keeping precisely the same time, yet independently.

The soul evolves its ideas out of itself. Like other monads the soul mirrors the whole universe; but most of its perceptions in this vast field are so confused that it has no consciousness of them. All ideas are available to the soul, all are *in* the

soul, but as man grows from childhood to maturity, and so through conscious life, the only ideas actually clear and usable are those which the soul clarifies by its own activity, or, more precisely, those which God, by His Pre-Established Harmony, has willed that the soul render clear.

Appetition results from perception, and is conscious or unconscious according to the character of the perception. If conscious, the appetite is called *volition*, which may be described as an effort to lay hold of what is good and to avoid what is evil. The human will is free, because it regulates its volitions without outside influence. Although God's Pre-Established Harmony has regulated our volitions from the beginning, this does not destroy freedom of will, since God has predetermined our free acts according to free nature, and from that nature the acts proceed freely (*physical premotion*).

iii. *Theodicy*.—The universe is *contingent*, i. e., it is not in its nature a being or collection of beings that *must* exist. We look beyond the world, therefore, for that being which must exist (*necessary* being), for that eternal, immutable substance which is the *sufficient reason* for its own existence and for that of the world, and which is the *cause* of the world. Such a being must be *intelligent*, for this world is contingent, and might have been made quite otherwise than it is; it is obviously the result of a selection, a choice, a determination: and a Being capable of such choice and determination is intelligent. Therefore, from the contingency of the world we rightly conclude to the existence of an intelligent substantial being, eternal and immutable, distinct from the world, and its first efficient cause. This is *God*.

Leibnitz thus proves God's existence *a posteriori*, i. e., reasoning back from effects to their cause. But he also believes that an *a priori* (ontological) argument can be offered for God's existence. He revises the famous proof of St. Anselm in this fashion: A Being whose essence involves existence is, if it *can* exist, really existent. But God is a *possible* Being (i. e., one

that *can* exist) whose essence involves existence. Therefore God is really existent.

God is a simple, (indivisible), bodiless, all-perfect monad, the first principle and the sufficient reason of all. God produces all things from nothing by creation. Creatures depend on God both in existence and in operation. God moves the operation of creatures and immediately concurs with their activity, but in a manner conformable to the nature of each: He moves free creatures in a manner conformable to their free nature and hence does not destroy their free will.

Leibnitz posits the *origin of evil* in the essence of creatures. He says that creatures are necessarily limited, imperfect, and, in so far, *evil*. This is *metaphysical evil* and is outside the will of God, except in so far as God, willing to create, must will to create *finite* beings. Metaphysical evil is the basis and principle of *physical evil* or lack of physical perfection, and of *moral evil* or sin. Metaphysical evil is independent of the will of God; physical and moral evil are permitted by God. No possible world excludes metaphysical evil, and therefore God, willing to create, implicitly wills and permits physical and moral evils.

From the supreme perfection of God we can infer that He created the best possible world (*optimism*). All possibilities have a right or claim to existence in the measure of their proper perfection; and therefore the things actually created had a greater grade of perfection than other possibles.

Remarks: In his *Monadology* Leibnitz finds fault with the Cartesian definition of substance, but his own definition of substance as "Being endowed with activity" is formally a definition of *nature*. Substance is that being which is fitted by nature for existence in itself and not for mere inherence in a subject or substratum. Bodily substance is a substance composed of matter and form naturally requiring local extension by the threefold dimension. The "activity" which Leibnitz makes an essential constituent of bodily substance is only a property of bodies. His "monad theory" makes him implicitly

deny extension in bodies, for he says the monads are simple or indivisible, and hence not extended. Now a body made up of unextended units is itself unextended. Leibnitz also absurdly denies transient activity; and he offers gratuitously his strange doctrine of the transformation of the sensitive soul into the rational soul in man.

In *Psychology* Leibnitz' dualism and Pre-Established Harmony theory is seen as the logical outcome of his doctrine on the solely immanent activity of monads. Here we perceive also how far Leibnitz was from the Scholastic doctrine of substantial union of body and soul, and from *Hylomorphism*, i. e., the substantial union of matter and form in bodies. Thus those critics greatly err who find Scholastic Hylomorphism in Leibnitz' theories.

In *Theodicy*, Leibnitz propounds much admirable doctrine if one excepts his ontological argument and his optimism. The latter is false for two reasons: (1) Possibilities are potentially infinite, and God can indefinitely go on conceiving more perfect worlds; (2) the actual choice of this or that world, before creation, is not dependent upon its perfection, but upon the will of God choosing a world to suit His divine purposes.

In Leibnitz' day (18 century) philosophers followed Cartesianism or the English Empiricism, and engaged chiefly in writing explanations of prominent philosophical doctrines for the non-scientific world. This "popularizing" movement among philosophers was a notable characteristic of the age. Before mentioning the popularizers of philosophy, we may name some admirers of Leibnitz, who, however, did not faithfully adhere to his system (if, indeed, they understood it); and also some opponents of his system.

(1) Leibnitz' admirers and followers:

i. Christian Wolff (1679-1754) tried to make a systematic redaction of Leibnitz' philosophy. He doubts the Law of Pre-

Established Harmony in the anorganic world, but admits it in man, and denies any mutual influence or interaction between body and soul. In the anorganic world he makes monads act by attraction and repulsion. He explains the extension of bodies by positing "vacuoles" or vacuum-intervals between the monads composing bodies. Wolff is memorable for a really good division of philosophy for practical pedagogy.

- ii. Bernard Bilfinger (1693-1750);
- iii. Theophile Hansch (1683-1752);
- iv. Philip Thuemning (1697-1728);
- v. Alexander Baumgarten (1714-1762);
- vi. Friedrich Meier (died 1777).

(2) Adversaries of Leibnitz:

i. Many Christian theologians who regarded his philosophy as incompatible with Christianity. Some asserted that his Monadology denied divine liberty. Others found his doctrine on the origin and nature of evil out of accord with the divine sanctity.

ii. Many naturalists and exponents of physical science who disagreed with the monad theory.

iii. Many Cartesians and Sensists, and also physicists, chief of whom was a certain Clarke, with whom Leibnitz had a long epistolary correspondence on the nature of bodies and of space.

(3) Popularizers of current philosophies in Leibnitz' time:

i. Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694), of Saxony, tried to conciliate the social philosophies of DeGroot and Hobbes.

ii. Walter Tschirnhausen (1651-1708), a physician and mathematician, whose doctrines are sensistic and deistic.

iii. Christian Thomasius (1655-1728) followed Pufendorf in social ethics, and attacked the Scholastics and Aristoteleans generally.

- iv. Hermann Samuel Reimarus (1694-1768);
- v. Johann Nicholas Tetens (1736-1805);

- vi. Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786);
- vii. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781).

(4) To the foregoing may be joined the members of the secret society called "The Enlightened" ("Illuminati"), which was founded in 1776 to popularize deistic, sensistic, and rationalistic doctrines, and to overthrow the Christian religion. This society was formed at Ingolstadt by Adam Weishaupt, an ex-Jesuit. It had some resemblance to and received substantial support from Freemasonry. The society was suppressed by civil edict on March 2, 1785, and Weishaupt was degraded and banished. Even after its dissolution, members of the society continued to exert an evil influence in the world of thought.

The philosophers mentioned in paragraphs (3) and (4) gave origin to the so-called "Enlightenment," or popularization of spurious philosophy, which has continued in a measure to the present day.

b) ENGLISH IDEALISM.

Idealism is the doctrine which denies that there is in reality an objectivity perfectly adequated to our knowledge either in the sensitive or the intellectual order. Locke's doctrines, diffused widely in England, contain the germ of idealism, for he denies the objectivity of secondary sense-qualities, and is vague in his exposition of the objectivity of substance. Besides he is obscure in his doctrine on efficient causality, a matter intimately concerned with the philosophy of sensation and intellection. It is therefore not surprising that followers of the Lockian philosophy soon developed its latent idealism.

The chief idealists in England during the 18 century were:

- i. George Berkeley (1684-1753), an Irishman, Protestant Bishop of Cloyne. His chief work is *The Principles of Human Knowledge*.
- ii. David Hume (1711-1776), a Scotsman, who lived in

France, Austria, and Italy. He wrote treatises on *Human Nature*, *Human Understanding*, *A Natural History of Religion*, and *An Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*.

Berkeley and Hume took up *ex professo* the question of the objectivity of human knowledge. Both distinguish knowledge as sensitive and intellectual; but neither rightly discerns the formal object in each field of knowledge. Hume admits two species of perceptions: *impressions* and *ideas*. Impressions are the more vivid and strong percepts (seeing, hearing, etc.), while ideas are weaker representations or images produced in us by remembrance of impressions previously received. Both Berkeley and Hume say that a certain natural impulse makes us regard the world around us as a real and objective complexity of different bodily things, but that, when we analyze our knowledge, we are forced to deny the truth of this naïve view of things. What is immediately present to us, to our knowledge, is not a real and objective world, but a complex of impressions, ideas, and images. Who can prove that anything externally objective corresponds to these subjective states?

Some say that, unless things really exist as we perceive them, God deceives us, inasmuch as he has given us lying faculties. Hume retorts that doubt of the existence of the external world induces doubt of the existence of God. Others say that we must distinguish primary and secondary qualities of bodily things, in the manner of Locke, and that the former are objective, while the latter are not, or are, at best, doubtfully objective. Hume answers that if one rejects secondary qualities as objective, one has no right to affirm the objectivity of primary qualities, for it is by and through the secondary qualities that we perceive the primary. Does anything then correspond, in the world outside us, to our subjective knowing states? Hume answers negatively. Berkeley, however, is only partially idealistic.

Berkeley says that the world as we perceive it does not exist, for what we perceive is our own impressions and not external

bodily substances. Therefore any discussion of so-called substances is useless in the inquiry into the nature of human knowledge. Now we know by experience that sensations and ideas are of two kinds: those that are formed and varied at will (e. g., imagination images), and those that our will cannot control or vary (e. g., a thing is perceived by looking at it, and will not change its appearance, no matter how we will to have it change; or, we know what, for example, a circle is, and no effort of will can make us understand it as anything different from a continuous curved line every point of which is equidistant from the centre). For the sensations and ideas obtruded upon us without reference to our will *some outside cause must exist*. This is God, who exhibits to us the ideas we are to know. The constant order, the rules according to which God manifests to us the succession of ideas, are the *Laws of Nature*. Besides the revealing God, there must be really existent a recipient of His revelations. This is the spirit or *soul*. Individual men have individual souls. Thus Berkeley acknowledges only two really existent orders: God and souls.

Hume not only denies the world; he also doubts the spiritual order acknowledged by Berkeley. He says the existence of God cannot be proved, and that examination of our subjective states reveals only a succession of impressions and ideas. Nothing, then, can be said with certainty to exist except a succession of perceptions in the order of which there is nothing causal.

c) THOMAS REID AND THE SCOTTISH SCHOOL.

i. Thomas Reid (1710-1796), a native of Aberdeen and a professor at the University in that city, undertook the study of philosophy with the purpose of refuting Hume. He wrote *An Inquiry into the Human Mind* and *An Inquiry into the Intellectual Powers of Man*. Reid makes an analysis of sensations and traces out their relations to ideas. This analysis proceeds in the following manner: There are three distinctions to be made in

each sensation. Suppose I perceive a colored object; I must distinguish, (1) this sensation itself as distinct from other sensations; (2) the act by which I judge and affirm that this sensation is in me as its subject; (3) the act by which I judge and affirm that this sensation is produced in me by an external cause. Corresponding to these distinctions I have, therefore, three ideas which come into play implicitly in the experiencing of every sensation, viz., (1) the idea of sensation itself; (2) the idea of subject of sensation; (3) the idea of cause of sensation. Now we acquire the *idea of sensation* from observation and experience; but we do not so acquire the other two (i. e., the ideas, respectively, of *subject* and of *cause*.) Whence come these ideas? They are not innate; they are not derived from sense experience; it remains that they must come from some instinct native to man. These two ideas mean that, by natural instinct, we have knowledge of the universal truths, "Every affection or modification requires a subject," and "Every effect requires a cause." The instinct here mentioned Reid calls *The Faculty of Inspiration and Suggestion*. By this faculty we hold as certain the existence of the bodily world; the existence and identity of our proper personality; the idea of substance, cause, and the universal truths upon which all science is founded. The Faculty of Inspiration and Suggestion gives us an *inevitable certitude* of the existence of these things. Reid sometimes makes the Faculty *blind*, and sometimes seems to make it operate by immediate objective evidence.

Remarks: Reid falls into the same confusion as that into which most philosophers of his time fell, that is to say, he does not accurately distinguish sensation and intellection. He errs in supposing universal truths as known to the mind antecedently to any experience. For the rest, his Faculty of Inspiration and Suggestion is to be rejected if *blind*; if, however, it means only the mental necessity of assenting to first principles made obvious by immediate objective evidence, he is pretty well in agreement with Scholastic dogmatism.

ii. The Scottish School is the name applied to the philosophers (mostly professors in Scottish universities) who followed Reid's doctrine and developed it. Most of the members of this School understand Reid's Faculty of Inspiration and Suggestion as a *blind* instinct of nature; hence they say that the truths evidenced by the Faculty are inexplicably held for certain by the natural constitution of our intellect. If "to know" means to grasp a thing mentally upon *evidence*, then we do not *know*, but only *believe* the truths made certain in the mind by the Faculty of Inspiration and Suggestion. Here we see that the Scottish School contained in germ the Kantian Idealism which was to run rampant through the 19 century. We notice that this School, laudably intent upon refuting Berkeley and Hume, falls into the very error it sought to disprove. Members of the Scottish School were:

i. Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), who makes a determinate and limited list of truths known by the Faculty of Inspiration and Suggestion;

ii. James Beattie (1735-1803), who makes *common sense* the basis of certitude, morality, and religion. This *common sense* is but another name for Reid's Suggestion Faculty;

iii. Thomas Brown (1778-1820);

iv. James Mackintosh (1764-1832);

v. William Hamilton (1788-1856).

all. Dissatisfied with Cartesianism, and roused to opposition by Hume's idealism, he sought a new and true answer to the *critical question*, the question of the extent and validity of human knowledge. He asked, "What can we know with certainty?" The answer to that question reaches into two fields, viz., that of pure speculation and that of practical action. In other words, the question amounts to this: "What can we know with certainty (speculative question); and what have we to do and to expect as a result of our certain knowledge? (practical question)." Kant's answer to the first part of this question is contained in *The Critique of Pure Reason*. His answer to the second part is contained in *The Critique of Practical Reason*.

i. What can we know with certainty; of what can we have scientific knowledge? First, we must investigate the cognitive faculties. These are three:

(1) *sense*, which gives (or seems to give) knowledge of the world around us. The function of sense is sensation: Kant calls sensation *empirical intuition*;

(2) *intellect*, which pronounces judgment on empirical intuitions as agreeing or disagreeing;

(3) *reason*, which argues to further conclusions from judgments.

Now each of these faculties has a twofold element. One element is the intrinsic constitution of the faculty itself, and this is the *formal* element. The other is the object with which the faculty deals; it is extrinsic to the faculty, and is called the *material* element. To illustrate by analogy: Suppose you have a quaintly shaped bottle. Any liquid you pour into the bottle will conform its bulk to the shape of the bottle. The shape of the bottle may stand by analogy for the *formal* element (called *a priori*) of the knowing faculty (be it sense, intellect, or reason). The liquid stands for the *material* element (called *a posteriori*) of the knowing faculty. Now to deal with these three knowing faculties in some detail:

(1) SENSE gives, or seems to give, knowledge of a bodily world around us. It somehow takes impressions from bodily things. But its action is its own (innate and *a priori*) in conformity to its intrinsic and natural constitution, and so it perceives things by qualifying them according to its nature, just as a bottle conforms the liquid contents to its own shape. Now the innate, *a priori*, intrinsic constitution of sense is characterized by two *forms* called *space* and *time*. Sense perceives things as occupying space and as occurring in time. But space and time are not anything outside the sense-faculty; they are the "shape" of the faculty, and whatever sense perceives (or receives into itself) must take that shape. There is indeed something real outside us, something which somehow stirs sense to act; this is the *mere appearance* of things (*phenomena*). Phenomena affect the sense-faculty much as a man affects a motor by cranking it; the impulse is given by phenomena, and then the "mental motor" goes on functioning in its own determinate way. It functions in the "grooves" of *space* and *time*. Its function results in a percept or *empirical intuition*. To sum up: The impression of phenomena, conditioned or qualified by space and time, causes the sense-faculty to produce empirical intuitions. The *material* element in sense-functions is phenomena; the *formal* element is found in two subjective forms, space and time. The two elements come together to form *empirical intuitions*, as already explained. To illustrate by analogy: I see green grass. This means that there is something real outside me, fitted with an appearance (phenomenon) which can stimulate my vision (i. e., *sense* of sight). My sense of sight, intrinsically conditioned by the *a priori* forms of space and time, gives me, here and now, an *intuition* (direct beholding) of something, which I call green and of something which I call grass.

(2) INTELLECT takes the *empirical intuitions* of sense as the material element of its function. Just as the senses perceive phenomena, so intellect perceives relations of empirical intui-

tions. The full fruitage of sense (i. e., phenomena perceived or received in a sense-qualified manner) is the *material* with which intellect deals. These empirical intuitions are taken into the intellect in a manner conformable to its constitution, its "shape." Now the "shape" of the intellect is determined by twelve *a priori* forms. These twelve forms constitute the *formal* element of intellect, and are conveniently divided into four groups of three, as follows:

- | Groups | Individual Forms |
|--------|--|
| (i) | quantityunity, plurality, totality; |
| (ii) | qualityaffirmation, negation, limitation; |
| (iii) | relationsubstance-accident; cause-effect; action-passion; |
| (iv) | modalityexistence-non existence; possibility-impossibility; necessity-contingency. |

For example: Intellect receives the empirical intuitions of "grass" and "green." Receiving this into itself, running it through its forms, it produces the judgment, "This grass is green." According to *quantity* the judgment has the form of *totality*; I perceive the sum-total of the blades of grass as green. (If I formed the judgment: "There are many blades of grass here," the judgment would have the character of *plurality* on the score of quantity. Or, if I made the judgment "This is a blade of grass," the judgment would have, on the head of quantity, the form of *unity*.) According to *quality*, my judgment is an *affirmation*. According to *relation*, my judgment is of the *substance-accident* kind. According to *modality*, my judgment is marked by the forms of *existence* and *contingency*. Thus every judgment receives its character from the *a priori* and innate *forms* of the intellect. Notice that the *reality of the thing judged* is not touched or perceived! Intellect has its own set and natural function; it "turns out" judgments; and these are "turned out" according to the forms, the "shape" of the intellect, as ingots are turned out in the shape of a mold. Now the judgment used here in illustration is a contingent judgment, as

we have seen when discussing its modality. Such judgments are *particular*, they are of little value for scientific knowledge which requires *universal* and *necessary* judgments. But how can I make such judgments, when the materials of judging are furnished by the empirical intuitions of sense, which are always particular? How, for example, can I say that "All grass is green" when my empirical intuitions (upon which judgment is made) are only concerned with *this* grass? How can I say that "The angles of any triangle are equal to two right angles" when my empirical intuition of *triangle* is always concerned with *this* or *that* or *these* triangles, and never, by any possibility, with *all possible triangles*? Kant says that universal and necessary judgments are really made by the intellect, but he sees that the direct materials for these cannot be particular and contingent empirical intuitions. Therefore, he says they are a separate or special kind of judgments, and come entirely from the intellect and not from empirical intuitions. These universal and necessary judgments are called *synthetic a priori* judgments; and they alone make science possible. To understand all this more clearly, let us make a classification of judgments according to Kant's mind:

(A) Analytic Judgments.—A judgment of any kind may be expressed in a *proposition*, which is a formula of words having a subject, predicate, and copula. Now if the analysis of the subject reveals the predicate, then the judgment is *analytic*. That is to say, if I take the subject apart—analyze it—and find the predicate therein, the judgment is *analytic*. Thus "A is A" is an analytic judgment. Also, "A body is an extended being" is an analytic judgment. Such judgments add nothing to science; they tell nothing new; they consist in explicitly affirming what is already implicitly contained in the subject-idea.

(B) Synthetic a Posteriori Judgments.—If the analysis of the subject does not reveal the predicate, and the latter is joined to the subject by reason of empirical intuition (sense knowledge), the judgment is *synthetic* ("put together"). Examples:

“This grass is green”; “This land is flat.” Such judgments do not serve science, for, while they tell us something new, they are particular and contingent, and science requires necessary and universal truths. The simply *synthetic* judgment here described is fully characterized as *synthetic a posteriori*.

(C) Synthetic a Priori Judgments.—When analysis of the subject does not reveal the predicate, and the latter is joined to the subject by no mere sensation reason, but by the intrinsic subjective power of intellect, independently of experience (*a priori*), then the judgment is *synthetic a priori*. These judgments are universal and necessary; they tell something new, and hence constitute an advance in science. They make science possible. Examples of such judgment: “7 and 5 are 12”; “Whatever has a beginning has a cause”; “All radii of a circle are equal”; “In bodily changes no quantity of matter perishes,” etc. These judgments are *synthetic*, because the predicate is not discovered by analyzing the subject; and they are *a priori*, because they are formed by the innate power of the intellect independently of sense experience.

(3) REASON takes the judgments (called also “concepts”) of intellect as its *material* element. The *formal* element of Reason consists in three “*Ideas*” which condition reasoning just as space and time condition sensation, and as the twelve forms of intellect condition judgment. These three *ideas* which constitute the formal element of Reasoning are, (i) The Idea of the Self or Soul; (ii) The Idea of the Material World; (iii) The Idea of God. Are these things then only ideas? Do self, world, and God exist as mere formalities of Reason? Kant does not deny the real existence of these things. He does, however, deny that we can know their nature, or anything about their nature. Nature or essence of things is called *Noumenon* (plural, *Noumena*), and Noumena really underly Phenomena, but all we know is Phenomena, and not even Phenomena in essential existence, but only inasmuch as Phenomena somehow impel sense to function. In the last analysis, all we

know is *our own mental states*. Our knowledge goes on forming according to the construction and constitution of our faculties (sense, intellect, reason) after phenomena have given the impulse to sense. We *reason* or speculate on things according to the formalities or "shape" of the Reason, and thus all reasoning is conditioned or qualified by the *a priori* and innate background of *ideas* of God, the world, and self.

To sum up: We have three knowing faculties, sense, intellect, reason. Each faculty has its own formalities (its "shape") which condition all that it apprehends. The first impulse for exercising the knowing-function is given by *phenomena* or sensible appearances of things. From that point on the knowing-faculties have no contact with things external. In the ultimate view, therefore, all we know of things is *phenomena*, and we know these only inasmuch as they impress sense and give rise to empirical intuitions. Therefore, speculation on the nature or *noumena* of things is vain and useless; we cannot know *noumena*; we know *that* they are, but we cannot know *what* they are. It follows that Metaphysics, which defines such things as essence, substance, subsistence, nature, cause, effect, spirit, body, matter, form, and all the other matters in its scope, is an illusory science, and no true science at all. Metaphysics as a science is *impossible*.

It may be of service to give in schematic outline Kant's theory of knowledge:

<i>Faculty</i>	<i>Material Element</i>	<i>Formal Element</i>	<i>Resulting Function</i>
1. Sense	Phenomena	Space and Time	Empirical Intuitions
2. Intellect	Empirical Intuitions	12 forms or "Categories"	Judgments
3. Reason	Judgments	3 ideas	Reasoning

ii. In *The Critique of Practical Reason* Kant declares that Practical Reason supplies to our needs what Pure Reason fails

to make clear. Pure Reason, indeed, fails to give us the most important truths with which human knowledge is concerned. For instance, Pure Reason discovers nothing of the nature or origin of *duty*. Practical Reason supplies the lack; it says in unconditional terms, "Do this"; "Avoid that." I am more certain of this moral obligation than of anything I apprehend through the functioning of the knowing-faculties. I am more sure, for example, that I must avoid murder, than that I am hot or cold. That moral obligation binds me, that it comes from some authoritative seat within me, I am perfectly sure. I call this inner authority, whose commands are unconditional (i. e., *categorical*) and imperative, *the Categorical Imperative*. Granting the existence of the Categorical Imperative (and I am so sure of it that I must acknowledge its existence), I find that it involves fundamental truths about man and his destiny: (1) If I am subject to imperative command, I must be free to obey or disobey. Necessitated beings need no command or "law." Therefore I must be free, i. e., *I have free will*. (2) If I freely obey, I am entitled to reward. If I disobey, I deserve punishment. The "law" of the Categorical Imperative must have *sanctions*, else it is illusory and meaningless, which I cannot admit. (3) But I can go on obeying, and am never through obeying. The Categorical Imperative does not cease its commands. If I perfect myself by obedience, I can go on through life without filling up the measure of obedience. The Categorical Imperative orders me to perfect obedience, but I cannot achieve perfect and full obedience in this brief life. Therefore, I must achieve obedience perfectly (and consequent *holiness*) in a life to come. In other words, the admission of the Categorical Imperative involves the admission of the *immortality of the soul*. (4) The Categorical Imperative is unquestionably a *law*. But a law presupposes a lawgiver. Being a law universal and unconditional, the Categorical Imperative demands a lawgiver supreme and perfect—*God*. Therefore the admission of the Categorical Imperative involves the admission of *the exist-*

ence of God. Thus Practical Reason gives certain knowledge which Pure Reason is powerless to give. Practical Reason informs me with certitude of moral duty, of the immortality of the soul, of free will, of sanctions in a life to come, of the existence of God.

iii. Intermediate between Pure and Practical Reason is the Faculty of judging and appreciating *the beautiful* with its purpose and design. This is the Faculty of Judgment or Aesthetic Appreciation. The use of this faculty gives a more striking and attractive presentation of the beauty of moral goodness than Practical Reason can give.

Remarks: Kant asserts that we cannot know things-in-themselves (noumena), but only appearances. This is a dogmatic statement; it is arbitrary without being authoritative. It is surely out of place in what purports to be a *critical* philosophy, and one indeed that was born of a sudden impulse of its author to cast aside "dogmatic dreams." Again, dogmatically, Kant asserts that space and time are pure forms in the knowing subject: a gratuitous statement which may be gratuitously denied.

Kant's assertion that there are *synthetic a priori* judgments is simply not true. His examples of such judgments are either analytic or they are *synthetic a posteriori*. His statement that Reason has a natural endowment of three regulative ideas which determine its function and color the result, is obviously false.

Kant contradicts himself: he denies the validity of reason; yet he uses reason in developing his own system. Again, he tells us that we can know nothing of things-in-themselves (noumena), and by that very statement he implicitly teaches us something of the intrinsic nature of the mind. He denies the value of speculation or pure reasoning, and proceeds to use it copiously, applying the principle of causality (in the order of noumena) after denying its validity.

Finally, Kant's doctrine leads to Skepticism, as reason shows it must, and as history shows it did. Any critical system which minimizes the relation between man's understanding or sensation and the objective reality of things known, is a long step in the direction of universal skepticism.

Notwithstanding its defects and absurdities, Kantianism has exerted an enormous influence upon philosophical thought since the beginning of the 19 century.

b) JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE (1762-1814), professor of philosophy at Jena and Berlin, tried to reduce Kantianism to a more unified and consistent system of philosophy. He saw that Kant inconsistently admitted the existence of *Noumena* while protesting that we can know nothing about them. Fichte denied *Noumena*, and declared that nothing exists except the *Absolute Ego*, the infinite and boundless *Self*. This is not the individual *self* realized in each conscious individual; it is "I-ness" in general. It is essentially an *activity*, a striving. The Ego or Infinite Self is not a real being, but it is activity which *results in realization*. The Ego *realizes* itself, and becomes conscious of existence. This mysterious process is expressed in Fichte's formula, "The Ego posits itself."

Having realized itself, the Ego finds its realizing-activity blocked by an impediment. The self-realizing process somehow meets with an obstacle in the fact that the realizing consciousness is aware of something *not realisable as self, other* than self. This the Ego posits as the *not-Self*—the world and all things in the world, including individual men or "empirical egos." All this is expressed in the formula, "The Ego posits the not-self."

Now the Ego (i. e., the *Absolute Ego*), inasmuch as it *realizes* the not-self (which does not have real existence outside the active realization process of the Absolute Ego), exercises *intellect*. Inasmuch as the Absolute Ego *posits* the not-self, it exercises choice or *free will*. Continuing to deal with the not-self

by free and active intelligence, the Absolute Ego perceives that, after all, self and not-self are radically one. Fichte's formula for this is, "The Ego com-posites the self and the not-self."

These operations of the active Absolute Ego in positing the self, positing the not-self, com-positing the self and not-self in a fundamental unity, are called a respectively, *thesis*, *anti-thesis*, and *synthesis*.

Thus all cognition is subjective, and to exist and to know are the same thing.

We limited men ("empirical egos," or limited egos) experience what we call sensations, and judge that there are things about us which cause sensations, and that we have a body which feels sensations. Now all this is mere seeming; it is illusory. We are merely part of the not-self posited by the Absolute Ego (and we are, like all the not-self, ultimately and fundamentally one with the Absolute Ego), and the world of bodies is simply a projection of the actively intelligent Ego: it has no real existence.

God is the Absolute Ego which realizes Itself in limited egos or individual men (by positing the not-self). Man, the empirical or limited ego, finds in his apparent bodiliness and in the apparent bodily world an impediment to the realization of his unity with the Absolute Ego. His belief that he will overcome this impediment and be merged perfectly in the Absolute Ego is *faith*. In his consciousness of the effort required to overcome this impediment lies *duty* and the whole notion of *morality*.

c) FRIEDRICH WILHELM JOSEPH VON SCHELLING (1775-1854), professor at various German universities including those of Jena and Berlin, found Fichte's doctrine unsatisfactory and self-contradictory. He argues that the notion of Ego involves that of non-Ego, and conversely the notion of non-Ego involves that of Ego. Therefore, above and before Ego and non-Ego, before being and knowing, there must be a *cause* of these things. This is *The Absolute*. In *The Absolute*,

Ego and non-Ego are found identified; and The Absolute may be described as "the identity of contraries." The process of Ego and non-Ego from The Absolute occurs, as Fichte says, by thesis, antithesis, synthesis. The Absolute is not a reality in itself; it is pure potency, positing itself from eternity by necessary law. It is the principle of all knowledge, but cannot be proved or known except by internal intuition. This Absolute is God, who from eternity projects himself (*thesis*), posits himself as nature (*antithesis*), and resumes himself as spirit (*synthesis*). Man is the perfect union of spirit and nature; he is one with The Absolute; hence he is a visible expression of The Absolute: he is "God visible." Man's bodily part, or expression of The Absolute in matter, is an obstacle to be overcome that man may merge consciously with The Absolute. Hence the body is the cause of evil. Man has no free will. Original sin and the Redemption are explained in a mystical and rationalistic fashion. Christ was not God more than other men. After this life man will live again in the body.

Schelling changed his philosophy five distinct times. What is given here represents fairly the more stable parts of his doctrine. He was a man susceptible of influence, and his changing doctrine shows the impress of theories propounded by many antecedent and contemporary philosophers.

d) GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL (1770-1831), professor of philosophy at Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin, declared that Schelling made The Absolute an intellect which understood nothing. He evolved a system of Absolute Idealism most difficult to understand, and impossible to abridge, for the system is expounded in one continuous chain of argument in which there are more than two hundred distinct steps. Besides, the system is variously interpreted. Hegel himself is said to have remarked that not more than a dozen of his contemporaries understood his philosophy.

The following *points* of his doctrine are to be noticed:

(1) Individual things are mere appearances. They do not really exist.

(2) The one existent thing is the Idea, the universal concept. To think is to know.

(3) The concept or thought so evolves itself (by the "triad" of thesis, antithesis, and synthesis) as to achieve concrete reality and still retain its universality.

(4) The concept or idea or thought viewed in itself is "The Idea in Itself." Viewed as evolved into concrete reality, it is "The Idea out of Itself." Viewed as returned into itself and conscious of itself, it is "The Idea for Itself." Notice the "triad" here.

(5) The first concept is that of *being*; and this is a dynamic concept, not a static one, as Aristotle taught. It tends to pass "out of itself" and over to its contrary, to return enriched as the idea of *becoming*. The process is as follows: *Being* conceived simply, stripped of every quality and determination, is not conceived as different from *nothing*. Hence the category of mere *being* implies its opposite—*nothing*. Thus the idea is said to pass "out of itself" to its opposite. The ideas of *being* and *nothing* (or the one idea in different stages of development) are contradictory. Yet, in spite of their contradiction, they can be regarded as complementary; both are included in the idea of *becoming*. Thus *being* as an idea in itself (thesis) passes over to its opposite and out of itself (antithesis), then forward again to itself and for itself as *becoming* (synthesis).

(6) The universal, the concept, the result of the original and universal thought is universal substance—God. This thought, or idea, evolving itself into the second stage (antithesis) is the world, and in the third stage (synthesis) it is made conscious of itself in *human nature*. God is the whole universe explained as logical concept. The rational alone is real, and the real is rational. The Absolute knows itself in knowing minds, just as these minds know themselves in knowing the Absolute (God).

(7) Nature and spirit are thus mere manifestations of The Absolute. The Absolute is all, and all is ultimately The Absolute; and The Absolute is infinite thinking activity. Therefore, Hegelianism is idealistic pantheism more intangible than that of Fichte or Schelling.

e) OTHER KANTIAN PHILOSOPHERS.

i. Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), professor at Koenigsberg and Goettingen, reacted against Hegelianism and taught what he called a system of “Realism”—a name taken from the “realities” of which his doctrine treats. He says things do exist independently of the mind, and sensation makes us aware of them. Yet sensation, and concepts formed upon sensation, are faulty and contradictory. We sense phenomena, but we do not sense them as they are. What we call a *thing* (man, tree, hill, for example) is really a collection of “realities” which compenetrates one another at one point. *Being* is made up of a multitude of immutable “realities” (like Leibnitz’ *monads*), each of which has its own proper nature. The mind is a single “reality,” but it grasps things as diverse because of its reactions with “realities” of different properties. Herbart is remembered in the field of pedagogics, a science which aroused his interest after he had had some conversation on the subject with Pestalozzi (1746–1827), the founder of a modern system of pedagogy.

ii. Arthur Schopenhauer (1788–1860), professor at Berlin, explains the universe as “Will” unfolding and manifesting itself in individuals. The universal will produces the world as its phenomenon or expression, and in the world individual wills of living things produce their bodies as their phenomena. The world is evil and filled with pain, and the impulse or “will” to exist and to know is strong. Thus we are held by a strong force in the midst of pains. The best thing to do is to deny this will, weaken it, drive it out, and so be relieved of the

pains of existence. Schopenhauer's doctrine is, therefore, *pessimism*.

iii. Eduard von Hartmann (1842–1906) substitutes "The Unconscious" for the blind and irrational "Will" of Schopenhauer. The Unconscious is gradually evolved into consciousness by its "Will" and "Idea" (knowledge). In the process it produces the world. The "Idea" in the Unconscious determines the essence of the world, while the "Will" gives it existence. Hartmann conserves the pessimism of Schopenhauer, although he differs from him in his doctrine on the manner of resisting and weakening the will for existence.

iv. Rudolf Herman Lotze (1817–1881), professor at Goettingen, follows Herbart in his reaction against Hegelianism. He teaches a "monad doctrine" in explaining the world of realities. He admits the existence of a God distinct from the world, the creator of the cosmos, and divine determinant of the last end of the world.

v. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), professor at Basle, took up the "Will" theory of Schopenhauer, but, far from teaching that the will or impulse of existence and knowledge should be repressed, he declared that it must be given free and wholly unbridled reign. Might is right; strength is good; weakness is evil. The weak must be crushed in the imperious progress of the will of the strong. The race must cultivate the will-force until the "blond beast," the *Superman*, has been generated. The whole purpose of the universe is the development of the Superman, and this purpose is served by the cultivation of ruthless power. Everything that makes for the repression of nature is evil, for it blocks the free movement of power, which will produce the Superman. Therefore, Christianity with its "slave morality" is to be overthrown; all religion, all social restraints, all nationalism must go down before the great wave of unrestricted force in which the universe is to realize its end and purpose.

vi. Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) taught a system called

Voluntarism. He says the soul is merely a *collection of acts*; that the so-called *matter* underlying physical realities is non-existent, being a mere projection of a soul-act; that there is no relation or connection between the physical and the psychic (i. e., between soul-act and body-process), but each proceeds in its own way, although the two series of acts move in perfect parallels (*Psycho-physical parallelism*). Wundt established a "psychological laboratory" for experiment in the field of empirical or phenomenal psychology at Leipzig in 1878, upon the pattern of which many similar institutes have since been founded.

vii. Friedrich Paulsen (1846–1908) traces all things to the action of a universal will-force, which manifests itself accidentally in the lower orders of bodies and culminates in consciousness in man. Man is the terminus of the will-evolution. Man's personal soul has no individual liberty, and no immortality, for it is only an accident of the soul of the *people*, which in turn is an accident of the soul of the *race*, and this, finally, is an accident of the *world-soul*. The world-soul itself is merged in the Absolute or original will-force made conscious by developing itself in man. Sensation and intellection have no causal relation, and indeed no connection at all; they proceed in parallel series (*Psycho-physical parallelism*). This doctrine is reducible to an explanation of the universe by the development of the universal *soul*, and hence is called *Pan-psychism*.

viii. Herbert Spencer (1820–1903), an English philosopher, professes *Agnosticism* in the field of both scientific and religious knowledge. He says science deals with the Absolute; religious faith deals likewise with the Absolute. Religion and science differ only in the manner in which they treat of this same object. Now the Absolute is unknowable. Therefore let science not seek to determine the nature of the Absolute nor of any substance; its field is *phenomena*. Let religion lay down no dogmas, but let it concern itself with practice. For the rest, let science be *positive*; let its rules be as few as possible. Spencer defines science as a *synthesis of things known*. He makes the

fundamental rule or law of science that of *evolution*, which he defines as the "transit from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous." This law he regards as of great worth in explaining the whole of philosophic truth, from world-origins up to the social relations of men.

ix. Charles Renouvier (1815-1903), in his *Neo-Criticism*, which is modeled on the Criticism instituted by Kant, declares that we know only *pure phenomena*. Phenomena have representing force. The Ego or Self is but a collection of representations. The phenomena, however, appear in a certain constancy of order, and so the mind is enabled to formulate *categories*. All categories are reduced to *Relation*. Some relations are static (quantity, quality, position) and some are dynamic (succession, becoming, finality, causality). We have clear certitude only of *phenomena here and now perceived*, that is to say, it is of such phenomena that we have *cogent* certitude, inevitable certitude. We may have *free* or reasonable certitude of other things, viz., in cases where the intellect propounds a matter for belief, the heart inclines towards it, and the will adheres to it with certain grasp. By such certitude we have legitimate and reliable knowledge of such matters as have merited common belief. This common belief is in some instances universal, as, for example, in the matter of the existence of oneself (the *ego*) as permanent consciousness, and the existence of the external world; in some cases, however, the common belief is not perfectly common or universal, as, for instance, in the matter of *liberty*, or the *existence of God*. Even in such matters as these, one may have legitimate free certitude. But Renouvier thinks that, if one is to avoid contradiction, one must admit only a *finite* God.

x. In Germany, about the mid-19 century, a "back to Kant" movement was started by Albert Lange (1828-1875). This movement is called *Neo-Criticism*. It branched in many and various directions, and we may leave the matter with a mere

mention of prominent names associated with the movement: Hermann Helmholtz (1821-1894); Johann Volkelt (born 1848); Alois Riehl (born 1844); Hermann Cohen (born 1842); Paul Natorp (born 1854); Ernst Cassirer (born 1874); Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915); Heinrich Rickert (born 1863).

xi. In France, and following the Neo-Criticism of Renouvier, were: Prat and Pillon, and Renouvier's friend, Charles Secrétan (1815-1895). Allied with these philosophers in some points of doctrine were: Victor Brochard; Victor Delbos (died 1915); L. D'Auriac.

xii. In Italy, Kantian doctrines were propounded by Alfonso Testa (1814-1860); Carolo Cantoni (1840-1906); Felice Tocco (1845-1911); Giacomo Barzellotti (1844-1917); Francesco de Sarlo. Kantianism was employed by the following in the exposition of rationalistic and atheistic doctrine: Giuseppe Ferrari (1811-1876); "Ausonio Franchi" (1820-1895), that name being the *nom de plume* of Cristoforo Bonavino. Of the Italian followers of Hegel we mention: Agosto Vera (1813-1885); B. Spaventa (1817-1883); Pasquale d'Ercole (1831-1916); Benedetto Croce (born 1866); Giovanni Gentile (born 1875).

Article 2. Reactions Against Kantianism

a) Positivism;

b) Materialism.

a) POSITIVISM.

Positivism takes as demonstrated that nothing but phenomena or appearances of things can be known, and it values only such phenomena as are perceivable by the *external senses*. Of such phenomena alone have we *positive* knowledge, and the structure of science must make the most of what the external senses offer it. Psychological introspection, or moral norms like the Categorical Imperative, have no positive, and hence no scientific

value. Positive phenomena have, as the experience of the senses testifies, a complexity of sufficiently stable *relations*, and these can be observed and formulated as *scientific laws*.

i. The older School of Positivism was founded by Auguste Comte (1798–1857). He says that history shows the evolution of science to have occurred in three stages: (1) The Theological Stage, in which the phenomena of the universe were explained by reference to the action of gods; (2) the Metaphysical Stage, in which philosophers discussed abstract entities and obscure general laws; (3) the Positive Stage, in which—the true limits of human powers being determined—positive facts are observed and their constant relations formulated as laws. The Positive Stage is the present and *perfect* stage of complete science. The classification of sciences, following the order of doctrine and increasing scope, gives us the following leading sciences: Mathematics, Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, Biology, and Sociology. Sociology is the greatest science, for it deals with Humanity, and Humanity is the only God there is.

Comte's pupil, Littré (1801–1881), followed his doctrine; and the Positivist "Church" was afterwards ruled by Laffitte.

John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), the English philosopher and economist, reduces even positive phenomena to "permanent possibilities of sensation," declaring that a natural and incurable *illusion* makes us accept them as real and existent. Mill tries to explain all psychological facts and phenomena as "associations of images" in the mind, the images being, so to speak, mere "atoms" of the mind, and not reliable representations of reality. This *Associationism* was also professed by Alexander Bain (1818–1904).

Hippolyte Taine (1828–1893), philosopher and historian, divides sensations into external (*strong*) and internal (*weak*). External sensations are indeed illusory, as Mill teaches, but constitute a "*true* hallucination," inasmuch as they remain normal and constant. Taine makes a valuable catalogue of psycho-

logical phenomena, but his interpretation of it is incomplete and very defective.

ii. The more recent School of Positivists professes an *applied* Positivism not only in the domain of natural science, but also in history, sociology, pedagogy, and psychology. In the last-named science Positivism has come, in our days, to such prevalence that so-called Experimental or Empirical Psychology is the sole concern of many psychologists. Severed from Rational Psychology, this experimental science is a department of study almost useless and sterile.

The more noted of the Experimental Psychologists are: Wilhelm Wundt; Oswald Kuelpe; A. Binet; P. Janet; Michotti; Titchener. Allied with the foregoing, but more concerned with the description and interpretation of psychological data than with "psychological measurements," are Theodule Ribot (1839-1916) and Jacques Delboeuf (1831-1896).

Positivism has developed into the following forms or phases:

(1) PSYCHO-PHYSIOLOGICAL PARALLELISM, which denies the relation between bodily and spiritual phenomena, and teaches that these proceed in parallel series, or rather in a single series of which there are two aspects. Exponents of this theory are Fechner, Wundt, Jodl, Ebbinghaus, and many others.

(2) PHENOMENALISM acknowledges mere phenomena of mind, i. e., mere *thoughts* without a real mind from which these proceed. Hume and Renouvier are affected by this doctrine, and it is professed outright by Louis Weber in his work *To Absolute Positivism Through Idealism*, written in French, and published in 1903.

(3) PRAGMATISM holds that thought has only a practical value; it is directed to action. The truth and moral goodness of thought—nay, the very essence of truth and goodness—is found in *utility*. If thought directs a useful action, that action is *good* and *true*—it is right morally and intellectually. That which "works" with reference to a given purpose is the true and the

good thing in the circumstances. Truth and moral quality are therefore *relative* and dependent upon circumstance and intention. This doctrine was promulgated by Pierce in America in 1878, but its chief propagator was William James (1842–1910), professor at Harvard. James' theories have been accepted by Dewey and many other moderns. The relativity of truth was developed to further consequences by the Italians, Prezzolini, Calderoni, and Vailati, and in France by Bergson and Le Roy. Many American philosophers of our time have abandoned pure Pragmatism for Neo-Realism.

(4) NEO-REALISM, although imperfectly purged of idealism, is yet a sane reaction against pure idealism or any of its cruder forms. Neo-Realism rejects the ego-centric theory of the idealists which limits the perception of the mind to its own modifications or states. It posits a perfect *continuity* between the psychic and the physical. Among the many Neo-Realists we choose for mention: William Montague; Frederick Woodbridge; Ralph Barton Perry; Walter Pitkin; Edward Spaulding.

b) MATERIALISM.

Materialism dogmatically asserts the existence of matter, and holds that all phenomena, even vital phenomena, can be explained in terms of material science (physics, chemistry, etc.); hence it denies the existence of anything *spiritual*. Materialism flourished in Europe in the 18 century, and at the beginning of the 19 it was taught in France by Pierre Jean Cabanis (1757–1808) and Antoine Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836), exponents of the Empiricism of Condillac. Following these philosophers there was a short period of spiritualistic reaction against Materialism; but about the middle of the 19 century it revived under the influence of rapidly developing natural science, especially physics and biology. Philosophers of this period again took up the problem of explaining all facts

and phenomena by matter and local motion. Noted Materialists of the time were:

- i. Karl Moleschott (1822-1894);
- ii. Ludwig Buechner (1824-1898);
- iii. Karl Vogt (1817-1895);
- iv. Thomas Huxley (1825-1895);
- v. George Romanes (1848-1894);
- vi. Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919);
- vii. Felix Le Dantec (1869-1917).

Among the arguments used by modern Materialists prominence is given to that known as *Evolution* or *Transformism of Living Species*. In the 18 century Denis Diderot (1713-1784) and Jean Baptiste Robinet (1735-1820) taught a sort of evolutionistic monism, but offered no theory of the manner in which one species is changed into another. Such an explanation was offered by Jean Baptiste Lamarck (1744-1829) in his *Philosophie Zoologique* (1809). He asserted that the organism of a living thing takes on new and external elements in a very gradual but continuous manner, and, adapting itself to these new "parts" or elements of structure, is slowly changed into a new species. Charles Darwin (1809-1882) teaches a theory of *natural selection*, according to which the stronger individuals of a species survive the Struggle for Existence while the weaker perish (Survival of the Fittest); and these surviving individuals tend to a continuously improved condition of their kind by their power of adaptation to surroundings and conditions (natural variations). Transmitting their adaptations or variations to their progeny, new species are slowly formed. Darwin in his *Descent of Man* traces human origins back to brute life. The evolutionistic tendency which shows in the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest extends to the moral order, and the norm of morality is a natural tendency for that which is of utility or benefit to the species.

Materialism makes the brain the organ of the understanding,

and so makes all psychological functions depend on organic conditions. This phase of materialism was developed by the *Phrenologists* under the leadership of F. J. Gall (1758–1828), a German scientist. It was also insisted upon by those *Criminologists* (chief of whom was Cesare Lombroso, 1836–1909) who regard the criminal impulse as traceable to some organic defect. Following Lombroso, and deducing further doctrines from his postulates (such as the opinion that even *talent* or *genius* comes from organic defect or degeneration) were Enrico Ferri, Morselli, and Garofalo.

Article 3. Other Recent Philosophical Movements

- a) Spiritualistic Philosophy; b) Traditionalism; c) Ontologism.
a) SPIRITUALISTIC PHILOSOPHY.

The reaction against the earlier Materialism may be said to have begun in France in the so-called Vitalistic School of Montpellier under the leadership of the anatomist and psychologist, François Bichat (1771–1802). This reaction took on a more definite character when the influence of the Scottish School was felt on the continent, and Pierre Paul Royer-Collard (1763–1845) spread wide the doctrines of the anti-Sensist followers of Thomas Reid. It appeared, more strongly defined still, in the philosophy of Maine de Biran (1766–1824), who proposed the doctrine of a human cognitive faculty superior to sense and endowed with consciousness and activity, together with an active will which is not determined or necessitated.

The so called Spiritualistic School was established by Victor Cousin (1792–1867), successor of Royer-Collard as professor of philosophy in the University of Paris. Cousin at first professed a system of *Eclecticism*, founded upon the History of Philosophy. This History, he declares, shows that four systems of philosophy were always in existence among thinking men, viz., Sensualism, Idealism, Skepticism, and Mysticism. Man

can do no more: these are his best fruits of philosophical effort. Let us then take them *all*, adhering to none to the exclusion of the rest, and we shall find the truth in its entirety. Later in life, especially after a trip to Germany, where he heard Hegel and Schelling, Cousin inclined towards transcendental idealism. In his last years, dissatisfied with the spiritual barrenness of the philosophical system he had professed, he leaned strongly towards Catholicism, but did not enter the Church.

Cousin deserves great credit for the fact that he aroused interest in the History of Philosophy, and, in particular, for the effort he and his followers made to recommend Medieval Philosophy—condemned generally as unimportant—to the serious attention of scholars. Although imperfect, the works of the following followers of Cousin merit commendation:

- i. Charles de Remusat (1797–1875);
- ii. Rousselot;
- iii. Bartholomew Hauréau;
- iv. Saint-René-Taillandier;
- v. Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire;
- vi. Salomon Munk.

Among the philosophers who follow Cousin in part are:

- i. Jean Damiron (1794–1862);
- ii. Theodore Jouffroy (1796–1842);
- iii. François Bouillier (1813–1899);
- iv. Emile Saisset (1814–1863);
- v. Jules Simon;
- vi. E. Caro;
- vii. A. Frank;
- viii. Paul Janet;
- ix. E. Naville.

The reaction against Materialism appeared in Italy in the philosophy of Pasquale Galluppi (1770–1846), professor in the University of Naples, who professed a spiritualistic philosophy verging upon Christian spiritualism. Closer still to the Scho-

lastic position was Agosto Conti (1822-1905), who extolled Scholasticism and its Catholic doctors.

In Spain, James Balmes (1810-1848) professed a philosophy which is basically Thomistic, although it involves doctrines taken from Descartes, Leibnitz, and the Scottish School.

Later philosophers in the School of Cousin who evinced new tendencies towards old doctrines were:

- i. Stephen Vacherot (1809-1897), who verges upon pantheism;
- ii. Felix Ravaisson, who is idealistic and even pantheistic;
- iii. Jules Lachelier (1832-1918), who is a Kantian idealist;
- iv. Louis Liard (1848-1917), who is also Kantian;
- v. Emile Boutroux (1845-1921), who borrows from Leibnitz;
- vi. Alfred Fouillée (1838-1912), who professes a doctrine of "idea-force" which concedes much to Positivism.

Connected with the foregoing is Henri Bergson (born (1859), who revives the ancient doctrine of Heraclitus and teaches that *becoming* is the essence of things. This *becoming* is a reality which evolves itself spontaneously and consciously. It tends to self-concentration, and this it achieves in plants, and even more perfectly in animals. Part of this reality loses its consciousness and makes up the anorganic world. To rule the anorganic world *conscious becoming* drops its spontaneity and from *instinct* becomes *intellect*. Intellect indulges itself in schematic and abstractive views of things. But intellect is only a degraded or degenerated state of *sense*. To achieve truth one must abandon the intellectual or metaphysical realm and view reality (*becoming, duration*) directly.

Finally, mention must be made of Rudolf Eucken (1846-1926), late professor of the University of Jena, who, rejecting Scholasticism and Idealism alike, sought a system of philosophy which would show the falsity of Positivism and Materialism and make clear the value and purpose of human life.

b) TRADITIONALISM.

The rationalistic or spiritualistic reaction against Materialism was itself the occasion of reactionary movements. Many, opposed to Rationalism as much as to Materialism, developed new solutions for philosophical problems, especially for that of human knowledge and the possibility of certitude (the Critical Question). Some of these had recourse to *authority* as the basis of certainty (*Traditionalism*), while others revived the Ontologism of Malebranche and based human certitude upon the direct or *intuitive vision of God*, the Divine Exemplar of creation.

The basic doctrine of Traditionalism is that individual man cannot attain to truth and certainty by his unaided powers. He must have help, and this help comes: (1) from *God*, who revealed necessary truths to primitive men; and (2) from *society*, which has preserved this revelation and transmits it by tradition. This doctrine has, say the Traditionalists, a clear confirmation in the existence of human *speech*; for, they maintain, man could not have invented speech; it must have been given to him by God: and therefore God *did* make a revelation to men.

Notable Traditionalists were:

i. Joseph de Maistre (1754–1821), forerunner of the rigid Traditionalists, who minimized man's unaided rational powers, and asserted the need of authoritative tradition for certainty about the relations of the supernatural with the natural, about the operations of Divine Providence in man's free acts, and about fundamental political ethics.

ii. Louis de Bonald (1754–1840) defines man as a spirit which employs a body ("l'homme est une intelligence servie par des organes"); yet, in spite of this exaggerated spiritualistic doctrine, he affirms the sensistic thesis that man cannot think without speech. Speech could not have been invented by man,

for it would require thought to invent it, and thought requires speech. Consequently, speech must have been given to man by the Creator. But if man received speech from God, he must also have received the *thoughts* of which speech is but the sensible expression. Therefore, concludes De Bonald, God must have given the first men *speech* and the *primary necessary truths* (thoughts) which were to be handed down by tradition to posterity.

iii. Félicité de Lamennais (1782–1854) distinguished *individual* reason and *general* reason. The first, the reason of the individual man, is suited only for doubts; it can achieve no certainty of anything. But general reason, or the consensus of humanity, is the infallible rule of certitude, and *faith* in this general reason is the only motive of certainty. The general reason is the storehouse and the reliable conserving agency of truths divinely revealed to primitive men.

iv. Louis Bautain (1796–1867); Augustine Bonnetty (1798–1879); Joachim Ventura de Raulica (1792–1861); and Casimir Ubaghs (1800–1875) professed a mitigated Traditionalism, teaching that the human mind is, indeed, powerless to *acquire* truth unaided, but once it has been furnished with the certainties it holds by faith, it can *demonstrate* or prove these as true and certain. Ubaghs was partly Traditionalistic, partly Ontologist.

v. With the Traditionalists must be mentioned the father of so-called *Fideism*, Daniel Huet, Bishop of Avranches in France, whom we have already mentioned among the skeptical philosophers of the 17 century. Fideism teaches that while human reason cannot attain to clear certitude, it can achieve *probability*, and then divine Faith supplies what natural powers cannot acquire unaided.

c) ONTOLOGISM.

While Traditionalism posits the ultimate criterion of truth in God's revelations to men, Ontologism makes this criterion the

direct or intuitive view of God. Obviously, this vision is not the Beatific Vision of the Blessed, but it is, nevertheless, a true intuition of the Divine Essence. Ontologists were:

i. Vincenzo Gioberti (1801–1852), who maintains that the order of things in real nature (*ontological* order) must coincide with the order of thought (*logical* order); that is to say, the first truth in the logical order must be the first fact in the ontological order, viz., *God*. The idea of God is the Divine Idea which is the principle of all our knowledge. Since God created all things, He has in Himself the ideas or exemplars of all things; and thus to know God is to know all things in God. We do not indeed know all things *clearly* in our knowledge or idea of God, nor are we conscious of our direct vision of Him. What we find *obscure* and *mysterious* in the field of knowledge makes us suspect the existence of a still higher and more remote world of mystery; and this it is that Revelation makes known to us. The immediate vision of God and the general view of all things confusedly in that vision, is the source of the list (greater or smaller) of *distinct* thoughts, or points of knowledge, and these are confirmed by the reflective power of reason; reason aided by speech *applies* the distinct elements of its knowledge of *things*.

ii. Antonio Rosmini-Serbatì (1797–1855), a saintly priest, and the founder of the Religious Order called the Institute of Charity, teaches that the mind has the innate idea of *being* (which he identifies with the idea of God) and forms different concepts by applying this idea in sensation. God is the intellectual light of man; and the communication of the idea of *Being* before man's birth makes the soul rational. Some of Rosmini's doctrines were condemned by the Church, and were at once retracted.

iii. The most prominent follower of Rosmini was Pestalozza. Gioberti was followed by Terenzio Mamiani (1800–1865). In France, Ontologism was taught by Alphonse Gratry (1805–1872). A mixture of Ontologism and Traditionalism was

taught about the middle of the 19 century in France and Belgium. In Belgium we find the following philosophers of this School: Moehler, Claessens, Laforet, and Casimir Ubaghs. In France we find: Fabre and Branchereau. Ontologism was skilfully and effectively refuted by the famous Dominican philosophers, Thomas Zigliara and Albert Lepidi. Controversy on the subject of Ontologism among Catholic philosophers was closed when this theory was condemned by the Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office in 1861.

Article 4. Scholasticism in Our Times

Scholasticism, which was almost completely submerged during the 17 and 18 centuries, emerged again in the early 19. Notable among the Scholastics of the restoration period were:

- i. Matteo Liberatore, S.J. (1810-1872);
- ii. Thomas Zigliara, O.P. (1833-1893);
- iii. Caietano Sanseverino (1811-1865);
- iv. Annunzio Signoriello (1821-1889);
- v. Z. Gonzalez (1831-1895);
- vi. Joseph Kleutgen, S.J. (1811-1883);
- vii. Karl Werner (1828-1888).

By 1870 there was almost unanimous agreement among philosophers of the Catholic Faith in the acceptance of Scholasticism, yet there was much controversy among them as to the manner of conciliating Scholastic Psychology and Cosmology with the data of modern science. Involved in this controversy were the following, who opposed Scholastic physics at least in part:

- i. Salvatore Tongiorgi, S.J. (1820-1865);
- ii. Angelo Secchi, S.J. (1818-1878);
- iii. Pietro Tedeschini, S.J. (died 1876);
- iv. Domenico Palmieri, S.J. (1829-1909).

Pius IX had favored the return to Scholasticism on the part of Catholic philosophers. His successor, Leo XIII, had scarcely

assumed the duties of the Supreme Pontificate (1878) when he issued (1879) the Encyclical *Aeterni Patris*, in which he prescribed the teaching of Scholastic and Thomistic philosophy in Catholic schools. The Encyclical orders Catholic teachers of philosophy to augment and perfect the body of Thomistic doctrine by the addition of all certainly established truths and discoveries in the fields of philosophy and science. On the advice of Cardinal Joseph Pecci, Pope Leo founded the "Roman Academy of St. Thomas" in the very year of the issuance of the famous Encyclical (1879). He promoted the movement which established such Academies elsewhere, and founded a chair of Thomistic Philosophy in the University of Louvain in 1880, and later a School or Institute there, which he committed to the charge of Professor Désiré Mercier (1851–1926). Cardinal Mercier, with Désiré Nys, and Maurice De Wulf, edited a *Course of Philosophy* which meets the requirements of the Encyclical of Leo XIII, and marks the beginning of larger achievements by the so called *Neo-Scholastics*.

Scholasticism is making rapid progress in our day. Its name has been amended to *Neo-Scholasticism* to indicate that it is no mere revival of a medieval system, but that it takes into account the established data of all sciences. As a body of principles, Scholasticism was completed once and for all by Thomas Aquinas in the 13 century; it is for modern Scholastics, or Neo-Scholastics, to apply these principles in the interpretation of the data of physical science. The work is being done, and done well, in Catholic colleges and universities the world over, not least among which are our American institutions. But the work progresses slowly, if surely, and a complete account of the 20 century achievements of Scholasticism can only be written at some time in the distant future.

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INDEX

Numbers indicate pages. The more important loci are designated by italic numbers.

- d'Abano, *see* Peter d'Abano.
 Abelard, Peter, 191, 197, 199ff., 206.
 207, 210, 221.
 Abraham, 9, 13.
 Absolute, The, 22, 23, 340 ff.
 "Absolute Ego, The," 339 ff.
 Absolutism, *see* State Absolutism.
Abstine et Sustine, 105.
 Abstractive Power of Intellect, 82
 ff., 215, 238. *See also* Origin of
 Ideas.
 Abubacer, 214.
 "Abyss, The," 146 f.
 Academies, Platonic, 79 f.;
 Old Academy, 79;
 Middle Academy, 79;
 Third Academy, 79;
 New Academy, 80.
 Accident, *see* Predicables; Catego-
 ries.
 Achaeans, 32.
 Achamoth, 146.
 Achilles, 33.
 Achillini, Alexander, 269.
 Act (actuality), 95.
 Action, *see* Categories of Aristotle.
 Active and Passive Intellect, *see* In-
 tellect.
 Actuality (act), 95.
Actus Purus, 95, 227.
 "Acute Master of Abstractions"
 (Francis of Myron) 249.
 "Adamantine Philosopher, The"
 (Origen) 154.
 Adelard of Bath, 198, 205.
 Aedesius, 134.
 Aenesidemus of Crete, 112.
 Aeolians, 32.
Aeons, 146 f.
Aeterni Patris, 359.
 Agent Intellect, *see* Intellect.
 Agni, 22.
 Agnosticism, 345.
 Agrippa, 112.
 de Aguirre, 309.
 Ahriman, 29 ff.
 Ahura-Mazda, 28.
 d'Ailly, *see* Peter d'Ailly.
 Alan of Lille (Alanus ab Insulis)
 270 f.
 Albert of Cologne, *see* Albert the
 Great.
 Albert the Great, Bl. (Albertus
 Magnus), 220, 225, 233 f., 235,
 240, 241.
 Albertus Magnus, *see foregoiing*.
 Alcherus, 207.
 Alcuin, 171, 182 f.
 d'Alembert, Jean, 314.
 Alexander of Alexandria, 249.
 Alexander of Aphrodisias, 101.
 Alexander of Hales, 220, 225, 227 f.
 229, 264.
 Alexander the Great, 14, 60, 80.
 Alexis (Emperor), 218.
 Al-Farabi, 214.
 Al-Gazali, *see* Algazel.
 Algazel, 214.
 Al-Kindi, 214.
 Amalric of Chartres (Amaury of
 Bène), 211.
 Amaury of Bène, *see foregoiing*.
 Ambrose, St., 158 ff., 182.
 Amelius, 133.
 Ammonius Saccas, 129 f., 132, 136.
 Amon, 14.
 Amyntas, King of Macedon, 80.
 Anacharsis, 34.
Analytic of Aristotle, 82 ff.
 Anaxagoras, 56 ff.

- Anaxarchus, 60.
 Anaximander, 39 f., 46.
 Anaximines, 40 f.
 Ancestor Worship, 17.
 Andreas Caesalpinus, 269.
 Andronicus of Rhodes, 101.
 "Angelic Doctor, The" (St. Thomas Aquinas). *See* Aquinas.
 Angra-Mainyu (Ahriman), 29.
 An-Nazzam, 214.
 Anniceris (friend of Plato) 71.
 Anniceris (the Cyrenaic) 70.
 Anselm of Canterbury, St., 191, 193 ff., 198, 205, 206, 220.
 Anselm of Laon, 200.
 Anthropology:
 Anaximander, 39;
 Aristotle, 92;
 Atomist, 59;
 Buddhist, 26;
 Chaldean, 13;
 Democritus, 59;
 Egyptian, 15;
 Empedocles, 55;
 Hebrew, 9 ff.;
 Heraclitus, 52 f.;
 Persian, 31;
 Socrates, 67.
 Anthropology of the Apparent, 47.
 Antiochus of Ascalon, 80, 113, 118.
 Antipater of Tarsus, 106.
 Anti-Realism, 178, 188, 190, 198, 205, 206.
 Antisthenes, 69.
 Antoninus, St., 250.
 Antonius Andre (*Doctor Dulcifluus*), 249.
 Antony, 116.
 Aphrodisias, *see* Alexander of Aphrodisias.
 Apollonius of Tyana, 114.
 Apologists, 142 ff.
 African, 155 ff.;
 Alexandrian, 152 f.;
 Ante-Nicene, 151 ff.;
 Greek, 151 f.
 Apuleius of Madaura, 113, 182.
 "Aquinas in Verse" (Dante's *Commedia*) 245.
 Aquinas, St. Thomas, 71, 171, 196, 220, 225, 229, 231, 234 ff., 247, 249, 252, 257, 264, 359.
 Arabian Philosophy, 213 ff.
 Arcesilaus, 79, 110.
 Archelaus of Athens, 57.
 Archimedes, 115.
 Archytas of Tarentum, 46.
 Arethas, 218.
 Argument, Ontological, *see* Ontological Argument.
 Arguments of Zeno of Elea, 49.
 Arianism, 156.
 Aristarchus of Samos, 115.
 Aristides, 151.
 Aristippus, 70.
 Aristo, 70.
 Aristobulus, 124 f.
 Aristocles (Plato), 70.
 Ariston, 101.
 Aristoteleans and Aristoteleanism, 100 ff., 269 ff.
 Aristotle, 35, 37, 39, 42, 47, 48, 50, 52, 57, 58, 62, 63, 64, 72, 80 ff., 103, 115, 122, 133, 136, 179, 180, 181, 188, 205, 207, 208, 213, 214, 215, 218, 220, 222, 224, 229, 234, 236, 237, 238, 240, 244, 256, 264, 271, 278, 282, 316.
 Aristoxenes of Tarentum, 101.
 Arius, 156.
 Arnauld, Anthony, 300.
 Arnobius, 155.
 Arouet, François, *see* Voltaire.
 Aryans, 16 to 31.
 Associationism, 348.
 Assur, 13.
 Assyrians and Babylonians, 12.
 Astrology, 12.
 Astronomy, 75, 92, 115.
Ataraxia, 110, 112.
 Athanasius, St., 157.
 Atheism, 109, 112.
 Athenagoras, 151.
 Athenodorus of Tarsus, 117.
 Atman, 23.
 Atomism, 55, 57, 107, 297 f.
 Atomist School, 57 ff.
 Attalus, 117.
 Attribute, *see* Predicables.
 Atum (Atum-Ra), 14.
 Augustine, St., 149, 156, 158, 159 ff.,

- 179, 182, 188, 193, 196, 199, 236, 242.
 "Augustine of the Eleventh Century" (St. Anselm), 196.
 Augustus, 116.
 Aulus Persius Flaccus, *see* Persius.
 Aureoli (Aureolus), *see* Peter Aureolus.
 d'Auriac, L., 347.
 d'Auriol, *see* Peter Aureolus.
 "Ausonio Franchi" (Cristoforo Bonavino) 347.
 Avempace, 214.
 Averroes, 215 *ff.*, 219, 264.
 Averroism, 215, 250, 269.
Avesta, 28 *ff.*
 Avicbrol (Avicbron), 217.
 Avicenna, 213, 214, 215.
- Babenstuber, Ludwig, 309.
 Babylon, 12.
 Babylon, Captivity of, 9, 10.
 Babylonians and Assyrians, 12.
 Babel, 7.
 "Back to Kant" Movement, 346.
 Bacon, Francis, 275, 278 *ff.*, 283, 286, 312, 313.
 Bacon, Roger, *see* Roger Bacon.
 Bagas, 28.
 Balmes, James, 354.
 Bannez, Dominic, 266.
 Bardesanes, 148.
 Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire, 353.
 Bartholomew of Medina, 266.
 Barzellotti, Giacomo, 347.
 Basil, St. 157.
 Basilides, 145, 147.
 Baumgarten, Alexander, 324.
 Bautain, Louis, 356.
 Bayle, Pierre, 308.
 Beattie, James, 329.
Becoming, *see* *Being and Becoming*.
 Bede the Venerable, St., 159.
Being, 93 *ff.*, 299.
Being and Becoming, 46 *ff.*
 Benedictine School of Salzburg, 309.
 Berengarius of Tours, 193, 196.
 Bergson, Henri, 350, 354.
 Berkeley, George, 316, 325 *ff.*
 Bernard of Chartres, 204 *f.*
 Bernard of Clairvaux, St., 209.
 Bernard of Tours, 210 *f.*
 Bernier of Nivelles, 251.
 Berosus, 12.
 Bessarion, Cardinal, 268.
 Bias, 34.
 Bichat, François, 352.
 Biel, Gabriel, 266.
 Bilfinger, Bernard, 324.
 Binet, A., 349.
 Biran, *see* Maine de Biran.
 Blaise of the Conception, 309.
 Blemmydes, Nicephorus, 218.
 "Blond Beast, The," 344.
 Boccaccio, Giovanni, 262.
 Boethius, 158, 182, 236.
 Boethius of Sidon, 101.
 Boethius, the Dacian, 251.
 Bolingbroke, Lord Henry, 311.
 de Bonald, Victor, 355.
 Bonaventure, St., 220, 225, 228, 229 *ff.*, 235, 247, 264.
 Bonavino, Cristoforo ("Ausonio Franchi"), 347.
 Boniface VIII, 257.
 Bonnetty, Augustine, 356.
 "Book of the Dead, The" 14 *f.*
 Book of Josue, 13.
 Books of Moses (Pentateuch), 11, 125.
 "Books of Sentences", 206, 211, 212.
 Bossuet, James Benignus, 300.
 Bouillier, François, 353.
 "Boundless, The", 39.
 Boutroux, Emile, 354.
 Bradwardine, Thomas, 259.
 Brahma, 23.
 Brahmanas, 21, 23.
 Brahmanistic Philosophy, 23 *ff.*
 Branchereau, 358.
 Brochard, Victor, 347.
 Brown, Thomas, 329.
 Bruno, Giordano, 271 *f.*
 Buddha (Sakya-Muni), 25.
 Buddhism, 25 *ff.*
 Buechner, Ludwig, 351.
 Buridan, John, 259.
 Burleigh, Walter (*Doctor Planus et Perspicuus*), 249.
 Butler, John, 313.
 Byzantine Philosophers. 218.

- Caballa (Kalah), 128.
 Cabanis, Pierre Jean, 350.
 Caesar, 116.
 Cajetan, Thomas de Vio, 264 f.
 Calculus invented by Leibnitz, 316.
 Calderoni, 350.
 Caligula, 125.
 Campanella, 270 f.
 Cantoni, Carolo, 347.
 Canus, Melchoir, *see* Melchoir Canus.
 Capreolus, *see* John Capreolus.
 Captivity of Babylon, 9, 10.
 Cardano, Geronimo, 271 f.
 Carolingian Schools, 180 ff.
 Carneades, 80, 111.
 Caro, E., 353.
 Carpocrates, 147.
 Cartesianism, 299 ff., 308.
 Carvakaism, 25.
 Cassier, Ernst, 347.
 Cassiodorus, 182.
 Castes, 24, 26.
 Catechetical School of Alexandria, 152 ff.
 Categoremata, *see* Predicables.
 "Categorical Imperative, The," 337, 347.
 Categories: Aristotle, 85 ff.; Hindus, 25.
 Cause and Causality, 47, 67, 96, 97, 112, 127, 241, 328.
 Celsus, 113.
 Cerinthus the Jew, 148.
 Chaldean Philosophy, 12 ff.
 Cham, 7.
 Chaos, Primordial, 13, 14, 22, 30, 38.
 Charlemagne, 171 f., 182.
 Charles the Bald, 184.
 Charles the Great, *see* Charlemagne.
 Chen (Shan), 17.
 "Chief of Rhetoricians, The" (Empedocles), 54.
 "Chief of the Thomists, The" (Capreolus), 250.
 Chilon, 34.
 Chinese Philosophy, 16 ff.
Choregia, 101.
 "Christian Cicero, The" (Lactantius), 155.
 Chrysanthus, 134.
 Chrysippus, 106.
 "Church" of the Positivists, 348.
 Cicero, 114, 117, 118 ff., 182.
 Clarke, 324.
 Clarke, Samuel, 313.
 Claessens, 358.
 Clauberg, John, 299.
 Claudius Mamertus, 158.
 Claudius Ptolemaeus (Ptolemy), 115.
 Cleanthes, 106.
 Clement of Alexandria, St., 152, 153 f., 182.
 Clitomachus, 111.
 Codrus, 70.
Cogito ergo sum, 293 f.
 Cohen, Hermann, 347.
 Colonies, Greek, 32, 36.
 Common Sense Philosophy, 329.
 Comnena, Anna, 218.
 Comte, Auguste, 348 f.
 Concept (of Socrates), 65 ff., 73.
 Conceptualism, 176, 205, 255, 257.
 Condillac, Abbé Stephen Bonnot de, 311, 350.
 Conditions of Knowledge; St. Augustine, 161; Socrates, 68.
 Confucius, *see* Kun-fu-tse.
 Confucianism, 16, 18, 21.
 Constantine the Great, 155.
 Conti, Agosto, 354.
 Contraries of Pythagoreans, 43.
 Controversy on Universals, 172, 189, 190, 198, 201 f., 205 ff.
 Cooper (Lord Shaftesbury), 313.
 Copernicus, 115, 261, 270.
 Cornutus (Lucius Annaeus Cornutus), 117.
 Cosmogony:
 Anaxagoras, 56;
 Atomists, 58 f.;
 Brahmanistic, 23;
 Chaldeans, 13;
 Empedocles, 54;
 Epicurean, 107;
 Heraclitus, 52;
 Ionian, 38 ff.;
 Lao-tse, 19;
 Persian, 30;
 Pythagorean, 44;
 Vedic, 22.

- Cosmology, 38, 39, 40, 41, 44, 52, 54,
 56, 58 f., 75, 92, 105, 107.
 Cosmology of the Apparent, 48.
 Council of Nicaea, 156.
 Counter-Earth, The, 44.
 Cousin, Victor, 200, 201, 352 f.
 Crantor, 79.
 Crates, 69.
 Cratylus, 71.
 Creationism, 10, 14, 19, 29, 75, 92,
 119, 198.
Credo ut intelligam, 194.
 Criminologists, 352.
 Criteriology, *see* Epistemology.
 Criterion of truth, 113, 118 f.
 Critical Question, The, 63, 68, 275,
 330, 354.
 "Critiques" of Kant, 330 f.
 Critolaus, 101.
 Criton, 65.
 Croce, Benedetto, 347.
 Crotona, School of, 41.
 Cudworth, Raphael, 300.
 Cuneiform writings, 12.
 Cynic Philosophy, 69, 109.
 Cyrenaic Philosophy, 69, 109.
 Cyrus, 27.

 Damasius, 136.
 Damiron, Jean, 353.
 Dante Alighieri, 245, 262.
 le Dantec, Felix, 351.
 Darwin, Charles, 351.
 Darwinian Evolution, *see* Evolution.
 of Empedocles, 54, 56.
 David, 9.
 David the Armenian, 136.
 David of Dinant, 211.
 Deduction, 87 f.
 Definition, 67 f.
 Deism, 11, 311, 312, 314.
 Deists (French), 311.
 Delboeuf, Jacques, 349.
 Delbos, Victor, 347.
 Demetrius of Phalerus, 101.
Demurge, 75, 141, 146 f.
 Democritus, 58 ff.
 Demons, 45.
 Denis the Areopagite, 158.
 Denis the Carthusian, 265.

 Descartes, René (Cartesius), 275,
 286, 291 ff., 300, 304, 308, 315.
 316, 331, 354.
 DeSoto, Dominic, 266.
 Determinism, 11, 53, 105 f., 259, 303.
 DeWulf, Maurice, 201, 234, 359.
 Dexippus 134.
 Dialectic:
 Aristotle (Logic), 81;
 Eclectic, 207;
 Eleatic, 48 ff.;
 Megarian, 69;
 Mystics and, 209 f.;
 Plato, 72;
 Sophists, 61.
 see also 253 ff.
 Dialectic Movement, 188.
 Dicaearchus, 101.
Dictum de Nullo, 87.
Dictum de Omni, 87.
 Diderot, Denis, 314, 351.
 Diodorus, 101.
 Diodorus Cronus, 69.
 Diogenes of Apollonia, 57.
 Diogenes of Babylon, 106.
 Diogenes of Sinope, 69.
 Diogenes of Smyrna, 60.
 Dionysius the Areopagite, *see* Denis
 the Areopagite.
 Dionysius the Elder, 71.
 Distinction (formal) of Scotus, 247.
 Divination, 17.
 Divine Mind (Anaxagoras), 56 f.
Doctor Angelicus (St. Thomas
 Aquinas), 225, 234.
Doctor Dulcifluus (Antonius An-
 dree), 249.
Doctor Facundus (Peter Aureolus),
 254.
Doctor Illuminatus (Raymond Lully)
 225, 250.
Doctor Invincibilis (William of
 Ockam), 257.
Doctor Irrefragabilis (Alexander of
 Hales), 225, 227.
Doctor Mirabilis (Roger Bacon),
 225, 232.
Doctor Ornatissimus (John of Bas-
 soles), 249.
Doctor Planus et Perspicuus (Wal-
 ter Burleigh), 249.

- Doctor Resolutissimus* (Durandus of St. Pourçain), 255, 256.
- Doctor Seraphicus* (St. Bonaventure), 225, 229.
- Doctor Solemnis* (Henry of Ghent), 225, 246.
- Doctor Subtilis* (John Duns Scotus), 225, 247.
- Doctor Universalis* (Albert the Great), 225, 233.
- Dominic of Flanders, 265.
- Dorians, 32.
- Dropides, 70.
- Dualism:
 of Anaxagoras, 56;
 Gnostic, 145 ff.;
 Platonic, 78, 208, 226, 228;
 Religious, 28 ff.
- Duns Scotus, *see* John Duns Scotus.
- Durandus of Aurillac, 250.
- Durandus of St. Pourçain (*Doctor Resolutissimus*), 250, 255, 256 f.
- Dynamism, 41, 53, 106.
- Earlier Ionians, *see* Ionian Philosophy.
- Ebbinghaus, 349.
- Eckhart, *see* Master Eckhart.
- Eclecticism:
 Cicero, 118 f.;
 French, 352 ff.;
 Greek, 113 ff.;
 Leibnitz, 316 f.;
 Medieval, 206 ff.
- Edict of Justinian, 136, 218.
- Education and the State (Plato), 78.
- Egyptian Philosophy, 14 ff.
- El, 12.
- Elean School, 69.
- Eleatic Philosophy, 46 ff.
- Elements, doctrine of:
 Aristotle, 90 ff.;
 Empedocles, 54;
 Plato, 75.
- Emanationism, 131, 185, 187, 210.
see also Pantheism; Philosophy.
- Empedocles, 54 ff.
- Empiricism, 278, 283, 299, 310.
- "Enlightened, The" (Buddha), 25.
- "Enlightenment, The," 325.
- Ephesius, Michael, 218.
- Epictetus, 117.
- Epicurean Philosophers, 107 ff., 117 f.
- Epicurus, 107, 108, 118.
- Epiphanius, St., 147.
- Epistemology:
 Aristotle, 81 ff.;
 Atomists, 59;
 Augustine, St., 161;
 Cicero, 118.
 Descartes, 294 ff.;
 Eclectic, 113;
 Empedocles, 55;
 Epicurean, 108;
 Hales (Alex.), 227;
 Heraclitus, 53;
 Kant, 331 ff.;
 Leibnitz, 318 f.;
 Plato, 73 f.;
 Pyrrhonian, 110;
 Socrates, 65, 67;
 Sophists, 61 ff.;
 Spencer, 345;
 Stoic, 104;
 Thomas Aquinas, St., 237 ff.
- d'Ercole, Pasquale, 347.
- Eretrian School, 69;
- Eric of Auxerre, 188 f.
- Erigena (Eriugena, Ierugena, Joannes Scottigena, John the Scot), 184 ff., 211.
- Eristic Method:
 Eleatic, 48;
 Megarian, 69;
 Sophist, 63.
- Eristic School, 69.
- Eriugena, *see* Erigena.
- Essence, 82, 241, 255, 259.
- Essence and Existence, 226, 228, 246, 250, 267.
- Essenes, 11.
- Eternal Law, 165.
- Eternal Matter, 67, 92.
- Ethical Question, The, 103 ff.
- Ethics:
 Abelard, 202;
 Academian, 111;
 Aristotle, 97 ff.;
 Atomists, 59;
 Augustine, St., 164;
 Brahmanistic, 24;
 Buddhistic, 26;

- Carvakaist, 25;
 Cicero, 120;
 Chaldean, 13;
 Confucian, 18;
 Egyptian, 15;
 Empedoclean, 105;
 Epicurean, 108;
 Greek, 33;
 Gnostic, 147;
 Hebrew, 10 f.;
 Iamblichus, 134;
 Lao-tse, 19 f.;
 Manichean, 150;
 Neo-Pyrrhonian, 112;
 Persian, 29 f.;
 Philo, 127;
 Plato, 72, 77 f.;
 Proclus, 135;
 Pyrrhonian, 110;
 Sadducees, 11;
 Skeptics, 110 ff.;
 Socrates, 67 f.;
 Stoic, 105;
 Thomistic, 242 f.;
 Vedic, 23.
- Eubulides, 69.
 Eucken, Rudolf, 354.
 Euclid (the Geometrician), 115.
 Euclid of Megara, 69, 71.
 Eudemus of Rhodes, 101.
 Euripides, 56.
 Eusebius, 12, 125.
 Eusebius of Myndus, 134.
 Evil, 165, 218, 322.
 Evolution, 22, 39 f., 54 f., 166, 346, 351.
 Evolutionist Theory of Religion, 12, 21, 27.
 Exaggerated Realism, *see* Realism.
 Exile in Babylon, 9, 10.
 Experiment, Bacon on, 233.
 Extension of Universals, 174.
 Extinction of Desire for Existence, 26.
 Extinction of Pain, 24 f.
- Faber, John, 267.
 Fabre, 358.
 "Faculty of Inspiration and Suggestion," 328 f.
 Fatalism, 106.
- "Father of Cosmology" (Thales), 38.
 "Father of Modern Experimental Science" (Galileo), 270.
 "Father of Natural Sciences" (Aristotle), 100.
 "Father of Nominalism" (Roscelin), 191.
 Fathers of the Church, 142 ff., 151 ff., 156 ff.
 "Fathers of the Italian Language" (Dante, Petrarca, and Boccaccio), 262.
 Faustinus, 159.
 Fechner, 349.
 Feijoo, Benedict, 311.
 Fénelon, Francis, 300.
 Ferguson, Adam, 313.
 de Ferrara, Francis de Sylvestris, 265.
 Ferrari, Giuseppe, 347.
 Ferri, Enrico, 352.
 Fichte, Johann, 339 f., 343.
 Ficino, Marsilio, 268.
 Fideism, 356.
Fides quaerens intellectum, 194.
 "First Great Scholastic, The" (William of Auvergne), 226.
 Fitzacre, Robert, *see* Robert Fitzacre.
 "Five Essences": Aristotle, 92;
 Pythagoreans, 44.
 Five Predicables, *see* Predicables.
 Fonseca, Peter, 266.
 Form, 90 ff.; *see also* Plurality of Forms.
 Foucher, Simon, 308.
 Fouillée, Alfred, 354.
 "Four Elements," 53, 55.
 "Four Labyrinths of France," 210.
 "Four Natures" of Erigena, 185 ff., 210.
 Francis of Myron, 249.
 Frank, A., 353.
 Frassen, Claude, 309.
 Fredegis, 183.
 Free-will, 11, 77, 119, 152, 164, 240.
 Fulbert of Chartres, 193, 204.
- Galen, 102, 113, 182.
 Galileo Galilei, 270 f.

- Gall, F. J., 352.
 Gallupi, Pasquale, 353.
 Gandulph of Bologna, 212.
 Garofalo, 352.
 Gassendi, Peter, 269, 300.
 Genera and Species, 174 ff.
 Genesis, 127.
 Gentile, Giovanni, 347.
 Geocentric System, 75, 92.
 Geometry, 115, 291.
 Gerard of Abbeville, 244.
 Gerbert, 187 f.
 Gerson, John, 260.
 Geulincx, Arnold, 299.
 Gilbert de la Porrée, 205, 210.
 Giles of Rome, 245, 247, 264.
 Gioberti, Vincenzo, 357.
 Glanville, Joseph, 307.
Gnosis, 144 f., 153.
 Gnosticism, 144 ff.
 Godfrey of Fontaines, 245, 247.
 Goethe, 307.
 Golden Age of Greek Philosophy, 63 ff.
 Golden Age of Scholasticism, 225 ff., 264, 265.
 "Golden Sayings of Pythagoras," 42.
 Gonet, Jean Baptiste, 309.
 Gonzalez, Z., 358.
 Gordian, 130.
 Gorgias, 62 ff., 69.
 Goudin, Antoine, 309.
 Government, forms of, 78, 98 f.
 Gratry, Alphonse, 357.
Great Avesta, 28.
 Greek Colonies, 32, 36.
 Greek influence, on Hebrews, 10, 124; on Egyptians, 14.
 Greek Religion, 33.
 Greek thought, qualities and development of, 34 f.
 Gregory the Great, St., 158.
 Gregory of Nazianzen, St., 157.
 Gregory of Nyssa, St., 157, 182.
 Gregory of Tours, St., 158.
 Gregory X, 229, 235.
 de Groot (Grotius) Hugo, 273, 324.
 Grosseteste, Robert, *see* Robert Grosseteste.
 Grotius, *see* de Groot.
 Habit, *see* Categories of Aristotle.
 Hades, 33.
Haeceitas, 248.
 Haeckel, Ernst, 351.
 Hamilton, William, 329.
 Hansch, Theophile, 324.
 Hartley, David, 311.
 von Hartmann, Eduard, 344.
Hate and Love of Empedocles, 54.
 Heads of Predicables, *see* Predicables.
 Hauréau, Bartholomew, 353.
 Heber, 9.
 Hebrew Philosophy, 9 ff.
 Hedonism, 11, 70, 77, 108, 118.
 Hedonist School, 70.
 Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 341 ff., 353.
 Hegesias of Alexandria, 70.
 Heliocentric System, 115.
 Heliodorus, 136.
 Heliopolis, 14.
 Hellenes, 32.
 Helmholtz, Hermann, 347.
 Héloïse, 200.
 Helvetius, Claude, 314.
 Henry of Ghent (*Doctor Solennis*), 225, 244, 246 f.
 Heraclides of Pontus, 79.
 Heraclitus, 51 ff., 53, 70.
 Herbart, Johann Friedrich, 343.
 Heretical Systems, 142 ff.
 Herman (of Tournai), 199.
 Hermarchus of Mytilene, 109.
 Hermes Trismegistus, 137, 182.
 Hermodotus of Clazomenae, 57.
 Hervé of Nedellec, 245, 250.
 Hesiod, 33, 124.
 Heterodox Schools of Hindu Philosophy, 25 ff.
 Heuristic Method of Socrates, 65 ff.
 Hexahemeron, 162.
 Hicetas, 115.
 Hieroglyphics, 14.
 Hilary, St., 158.
 Hildebert of Lavardin, 199.
 Hindu Philosophy 21 ff.:
 Brahmanistic, 23 f.;
 Heterodox, 25 f.;
 Orthodox, 24;
 Vedic, 22 f.

- Hippias of Elis, 63.
 Hippocrates, 182.
 Hippodamus of Miletus, 46.
 Hippolytus (Hippolyte), St., 151.
 History of Philosophy, importance stressed by Victor Cousin, 352 f.
 Hobbes, Thomas, 283 ff., 286, 312 ff., 324.
 Holy Scripture, 9 ff.
 Homer, 33, 124.
 Horace (Quintus Horatius Flaccus), 118.
 Horus, 14.
 Huet, Daniel, 300, 308.
 Hugh of St. Cher, 244.
 Hugh of St. Victor, 209.
 Humanism and Humanists, 263 ff., 273.
 Humbert of Preuilly, 245.
 Hume, David, 316, 326 f., 331.
 Hutcheson, Francis, 313.
 Huxley, Thomas, 351.
 Hyksos, 7.
 Hylomorphism, 90, 322.
 Hylozoism, 37, 41, 53, 57, 75.
- Iamblichus, 137 ff.
 Ibn-Badscha, *see* Avempace.
 Ibn-Roschd, *see* Averroes.
 Ibn-Sina, *see* Avicenna.
 Ibn-Tophail, *see* Abubacer.
 Idealism, 290 f., 325 ff., 329, 352, 354.
 Ideas, Theory of:
 Aristotelean, 82 ff.;
 Augustine, St., 162;
 Neo-Platonic, 132;
 Platonic, 72 ff.
 see also Origin of Ideas.
- Ideology:
 Anselm, St., 196;
 Aristotle, 82 ff.;
 Epicurean, 107;
 Medieval Eclectic, 208;
 Plato, 73 ff.;
 Socrates, 67;
 Stoic, 104;
 see also Origin of Ideas.
- Ierugena, *see* Erigena.
 Ildephonse, St., 159.
 "Illuminati, The," 325.
 Illumination Theory of Knowledge, 144 f., 153, 161, 226, 228, 233, 238, 244, 246.
- Immortality of the Soul:
 Aquinas, St. Thos., 240;
 Aristoteleans, 125;
 Aristotle, 92;
 Averroes, 216;
 Egyptians, 15;
 Epicureans, 108;
 Greeks, 33;
 Hebrews, 9 f.;
 Heraclitus, 53;
 Hindu (Vedic), 22;
 Hume and Berkeley, 326 f.;
 Lao-tse, 20;
 Leibnitz, 320;
 Ockam, 259;
 Persians, 29;
 Plato, 76;
 Socrates, 68;
 Spinoza, 306;
 Stoics, 105.
- Indi, 21.
 "Individualist, The" (Protagoras), 62.
 Indra, 22.
 Induction, 67, 68, 88, 278 f.
 Inference, 87 ff.
 "Inferiors" of Universal, 173 f.
 Infinite Series of Worlds Theory, 37, 39, 40, 52, 53, 154.
 Innatism, 67 ff., 73, 231, 286, 290.
 Intellect, 92, 101, 215; *see also* Illumination Theory.
 Intellectualism, 291 ff., 315 ff.
 Intellectualism and Voluntarism, 240, 246.
 Ionian Philosophy, 36 ff., 51 ff.
 Ionians, 32.
 Irenaeus, St., 151 f.
 Irony of Socrates, 66.
 Isaac de Stella, 207.
 Isaias, 10.
 Isidore, St., 159.
 Isidorus, 136.
 Isis, 14.
- Jahve (Yahweh), 9 ff.
 James I, 277.
 James, William, 350.
 Janet, Paul, 349, 353.

- Japheth, 7.
 Japhethites (Aryans) 16 to 31.
 Jerome, St., 148, 155.
 Jesuits, *see* Society of Jesus.
 Jewish Philosophy, 9 ff., 217 f.
 Joannes de Rupella, *see* John de la Rochelle.
 Joannes Italus, 218.
 Joannes Magistri, 267.
 Joannes Scottigena, *see* Erigena.
 Jodl, 349.
 John Capreolus, 250.
 John Damascene, St., 182.
 John Duns Scotus, 220, 225, 244, 247 ff., 258, 264.
 John Fidanza, *see* Bonaventure, St.
 John of Bassoles (*Doctor Ornatus*), 249.
 John of Jandun, 251.
 John à Lapide, 265.
 John of Naples, 250.
 John de la Rochelle (de Rupella), 228 f.
 John Ruysbroeck, Bl., 260.
 John of St. Thomas, 266.
 John of Salisbury, 191, 206 f.
 John the Scot, *see* Erigena.
 John the Sophist, 192.
 Jorz, Thomas, 245.
 Joseph Saenz de Aguirre, 309.
 Josue, Book of, 13.
 Jouffroy, Theodore, 353.
 Julian the Apostate, 134.
 Jupiter, 14.
 Jupiter-Amon, 14.
 Justin, St., 151 f.
 Justinian, Edict of, 136, 218.
 Justus Lipsius (Joest Lips), 269.

 Ka, 15.
 Kabbalah, *see* Caballa.
 Kantianism, 330 ff.
 Kant, Immanuel, 307, 330 ff., 346.
 à Kempis, Thomas, *see* Thomas Hemerken.
 Kepler, Johann, 270, 271.
 Kilwardby, Robert, 244.
 "King Books," 16.
 Kleutgen, Joseph, 358.
 Knowledge, *see* Epistemology, Ideas, Ideology, Illumination Theory, Origin of Ideas.
 Knum, 14.
 Kuelpe, Oswald, 349.
 Kun-fu-tse (Confucius), 16 ff.

 Lachelier, Jules, 354.
 Lactantius, 155, 182.
 Lafitte, 348.
 Laforet, 358.
 Lamarck, Jean Baptiste, 351.
 de Lamennais, Félicité, 356.
 LaMettrie, Julian, 314.
 Lanfranc, 193.
 Lange, Albert, 346.
 Lao-tse, 16, 19 f.
 "Last Father and First Scholastic" (St. Anselm), 196.
 Later Franciscan School, 247.
 Later Ionians, *see* Ionian Philosophy.
 Latin, Medieval, 181.
 Law, *see* Eternal Law, Natural Law.
 Laws of Thought, 81 f.
 Leander, St., 159.
 Leibnitz, Gottfried Wilhelm, 316 ff., 354.
 Leo XIII, 358, 359.
 Leo the Great, St. 158.
 Leonidas, St., 154.
 Lepidi, Albert, 358.
 Le Roy, 350.
 Lessing, Gotthold Ephraim, 325.
 Leucippus, 58.
 Liard, Louis, 354.
 "Liberal Arts," 171, 181.
 Liberation, Doctrine of, 24.
 Liberatore, Matteo, 358.
 "Light and Pillar of Islam" (Al-gazel), 214.
 Lipsius, Justus (Joest Lips), *see* Justus Lipsius.
 Littré, 348.
 Locke, John, 285 ff., 310, 312, 313, 326.
 Logic:
 Augustine, St., 161;
 Cicero, 118;
 Epicureans, 107 f.;
 Stoic, 104 f.
 see also Dialectic.
 Logical Order, The, 93, 195, 357.

- Logos*, Doctrine of the:
 Gnostic, 146;
 Fathers, 152;
 Heraclitus, 52;
 Philo, 126 ff.;
 Stoic (World-Soul), 105.
see also World-Soul.
- Lombroso, Cesare, 352.
- Lotze, Rudolf Herman, 344.
- Louis the Pious (*Le Débonnaire*), 182.
- Love and Hate* of Empedocles, 54.
- Lucan (Marcus Annaeus Lucanus), 117.
- Lucius Annaeus Cornutus (Cornutus), 117.
- Lucius Annaeus Seneca (Seneca), 117.
- Lucretius (Titus Lucretius Carus), 117 f., 182.
- Lully, Raymond, *see* Raymond Lully.
- Lychetus of Brescia, 249.
- Lycon, 101.
- Macedonians, 32.
- Machiavelli, 273.
- Mackintosh, James, 329.
- Macrobius, 182.
- Magic, 12, 15, 17.
- "Magic Number, The" (Pythagorean), 43 ff.
- Maieutic* of Socrates, 66 ff.
- Maimonides, Moses, 217 f., 219.
- Maine de Biran, 352 f.
- de Maistre, Joseph, 355.
- Major, John, 266.
- Major Socratic School (Old Academy), 68, 79.
- Mak (Mih-tse), 21.
- Malebranche, Nicole, 300 ff.; 307, 355.
- Mamiani, Terenzio, 357.
- Mandeville, Bernard, 311.
- Manes, 149 ff.
- Manicheism, 148 ff.
- "Man, the Measure of All" (Protagoras), 62.
- Marcion, 145, 147.
- Marcus Annaeus Lucanus (Lucan), 117.
- Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, 117.
- Marduk, 13.
- Marinus of Sicchem, 136.
- Marius Victorinus, 182.
- Marriage, Aristotle on, 98.
- Marsilius of Inghen, 259.
- Martian Capella, 136 f., 182.
- Master Eckhart of Hochheim, 260.
- "Master of Sentences, The" (Peter the Lombard), 212.
- Materialism:
 Atomists, 58 f.;
 Carvakaists, 25;
 Empiricists, 312 f.;
 Epicureans, 107, 109;
 French, 313 ff.;
 Greek, 64;
 Hobbes, 283, 285;
 Lockian, 290;
 Post-Kantian, 350 ff.;
 Sadducees, 11;
 Stoics, 105 f.
- Mathematics, 115.
- "Matter and Mind" (Anaxagoras), 56 f.
- Matthew of Aquasparta, 244.
- Maximus of Ephesus, 134.
- Maya* ("illusion"), 23.
- Mazda (Ahura-Mazda, Ormazd, Ormuzd), 28.
- Mazdeism, 28 ff.
- Mechanistic Philosophy:
 Atomists, 57 ff.;
 Descartes, 296, 298;
 Empedocles, 55, 57;
 Epicurean, 107, 109.
- Medieval Latin, 181.
- Megarian School, 69.
- Meier, Friedrich, 324.
- Melchior Canus, 266.
- Melissus of Samos, 50 f.
- Menander the Samaritan, 148.
- Mencius (Meng-tse), 21.
- Mendelssohn, Moses, 325.
- Mendicant Religious Orders, 223 f.
- Menedemus, 69.
- Meng-tse (Mencius), 21.
- Menippus, 69.
- Mercier, Cardinal Désiré, 276, 359.
- Merovingians, 171.
- Metaphysics of Aristotle, 93 ff.

- Metempsychosis, 15, 22, 24, 26, 45, 77, 147, 150, *see also* Transmigration of Souls.
- Method, *see* Eristic Method, Heuristical Method, Deduction, Induction.
- "Methodic Doubt" (Descartes), 292, 293 f.
- Metrodorus of Chios, 60.
- Mettrie, *see* LaMettrie.
- Mezger, Paul, 309.
- Michael Ephesius, 218.
- Michael Psellus, the Elder, 218.
- Michael Psellus, the Younger, 218.
- Michotti, 349.
- Mih-tse (Mak), 20.
- Milesian Philosophers, *see* Earlier Ionians.
- Mill, John Stuart, 348 f.
- "Mind and Matter" (Anaxagoras), 56 f.
- Minor Socratic Schools, 69 f.:
 Megarian or Eristic, 69;
 Cynic, 69;
 Elean or Eretrian, 69;
 Cyrenaic or Hedonist, 69 f.
- Minucius Felix, 155.
- della Mirandola, Giovanni, 268.
- Mithras, 28 f.
- Moderate Realism, *see* Realism.
- Moderatus of Gades, 114.
- Modern Philosophy, Character of, 276.
- Modes of Predication, *see* Predicables.
- Moehler, 358.
- Moleschott, Karl, 351.
- Molina, Louis, 266, 267.
- Monadology of Leibnitz, 317 ff.
- Monica, St., 159, 160.
- Monism, 41, 46, 53, 58, 109, 210, 314, 351.
- Monotheism:
 A primitive belief, 9, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 21, 22, 27, 28, 30.
 Egyptian, 14 f.;
 Chaldean, 12 f.;
 Chinese, 17, 21;
 Greek, 33, 45, 67, 74, 96.
 Hebrew, 9, 12;
 Hindu, 22; 27;
 Persian, 28, 30;
 Montaigne, William, 350.
- Montanism, 155.
- de Montesquieu, Charles, 314.
- Moral Code, *see* Ethics.
- Moral Indifference of Cynics, 69.
- Moralism, English, 312 ff.
- Morality, Norm of:
 Abelard, 202 f.;
 Aristotle, 98 f.;
 Augustine, St., 165;
 Cicero, 120;
 Deists, 312;
 Descartes, 297 f.;
 English Moralists, 312 f.;
 French Materialists, 314;
 Locke, 289 f.;
 Thomas Aquinas, St., 243.
- Moral Law, *see foregoing*; Ethics.
- Moral Sensualism, *see* Sensualism.
- More, Thomas, Bl., 273.
- More, Henry, 300.
- Morselli, 352.
- Moses, 11.
- Moses Maimonides, *see* Maimonides.
- de la Mothe le Vayer, 308.
- Mueller, Max, 28.
- Munk, Salomon, 352.
- "Music of the Spheres" (Pythagoreans), 45.
- Musonius Rufus (Musonius) 117.
- Myron (Mayron), *see* Francis of Myron.
- Myson, 34.
- Mysticism, 123, 190, 208 ff., 260, 352.
- Mythology:
 Chaldean, 13;
 Chinese, 17;
 Egyptian, 14;
 Greek, 33;
 Hindu, 22 ff.;
 Persian, 28 f.
- Natorp, Paul, 347.
- Naturalists, Medieval, 270 ff.
- Natural Law, St. Augustine, 165;
 Berkeley, 327.
- Naville, E., 353.
- Nemesius of Phoenicia, 157, 182.
- Neo-Criticism, 346 f.

- Neo-Platonism, 129 ff., 148 f., 217.
 Neo-Pyrrhonian School, 111 f.
 Neo-Realism, 350.
 Neo-Scholasticism, 169, 276, 359.
 Nephthys, 14.
 Newton, Isaac, 300.
 Nicetas, 218.
 Nicholas (and the Nicholaites), 148.
 Nicholas of Autrecourt, 259 f.
 Nicholas of Cusa, 260.
 Nicholas of Damascus, 101.
 Nicholas de Orbellis, 249.
 Nichomachus of Gerasa, 114.
 Nicole, Peter, 300.
 Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm, 344.
 Nigidius Figulus, 114.
 "Nihilist, The" (Gorgias), 63.
 Nine Accidents, The, *see* Categories of Aristotle.
 Nirvana, 26.
 Noe, 7.
 Nominalism, 176:
 Abelard, 201;
 Durandus of St. Pourçain, 256;
 Epicurean, 107;
 Eric of Auxerre, 188;
 Hobbes, 284 f.;
 Locke, 288;
 Ockam, 254, 257;
 Rhabanus Maurus, 183;
 Roscelin, 191.
 Norm of Morality, *see* Morality.
Nous, 131 ff.
 Number Theory (Pythagorean), 42 ff.
 Numenius of Apamea, 113.
 Nyaya, 24.
 Nys, Désiré, 359.
 Objective Truth, 62.
 "Obscure, The" (Heraclitus), 52.
 Occasionalism, 299, 301, 303, 307, 317.
 Ocellus the Lucanian, 46.
 Ockam, *see* William of Ockam.
 Ockamism and Ockamists, 259 ff.
 "Ockam's Razor," 254.
 Odo (Odon, Otto) of Tournai, 198 f.
 Olivi, *see* Peter Olivi.
 "One, The": of Lao-tse, 19; of Plotinus, 113 f.
 "Ontological Argument, The":
 Anselm, St., 194 ff.;
 Bonaventure, St., 230;
 Descartes, 297;
 Leibnitz, 321;
 St. Thomas criticizes, 242.
 Ontological (Real) Order, The, 93, 195, 357.
 Ontologism, 269, 301 f., 307, 355 ff.
 Augustine, St., and Ontologism, 166;
 Bonaventure, St., and Ontologism, 231.
 Operations of the Mind, 81 ff.
 Optimism, 67, 75, 202, 321, 323.
 de Orbellis, *see* Nicholas de Orbellis.
 Order, Logical and Ontological, 93, 195, 357.
 "Organism" of Society, 77 f.
 Oriental Influence on Greek Philosophy, 34 f.
 Origen (The Adamantine Philosopher"), 114, 152, 154 f., 157, 182.
 Originality of Greek Mind, 34
 Original Sin, St. Augustine on, 167;
 Odo of Tournai on, 199.
 Origin of Ideas:
 Anselm, St., 196;
 Arabians, 215 f.;
 Aristotle, 82 ff.;
 Augustine, St., 161;
 Bonaventure, St., 231;
 Descartes, 295 ff.;
 Kant, 331 f.;
 Leibnitz, 320;
 Locks, 286;
 Malebranche, 301 f.;
 Medieval Eclectics, 208;
 Plato, 72 ff.;
 Socrates, 67;
 Thomas Aquinas, St., 238, 241;
 William of Auvergne, 226 f.
 see also Ideas, Ideology, Epistemology.
 Ormazd (Ormuzd, Ahura-Mazda), 28 ff.
 Orpheus, 124.
 Orthodox Schools of Hindu Philosophy, 24 ff.
 Osee, 10.
 Osiris, 14.

- Otloh of Regensburg, 193.
 Otto of Freising, 205.
 Ovid (Publius Ovidius Naso), 118.
- Pachymeres, George, 218.
 Palatine (Palace) School, The, 171 ff., 180, 182, 184.
 Palmieri, Domenico, 358.
 Panaetius of Rhodes, 106.
- Pan-Psychism:
 Empedoclean, 53;
 Naturalistic, 272;
 Paulsen, 345.
- Pantaenus, 152 f.
- Pantheism:
 Academician, 79;
 Arabian, 216;
 Bruno, 272 f.;
 Chinese, 19 f.;
 Clauberg, 299;
 Elean, 69;
 Erigena, 186 f.;
 Gnostic, 145;
 Hegel, 343;
 Hindu, 23;
 Medieval, 210 ff.;
 Nicholas of Cusa, 260;
 Patrizzi, 272;
 Plotinus, 131 f.;
 Spinoza, 304 ff.;
 Stoic, 106;
 Xenophanes, 47.
- Paracelsus, 270 f.
- Parmenides, 47 f.
- Particularity, *see* Categories of Hindus.
- Pascal, Blaise, 308.
- Passion, *see* Categories of Aristotle.
- Passions: Stoics on, 105; Cicero on, 120.
- Passive Intellect: Aphrodisias on, 101; Aristotle on, 92; *see also* Intellect.
- Patricius, 159.
- Patrizzi, 271 f.
- Patroclus, 33.
- Paulsen, Friedrich, 345.
- Paul the Persian, 157.
- Paulus Pergulensis, 266.
- Pecci, Cardinal Joseph, 359.
- Peckham, John, 244.
- Pentateuch (Books of Moses), 11.
 Pepin, 180.
- Periander, 34.
- Pericles, 56.
- Peripatetics, The, 80, 100 ff., 126, 130.
- Perry, Ralph Barton, 350.
- Persian Philosophy, 27 ff.
- Persius (Aulus Persius Flaccus), 117.
- Pessimism: Hindus, 27; Schopenhauer, 343 f.
- Pestalozza, 357.
- Pestalozzi, 343.
- Peter Aureolus (d'Auriol, Aureoli; *Doctor Facundus*), 255, 257.
- Peter d'Abano, 251.
- Peter d'Ailly, 260.
- Peter d'Auriol, *see* Peter Aureolus.
- Peter of Auvergne, 245.
- Peter Damien, St., 193.
- Peter the Lombard, 210, 212, 264.
- Peter Olivi, 244.
- Peter of Poitiers, 210, 212.
- Peter the Venerable, 200.
- Petrarca, Francesco, 262.
- Phaedo, 69.
- Pharisees, 10 f.
- Phath, 14.
- Phenomena and Noumena of Kant, 331 ff.
- Phenomenalism, 210; *see also* Pantheism.
- Philip the Fair, 257.
- Philip of Macedon, 80.
- Philo of Opus, 79.
- Philo of Athens, 110.
- Philo of Larissa, 80, 111, 113, 118.
- Philo Judaeus, 125 ff., 154, 217.
- Philolaus of Crotona, 46.
- Philoponus, 102, 136.
- Philosophy:
 Academician, 79 f.;
 Ancient, 7-137;
 Anti-Realistic, *see* Anti-Realism;
 Apologist, 151 ff.;
 of Apparent, 47 f.;
 Arabian, 213 ff.;
 Aristotelean, 80-102, 269 f.;
 Aryan, 16-31;

- Atomistic, 57 ff.;
 Averroistic, 215; 250, 269,
 Brahmanistic, 23 ff.;
 Buddhistic, 25 ff.;
 Byzantine, 218;
 Cartesian, 299 ff.;
 Carvakaistic, 25;
 Chaldean, 12 ff.;
 Chinese, 16 ff.;
 Common Sense, 329;
 Critical, *see* Kant;
 Cynic, 69;
 Cyrenaic, 69;
 Deistic, 311 ff.;
 Deterministic, *see* Determinism;
 Dualistic, *see* Dualism;
 Dynamistic, *see* Dynamism;
 Earlier Ionian, 36 ff.;
 Eclectic, 113 ff., 206 ff.;
 Egyptian, 14 f.;
 Elean, 69;
 Eleatic, 46 ff.;
 Emanationistic, *see* Emanationism,
 Pantheism, *also* 20, 23;
 Empiricist, 278 ff., 283, 299, 310 ff.,
see also Empiricism;
 Epicurean, Greek 107 ff., Roman
 117 f.;
 Gnostic, 144 ff.;
 Greco-Jewish, 124 ff.;
 Greco-Oriental, 122-137;
 Greco-Roman, 116-121;
 Greek, 32-115;
 Hebrew, 9 ff.;
 Hedonistic, *see* Hedonism;
 Hegelian, 341 ff.;
 Heretical, 144 ff.;
 Hindu, 21 ff.;
 Humanistic, *see* Humanism;
 Hylozoistic, *see* Hylozoism;
 Idealistic, *see* Idealism;
 Intellectualistic, *see* Intellectualism;
 Ionian, *see* Earlier Ionian, Later
 Ionian;
 Jewish, 217 f., *see* Hebrew;
 Kantian, 330 ff.;
 Later Ionian, 51 ff.;
 Manichean, 148 ff.;
 Materialistic, *see* Materialism;
 Mazdeistic, *see* Mazdeism, Zoroaster;
 Mechanistic, *see* Mechanistic Philosophy;
 Medieval, 168-274;
 Milesian, *see* Earlier Ionian;
 Modern, 275-359;
 Mystic, *see* Mysticism;
 Naturalistic, 270 ff.;
 Neo-Critical, *see* Neo-Criticism;
 Neo-Platonic, *see* Neo-Platonism;
 Neo-Pyrrhonian, 111 f.;
 Neo-Realistic, *see* Neo-Realism;
 Neo-Scholastic, *see* Neo-Scholasticism;
 Nominalistic, *see* Nominalism,
 Universal;
 Ockamistic, 259 ff., *see also* William of Ockam;
 Ontologistic, *see* Ontologism.
 Pagan (medieval), 268 ff.;
 Pantheistic, *see* Pantheism.
 Patristic, 141-167;
 Peripatetic, *see* Aristotelean;
 Persian, 27 ff.;
 Platonic, 70 ff.;
 Pluralistic, *see* Pluralism.
 Political, 273 f.;
 Post-Aristotelic, 103 ff.;
 "Practical," 18;
 Pre-Socratic, 32-63;
 Pythagorean, 41 ff.;
 Rationalistic, *see* Rationalism.
 Realistic, *see* Realism, Universal;
 Scholastic, *see* Scholasticism;
 Scotistic, *see* John Duns Scotus,
also 249 f., 254 f., 264, 266 f.;
 Semitic, 9-15;
 Sensistic, *see* Sensism;
 Skeptic, *see* Skepticism;
 Socratic, 64-102;
 Sophistic, 60 ff.;
 "Speculative," 18;
 Stoic, Greek 104 ff., Roman 117;
 Terministic, *see* Terminism, *also*
 William of Ockam.
 Thomistic, *see* Aquinas, St.
 Thomas; *also* Thomism;
 Traditionalistic, *see* Traditionalism.
 Vedic, 22 f.

- Philosophy, the "Handmaid of Theology," 237.
- Philosophy and Revelation, 171 f.
- Photius, 218.
- Phrenologists, The, 352.
- Physical Premotion, 242, 309, 321.
- Physics:
- Aristotle, 89 ff.;
 - Augustine, St., 161 ff.;
 - Cicero, 119;
 - Epicurean, 107 f.;
 - Plato, 72, 74;
 - Stoic, 105 f.;
 - Thomas, St., 239 ff.
- Pierce, 350.
- Pillon, 347.
- Pitkin, Walter, 350.
- Pittacus, 34.
- Pius IX, 358.
- Place, *see* Categories of Aristotle.
- Plato, 35, 52, 53, 62, 63, 64, 65, 70 ff., 80, 103, 109, 115, 122, 125, 127, 128, 132, 133, 162, 164, 181, 225, 229, 236, 316.
- Platonic Academies, *see* Academies.
- "Platonic Academy of Florence," 268.
- Platonists (medieval), 268 ff., 271.
- Pletho, George Gemistus, 268.
- Plotinus, 130 ff., 135.
- Pluralism, 41, 53.
- Plurality-of-Forms Theory, 226 ff., 230 f., denied by St. Thomas, 239, 244, 246, 248.
- Plutarch of Chaeronea, 113.
- Plutarch, son of Nestor, 136.
- Political Philosophers, 273 f.
- Polystratus, 109.
- Polytheism:
- Anthropomorphic, 33;
 - Chaldean, 13;
 - Chinese, 17;
 - Egyptian, 14;
 - Greek, 33;
 - Naturalistic, 22, 33;
 - Vedic, 22.
- Pompey, 116.
- Pomponazzi, 269.
- Popular Buddhism, 27.
- Porphyry, 102, 133, 181, 188, 207, 213.
- Positivism, 233, 283, 314, 347 ff., 354.
- Possidonius of Apamea, 106, 118.
- Post-Captivity Scriptures, 10.
- Posture, *see* Categories of Aristotle.
- Potency (potentiality), 95.
- Potentiality of Matter, 91.
- Practical Philosophy, 18.
- Praeambula Fidei*, 151, 153.
- Pragmatism, 349.
- Prajapati, 23.
- Prat, 347.
- Pre-Captivity Scriptures, 9 f.
- Predicables (Heads of Predicables; *Categoremata*), 83 ff.
- Predicamentals, *see* Categories of Aristotle.
- "Pre-Established Harmony," 319 ff., 323.
- Pre-existence of Souls, 73, 76, 79, 127, 131, 154, 157, 226.
- Premotion, *see* Physical Premotion.
- Pre-Socratic Philosophy, 32-63.
- Prezzolini, 350.
- Priestley, Joseph, 311.
- Primary Qualities of Locke, *see* Qualities.
- Prime-Matter:
- Aristotle, 90 ff.;
 - Arabian, 216;
 - Augustine, St., 163;
 - Bonaventure, St., 230;
 - Plato, 74 f.;
 - Suarez, 267;
 - Thomas, St., 239.
- Primitive Revelation, 31.
- Primordial Causes (Erigena), 185 f.
- Primordial Chaos, 13, 14, 22, 30.
- Principle:
- of Causality, 259, 298;
 - of Contradiction, 94;
 - of Excluded Middle, 94;
 - of Identity and Difference, 94;
 - of Individuation, 230, 232, 239 f., 246, 248, 256, 267.
 - of Nationality, 273;
 - of Parsimony, 254;
 - of Specification, 239.
- Priscus, 134.
- Proclus, 135 f.
- Prodicus of Ceos, 63.
- Prosper of Aquitaine, St., 158.

- Protagoras, 61 ff.
 Providence, denied by Sadducees, 11; Socrates, 67; Cicero, 119.
 Psalms, 10.
 Psellus, *see* Michael Psellus.
 Pseudo-Dionysius, 158, 182, 236.
Psyche, 92.
 Psychological Measurements, 349.
 Psychology, 53, 59, 67, 76, 92, 164, 240.
 Psycho-Physical Parallelism, 345, 349.
 Ptolemy, 115.
 Publius Ovidius Naso (Ovid), 118.
 Pufendorf, Samuel, 324.
 Purva-Mimansa, 24.
 Pyrrho, 110.
 Pyrrhonian School, 110.
 Pythagoras, 41 ff., 116, 125, 128.
 Pythagorean Philosophy, 41 ff., 71, 126, 130.
- Quadrivium, 171, 181.
 Qualified Realism, *see* Realism.
 Qualities, Primary and Secondary (Locke), 287, 326.
 Quality, *see* Categories of Aristotle.
 Quantity, *see* Categories of Aristotle.
 Question of Universals, The, 173 ff.
 Quidort, John, 245.
 Quintus Horatius Flaccus (Horace), 118.
 Quintus Sextius, 114.
- Ra, 14.
 Raimbert of Lille, 192.
 Rationalism, 200.
 Rationalist Theory of Religion, 12, 27.
Rationes aeternae, 161.
Rationes seminales, 162 ff., 166 f., 230 ff., 244, 249.
 de Raulica, *see* Ventura de Raulica.
 Ravaisson, Felix, 354.
 Raymond Lully (*Doctor Illuminatus*), 225, 250 f.
 Raymond of Sabunde, 251.
 Realism (and Realists), 174, 190, 247, 264.
 Exaggerated, or Ultra-Realism, 174 f., 183, 186, 188 f., 191, 192, 196, 199, 205, 206, 210, 248, 254;
 Moderate, Moderated, or Qualified Realism, 175, 196, 198, 201, 205, 207, 212, 220, 228, 237, 248.
 "Realities" of Herbart, 343.
 Real (ontological) Order, The, 93.
 Reasoning, 87 ff.
 Reding, Augustine, 309.
 Reid, Thomas, 316, 327 f., 352.
 Reimarus, Hermann Samuel, 324.
 Reincarnation, 24.
 Relation, *see* Categories of Aristotle.
 Relative Truth, 62.
 Religion:
 Chaldean, 12 f.;
 Chinese, 16 f.;
 Egyptian, 14;
 Evolutionist Theory of, 12, 21, 27;
 Greek, 33 ff.;
 Hebrew, 9 f.;
 Hindu, 22 ff.;
 Persian, 28 ff.;
 Positivist, 348;
 Pythagoreans, 41, 45;
 Rationalist Theory of, 12, 27
 Revival in Egypt, 14.
 Remi of Auxerre, 188 f.
 de Remusat, Charles, 353.
 Renaissance, 263, 270, 273.
 Renouvier, Charles, 346.
 Renz, Placidus, 309.
 Resurrection of the Body: Egyptians, 15; denied by Sadducees, 11.
 Retributions of a Life to Come, 10, 11, 15, 20, 22, 29 f., 33, 77.
 "Revival of Learning, The" (Medieval), 171, 179, 183 f.
 Rhabanus Maurus (Rhaban Maur), 183.
 Rhetoric (oratory), 61 f.
 Ribot, Theodule, 349.
 Richard of Middleton, 244, 247.
 Richard of St. Victor, 209.
 Rickert, Heinrich, 347.
 Riehl, Alois, 347.
 Robert Fitzacra, 244.
 Robert Grosseteste, 228.
 Robinet, Jean Baptiste, 351.
 Roger Bacon (*Doctor Mirabilis*), 225, 232 f., 247, 251.

- Roger Marston, 244, 251.
 Roland of Cremona, 244.
 "Roman Academy of St. Thomas, The," 359.
 Romanes, George, 351.
 Roscelin, 191 ff., 196, 201, 206.
 Rosmini-Serbati, Antonio, 357.
 Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 314 f.
 Rousselot, 353.
 Royer-Collard, Pierre Paul, 352.
 de Rupella, *see* John de la Rochelle.
 Ruysbroeck, *see* John Ruysbroeck.
- Saadias, 217.
 Sabaeism, 17.
 Saccas, Ammonius, *see* Ammonius Saccas.
 "Sacred Books of the East, The," 28.
 Sadducees, 11.
 Sages of Greece, 34.
 Saint-René-Taillandier, 353.
 Sais Kings, 14.
 Saisset, Emile, 353.
 Sakya-Muni (Buddha), 25.
Salmanicenses, 266.
 Salomon Ibn-Gebriol, *see* Avicibrol.
 Salzburg, Benedictine School of, 309.
 Sankhya, 24.
 Sanction of laws, 18 f.
 Sanseverino, Caietano, 358.
 de Sarlo, Francesco, 347.
 von Schelling, Friedrich, W. J., 340 f., 343, 353.
 Schleiermacher, 307.
Scholarch, 106.
Scholastic, 171.
 Scholasticism, 170-267, 358 f.
 Scholastic Method, The, 181, 187 ff., 228.
 "Scholastics by reason of Faith," 308.
 Schools:
 Alexandrian of Catechetics, 180 ff.
 Aristotelean, 100 ff.;
 Atomist, 57 ff.;
 Carlovingian, 180 ff.;
 Eleatic, 46 ff.;
 Eclectic, 113 ff.;
 Epicurean, 107 ff.;
- Ionian: Earlier, 36 ff.; Later, 51 ff.;
 Neo-Platonist,
 of Alexandria, 129 ff.;
 of Athens, 135 ff.;
 of Syria, 133 ff.;
 Peripatetic, *see* Aristotelean;
 Platonic, *see* Academies.
 Pythagorean of Crotona, 41 ff.;
 Scottish, 329;
 Skeptic, 109 ff.;
 Socratic:
 Cynic, 69;
 Cyrenaic or Hedonist, 69 f.;
 Elean or Eretrian, 69;
 Megarian or Eristic, 69;
 Sophist, 60 ff.;
 Stoic, 104 ff.
 Schopenhauer, Arthur, 343 f.
 Science, 67 f., 72, 79; Experimental, 88.
Scientia Media Theory, 267.
 Scotistic Formal Distinction, 247.
 Scotism (and Scotists), 249 f., 254 f., 264, 266 f.
 Scottish School, 316, 327, 329, 352, 354.
 Scotus, *see* John Duns Scotus.
 Scriptures, 9 f.
 Secchi, Angelo, 358.
 Secondary Qualities (Locke) *see* Qualities.
 Secretan, Charles, 347.
 Secundus the Athenian, 114.
 Sem, 7.
 Semitic Philosophy, 7-15.
 Seneca (Lucius Annaeus Seneca), 117, 182.
 Sensations, Cicero on, 118.
 Sensism, 107, 283, 286, 291, 299, 310 ff.
 Sensualism, 70, 109, 114, 311 ff., 352.
 Sergius of Raisain, 157.
 Set, 14.
 Seven Wise Men of Greece, 34.
 Sextus Empiricus, 63, 112, 308.
 Shaftesbury, Lord (Anthony Ashley Cooper), 313.
 Shan (Chen), 17.
 Shang-ti, 17.
Scheol, 10.

- Siger of Brabant, 251.
 Signoriello, Annunzio, 358.
 "Signs of the Perfect Manichee,"
 150.
 "Sillographer, The" (Timon), 110.
 Simon, Jules, 353.
 Simon Magus, 148.
 Simplicius, 47 f., 50, 56, 102, 136.
 Skepticism, 60, 62, 64, 79, 103, 109 ff.,
 119, 122, 283, 290 f., 307, 311,
 313, 339, 352.
 Slavery, Aristotle on, 98.
 Small Avesta, 28.
 Smith, Adam, 313.
 Social Contract (Compact) Theory:
 Hobbes, 284;
 Machiavelli, 274;
 Rousseau, 315.
 "Social Organism" (Plato), 77 f.
 Society a Natural Institution (Aris-
 totle), 98.
 Society of Jesus, 265 f.
 Socinas, Paul, 265.
 Socrates, 35, 64 ff., 73, 109.
 Socratic Irony, 66.
 Socratic Maieutic, 66 ff.
 Socratic Method, 65 ff.
 Socratic Schools, 68 ff.
 Solon, 34, 70.
 Sopater, 134.
 "Sophoi," 61.
 Sophist School, 60 ff.
 Sorbière, Samuel, 308.
 Soul:
 Immortality: 10, 15, 20, 22, 29,
 33, 45, 68, 76, 92, 119, 125, 131,
 155, 158, 163 f., 208, 228, 231,
 240.
 Spirituality: 10, 76, 92, 125, 146,
 208, 228, 240.
 Substantial Form of Body, 91.
 Spaulding, Edward, 350.
 Spaventa, B., 347.
Species (impressa, expressa, intel-
ligibilis), 82.
 Speculation, 18, 34 f., 68, 113.
 Speculative Philosophy, 18.
 Spencer, Herbert, 345 f.
 Speusippus, 79.
 Spinoza, Baruch, 304 ff., 307.
 "Spiritualistic School, The," 352 f.
 Stages of History, Comte on, 348.
 "Stagirite, The" (Aristotle), 80.
 State, The, Aristotle on, 98 f.;
 Machiavelli on, 274; Plato on,
 77 f.
 State Absolutism, 78, 274, 285.
 de Stella, Isaac, *see* Isaac de Stella.
 Stewart, Dugald, 329.
 Stilpo, 69.
 Stoic School: Greek, 104 ff.; Roman
 117.
 Strato of Lampsacus, 101.
 Subjectivism, 62, 260, 290.
 Suarez, Francis, 266 f.
 Substance, 25, 304, 317, 322; *see*
 also Categories of Aristotle.
 Substantial Form and Prime-Matter,
 90 f.
 Suidas, 218.
 Summarists, The, 190, 206, 211 ff.
Summum Bonum, 98, 243.
 "Superman, The," 344.
 Survival of Fittest Theory, 56, 351.
 Suso, Bl. Henry, 260.
 Sutton, Thomas, 245.
 Sylvester II (Gerbert), 187 f.
 Syncretic Systems, 122 ff., 144, 148.
 Synesius, 157.
Synthetic a priori Judgments (of
 Kant), 334 f.
 Syrianus, 136.
 Taoism, 19 f.
 Tartaretus, Peter, 267.
 Tartarus, 45.
 Tatian, 12.
 Tauler, John, 260.
 Tedeschini, Pietro, 358.
 Telesius (Telesio), Bernardine, 270 f.
 Tempier, Archbishop Stephen, 250.
 Terminism and Terminists, 254 ff.,
 257, 264, 266.
 Tertullian, 155.
 Testa, Alfonso, 347.
 Tetens, Johann Nicholas, 324.
 Thales, 34, 36 ff.
Theodicy, 317.
 Theodore of Gaza, 269.
 Theodoric (Thierry) of Chartres,
 204 f.
 Theodorus Atheus, 70 f.

- "Theologian, The" (Xenophanes), 47.
 Theology and Philosophy, 196, 219 f., 236 f., 246, 248.
 Theophilus of Antioch, 151.
 Theophrastus, 39, 58, 100 f.
 Theory of Knowledge, *see* Epistemology.
 Theosophy, 148, 251, 260.
 Theumning, Philip, 324.
 Thian (Tien), 17.
 Thomas Hemerken (à Kempis), 260.
 Thomasius, Christian, 324.
 Thomas of Aquin, St., *see* Aquinas.
 Thomism and Thomists, 227, 244 ff., 249 f., 256, 264 ff.
 Thot, 14.
Thymos (courageous soul of Plato), 76.
 Tiamat, 13.
 Tien (Thian), 17.
 Timaeus of Locris, 46.
 Time, *see* Categories of Aristotle.
 Timon of Phlius, 110.
 Titchener, 349.
 Titus Lucretius Carus (Lucretius), 117 f.
 Tocco, Felice, 347.
 Toland, John, 311.
 Toletus, Francis, 266.
 Tongiorgi, Salvatore, 358.
 de Tracy, Antoine Destutt, 350.
 Traditionalism, 232, 355 ff.
 Traducianism, 155, 164, 167, 198.
 Transformism, *see* Evolution.
 Transmigration of souls, 127, 132; *see also* Metempsychosis.
 Tritheism, 192.
 Trivium (and Quadrivium), 171, 181.
 Trombetta, Anthony, 267.
 Truth: Relative and Objective, 62; Stoic criterion of, 104; Cicero 118 f.
 Tschirnhausen, Christian, 324.
 Twofold Truth Theory, 216, 251, 269.
 Ultra-Realism, *see* Realism.
 Ubaghs, Casimir, 356, 358.
 Ulysses, 33.
 "Unconscious, The" (of von Hartmann), 344.
Universalia ante rem, 177.
Universalia ante rem, in re, et post rem, 177.
Universalia post rem, 177.
 Universal Ideas, 73 f., 93 ff., 107; *see also* Question of Universals.
 Universality, *see* Categories of Hindus.
 Universities, Rise of, 223.
 "Unlimited, The" (of Pythagoreans), 44.
 Upanishads, 21, 23.
 Utilitarianism, 77, 120, 314.
 Uttara Mimansa (Vedanta), 24.
 Vacherot, Stephen, 354.
 Vacuole Theory (of Democritus), 58.
 Vailati, 350.
 Vaiseshika, 24.
 Valentinus, 145, 147.
 Valerius, 160.
 Validity of Thought:
 Aristotle on, 82 ff.;
 Cicero on, 119;
 Democritus on, 59;
 Eleatics on, 48 ff.;
 Epicureans on, 107;
 Parmenides on, 48;
 Plato on, 72 ff.;
 Skeptics on, 110 ff.;
 Socrates on, 65 ff.;
 Sophists on, 63;
 Stoics on, 104 f.
 Varuna, 22.
 Vasquez, Gabriel, 266.
 Vasquez, Marsilio, 309.
 Veda: 21 ff.:
 Rig-Veda,
 Sama-Veda,
 Artharva-Veda,
 Yajur-Veda.
 Vedanta (Uttara-Mimansa), 24.
 Vedic Philosophy, 21 f.
 Vendidad, 28.
 Venerable Bede, St., 159.
 "Venerable Inaugurator, The" (Ockam), 257.
 Ventura de Raulica, Joachim, 356.

- Vera, Agosto, 347.
 Visparad, 28.
 Vittoria, Francis, 265 f.
 Voet, Gisbert, 300.
 Vogt, Karl, 351.
 Volkelt, Johann, 347.
 Voltaire, 314.
 Voluntarism, 242, 246, 248, 345.
- Walter of Mortagne, 198, 205.
 Walter of St. Victor, 209 f.
 Weber, Louis, 349.
 Weishaupt, Adam, 325.
 Werner, Karl, 358.
 William of Auvergne, 220, 225 ff.
 William of Champeaux, 197 f., 201, 206, 209.
 William of Conches, 204 f.
 William of Falgar, 244.
 William de la Mare, 244.
 William of Ockam (*Doctor Invincibilis; Venerabilis Inceptor*), 255, 257 ff., 260.
 William of St. Amour, 244.
 "Will Theory" of Schopenhauer, 343; of Nietzsche, 344.
 Windelband, William, 347.
 Wise Men of Greece, 34.
 Wittich, Christopher, 299.
- Wolff, Christian, 323 f., 331.
 Wollaston, William, 313.
 Woodbridge, Frederick, 350.
 World-Soul, 52, 75, 105, 127, 131, 135, 217.
 World-Stuff, 37 ff., 45 f., 52 ff., 74.
 Wundt, Wilhelm, 344 f., 349.
- Xenocrates, 79.
 Xenophanes, 46 f.
 Xenophon, 65.
- Yahweh (Jahve), 9 ff.
 Yang-chu, 20.
 Yasna, 28.
 Yoga, 24.
- Zarates (Zoroaster, Zarathustra), 28.
 Zarathustra, *see foregoing*.
 Zend-Avesta (Avesta), 28 ff.
 Zeno of Citium, 105.
 Zeno of Elea, 48 ff.
 Zeno of Sidon, 109.
 Zeno of Tarsus, 106.
 Zeus, 33.
 Zigliara, Thomas, 358.
 Zoölatry, 14.
 Zoroaster (Zarates, Zarathustra), 28, 149.