

BIBLIOTECA DE AUTORES CRISTIANOS

SACRAE THEOLOGIAE
SUMMA
IIIB

ON GRACE



ON THE INFUSED
VIRTUES

by
Severino González Rivas, S.J.

revised by
Joseph A. de Aldama, S.J.

Translated from Latin by
Kenneth Baker, S.J.

KEEP THE FAITH

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THEOLOGICAL NOTES

USED IN THIS "SACRAE THEOLOGIAE SUMMA"

Divine faith (de fide divina): what is contained in the word of God written or handed down. The opposite is: *an error in faith (error in fide)*.

Divine and catholic faith (de fide divina et catholica): what is contained in the word of God written or handed and is proposed by the Church either by a solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium to be believed as divinely revealed. The opposite is: *heresy*.

Defined divine and catholic faith (de fide divina et catholica definita): what is contained in the word of God written or handed down and is proposed by the Church by a solemn judgment, that is, by the infallible Magisterium, exercised in an extraordinary way, either in an ecumenical council or by the Roman Pontiff speaking "ex cathedra" and to be believed as divinely revealed. [N.B. Even the Chapter Titles in Trent and Vatican I are considered as true *definitions*.]

Proximate to faith (fidei proxima): a truth that by an almost unanimous agreement of theologians is contained in the word of God written or handed down. The opposite is: *proximate to error or heresy*.

Faith based on the authority of the Church (fides ecclesiastica): a truth not formally revealed, which is proposed infallibly by the Magisterium of the Church. The opposite is: *error in ecclesiastical faith*. [Those who do not admit there is such a thing as ecclesiastical faith give a different theological note for such a truth.]

Catholic doctrine (doctrina catholica): a truth that is taught in the whole Church, but not always proposed infallibly (for example, what the Roman Pontiffs wish to teach explicitly in encyclical letters). The opposite is: *error in catholic doctrine*.

Theologically certain (theologice certa): a truth that in the theological schools is certainly recognized as necessarily connected with revealed truths; this connection can be either virtual or presuppositive or final. The opposite is: *error in theology*.

A doctrine to be so held that its contrary is temerarious (doctrina ita tenenda, ut contraria sit temeraria): a truth proposed by the Roman Congregations, which proposition however does not enjoy the special approbation of the Roman Pontiff.

Common and certain in theology (communis et certa in theologia): what by the common agreement of theologians is taught in the schools as well founded. The opposite is: *false in theology, temerarious*.

Probable (probabilis): a theological opinion with a lesser grade of certainty.

ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------------------------|--|
| AAS..... | Acta Apostolicae Sedis |
| ACO..... | Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum, iussu Atque mandato societatis scientiarum Argentoratensis edidit Ed Schwarz |
| ActPontAcRomSTh.... | Acta Pontificae Academiae Romanae S Thomae Aq et Religionis Catholicae |
| AmCl..... | L'Ami du Clergé |
| AnalBoll..... | Analecta Bollandiana |
| AnalGreg | Analecta Gregoriana |
| AnalSacraTarrac | Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia |
| Ang..... | Angelicum |
| Ant..... | Antonianum |
| AntChr | Antike und Christentum |
| AnTh..... | L'Année Théologique |
| ArchFrPraed | Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum |
| ArchHistDoctrLitMA | Archive d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age |
| ArchLitKirchMA..... | Archiv für Literatur und Kirchen-Geschichte des Mittelalters |
| ArchPh | Archives de Philosophie |
| ArchTG..... | Archivo Teológico Granadino |
| ASS | Acta Sanctae Sedis |
| BAC | Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos |
| BeitrGPhMA..... | Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie (und Theologie) des Mittelalters |
| BenedMschr..... | Benediktinische Monatsschrift |
| Bibl..... | Biblica |
| BibleZeitschr | Biblische Zeitschrift |
| BullLitEcccl..... | Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique |
| BullSocFrançEtMar..... | Bulletin de la Société Française d'études Mariales |
| BullThAncMéd..... | Bulletin de Théologie ancienne et Médiévale |
| BullThom..... | Bulletin Thomiste |
| CathBiblQuart..... | The Catholic Biblical Quarterly |
| Cav | F Cavallera, SI, Thesaurus Doctrinae Catholicae |
| CiencTom..... | La Ciencia Thomista |
| CivCatt..... | La Civiltà Cattolica |

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| CL | Acta et Decreta sacrorum Conciliorum Recentiorum Collectio Lacensis |
| CollatBrug | Collationes Brugenses |
| CollatGrand | Collationes Gandavenses |
| CollFranc | Collectanea Franciscana |
| CSEL..... | Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum Academiae Vindobonensis |
| CTr..... | Concilium Tridentinum Ed Societas Goerresiana |
| D..... | H Denzinger – Peter Hünermann, Enchiridion Symbolorum 2012 ⁴³ |
| DACL..... | F Carrol – H Leclercq- H Marrou, Dictionnaire d'Archeologie chrétienne et de Liturgie |
| DAFC..... | A d'Alès, Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique |
| DB..... | F Vigouroux, Dictionnaire de la Bible |
| DBS..... | L Pirot-A Robert, Dictionnaire de la Bible Supplément |
| DivThom (Fr) | Divus Thomas Freiburg i der Schweiz |
| DivThom (Pi)..... | Divus Thomas Piacenza |
| DocComm..... | Doctor Communis |
| DSpir..... | M Viller, SJ – Ch Baumgartner, SJ Dictionnaire de Spiritualité |
| DTC | A Vacant-E Mangenot-E Amann, Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique |
| EchOr..... | Echos d'Orient |
| EcclRev..... | The Ecclesiastical Review |
| EchOr..... | Echos d'Orient |
| EphCarm..... | Ephemerides Carmeliticae |
| EphLitur..... | Ephemerides Liturgicae |
| EphThLov..... | Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses |
| Est | Estudios |
| EstBibl | Estudios Biblicos |
| EstEcl..... | Estudios Ecclesiasticos |
| EstFranc... .. | Estudios Franciscanos |
| EstMar..... | Estudios Marianos |
| Et..... | Etudes |
| EtCarm..... | Etudes Carmelitaines |
| EtFranc..... | Etudes Franciscaines |
| FrancisSt | Franciscan Studies |

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| FranzStud..... | Franziscanische Studien |
| GChS..... | Die griechischen cchristlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter-Commission der Königlichen preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften |
| GLeb | Geist und Leben |
| Greg | Gregorianum |
| Hrd | J Harduini, SI, Conciliorum Collectio regia maxima |
| IlustrCler | Ilustración del Clero |
| IrishThQuart | The Irish Theological Quarterly |
| JahrbPhTh..... | Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie |
| Kch..... | C Kirch, SI-L Ueding, SI, Enchiridion Fontium historiae ecclesiasticae antiquae ⁵ |
| LCienc..... | Las Ciencias |
| LScPhTh | Les Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques (Antea et postea: Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques |
| LTK..... | M Buchberger, Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche |
| Manr..... | Manresa |
| Marian..... | Marianum |
| MélScRel | Mélanges de Science Religieuse |
| ML, MG..... | J P Migne, Patrologiae cursus completus Series prima latina Series graeca |
| MGh..... | Monumenta Germaniae historica inde ab Anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad annum millesimum et quingentesimum, ed Societas aperiendas fontibus rerum germanicum medii aevi LL=Leges (s3 Concilia) SS=Scriptores |
| MiscCom | Miscellanea Comillas |
| MiscFranc | Miscellanea Francescana |
| Msi | J D Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collection |
| NouvRevTh | Nouvelle Revue Théologique |
| Or... .. | Orientalia |
| OrCh | Orientalia Christiana |
| OrChP | Orientalia Christiana Periodica |
| Pens..... | Pensamiento |
| R..... | M J Rouët de Journal, SI, Enchiridion Patristicum ¹⁴ |

| | |
|-----------------------|--|
| RazFe | Razón y Fe |
| RechScRel | Recherches de Science Religieuse |
| RechThAncMéd | Recherches de Théologie ancienne et Médiévale |
| RelCul | Religión y Cultura |
| REPT | JJ Herzog, Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche |
| RevApol | Revue Apologétique |
| RevAscMyst | Revue d'Ascétique et Mystique |
| RevBén | Revue Bénédictine |
| RevBibl | Revue Biblique |
| RevClerFr | Revue du Clergé Français |
| RevEcl | Revista Ecclesiastica |
| RevEspir | Revista de Espiritualidad |
| RevEspT | Revista Española de Teología |
| RevEtByz | Revue des Etudes Byzantines |
| RevHistDrFranç | Revue historique de droit français et étranger |
| RevHistEccl | Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique |
| RevHistLittRel | Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuse |
| RevHistPhRel | Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuses |
| RevMoeAgeLat | Revue du Moyen Age Latin |
| RevScPhTh | Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques |
| RevScRel | Revue des Sciences Religieuses |
| RevThom | Revue Thomiste |
| RevUnivOtt | Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa |
| RömQschr | Römische Quartalschrift |
| SalTer | Sal Terrae |
| Sap | Sapienza |
| ScEccl | Sciences Ecclésiastiques |
| Schol | Scholastik |
| ScuoCatt | Scuola Cattolica |
| SThS | Sacrae Theologiae Summa |
| Stimm | Stimmen (aus Maria-Laach; ab anno 1915: der Zeit) |
| StudAnselm | Studia Anselmiana |
| SyllExcerptDiss | Sylloge excerptorum e dissertationibus ad Gradum Doctoris in Sacra Theologia vel In Iure canonico consequendum conscriptis (Lovanii) |
| StudCath | Studia Catholica |

| | |
|--------------------|--|
| Temoign | Temoignages |
| ThGl | Theologie und Glaube |
| ThPraktQschr | Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift |
| ThQschr | Theologische Quartalschrift |
| ThRev | Theologische Revue |
| ThSt | Theological Studies |
| TU | Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur |
| VerDom | Verbun Domini |
| VerVid | Verdad y Vida |
| VetTest | Vetus Testamentum |
| VieSpir | Vie Spirituelle |
| WissWeish | Wissenschaft und Weisheit |
| XenThom | Xenia Thomistica |
| ZAscMyst | Zeitschrift für Aszese und Mystik |
| ZkathTh | Zeitschrift für KatholisdcheTheologie |
| ZNTWiss | Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissen- schaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche |

TREATISE III

ON GRACE

by

Severino Gonzalez Rivas, S.J.

revised by

Joseph A. de Aldama, S.J.

Translated from Latin by

Kenneth Baker, S.J.

INTRODUCTION

Connection of the treatise. The grace which God gave to our first parents in paradise and which they lost by sin has been restored to the human race by Christ the Lord. Therefore, we who are endowed with his grace are helped both to live properly and to desire eternal salvation with a hope of success. Thus, salvation begins now on earth, but will be completed after death by the beatific vision of God. Accordingly, after considering Christ the Redeemer (Christology), we move on to a consideration of his grace through which the merits of his passion are communicated to men.¹

Concept of grace. The name of “grace,” in theology, seems to be derived from the word *gratis*. Thus St. Paul to the Romans 11:6: *But if it is by grace, it is no longer on the basis of works; otherwise grace would no longer be grace.* And St. Augustine, *In Io* 3:9: “What is grace? It is a free gift...” (R 1807, 1851, 1473).

Indeed, setting aside other views, which you can helpfully consult in I-II, q. 110, a. 1, grace is defined:

a) In a wider sense: *It is a gift conferred out of benevolence.* This benevolence, under the name of *gift* (the material element), is understood as any divine benefit, natural or supernatural, v.gr., creation, freedom, etc. However, such gifts are conferred out of *gratuitous benevolence* (the formal element), but not from necessity, justice, etc.

b) In a narrower sense: *Grace is a supernatural gift, freely given by God to a rational creature, which is ordered to eternal life.* I will explain each word:

Gift, that is, a benefit. In this point it agrees with gifts of the natural order, which come under the name of grace, taken in wider sense. In what follows the difference will be pointed out.

Supernatural, that is, absolutely unowed, so that it is not due either as a part of nature, or that which proceeds out of nature as its effect, or to which nature has a claim. Therefore it is added to nature, surpassing its nature, powers and claims. Hence it is a gratuitous gift.

By God. For, since grace is something belonging to God, he alone can be its source.

To a rational creature. A rational creature is the only subject capable of receiving grace, namely, an angel or a man. Irrational animals cannot receive grace, since it is a certain participation in the intellectual life of God.

1. Council of Trent s.6 c.3 (D 1523)

Freely given, both on the part of God, because he is not held to it, even because of creation; and on the part of man, because it is not due to him either physically or morally on the basis of his natural activities alone.

Which is ordered to eternal life. For this is the last end of grace—eternal life or the intuitive vision of God. Grace is the road to this and it is also a quasi beginning of glory itself.

Divisions of grace. Although we will have to speak below about the well-known divisions of grace, still it is necessary now at the beginning to present a few distinctions.

a) *Grace of God and grace of Christ.* Both graces, considered in their reality, are one and the same grace. But we call *grace of God* the grace given to angels and to our first parents before the fall, independently of the merits of Christ, because of God's goodness alone; but we call the *grace of Christ* the grace given after original sin, because of the merits of Christ.

b) *Uncreated and created grace.* *Uncreated grace* is: the whole Trinity communicating itself to the blessed in heaven and to the just on earth; but *created grace* is understood as any gratuitous gift of God that is distinct from him.

c) Regarding created grace, one type is *external*, that is, what is given outside of the soul, v.gr., the Church, Sacraments, etc.; another type is *internal* or a gift intrinsic to the soul.

d) *Sanctifying grace (gratia gratum faciens) and charisms (gratia gratis data).* We understand the first one as what is per se ordered to the spiritual good of the recipient; the second one is given per for the good of others (I-II, q. 111, a.1).

e) Again, sanctifying grace is divided into *actual* and *habitual* grace. Actual grace is what is given as a temporary help to posit a salvific act. But habitual grace is what is conferred by way of a habit or a permanent quality.

f) Now for the different tasks that it assists, actual grace is said to be either *elevating (elevans)* (if it is conferred to elicit a supernatural act), or *medicinal (sanans)* if it cures only ignorance or concupiscence), or *exciting (excitans)*, or *helping (adiuvans)*, or *sufficient (sufficiens)*, or *efficacious (efficax)*.

Historical overview of the doctrine on grace. The histories of dogma present such an overview. Among Catholics there are Schwane, Tixeront, De Groot...; but among non-Catholics, Harnack, Loofs, Seeberg, etc. To the Catholic authors can be added I. van der Meersch, *Grâce*: DTC 6 (1920) 1554-1687. Lange offers a very brief form in his *De gratia* 7-18. Another

author to consult is H. Rondet, S.J., *Gratia Christi: Essai d'histoire du dogme et de théologie dogmatique* (Paris 1948).

Division of the treatise. St. Thomas presents the doctrine on grace in three chapters: 1) *On the grace of God*, that is, on the necessity, essence and divisions of grace (I-II, q. 109-111). 2) *On its causes*, both on the part of God as the efficient cause, and on the part of man disposing himself for grace (q. 112). *On its effects* or on justification and merit (q. 113f.).

However, in order that we might adhere more closely to the historical evolution of this doctrine on grace, we will treat first *the existence of grace in general*, then *in particular the nature of grace, both habitual and actual*, and finally *the fruits of grace or merit*. In each thesis we will refer to particular articles of the Angelic Doctor which we intend to explain.

CHAPTER I

On the existence of grace

P. Lombard, *Sent.* 2,28-29; S.Th. I-II, q. 109; St. Bonaventure, *In 2 Sent.* d.28; Scotus, *In 2 Sent.* d.28; Aegidius Romanus, *In libros Sententiarum* 2,28; Suarez, *De gratia* 1.1f, 1.10; Salmanticenses, *Cursus theologicus* tr.14 d.1-3; J.L. Berti, *De theologicis disciplinis* 1.18 c.1-8; 1.14f; Beraza, *De gratia Christi* 172-448; H. Lange, *De gratia* 20-310, 659-696; H. del Val, *Sacra theologia dogmatica* t.2 n.14f.; Zubizarreta, *Theologia dogmatico-scholastica* t.3 q.3f.; I. Escudero, *De gratia* 11-119.

1. The existence of grace will easily be made certain when we have demonstrated its necessity, gratuity, supernaturality and universality. And all these aspects, once they have proved the existence of grace, also in a certain way foreshadow the nature or certain properties of grace considered in general. Therefore we will have to present the same number of articles on the *necessity, gratuitousness, supernaturality and universality* of grace.

ARTICLE I

ON THE NECESSITY OF GRACE

2. Since human acts are thought to be of two kinds, some supernatural and others natural or ethically good, there is a question about whether grace is necessary for both kinds of acts. It is necessary to respond in the affirmative, although on a different level and measure. First of all we will deal with *salvific acts*, for on this point there are some ancient disputes; then we will consider *naturally good acts*; about these there has been a controversy in more recent times.

Considering the necessity of grace for salvific acts, we assert this necessity both *for all salvific acts in general*, and in particular *for any acts involved in the beginning of faith*. But afterwards, coming to the necessity of grace regarding naturally good acts, two points must be considered: 1) *What fallen nature can do without grace*, that is, perform some ethically good acts, so that not all the works of sinners and unbelievers are sins. 2) *But also what it cannot do without grace*, namely, observe the whole law for a long time or avoid all grave sins, avoid all venial sins for a long time, persevere in received justice for a long time.

However, grace is required for different reasons for salvific acts and for naturally good acts. In order to produce the former grace must be said to be necessary, because we labor under a physical impotency; but for the latter, because, even though we have the physical power, and even the moral

power concerning some acts, still we lack the moral power concerning all such acts, that is, regarding those three types of acts just mentioned.

I. On the necessity of elevating grace

Thesis 1. Internal grace is required for all salvific acts.

S.Th. I-II, q. 109, a. 5f.; Lercher-Lakner, 244-255; Beraza, 176-193; Lange, 33-55.

3. Definition of terms. A *salvific act* is understood as an act, either merely internal or joined with an external work, which “pertains to the salvation of eternal life” (D 377). Therefore it is a free act of man, which, not only negatively but also positively leads to the salvation of the soul. This positive suitability (which therefore is more than a mere removal of impediments) is had in different ways in the two kinds of acts. For there are some that lead so immediately to eternal life that they truly merit it; but there are others whose suitability is more mediate, and it consists in disposing one for justification, in which eternal life is contained in a beginning way. Those first types of acts occur in the just, and therefore they supposed sanctifying grace already present. The latter occur in the sinner, and therefore they are placed by one who lacks sanctifying grace. In the thesis we are considering this last type of acts, which are said to be *purely and simply salvific*, while the others are called *meritorious*.

Is required, that is, grace is simply necessary, so that without it a salvific act cannot be performed. But this necessity must be said to be a) *physical*, since without grace a man cannot place these acts by his physical powers alone; b) and *absolute*, not hypothetical only or relative, because in this order of salvation de facto no salvific act can be elicited without grace under any hypothesis, v.gr., of ignorance, impotence, etc.

Internal grace, that is, the gift, which we defined above, conferred by God gratuitously, and sent by Him directly into our soul and its higher powers. Therefore external grace does not suffice, such as spiritual reading, preaching or the movement of the lower powers; but what is required is the immediate influx of God on the intellect or the will. But the nature of this influx will be explained at length later.

Therefore we assert that internal grace is required physically and absolutely in order to perform any salvific act. Or, to state it in a negative way: man, by his natural powers alone, cannot physically elicit any salvific act, and there are no exceptions.

4. Adversaries. 1) Pelagius and his disciples Caelestius and Julianus Aeclanensis, at the beginning of the 5th century, held that one's natural powers are sufficient in order to attain eternal life. Distinguishing the possibility, the will and its act, they placed the *possibility* in nature, which was given by God to man, and in that sense it was said by them to be a "grace"; they attributed the *will* to free choice, which, once given by God as a power, is activated by man alone; they attributed the *act* to man, inasmuch as it is nothing else but the natural exercise of freedom. However under pressure by the arguments of Catholics, they did acknowledge some external graces as useful helps, but they always denied the necessity of internal grace for the will; they do seem at one time to have conceded the need of internal grace for the intellect.¹

2) *Rationalists*² inasmuch as they teach that man can come naturally to the possession of all truth and goodness (D 3028).

5. Doctrine of the Church. The *Indiculus* in many chapters and in its conclusion (D 244-245, 248) teaches the necessity of grace. *Orange II*, cn.7 and *Trent*, cn.1-3 s.6 present internal grace as simply necessary for salvific acts (D 377, 1551-1553. See 1525f., 1545-1547). *Vatican I* prepared this definition: "If anyone says that the faculty of a rational nature without divine grace through Jesus Christ suffices for any good work, which disposes one for justice and eternal life, let him be anathema."³

6. Theological note. 1) That internal grace is required to elicit salvific acts is a truth of *defined divine and Catholic faith*. 2) Moreover, that it is required physically and absolutely is at least *a certain interpretation of the dogma*.

7. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) *In general, concerning every salvific act*, from John 15:1⁴: *Apart from me you can do nothing*.

a) *Context*: Chapter 15 has two parts: in the first (1-17) the allegory of the true vine is contained; in the second (18—16:4) future persecutions are foretold. Our text pertains to the first part whose fundamental idea is the necessary union of Christians with Christ (1-11) and among themselves

1. See G. de Plinval, *Pélage. Ses écrits, sa vie et sa réforme* (Lausanne 1943); Id., *Essai sur le style et la langue de Pélage suivi du traité inédit "De induratione cordis Pharaonis"* (Fribourg 1947); Hedde-Amann, *Pélagianisme*: DTC 12,675-715.

2. On theological rationalism, see L. Baur: LTK 8, 645-7; C. Constantin: DTC 13,1688-1788.

3. CL 7,563.

4. See J. Leal, *La alegoria de la vid y la necesidad de la gracia*: EstEcl 26 (1952) 5-38; St. Augustine, *In Io* tr.80-81; I. Maldonado, *In Io* c.15 v.1-5; Fr. Toledo, *In Io* c.15 v.1-5; Lagrange, *Evangile selon Saint Jean* (Paris 1927) 401-403.

(12-17). Here three strophes are distinguished (1-4, 5-8, 9-11); the first two propose the union in an allegorical way, but the third does it properly and without allegory. Our verse is found in the allegory. In the first strophe it urges the necessity of bearing fruit; just as bearing fruit belongs to the vine, so bearing spiritual fruits belongs to the Church and to all of its members. In the second strophe the necessity of union is urged in order to bear fruit: just as a branch cannot bear fruit unless it is united with the vine, so no Christian can bear fruit unless he is in union with Christ.

b) *Text*: *He who abides in Me, and I in him, he it is that bears much fruit*; that is, *everyone* who abides in Me, and *only* he who abides in Me, bears fruit. This exclusive meaning is apparent from the nature itself of the allegory. It is as if he were to say: everyone who is joined together with Me, bears fruit, and everyone who is separated from Me, does not bear fruit. So union with Christ is the absolute condition for bearing fruit. This one condition has two aspects (he abides in Me, and I in him). *Because apart from Me you can do nothing*; that is, everyone who is separated from Me, does not bear fruit, *because* apart from Me you can do nothing. *Apart from me* ἡρώς, that is, outside of Me. This is the same thing he said about the branch: *by itself, unless it abides in the vine*; and about the faithful: *unless you abide in Me, if a man does not abide in Me*. *You can*, that is, in the physical and absolute sense, just as a branch in the same sense cannot bear fruit. *To do* in the allegory is equivalent to the formula *to bear fruit*. But this fruit, from the very nature of the allegory, is something from the vital activity that is present in the branch. Hence these words cannot be said to designate only fruit in the order of the apostolate, or only the good acts of the just, but it means the whole internal supernatural activity of the soul.

c) *Argument*: Christ teaches a true impotency of doing anything in the supernatural order apart from union with Him. But this impotency 1) is physical and absolute, 2) it refers also to acts that are also merely salvific, 3) and it supposes the denial of any supernatural union, even of a dynamic union by the assistance of actual grace. Therefore for all salvific acts actual grace is required physically and absolutely.

The major: It is clear that a true impotency is taught. That it is dealing with the supernatural order is clear. For the impotency is had in the same order in which it is called a true vine. In fact, Christ is called the vine since he is at the same time God and man, or in the supernatural order.

The minor: Power and impotency are the same for the faithful in reference to the supernatural order and for the branches with regard to fruit; but this is physical and absolute, as consisting in a real and vital influx of the vine.

2) The form that Christ uses is wholly universal, so that he changed the formula of *bearing fruit*, to this other form of *you can do nothing*, which is much broader. Moreover Christ distinguishes between the branch joined to the vine but which does not bear fruit, and the branch that bears fruit but ought to bear more fruit (v. 2); hence the words *you can do nothing* includes both the negation of fruit and the negation of any vital activity. Therefore included there is the impotency of doing both meritorious acts and acts merely salvific.

3) *Apart from Me* signifies: without my vital influx. Indeed this influx is not just habitual grace (because the possibility of performing merely salvific acts is excluded, as we have said). Therefore it is also the dynamic influx of actual grace.

Note that this is the interpretation of this text often proposed by the Church: see the *Council of Carthage* (D 227), *Indiculus* (D 245), *Orange* (D 377), *Trent* (D 1545-1547), *St. Leo I* (R 2200), *St. Augustine* (R 1793, 1835, 1851).

8. 2) *In particular, on singular salvific acts:*

A salvific act is either a good thought or a good desire or a good action. But without internal grace none of these can be accomplished. Therefore internal grace is required for all salvific acts.

a) On salvific thoughts, it is probably affirmed in 2 Cor. 3:5: *Not that we are sufficient of ourselves to claim anything as coming from us; our sufficiency is from God.*⁵ See *Orange* (D 377), *St. Augustine* (R 1938, 1980).

Context: His adversaries had accused Paul of pride and arrogance. However the Apostle responded by referring whatever he had to God. His total fittingness is from God, as from the unique and ultimate source; from himself alone he is not capable of having even a salvific thought.

Therefore, both the context, which concerns the supernatural order, and the interpretation of tradition, require that this text be understood to be about the necessity of internal grace to elicit any salvific thought.

b) On salvific desire and action, from Phil. 2:12f.: *For God is at work in you, both to will and to work for his good pleasure.*⁶

Context. Paul exhorts the Philippians to be always working out their salvation; in this work they depend on God to such an extent that it is rightly said that he accomplishes in them (internally) both the willing and the acting. That is, the desires and actions of the faithful are shown as the effects of the divine activity, conferring them according to his good will,

5. See Cornely, *Comment. in epist. alteram ad Corinthios* 84-86.

6. See Knabenbauer, *Comment. in epist. ad Philippenses* 224-228.

that is, according to the good pleasure of God.

Deservedly therefore the Councils and the Fathers quote this text in order to prove the necessity of internal grace in the work of salvation. See *Orange* (D 374), *Indiculus* (D 248), *St. Augustine* (R 1556, 1572, 1854, 1889).

9. Proof from tradition. 1) *The holy Father, writing before Pelagius*, do not speak very frequently about the necessity of grace, but rather stress the freedom of the will against the Gnostics and Manicheans. However, more general assertions about the necessity of grace for salvation are not totally lacking. Thus St. Justin: "For the coming into being at first was not in our own power; and in order that we may follow those things which please Him..., He both persuades us and leads us to faith" (R 114). St. Irenaeus teaches that the grace of the Holy Spirit is necessary as the rain from above, that we, a dry tree, may bring forth fruit unto life (R 220). St. Cyprian: "We pray and petition that God's will be done in us. That it may be done in us, there is need of God's will, that is, of His help and protection, because no one is strong in his own strength..." (R 558). St. Gregory Nazianzen: "Such are taught by this word that even to wish well needs help from God; or rather that even to choose what is right is divine and a gift of the mercy of God" (R 1003). St. Ambrose: "No one can build without the Lord, no one can guard without the Lord, no one can begin anything without the Lord" (R 1302).⁷

With the rise of the Pelagian heresy, many Councils condemned it, and the Fathers, especially St. Augustine, fought strenuously against it. For, St. Augustine through almost twenty years with several different books taught the necessity of internal grace for all salvific acts. He cannot be accused of being instigator of this teaching, since he bases it both on Scripture and the Fathers who came before him. For, he writes in this vein: "Those great teachers [Cyprian, Ambrose, Gregory Nazianzen] saying that there is not anything in which we can take glory as if it were from us and not given to us by God, also said that our heart and our thoughts are not in our own power. They attribute everything to God and they confess that we receive from Him in order that we may be permanently converted to Him, so that what is good might also appear good to us, and that we might desire that good in order to honor God and receive Christ. It is from Him that we are changed from being unbelievers to being believers and religious, that we believe in the Trinity itself and also confess with our tongue what we

7.. See H. Rahner, S.J., *Die Lehre der Kirchenväter von der Geburt Christi im Herzen der Gläubigen*: ZkathTh 59 (1935) 383-393.

believe. They surely attribute this to the grace of God, they acknowledge the gifts of God, and they testify that they come from Him to us and not from ourselves” (R 2004). See also R 1715, 1719, 1855, 1936, 1954.⁸

After St. Augustine other Fathers, especially his disciples Prosper and Fulgentius, openly teach this same necessity of grace. Here are the words of St. Leo the Great: “For when the Lord said to his disciples: ‘Apart from me you can do nothing,’ there is no doubt that a man doing good has received from God both the result of the work and beginning of his desire” (R 2200). Also St. Fulgentius: “Just as the flesh does not have life from itself, but receives it from the soul, so a man cannot have faith, unless he received it as a gift from God” (R 2243).⁹

2) The same faith is illustrated *from the praxis of the praying Church*; St. Cyprian (R 558) and St. Augustine (R 1940, 1456) often appeal to this and the *Indiculus* (D 246) bears witness to the same thing. Undoubtedly: the rule of prayer (*praxis orandi*) determines the rule of belief (*regulam fidei*).¹⁰ But the *praxis* of the Church is to ask God for help for all: namely, for unbelievers, Jews, sinners, heretics, schismatics... Therefore her faith, or solid doctrine, teaches the absolute necessity of grace.

10. Theologians. The scholastics always taught the absolute necessity of internal grace in order to posit acts meritorious of eternal life (I-II, q. 109, a. 2). But what they held concerning those other salvific acts, by which a man disposes himself positively for justification, will be treated elsewhere (thesis 11). Certainly, St. Thomas as an older man said that “a man cannot prepare himself to receive the light of grace except by the gratuitous help of God moving him inwardly” (I-II, q. 109, a. 6). Hence from this time, with the exception of Durandus and the Nominalists, theologians openly teach the necessity of internal grace for all salvific acts, even for those

8.. Here are the books in which especially St. Augustine defends the absolute necessity of internal grace: *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* (412); *De spiritu et littera* (412); *De natura et gratia* (415); *De perfectione iustitiae hominis* (415); *De gestis Pelagii* (417); *De gratia Christi et de peccato originali* (418); *Contra Iulianum, haereses pelagianae defensorem* (421); *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (426-7); *De correptione et gratia* (426-7); *De praedestinatione sanctorum* (428-9); *De dono perseverantiae* (428-9); *Contra secundam Iuliani responsionem, imperfectum opus* (429-30).

9. In order to correctly understand the mind of some of the Fathers in things pertaining to grace, the following books will help: H. Straeter, *Die Erlösungslehre des hl. Athanasius* (1894); G.A. Pell, *Die Lehre des hl. Athanasius von der Sünde und Erlösung* (1888); E. Scholl, *Die Lehre des hl. Basilii von der Sünde* (1881); H. Hummer, *Des hl. Gregor von Naz. Lehre von der Gnade* (1890); F. Hilt, *Des hl. Gregor von Nyssa Lehre von Menschen* (1890); J.B. Aufhäuser, *Die Heilslehre des hl. Gregor von Nyssa* (1910); E. Weigl, *Die Heilslehre des hl. Cyrillus von Alex.* (1905); E.J. Carney, *The Doctrine of St. Augustine on Sanctity* (1945); *Obras de San Agustín* (B.A.C.) t.6. Treatises on grace (1949).

10. See *Indiculus* c.8 (D 246); Pius XI, *Divini cultus* (D 2200); Pius XII, *Mediator Dei*. On the efficacy of this liturgical argument see M. Nicolau, S.J., *Etapas del proceso teológico*: EstEcl 19 (1945) 168-170 and especially M. Pinto, *O valor teológico da Liturgia* (Braga 1952).

that precede justification. Finally, after Trent every ambiguity in this matter disappeared.¹¹

11. Theological reasoning. From the proportion between the end and the means. For, the last end of man is simply supernatural, so that no natural act of man has adequate proportion with it—not by reason of merit and not by reason of any positive disposition. Therefore acts of this kind, in order to lead positively to this end, must be supernatural. However, that they actually be supernatural, internal grace is required (for an intellectual or freely-choosing power alone is incapable of positing a supernatural act). Therefore internal grace is required for all salvific acts (I-II, Q. 109, a. 5; CG 3,147).

11. See A. Landgraf, *Studien zur Erkenntnis des Übernatürlichen in der Frühscholastik*: Schol 4 (1929) 1-37, 189-220, 352-389; *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* I (Regensburg 1950) 238-302; B. Lonergan, S.J., *Saint Thomas' Thought on Gratia Operans*: ThSt 2 (1941) 282-324; 3 (1942) 69-88, 375-402, 533-578.

Thesis 2. This necessity of grace extends also to the very beginning of faith.

S.Th. I-II, q. 114, a. 5 ad 1; Lercher-Lakner, 256-260; Beraza, 194-207; Lange, 56-69.

12. Connection. This question has already been answered implicitly in the previous thesis. For if internal grace is required for all salvific acts, and since the beginning of faith is a salvific act, then one must admit that grace is also necessary for it. However, because a special controversy on this matter has existed for centuries, from Augustine up to the Council of Orange, we propose a special thesis regarding it.

13. Adversaries. 1) *Some French monks* in the 5th century (Cassian, Faustus, Vincentius, Hilarius Arelatensis, Gennadius), while holding that internal grace is necessary for salvation, said that it was not necessary for *the beginning of faith (initium fidei)* and *the affection of credulity (affectus credulitatis)*. Distinguishing in faith between the initial act, by which a man first converts himself to God, and the subsequent acts of faith, they call the former *the beginning of faith*, and the latter acts *the increase of faith*. To the beginning of faith they added a series of acts of believing, of praying, of repenting, of loving God, of observing the commandments, by which a man prepares himself for Baptism. They call *the affection of credulity*, not the desire of believing or the command of the will (as a usage that later grew strong in theology), but the very first act of faith.

Therefore they thought that this beginning of faith and this affection of credulity come from the freedom alone of man, so that this freedom is the reason why some rather than others accept grace from God.

Formerly they were called *holdovers from the the Pelagians, Gauls, Massilians*; but since the time of the controversies about the nature of grace in the 17th century they are called *Semi-Pelagians*.¹

2) G. Hermes (1775-1831) acknowledged that grace is required for salvific acts. But since he erroneously held that theoretical faith is not salvific, therefore he denied the necessity of grace in order to elicit it (see *Vatican I*, D 3010, 3035).²

However we hold that acts of this kind, in order to be salvific, must be preceded by the grace of God. Therefore we say that grace is not conferred *because* a man by his natural powers alone believes, wills, beseeches; on the contrary, we say that grace brings it about *that* a man believes, wills and

1. Semi-Pelagianism was attacked by: Augustine,

2. To correctly understand the mind of Hermes you will find much information in K. Feckes: LTK 4,991-3; A. Thourenin: DTC 6,2288-2303.

beseeches as is necessary for the salvation of his soul.

14. Doctrine of the Church. *Indiculus* (Pseudo-Celestine Chapters), c.6-9: every holy thought or good desire, from the beginning of faith, is preceded by grace (D 244-248). *Orange*, cn.3-8: even the beginning of faith proceeds from grace (D 373-378; 398-400). *Trent*, s.6 cn.3: on the acts that dispose one for justification (D 1553). *Vatican I*, c.3 and cn.5: theoretical faith is salvific, and so grace is required in order to posit it (D 3008, 3010, 3035).

15. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

16. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) *In general, as a corollary of the preceding thesis:*

From John 15:5, it is certain that man without grace can do *absolutely nothing salvific*. But the acts by which a man begins to acknowledge the infirmity of his soul, and both desires salvation and hastens to the healer, are salvific; for they positively lead a man to God, our supernatural end. Therefore a man, without grace, is not able to elicit these acts. See *Orange*, cn.7 (D 377); *Boniface II* (D 399-400).

2) *In particular, on the acts that constitute the beginning of faith:*

In the Holy Scriptures it is asserted with clear words that neither faith, nor the desire of salvation, nor the beseeching of divine assistance can be elicited without grace. Therefore grace is required even for acts that constitute the beginning of faith.

a) *On faith*, from John 6:65, where it speaks 1) about the call to faith, for in verse 64 it says *there are some of you that do not believe...*; 2) about the necessity of internal grace, since the miracles and preaching of Christ are not sufficient, but in addition it is necessary that we be drawn by the Father; 3) about the absolute necessity, for it is not said that we cannot do it easily, or that we can do it partially, but simply that no one can come to Him....³ This passage is quoted by: St. Augustine (R 1906, 1946); St. Prosper (R 2034); *Boniface II* (D 399-400).

b) *On the desire and petition of salvation*, from Phil. 2:13, where it is said that *God is at work in you, both to will and to work*; this text, following verse 12, must be understood to be about salvation. See St. Augustine (R 1854, 1572); *Orange*, cn.4 (D 374).

17. 3) The texts quoted by the Semi-Pelagians do not negate what we

3. See F. Toledo, *In Io.* c.6 v.65; Maldonado, *In Io.*, *ibid.*; Knabenbauer, *Evangelium secundum Ioannem* 256.

just said: *Return to me, says the Lord of hosts, and I will return to you* (Zech. 1:3); *Ask, and it will be given to you, seek, and you will find...* (Matt. 7:7); *Awake, O sleeper... and Christ shall give you light* (Eph. 5:14); *Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved...* (Acts 16:31).

For, these texts do not negate the necessity of prevenient grace, as if the beginning of faith were to be attributed to the natural efforts of man; but, having tacitly supposed that, as is clearly apparent from other texts, they express the necessity of cooperating freely so that one might receive further graces. See *Orange*, cn.25 (D 397); *Trent* s.6 c.5 (D 1525).

18. Proof from tradition, whose witnesses are the Fathers and liturgical prayers. 1) *The Fathers, before the beginning of the Semi-Pelagian heresy*, do not comment explicitly on this matter. However, implicitly in a certain way they also teach the necessity of grace for the beginning of faith under more general statements. Thus, St. Basil, while speaking about faith, says: "Faith, which is not generated by the necessary deductions of geometry, but by the work of the Holy Spirit" (R 936). And Nazianzen: "For since there are some who are so proud of their successes that they attribute all to themselves and nothing to Him that made them and gave them wisdom and supplied them with good; such are taught by this word that even to wish well needs help from God; or rather that even to choose what is right is divine and a gift of the mercy of God. For it is necessary both that we should be our own masters and also that our salvation should be of God. This is why He says not of him that wills; that is, not of him that wills only, nor of him that runs only, but also of God. That shows mercy. Next; since to will also is from God, He has attributed the whole to God with reason. However much you may run, however much you may wrestle, yet you need one to give the crown" R1003).

With the flowering of the heresy, St. Augustine stands out as its main opponent. Although before he was a bishop he held more or less the same thing as the Semi-Pelagians regarding the beginning of faith, later he became the unanswerable promoter of the necessity of grace for any and all salvific acts. See *Epist. ad Vitalem* (R 1456-1458); *De praedestinatione sanctorum* (R 1978-84); *De dono perseverantiae* (R 2004-2006). The same doctrine is defended by St. Prosper (R 2034-2045)⁴ and St. Fulgentius (R 2243-46, 2278).

There is a dispute about the mind of Chrysostom. However it seems certain that Chrysostom thought correctly about the necessity of grace

4. See L. Pelland, S.J., *S. Prosperi Aquitani doctrina de praedestinatione et voluntate Dei salvifica...* (Montreal 1936).

for the beginning of faith. On this see what is said in the thesis about the supernaturality of faith.⁵

2) *From liturgical prayers.* The rule of prayer determines the rule of belief. But this is the law of prayer, "that faith be granted to unbelievers" (D 246). Therefore faith is not the fruit of one's natural powers, but is given by God. St. Augustine makes use of this argument (R 1940, 1456).

19. Theological reasoning. It is the same as in the preceding proposition, that is, from the proportion between the end and the means (I-II, q. 109, a. 5). For, the acts of the beginning of faith are truly salvific, as positively disposing one for justification and eternal salvation. Therefore they can be elicited only with the help of grace.

20. Objections. 1. Man is bound to make salvific acts. But no one is held to what is impossible. Therefore salvific acts are possible for man.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. No one is held to things that are impossible both by one's natural powers and by the powers of grace, *conceded*; to things that are impossible by natural powers, but possible with the powers of grace, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* Salvific acts are possible for man with his natural powers, *denied*; with the powers of grace, *conceded*.

2. If man cannot do what he is held to do except with the powers of grace, then grace must be said to be due to him. But the idea of a debt is opposed to the notion of grace. Therefore grace either is not necessary or it is not true grace.

I distinguish the major. It must be said to be due from the exigency of nature itself, *denied*; because man was ordained to the supernatural end of eternal life, *conceded*. *I distinguish the minor.* A natural debt is opposed to grace, *conceded*; a hypothetical debt, given the gratuitous ordination of man to a supernatural end, *denied*.

3. The assent of faith is a salvific act. But assent of this kind can be given without grace, from the motives alone of credibility. Therefore grace is not necessary, at least for the act of faith.

I distinguish the major. The assent of supernatural faith or one posited from grace is a salvific act, *conceded*; a natural assent of faith, or that which a man makes only from the motives of credibility, without the help of grace, would be a salvific act, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.* Supernatural assent, *denied*; natural, *conceded*.

The assent of faith, given from the bare motives of credibility, is purely natural, and therefore sterile in relation to eternal life. It is necessary to say the same thing about any other act, v.gr., of prayer, love, and any other act elicited without grace. For, the dignity and excellence, which accompanies salvific acts with respect to eternal beatitude, is completely lacking in them. Therefore it cannot be objected that a man can perform such acts from the powers of nature alone. For, having bypassed this question, we have

5. Below IV, 112. See E. Boularand, S.J., *La venue de l'homme à la foi d'après saint Jean Chrysostome* (Rome 1939) 153-164.

proved the necessity of grace, not because a man cannot naturally elicit these acts, but because he cannot perform them in a way that is salvific.

4. The Council of Orange, cn.7 (D 377), describes salvific acts as the effects of the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, “who gives to all *ease and joy* in assenting to the truth and believing it.” Therefore, grace is given that we may act more easily and joyfully, but not because it is morally necessary.

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. From these words alone one can suspect that the necessity of grace is only moral, *conceded*. But if the context of the same canon is examined carefully, *denied*. For there the necessity of grace is proved from John 15:5 *apart from me you can do nothing*; this text contains a necessity that is truly physical and absolute. Indeed this is also certain from other canons of the same Council., cn.6 and 24 (D 376, 394). Moreover the true doctrine is stated in clear words by Carthage, cn.5 (D 227) and by Trent, s.6 cn.2 (D 1552).

In a similar way one can respond to objections taken from the Fathers, inasmuch as they apply the ideas of *delight* and *sweetness* to the grace that is necessary to act in a salvific manner.

5. St. Augustine at times offers a proof about the necessity of grace from man’s weakness brought on by concupiscence.⁶ Therefore one must say that grace is necessary not physically, but only morally.

I respond that the antecedent is true. Therefore at times Augustine demonstrates the necessity of grace from our moral impotence, which is also done by the Apostle in Rom. 7. But he also excludes physical necessity, to which he also refers elsewhere. Thus, v.gr., in his book *De gestis Pelagii*: “We are warned that there are two kinds of help. For there are some without which, what one wants to do, cannot be done; as without a ship no one can sail, without a voice no one can speak, without feet no one can walk, without light no one see, and so forth. *Hence it is also true that without the grace of God no one can live justly*. But there are also other helps that we use in such a way that, even if they are absent, what we want to do can be done in some other way...” (R 1850).

6. The free will of man, although weakened, was not completely extinguished by sin. Therefore man, even fallen man, can do some good works.

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. Free will alone, without grace, can do something naturally good, *conceded*; salvific good acts, *denied*. Certainly free will, by itself alone, cannot do anything positively leading to eternal life, nor can it precede grace. But once it has been prompted by grace, it can accept or reject its influence.

7. In order to confer his gifts on us God demands something from us: *Return to me... and I will return to you* (Zech. 1:3); *Ask, and it will be given to you* (Luke 11:9). Therefore he demands from us what lies in our hand, namely, faith, prayer, etc.

I distinguish the antecedent. He demands something from us freely given to him by the power of the grace which he has previously bestowed, *conceded*; he demands something freely given to him by natural powers alone, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* From us he demands faith, prayer, etc., after having given us

6. *De natura et gratia* 64,76: ML 44,285.

the power of grace by which he precedes our acts, *conceded*; with the powers of nature alone, *denied*.

21. Scholium 1. *On the nature of the grace that is required for salvific acts.* The grace necessary for salvific acts can take various forms:

1) *For negative unbelievers*, or those who have never been called, the grace required so that they may be called to salvation is actual exciting grace. All theologians agree on this point. This is the one thing considered possible for them.

2) *For positive unbelievers*, or those who at one time were called and resisted the call, the actual exciting grace formerly given certainly does not suffice in order to posit a salvific act here and now, but a new actual grace is required.

3) *For members of the Church in the state of mortal sin*, in order to elicit acts of the virtues that they have lost through sin (charity), certainly actual exciting grace is necessary; but for the acts of those virtues they have not lost (faith, hope), it is more probable that actual grace is also required. But in this second hypothesis their situation is like that of the just, which we will treat in the next number.

22. Scholium 2. *On the necessity of actual grace for the salvific acts of the just.*⁷

When the question is first raised about the necessity of grace for the salvific acts of non sinners, but of the just, the state of the question is completely changed. For, we have seen that the root of the necessity of grace for salvific acts is to be found not in the moral infirmity of nature, but in the physical defect of the proportion between the natural and the supernatural. But this defect is not present in the just person, since he already has habitual grace and the infused habits of the virtues.

This question is quite complex, as is sufficiently proved by the various ways of speaking about it by the theologians. For, while some thought that the necessity of actual grace for these acts of the just pertains to faith, others defend the denial of that necessity as the more probable and true opinion. And surely certain confusions should be avoided.

For, the concern is not about the grace necessary to persevere in justice, which per se is medicinal grace and not elevating grace; nor is it about the grace necessary to elicit acts more intense than the infused habits, which grace without doubt is required to supply for the defect of sufficient elevation. But it has to do with the elevating grace necessary for the individual acts of the just. Moreover it is not about helping grace, concerning which there is no dispute, but it is about prevenient grace.

Surely this prevenient grace for the individual acts of the just cannot be necessary by reason of elevation, that is, in order to give the physical and entitative proportion between the act and salvation. For, these acts are performed by an agent already really elevated by sanctifying grace and the infused virtues.

But they say that that grace is necessary by reason of animating the habits, that is, so that the infused habits, which are already present in the soul, might be animated to elicit their acts. This animation, however, either is understood in relation to deliberate acts,

7. See Lange, 531-536.

or in relation to indeliberate acts. But for deliberate acts sufficient animation is already had in indeliberate supernatural acts. But regarding these latter acts, since they have the nature of animating grace, as we will see later (see. N. 265-277), it is not fully apparent how another previous grace is given in order to elicit them.

But if it is said that prevenient grace is required so that the power of a just man may be determined to act supernaturally, since being already elevated by the infused virtues it can still act naturally, it can be responded that this determination is sufficiently given from the purpose of the object. For, although the object is natural, there does not seem to be a difficulty in the fact that, once the object has been proposed, that the infused habits, connatural to the state of elevation, are determined always to elicit indeliberate supernatural acts, of course with the usual supernatural cooperation, which is in agreement with the same supernatural habits.

Therefore the whole question finally seems to come down to this. In a just man, as also in the sinner, indeliberate salvific acts recur. These acts of a sinner take place with the special supernatural assistance of God, and therefore they are supernatural. But their supernaturality seems to be sufficiently explained by the infused habits which have a physical influence on the existence of these acts. But of course for this the supernatural cooperation of God is required. Therefore the question can be raised, whether this final cooperation should be called a new help of God, or a new actual grace. And it seems that it must be affirmed as more probable, although really it is connatural to the state of the elevation of the infused habits.

II. On the necessity of medicinal grace

23. Considering the truths and actions of the natural order, there is a question *about the ability of the intellect* to know the truth and *about the power of the will* to do what is good.

Elsewhere it is proved that the human *intellect*, by its natural powers alone, can know many things, not only concerning the things that are in the sensible world, but also the existence of God and his attributes, and also the foundations of morality (I-II, q. 109, a. 1). But at the same time it must be held that revelation was morally necessary, according to Vatican I so that “such truths among things divine that of themselves are not above human reason can, even in the present condition of mankind, be known by everyone with facility, with firm certitude, and with no admixture of error” (D 3005).

Therefore the human mind, even in those divine things that are not per se impervious to reason, can know many things; but it cannot know all things certainly, easily and without any error, unless it is helped by revelation, which is a type of external grace, whose help is said to be necessary, not physically but morally. This matter is treated at great length in the treatise *On the True Religion* (see vol. I), and so we will not say anything more about it here.

We will move on now to study the power of the will to do good. Therefore our question concerns the power or weakness of nature to perform some good acts (not salvific). For, in the state of fallen nature, in which we now are, nature wounded by original sin cannot accomplish all good things by its own powers, but sometimes requires the help of grace, which, because it heals its wounds, is called “healing” grace or “medicinal” grace. But since there are mutually opposed errors in this matter—some holding that the will can always do what is right and good, and others holding that nothing good can proceed from the will because of the total corruption of nature, we will explain by stages the Catholic doctrine, which takes a middle position.

Therefore, Catholic doctrine holds on the one hand that the will is not so corrupted by original sin that it cannot at times posit good acts *without the assistance of grace*; on the other hand, it also teaches that the will was wounded to such an extent that it cannot keep the whole natural law *without the help of medicinal grace*, avoid all venial sins for a long time, and persevere in the state of grace. Now we will explain all of these points.

A) What the will can do without grace.

24. Here is the fundamental Catholic position on this matter: a man can posit naturally good acts *without the help of any grace*. Or, what comes to the same thing, the adequate division of human acts is not into acts that take place with the help of grace, and evil acts. But because grace manifests many forms, we will proceed step by step, paying attention especially to the differences of our adversaries:

1) Not all the works of sinners are sins. Therefore *habitual grace* is not required in order to perform good acts.

2) Not all the works of unbelievers are sins. Therefore the *grace of faith* is not required to perform good acts.

Hence it follows that sinners and unbelievers can posit good acts; but still it does not follow that they can posit such acts *without any grace*. For actual medicinal grace is still not excluded, which perhaps is present in those good acts of sinners and unbelievers, even though they do not yet have habitual grace or the grace of faith. Therefore, in order to exclude even medicinal grace, we say:

3) Any man can posit some good acts *without any grace*.

4) Indeed at times he really does posit such acts.

Therefore we will now explain each of these points in the following propositions.

Thesis 3. Not all the works of sinners are sins.

S.Th. I-II, q. 85, a. 1f.; Lercher-Lakner, 233-240; Beraza, 311-319; Lange, 88-106.

25. Definition of terms. A *sinner*, that is, a believer lacking sanctifying grace, because he is in the state of mortal sin. Hypothetically, though, he still has supernatural faith.

Sin, that is, a serious offense against God in virtue of which a man is turned away from God and incurs his hatred.

We say therefore, that the acts of a sinner, just because they are done without habitual grace, are not necessarily sins. For, they can be either salvific (if they take place with the help of elevating grace, which we treated in the preceding theses), or simply good acts, that is, in conformity with his rational nature as such both because of the object (which is something not forbidden), and from the intention of the one acting (which is not inordinate). By reason of this thesis, however, it is not excluded that these latter acts take place with the help of actual medicinal grace. Now we are

not going to consider this point.

26. Adversaries. 1) *The Reformers*, since they said that original justice pertained to the constitutive essentials of human nature, held, because of its loss, that nature was so essentially corrupted that a man necessarily sins in everything he does (D 1486).¹

2) De Bay (1513-1589) taught that original justice was due to man, not as a part of nature but certainly as something that proceeds out of nature as its effect, or at least as something to which nature has a *claim* (D 1921-1926). When original justice was lost by the sin of Adam, free will was extinguished (D 1966). In its place there are two loves which necessarily attract the will: an evil love and a love of perfect charity (D 1938). However in sinners, since charity does not rule, all their works necessarily are sins (D 1940, 1935).²

3) Quesnel draws the same conclusion (D 2459).³

4) *The Synod of Pistoia* embraced the same error (D 2623).⁴

27. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, s.6 cn.7, defined that the acts by which a sinner positively disposes himself for justification are not sins (D 1557; see 395f., 1677-1678). *Vatican I*, s.3 c.3, teaches that the faith of a sinner is salvific (D 3010).

Also see the condemnations of de Bay, Quesnel and the Synod of Pistoia cited in the previous number; and even before that the error of John Huss, condemned at the *Council of Constance* (D 1216).

28. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 1557).

29. Proof from Holy Scripture. God exhorts sinners (and also unbelievers) to do certain works, and he praises them for some of their works. But this would be repugnant, if such works were sins. Therefore not all the works of sinners are sins.

The major: For, he exhorts sinners to pray (Sir. 21:1), to do penance (Ezek. 18:30), to give alms... (Dan. 4:27); and he praises them for some of their works, v.gr., the prayer of Manasseh, the wicked king (2 Chron. 33:11-13), the prayer of the publican (Luke 18:13f.), the desire of Zachaeus to see Jesus (Luke 19:1-10), the alms and prayers of Cornelius (Acts 10:4).

1. See L. Cristiani, *Réforme*: DTC 13,2020-2097; J. Dedieu, *Protestantisme*: DTC 13,850-907.

2. See Le Bachelet, *Baius*: DTC 3,8-111; F.X. Jansen, S.J., *Baius et le Baianisme. Essai théologique* (Louvain 1927).

3. J. Carreyre, *Quesnel et le Quesnellisme*: DTC 13,1460-1535.

4. J. Carreyre, *Pistoie (Synode de)*: DTC 12,2134-2230.

The minor: It would be repugnant to the divine holiness and truth.

30. Proof from tradition. *Before St. Augustine*, both the Greek and Latin Fathers willingly acknowledged that pagans do some good works; however many of them do not teach explicitly whether these works are done by one's natural powers alone, or also with the help of actual grace. Here is what Nazianzen says: "Even before he belonged to our Church, he [the father of Nazianzen] was one of us. For his habits joined him to us. For just as many of our own are not really with us, namely, those whom life has removed from the common body of the faithful, so on the contrary many of those outside of us pertain to us—all those who prefer the faith to their old habits, and only lack the name, since they possess the reality. My father was also one of these..." (R 982). And Chrysostom: "Are not Christians found acting badly and gentiles living philosophically?... However lest we seem to be contentious, let us concede that there are those among the pagans who live correctly; for nothing is opposed to our prayer; for we were speaking about what happens often, not about what happens rarely" (R 1162).

St. Augustine contrasted avarice with charity; however not so exclusively that he did not acknowledge some works as naturally good. For he wrote: "One type of charity is divine, another human; some human things are licit, some illicit... Human love is licit by which a wife is loved... It is licit for you with a human love to love your wife, to love your children, to love your friends, to love your fellow citizens... But you see that such love can also be shown by the impious, that is, by pagans, Jews and heretics" (R 1528; see 1733, 1827). St. Fulgentius held the same doctrine, since he said about unbelievers and sinners: "Some good things that pertain to the justice of human society can be present in them; but because they are not done from faith and the love of God, they cannot be beneficial" (R 2244).

Now if a pagan or unbeliever can do such things, a fortiori a sinner who is endowed with supernatural faith can also do them.

31. Theological reasoning. 1) From *Trent*, s.6 c.6. Sinners, aided by actual grace, are disposed positively for justification by salvific acts. But no one is disposed for justification by sinning. Therefore not all works of sinners are sins.

2) From *Trent*, s.14 c.4. A sinner can elicit an act of attrition which is a true gift of God and an inner impulse of the Holy Spirit moving him. But no one is disposed for justification by sinning. Therefore not all the works of a sinner are sins.

32. Objections. 1. From Matt. 6:24: *No one can serve two masters...* But the sinner serves the devil, not God. Therefore the sinner sins in everything.

I distinguish the major. No one can habitually serve both God and the devil, *conceded*; one who habitually serves the devil cannot sometimes offer some service to God, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* Habitually, *conceded*; always and in all things, *denied*.

2. From John 9:31: *We know that God does not listen to sinners, but if anyone is a worshipper of God and does his will, God listens to him.* Therefore the prayer of a sinner, and for the same reason his other works, which have the appearance of being good, are displeasing to God.

I respond: a) the intended meaning of the man born blind was this: if Christ were a sinner, as his enemies contended, then he would not have been able to cure my blindness.

b) *I distinguish the major.* God does not listen to sinners who petition in a sinful way, *conceded*; who petition correctly and properly, *denied*. See II-II, q. 83, a. 16.

3. From Matt. 7:18: *A sound tree cannot bear evil fruit, nor can a bad tree bear good fruit.* But a sinner is an evil tree whose fruits are his works. Therefore a sinner cannot perform good works.

I respond: a) that Christ is talking about false prophets whose doctrine of itself cannot produce good fruits.

b) *I retort*, inasmuch as therefore it would follow that a just person could never sin, because he is a good tree; and this is false.

c) These words of Christ contain a proverbial way of speaking; this way of speaking expresses what happens generally, but not what happens always.

4. St. Augustine writes about the precepts of charity: "All these precepts of love, that is, of charity, which are so great and of such a nature that whatever a man thinks he has done well, if he does it without charity, in no way does it well" (R 1943). But this charity is understood as theological charity, which is joined together with sanctifying grace.⁵ Therefore the sinner can in no way act well.

I distinguish the major. According to St. Augustine, whatever takes place without charity is not done well, inasmuch as it happens either in a bad way against charity, or it is not condignly meritorious of eternal life, *conceded*; according to St. Augustine a sinner cannot do anything naturally good, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* A sinner cannot do anything naturally good, *denied*; condignly meritorious of eternal life, *conceded*. The words of St. Augustine quoted in n. 30 should be read again. According to what he says there it is certain that, in addition to avarice and charity, there are also naturally good works.

5. Suarez proves that the matter should be understood in this way, *De gratia* 1,5,7. Therefore we solve the difficulty on the basis of his interpretation.

Thesis 4. Not all the works of unbelievers are sins.

S.Th. II-II, q. 10, a. 4; Lercher-Lakner, 233-240; Beraza, 320-328; Lange, 88-116.

33. Definition of terms. *An unbeliever*, both positive and negative, that is, one who lacks supernatural faith, habitual or actual. Therefore under this term we include both those who acknowledge the true God (Jews) and those who do not (pagans and atheists).

The scope of this proposition is to demonstrate that the works of unbelievers, even though they lack sanctifying grace and the grace of faith, are not all sins; but that sometimes they can act uprightly, or, if actual supernatural grace is present, that they can also act in a salvific way.

34. Adversaries. 1) Jansen (1585-1638) conceded that sinners can perform good works; but he denied this to unbelievers. Here is a summary of his doctrine: Original justice was owed to man by a debt of *decency*. But by sin we lost our freedom from necessity. It was replaced by a twofold delectation: grace and concupiscence. The will however follows the impulse of the greater delectation. But in unbelievers concupiscence has domination, because no grace is given to them. Therefore everything they do is a sin.¹

2) De Bay and Quesnel defend the same error.

Note the difference between the opinion of the Reformers and the error of de Bay, Jansen and Quesnel. According to the Reformers, the works of sinners are sins because they proceed from an evil intrinsic principle, that is, from a nature that is intrinsically corrupted. According to the other authors, the works of sinners and unbelievers are sins, because they proceed from an evil extrinsic principle, that is, from earthly avarice. Relying in vain on this distinction, de Bay and Jansen thought that their doctrine was not at all proscribed by the Tridentine condemnation of the Protestant error.

35. Doctrine of the Church. Alexander VIII condemned the doctrine of the Jansenists (D 2308, 2311); St. Pius X the opinion of de Bay (D 1925); Clement XI the errors of Quesnel (D 2442, 2448).

Theological note. *Certain*, from the condemnation of the Jansenists.

36. It is proved from Holy Scripture and tradition with the same reasoning as in the preceding thesis.

1. J. Carreyre, *Jansénisme*: DTC 8,318-529; A. de Becdelièvre: DAFC 2,1153-92.

On the mind of St. Augustine concerning the works of unbelievers, keep this in mind. St. Augustine sometimes taught, and even in the Pelagian controversy, that unbelievers can do some good things (R 1733, 1528, 1827)...; at other times, however, at least apparently, he denied it, especially in his work *Contra Iulianum* (1.4 c.3 n.23-33; c.30; c.32), where he says that all the works of unbelievers are sins. St. Prosper made similar statements (R 2037, 2041f.).

Therefore, how should St. Augustine be understood?

Many interpretations have been given and Lange presents the main ones. From all of them, the interpretation given by Suarez pleases us most, because perhaps he reflects the mind of St. Augustine better than others.²

Here is what Suarez says: "That all the works of unbelievers are sins is usually explained in three ways. *First*, as it is understood about sin taken broadly—for an act done in a bad state of soul, in which there can be nothing beneficial for eternal life. Some respond in this way, but it does not please me... Therefore there is a *second* response—that Augustine in these propositions is talking about unbelievers, as they are unbelievers, that is, acting not according to the rule of right reason, but from the rule of their own error. St. Thomas explains it in this way... This explanation is certainly not foreign to the mind of Augustine... However this explanation of St. Thomas becomes more probable, if we add *another way*... Namely, that Augustine thought that unbelievers act regularly and almost always out of their unbelief, or from some perverse motive, from unbelief itself... But understood in this way, the opinion of Augustine is reduced to the question about what is *de facto* rather than what is by right, or by power (so to speak)... And because what is small or rare is considered to be as it were nothing, speaking morally, therefore at times he speaks with that exaggeration or absolute negation."

Therefore Suarez explains the different statements of St. Augustine concretely in the following way:

a) "True virtues were not present in unbelievers": that is, because the virtues of unbelievers did not bring them to eternal life; moreover, because they were not able morally to arrive at the state in which they can truly be said to be virtues.

b) "An unbeliever does nothing good": that is, he hardly does anything good; or he does not do anything that leads to eternal life.

c) "All the works of unbelievers are sins": that is, because regularly and

2. Lange, *De gratia* 108. Suarez, *De gratia* I,5,7,20f. See J.M. Dalmáu, S.J., *San Agustín en la teología de la gracia de Suarez*: EstEcl 22 (1948) 347-353; Id., *Sobre un punto difícil de exégesis agustiniana*: EstEcl 23 (1949) 59-65.

almost always they act out of their own infidelity.

37. The solution of John Ernst, in which the guilt of original sin is invoked, has been quite favorably received by recent theologians.³ Here is a summary of this solution. The acts of unbelievers, although naturally good, because they are elicited in the state of original sin, are called sins by St. Augustine; and so indeed they are sin, not only materially but truly formally, however not formally personal but in an analogical way to personal sin. Hence the different way of speaking of the scholastics and Augustine arises from a different term of comparison. For, the former compare the acts of unbelievers with pure nature as such, that is, fallen nature but not as fallen; but Augustine compares them with fallen nature and as vitiated by sin. For this reason, Augustine could rightly say about the works of unbelievers that they are actual sin in an analogous way, whose guilt is identical with the guilt of original sin. However the theologians, since they reserve this concept for personal sin, rightly thought that one should avoid this manner of speaking.

Beraza seems to have accepted this solution of John Ernst.⁴ Sin—argues Beraza—can be said to be any work that lacks its due order to the end. Now the human race was raised in Adam to a supernatural end, which it lost by the sin of Adam himself. This cannot be repaired in any other way than by faith in Jesus Christ; by this faith we are ordered once again to our supernatural end. Therefore, whatever does not come from faith can be called sin by Augustine.

38. Theological reasoning. 1) From *Trent*, in the same way as in the previous thesis.

2) Unbelievers are bound to keep the natural law. But no one is required to sin. Therefore not all their works can be called sins.

3) Finally, the Angelic Doctor says (II-II, q. 10, a. 4): “Unbelievers are without grace indeed, *yet some good of nature remains in them*. Consequently it is evident that unbelievers cannot do those good works which proceed from grace, that is, meritorious works; yet they can, to a certain extent, do those good works for which the good of nature suffices. Hence it does not follow that they sin in everything they do....”

3. J. Ernst, *Die Werke und Tugenden der Ungläubigen nach St. Augustin* (1871); Id., *Zur Erklärung des 22. Kanons von Orange: ZkathTh 19* (1895) 177-185. This solution seems in a certain way to have been anticipated by St. Thomas, I-II, q. 89, a. 5 ad 3, and A. de Vega, *Tridentini decreti de iustificatione expositio et defensio...* 14,19.

4. Beraza, 326-328.

39. Objections. 1. From Rom. 14:23: *For whatever does not proceed from faith is sin.* Therefore all the works of unbelievers are sins.

I respond that it is clear from the context that in this case faith signifies the dictate of conscience. Hence: sin is whatever takes place against the dictate of conscience, *conceded*; whatever does not take place from theological faith, *denied*.

However, it must be admitted that St. Augustine (*Contra Iulianum* 4,3) understood this text to be about theological faith, and from that to have proved that all the works of unbelievers are sins. But the mind of Augustine should be understood from what we said in n. 36f.

2. From Tit. 1:15: *To the pure all things are pure, but to the corrupt and unbelieving nothing is pure; their minds and consciences are corrupted.* Therefore an unbeliever sins in everything.

I respond that this is the meaning: For Christians who knew very well that no food is unclean, because the Mosaic Law about the prohibition of certain foods had been abolished, all foods are clean. But the Judaizers, thinking that the law was still in force, sin against faith and against their own conscience.⁵

3. From Heb. 11:6: *Without faith it is impossible to please God.* Therefore an unbeliever cannot please God.

I respond that the Apostle is asserting only, certainly, that faith is necessary for salvation, so that an adult cannot be justified unless an act of faith in God who exists and rewards has been made. Therefore: without faith no adult can be justified, *conceded*; without faith all works become evil, *denied*.

5. See J.C. Plumpe, *Omnia mundo mundis*: ThSt 6 (1945) 509-523.

Thesis 5. Any man, even without grace, can perform some naturally good acts, which he also sometimes does.

S.Th. I-II, q. 109, a. 2; Lercher-Lakner, 223-232; Beraza, 329-349; Lange, 117-133.

40. Definition of terms. *A man without grace*, that is, without any unowed help of nature, or an agent with his natural powers alone. Therefore he lacks, not only habitual grace and the grace of faith, but also any actual graces. Therefore his works cannot be salvific, but will be purely natural, in conformity of course with rational nature as such, but sterile in reference to eternal life.

He can (a question of right), that is, he has sufficient powers, and physically and morally he can act honorably, at least sometimes, with those powers alone. Moreover, we hold that actually he does perform some acts of this kind.

Some naturally good acts. We are not saying many, or even more difficult ones, but only some, without determining what they are in particular. Augustine mentions, v.gr., love of children, of friends... (R 1528).

41. Opinions. 1) *The Augustinians* require for the goodness of the act that it be referred, at least virtually, to God as being loved for his own sake. But a relation of this kind, in this state of nature, *cannot take place without grace*. Hence it is that any act, placed without this influx of charity, even though its object is good and the purpose of the agent is good, turns out to be not really good, so that it is at least a venial sin.¹ However this opinion is now obsolete, so that even more recent Augustinians like H. del Val have abandoned it.²

2) G. Vázquez (1551-1604) and I.D. de Ripalda (1594-1648) differ greatly from the opinion of the Augustinians, although their opinion has always been considered by theologians to be quite singular. Both concede that fallen man, before he receives grace, enjoys the *power* of performing naturally good acts. But at the same time they affirm that, as a result of Christ's redemption, *de facto* there cannot be a good act unless it is also salvific. Therefore, in this order any act *de facto* is either salvific or simply evil. But the grace by which a good act becomes salvific is different for Vázquez than it is for Ripalda.

For the grace, which Vázquez singles out, is only *supernatural*

1. See G. Ariminensem, *In 2 Sent.* d.41,3 c; Berti, *De theologicis disciplinis* 18,3; Noris, *Vindiciae august.* 3. Portalié treats this opinion, *Augustinianisme*: DTC 1,2185-2501. This opinion is rejected by D. Sotoa, *De natura et gratia* 1,20-21.

2. Honoratus del Val, O.S.A., *Sacra theologia dogmatica* vol2, *De gratia Christi* n.52.

according to its mode, since it is nothing other than a *thought* about doing some good, which must be preceded by the will; but it must be *congruous* or one that is efficaciously and infallibly joined to the act of the will. Now this *congruous thought*, although it is entitatively natural, since it comes from natural causes, is nevertheless unowed to the rational creature, especially to one fallen, and it is given to it because of the merits of Christ. For a better understanding of the opinion of P. Vázquez it will be helpful to read his commentary, *In 1.2 q. 109, a. 2 d.190*. This opinion is explained briefly and clearly by Schiffini.³

According to Ripalda the grace, by which a good act is made salvific, is *entitatively supernatural*, because such an act, either proceeds from the *command* of some supernatural act, or it has a supernatural act *associated with it*. A more lengthy explanation of Ripalda's opinion will be found in his work, *De ente supernaturali* d.20 and d.114. Huarte and Billot consider this opinion to be probable; Palmieri and Pesch admit that it is more easy for the faithful.⁴

3) The common opinion of theologians holds that fallen man, bereft of all grace, can perform some naturally good acts, and sometimes does them.

Therefore, in the opinion of the Augustinians, the condition, v.gr., of unbelievers, would be very bad; for, at the very least, they would sin venially in all they do. In the opinion of Ripalda and Vázquez it would be very good; for, all their good acts would turn out to be salvific, disposing them at least remotely for justification. According to the common opinion of theologians, their lot stands in the middle, that is, without any grace they can, at least sometimes, perform naturally good acts; but when they are given actual graces they can also perform salvific acts by which they become disposed for justification.

42. Doctrine of the Church. The Church, which has often defined what man cannot do without grace, has never taught explicitly what he can accomplish naturally without grace. Nevertheless from her condemnations of the Baianians, Jansenists, Quesnel and Pistoia a good argument can be made that the doctrine of the Church favors our opinion, and can hardly be reconciled with the opinion of the Augustinians.

1) The complete inability of fallen man, without grace, to do anything good has been condemned (D 1927, 2402, 2439). Therefore he can perform

3. S. Schiffini, *Tractatus de gratia divina* 103-107.

4. Huarte, *De gratia Christi* n.39, where you find quoted the words of Billot and of the other theologians who think the teaching of Ripalda is probable; Palmieri, *De gratia actuali* 254-258; Pesch, *Compend. theol. dogmat.* 3,221; Id., *Praelectiones dogmaticae* 5,127. There is much more about Ripalda in A. Arbeloa, *La doctrina de la predestinación y de la gracia eficaz en Juan Martínez de Ripalda* (Pamplona 1950).

some good acts.

2) The concept of the twofold love has been condemned, namely of love and cupidity, as an adequate division of the love that can be found in the rational creature (D 1938, 2307, 2444, 2624). Therefore there is a third kind of love, namely, naturally good love.

43. Theological note. *Common and certain*, from the almost unanimous agreement of theologians.

44. Proof from tradition. *The Fathers* acknowledge that there can be naturally good acts performed by unbelievers, and de facto they say that such works are at times done by them. See Chrysostom (R 1162); St. Augustine (R 1528, 1733); St. Fulgentius (R 2244).⁵

45. Theological reasoning. 1) *Against the Augustinians:* From *Vatican I*, s.3 ch.2 (D 3004), man can know for certain God, the principle and end of all things, by the light of natural reason. Therefore a man, by his natural powers alone, can direct explicitly a good act to God known as his last end. For, otherwise a thinking man would be so evil that, even after having known the supreme good, he would always and infallibly embrace the finite good; of course, this is absurd.

2) *Against Vázquez:* We concede that “a congruous thought,” which de facto is required for every good act, is a special benefit of God, inasmuch as he freely chose this order of congruous knowledge rather than some other order; but we deny that this benefit, for the whole human race, is of a higher order than the present benefits of the natural order. For, such a benefit is due also to a fallen nature; for, otherwise one would have to say that all men are so corrupt that what is bad is more pleasing to them than what is good. Therefore the natural providence of God is held to confer on the human race some congruous thoughts.

Therefore we reject Vázquez’s basic principle that every congruous thought must be considered as a special grace, given to a man because of the merits of Christ.⁶

3) *Against Ripalda:* We confess that God could have chosen the order proposed by Ripalda; but at the same time we say that the sources testify to the fact that such an order de facto was not chosen by God. For, *Trent*, s.3 ch.3 (D 1532), and *Vatican I*, s.3 ch.3 (D 3008), teach that faith is the beginning of human salvation and the root of justification. Therefore all

5. These testimonies are cited in n. 30.

6. Suarez rejects this opinion, *De gratia* 1,17, with many arguments.

those acts “by which from the beginning of faith one tends towards God” must be considered as salvific acts, but not all the acts that precede this beginning of faith. But for other reasons we know that unbelievers can perform some naturally good acts. Therefore not every good act is salvific.

46. Objections. 1. From Orange, cn.22 (D 392), where the teaching that Augustine taught often is quoted: “No one has anything of his own except lying and sin. But if a man has anything of truth and justice, it is from that fountain for which we should thirst in this desert, so that, as though refreshed by some of its drops, we may not falter along the way.” Therefore no man, without grace, can do anything good.

I respond that this canon has been interpreted in different ways.⁷ Perhaps it should be understood like this: *No one has of his own*, or from himself alone, anything that he has not accepted from God, the author of both the natural and the supernatural orders, *except lying and sin*. For, if a man has some good, he has received it from God, who is the fountain from which flow into us all good things, both natural and supernatural. Therefore, *I distinguish the antecedent*: Whatever goods a man has, they come from God, the author of the natural and the supernatural orders, *conceded*; they come from God, the author of the supernatural order only, *denied*. Therefore, a man can perform, not only salvific acts, but also natural or ethically good acts.

2) From Orange cn.9 (D 379): “It is a divine gift, both when we think rightly and when we restrain our feet from falsity and injustice; for as often as we do good, God operates in us and with us, that we may work.” Therefore grace is required for all acts, both salvific and merely natural; or man, without grace, cannot do anything good.

I respond that this controversy is with the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians about the necessity of grace for salvific works, but not at all whether at times without grace a man can perform some good work, even though it is not salvific. See canons 6-8 (D 376-378). Therefore, the words quoted apply to salvific acts, *conceded*; to purely natural acts, *denied*.

3) From Matt. 22:37, where the universal precept of charity is imposed. But such a precept cannot be fulfilled by that relation alone to God which by its nature is present in every morally good act. Therefore, lest the precept of charity be violated, all works must be referred to God with an actual or virtual intention.

I distinguish the major. A universal precept is imposed, negatively, inasmuch as it forbids the violation of any precept, *conceded*; positively, inasmuch as everything must be done from a motive of charity, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor also*: It is not fulfilled as negative, *denied*; as positive, *conceded*. Therefore the precept of charity is universal by reason of its end, because the other precepts are referred to charity, either to acquire it or to increase it. See II-II, q. 23, a. 8 ad 3.

4) From 1 Cor. 10:31: *So, whether you eat or drink, or whatever you do, do all to the glory of God*. Therefore all works, in order to be good, must be referred to God as

7. See Hurter, *Theologiae Dogmaticae Compendium* 3,65; Ernst, *Die Werke und Tugenden der Ungläubigen nach St. Augustin* 228-253; *Zur Erklärung des 22. Kanons von Orange*: ZkathTh 19 (1895) 177-185; J. De Blic, *Sur le canon 22 du concile d'Orange*: Greg 7 (1926) 396-401.

the supernatural end. But this can take place only through acts of charity.

I distinguish the antecedent. Everything must be done for the glory of God, negatively, inasmuch as nothing should be done contrary to the will of God, *conceded*; they must be done positively by referring everything to God, *I subdistinguish*: by way of counsel, as St. Bonaventure says, *conceded*; by way of precept, as St. Thomas holds, *I make a further distinction*: with an actual or at least virtual relation on the part of the agent, *denied*; with a virtual relation on the part of the work, *conceded*.

5) A man is bound to elicit acts of charity. But to elicit acts of charity is the same thing as to refer actually everything to God. Therefore a man is bound to refer actually everything to God.

I distinguish the major. Sometimes in life, *conceded*; whenever a good act is performed, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* Sometimes in life, *conceded*; always and in everything, *denied*.

47. Scholium. *On the love of God naturally above all things* (I-II, q. 109, a. 3). From the thesis it is certain that fallen man, without any grace, can perform some naturally good acts. Therefore in particular there is a question about a certain singular and more difficult act by reason of its excellence, namely, about the love of God—whether he can also elicit such an act.

The love of God is thought to take two forms—one natural and the other supernatural. *Natural* love is that by which we love God, known from creatures, as the author and end of the natural order; but *supernatural* love is that by which we love God, known through revelation, as the author and end of the order of grace. Now both loves can be either *imperfect* or *perfect*, according as we do not consider God to be above all created things, or vice versa. But again, perfect love, can be such either *affectively* or also *effectively*, if we love God above all created things not only with feeling but also by an observance of the commandments lasting a long time.

Therefore, there is a question whether a fallen man (almost all theologians concede the point re the innocent), by his natural powers alone, enjoys the moral power (the physical power is certainly to be conceded) to love God perfectly (no one doubts that he can love God imperfectly), both with the love of concupiscence, since He is good to us, and with the love of benevolence, since He is good in Himself.

Indeed *perfect effective* love is impossible without grace, according to all theologians; for we will soon demonstrate that without grace we cannot avoid all grave sins for a long time.

However there is a dispute about *perfect affective* love.

It is *denied* by Bellarmine, Billuart, Salmanticenses, Hugon, Zubizarreta, Mendive, Schiffini, Boyer..., because man cannot sincerely will what he is not able to do. But he cannot effectively love God above all things. Therefore he cannot do it affectively.⁸

However Molina *affirms it* and in favor of this opinion he cites St. Thomas, Sco-

8. Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 6,7; Billuart, *De gratia* dis.3 a.4; Salmanticenses, *De gratia* d.2 dub.3-4; Hugon, *De gratia* q.2 a.3; Zubizarreta, *Theologia dogm. schol.* 3,34-37; Mendive, *De divina gratia* 90ff; Schiffini, *De gratia* 99 obj.4; Boyer, *De gratia divina* (1938) th.4 p.71-78. Suarez holds the same opinion. For more on his thinking, *De gratia* 1,30-36.

tus, Bonaventure, Cajetan, Soto,⁹ Cano, Occam, Peter of Aliaco, Marsilius, Paludanus, Richard, Vitoria, Vega. Among more recent authors, the following can be names: Tepe, Pesch, V. d. Meersch, Muncunill, Beraza, Lange, Lercher....¹⁰ For, although de facto a man cannot observe all the precepts, nevertheless he can, when no temptation afflicts him and he enjoys moments of serenity and peace, sincerely desire to keep all of them. But this is love of God affectively perfect. Therefore a fallen man, without grace, at least for a short space of time, can love God with a love that is affectively perfect.

Therefore since the rather great authority of theologians holds the affirmative position, and the intrinsic reasons seem to point in the same direction, we also embrace it as the more probable opinion.

9. D. Soto is not correctly cited in favor of this opinion, since it is certain from his book, *De natura et gratia* 1,2, that he held the negative opinion.

10. Molina, *Concordia* q.14 a.13 d.14 membr.1 and 3; Tepe, *De gratia* 25-32; Pesch, *Prael. dogmat.* 5,128-131; I.v.d. Meersch, *De divina gratia* 81ff.; Muncunill, *De gratia Christi* d.1 c.3 a.4; Beraza, 302-309; Lange, 133; Lercher, *Instit. theol. dogmat.* 4,1,239.

B) What the will cannot do without grace.

48. Even though fallen man, from what we have seen so far, can do some good things without grace, still without it he cannot accomplish everything. For he cannot avoid all mortal sins for a long time, or overcome all grave temptations, which press upon him against the natural law which he is bound to observe. He cannot persevere for a long time in his accepted justice; he cannot avoid for a long time all venial sins. Therefore, we will treat each of these points.

Thesis 6. Fallen man without grace cannot for a long time observe the whole natural law according to its substance.

S.Th. I-II, q. 109, a. 4; Lercher-Lakner, 190-200; Lange, 134-162.

49. Definition of terms. *Man* is understood as one who has a basic knowledge of the natural law. Therefore we are talking about an adult man with a healthy mind.

Fallen, that is, affected with original sin, although antecedently to any personal sins. But if these are present, a fortiori whatever was said before applies to him.

Without grace, both habitual and actual, but with the general concursus alone of God. In the state of innocence this was not present because of the gift of integrity. In the state of pure nature some special help of God would be due in order to overcome that impotence. What grace is required in this state of fallen nature will be explained in scholium 2.

He cannot, with his moral power in the strict sense. Therefore in agreement with many theologians we deny any physical impotence,¹ but we do assert a moral impotence that comes from the difficulty of keeping the moral law. Indeed we defend the notion of a strict moral impotence, since it can take two forms—one *broad* which allows for some exceptions, and the other *strict* which can never be overcome. However theologians dispute (Ripalda, Suarez and some recent authors) whether this moral impotence is only *consequent*, or also antecedent to the foreseen use of freedom, at least as a futurible.² It seems that antecedent impotence should be chosen.

For a long time, that is, for many months and years. Moreover, this

1. The Salmanticenses teach an impotency that is also physical, *De gratia* d.2 n.301-302. They speak about overcoming temptations, but the same thing holds for the law that must be observed.
 2. Suarez chooses antecedent impotency, *De gratia* 1,26. In opposition, Ripalda prefers consequent impotency, *De ente supernaturali* d.114 s.19; Lange, *De gratia* 135.

duration is to be estimated morally, for it is different in different human situations. Nevertheless, unless some grave temptation occurs during that time, we admit that a man without grace can observe the whole natural law for a short space of time.

Observe, that is, to do what is commanded and to avoid what is forbidden.

The natural law is that which God necessarily desires, since it is the eternal law, commanding that the natural order be preserved and forbidding it to be violated; it is promulgated and made known by the light of reason.

The natural law can be considered in two ways: either inasmuch as it obliges one to simply keep the natural precepts (love of God, of parents, etc.), or also inasmuch as it obliges one to observe some positive commands (to embrace the true faith, etc.). In the thesis we consider the natural law under the first respect. Nevertheless, it is perfectly clear that if a man is unable to keep the natural law, a fortiori he will be incapable of observing the added positive law. Therefore the natural law is the Decalogue.

This natural law is understood to be a serious obligation and to be binding under pain of eternal damnation. Therefore, an adult violating it becomes guilty of a formal mortal sin.

Whole, or collectively, concerning all the precepts of the natural law taken together. For, concerning the individual precepts *considered distributively*, provided that no great difficulty is present, it seems that a moral capability must be admitted. We will treat this matter in scholium 1.

According to its substance. The natural law should be fulfilled, either by natural acts that are ethically good, or by salvific acts. According to the way of speaking of the old scholastics, the first way of observance is called the observation of the natural law *according to its substance*; but the second way is said to be the fulfillment *according to the way*. This distinction of the twofold observance of the law, “the one pertaining only to the substance of the works commanded,” and “the other pertaining to a certain way,” must be retained (D 1961).

50. Adversaries. 1) *The Pelagians* held that a man can observe the whole law by his own natural powers, and that he can avoid every sin, even the smallest.³

2) The mind of *some of the older scholastics* is doubtful (Scotus,

3. See Augustine, *De haeresibus* 88; *Id.*, *Contra duas epist. Pelagianorum* 4,11,31.

Durandus, Biel, etc.). Suarez⁴ thinks that they truly taught that man without grace can avoid all sins against the natural law, even taken collectively. But other theologians excuse them, because perhaps they denied only the necessity of habitual grace, but not actual, or because they were speaking about the physical power and not the moral.

51. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Carthage*, cn.3-5 (D 225-227), teaches the necessity of grace in order to avoid grave sins. *The Indiculus*, c.3 (D 241), teaches that every man, even the just, needs the daily assistance of God to avoid grave sins. *Trent*, s.6 c.13 and cn.22 (D 1541, 1571), asserts that a special help of God is required so that the just person can overcome the temptations of the flesh, world and devil, and for this reason to be able to persevere in his accepted justice.

52. Theological note. Since the sources of revelation and church definitions do not speak explicitly about the observation of the natural law alone, nor about an observance that is only naturally good, we think that the thesis cannot be said to be a matter of faith. But it should be held as *theologically certain*, inasmuch as it is certainly deduced from defined propositions.⁵

53. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) *The Bible* suggests that a dangerous battle must be fought by the just man, which he can win only with the aid of divine grace obtained by prayer. Therefore, a fortiori the unjustified person, acting with the powers of nature alone, will easily succumb to the same temptations, so that he is not able to observe the whole natural law, not even with regard to its substance.

The antecedent: The devil prowls about like a roaring lion, seeking someone to devour (1 Pet. 5:8); Put on the whole armor of God, that you may be able to stand against the wiles of the devil... the breastplate of righteousness... the shield of faith... the helmet of salvation... the sword of the Spirit... with all prayer and supplication (Eph. 6:11-18). Let anyone who thinks that he stands take heed lest he fall... (1 Cor. 10:12). Therefore we have to pray continually: lead us not into temptation (Matt. 6:13).

2) From Rom. 7:1-25, from which, although our thesis is not stated explicitly, it is easily deduced.⁶

4. Suarez, *De gratia* 1,26,1.

5. See Suarez, *De gratia* 1,26,12; Huarte, *De gratia Christi* 50.

6. See Cornely, *In epist. ad Romanos* 343f; F. Prat, *La théologie de saint Paul* (Paris 1927) 268-284; J.M. Bover, *Teologia de San Pablo* (Madrid 1946) 264-268.

Context. In this chapter 7 Paul shows the power of the Gospel because it frees us from the Law of Moses, under which is contained the natural law. For he considers the Law of Moses, not just as something positive, but also inasmuch as it forbids concupiscence or evil desires. Therefore, v.1-6 deals with the fact of this liberation; v.7-13 with the opposition between the law and concupiscence; v. 14-25 with the power of concupiscence.

Text. Therefore here is the mind of St. Paul. The Jew, living under the Law of Moses, and without the grace of Christ left to his own concupiscences, even though he desires what is good, still he cannot fulfill that law. For, he is so attracted by the law of his members that he sins against the law of God (v.21-23), and he does so gravely and with full imputability (v.11). But from this wretched servitude he can be freed only by the grace of Christ. This is asserted, both implicitly under the formula of giving thanks (v.25), and explicitly elsewhere (ch. 8:2).

Therefore Paul teaches: a) that the *Jews*, without the grace of Christ, are so subject to the slavery of sin that, moved by concupiscence, they sin gravely against the natural law; b) that the *Gentiles*, as he said before in chapters 1-3, do not find themselves in a better condition, but fall into grave sins (1:18-29). The reason for this, both for pagans and for Jews, is nothing else but concupiscence.

Argument. Therefore neither Jews nor Gentiles, without the grace of Christ, observe the natural law. But this observance of the natural law, a) must be understood according to its substance; b) but it is necessary to say that the inability is strictly moral. Therefore, any fallen man, without grace, cannot for a long time observe the whole natural law according to its substance.

The minor: a) *It must be understood about the natural law, to be observed according to its substance.* Here the Apostle speaks explicitly about *salvific* observance, which is made possible by the grace of justification; but this holds also for the *naturally good* observance. For, the reason for this impossibility as given by the Apostle, namely concupiscence, holds not only for salvific observance but also for naturally good observance.

The minor: b) *The inability must be understood as strictly moral.* For, from the words of the Apostle in chapters 1-3 and 7, it is certain that all men *de facto* sin gravely against the natural law, because concupiscence is present in all of them.

54. Proof from tradition. 1) The *Fathers* do not usually distinguish between natural and salvific observance of the divine law. However they

do stress the great weakness of man, so that without the help of God he cannot overcome temptations. See Chrysostom (R 1191, 1210), St. Ambrose (R 1263), St. Leo the Great (R 2201). Indeed sometimes they reject man's perfect sinlessness, which was affirmed by Pelagius. Thus St. Jerome: "This is what I told you in the beginning, that it is in our power either to sin or not to sin, and to stretch out our hand to either good or evil, in order that free will may be preserved; but this is because of the manner and time and condition of human weakness. I also said that the perpetuity of sinlessness is reserved for God alone and for Him, who, as the Word made flesh, was not subject to sin and the defects of the flesh. But just because I can avoid sin briefly does not mean that I can do it continually. I can fast, pray, walk, read, sing, sit, sleep; but can I do these things continually?" (R 1406).

2) *Liturgical prayers* likewise stress our impotence when it comes to keeping God's law: "O God, you see that we are completely powerless of ourselves. Protect us from bodily and spiritual dangers..." (2nd Sunday in Lent); "O God, you see that we cannot depend on our own strength. Mercifully preserve us from all harm..." (St. Martin of Tours, Nov. 11).

55. Theological reasoning. 1) From St. Thomas, who by this reasoning proves that a man, not yet justified, cannot remain without mortal sin for a long time: "As the lower appetite ought to be subject to the reason, so should the reason be subject to God, and should place in Him the end of its will. Now it is by the end that all human acts ought to be regulated, even as it is by the judgment of the reason that the movements of the lower appetite should be regulated. And thus, even as inordinate movements of the sensitive appetite cannot help occurring since the lower appetite is not subject to reason, so likewise, since man's reason is not entirely subject to God, the consequence is that many disorders occur in the reason. For when man's heart is not so fixed on God as to be unwilling to be parted from Him for the sake of finding any good or avoiding any evil, many things happen for the achieving or avoiding of which a man strays from God and breaks his commandments, and thus sins mortally..." (I-II, q. 109, a. 8). Therefore the reason is sought from the defect of the subjection to God of our reason and will.

2) *From experience* it is certain that men, even those endowed with sufficient graces, sin very much against the law of God. Hence one concludes that there is at least a great difficulty in order to keep God's law.

3) *Both the weakness of our will and the influx of concupiscence*

prove this same difficulty. We can add to these the external temptation of the devil and the world, which can be manifold, vehement and of long duration.

56. Objections. 1. From. Rom. 2:14: *When the Gentiles who have not the law do BY NATURE what the law requires, they are a law to themselves, even though they do not have the law.* Therefore the Gentiles *by nature* observe the whole natural law.

I respond that the phrase “by nature” is opposed to the written law, so that the meaning is: the Gentiles, following their rational nature, but not the written law, fulfill some of the precepts of the law. Therefore, Paul is saying that individual Gentiles observed all the precepts of the law, *denied*; he says that some Gentiles kept some precepts, and for this reason, that all Gentiles fulfilled all the precepts, *I subdistinguish*: without divine assistance, *denied*; by not excluding this assistance, *conceded*.

2. Chrysostom interprets the words of the Apostle like this: “Amazing [Gentiles] because they did not act on the basis of a [written] law, and they did *everything* that the law requires.”⁷

I respond that the mind of Chrysostom is, not that individuals fulfilled all the precepts, but that some fulfilled some; and in this way all of them are observed by all. For, otherwise he would be contradicting himself when he writes: “Although we may be the strongest and most powerful of all, if the help of God is absent, we cannot overcome even the smallest temptation. But what am I saying about our weakness and worthlessness? Although Paul is someone or Peter, although James or John, without heavenly assistance he is easily overcome and replaced and falls... And not only in dangers that exceed our strength, but also in those that do not exceed it, we need the heavenly assistance so that we can generously resist temptation” (R 1210).

3. In the state of pure nature man would have been able to observe the whole natural law. But man in the state of fallen nature has the same powers that he would have had in the state of pure nature. Therefore also fallen man can observe the whole natural law.

I distinguish the major. In the state of pure nature man would have been able to observe the whole natural law with his natural powers alone, without any superadded assistance, *denied*; with some superadded assistance of God, *conceded*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* He can observe the whole natural law with his natural powers alone, without any superadded assistance, *denied*; with this superadded assistance, *conceded*.

In order that the purely natural man might be able to keep the whole law, he needed a certain assistance from God, superadded to his natural powers. However this assistance would have been due to him. Also an assistance of this kind would be necessary for the *fallen man who has not been justified*; and because through original sin man is not deprived of his natural powers, it would also be due to him.

7. *In epistolam ad Romanos* hom.5 n.5: MG 60,428.

But to the man who is fallen and restored, in place of the assistance due to him naturally, supernatural assistance is given; with its help he can observe the law, not only according to its substance, but also in a salvific way. But this assistance is both due and not due. It is not due inasmuch as it is ordered to the supernatural end; but it is due, inasmuch as it makes the observance of the law according to its substance morally possible.⁸

4. God in creating man morally unable to observe the law, and therefore to obtain his end, would be acting imperfectly; just as a craftsman would work imperfectly if he built something that could not stand on its own, but would need his constant assistance. But God cannot act imperfectly. Therefore God made man in such a way that he can morally observe the whole natural law.

I deny the parity. There is a great disparity between something made by a craftsman and the dependence of creatures on God. For the former depends on the craftsman for its coming into being, while man depends on God both for his coming into being, his permanent existence and his activity. Therefore, it pertains to the providence of God that some assistance be given to man by which the observance of the whole law is made morally possible for him, and consequently the attainment of his last end.

57. 5. In order to sin gravely, a power of avoiding sin not only physically but also morally is required. But man indeed has the physical power to observe the whole natural law, but he lacks the moral power. Therefore the transgression of the law cannot be imputed to him as sin.

I distinguish the major. A power is required, not only physical but also moral, to perform individual acts, *conceded*; for the whole collection of acts taken in an indeterminate way, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* He does not have the moral power regarding single acts, *denied*; regarding the collection, *conceded*. On this point Suarez says: "This moral impotence is not opposed to freedom; because... it is not by the determination of the power to one thing which is opposed to freedom; but by the inconstancy and weakness of the agent, which is an opposition not to his freedom, but to his constancy and fortitude."⁹

6. The whole collection of precepts cannot morally be observed. But God cannot command what is impossible. Therefore, since God commands the observance of the whole law, it ought to be morally possible.

I respond that God did not command the collection as something different from the observance of the single precepts. Now man can observe the single precepts. Moreover, in order to observe the whole law, keeping them one after the other, the necessary assistance from God will not be lacking.

7. From what has been said, some assistance from God is due to man, so that he can observe the whole natural law. But what is due cannot be called grace. Therefore

8.. On the controversy concerning the debt of medicinal grace, more information is given below in n. 70. But how man in the state of pure nature would have needed the assistance of God is explained well by D. Soto, *De natura et gratia* 1,4.

9. Suarez, *De Gratia* 1,24,37.

man, without grace, will be able to observe the whole natural law.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. It cannot be called grace, if it is looked at according to its being, *I bypass the minor*; if it is looked at with respect to the end for which it is given, *denied*. *I also distinguish the consequent.* Without entitatively supernatural grace, *conceded*; without supernatural grace by reason of the end to which it ordained, *denied*.

For the observance of the natural law according to its substance, surely on the part of God, some assistance is due. But from the nature of this case, only entitatively natural assistance is required. That is what it would be in the state of pure nature. But in the present state of nature fallen and restored, because man's end in supernatural, the divine assistance, at least by reason of this end, is always supernatural or not due to man, and therefore it is true grace.

58. Scholium 1. *On temptations.* The reason for this moral inability to observe for a long time the whole natural law is the temptations that can come either from the flesh or from the devil or from the world (D 1541).

From theses 1 and 2 it is clear that man cannot overcome temptations *in a salvific way* except by the grace of God. But there is a question about whether they can be overcome naturally without the assistance of God.

a) Certainly it is necessary to hold, based on the preceding thesis, that a man cannot overcome without grace *all temptations taken collectively* that come to him over a long period of time. For otherwise, without grace, he would be observing the whole natural law.

b) Indeed, it is commonly held that some temptations are so strong, or so enticing towards sin by reason of their intensity or duration, that even individual ones cannot be overcome without grace.

c) The same point is more commonly held regarding *other grave temptations taken in a distributive sense*. Thus, v.gr., Bellarmine, Suarez, Salmanticenses, Mazzella, Lahousse, Muncunill, Beraza....¹⁰

d) It is commonly held that there are *temptations so slight* (because they entice to evil gently or very briefly) that a man can resist them with his natural powers alone.¹¹ The condemnation of de Bay touches on this point (D 1930): They are thieves and robbers who teach that "a man can resist any temptation without the assistance of grace, so that he may not be led into it and not be overcome by it."

59. Scholium 2. *What grace is required in order to keep the whole natural law properly, or to overcome all temptations?*

I respond, a) that from the nature of the matter entitatively supernatural grace is not required, but that medicinal or healing grace suffices through which the weakness of nature is assisted. Thus St. Thomas: "In the state of corrupted nature man cannot

10. Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 5,7; Suarez, *De gratia* 1,2,23-24; Salmanticenses, *De gratia* d.2 dub. 8 n.274f.; Mazzella, *De gratia Christi* 385-394; Lahousse, *De gratia divina* 164f.; Muncunill, *De gratia Christi* d.1 c.3 a.3; Beraza, 290f.

11. See Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 5,7. See also R. Broquillard, *Tentation*: DTC 15,116ff.

fulfill all the Divine commandments without healing grace” (I-II, q. 109, a. 4).

b) Actually, nothing prevents intrinsically supernatural grace from being given to all, even to unbelievers. If it is a matter of individual temptations, *actual grace* suffices; but in order to overcome all temptations for a long time, ordinarily *the state of grace* is also required, not as a proximate help, but as the foundation or reason for obtaining the help needed. For this long-lasting victory over temptations is a special gift, and sinners are not properly disposed to receive it.¹²

12. See Suarez, *De gratia* 1,27,20ff.

Thesis 7. In the state of fallen nature, without the special help of God the justified man cannot persevere for a long time in justification.

S.Th. I-II, q. 109, a. 9f.; Lercher-Lakner, 201-216; Lange, 170-175.

60. Definition of terms. The *justified* person is thought to be a man who has accepted justification or habitual grace and the other gifts that accompany it, and he is now in possession of them. For this reason, this thesis differs from thesis 6 about the observance of the natural law. For, there it was a question of any man keeping the law, but here we are dealing only with a man in grace and persevering in that grace by keeping the commandments. But the problem is the same and the solution is the same.

It is called a *special help* because it is something different from the natural powers alone and from the habitual gifts of justification; for, the Tridentine definition requires this. Therefore, it is not called *special* because it is a privilege, such as is required to avoid all venial sins; for, this help is given not just rarely, but to all, since "God does not desert those who have been once justified by his grace, unless they desert him first" (D 1537). Therefore, *in what shall we place this special help?*

a) *Many Thomist theologians* (John of St. Thomas, Gonet, Salmanticenses, Billuart, Del Prado, Hugon...) put it in efficacious actual grace, which is necessary for perseverance.¹ However it is correctly objected that Trent seems to speak about the capability of persevering, not about the fact of perseverance.²

b) *Some recent Jesuit theologians* (Hurter, Mazzella, Pesch, Perrone, Tepe) think that it is a complex of actual graces which, in order to overcome single difficulties taken separately, are required and are sufficient; or that it is actual graces, which are connaturally due to the state of grace.³ But this does not seem to be sufficient. For, just as what suffices to keep individual precepts separately (for a man can do this without grace) is not sufficient to keep the whole natural law for a long time, so the help given the just for individual acts taken separately does not seem to suffice for persevering in the state of grace for a long time.

c) *But other theologians*, like Beraza, Lercher, Michel, hold that there is something different from that group of actual graces; namely,

1. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus theologicus* in 1.2 d.21 a.2; Gonet, *Clypeus theol. thomisticae* d.1 a.8; Salmanticenses, *De gratia* d.3 dub.11; Billuart, *De gratia* dis.3 a.10; N. del Prado, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1,120f.; Hugon, *De gratia* q.2 a.8.
2. See Suarez, *De gratia* 10,2,16.
3. Hurter, *De gratia* 41; Mazzella, *De gratia Christi* 314-315; Pesch, *Praelectiones dogmaticae* 5,189; Perrone, *De gratia Christi* 67f.203; Tepe, *De gratia* 87.

that there is a *singular protection of God* for the just, which includes both real natural and external helps, by which occasions of sin are removed, and internal and intrinsically supernatural helps by which the just person acts in a salvific manner. The sources themselves, the words of St. Thomas (I-II, q. 109, a.9-10) and Suarez, and even the word help (*auxilium*) (which the Tridentine Fathers used deliberately) seem to favor this interpretation. For the word *auxilium* has a broader meaning than the word “grace,” which they avoided here.⁴ Therefore, this special providence is exercised by God, both by medicinal grace and by elevating grace.

For a long time should be understood in the same way as in thesis 6.

Perseverance is permanence in accepted justification, because mortal sins are avoided. But it can be either perfect or imperfect. *Perfect* (final, complete) is that which lasts to the end of life; *imperfect* (temporal, incomplete) is that which last for a certain time of life.⁵ Also, this perfect perseverance can have a double aspect—active and passive. *Active perseverance* is a good life with the observance of the commandments; *passive perseverance* is a good death, or the end of life in the state of grace. A man dying immediately after justification, had purely passive perseverance; one dying in the state of sin, after he had lived in the state of grace for some time, had purely active perseverance; one living a holy life and dying as such had both active and passive perseverance.

He cannot. Granted the physical ability of persevering, we deny a strictly moral ability, especially one that is antecedent, as in thesis 6.

Moreover, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between these two: a) *the capability of persevering* (potential perseverance), namely, that which proceeds from both physical and moral powers which are required for a just person to be able to persevere in the state of grace in the face of all temptations; b) *the fact of perseverance* (actual perseverance) or perseverance which actually takes place. For it is one thing to be able to persevere, and something else to actually persevere; just as it is one thing to be able to run, and something else to actually run. For, efficacious actual graces are required for the fact of perseverance, while for the capability of persevering only sufficient actual graces are

4. Suarez, *De gratia* 10,2,6f.; Beraza, 230; Lercher, 4,1,202; A. Michel, *Persévérance*: DTC 12,1283-6, where you will find other interpretations of this special help. It seems to be sufficiently certain, both from the acts of Trent and from the corresponding chapters, that the help cn. 22 speaks about essentially is the help of medicinal grace, not elevating. See the controversy over this point between Lingens and Straud, in *ZkathTh* 20 (1896) 40-60; 21 (1897) 107-140, 209-254.

5. St. Augustine mentions this division, *De dono persev.* 1 (R 1992).

required.

Therefore, our thesis considers *the capability of persevering*. Actual perseverance will be treated in *scholium* 1. Thus we assert that in this state of fallen nature, in order for a just person to be able to persevere for a long time in the state of grace, he needs the special help of God.

61. Adversaries. 1) *The Pelagians* taught that man, by his natural powers alone, can fulfill all the precepts and therefore persevere without sin.

2) *The Semi-Pelagians* are also mentioned by many authors as promoters of this error. However, Lange thinks that they defended the necessity of a special help in order to be able to persevere, and only opposed the Augustinian teaching about the gift of actual perseverance.⁶

62. Doctrine of the Church. The *Indiculus*, c.3 (D 241) declares that “no one, even if renewed by the grace of baptism, is able to overcome the snares of the devil or subdue the passions of the flesh unless he receives, through the daily help of God, the gift of perseverance in remaining good.” *Orange*, cn.10 (D 380) says that “The assistance of God ought to be implored always even by those who have been reborn... that they may continue in good work.” *Trent*, s.6 cn.13 (D 1541), considering the duty of perseverance, says that it “can be had only from him who has the power to uphold him who stands that he may stand with perseverance.” But in cn. 22 (D 1572) it defines: “If anyone says that without God’s special help a justified man can persevere in the justice he has received or that with it he cannot persevere, let him be anathema.”

Concerning the meaning of this Tridentine canon, it must be admitted that it exhibits a certain amount of indetermination, since it can be understood about the fact or the capability of persevering, about perfect perseverance or about imperfect perseverance. Hence:

a) At the very least, it must be held that the Council defined that the justified person *de facto does not persevere without the special help of God*.

b) It seems certain that the Council also defined that the just man *cannot persevere to the end without the special help of God*. For that is what the words say.

c) More probably, the Council is speaking directly about *perfect perseverance*, as one can conclude from a comparison with ch.11 and 13; nevertheless, arguably *it can be extended also to imperfect*

6. Lange, 172.

perseverance, since the reason for the inability is the same, that is, victory over all temptations for a long period of time.

63. Theological note. 1) The fact of perfect perseverance is a truth *of defined divine and Catholic faith*; 2) the capability of persevering perfectly seems also to be a truth *of defined divine and Catholic faith*; 3) the ability to persevere for a long time is *theologically certain*.

64. Proof from Holy Scripture. Holy Scripture testifies that a fierce battle must be fought even by the just man; and therefore it exhorts him to ask continually for divine help, without which he will not be able to overcome his enemies. But this means that some special help, in addition to habitual grace, is required in order to be able to persevere for a long time. Therefore, for the just man to be able to persevere for a long time, in addition to habitual grace, he needs the special help of God.

The major. For, if the just were able to persevere with grace alone of this kind, they would be able to stand against the attacks of the devil (Eph. 6:11-17); but the enemies of the just are *temptations* (Jas. 1:2, 12), *concupiscence* (Jas. 1:14), the *devil* (1 Pet. 5:8). Therefore they should "Pray at all time in the Spirit, with all prayer and supplication" (Eph. 6:18), lest they succumb to temptations (Matt. 6:13; 26:41).

The minor. For, if the just were able to persevere with habitual grace alone, that special difficulty under which they labor would not make sense, nor would they have to pray in order to persevere; for, one asks for what one does not have.

65. Proof from tradition. 1) *The Fathers* stress a) the impossibility of persevering without divine help; b) the necessity of assiduous prayer to obtain that help. Thus Origen says: "It is necessary that our will and the divine help work together... for this purpose, that the man who is virtuous and just may persevere" (R 485). "We petition and ask that we, who have been sanctified by baptism, may persevere in what we have begun...."⁷ Also Chrysostom says: "Although we may be the strongest and most powerful of all, if the help of God is absent, we cannot overcome even the smallest temptation. But what am I saying about our weakness and worthlessness? Although Paul is someone or Peter, although James or John, without heavenly assistance he is easily overcome and replaced and falls... And not only in dangers that exceed

7. *De orat. domin.* 12: ML 4,527; ed. Hartel, CSEL 1,275.

our strength, but also in those that do not exceed it, we need the heavenly assistance so that we can generously resist temptation" (R 1210; see 1191, 1153). Similar statements are made by St. Ambrose (R 1302) and St. Jerome (R 1404, 1406). St. Augustine in the book, *De dono persever.*, shows that perseverance is a gratuitous gift of God, especially because it is the object of prayer.⁸ His disciples St. Prosper of Aquitaine and St. Fulgentius hold the same doctrine.⁹

2) *From the praxis of the praying Church*: In the Canon of the Mass we pray: "Make me always obedient to your commandments, and never let me be parted from you." On Tuesday of Passion Week we pray: "Grant that we may persevere in being obedient to your will." We find the same idea in other prayers: "Grant us perpetual fear and love of you...." "Graciously protect the gifts you have given us...."

3) *From the praxis of faithful and holy souls*, who continually beg this perseverance from God, because they are convinced that they cannot long persevere unless they are assisted by his special help.

66. 4) From the theologians. *The Pre-Tridentine theologians*, although explicitly they do not yet distinguish between habitual and actual grace, surely hint that some helps must be superadded so that the just person can persevere. Thus, v.gr., St. Anselm and Scotus. St. Thomas, in his first writings, required nothing more than habitual grace; but in his *Summa Theologiae*, as we will see immediately, he clearly teaches that man cannot persevere with habitual grace alone.¹⁰

Post-Tridentine theologians hold with one voice the necessity of a special help, distinct from habitual grace. But they disagree about whether that help must always be elevating grace (Lingens against Straub and other theologians), or whether it is different from the complex of helps which connaturally come from habitual grace (above we mentioned some theologians).

67. Theological reasoning. St. Thomas supports the necessity of a special help, distinct from habitual grace, because of the weakness of human nature, which habitual grace alone does not perfectly remedy. For he writes in I-II, q. 109, a. 9: "In order to live righteously a man

8. *De dono persever.* n.3-9.15.41.55, etc.; *De corrept. Et gratia* c.6012. His main points may be read in R 1944f., 1992f.

9. St. Prosper of Aquitaine, *Carmen de ingratis: De gratia Dei et libero arbitrio*: ML 51,76f.; St. Fulgentius of Ruspe, *De fide ad Petrum; De veritate praedestinationis*: ML 65,603f.

10. St. Anselm, *De concordia* 4; Scotus, *In 4 d.22 n.17*. On the development of the mind of St. Thomas, see. A. Michel, *Persévérance*: DTC 12,1274-6.

needs a twofold help of God—first, a habitual gift whereby corrupted human nature is healed, and after being healed is lifted up so as to work deeds meritorious of everlasting life, which exceed the capability of nature. Secondly, man needs the help of grace in order to be moved by God to act. Now with regard to the first kind of help, man does not need a further help of grace, e.g., a further infused habit. Yet he needs the help of grace in another way, i.e., in order to be moved by God to act righteously, and this for two reasons: first, for the general reason that no created thing can put forth any act, unless by virtue of the Divine motion. Secondly, for this special reason—the condition of the state of human nature. For although healed by grace as to the mind, yet it remains corrupted and poisoned in the flesh, whereby it serves *the law of sin* (Rom. 7:25). In the intellect, too, there remains the darkness of ignorance, whereby, as it is written (Rom. 8:26): *We know not what we should pray for as we ought*; since on account of the various turns of circumstances, and because we do not know ourselves perfectly, we cannot fully know what is for our good, according to Wis. 9:14: *For the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels uncertain*. Hence we must be guided and guarded by God, who knows and can do all things. For which reason also it is becoming in those who have been born again as sons of God, to say: *Lead us not into temptation, and Thy will be done on earth as it is in heaven*, and whatever else is contained in the Lord's Prayer pertaining to this." See also ad 1 and 2.

68. Objections. 1. The Council of Carthage in cn.3 (D 224) defines that the grace of God, by which we are justified, not only produces the remission of sins, which have already been committed, but also assistance so that they will not be committed. Therefore, to persevere habitual grace itself suffices without requiring any special new grace.

I distinguish the antecedent. It defines that the whole series of actual and habitual graces suffices for perseverance, *conceded*; habitual grace alone, *I subdistinguish*: remotely, *conceded*; proximately, *denied*.

Many doctors contend that justifying grace, which Carthage is speaking about, must be understood in a broader sense, as often happens among the ancients, about all graces, whether this grace is formally justifying, or affirming the order to justification. Now by accepting the definition in this sense it causes no difficulty, since among those graces the necessary help for justification is also contained. But there are some other interpreters, who understand the definition to be about habitual grace alone. That being the case, they concede that sanctifying grace is the principle that *remotely* suffices for perseverance, but they also deny that it suffices *proximately*, in this state of fallen nature. On this point Suarez says: "We say that this help...,

although of itself it is sufficient, insofar as it is *on the part of the grace itself*, for perseverance or the long-lasting preservation of the same grace, nevertheless *on the part of the subject in fallen man* it does not suffice, unless that grace receives further help by the special protection of God."¹¹

2. Habitual grace heals nature weakened by sin. But the inability to avoid sins comes from the weakness of nature. Therefore habitual grace is the proximate principle of persevering.

I distinguish the major. Habitual grace heals nature with that same perfect health which it had before sin, *denied*; it heals imperfectly, that is, with a health that is indeed essential, but not integral, *conceded*. *I also distinguish the minor.* It comes from a weakness produced by concupiscence, which is not removed by habitual grace, *conceded*; which is removed, *denied*.¹²

3. The grace of Christ is more efficacious than original justice. But in the state of original justice there was no concupiscence. Therefore the grace of Christ, even though it does not remove it, still must totally overcome concupiscence.

I distinguish the major. The grace of Christ is more efficacious, if it is taken adequately for every kind of grace, *conceded*; if it is understood as habitual grace alone, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* The grace of Christ, both habitual and actual, *conceded*; habitual grace alone, *denied*.

4. The help that is necessary for them is owed to all the justified. But a special help for perseverance is not owed to the justified. Therefore a help of this kind is not necessary.

I distinguish the major. A help proximately or at least remotely sufficient is owed to them, that is, the grace of prayer, *conceded*; proximately sufficient, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* A help proximately sufficient is now owed to the justified, *conceded*; remotely sufficient, *denied*.

5. A just person can persevere, without special help, for a short space of time. Therefore successively he will be able to persevere also for a long time.

I bypass the antecedent, but deny the consequent and the consequence. For, those difficulties, v.gr., temptations, which can be absent for a short space of time, certainly will not be absent over a long period of time.

69. Scholium 1. *On the fact of perseverance.* 1) Perfect or final perseverance, or death in the state of grace, is called by St. Augustine *a gift of God*,¹³ and by Trent it is called *a great gift of God* (D 1566). These words, although they refer primarily to that perseverance which is both active and passive, must also be extended to purely passive perseverance; for it brings with itself eternal predestination.¹⁴ Therefore, this actual perseverance is a *great gift* because it includes habitual grace, internal efficacious graces, and external graces, the principal one of which is a holy

11. Suarez, *De gratia* 10,2,11.

12. Suarez explains this distinction very well, *De gratia* 10,2,11.

13. *De dono persev.* 17: ML 45,1018. *De corrept. et gratia* 8: ML 44,927.

14. Some authors are opposed to this extension, according to the claim of I. Hermann, *Tract. de gratia divina* 242. There he mentions Salmanticenses, Oviedo, Gonet.

death, with the attainment of eternal beatitude. Therefore, this fact of perseverance is rightly also called *a special benefit*, since it is distinct both from the power of persevering and from the other gifts, which are common to all the justified. It is also *a gratuitous gift*, because it cannot be merited condignly. The theological schools disagree on how this gift of perseverance ought to be explained; the reason for this is their diversity of opinion both concerning efficacious grace and concerning predestination to glory.

2) But the granting of this gift is not certain to us, according to what Trent says: "Let no one promise himself any security about this gift with absolute certitude, although all should place their firmest hope in God's help." And in the canon: "If anyone says that he has absolute and infallible certitude that he will surely have the great gift of perseverance to the end, unless he has learned this by a special revelation, let him be anathema" (D 1541, 1566). Still it must also be held, as will be proved in thesis 13, that the grace proximately or remotely sufficient will be conferred on all the justified by which they will be able to fulfill God's precepts (D 1568).

3) Indeed this final perseverance *can be infallibly obtained by prayer*. For, *Christ the Lord* promised absolutely that he would give it to those who asked (Matt. 7:7). And this ought to hold true above all for the gift of perseverance, for it is the thing most necessary of all in order to obtain eternal life. Moreover, the *holy Fathers* (Cyprian, Chrysostom, Jerome, Augustine) and *theologians* bear witness explicitly to this with regard to perseverance. But for this prayer to be infallible, it is necessary to persevere in this petition. On this point Suarez says: "Therefore, the perseverance of prayer in such a matter is required, so that it takes place not just once or again, but that it lasts during the whole time of life, and especially in the recurring occasions of keeping the commandments or overcoming temptations, since the necessary faithfulness is repeated. For thus it will come about that, by proceeding from one act to another, by acting well and praying regularly, he infallibly obtains perseverance."¹⁵ But this assiduous prayer must be joined together with receiving the Holy Eucharist, not only because this is commanded, but also because it is the necessary means to obtain the special help of perseverance.¹⁶

4) But this actual perseverance can not only be obtained but *it can also be merited*, not indeed condignly, but certainly congruously. Thus commonly theologians quote 2 Pet. 1:10: *Therefore, brethren, be the more zealous to confirm your call and election....* But this congruous merit ought not to be called infallible, but fallible, because God indeed promised the gift of perseverance to prayer, but not to any other good works.

15. Suarez, *De gratia* 12,38,16. For the infallibility of this prayer Suarez requires the state of grace (*ibid.*, 12,38,15). Bellarmine, after the controversies about grace, wrote a book about prayer (*De controversiis* [Naples 1858] t.4 p.636-672).

16. L. Lercher, *Instit. Theol. dogmat.* (1945) vol.4,1 n.208; Id., *Die hl.Eucharistie als notwendiges Mittel zur Bewahrung des Gnadenstandes*: *ZkathTh* 55 (1931) 287-293; G. Alastruey, *Tractatus de sanctissima Eucharistia* (1949) p.308-310. Therefore De la Taille, *Myst. Fidei* elucid.49 § 2, calls the Eucharist the sacrament of perseverance.

5) But how the gratuity of final perseverance coheres with the doctrine about the gratuity of predestination will have to be explained in different ways according to the different Catholic schools. Those who hold that predestination to glory is antecedent, logically must say: because God absolutely chose this man for glory before the prevision of his merits, therefore he prepared for him the gift of final perseverance. But those who hold that the predestination to glory is consequent, explain the matter in this way: God prepares the gift of final perseverance for this man, who prays very much; and because this man is seen in advance to die in the state of grace, God decrees absolutely to give him glory.

70. Scholium 2. *Final perseverance and confirmation in grace.* Because both final perseverance and confirmation in grace agree in immunity from mortal sins up to the end of life, theologians ask how these two gifts differ from each other. For, that they differ from each other is certain from the fact that confirmation in grace is a singular privilege which is granted to very few (as the Bl. Virgin Mary and the Apostles, although for a different reason), while the gift of final perseverance is granted to all the predestined. And surely confirmation in grace adds something to final perseverance. But what it adds is not explained in the same way by theologians.

For, some explain confirmation in grace by a certain inability to sin which comes from the reduced freedom through efficacious helps (according to Valencia), or through some intrinsic gift (as Ledesma holds). But this must be so understood that freedom is not lost for all acts, even good ones, but only for evil ones. Suarez attributes a certain probability to this opinion, if it is affirmed about some of the saints, but not about all of them.

Other theologians hold that one confirmed in grace always has a revelation of his own perseverance; but certainly everyone who perseveres finally does not have this. Thus Vázquez. But this is all very uncertain, and also it does not seem to explain the nature of confirmation in grace.

Others explain this by a greater intrinsic perfection of habitual grace. Thus many Thomists. But it is not clear in what that greater intrinsic perfection of grace consists.

Finally, others explain it by a greater abundance of God's helps; as if God shows more care for those confirmed in grace by granting more efficacious actual graces than would suffice for perseverance. Thus Suarez and the Molinists in general. This explanation seems preferable. Till now in this general solution of the problem, some theologians admit formal predefinitions for those confirmed in grace, but only virtual ones for the others. Even though in an absolute sense this can be admitted, still it is less in conformity with the strict Molinistic system.¹⁷

17. Beraza, 250, explains very well these various opinion,

Thesis 8. No fallen man can for a long time avoid all venial sins, without a special privilege of God.

S.Th. I-II, q. 109, a. 8; Lercher-Lakner, 217-222; Beraza, 251-261; Lange, 163-169.

71. Definition of terms. *No fallen man.* In this state of fallen nature, no adult, neither unbeliever nor believer; but from among the just, not even the most holy man. We exclude for certain one person—the Bl. Virgin Mary.¹ It is disputed whether St. John the Baptist and St. Joseph, as least in some matters, should also be excepted.

He can. As in the prior thesis, we concede the physical power, but deny the moral power, and that in the strict sense. This ought to be understood as antecedent to the foreseen use of human freedom.²

For a long time. This should be understood in a moral sense from the circumstances in which a man finds himself.³ However, a shorter time should be assigned than is required to keep the natural law. Certainly, Trent defined that the just man cannot avoid them *for his whole life* (D 1573), but at the same time it speaks about *daily* sins, into which even the just and saints sometimes fall (D 1537).

Venial sin is said to be that inordinate moral act, which is slight, either because of the smallness of the matter or because of some defect of knowledge or consent. There are two kinds of venial sins: a) *deliberate*, if, in a small matter, there is full knowledge and consent; b) *semi-deliberate or subreptitious*, if, in any matter, there is not perfect advertence and consent. In the thesis we are considering semi-deliberate venial sins, and it is sufficient that the Tridentine definition of them is understood; for the Doctors generally think that men of outstanding holiness can abstain for a long time from every venial sin that is fully deliberate, without a special privilege from God. Therefore they think a vow to avoid deliberate venial sins is valid.⁴

All, taken collectively; for, we concede the point regarding singular cases. Therefore the inability affects directly the collectivity; therefore we can freely deal with individual cases.

A privilege is an exception from the general and binding law. In this case, the general law of divine providence, from which an exception is given, seems to be this: that a man receives such grace, which does not

1. See J.A. de Aldama, S.J., *El valor dogmático de la doctrina sobre la inmunidad del pecado venial en Nuestra Señora*: ArchTG 9 (1946) 53-67.

2. See Beraza, 253-255.

3. See Suarez, *De gratia* 9,8,29.

4. See Suarez, *De voto* 2,5; St. Alphonsus, *Theol. Mor.* 3,203. Some theologians are opposed to this, like Gotti, Gonet, Montesinos, Serra....

suffice in order to avoid all venial sins taken as a group. But this privilege can be given in different ways: either by immunity from concupiscence, which is the root of this inability; or by a singular providence of God; or by a continual series of actual graces, which are not necessarily required to be intrinsically supernatural.

Special—it is called special because it is rarely granted. Therefore in order to keep the whole natural law taken collectively, just as for perseverance, grace is required, *which de facto is given to all*. But in order to avoid all venial sins taken collectively a grace is required *that is rarely given*.

72. Adversaries. 1) *The Pelagians*, who attributed perfect sinlessness, on the basis of their natural powers alone, to many saints, and also said that any man can obtain it.⁵

2) *The Beghards and Beguines* embraced a similar error in the 14th century (D 891).⁶

73. Doctrine of the Church. *Carthage*, cn.6-8 (D 228-230), taught, against the Pelagians, that all men truly say that they have sin, and for its remission they rightly pray. *Vienne* condemns the error of the Beghards and Beguines about the perfect impeccability of some individuals (D 891). Trent, s.6 ch.11 and cn.23 (D 1536-1539), says that the just also fall into light and daily sins; and it defines that no justified person can avoid them fully *during his whole life*, unless it is from a special privilege of God. But it is necessary to understand that that life does not end immediately after receiving justification; for otherwise, if a very brief time elapses between justification and death, even without any privilege, they could avoid all venial sins. Lange explains the meaning of the Tridentine definition with these words: "It is concerned 1) with the state of fallen nature; 2) with the whole life...; 3) with all venial sins, not with deliberate ones alone; 4) not with any definite sin; 5) with a true lack of power, not something merely futurible; 6) with a very rare privilege."⁷

74. Theological note. 1) That a justified person cannot avoid all venial sins during his whole life, without a special privilege of God, is a truth of *defined divine and Catholic faith*. 2) That no man by himself can accomplish this is *theologically certain*. 3) That the same holds true for avoiding all venial sins for a long time is *a common and certain opinion*.

5. See St. Augustine, *De haeresibus* 88 (R 1976).

6. On the thinking of the Beghards and Beguines, see F. Vernet: DTC 2,528-535.

7. *De gratia* 165.

75. Argument. The sources of revelation testify to the fact, with the exception of the Bl. Virgin Mary, that no one has avoided all venial sins. Therefore no one, without a special privilege of God, can avoid them.

The consequence is clear. For a fact so universal is an argument for the inability, at least one that is strictly moral; it can be overcome, not with ordinary graces, but only with a special privilege.

A) *The antecedent is proved from Holy Scripture:* a) From Matt. 6:12: *Forgive us our sins.* Christ taught all to pray in this way; therefore all truly say that they are guilty of sins, and rightly pray for their remission. But this is not the case in all with regard to serious sins; therefore at least it has to do with venial sins. See the authentic interpretation of this text in Carthage and Trent (D 229, 1536-1539).

b) From Jas. 3:2: *We all make many mistakes.* With these words the weakness of human nature is hinted at and the creeping in of certain sins; these certainly can be slight sins, not grave ones, since not all people commit grave sins. See the authentic interpretation of this text in Carthage and Trent (D 229, 1549).

c) From Ps. 143:2; Job 37:7; 1 Kings 8:46; Dan. 9:5, 15, 20, according to the interpretation of the Council of Carthage (D 229).

B) *The antecedent is proved from tradition, as is clear from the Fathers:*

Before Pelagius, Nazianzen excludes only God from all sin: "Let us be assured that to do no wrong is really superhuman, and belongs to God alone" (R 981).

When Pelagianism appeared, St. Augustine always defended this doctrine. However he did it in such a way that at first he denied the fact, then also its possibility, based on ordinary graces alone. But he makes an exception for the Bl. Virgin Mary. For he says: "Since by divine grace assisting the human will, man may possibly exist in this life without sin, why does he not? To this question I might very easily and truthfully answer; because men are unwilling" (R 1722). "The daily sins of a momentary and trivial kind which are necessary incidents of this life" (R 1921). "A man cannot, as long as he is in the flesh, not have trivial sins" (R 1846). "The life of someone who has reached the age of reason, no matter how much he excels in justice, is not led without the remission of sins" (R 1918). "We must except the holy Virgin Mary, concerning whom I wish to raise no question when it touches the subject of sins, out of honor to the Lord..." (R 1794. More will be found in R 1718, 1720, 1733, 1737, 1888, 1894).

St. Augustine also proves this doctrine by appealing to St. Cyprian and St. Ambrose, whose words he quotes.⁸

8. *Contra duas epist. Pelag.* 4,10,27f.: ML 44,629.32.632-636.

Finally, St. Leo the Great says: "This attitude is totally false, and whoever among the temptations of this life believes that he is immune from every wound has grown old in excessive vanity" (R 2201).

76. Theological reasoning. From St. Thomas (I-II, q. 109, a. 8): "But man cannot abstain from all venial sin on account of the corruption of his lower appetite of sensuality. For man can, indeed, repress each of its movements (and hence they are sinful and voluntary), but not all, because while he is resisting one, another may arise, and also because the reason is not always alert to avoid these movements."

Therefore the reason for this impotence is sought in the *concupiscence* that thrives in us, in *the slowness of our intellect* in knowing what is truly good, and in *the mutability of our will*. Added to this are the frequent *temptations*, by which we are led into venial sins.

77. Objections. 1. The just man can avoid individual venial sins. But someone who can avoid individual sins can avoid all of them successively. Therefore the just man can avoid all venial sins.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. If the moral power of the will is the same with respect to each sin taken separately, and with respect to the whole group, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*.

The whole group brings with itself a special difficulty, which is not present with respect to individual sins. On this point Molina says: "The occasions of venial sins are very frequent, and venial sins can be committed by surprise without full deliberation. The mind cannot be in such exact and continual vigilance against such frequent and manifold occasions, that it can avoid all sins of this kind. This is so especially since mortals grow tired from so much effort. They also know that they will not lose the grace of God by such sins and so will not incur eternal loss. But the more holy a person is, the more vigilant he will be, he is assisted with greater helps and therefore he can avoid more venial sins."⁹

2. If a just man cannot avoid all venial sins, they cannot be imputed to him; for no one is held to the impossible. But they are imputed to him. Therefore he can avoid them.

I distinguish the major. If he cannot avoid a definite sin, this cannot be imputed to him, *conceded*; if he cannot avoid the collection of all venial sins, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* He can avoid this definite sin, which he here and now confronts, *conceded*; all taken together, *denied*. However, this indeterminate necessity with respect to the whole collection does not take away his freedom.

3. There is a precept of avoiding venial sins, also taken collectively. But this precept is of itself possible. Therefore a just man can avoid all venial sins. *The major is proved.* This act "I do not want to observe all precepts" is sinful. But an act of this kind is not opposed to any definite precept, but to all of them. Therefore there is a precept of avoid-

9. Molina, *Concordia* q.14 a.13 d.17.

ing venial sins, even taken collectively.

I deny the major. Regarding the proof, *I concede the major and deny the minor.* For, from the fact that that sin is not against some definite precept, it is not rightly inferred that it is against all of them. For, from that one can only infer that it is against some indeterminate precept. Therefore, that act "I do not want to observe all precepts" is equivalent to this: "I want to sin, or fall short in some precept."

4. Some holy men have taken a vow to avoid all venial sins. But a vow must be about something possible. Therefore the just can avoid all venial sins, without a special privilege.

I distinguish the major. They took a vow to avoid all deliberate venial sins, *conceded*; also semi-deliberate, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* They can avoid deliberate venial sins, *conceded*; also semi-deliberate, *denied*.

78. A general corollary of the whole article. From what has been proved the existence of a twofold divine help, or twofold grace follows. For, what is necessary for something intended by God, without doubt must be given by God.

a) Therefore a help or *elevating grace* exists; this is given to elicit salvific acts and it also removes the physical impotence of nature for the supernatural. This grace is necessarily supernatural in its being.

b) Moreover, a medicinal help exists, or *medicinal grace*, which is given in order to elicit morally good acts (but not all of them), and it removes the moral impotency of nature wounded by original sin. From its concept this grace is not necessarily supernatural in its being, but it is always in the order of the supernatural with regard to its mode, and sometimes also in its being.

ARTICLE II

ON THE GRATUITY OF GRACE

79. This grace, whose existence we have proved, would not be true grace unless it were *gratuitous*. This is our next question.

Now both graces, medicinal and elevating, must be said to be gratuitous, but in a very different way.

Medicinal or healing grace of itself is a help of the natural order, for it only heals the moral impotence to perform naturally good acts. But to what extent a help of this kind is unowed is a matter of debate: Suarez thinks that it is unowed even in the state of pure nature; other theologians (Salmanticenses, Billot...) teach the same thing, at least as a consequence of original sin. Finally, others (Scheeben, Beraza, Lange...) hold that this help is due to man, both in the state of pure nature and as a mere consequence of original sin.¹

Whatever may be the result of this controversy, this grace is called *grace* by the sources, and rightly so. For it can be said to be unowed for three reasons: a) because this order, in which we now find ourselves, is supernatural and to it everything is subordinated directly or indirectly, negatively or positively; b) because this order is given because of the merits of Christ the Redeemer; c) if personal sins are added, because then man becomes guilty of eternal damnation, and unworthy to receive any help necessary to avoid new mortal sins. But these points suffice for the gratuity of medicinal grace.

Therefore, in this article, we are concerned with *elevating grace* which cures the physical impotence for eliciting salvific acts. And the question has to do with fallen man regarding the first actual grace by which, when it is given, an adult person disposes himself for justification. For, once the first salvific grace has been given, in virtue of it man can now merit new graces.

Therefore, what is freely given is gratuitous, or it is something that is now owed. But what is owed can be either *physical* or *moral*. Indeed, a physical requirement, i.e., one based on the exigencies of nature, we have already excluded in theses 1 and 2, inasmuch as we proved there that man labors under a physical incapacity to perform salvific acts, and at the same time we excluded any natural exigency for them. Therefore, it remains to exclude any moral exigency, or a requirement based on personal acts,

1. Suarez, *De gratia* 1,25-27; Salmanticenses, *De gratia* d.3 dub.6; Billot, *De gratia Christi* th.2; Scheeben, *Dogmatik* t.2 1.4 n.381ff.; Beraza, 282; Lange, 155-162.

inasmuch as these cannot establish any demand for grace, *either by means of merit, or by means of obtaining by asking, or by means of a positive disposition*. So we have three theses to deal with.

Thesis 9. Fallen man, by the powers of nature alone, cannot merit grace.

S.Th. I-II, q. 114, a. 5; Lercher-Lakner, 293-300; Beraza, 357-366; Lange, 195-209.

80. Definition of terms. Fallen man, and also an adult; for, he alone is capable of meriting. Any man, even one not fallen or before original sin, would be incapable of this merit; but a *fortiori* fallen man, who moreover has made himself positively unworthy by original sin.

By the powers of nature alone, that is, without salvific grace. Therefore, either by his own powers, or also helped by medicinal grace by which he can observe the natural law.

Grace, entitatively supernatural. But we are directing our attention to actual grace, and indeed the first one, by which a man is disposed for justification. For, he can now merit other graces because of this first grace.

Merit is said to be any good work, performed for the service of God, and therefore worthy of a reward. Merit will be *condign* (*de condigno*), if the reward is due out of justice from God who accepts that service; but it is *congruous* (*de congruo*), if it is due only out of the decency or liberality of God. There will be more about this concept in chapter four.

Therefore, we deny that there is any reason for merit in natural works, even though they are good, of a sinner or an unbeliever, regarding the first actual grace that is entitatively supernatural. Therefore, no unbeliever or sinner, even though he is naturally very upright, merciful, etc., merits that first grace. Indeed, if you imagine two unbelievers, one who leads a life of vice and the other who is very moral, neither one merits this grace and both of them are unworthy of it.

81. Adversaries. 1) *Pelagians*, at first, said “the grace of God is given according to our merits” (R 1978); then, after the retraction of Pelagius in 415, they mitigated it, positing something less than condign merit.²

2) *The Semi-Pelagians* defended a certain small merit with respect to grace, through the beginning of faith. Cassian, for example, writes that “our knocking is *not condign*... since it is only an *occasion* offered by us of our good will...”³

2. See St. Augustine, *Contra duas epist. Pelag.* 2,8,17: ML 44,583f.; Id., *Contra Iulianum* 4,8,41: ML 44,759.

3. *De coenobiorum institutis* 12,14: ML 94,447. See *Collationes* 13,13: ML 49,932f.

82. Doctrine of the Church. *Indiculus*, c.5 (D 243) says: "No one pleases him except as a result of that which he himself has granted"; c.6 (D 244), "through him we can accomplish something good, but without him we can do nothing"; c.9 (D 248), "his grace precedes all man's merits..." *Orange*, cn.18 (D 388), teaches "grace is not preceded by any merit"; cn.22 (D 392), "No one has anything of his own except lying and sin"; cn.25 (D 397), "he himself, without any previous merits on our part, first instills in us faith in him and love for him...." Therefore the Council of Orange rejects any merit, even that tenuous and small amount that the Semi-Pelagians advocated, and against which these canons are directed. Indeed, canons 22 and 25 reject, not only the acceptance, but also the suitability for merit. *Trent*, s.6 chap.5 (D 1525), "without any previous merits," excludes at least condign merit. See chap.8 (D 1532), where the word "merit" (*promeretur*) is understood to be congruous merit.

83. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* regarding the exclusion of all merit, both condign and congruous.

84. Proof from Holy Scripture. It 1) says that for salvation it is necessary that *God precede us* with his internal grace; 2) positively *excludes our natural works* as a help for justification. But these works conflict with any merit of grace. Therefore fallen man cannot naturally merit grace.

The major: 1) from John 6:44: that a man comes to salvation, neither miracles nor the preaching of Christ suffice, but what is required is that the Father, by his internal motions, draws him to Christ (see v. 65-66).

The major 2) from Rom. 11:6: Paul teaches that some Jews participated in Christ's salvation, not by their works but by the gratuitous election of God. Moreover, the Letter to the Romans, in its dogmatic part (chaps. 1-11), is almost completely about the gratuity of grace. There he shows that justification is not from condign meritorious works. But perhaps also from congruous works? It is not explained very clearly, but the exclusion of this congruous merit is deduced from the general idea of the Apostle about the complete gratuity of all Christian salvation (Eph. 2:1-10).

85. Proof from tradition. 1) *Before St. Augustine*, the Fathers acknowledge, under rather general formulas, the necessity of grace for all salvific acts, as we pointed out in theses 1 and 2. Indeed, St. Cyril of Jerusalem affirms explicitly the gratuity of grace, when he says: "Despise not the grace because it is freely given" (R 808). Therefore what Cyril himself had already said, and similar things that are found among other

Fathers of that time, should be interpreted to be either about a purely negative disposition, or in the sense that they do not exclude the help of a grace that precedes the performance of those works.

2) St. Augustine, as a young man before he became a bishop, held a mild form of Semi-Pelagianism, teaching that some “hidden merits” precede grace.⁴ But then from the year 397 he changed his mind and acknowledged the absolute gratuity of grace. “For what have you that you have not received?... And it was chiefly by this testimony that I myself was also convinced when I was in a similar error, thinking that faith whereby we believe in God is not God’s gift, but that it is in us from ourselves, and that by it we obtain the gifts of God, whereby we may live temperately and righteously and piously in this world” (R 1981). And elsewhere: “Let them see... whether, in the latter portions of the first book of those two which I wrote in the beginning of my episcopate, before the appearance of the Pelagian heresy, to Simplicianus, the bishop of Milan, there remained anything whereby it might be called in question that God’s grace is not given according to our merits; and whether I have not there sufficiently argued that even the beginning of faith is God’s gift...” (R 2005). He offers more in R 1452, 1473, 1791, 1807, 1851, 1857, 1974.

3) *The other Fathers* embrace this teaching of St. Augustine: St. Prosper (R 2034, 2044f.), St. Leo the Great, St. Fulgentius, St. Gregory the Great.⁵

86. Theologians. *The early theologians* always denied condign merit with respect to habitual grace. Thus, for example, St. Thomas (*In 2 d.27 q.1 a.4; I-II, q. 114, a. 5*). But some form of congruous merit was admitted by Alexander of Hales, St. Thomas,⁶ Durandus, the Nominalists⁷; and more recently by Hermes and Kuhn.⁸ On the contrary, St. Bonaventure denied congruous merit, unless “a movement by some gift of sanctifying grace” preceded it.⁹ *After the Council of Trent*, with one voice, any kind of merit is denied.

4. St. Augustine, *Expositio... ad Romanos* 6-64: ML 35,2078-81; Id., *De diversis quaestionibus* 68,3f.: ML 40,71-74.

5. St. Leo the Great, *Epist.* 1,3: ML 54,595; St. Fulgentius, *De veritate praedest.* 1,3,7: ML 65,606; St. Gregory the Great, *Moral.* 33,21,38: ML 76,698.

6. On the mind of St. Thomas on the process of conversion, see M. Flick, *L'attimo della giustificazione secondo St. Tommaso* (Rome 1947).

7. Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* d.17 s.1 n.1-3, lists several old scholastics who endorsed congruous merit.

8. I. Kuhn, *Die christliche Lehre von der göttl. Gnade* (1868); Hermes, *Christkatholische Dogmatik* (1834)

9. *In 2 d.28 a.2 q.1.* On the mind of the Franciscan school about the process of conversion, see R.Ch. Dhont, O.F.M., *Le problème de la préparation a la grace, Débuts de l'Ecole franciscaine* (Paris 1946); F. Mitzka, S.J., *Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura von der Vorbereitung auf die heiligen Gnade*: ZkathTh 50 (1926) 27-72, 220-252.

87. Theological reasoning. 1) *From the reason adduced by St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 5, which applies not only to habitual grace, but also to the first actual grace which is intrinsically supernatural. The Angelic Doctor says: "The gift of grace may be considered in two ways:--first in the way of a gratuitous gift, and thus it is manifest that all merit is repugnant to grace... Secondly, it may be considered as regards the nature of the thing given, and thus, also, it cannot come under the merit of him who has not grace, both because it exceeds the proportion of nature, and because previous to grace a man in the state of sin has an obstacle to his meriting grace, namely, sin."* Therefore merit is opposed to grace, both from its formal concept, because it involves the nature of a gift from gratuity, and from the nature of the thing given, which exceeds the proportion of nature, and man is unworthy of it because of sin.

2) *From thesis 2, the beginning of salvation cannot be from us. But it would be from us, if we were able to merit the first grace; for to merit it would be a significant beginning in the process of salvation. Therefore we cannot merit it.*

88. Objections. 1. Evil works are not meritorious of grace. Therefore, similarly, good works must be said to be meritorious of grace.

I deny the parity, because more is required for meriting than for not meriting. For, demerits come from some defect. But in order to merit a certain proportion is demanded between the merit and the reward, such as is present between a cause and its effect. This cannot happen unless it takes place among things in the same order. Therefore since natural works and grace function in different orders, the former can never merit grace.

2. In the present economy the natural end cannot be obtained without obtaining the supernatural end. But a man can merit the natural end by his natural acts alone. Therefore also his supernatural end.

I concede the major and minor, but deny the consequent. For from that it follows only that, in the hypothesis of this elevation to a supernatural end, the help of grace is due to man in order that he may be able to obtain his supernatural end.

3. If man, by his natural powers alone, does not merit at least congruously the first grace, there is no reason why God gives this grace to one and denies it to another; if he does that, he would have to be called a respecter of persons. But this is repugnant. Therefore man at least congruously can merit the first grace.

I deny the major. For, since the gifts of grace are absolutely gratuitous, God freely distributes them, so that no one can reasonably be offended.

Someone is a *respecter of persons* who, in the distribution of gifts that ought to be given according to the merit or good works of each one, does not respect this, but uses another criterion; but in this way he violates distributive justice. From what we have said, however, this does not apply with respect to the gifts of grace, because they are all given gratuitously.

Moreover, God grants to all men grace that is at least sufficient to obtain eternal life. But if he confers more on one than on another, that depends on his will alone, according to the words of St. Paul: *Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump one vessel for beauty and another for menial use?* (Rom. 9:21). *I will have mercy on whom I have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I have compassion. So it depends not upon man's will or exertion, but upon God's mercy* (Rom. 9:15-16).

However, in no way should we think that God does this arbitrarily and as it were fortuitously, without his own wise counsel. But what the nature is of this very wise counsel is completely hidden from us, so that we cannot even conjecture anything about it.

Thesis 10. Fallen man cannot obtain grace by natural prayer.

S.Th. II-II, q. 83, a. 15; Lercher-Lakner, 293-300; Beraza, 367-376; Lange, 195-209.

89. Definition of terms. *Prayer* is the expression of a desire before God in order to obtain something from him; or, as St. Thomas says, it is the interpreter before God of our desire (II-II, q. 83, a. 1 ad 1).

Natural, which takes place by natural powers alone, without salvific grace, although perhaps with medicinal grace.

Obtaining by petition is understood as a certain moral power that is proper to prayer. Now this power belongs to prayer, either inasmuch as it is obedience offered to God and so is congruously meritorious (*impetratio latoriori sensu*), or inasmuch as it is a humble confession of our indigence, and a begging for divine mercy (*impetratio stricte dicta*). Therefore prayer in this second sense does not move God by way of obedience, but by reason of a humble request. For, it appeals not to the justice and equity of God, but to his mercy towards a miserable supplicant. In the thesis we are concerned with *impetration in the strict sense*.

Therefore, from the preceding thesis it is certain that God is not moved to confer the first supernatural grace by natural prayer, as is obedience to God, or by the natural merits of man. Therefore the question in this thesis is whether he is perhaps moved by natural prayer, according as it involves a strict impetration.

Our question, however, concerns *the present order of providence*. For Ripalda thinks that, in a different order, it would not be repugnant to obtain grace from purely natural prayer.¹

Moreover, there is a question here about the factual situation. For, in itself the gratuity of grace would not be harmed if it were granted by God in virtue of a natural impetration, since in any event God would grant it because of his mercy alone. But we contend that the sources *de facto* exclude this way of obtaining grace.

90. Adversaries. *The Semi-Pelagians* held that the beginning of faith, manifested by us naturally, could obtain grace.

91. Doctrine of the Church. *Orange*, cn.3 (D 373) condemns as contrary to Scripture, "If anyone says that the grace of God can be conferred because of human prayer, and not rather that it is grace itself that prompts us to pray"; cn.6 (D 376), rejects the idea that grace is conferred on those

1. Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* d.19 s.3 n.12-16.

who naturally “pray... request, seek, knock.”

92. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

93. Proof from Holy Scripture. The prayer, by which grace is sought, itself supposes grace and requires it. Therefore this grace cannot be obtained by natural prayer.

The antecedent: For God is at work in you, both to will and to work (Phil. 2:13). We already explained the meaning of this text in n. 18.

94. Proof from tradition. *The Fathers* require grace *in order to pray in a salvific way*. Thus St. Augustine: “Lest we should think that even the merit of prayer is antecedent to grace, in which case it would not be a free gift—and then it would not be grace because it would be the reward which was due—our very prayer itself is counted among the gifts of grace” (R 1451). And elsewhere: “When we understand that this is also itself the gift of God, that with a true heart and spiritually we cry to God. Let them, therefore, observe how they are mistaken who think that our seeking, asking, knocking is of ourselves, and is not given to us” (R 2006).

In general, as is clear from thesis 2, the Fathers require grace *for the beginning of faith*, under which is contained the desire and petition of salvation.

95. Theologians. St. Thomas explains this matter brilliantly (II-II, q. 83. a. 15): “Prayer... is efficacious in *meriting*, because it proceeds from charity as its root... As to its efficacy in impetrating, prayer derives this from the grace of God to whom we pray, and who instigates us to pray.” And ad 1: “Even that prayer which impetrates sanctifying grace proceeds from some grace, as from a gratuitous gift, since the very act of praying is a gift of God, as Augustine states.” Therefore the necessity of some gratuitous gift in order to impetrate sanctifying grace is stated

openly. Hence this is not had naturally.

96. Theological reasoning. 1. If natural prayer had the power of obtaining grace, the beginning of salvation would be from us. But according to thesis 2 it cannot be from us. Therefore natural prayer is not able to obtain grace for us.

97. Objections. 1. The alms that a rich man dispenses, moved by the prayer of a poor man, does not cease to be completely gratuitous. Therefore similarly, the first

grace, which would be given by God in response to natural prayer, would not cease to be truly gratuitous.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. It would not cease having some true gratuity, *conceded*; it would not cease having the complete gratuity which God wills in this order, *denied*. And, *I deny the parity*. The disparity consists in the fact that the rich often accept the petitions of the poor; but God *de facto* in this order of providence does not will to accept any natural prayer in order to give the first grace. Therefore, although of itself the gratuity of grace could be maintained with the impetration of natural prayer, nevertheless *de facto* God does not accept such prayer, as is sufficiently made certain from the sources of revelation. Therefore, *de facto*, the gratuity of grace is such that it excludes any natural affection of the will with reference to the conferring of the first grace.

2. The just of the Old Testament were able to obtain with their prayers, offered with the help of grace, certain circumstances of the Incarnation, for example, its hastening. Therefore any man by natural prayer will also be able to obtain the first grace; for grace is not as excellent as the Incarnation.

I deny the parity. For, although the Incarnation is the greatest work of all, still it is in the same order as those prayers made by grace; but natural prayer and grace are in different orders.

Thesis 11. Fallen man, by his natural powers alone, cannot dispose himself positively for grace.

S.Th. I-II, q. 109, a. 6; q. 112, a. 2f.; q. 113; Lercher-Lakner, 301-310; Beraza, 377-386; Lange, 210-246.

98. Definition of terms. *A disposition* is the aptitude or proportion of a subject to receive something. Thus, for example, dry wood is disposed for burning; warm wax is disposed to receive any form.

A disposition can be either physical or moral. *Physical* is a disposition based on physical reality; but *moral* is based on moral reality, that is, on free acts, whereby a man is rendered apt to receive some perfection. In this thesis that is our concern. Therefore, it is nothing other than preparation for grace which is produced by free acts.

Again, a moral disposition can be either negative or positive. *A negative or unsuitable disposition* is the removal of an obstacle to receiving the form; v.gr., not soaking wood in water, or in our case, not sinning. A disposition is said to be unsuitable, because it does not make the subject more suitable for receiving the form, but only takes care lest it become more inept. *A positive disposition* is a real capacity for something, or a reality that comes accidentally to a subject in itself indifferent, and renders it suitable to receive this form rather than some other form. This positive disposition can be *proximate*, if now nothing else is required, or *remote*, if something else is still needed to receive the form.

99. Now there are three types of positive dispositions:

1) A disposition that demands the form, or *a disposition of exigency*. Thus, v.gr., when generative material is proximately disposed, it demands the infusion of the soul.

2) A disposition which by its nature is demanded by the form, or *a disposition of condignness*. That is, this disposition does not demand the form, but the form, by its nature, requires that disposition. Thus, v.gr., dry wood does not require combustion, but combustion requires the dryness of the wood; the qualities of probity, knowledge and prudence do not require a public office, but a public office requires these qualities.

3) A disposition that is demanded by a form, not by its nature, but from a positive law, extrinsic to the subject, or *a legal disposition*. Thus, v.gr., ecclesiastical law requires a certain age for many things.

Therefore, we assert that a man, by his natural powers alone, in no way can dispose himself positively to receive the first grace. *Not by a positive disposition of exigency*, inasmuch as due to a man. *Not by a positive*

disposition of condignness, inasmuch as grace, by its nature, prerequisites in man certain natural dispositions, so that it can be conferred. *Not by a positive legal disposition*, inasmuch as some divine law about not conferring grace exists, unless man naturally manifests definite dispositions, and then grace would be given infallibly if he has them. We deny the existence of such a law.

Now notice that a positive moral disposition *de facto* is joined, as it seems, with the idea of congruous merit. But this does not hinder disposition from being distinguished from merit, at least conceptually. For, merit means obedience towards another, and implies a certain exigency of a reward...; but a disposition concerns only the subject that is disposed, and not every disposition demands a form, v.gr., a disposition of condignness or legality.

100. Opinions. 1) *In the patristic era*, this question was not proposed under the Aristotelian concept of disposition. However, regarding the matter itself, although not in explicit words, the *Pelagians*, *Semi-Pelagians* and even the younger Augustine, admitted some positive disposition.

2) *The scholastics* began to dispute about this matter, led by Alexander of Hales,¹ under the Aristotelian concept of the disposition of matter for the form. Many older theologians, not yet well aware of the Semi-Pelagian controversy, and understanding by the word “grace” only habitual grace, thought that it would satisfy Church teaching if one defended that habitual grace was not conferred based on condign merits. Thus, v.gr., Durandus and the *Nominalists* (G. Occam, G. Biel) held for a positive proximate disposition, from the powers of nature alone; but others said that it was at least remote.² For this reason, the truth about the exclusion of any disposition was very much obscured and this was certainly a result of the Semi-Pelagian controversy.

3) But, *with the help of other scholastics*, this truth was gradually restored to its former clarity:

a) St. Thomas, even though at first he taught that there is a positive disposition for habitual grace without internal grace,³ then, having changed his mind, he denied it, holding that *at least the final disposition* for justification proceeds from a gratuitous and internal movement of God. After the Angelic Doctor, Richard of Mediavilla, Aegidius Romanus,⁴ the

1. Karl Heim, *Das Wesen der Gnade... bei Alex. Hal.* (1907) p.72.114.

2. Suarez, *De gratia* 8,7,9, speaking about the remote disposition, says: “I see almost all theologians, without scruples, using that way of speaking.” See A. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* 1,1 (Regensburg 1952) 238-302.

3. Cajetan testifies to this (*In* 1-2 q.109 a.6) and also D. Soto (*De natura et gratia* 2,3). See Lange, *De gratia* 219-224; M. Flick, *L'attimo della giustificazione secondo S. Tommaso*.

4. Richard of Mediavilla, O.F.M., *In* 2 d.28 a.1 q.2; Aegidius Romanus, *In* 2 d.28 q.1 a.3.

Thomists and many *Scotists* asserted the same thing.

b) In the 16th century, D. Soto, A. Vega and B. Medina still held for *a certain natural, remote and improper disposition*, which they seemed to consider as something positive.⁵

c) Finally, Suarez demonstrated that *no positive disposition, not even the most remote*, could be taught. After him this was generally held.⁶

101. Doctrine of the Church. *Indiculus*, c.5-6 and 8-9 (D 243-244, 246-248), "we acknowledge God as the author of all good tendencies... by which advancement is made towards God from the beginnings of faith." *Orange*, cn.4 (D 374), teaches that God does not wait for our will, but on the contrary, that it is prepared by God; cn.6f. (D 376f), excludes all acts that could be conceived as positive dispositions, and asserts that all of them are the fruit of grace. *Trent*, s.6 ch.5-6 and cn.3 (D 1525f., 1553), hands on and defines that at least a proximate disposition does not come from the powers of nature, but from prevenient grace.

102. Theological note. 1) The exclusion of a disposition of exigency, according to the matter, must be said to be a truth *of defined divine and Catholic faith*; 2) the exclusion of a disposition of condignness seems to be *theologically certain* (D 374, 376, 378); 3) the exclusion of a legal disposition is *certain*.

103. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) In the process of salvation we can do nothing without grace (John 15:5). Therefore we cannot positively dispose ourselves for grace.

2) The very beginning of salvation is from God (John 6:66; Phil. 2:13; 1:6; 2 Cor. 3:5). But it would be from us, if a positive disposition preceded it. Therefore such a disposition cannot precede it.

3) God confers his grace even on those who are poorly disposed (Isa. 65:1; Rom. 10:20; 1 Pet. 2:20). Therefore, neither from the nature of grace, nor from a positive law of God is a positive disposition required. Think about Matthew, Saul....

Observe that a disposition of exigency is excluded by the first and second considerations; and that the dispositions of condignness and of law by the third consideration.

5. D. Soto, *De natura et gratia* 2,3; Andreas Vega, *Trident. decret. de iustificatione expositio* 8,9; Barth. Medina, *In 1-2 q.109 a.6*.

6. Suarez, *De gratia* 8,7.

104. Proof from tradition. 1) *Before St. Augustine*, there are some Fathers who attribute the beginning of salvation to God, with a certain general way of speaking; and therefore they necessarily exclude a positive natural disposition. Thus St. Cyprian: "We glory in nothing, since nothing comes from us."⁷ See also St. Basil (R 963), St. Ambrose (R 1302).

2) St. Augustine, in his old age, constantly denies any positive disposition. For he often appeals to Prov. 8:35 according to the LXX: "The will is prepared by the Lord" (R 1889, 1906, 1941, 1968, 1982). The Indiculus and Orange quote this same text (D 243, 374).

3) *The disciples of St. Augustine*, like St. Prosper, hand on the same doctrine.⁸

105. Theological reasoning. 1) St. Thomas (I-II, q. 109, a. 6) proves the necessity of some gratuitous help, moving the soul interiorly, so that man is able to prepare himself for grace, in this way: "Since every agent acts for an end, every cause must direct its effect to its end, and hence since the order of ends is according to the order of agents or movers, man must be directed to the last end by the motion of the first mover... But he directs righteous men to himself as to a special end, which they seek, and to which they wish to cling as to their own good... And that they are turned to God can only spring from God's having turned them. Now to prepare oneself for grace is, as it were, to be turned to God."

2) Further, a *disposition of exigency* is rejected because by it the beginning of salvation would be from us. A *disposition of condignness*, because it would make grace dependent on man. A *legal disposition*, because it is contrary to experience; not even the Semi-Pelagians dared to defend such a general law.

106. Objections. 1. From Matt. 25:14-30. Christ testifies that he distributes talents *to each one according to his ability*. But the gifts of grace come under the name of talents; but one's own ability is a previous natural disposition. Therefore man can dispose himself positively, by his natural powers alone, to receive the first grace.

I concede the major and the first part of the minor; but I distinguish the second part of the minor. One's own ability is a natural disposition on the part of man, which determines the conferring of grace, *denied*; it is a natural condition of temperament, age, etc., to which God is wont to adapt the manner of his call to grace, *conceded*.

There are many interpretations of these words of Christ the Lord. That being the case, Maldonado thinks that Christ used the expression "according to his own ability," not in order to signify something, but to complete the narration. That is, Christ did not

7. *Testimonium* 3,4: ML 4,734; CSEL 3,1,116.

8. *Contra collatorem* 3,8; *De vocatione omnium gentium* 1,18: ML 45,1805; 51,671.

intend to teach that God confers grace according to the ability of each one, but only to signify what men are generally accustomed to do.⁹ Moreover, if that interpretation is admitted, that God is wont to adjust his gifts to the conditions in which a man finds himself, then the distinction we gave above is valid.

2. A man must have in his own hands the means necessary for salvation. But the first grace is the means necessary for salvation. Therefore the first grace must be in man's power; and therefore he can dispose himself positively for it.

I distinguish the major. He must have in his own hands the means necessary for salvation, *effectively* or *dispositively*, that is, he must be able to produce that means, or so to prepare himself for it that it is infallibly conferred, *denied*; he must have it in his hands *in a receptive way*, inasmuch as it is infallibly offered by God, so that a man can receive it or reject it, *conceded*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* It is in man's power *effectively* or *dispositively*, *denied*; *in a receptive way*, *conceded*.

3. Parents naturally dispose the matter for the creation of an infant's soul, which can be created by God alone. Therefore, similarly, a man can dispose himself naturally for grace, although it can be given by God alone.

I deny the parity. For the soul is the natural form of the body; therefore the parents naturally dispose the matter to receive it. But for grace, since it is a supernatural entity, there cannot be a disposition which is produced by natural powers alone.

4. It is fitting that God accommodate the granting of gifts to the dispositions of the subject. Therefore it is fitting that God give grace in virtue of the natural disposition.

I distinguish the antecedent. It is fitting, if those dispositions preserve proportion with grace, as happens in supernatural acts, *conceded*; if this proportion is not preserved, as happens in natural works, *denied*.

5. When the first grace is denied to someone, it happens because of impediments that a man places to it. Therefore to whom it is given, it is conferred because of the dispositions for it.

I deny the parity. For, just because a man can place impediments to the reception of grace, it does not follow that he can dispose himself for it. For, less is required to impede grace, which is freely given, than to make demands for it.

Of course, the theologians, who reject the negative disposition, respond to the difficulty by denying the supposition, that is, that the first grace is denied to any man. See n. 107.

107. Scholium 1. On the negative disposition. There is a controversy over whether or not it should be admitted.

St. Thomas, who when he was young taught a natural positive disposition, then as an older man he would not admit even a negative disposition. The older Thomas is followed by Cajetan, Báñez, Billuart, Salmanticenses,

9. Maldonado, *In Mt* c.25 v.15.

Ripalda, and generally contemporary Thomists.¹⁰ All of these conceive the vocation to faith of a negative unbeliever (the negative disposition should be restricted to him) in the following way. Any unbeliever, when he comes to the full use of reason, receives infallibly from God elevating grace, by which *he is remotely called to faith*. If the unbeliever responds to this first supernatural grace, others will be given to him whereby he will come to faith that is necessary for justification. But if he does not come to justification, the reason is because he neglected to cooperate with these graces. Therefore, there cannot be a place for a negative disposition, but only for a positive one from supernatural grace. Therefore there is no such thing as a purely natural negative disposition.

In contrast to that position, Molina, Suarez and Lessius,¹¹ whom many theologians follow, developed the concept of a negative disposition, which they contend must be admitted. In this opinion, the call of an unbeliever to faith can take place as follows. The first grace, intrinsically supernatural, which is given to an unbeliever, is a *proximate call* to faith; God wills to give this grace to all unbelieving adults. But the reason why this grace de facto is not conferred on all, is because God often refuses to give that grace, unless the unbeliever removes the impediments of grace, that is, unless he avoids sins by the observance of the natural law—in more easy matters by his natural powers alone and in the more difficult with the assistance of medicinal grace. For this reason, it is in the hand of the unbeliever to accept the call to faith, for, if he accepts the call, God will infallibly give it to him. Therefore, God *gives grace to all*, who dispose themselves in a negative way. *But he does not give it to these alone*; for sometimes, he also calls those indisposed and refusing him. Further, that negative natural disposition *is not the reason determining* the conferring of grace, but a pure negative condition; for, once it is given, God confers his grace because of his universal salvific will.

We think that this second opinion is safe and more probable. For, it flows from the universal salvific will, from the moral ability of man to perform some naturally good acts, and from the fact that is a sign that man, with his sins, can make himself unworthy of grace (1 Tim. 1:13; Luke 23:34. See D 1536-1539, 3013-3014). Moreover, the supernatural call to faith of all unbelievers, proposed in the first opinion, has not been sufficiently proved.

10. St. Thomas, *In 2 d.28 q.1 a.4*; *Quaest. disp. de veritate q.6 a.2*; *Quodlib. 1 a.7*; I-II, q. 109, a.6; q. 112, a. 2; Cajetan, *In 1-2 q.109 a.6*; Báñez, *in 2.2 q.10 a.1 dub.2*; Billuart, *De gratia dis.3 a.7*. Salmanticenses, *De gratia d.3 dub.7*; Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali d.18 and 20*; N. Del Prado, *De gratia et libero arbitrio 1,67ff*; Hugon, *De gratia q.2 a.5*; Garrigou-Lagrange, *De gratia 249*.

11. Molina, *Concordia q.14 a.13 d.10*; Suarez, *De gratia 4,15*; *De divina motione 3,2,6*; *De praedestinatione 2,7*; Lessius, *De gratia efficaci c.10 and append.*; Beraza, 384ff.; Lange, 231ff.

108. Scholium 2. *On the meaning of the axiom: God does not deny grace to anyone who does what he can (facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam).* This axiom is adumbrated in Holy Scripture (Matt. 7:7), professed by the Fathers (R 892, 1219), accepted by all theologians and condemned by the Reformers.

1) The meaning of this axiom can vary according to the various ways of understanding the word *grace* and the formula *what he can (quod in se est)*.

If *grace* here is understood as *habitual*, then the axiom is not true unless it concerns one who does what he can in the power of *actual grace*. Hence the meaning is: if someone cooperates with actual graces, God will give him habitual grace.

If *grace* is understood as *helping actual grace (actualis adiuvans)*, the axiom is not true unless it concerns one who does what he can in the power of *prevenient grace (gratia excitans)*. Hence the meaning is: if someone cooperates with prevenient grace, God will give him helping grace.

If *grace* is understood as *prevenient actual grace (actualis excitans)*, not the first grace but a *subsequent one*, in some series of graces, the axiom is not true unless it concerns one who does what he can in the power of the first prevenient grace. Hence the meaning is: if someone cooperates with the first prevenient grace, God will give him more prevenient grace.

If *grace* is understood as the first prevenient actual grace (*actualis excitans prima*), the axiom is not true about someone who does what he can with his natural powers alone (or also with medicinal grace), in the sense that God *must* give him grace as the reward of merit, of the fruit of impetration, or the form corresponding to some positive disposition. But regarding the sense that God *de facto* will give the first prevenient grace to someone who does not place an obstacle to it by his sins, or *to someone only negatively and improperly disposed*, it is disputed by theologians whether the axiom is true or false. The Jesuit authors generally hold that it is true in that sense; the Thomists generally hold that it is false.

2) However, in order to exclude all ambiguity, *we define the matter thus:*

a) We are considering a man who disposes himself negatively for grace by his natural powers alone, or also with the help of medicinal grace. Therefore he is one who keeps the natural law by not sinning against it. And we say that that man will accept the first prevenient grace from God, which in this case will be the proximate call to faith.

b) *We do not say:* the connection between this negative disposition and grace is of such a nature that God will give his grace to all and only those who do what they can. For, if that were so, then the negative disposition

would be the reason determining the conferring of grace. *But we do say:* God infallibly gives grace to every man not placing an obstacle by sin, or to everyone disposing himself negatively; however, this negative disposition is not required, not even as a necessary condition, since God sometimes gives his grace also to a man who places an obstacle by his sins, and therefore does not dispose himself negatively. Therefore grace is given to everyone disposing himself in this way, but *not only to such*.

c) Hence the meaning is this: God always and infallibly will give the grace of vocation to faith to an unbeliever who keeps the natural law by his own powers and with the help of medicinal grace; although sometimes he also gives that grace to one who has not kept the natural law.

d) Therefore the vocation to faith will be given to that man *after* he has done what he could by not sinning, but certainly not *because* he did so.

3) Therefore the axiom in this limited and determined sense *is true*. For, given the universal salvific will of God, on the part of God there is nothing lacking for him to grant grace to that man. But something would be lacking on the part of God, if the axiom in that sense were false. For, in that case grace *de facto* would not be given. Therefore something would be lacking either on the part of God or on the part of man. But not on the part of man, because he did what he could. Therefore it would be on the part of God.

Further, such a meaning of the axiom simply cannot be called Semi-Pelagian. For, in order for it to be Semi-Pelagian it would have to be understood to be about some connection between the natural works of that man and grace, or by way of merit, or by way of impetration, or by way of some positive disposition, or also by way of a negative disposition which would be a true reason for the conferring of grace. But all of these have been positively excluded, as has been explained.

4) *A completely different question is:* how *de facto* the older theologians understood this axiom. But this is hard to determine, since the state of the question was not always clearly defined by them.¹²

12. Beraza, 387-395; Lercher-Lakner, 305; Bucceroni, *Commentarius de axioma*: "*Facienti quod est in se...*" (Rome 1890). J. Rivière, *Quelques antécédents patristiques de la formule: "Facienti quod in se est..."*; RevScRel (1927) 93f.

ARTICLE III

ON THE SUPERNATURALITY OF GRACE

109. From what has been proved in the preceding articles, salvific grace is conferred gratuitously to man in such a way that it is not due to *fallen human nature*, nor by reason of nature itself, nor by reason of any of its works. But is it so gratuitous that it is not demanded by any *created nature*, either angelic, or human, even though it is considered to be pure and integral? This is the question that we now have to answer and it coincides with the question about the supernaturality of grace. We pursue this question in particular with regard to salvific acts, which we treated in theses 1 and 2; but from there we also derive the solution for the other gifts of grace. But regarding the supernaturality of medicinal grace, we already mentioned that above in n. 78.

Thesis 12. Since salvific acts are entitatively supernatural, grace must also be said to be entitatively supernatural.

S.Th. I-II, q. 62, a. 1; q. 109, a. 5; Lercher-Lakner, 272-276; Beraza, 66-68; Lange, 292-303.

110. Definition of terms. *Salvific acts*, which we described above, are understood both as those which, posited with the help of actual grace, dispose a sinner for justification, and as those which, elicited by a just man, are meritorious of eternal life. Regarding both kinds of acts we say that they are entitatively (substantially, internally) supernatural.

Entitatively supernatural is called that divine gift whose being (essence or substance) is not due to any creature, but has a certain proportion with the intuitive vision of God.¹

A supernatural gift *according to its mode* is different from a supernatural

1. To properly understand the concept of a supernatural being, the following sources will help: S.Th. I, q. 12, and all the commentaries on this question; Suarez, *De gratia* prolog.4 c.1 (Vives, 7,179-185); Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali*: Scheeben, *Natur und Gnade* (1861); Mercier, O.P., *Le surnaturel*: RevThom 1902f.; Bainvel, *Nature et surnaturel* (1905); Deneffe, *Geschichte des Wortes "supernaturalis"*: ZkathTh 46 (1922) 337-360; Ehrhard, *Le surnaturel* (1925); A. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* 1,1,140-201; H. de Lubac, *Remarques sur l'histoire du mot "surnaturel"*: NouvRevTh 61 (1934) 225-249, 350-370. The articles of de Lubac should be supplemented by the article of J.C. Martínez Gómez, *Notas sobre unas notas para la historia de la palabra "sobrenatural"*: ArchTG 1 (1938) 57-85. H. de Lubac, *Surnaturel* (1946). On this book one should consult the review of C. Boyer: Greg 28 (1947) 375-395, and many others which, on the appearance of de Lubac's book, were written about supernatural being. See, v.gr., G. de Broglie, *De gratuitate ordinis supernaturalis ad quem homo elevatus est*: Greg 29 (1948) 435-463; C. Boyer, *Morale et surnaturel*: Greg 29 (1948) 527-543; H. Rondet, *Le problème de la nature pure...*: RechScRel 35 (1948) 481-521; H. de Lubac, *Le mystère du surnaturel*: RechScRel 36 (1949) 80-121; J. Alfaro, *La natural y lo sobrenatural* (Madrid 1952).

gift *according to its being*: namely, that which, even though according to its being is due to some nature, but is conferred on it in a way that is naturally not due to it. Indeed, this can happen in different ways: a) either because the natural entity is produced in a supernatural way, v.gr., the raising of a dead man; b) or because a natural act is accepted by God for a supernatural end (extrinsically supernatural); c) or because it is accomplished in a more intense way than nature can do it, v.gr., if such sharpness of the eyes is given that the natural powers cannot provide.

Separating the fact of supernaturality from its foundation, in the thesis we consider *the fact of the supernaturality* of salvific acts, without entering into another question—and one that is controversial, namely: *what is the source of supernaturality*; is it from the efficient principle alone of salvific acts, or is it from the formal object which is specifically different? Therefore we affirm two points: the *first* is, salvific acts are entitatively supernatural; the *second* is, the grace, which is the cause of these acts, is also supernatural.

111. Opinions. 1. Even though *before Trent* the way of speaking about this question was not fully clear, still the opinion in the schools about the modal supernaturality of salvific acts seems to have predominated. For, under the leadership of Scotus, many taught it, according to reports, not only *Scotists*, but also *Thomists*. Those mentioned are, v.gr., Durandus, Aureolus, G. Biel, Maior, Almain, G. Ariminensis, Capreolus, Cajetan, F. de Vitorio....² However the matter is not certain. For there can be some doubt about the mind of Scotus and Capreolus, while Cajetan almost certainly defends entitative supernaturality.

2. *After the Council of Trent* the opinion about the supernaturality of salvific acts became more and more common. The *Thomists* hold it, v.gr., M. Cano, D. Soto, P. de Sotomayor, I. de la Peña, Mantius de Corpore Christi, B. de Medina, D. Báñez³; also the *Jesuit authors* generally defend it, v.gr., Molina, Suarez, Ripalda, Lugo, etc., with the exception of Vázquez who said that some truly salvific acts are entitatively natural.⁴ However one should note well that the Jesuit authors fully defend the entitative supernaturality, even though many of them wish to explain this supernaturality not from the object, but only from the supernatural principle.

2. See T. Urdáñez, O.P., *La teología del acto sobrenatural en la Escuela de Salamanca*: CiencTom 62 (1942) 121-145. See also Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* d.44 sl.

3. See Urdáñez: CiencTom 63 (1942) 7-24.

4. Molina, *Concordia* q.14 a.13 d.7.14.38; Suarez, *De gratia* 2,4-9; Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* d.44 s.3-8; Lugo, *De fide* d.9; Lange, 29ff.; Vázquez, *In* l.2 d.189f.

112. Theological note. The doctrine is *common and certain*.

113. Argument. A. *Salvific acts are entitatively supernatural.* 1) The sources, as we proved at length in theses 1 and 2, assert the absolute necessity of grace for salvific acts. Therefore it is necessary to say that they are entitatively supernatural.

The consequence. If the being of those acts were not supernatural, but natural, the help of grace would not be required simply and absolutely, but the powers of nature alone would suffice to elicit those acts. But we have proved that these natural powers do not suffice in any way. Therefore, the absolute necessity of grace proves the entitative supernaturality of salvific acts.

2) Salvific acts are ordered ultimately to the intuitive vision of God. But this vision is entitatively supernatural. Therefore the salvific acts are also entitatively supernatural.

The major: These salvific acts are elicited either by a just man or by a sinner who is disposing himself for justification. But both kinds of salvific acts are ordered to the intuitive vision of God. For, a) *the salvific acts of the just* merit eternal life condignly, and are even a certain beginning of it, since they have a certain proportion to it. But also ordered to the intuitive vision are b) *the salvific acts of sinners*, who are disposing themselves for justification, inasmuch as these acts must be in the same order as justification itself, lest the effect exceed the cause. But justification makes us heirs of eternal life and partakers of the divine nature.

The minor: This was proved in the treatise, *On the One God*.⁵ Therefore, those statements of the Councils of Orange and Trent “as is required” etc., really signify not the modal, as one could suspect at first sight, but entitative supernaturality.

114. B. Grace is entitatively supernatural. If salvific acts are entitatively supernatural, they necessarily must have an efficient cause which is also entitatively supernatural. But only grace is such a principle. Therefore grace is entitatively supernatural.

The major: If the efficient principle of salvific acts were entitatively natural, then the effect would exceed the cause.

The minor: The adequate principle of supernatural acts is the faculty and grace. But the faculty is entitatively natural. Therefore the entitative supernaturality must be found in grace.

5. See SThS 2,1,48-64.

115. Scholium. *On the explanation of this supernaturality.* Therefore human acts can be entitatively natural and entitatively supernatural. What is the source of this essential difference?

According to all theologians, this difference comes, at least partially, from different efficient principles. For, a natural act is produced by natural powers alone, or by the powers of nature together with medicinal grace; but a supernatural act can be elicited only with the help of elevating grace. But *the question is very much disputed*, namely, whether it is also required that the formal object be supernatural. I said *the formal object*, or that which moves the power to seek or to not to seek the *material object*, that is, that to which the power is inclined.

Thomists generally,⁶ and Suarez⁷ follows them in this, hold that a different formal object is required for a natural act than for a supernatural act. Therefore if an act is entitatively natural, its formal object will be natural, that is, apprehended by natural powers alone, without the intervention of revelation. On the other hand, if the act is entitatively supernatural, its formal object will be likewise supernatural, that is, known by the light of revelation. Again, if there is an act whose formal object is natural, by that very fact one must say that the act is entitatively natural; but if it is an act whose formal object is supernatural, then we must conclude that the act is also supernatural.

However, Molina, Lugo, Ripalda, Billot, most Jesuits, and other theologians like Gutberlet, Atzberger, V. de Meersch,⁸ teach that a different formal object in a natural act and in a supernatural act is not required *necessarily and universally*. We also embrace this opinion as being more probable. We concede that there are some acts whose object cannot be attained by any natural act, for example, the intuitive vision of God, the love consequent upon that vision, in a word—acts performed by the blessed in heaven; indeed, we concede that *de facto* many supernatural acts of the just have a different formal object. But at the same time we say that there can be natural and supernatural acts which have one and the same formal object.⁹

We prove these points as follows:

a) *Negatively*, inasmuch as neither theological nor philosophical

6. S. Soto should be excluded from this common opinion, *De natura et gratia* 1,22; 2,14 and 16. Indeed, V. de Meersch, *De divina gratia* 243, makes an exception also for St. Thomas, Capreolus and Cajetan.

7. Suarez, *De gratia* 2,11. See Salmanticenses, *De gratia* d.3 dub.3.

8. Molina, *Concordia* q.14 a.13 d.38 and 7-10; Lugo, *De fide* d.9 a.1; Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* d.45; Billot, *De virtutibus infusis* (Rome 1905) 62ff.; Gutberlet, *Dogmat. Theol.* 8,671ff.; Atzberger, *Dogmatik* 1.6 671f.; V. De Meersch, *De divina gratia* 243-247.

9. For more on this see: G. Huarte, *De gratia Christi* 111-120; H. Lange, 304-310; H. Lennerz, *De vero sensu principii "actus specificantur ab obiecto formali"*: Greg 7 (1936) 143-146; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De gratia* p. 375-387.

arguments are able to prove for certain the first opinion. *Not theological arguments*—there are two of them. 1) For, although we concede that the Apostle affirms (1 Thess. 2:13) that the faith of the Thessalonians, given because of the authority of God revealing, was supernatural, still Paul does not exclude the possibility of a natural assent, because of the authority of God revealing; for he states the fact, but he does not deny the possibility, or affirm any intrinsic repugnance. 2) Moreover, the greater perfection, which a supernatural act has, when compared with a natural act, does not proceed necessarily from the formal object, but from the order it has to the beatific vision, with which it is intrinsically connected. But *neither do the philosophical arguments* prove that opinion, since that axiom, that acts are specified by their objects, has assertive value, but by no means is it exclusive. Neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas (I-II, q. 54, a. 2) exclude other specifying principles.¹⁰

b) *Positively*, by arguing *ad hominem*. If the formal object, that is, the motive of natural and supernatural assent were different, we would be able to discern the different acts. But the adversaries themselves refuse to concede this. Therefore it must be said that the motive of natural and supernatural assent does not necessarily differ.

c) It is also proved *positively* from Orange and Trent (D 376, 377, 396, 1553), inasmuch as these Councils teach that man cannot believe, hope, repent... *as is required* for justification and salvation, without grace. But these seem to imply that man can posit these same acts in a purely natural way, or not in the way that is required. Therefore it is only because of a difference in the operating principle that the former acts are supernatural, but the latter ones are natural.¹¹ There is more on this in the treatise on faith.

10. See Lange, 305 n.2.

11. See Molina, *Concordia* q.14 a.13 d.7; Huarte, *De gratia Christi* 115.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF GRACE

116. That grace, which must be said to be both *necessary* and *gratuitous* and *supernatural*, is it also *universal*, that is, is it given to all?

Since from the treatise *On the One God* it is certain that God desires the salvation of all men, and on the other hand since we have proved in this treatise (n. 3-22) the necessity of grace for salvation, its universality flows from that too. For, no one would say that God seriously desires the salvation of all men, if he refused to give them the necessary means, that is, the grace to attain it. Therefore in this article we will investigate in a concrete way the law which God follows in distributing his graces to adults of the New Law. But since these can be either *just*, or *believing sinners*, or *unbelievers*, we will present a thesis regarding each one of them.

Thesis 13. For the observance of a precept, grace proximately or remotely sufficient, by which they can fulfill it, is conferred by God on all the just.

S.Th. I-II, q. 109, a. 9; Lercher-Lakner, 371-379; Beraza, 397-405; Lange, 175-185.

117. Connection. As we said above in n. 69, even though the gift of perseverance for the just is uncertain, for his part God offers to all sufficient helps to obtain it by the proper observance of the commandments. Therefore we will now have to prove this.

118. Definition of terms. *The just*, that is, adults with the use of reason who are in the state of grace.

All, even those who de facto are going to sin mortally, and also those who are not predestined.

For the observance of a precept, that is, what is necessary to keep a grave precept and is recognized as such; and for its observance grace is necessary, either because the precept is supernatural, or because, although it is natural, a serious temptation is present which cannot be overcome without grace.

Sufficient grace is a grace by which a just person is made capable of observing a precept. But, according to Augustine and Trent, some are proximately sufficient and others are remotely sufficient: "For God does not command the impossible, but when he commands he admonishes you to do what you can and to pray for what you cannot do" (D 1536). Therefore,

proximately sufficient grace is called that which immediately, without any new help, makes a just person capable of fulfilling the commandments; but *remotely sufficient grace* is the grace of prayer, which God continually bestows on the just, and by which, if they use it well, they will obtain proximately sufficient help in order to observe the commandments.

They can fulfill it-- it is a true power, not only absolute but also relative, that is, even though some contrary concupiscence is present.

119. Adversaries. 1) *The Reformers* taught that the observance of the commandments is impossible, even for the just; especially the commandment to love God with one's whole heart, and the precept of not coveting.

2) *Jansen* held that some precepts are impossible, even for the just, because, given the domination of earthly love, the grace is lacking by which the observance of the commandments is made possible. Certainly according to him, a distinction must be made between absolutely sufficient grace and relatively sufficient grace. The first, considered only in its nature and prescinding from other circumstances, suffices in order to elicit a salvific act; the second, considered not only in its nature but also by paying attention to the contrary earthly love in a definite subject, confers sufficient powers in order to elicit an act. Given this distinction, he denies relatively sufficient grace and admits absolutely sufficient grace which, as is evident, cannot really be said to be sufficient.

120. Doctrine of the Church. *Carthage*, cn.3 (D 225) teaches that grace strengthens a person, not only for the remission of sins, but also so that new ones are not committed. *Orange*, cn.25 (D 397): "We also believe and profess that... after baptism we may with his help accomplish what is pleasing to him." *Trent*, cn.18 (1568): "If anyone says that the commandments of God are impossible to observe even for a man who is justified and established in grace, let him be anathema." See D 1536. Innocent X (D 2001) condemned the proposition of Jansen as heretical. Pius XI (D 3718) applies this to the right use of matrimony.

121. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 2001).

122. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) From 1 Cor. 10:13: *God is faithful, and he will not let you be tempted beyond your strength.* The Jansenists understood this passage to be about the predestined only.¹

1. See Cornely, *In priorem epistolam ad Corinthios* 284-287.

Context: The Apostle warns the Corinthians that the profession of the Christian faith is not sufficient to attain eternal salvation, but that they must also avoid sins, lest, like the Israelites, they sin and so perish. Therefore, he who thinks he stands firm in the way of salvation, should be careful lest he fall....

Text: *No temptation has overtaken you* (εἰληφε, that is, overtaken) *that is not common to man.* Up till now you have endured only minor temptations, which were suited to your weakness. Wherefore, even in the future you should have confidence....

God is faithful... this gives courage to the Corinthians; for God will not allow you to be tempted beyond your strength to resist.

But with the temptation he will also provide the way of escape (ἐκβασιν). He will see to it that you emerge victorious from temptation, in the way in which a soldier prevails in battle.

However the Apostle says these things *about the justified, and also about those who are not predestined.*

He is talking *about the justified.* For, a) Paul is writing to the faithful of the Church in Corinth; b) he says explicitly in v. 12: *Let anyone who thinks he stands take heed lest he fall.*

He is talking *about all the justified,* even about those who are not predestined. For, a) the purpose of the letter is to console the Corinthians and to encourage those tempted; but the Apostle would in no way achieve that, if his words applied only to the predestined, since no one knows that he is in the number of the predestined; b) it is gratuitous to suppose that all the faithful of that Church were predestined; c) Trent uses these words to promote the observance of the vow of chastity (D 1809) and Pius XI used them to recommend the duties of spouses (D 3718).

Argument: No just person, even those not predestined, is tempted beyond what he can endure. But if, for the observance of some precept, he were not given grace proximately or remotely sufficient in order to observe it, he would be tempted beyond what he can endure. Therefore, grace is given to all the faithful in order to fulfill the precepts, when their observance is put to the test.

2) Trent (D 1536) proves that all the just enjoy grace that is truly sufficient for the observance of the precepts, by quoting the words of Jesus *my yoke is sweet and my burden is light* (Matt. 11:30), and the words of John the Apostle *his commandments are not burdensome* (1 John 5:3).

123. Proof from tradition. St. Augustine supports this truth with two principles: a) “God does not abandon us, if he is not abandoned”²; b) “God does not command what is impossible, but...”³ In the writings of St. Augustine you will find more on this point (R 1889, 1954, 1960).

After St. Augustine St. Prosper explains the first Augustinian principle: “For they were not abandoned by God [sinners], so that they would abandon God; but they abandoned him and were abandoned because they changed themselves from good to evil by their own will...” (R 2026; see 2029). Gennadius testifies that “no one perishes by the will of God, but he is permitted to use his free will, lest the uprightness of power, given once to man, be forced to slavish necessity” (R 2227). St. Caesar of Arles reaffirms the saying of Augustine: “God never abandons a man, unless he is first abandoned by man” (R 2232). Finally, St. Fulgentius: “No man sins justly, although God justly permits him to sin. For that man who abandons God is justly abandoned by God” (R 2255).

124. Theological reasoning. When he must obey a commandment, the justified person can always persevere in justice. But he cannot do this without grace. Therefore when he must obey a commandment, the justified person always has sufficient grace.

The major: If sometimes he were not able to persevere, then the sin would not be imputed to him. But the sin is always imputed to him. Therefore he is always able to persevere.

The minor: We proved in thesis 7 that the just without grace cannot persevere in habitual grace for a long time.

125. Objections. 1. It is certain from John 13:10 that Peter before his denial of Christ was justified. But Peter lacked the grace to overcome his temptation. Therefore the grace necessary to observe the precepts is not always given to all the justified.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. Peter lacked efficacious grace, *conceded*; he lacked sufficient grace, *I subdistinguish*. Proximately sufficient grace, *I bypass*; at least remotely sufficient grace, *denied*.

2. From John 13:36 it is clear that Peter lacked all grace. *Where I am going you cannot follow me now, but you shall follow afterward*. This is confirmed by the interpretation of the Fathers. For, Chrysostom writes about Peter: “Because he was not strengthened by any assistance, he fell.”⁴ And St. Hilary says about Peter that “he was not able to avoid guilt, even though he had been warned.”⁵ Therefore, at least sometimes, some just persons lack all the grace they need to keep the commandments.

2. St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia* 26 (R 1792).

3. St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia* 26 (R 1795).

4. Chrysostom, *In Mt hom.* 82,4: MG 58,742.

5. St. Hilary, *In Mt c.* 32 n.4: ML 9,1071.

I respond 1) that the words of Christ are understood by St. Augustine to be about the martyrdom of Peter, inasmuch as Peter at the time did not have the necessary strength to die for Christ, but that he would have it later after the advent of the Holy Spirit.⁶ Given this interpretation, the quoted words prove nothing against the thesis, since the precept of dying for Christ was not yet pressing on Peter.

2) But if someone contends that the words of Christ the Lord should be understood to be about grace, it is necessary to say that it ought to be understood about the removal of more abundant grace, but not at all about the negation of all grace, even remotely sufficient. For, the words *you cannot follow me now* signify his incapacity following upon a defect in his will, but not an antecedent defect.

3) Indeed the foundation of this interpretation is found in the Fathers themselves who raise the objections. For, according to Chrysostom, Christ “abandoned Peter in order that he might learn his own weakness”⁷; therefore Peter was abandoned by Christ, because he was puffed up and had too much self-confidence. However, St. Hilary tries to excuse Peter’s denial, while at the same time hinting that his weakness was a result of a defect in his will. Further, St. Augustine openly confesses: “For who will doubt that Judas would not have betrayed Christ if he so chose; and Peter, if he chose, would not have denied Christ three times? For, when he felt that he was strengthened, he was able to set aside the agitation of his mind, and to say to God with the prophet: You are my protector, do not abandon me.”⁸

3. From St. Augustine who says: “Of two pious men, why perseverance to the end is given to this one, and is not given to the other, flows from the inscrutable judgments of God.”⁹ But if both had sufficient grace to observe the precepts, it would have to have happened that one consented to the grace, but the other rejected it. Therefore, this appeal to the inscrutable judgments of God shows that Augustine did not hold that all the justified have sufficient grace to observe the precepts.

I distinguish the major. The *universal* and *ultimate* reason why of the two pious men, one perseveres and the other does not, is the inscrutable judgment of God, *conceded*; the *inadequate* and *proximate* reason, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* He would have had to appeal to the fact that one consented, but the other rejected it, as the *inadequate* and *proximate* reason, *conceded*; as the *universal* and *ultimate* reason, *denied*.

The proximate and inadequate reason for the difference between perseverance and non-perseverance is the fact that one consents to the grace, but the other rejects it. Nevertheless the universal, adequate and ultimate reason is the inscrutable mystery of divine predestination. That is what St. Augustine is talking about.

4. Sufficient grace to keep the commandments consists in the enlightenment of the mind, teaching it what must be done and what must be avoided. But such knowledge excludes ignorance about the observance of the commandments. Therefore, if sufficient grace were always given, when it is necessary to keep a commandment, no one

6. St. Augustine, *In Io* tr.66 n.1: ML 35,1810.

7. Chrysostom, *In Io* hom.73,1: MG 59,395.

8. St. Augustine, *De unitate Ecclesiae* 9,23: ML 43,407; CSEL 52,257.

9. St. Augustine, *De dono perseverantiae* 9,21 (R 1995).

would sin out of ignorance; but this contradicts daily experience.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. It excludes inculpable ignorance, *conceded*; it excludes all culpable ignorance, *denied*. *I also distinguish the consequent.* No one would sin from inculpable ignorance, *conceded*; from some culpable ignorance, *denied*.

Thesis 14. Grace at least remotely sufficient for doing penance is given also to all sinners among the faithful, depending on the circumstances of place and time.

S.Th. III, q. 86, a. 1; Lercher-Lakner, 371-379; Beraza, 406-430; Lange, 665-696.

126. Definition of terms. *Sinners among the faithful*, that is, adults with the use of reason who fall into grave sin after Baptism, but retain their Catholic faith. These however can be either predestined or reprobate. In the thesis we are concerned primarily with the reprobate. For, the predestined will have at some time not only sufficient grace, but also efficacious grace.

To all: the sinner is thought of as either common, or blinded or hardened. A *common sinner* is understood as one who falls into sin more from weakness than from malice. A *blinded and hardened sinner* is one who adheres obstinately to his sins. The state of such a person is opposed to the state of grace. For, just as grace says enlightenment of the mind and movement of the will to what is good, so, in contrast, the blinded and hardened sinner says both blindness of the mind (consisting in the first place in a certain dullness in perceiving what concerns salvation, and secondly in a positive perversion of judgment, see Isa. 5:20), and a hardening of the will (arising in the first place from obstinate resistance to grace and secondly from a firm attachment to sin). This is blindness and hardness taken in a passive sense.

This is found *perfectly* in the damned. But in wayfarers it is found *imperfectly*, since it does not absolutely exclude conversion.

The *intrinsic and principal* cause of this blindness and hardness is the sinner himself, as the efficient cause. The *extrinsic and inducing* cause is the devil; God can be said to be the *negative, permissive and occasional* cause (Rom. 9:18; John 12:400. This is blindness and hardness taken in an active sense.

Is given: the word "to be given" in our case can be understood in two ways. *In the first way*, it is understood from the side of God alone, and it is the same thing as "to be offered," or the grace to be prepared by God; in this sense, God can give grace to man without man accepting it. *In the second way*, it is understood not only from the side of God but also from the side of man, and it is the same thing as for the grace to be de facto conferred by God and for it to be accepted by man; in this sense, grace cannot be given by God without it being accepted by man. We are saying that grace is given in both senses. But there is a great difference to be taken into account here. For, it is held by all Catholics that grace is given in the first sense

(*offered*); but it is not admitted by all theologians that grace is given in the second sense (*conferred*).

Depending on the circumstances of place and time, at a suitable time. Therefore sinners are not called to conversion at just any time, but generally when external graces are present: a) preaching, reading, good example; b) problems with health, good fortune, the death of a friend; c) a good deed, v.gr., giving alms; d) at the moment of death, for then the necessity of repentance is urgent.

For doing penance, that is, for conversion to Christ or the recovery of the state of grace. For, in these sinners grace is considered as necessary, either in order to avoid new mortal sins or for conversion. We suppose that they have sufficient grace to avoid new sins. For, if grace were denied to them, which would be necessary to avoid sin, they would sin; for, no one is held to what is impossible. Therefore in the thesis we are talking about the grace of conversion or of salvific repentance.

Therefore, *the meaning of our thesis is*: God does not deny grace which is at least remotely sufficient for conversion to any believing sinners—neither common ones nor those blinded and hardened by sin; but, at the right time, God confers grace on them, at least remotely sufficient, in order that, having cooperated faithfully with this grace, they can repent and find salvation.

127. Adversaries. 1) *Jansen* denied sufficient grace for conversion to blinded and hardened sinners. For, he wrote in c.10 1.3 in his *De gratia Christi*: “Blinded and hardened sinners lack sufficient grace by which they see and are moved to what is good.”

2) *Many older Thomists* (Báñez, Alvarez, Gonet, John of St. Thomas, Ledesma, Lemos...) held that God *offers* sufficient grace for conversion generally to all sinners, but he does not *confer* it on some so that they accept it, as a punishment for their sins. However, today this opinion seems to have been abandoned by recent Thomists.¹

3) They seem to err *by excess* who attribute to each and every man a certain final illumination, which does not appear to be sufficiently founded on revelation or on daily experience.²

1. Báñez, *In 1* q.23 a.3; Alvarez, *De aux. gratiae* d.112; Gonet, *De reprobatione* d.5 a.5; John of St. Thomas, *Cursus theologicus* in q.24 d.10 a.3; Ledesma, *De auxiliis* a.16 dicto 4; Lemos, *Panoplia* t.4 p.2 tr.3 c.16; Hugon, *De gratia* q.5 a.3.

2. See, v.gr., A. Getino, *Del gran número de los que se salvan y de la mitigación de las penas eternas* (Madrid 1934) dialogue 4 (p. 51), dialogue 15 (p. 248f.). See Salmanticenses, *De gratia* d.3 dub.8 n.199.

128. Doctrine of the Church. *Lateran IV*, c.1 (D 802): “After receiving baptism, anyone who shall have lapsed into sin can always be restored through true penance.” *Trent*, s.6 cn.29 (D 1579): “If anyone says that the man who has fallen after baptism cannot rise again through God’s grace... let him be anathema.”

129. Theological note. 1) Concerning common sinners it is a truth that is *implicitly defined divine and Catholic faith*. For, it has been defined that baptized sinners can always be restored through penance; and elsewhere it has also been defined that it cannot take place without grace (D 374, 1553). Therefore this grace must be offered to these sinners.

2) Regarding blinded and hardened sinners the thesis is *common and certain*.

130. Proof from Holy Scripture. The Holy Scriptures, without making any distinction between the ordinary sinner and the hardened one, testify that God desires the conversion of all. But without grace that cannot happen, as was proved in theses 1 and 2. Therefore grace, at least what is remotely sufficient for conversion, is not lacking in any of them.

The major: Ezek. 33:11: *As I live, says the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked, but that the wicked turn from his way and live; turn back, turn back from you evil ways....* 2 Pet. 3:9: *The Lord... is forbearing toward you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance.* Rom. 2:4: *Do you not know that God’s kindness is meant to lead you to repentance?* Luke 15:1-32 in three parables shows how Christ receives sinners. However those passages, in which some sins seem to be treated as unforgiveable (Matt. 12:31; Heb. 6:4; 10:25; 1 John 5:16), are explained in the treatise on Penance.³

131. Proof from tradition. *The Fathers* bear witness in various ways that the way of salvation is always open to sinners:

1) When for this reason the words of Scripture are interpreted. Thus, St. Cyril of Alexandria: “Since he [God] says to sinners, ‘you will still have help,’ he lifts them up to hope and trust, even though they are burdened with many grave sins...” (R 2097). And St. Caesar of Arles says: “Since each one committed grave sins once, twice and a third time, nevertheless God waits for him, as he says through the prophet, *so that he turn back and live*” (R 2232).

2) From the universal salvific will of God. St. Prosper: “Likewise, the

3. SThS 4,4,27-30.

one who says that God does not desire that all men be saved speaks more harshly than what should be said about the greatness of the inscrutable grace of God, *who desires that all be saved, and that they come to the knowledge of the truth...* (R 2030). Ambrosiaster: “*God desires that all men be saved, but if they come to Him; for he does not so wish that those who do not repent should be saved; but he desires them to be saved, if they also will it...*” (R 1343). Chrysostom: “If he ‘enlightens every man that comes into the world,’ how is it that so many continue unenlightened?... How then does he enlighten every man? He enlightens all as far as in him lies. But if some, willfully closing the eyes of their mind, would not receive the rays of that light, their darkness arises not from the nature of the light, but from their own wickedness, who willfully deny themselves of the gift” (R 1158).

3) Inasmuch as they teach that sinners perish from the defect of their own cooperation with grace. Thus Chrysostom says: “It is not licit to say: I cannot... How is it, then, he says, that many cannot? Because they do not will it. Why do they not will it? Because of their desires; for, if they willed it, they certainly could do it...” (R 1220). St. Jerome: “Such is his goodness [God]... that he chooses a man who, he perceives, will meanwhile be good, and who, he knows, will turn out badly, thus giving him the power of being converted and repenting...” (R 1405). St. Augustine: “They could not believe... But if I am asked why they could not, I reply at once, because they would not...” (R 1830).

4) Inasmuch as they assert that the door to forgiveness is open to each person, as long as he lives. Thus St. Cyprian: “When there has been a withdrawal hence, then there is no opportunity for repentance, no accomplishment of satisfaction... To him who still remains in this world no repentance is too late. The approach to God’s forgiveness is open, and for those who seek and understand the truth the access is easy” (R 561).

132. Theological reasoning. Here is what St. Thomas says (III, q. 86, a. 1): “The fact that a sin cannot be taken away by Penance may happen in two ways: first, because of the impossibility of repenting of sin; secondly, because of Penance being unable to blot out a sin. In the first way the sins of the demons and of men who are lost, cannot be blotted out by Penance, because their will is confirmed in evil... Nevertheless no sin of a wayfarer can be such as that, because his will is flexible to good and evil. Hence to say that in this life there is any sin of which one cannot repent, is erroneous, first, because this would destroy free will, secondly, because this would be derogatory to the power of grace, whereby the heart of any sinner whatsoever can be moved to repent.”

133. Objections. 1. Scripture (Isa. 5:5f.; Jer. 51:9; Matt. 23:32) says that God, when the measure of sins is full, no longer has mercy on some men. Therefore the grace of repentance is not given to all sinners.

I distinguish the antecedent. Certainly of those who come to the end of life, *conceded*; of those also who are still living in this life, *I subdistinguish*: he does not take further mercy on them, inasmuch as he imposes temporal evils on them, *conceded*; inasmuch as he refuses to give all grace to them, even remotely sufficient in order to repent, *denied*.

2. From John 12:40 and Isa. 6:10: *He has blinded their eyes, and hardened their heart...* Therefore, the Jews were not able to believe, because God blinded them. Therefore, the grace of conversion is not given to all sinners.

I distinguish the antecedent. They were not able to believe with an antecedent incapacity, *denied*; with an incapacity consequent to the exercise of freedom, *I subdistinguish*: they could not believe immediately, because they lacked proximately sufficient grace, *conceded*; they could not believe mediately, if they responded to remotely sufficient grace which they had, *denied*. Therefore, God blinded the eyes of the Jews, not *directly* and *positively*, but *negatively* or *permissively*, inasmuch as he denied to them more abundant helps to believe.⁴

3. From Rom. 9:18, 21 we know that God hardens whom he will, and he conducts himself like a potter, who by his own choice, makes one vessel for beauty and another for menial use. Therefore, not all receive the grace necessary for conversion.

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. Not all receive graces from God foreseen as efficacious in order to embrace faith, *conceded*; not all receive grace that is truly sufficient, *denied*.⁵

4. From Trent (D 1536), adopting the opinion of Augustine: God does not abandon someone, if he is not abandoned. But sinners abandon God by their sins. Therefore they are also abandoned by God; therefore they lack the grace necessary for conversion.

I concede the major and minor but distinguish the consequent. They are abandoned by God through the removal of sanctifying grace, *conceded*; through the removal of all actual grace, even that remotely sufficient for conversion, *denied*.

5. From St. Augustine many statements are collected together which seem to be opposed to the thesis: "Since I think that the blind person wants to see, but cannot."⁶ "But now there is the blindness of the mind, and then the eye of the mind is extinguished."⁷ "We know that grace is not given to all men..." (R 1456).

Response. That the mind of the holy Doctor be properly understood and to respond easily to these and other difficulties, the following points must be kept in mind:

a) When he seems to deny that grace is given to all sinners, sometimes he is speaking about *habitual grace*, but not about *actual grace*.

b) At other times, he is talking about *efficacious grace*, or even what we today call *proximately sufficient grace*.

c) You should make a distinction between *grace for faith* and *grace of faith*. The

4. See St. Augustine, *In Io tr.* 53 n.6 and 10: ML 35,1778.

5. For more on this, see Bover, *Teología de San Pablo* 234-250.

6. St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia* 51,59: ML 44,276; CSEL 60,277.

7. St. Augustine, *Enarrat. In Ps.* 57 n.22: ML 36,692.

former is the disposition for conversion, and it is given to all; but the latter is the act of faith or the beginning of salvation, which is not given to all.

d) Another point is *abandonment on the part of God*, which admits many different degrees and does not exclude all grace; but another is the *denial* of all grace.

e) Distinguish also between *to give grace* and *to receive grace*. For, with Augustine, to receive grace is the same thing as to cooperate with grace.

f) It is important to remember that St. Augustine, towards the *end* of his life, to a certain extent limited the universal salvific will.⁸

8. See Lercher-Lakner, 379 pb.8.

Thesis 15. Finally, God does not deny truly sufficient grace to unbelievers so that they can be converted to the faith.

Beraza, 431-448; Lange, 665-696.

134. Definition of terms. *An unbeliever* is said to be one who lacks true faith in God and in Christ the Lord. A distinction is made between a negative and a positive unbeliever. A *negative* unbeliever is one to whom the true faith was never sufficiently proposed. A *positive* unbeliever is one who has neglected to hear or accept the faith sufficiently proposed to him, or has rejected it after having accepted it, either totally (apostate) or partially (heretic). In the thesis we are considering *negative unbelievers*, and those who are adults; for, a truly sufficient grace has already been given at some time to the positive unbelievers.

Truly sufficient grace, whatever this may be—natural or supernatural, remote or proximate. For, we are omitting to determine this more precisely, because different opinions are expressed about it, according as a different way of providing salvation of unbelievers is proposed.

Therefore, in the thesis we assert only the *fact*: God gives truly sufficient grace so that unbelieving adults can come to faith. But we are saying nothing about the *way* in which God brings about this vocation.¹

135. Opinions. 1) *Jansen* denied that Christ died for all men (D 2005). The *Jansenists* held that Christ was offered up for the faithful only; hence they denied all influence of Christ and all sufficient grace is given to pagans, Jews and heretics (D 2304-2305). Quesnel repeated the same errors; he said that faith is the first grace, and that no grace is given outside the Church (D 2426-2429).

2) Among the theologians, the same opinion was not always held strongly:

a) St. Thomas (*De verit.* q.14, a. 11 ad 1) openly defended the universal call to faith; but as an older man he did not dare to affirm it with the same firmness and extent (see II-II, q. 2, a. 5 ad 1).²

2) *Many Thomists*, that is, those mentioned in the previous thesis, taught that God *offers* the grace of faith to all, inasmuch as he provides the general

1. On these points, see L. Capéran, *Le problème du salut des infidèles* (Toulouse 1934); E. Harent, *Infidèles: DTC 7,1726-1930*; D'Ales: DAFC 4,1156-82; T. Urdáñez, O.P., *La necesidad de la fe explicita para salvarse, según los teólogos de la Escuela Salmantina*: CiencTom 59 (1940) 395-414, 529-533; 60 (1941) 109-134; 61 (1941) 83-107; P. Angeli, O.P., *La possibilità di salute nel primo atto morale per il fanciullo infedele* (Rome 1946); H.P.A. Cornelissen, O.P., *Geloof zonder prediking* (Roermond-Maaseik 1946).

2. See J. de Guibert, S.J., *Quelle a été la pensée de S. Thomas sur le salut des infidèles*: Bull.LittEccl (1913) 337-355; P. Lumberras, O.P., *Cuando el salvaje llega al uso de razón*: AnAsFrV 7 (1946-1947) 85-128.

means that are *per se* sufficient; but he does not *confer* the same means of salvation on all, because *per accidens*, in particular cases, they cannot be applied, and God is not held to supply miraculously for the defects of secondary causes.

c) However this opinion today has been abandoned by the Thomists themselves. For example, here is what Hugon says: "Graces proximately or remotely sufficient, depending on time and place, are given to all negative unbelievers. Even though of old many theologians denied that, today that conclusion is very common."³ And on this same point M. Sola says: "This doctrine today is quite common among Catholic theologians."⁴

136. Doctrine of the Church. Innocent X condemned the error of Jansen (D 2005). Alexander VIII condemned the Jansenists (D 2304-2305). Clement XI condemned Quesnel (D 2426-2429). Pius IX said that "God... will not permit... anyone who is not guilty of a voluntary fault to suffer eternal punishment" (D 2866).

137. Theological note. *Common and certain.*

138. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) *From the universal salvific will of God.* For God desires all men to be saved and to come to the knowledge of the truth (1 Tim. 2:4). Accepting the exegesis of this text from the treatise *On the One God*,⁵ we argue: God seriously desires the salvation of all men. But such serious desire would not be in God with respect to unbelievers, if he did not give them truly sufficient grace by which they could come to acknowledgment of the truth. Therefore, at least occasionally in life, God gives truly sufficient grace to unbelievers in order that they might dispose themselves and come to faith, which is necessary for justification.

2) *From the universal redemption of Christ.* For Christ gave himself as a ransom for all (1 Tim. 2:6); Christ died for all (2 Cor. 5:15). Therefore, Christ died for all, and he truly redeemed all or he merited salvation for all. Therefore this must be possible for all. But this can happen only by a call to faith, either proximate or at least remote. Therefore there is sufficient grace so that all unbelievers can come to faith.

139. Proof from tradition. *The Fathers* a) appeal to the universal salvific will (R 622, 1158) and to the universal redemption (R 12); b) they

3. E. Hugon, O.P., *De gratia* q.5 a.3.

4. See *CiencTom* 33 (1926) 357.

5. *SThS* 2,1,229.

say that all those who perish, perish because of their own guilt (R 1313, 1343); c) Orosius taught explicitly: "This has always been my faithful and undoubted opinion that God gives his assistance, not only in his own body, which is the Church..., but also to all peoples in this world because of his patient and eternal clemency..." (R 2020).

140. Theological reasoning. All adults are bound to tend to their last end, that is, to eternal salvation. But salvific faith is the means absolutely necessary for salvation; but this is impossible unless truly sufficient grace is given to them as a call to faith. Therefore this sufficient grace as a call to faith is given to all.

141. Objections. 1. From Acts 14:16: *In past generations he allowed all the nations to walk in their own ways.* And in Acts 16:6 it is said about Paul and Timothy that *they were forbidden by the Holy Spirit to speak the word in Asia.* Therefore before the advent of Christ all nations lacked sufficient grace to obtain salvation, and after Christ at least some lack the same grace.

I concede the major and deny the consequent. For, *in the first place*, it is said only that God did not have the singular providence for the nations that he had for the Jews, but in no way that he refused to give them sufficient grace for salvation. *In the second place*, it is said that the Holy Spirit at that particular time did not will to impart the grace of faith to the Asians, but which he did grant later. Therefore God grants this grace only at the opportune time.

2. Orange, cn.25 (D 397) confesses that God "first instills in us faith in him and love for him"; but Trent, s.6 c.8 (D 1532) says that faith is "the beginning of man's salvation." Hence it concludes that faith constitutes the first supernatural grace. But this grace is not conferred on negative unbelievers. Therefore negative unbelievers lack sufficient grace for salvation.

I distinguish the major. Perfect faith, or intellectual assent given to revealed truths because of the authority of God revealing constitutes the first supernatural grace, *denied*; imperfect faith or beginning faith by which adults are disposed to elicit an act of perfect faith constitutes the first supernatural grace, *I subdistinguish*: according as it is a deliberate act of the unbeliever, *denied*; according as it is the principle of this act, *conceded*. But other medicinal graces can still precede this first supernatural grace. *I also distinguish the minor.* The grace of perfect faith is not given to negative unbelievers, *conceded*; imperfect faith, entitatively supernatural, or at least medicinal, which remotely suffices for the purpose that an unbeliever comes to perfect faith, *denied* (see D 2426-2429).

3. If graces at least remotely sufficient were given to negative unbelievers, their ignorance in matters of faith would be culpable. But it is not culpable, as is certain from the condemnation of the proposition of de Bay: "Pure negative infidelity in those among whom Christ has been preached is a sin" (D 1968). Therefore remotely sufficient graces

are not given to negative unbelievers in order that they might be converted to the faith.

I deny the major. For, in order for this ignorance to be culpable, it would be required that they freely reject it, that is, to reject the graces by which they are invited to faith. Now, since such an effect, not even in a confused way, can be known about unbelievers as its cause, neither can their opposition to the given graces take on some formal responsibility against the faith. Therefore the proposition of de Bay was deservedly condemned; he taught that negative infidelity, although involuntary, is a sin; for, de Bay held that voluntariness does not belong to the nature of sin (D 1946).

4. This remotely sufficient grace, before faith, is the grace of prayer. But salvific prayer supposes faith, according to Paul's words: "How are men to call upon him in whom they have not believed?" (Rom. 10:14). Therefore negative unbelievers have absolutely no grace in order to achieve salvation.

I distinguish the major. Some prayer, *conceded*; the prayer about which the Apostle is speaking, or invoking God the Savior, which is a profession of Christian faith, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* The prayer about which Paul speaks supposes faith, *conceded*; any kind of prayer, *denied*. It should be noted that remotely sufficient grace in unbelievers cannot be prayer in the strict sense, since that supposes faith. Therefore, remotely sufficient prayer in unbelievers will be a help to keep the natural law, or also some other help, depending on the different opinion that someone may have about the manner of the call to faith.

5. If grace at least remotely sufficient to embrace the faith were conferred on negative unbelievers, the mystery of predestination would disappear. For then the reason could easily be given why some come to faith, but others do not, namely, because some consent to remotely sufficient grace, but others do not. Therefore, grace cannot be conferred on negative unbelievers, not even grace that is remotely sufficient, in order to come to faith.

I deny the antecedent. For, even after having given such grace to unbelievers, the mystery of predestination still remains. For it always remains unknown to us why God gives efficacious graces to some, but to others only sufficient graces.

142. Scholium. *On the unequal distribution of graces.* God freely willed to bind himself by some laws in the distribution of graces, while he promised that he would give graces to all that are at least remotely sufficient for salvation, that he would infallibly hear prayers under certain condition, and so forth. These promises, however, in no way remove the gratuity of grace.

But also, having freely established these laws, which God faithfully observes, he still retains great freedom in the distribution of graces, which he exercises differently in the O.T and in the N.T., among adults and infants, among believers and unbelievers, among ordinary Christians and certain chosen souls. For, he dispenses to individual men, as he wishes, both charismatic graces and sanctifying graces, and they can be either external or internal.

Moreover, *the sacred Scriptures* bear clear witness to this fact (Matt. 11:20; 13:11; 20:1; 25:14; Luke 19:12; Rom. 12:3; 1 Cor. 12:11; Eph. 4:7), *the holy Fathers* (v.gr.,

Augustine, Prosper, Fulgentius), *the Council of Trent* when it says that justice is given “according to the measure that the Holy Spirit apportions to each one individually as he wills, and according to each one’s personal disposition and cooperation” (D 1529).

Therefore, the first and principal cause of this unequal distribution is the divine will, but the disposition and cooperation of each person is also a factor.

CHAPTER II

On the grace of justification

P. Lombard, *Sent.* 2,26; S.Th. I-II, q. 112-113; St. Bonaventure, *In 2 Sent.* d.26 q.1-6; Scotus, *In 2 Sent.* d.26-27; Aegidius Romanus, *In libros Sententiarum* 2,26; Suarez, *De gratia* 1,6-9; 1-11; Bellarmine, *De iustificatione impii libri quinque*; Salmanticenses, *Cursus theologicus* tr.15 d.1-4; Berti, *De theologicis disciplinis* 1,19 c.1-5 and 9; H. Lange, *De gratia* 311-487; Lennerz, *De gratia Redemptoris* p.74-133; J. Rivière, *Justification*: DTC 8,2042-2227; J.V. de Meersch, *Grâce sanctificante*: DTC 6,1604-1636; E. Tobac, *Grâce*: DAFC 2,224f.

143. We have spoken so far about the properties common to any grace. Now we will consider the various species of grace, that is, *habitual grace* and *actual grace*. We will treat habitual grace first.

Every supernatural gift that inheres in the soul by way of a habit or as a permanent quality comes under the broad notion of habitual grace. These are: sanctifying grace, the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit. But in a more strict sense, habitual grace is the same as what more recent theologians have called *sanctifying grace*. But in the Middle Ages sanctifying grace was called *grace making one pleasing to God* (*gratia gratum faciens*), or also just simply “grace.” In the decrees of the Council of Trent it is expressed in the phrase *the grace of justification* (D 1553, 1567, 1580).

Now in order to develop fully the doctrine on the grace of justification, first of all we will consider *the origin of justification* or the preparation of adults to receive justice; then, *the nature of justification*, both in itself and in its effects; and finally, *the properties of justification*, that is, its increase, loss and uncertainty.

All of these points are clearly explained by the Tridentine decree on justification. For, after the introduction in chs. 1-4, then it deals with the necessity of and way of preparation for justification in adults in ch.5-6, with the nature of this justification in ch.7-9, in ch.10-15 with the increase of justification, perseverance and the loss of grace.¹

ARTICLE I

ON THE ORIGIN OF JUSTIFICATION

144. The origin of justification is different in children from what it is

1. As commentaries on the decree on justification, the following are recommended: A. de Vega, *Tridentini decreti de iustificatione expositio et defensio libris XV distincta, totam doctrinam iustificationis complectentibus* (1548); D. Soto, *De natura et gratia* (1,2-3) (1947). An ample bibliography is offered by J. Olazarán, S.J., *EstEcl* 20 (1946) 297f.; especially 312f. See also S. González, S.J.: *EstEcl* 21 (1947) 147f.

in adults. For, children are justified from the rite itself (*ex opere operato*) through the sacrament of Baptism. But adults must do something. The words of Augustine are well known: "He who made you without you, does not justify you without you. Therefore, he made you without your knowledge, but he justifies you when you will it" (R 1515). But how?

The Protestants thought along these lines²:

1) Because of original sin or inordinate concupiscence man is so corrupt that all his works, both before and after justification, are sins. Therefore, we cannot talk about any preparation on our part for justification. For, fiducial faith (*fides fiducialis*) can in no way be called a disposition or a meritorious cause of justification because it is an *empty vessel* or a *mere hand* with which we grasp the justice of Christ.

2) A Godless person, without any internal renewal, grasps the justice of Christ by *faith alone* (*sola fides*) without any acts of the other virtues.

3) But this faith is not dogmatic faith, which they ridicule, but *fiducial faith*, that is, that confidence by which a man is firmly convinced that his sins are no longer imputed to him out of the mercy of God because of the merits of Christ. Therefore, this fiducial faith is an act of the will, which however presupposes some previous knowledge and intellectual assent.³

We oppose all these errors explicitly condemned by Trent (D 1554-1557, 1559, 1561-1564) with the Catholic doctrine of preparation for justification, which includes both the *fact* of the necessity of some preparation, and *its mode*. We will prove the fact in thesis 16 and the mode in theses 17 and 18.

Thesis 16. Adults must prepare themselves to accept justification.

S.Th. I-II, q. 112, a. 2; q. 113, a. 3; Lercher-Lakner, 55-60; Lange, 322-341.

145. Definition of terms. *An adult*, that is, a man enjoying the use of reason, and aided by intrinsically supernatural actual grace, so that the preparatory acts of justification are truly salvific.

Prepare. Trent, s.6 ch.5-7, uses as synonyms for divine grace the words *cooperation*, *disposition* and *preparation* (D 1525, 1527, 1554, 1559). Therefore we say: *negatively*, that the sinner must not remain just passive in the reception of justification; *positively*, he must contribute something by his own activity to his justification, which we will explain later. In the

2. When and how Luther arrived at this opinion is explained by: J. Lortz, *Die Reformation in Deutschland* (1939) 1,188f.; H. Grisar, *Luther* (1811-1912) 1,304f.; 3,978f. On the pre-Tridentine controversies, see J.M. Dalmay, S.J.: *RevEspT* 6 (1946) 127-147.

3. Recent Protestants either do not know about or pay little attention to the doctrine about justification by faith alone. Thus contemporary conservative Protestants, although not verbally, but in reality come very close to the Catholic concept of justification. See Lange, 315.

meantime, we are not saying anything about the nature of this preparation or disposition.

They must, that is, they are bound by the will of God, who has so decreed. Moreover, this is also very much in conformity with reason.

Justification, in the Holy Scriptures, is understood in various ways.⁴

a) As *metonymy*—it is taken as the law which prescribes and teaches justice, or for the external declaration of justice (Ps. 119; Prov. 17:15).

b) *For the acquisition of justice* (Luke 18:14; Rom. 8:30).

c) *For the increase of justice* (Rev. 22:11).

In this chapter justification is taken by us especially for the acquisition of justice. This can be considered *actively* (for the act of God infusing justice), or *passively* (for the reception of justice).

But justification can take place in two ways—one when it is given to an innocent creature and the other when it is given to a sinner. In the present state of the human race, justification means being changed or moved from the state of sin to the state of justice. Therefore, it is defined by Trent, s.6 ch.4: “A transition from the state in which man is born a son of the first Adam to the state of grace and adoption as sons of God, through the second Adam, Jesus Christ our Savior” (D 1524). In the state of innocence it would be different, just as it was different in the first justification of Adam.

We will study the more intimate nature of justification in the following articles.

146. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, s.6 ch.5 (D 1525) explains the beginning of justification in adults by the prevenient grace of God, and by the free assent and cooperation of the creature with divine grace: “they are disposed... by freely assenting to and cooperating with that grace.” And ch.7 (D 1528-1529): “This disposition or preparation is followed by justification itself”; but justice is received “according to the measure that the Holy Spirit apportions to each one individually as he wills.” Man’s free will is defined in cn.4 (D 1554) as “cooperating by an assent... through which he disposes and prepares himself to obtain the grace of justification.” In cn.9 (D 1559) it is also defined that “it is necessary that he [the sinner] should be prepared and disposed by the movement of his will.”

147. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

4. There is more on this matter in M.J. Lagrange, O.P., *La justification d'après S. Paul*: RevBibl 11 (1914) 321-343, 479-503; *Epître aux Romains* (1931) 19f.121-141; F. Prat, S.J., *La théologie de saint Paul* t.2 1.5 c.1; J.M. Bover, S.J., *Teología de san Pablo* 731-803.

148. Proof from Holy Scripture. Scripture attributes some causal influence to the good deeds of a sinner in order to receive justification. Therefore, some preparation, disposition or cooperation on the part of an adult person is required for justification.

The antecedent: This causal influence is attributed to:

a) *faith* primarily, as is certain from the Greek prepositions ἐκ, διά, and from the instrumental dative, since all of these express true causality: Rom. 3:27-30: *Then what becomes of our boasting? It is excluded. On the principle of works? No, but on the principle of faith. For we hold that a man is justified by faith apart from the works of the law....* Rom. 5:1: *Therefore, since we are justified by faith... Through him we have obtained access to this grace in which we stand.*

b) *penance:* Acts 2:38: *Repent, and be baptized every one of you... and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit.* Matt. 4:17: *Jesus began to preach, saying: Repent....* Matt. 3:2: *John the Baptist came... preaching: Repent....* Ezek. 18:21: *But if the wicked man turns away from all his sins... he shall surely live.*

c) *love:* *Her sins, which are many, are forgiven, for she loved much.*

d) *alms and prayers:* Acts 10:4: *Your prayers and yours alms have ascended as a memorial before God....*

149. Proof from tradition. By gathering together many texts, Rivière summarizes the teaching of the Fathers in this way: The whole ancient Church, without exception and sensible progress, with one voice teaches that for justification, in addition to divine grace, the cooperation of our will is required, which must be manifested both by faith and by good works.⁵

150. Theological reasoning. St. Thomas (I-II, q. 113, a. 3) mentions this cooperation as an argument for the necessity of preparation on the part of man: "The justification of the ungodly is brought about by God moving man to justice... Now God moves everything in its own manner... Hence he moves man to justice according to the condition of his human nature. But it is man's proper nature to have free will. Hence in him who has the use of reason, God's motion to justice does not take place without a movement of the free will; but he so infuses the gift of justifying grace that at the same time he moves the free will to accept the gift of grace, in such as are capable of being moved thus."

5. J. Rivière, *Justification*: DTC 8,2102. See R, *Index theol.* n. 362f.

Thesis 17. This preparation takes place primarily not through fiducial, but through dogmatic faith.

S.Th. I-II, q. 113, a. 4; Lercher-Lakner, 61; Beraza, 644-657; Lange, 322-341.

151. Definition of terms. The Reformers enumerate three forms:

a) *faith in miracles*, or that through which miracles are obtained; St. Paul speaks about this in 1 Cor. 13:2.

b) *historical faith*, or knowledge of the history of the gospel.

c) *faith in the promises*, by which we believe the promises made by God concerning the forgiveness of sins. But they distinguish between a *general* and a *special* faith in the promises. General is that by which we believe that salvation has been promised to all the faithful; but special is that by which individual persons have confidence that their sins are not imputed to them. Therefore this special faith actually is confused with fiducial faith.

Dogmatic faith, which we affirm in opposition to the Lutheran faith, is to be understood, from the Vatican definition, as the assent by which “we believe that what he has revealed is true, not because the intrinsic truth of things is recognized by the natural light of reason, but because of the authority of God himself who reveals them” (D 3008; see 3032).

152. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, ch.9 and cns.9-14 (D 1533-1534, 1559-1564) taught and defined that fiducial faith does not justify, nor is it required for justification.

On the contrary, *Trent* proclaims that dogmatic faith is necessary for justification. For, in s.6 ch.6 (D 1526-1527) we read: “Adults are disposed for that justice when, awakened and assisted by divine grace, they conceive faith from hearing and are freely led to God, believing to be true what has been divinely revealed and promised.” But this faith is manifested in ch.8 (D 1532) as “the beginning of man’s salvation, the foundation and root of all justification, without which it is impossible to please God and to come into the fellowship of his sons.” Therefore, in ch.7 (D 1528-1529) it is said that without it no one ever achieved justification.

153. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

154. Proof from Holy Scripture. The Bible preaches the necessity of faith for justification, and declares that this faith is intellectual assent given to the truths revealed by God. Therefore, in adults dogmatic faith is required for justification.

The antecedent: In Heb. 11:1 faith is described as assent of the mind; in v. 6 the object of faith is stated, that is, *because he exists and because he rewards*. Therefore it is expressing dogmatic faith. Now this faith in the same v. 6 is said to be so necessary that without it it is impossible to please God.¹

See also Mark 16:15-16; John 20:31; Acts 8:37, etc.

Please note: 1) St. Paul in his letters to the Romans and Galatians often speaks about justifying faith. But this is evangelical or objective faith (Rom. 1:16), never fiducial faith.

2) Scripture never commends fiducial faith as the disposition for justification, but rather warns against vain self-confidence (Phil 2:12; 2 Pet. 1:10).

155. Proof from tradition. 1) *The Fathers with one voice* proclaim the necessity of dogmatic faith for justification. Thus St. Fulgentius: "Faith is the beginning of human salvation. Without it no one can belong to the number of the children of God, because without it in this world no one achieves the grace of justification, nor will he possess eternal life in the future world. If someone here has not walked by faith, he will not arrive at heaven. Without faith every work of man is vain" (R 2260). And in the following chapters he explains the individual articles of faith (R 2261f.). It is not necessary to present any more, since even the Protestants acknowledge and admit the truth of our assertion.²

2) *The Church*, already from the earliest times, required from the catechumens, before their Baptism, a profession of faith which is contained in the ancient creeds. For this reason, so that the catechumens could be easily instructed, we note the appearance of such helps as the *Catechesis* 4-18 of St. Cyril of Jerusalem, the *Enchiridion* of St. Augustine, the *De cognitione baptismi* of St. Ildephonsus of Toledo, etc. Therefore, this praxis of the Church proves that it considered dogmatic faith to be necessary in order to obtain justification.

156. Theologians, admitting the necessity of dogmatic faith, studied whether explicit faith is also required, and how much; they studied whether this is necessary because of a precept or also as a means, etc. These points will be handled in the treatise *On Faith*.

1. See Bover, *Teologia de San Pablo* 841-851.

2. See O. Kim, *Glaube*: REPT 6,676.

157. Theological reasoning. St. Thomas argues thus (I-II, q. 113, a. 4): “A movement of free will is required for the justification of the ungodly, inasmuch as man’s mind is moved by God. Now God moves man’s soul by turning it to Himself... Hence for the justification of the ungodly a movement of the mind is required, by which it is turned to God. Now the first turning to God is by faith... Hence a movement of faith is required for the justification of the ungodly.”

158. Objections. 1. From Matt. 9:22: *Take heart, daughter; your faith has made you well.* And from Luke 17:19: *Your faith has made you well.* Here the faith, which was demanded by Christ the Lord, was fiducial faith, or confidence in Him.

I bypass the fact that, in the quoted texts, what Christ demanded of the sick was trust in Himself. But from that nothing follows against our thesis, since there the word is not about the forgiveness of sins, but about the cure of a flow of blood and leprosy, that is, about bodily health.

2. From Matt. 9:2, where Christ said to the paralytic: *Take heart, my son; your sins are forgiven.* Hence it is certain that Christ attributed the forgiveness of sins to trust. Therefore the faith, which is required for justification, is not dogmatic faith, but fiducial faith.

I deny the antecedent. For, Christ disposes the mind of the paralytic for justification, exhorting him to hate sins and to hope for forgiveness, as is suggested by Trent (D 1527); but in no way does it follow from this that what is required for justification is that fiducial faith, with which someone believes that his sins are not imputed.³

3. See Maldonado, *In Mt* c.9 v.2.

Thesis 18. But, in addition to dogmatic faith, other acts of other virtues are also required.

S.Th. I-II, q. 113, a. 5; Lercher-Lakner, 62; Beraza, 658-669; Lange, 322-341.

159. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, s.6, cn.9 (D 1559) defined: "If anyone says that the sinner is justified by faith alone in the sense that nothing else is required by way of cooperation... let him be anathema." Therefore, in addition to faith, acts of other virtues are also required. What are they? *Trent* itself in ch.6 (D 1526-1527), after faith, lists as dispositions for justification acts of *fear, hope, love, penitance, desire for Baptism, the determination to begin a new life*. But the mind of *Trent*, while it describes the process of conversion in this way, intended to mention those acts that generally are wont to be present. But *Trent* did not intend to teach a) that all of these acts are necessary *in every* justification; b) or that they are necessary *in this order*; c) or that *the same necessity* exists for all; d) nor does it deny that, beside these acts, there could also be others, v.gr., prayer, mercy, etc.¹ Further, compare this teaching of the Council with S.Th. III, q. 85, a. 5.

160. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

161. Proof from Holy Scripture. Holy Scripture bears witness to this for two reasons:

a) *Negative*, inasmuch as it denies that faith alone suffices. Listen to James 2:14-26: *What does it profit, my brethren, if a man says he has faith but has not works?... So faith by itself, if it has not works, is dead... You see that a man is justified by works and not by faith alone... For as the body apart from the spirit is dead, so faith apart from works is dead*. Also, hear what Paul says in Gal. 5:6: *For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any avail, but faith working through love*.

b) *Positively*, inasmuch as Scripture demands, in addition to faith, other acts also as a disposition for justification. For, it demands *penance*: Matt. 4:17: *Jesus began to preach, saying: Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand...* Matt. 3:2: *In those days came John the Baptist saying: Repent...* Acts 2:38: *Peter said: Repent, and be baptized every one of you... and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit*. Ezek. 18:21: *But if a wicked man turns away from all his sins... he shall surely live*. It demands *fear*: Sir.

1. See A. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* 1,2,7-40; S. González, *El proceso de la conversión a la luz del concilio de Trento*: *RevEspir* 5 (1946) 56-73.

1:27: *For the fear of the Lord is wisdom and instruction. It demands hope:*
 Matt. 9:2: *Take heart, my son, your sins are forgiven.*

OBJECTION 1): St. Paul sometimes attributes justification to faith, without mentioning any other act. Thus in Rom. 5:1: *Therefore, since we are justified by faith...* Eph. 2:8: *For by grace you have been saved through faith...* Therefore it is concluded from that that faith alone justifies.

There is a twofold solution to this difficulty²:

a) *The older exegetes*, like Bellarmine, respond that Paul never enumerates all the causes of justification, but now one and now another. Harent has adopted this solution.

b) *Recent exegetes*, like Lagrange, Prat, respond that Paul understood a living faith, that is, the disposition of the mind that includes everything that is required by Trent, that is, other acts of other virtues.³

OBJECTION 2): There is opposition between the teaching of Paul and James. For Paul says that faith justifies without works (Rom. 3:28; 4:2; Eph. 2:9); but James teaches that faith without works is dead (Jas. 2:14).

I respond that Paul is talking about the works of the law, as they were understood by the Jews. Therefore, he teaches that good works, performed by the powers of nature alone, especially with only the external observance of the law without any change of heart, do not justify. Surely this is true, and James does not deny it. But James always requires for justification that, in addition to faith, there be also good works performed with the help of grace; St. Paul himself explicitly agrees with this (1 Cor. 13:1; Gal. 5:6).⁴

162. Proof from tradition. The common opinion of the *Fathers* is that, in addition to faith, works or acts of other virtues are also required. They bear witness to this, either by asserting that, in addition to faith, good works or a moral and just life is required, or in particular by mentioning acts of penance, hope, fear, charity, etc. See St. Clement of Rome: "Why was our father Abraham blessed? Was it not because he performed justice and truth through faith?" (R 15). But Clement of Alexandria writes: "And, in truth, faith is discovered by us to be the first movement towards salvation; after which fear, and hope, and repentance, advancing in company with temperance and patience, lead us to love and knowledge"... "So that when we hear, 'Your faith has saved you,' we do not understand Him to say that

2. Augustine suggested the solution, *De fide et operibus* 13,20; 14,21: ML 40,210f. See Bover, *Teología de San Pablo* 795-802.

3. Harent: DTC 6,70f.; Lagrange, *Épître aux Romains* (Paris 1931) 99f.; Prat, *La théologie de Saint Paul* t.2 1.5. See P. Denis, O.P., *La Révélation de la grâce dans S. Paul et dans S. Jean* (Liège 1948).

4. See E. Tobac, *Le problème de la justification dans S. Paul et dans S. Jacques*: *RevHistEccl* 22 (1926) 797-805.

those who have believed in any way whatsoever shall be saved, unless also works follow..." (R 419, 428). Origen: "Although it is called faith, if it is without works, such faith is dead..." (R 481). St. Gregory of Nyssa: "For, faith without the works of justice is not sufficient for salvation; again, the justice of one's life, separated from faith, per se is not a sure way to salvation" (R 1024). Chrysostom: "Is it then enough, says one, to believe on the Son, that one may have eternal life? By no means... Though a man believe rightly..., yet if he lead not a right life, his faith will avail nothing towards his salvation" (R 1163). St. Augustine: "For certainly it very rarely happens, indeed, I should rather say, never, that anyone approaches us with the wish to become a Christian who has not been smitten with some sort of fear of God"... "For without charity of course there can still be faith, but it does not help" (R 1590, 16790).

163. Theological reasoning. St. Thomas proves the necessity of other acts for justification as follows (I-II, q. 113, a. 5): "The justification of the ungodly is a certain movement whereby the human mind is moved by God from the state of sin to the state of justice. Hence it is necessary for the human mind to regard both extremes by an act of free will... Hence the human mind while it is being justified, must, by a movement of its free will withdraw from sin and draw near to justice. Now to withdraw from sin and to draw near to justice, in an act of free will, means detestation and desire... Hence in the justification of the ungodly there must be two acts of the free will—one, whereby it tends to God's justice; the other whereby it hates sin."

164. Scholium. *On the nature of this preparation for justification.* Acts of faith and the other virtues, by which, from what has been proved, an adult man must necessarily be prepared so that justification may be conferred on him, have the following characteristics:

1) *They are a true positive disposition.* That is, they are not just a negative disposition or the absence of a contrary disposition; nor are they a necessary pre-condition, or something that is required absolutely for justification, but without having any essential influence on it. They are a truly positive disposition which makes a man suitable for receiving justification so that between the adult about to be justified and the imminent justification there is a certain proportion, analogous to the proportion of a material cause with respect to the form (see n. 98). These points are certain from the causal influx which Scripture attributes to faith and to the other acts of a sinner in the movement towards justification (see thesis 16).

2) *They are a true moral disposition.* Certainly, this causal influx is in the moral order; for, by these moral acts a certain moral fittingness for receiving the form of justification is produced. There are some theologians, v.gr., Billuart, who say that this disposition is a physical disposition.⁵

3) *They are a disposition congruously impetrative and meritorious.* Therefore, faith and the other acts have the power of impetrating justification; moreover, because they are works done in obedience to God, in a sense they move His goodness to grant justification. But they are not condign merit, “because nothing that precedes justification, neither faith nor works, merits the grace of justification” (D 1532); for otherwise the gratuity of justification would be denied.⁶

4) *They are a disposition more or less remote.* That is, those acts, which are both necessary and as close as possible to justification, are rightly said to be dispositions that are less remote. They are: faith, hope, love, repentance. But the other salvific acts, v.gr., alms, prayer, etc., are called more remote dispositions. But in the strict sense, and according to the common way of speaking, a *proximate disposition* is that which the infusion of grace immediately follows (perfect contrition, or also imperfect contrition together with the sacrament of Penance); all the others are *remote dispositions*.

165. Objections. 1. From Rom. 3:28: *For we hold that a man is justified by faith apart from works.* And from Eph. 2:8f.: *For by grace you have been saved through faith; and this is not your own doing, it is the gift of God—not because of works, lest any man should boast.* Therefore in obtaining justification the Apostle excludes other works, except faith.

I distinguish the consequent. The Apostle excludes the works of the Mosaic law, *conceded*; he excludes other works, *I subdistinguish*: works done without grace before faith, *conceded*; works done from faith with grace, *denied*. We already answered this difficulty in n. 161.

2. From Luke 8:50, where Christ says to Jairus: *Only believe, and she shall be well.* Therefore Christ, for salvation, requires faith alone.

I deny the supposition. For there he is not dealing with justification, but with the re-animation of the little girl. The faith here that Christ is encouraging is not justifying faith, but trust in His power.

3. St. Paul in his letter to the Romans, 3:24, says that we are justified gratuitously. But if good works disposed one for justification, the words of the Apostle would be false. Therefore, beside faith, nothing else is required as a disposition for justification.

5. See Lange, 342; Suarez, *De gratia* 8,4,15; Billuart, *De gratia* d.6 a.3. According to Garrigou-Lagrange, *De gratia* p.248, the Thomists quite commonly hold that such acts are a physical disposition for grace.

6. See R.Ch. Dhont, O.F.M., *Le problème de la préparation à la grâce. Débuts de l'école franciscane* (Paris 1946).

I distinguish the major. To be justified gratuitously, that is, without the causal influx of natural acts, *conceded*; that is, without the causal influx of supernatural acts, *I subdistinguish*: without physical efficient influx, or morally meritorious condign acts, *conceded*; without morally meritorious influx that is congruous and impetrative, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* The words of the Apostle would turn out to be false, if natural good acts disposed one for justification, *conceded*; supernatural good acts, *I subdistinguish*: if they disposed for justification by physical efficient influx or morally meritorious acts condignly, *conceded*; if only by a morally meritorious influx that is congruous or impetrative, *denied*. Consult the explanation of this Pauline statement given by the *Council of Trent*, s.6 ch.8 (D 1532).

4. St. Hilary openly testifies: "For faith alone justifies."⁷ And Chrysostom: "If you believe with faith, why do you conclude otherwise, as if faith alone is not sufficient to justify?"⁸ But Origen says: "And he [Paul] says that justification by faith alone suffices, so that someone by believing only is justified, even if no work has been done by him."⁹ Therefore from the teaching of these Fathers, in addition to faith, no other works are required for justification.

I respond by denying the consequence, and I will explain each text of the Fathers:

According to St. Hilary, as is clear from the context, the faith alone that justifies is opposed to the Mosaic Law, but not to those dispositions that arise from faith.

But Chrysostom excludes only the ceremonies of the Old Law. For he adds immediately: "Why do you make yourself a slave of the law, and so subject yourself to it?"

Origen only excludes external works and holds that man sometimes can be justified, even if he does not perform any external work. But he proves this by citing the examples of the woman taken in adultery and the good thief. It is not said that they performed any external works of fasting or almsgiving before their justification. Moreover, Origen himself, in chapter 4 of the same commentary on Romans, beside faith, explicitly requires other internal acts.

7. St. Hilary, *In Mt* 8: ML 9,961.

8. Chrysostom, *In epist. ad Tit.* hom 3 n.2: MG 62,670.

9. Origen, *In epist. ad Rom.* 3,9: MG 14,952.

ARTICLE II

ON THE NATURE OF JUSTIFICATION IN ITSELF

166. Trent's doctrine on the nature of justification, s.6 ch.7 (D 1528f.) embraces mainly three points:

- a) The essential elements of justification: not the remission only of sins, but the sanctification and renewal of the interior man.
- b) The concrete way in which this takes place in the soul: by a voluntary acceptance of grace and the gifts.
- c) The formal effects flowing from this: from being unjust a man becomes just....

We will study these points under just as many articles and then we will add something more on the properties of justification.

Thesis 19. *The justification of a sinner not only introduces a true remission of sins, but also an internal renewal of the soul.*

S.Th. I-II, q. 113, a. 1f.6; q. 109, a. 7; Lercher-Lakner, 65-71; Beraza, 678-702; Lange, 347-358.

167. Definition of terms. *The justification of a sinner*, whether an adult or an infant, is understood as the transition from the state of sin to the state of grace (1524). Therefore it involves two contrary terminal points: the *terminus a quo*, or the state of sin, and the *terminus ad quem*, or the state of justice. Therefore we exclude the justification of angels and the first parents. For they did not move from the state of sin, which they did not have, to the state of grace, but their justification was a transition from an absence of grace to the possession of grace. Therefore their justification was produced from two terminal points—not contrary but contradictory.

Sins here means “habitual,” that is, the stain left from actual sins, either of Adam or the personal sins of each person. Hence they are grave habitual sins, both original and personal. We are not considering venial sins, because they do not make man a sinner or ungodly. Even though de facto they are also forgiven always in baptismal justification, if the necessary conditions are present they are also forgiven by the sacrament of Penance.

Truly remitted, that is, they are removed in such a way that they no longer exist. The stain, which remained, is no longer there.

Internal renewal. Beside the *negative element*, that is, beside the remission of sins, which of course already includes a certain renewal, justification contains also a *positive element*, that is, the internal renewal of the soul, or a new and better internal state.

Therefore, we affirm that justification, in the present economy of providence, implies two things: *Both a true remission of sins and the internal renewal of the soul*. You will find in *scholium 3* a few observations about the causal connection that exists between these two realities.

168. Adversaries. 1) *The old Protestants* considered justification as something purely extrinsic, inasmuch as it takes place through the non-imputation of sin and through the imputation of the justice of Christ. Internally, however, man remains a sinner. Therefore, sins are *covered* so that they are as it were not seen by God; they are *smoothed* over so that they do not appear; *they are not imputed*, and God ignores them, although they remain in the soul. That is, the Reformers rely on the false supposition that human nature was essentially corrupted by original sin, and that this sin consists formally in concupiscence.

2) De Bay put justification in obedience to the commandments, without the remission of sins and without the infusion of grace that renews one internally (D 1942-4, 1931-3).

3) Rosmini (1797-1855) contends that one should retain the expression “that God covers certain sins or does not impute them” (D 3235).¹

169. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, s.5 cn.5 (D 1515-1516), defines that original sin is truly remitted by Baptism. But this assertion must be extended both to personal sins and to justification by repentance, because the reason for remission is the same, namely, the presence of habitual grace (see D 1542-1543, 1579f., 1671-1672, 1676f.). Therefore in s.6 ch.7 (D 1528-1529) the Council speaks about the remission of sins in adults and about their internal renewal: “Justification is not only the remission of sins but the sanctification and renewal of the interior man”... And also “the single formal cause [of justification] is the justice of God, not (that) by which he himself is just, but (that) by which he makes us just, namely, the justice that we have as a gift from him and by which we are spiritually renewed... each one receiving within himself his own justice.” This is stated again in ch.16 (D 1545-1547): “For the justice that is said to be ours because we become just by its inherence in us is that of God himself, since it is infused in us by God through the merit of Christ.” Further on in cn.10f. (D 1560) it is defined that men are not formally just through the justice of Christ, nor are they justified only by the imputation of Christ’s justice, nor by the remission alone of sins with the exclusion of inhering grace. Therefore we are justified both by the remission of sins and by the inhering justice.

1. For more on the thinking of Rosmini, see A. Michel: DTC 13,2917-52.

170. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

a) THE NEGATIVE ELEMENT

171. Proof from Holy Scripture. It asserts that sins are truly remitted in justification; they are not just covered over, shaved or non-imputed. Therefore justification implies true remission of sins.

The antecedent: This truth is expressed in such a way that deservedly Bellarmine wrote that no one “can find anything [any word], which the divine Scripture itself did not already anticipate.”² Here we will present some of the best formulas:

- a) Sins are *taken away, removed* from man (John 1:29; 2 Sam. 12:13).
- b) Men are *cleansed, washed, whitewashed* from their sins (Ps. 51:4,9; 1 Cor. 6:11).
- c) Sins are *blotted out* just like words written on a tablet coated with wax (Isa. 43:25; Acts 3:19).
- d) They are *removed* from the sinner, and *buried* in the sea (Ps. 103:12; Mic. 7:19).
- e) They are like a wound that is *healed* (Isa. 30:26; see Matt. 9:12; Luke 10:30f.).
- f) They are like death, which is *completely destroyed* by the vivifying effect of Baptism (Rom. 6:2-11).

Objection: But Holy Scripture itself testifies that sins are covered over, and not imputed. Therefore they are not really destroyed (see Ps. 22:1f., 2 Cor. 5:19).

Response: Since Holy Scripture says so clearly that sins are truly remitted, these texts must be interpreted accordingly. This can certainly be done, if these points are kept in mind: 1) when Scripture says that sins are covered, it is not saying at the same time that the sins remain. Therefore these texts 1) either are metaphors that must be explained in the light of previous texts, 3) or imperfect ways of speaking, for what is completely taken away is truly covered or not imputed, so that now it no longer exists, 4) or the reference is to the act of sinning, not to the habit. Therefore sins are covered and are not imputed, because they have been truly destroyed, not as if they are only hidden.

172. Proof from tradition. 1) Recent Protestants, forced by historical arguments, are not wont to concede that the whole tradition is opposed to Luther. But they try to explain this fact in the following way: “The profound theology of Paul even in the ancient Church was not well understood. The

2. Bellarmine, *De iustificatione* 2,7.

Greeks especially were attached to the justice of good works and to the mystical and superstitious ideas of deification. Among the Latins, Tertullian, a lawyer, and Cyprian did much harm. Ambrose and especially Augustine had a better understanding of Paul, but they were not able to prevent the whole medieval Church from falling completely into Pelagianism, until Luther rediscovered the pure gospel of Paul or rather experienced it himself.”³

2) Here is how some of the Fathers speak, as it were from a distance looking at the Protestant error. St. Justin: “Blessed is the man to whom the Lord imputes no sin; that is, having repented of his sins, that he may receive remission of them from God; and not as you deceive yourselves, and some others who resemble you in this, who say, that even though there be sinners, but know God, the Lord will not impute sin to them” (R 146). St. Ambrose testifies that God “takes away iniquity... for he takes them away altogether, and what he remembers not are as though they did not exist” (R 1256). St. Augustine: “I say that baptism gives remission of all sins, and takes away guilt, and does not shave them off; and that the roots of all sins are not retained in the evil flesh, as if of shaved hair on the head, whence the sins may grow to be cut down again” (R 1886). St. Gregory the Great: “Whoever says, then, that sins are not entirely put away in baptism, let him say that the Egyptians did not really die in the Red Sea. But, if he acknowledges that the Egyptians really died, he must needs acknowledge that sins die entirely in baptism, since surely the truth avails more in our absolution than the shadow of the truth” (R 2298).

173. Theological reasoning. 1) If sins were not truly remitted, then the death of Christ would have less efficacy than the sin of Adam. For since his sin constitutes us intrinsically as sinners, the death of Christ would not destroy sins intrinsically, but only pretend to do so. But this contradicts the words of St. Paul to the Romans in 5:15f. Therefore it must be confessed that sins are truly remitted in justification.

2) From St. Thomas in I-II, q. 113, a. 1. Justification is a movement towards justice. But this justice implies such rightness towards God that it excludes mortal sins. Therefore the justification of the sinner involves the remission of sins.

b) THE POSITIVE ELEMENT

174. Proof from Holy Scripture. Baptismal justification is described as *regeneration* and *renewal* (Tit. 3:4-7)⁴; by Baptism *the old man is put*

3. Lange, 355 note, which he borrowed from Ihmels in REPTH at the word *Rechtfertigung* 16,482f.

4. It will be helpful to consult J. Solano, S.J., *La παλαιογενία según San Juan Crisóstomo*: MiscCom 2 (1944) 91f.

away or the state of sin, and, after having been renewed, *the new man is put on* or the state of innocence (Eph. 4:17-24); however the new man who is put on is Christ (Gal. 3:7), so that the baptized person is now vivified by the life of Christ (Eph. 2:5), and is the *workmanship* of God (Eph. 2:10) and a *new creature*. Indeed this regeneration, this renewal, this vivification, this new workmanship or creature proclaim the restoration of that supernatural life which we lost through the sin of Adam, and which is restored to us by Christ. Even our adversaries admit that this life was a gift intrinsically inhering in our first parents. Therefore our justification is brought about not just by the remission of sins, but also by a gift intrinsically inhering in the soul.

175. Proof from tradition. The Fathers acknowledge that by justification, in addition to the remission of sins, an intimate renewal of man also takes place, so that even the Reformers, v.gr., Calvin and Chemnitius, confess that in this matter they separate themselves from the Fathers.⁵ Thus the *Epistle of Barnabus*: “Since then he has renewed us by the forgiveness of sins, he made us another product, and we have the souls of children, as though he were creating us again” (R 32). St. Cyprian: “A second birth restored me into a new man” (R 548). Chrysostom gives the reason why Baptism is called the washing of regeneration: “Because it not only remits our sins, and not only purges our offenses, but it does it in such a way that finally we are generated anew. For it creates and forms us anew.”⁶ St. Augustine: “The righteousness of God is manifested: he does not say the righteousness of man... but the righteousness of God—not that whereby he is himself righteous, but that with which he endows man when he justifies the ungodly” (R 1730). For more see: St. Irenaeus (R 219), St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 835), St. Gregory Nazianzen (R 1011), St. Chrysostom (R 1144, 1203), St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2080, 2089, 2106, 2109), St. Leo the Great (R 2193), St. Augustine (R 1710, 1732, 1715).

The whole teaching of the Fathers about the deification of man by grace proves the same point.⁷

176. Theological reasoning. As will be proved later, justice is unequal, both in different just men, and in the same man at different times in his life. Therefore justice a) cannot consist in the remission of sins alone, for this

5. Bellarmine, *De iustificatione* 2,8.

6. *Catech. ad illuminandos* 1,3: MG 49,227.

7. See J. Gros, *La divinisation du chrétien d'après les Pères grecs* (Paris 1938). There is more also in Galtier, *Le Saint Esprit en nous d'après les Pères grecs* (Rome 1946); H. Rondet, S.J., *La divinisation du chrétien*: NouvRevTh 71 ((1949) 449-476, 581-588.

cannot be unequal; b) nor merely in the imputation of the justice of Christ, for this is always the same. Therefore, justice is a reality internal to us.

177. Scholium 1. *On the twofold formal justice.*⁸ From what we have seen so far, the Catholic concept of justification is diametrically opposed to the Protestant concept. a) For, sin truly forgiven is opposed to sin truly remaining but *not imputed*; b) the soul *intrinsically* renewed and sanctified is opposed to the soul intrinsically not changed, but to which the justice of Christ is imputed *extrinsically*.

Therefore the Protestant conception is totally extrinsic (non imputation of sin, imputation of justice), while the Catholic conception is totally intrinsic (true remission of sin, true inhering justice).

A *quasi middle conception* of this matter, invented by M. Bucero, was accepted by some important Catholic apologists, like Pigge and Grooper in Germany, Catarinus and especially Seripandus in Italy.

According to this explanation, our justification consists not alone in the fact that the justice of Christ is imputed to us extrinsically; but also not alone in the fact that a certain justifying form is given to us intrinsically, that is, our justice. Certainly these doctors thought that both forms of justice are essentially required (both our justice and the justice of Christ) in our justification, and that we are justified formally at the same time by both of them. Surely our justice is required as a certain form inhering intrinsically in us. But because our justice is always imperfect, the justice of Christ is also required, which is imputed to us and so acts as a kind of extrinsic form of our justification.

Some theologians at the Council of Trent defended this opinion—especially Seripandus during the general congregation on October 8, 1546. On this occasion, the question for debate was proposed to the official theologians, which Seripandus himself formulated thus: “Whether a justified man before the divine tribunal is to be judged only on the basis of his inherent justice or on the basis of the works done with grace, or whether with this inherent justice he also has need of the mercy of God and the justice of Christ, that is, His merit and His passion, whereby the defect of his own justice is corrected; this justice of Christ is not communicated totally to all, but according to the divine dispensation or according to the measure of each one’s faith and charity.” Some theologians defended the necessity of imputed justice in addition to inhering justice, but most of them rejected it; the leader of the latter group was I. Laínez who totally refuted the theory with twelve arguments: namely, because it would take away

8. Lange, 359-362.

merit, pervert true justification, satisfaction and purgatory, the providence of God, inherent justice itself, in addition to the fact that it would be a novel opinion and vitiated by its base origin. After the question had been fully discussed, the theory of the twofold formal justice was rejected by the Council with these words: "the *single* formal cause is the justice of God, not (that) by which he himself is just, but (that) by which he makes us just" (D 1529).

Our justification from inhering justice can be said to be imperfect, inasmuch as it has its full force from the merits of Christ, inasmuch as it does not suppress immediately all rebellion of the flesh, inasmuch as it does not yet actually bring us complete salvation but just hope, inasmuch as it does not give perfect security of our own justification. But from that it does not follow that this imperfection necessarily must be removed in this life, and indeed in the line of a formal cause so that, unless it is removed true justification is not present.⁹

178. Scholium 2. *On the causes of justification.*

In the thesis we spoke especially about the formal cause of justification. Trent offers a beautiful presentation in s.6 ch.7 (D 1529) of the whole doctrine on the causes of justification.

The *final* cause is the glory of God and Christ, and eternal life.

The *efficient* cause is the merciful God who gratuitously washes and sanctifies us.

The *meritorious* cause is Christ the Lord, who merited for us justification by his most holy Passion and made satisfaction for us to God the Father.

The *instrumental* cause is the sacrament of Baptism or the sacrament of Penance (D 1542-1543).

The single *formal* cause is the justice of God, not (that) by which he himself is just, but (that) by which he makes us just.¹⁰

9. On these authors see F.X. Linsenmann, *Albertus Pighius und sein theologische Standpunkt*: ThQschr 48 (1866) 571-644; St. Ehses, *Ihannes Gropers, Rechtigertigungslehre auf dem Konzil von Trient*: RömQschr 20 (1906) 175-188; F. Hünemann, *Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Kard. G. Contarini*: ThQschr 102 (1921) 1-22; J. Henninger, *S. Augustinus et doctrina de duplici iustitia. Inquisitio historico-critica in opinionem H. Seripandi de iustificatione, eiusque habitudinem ad doctrinam S. Augustini* (Mödling 1935); H. Jedin, *Giralamo Seripando. Sein Leben und Denken im Geisteskampf des 16. Jahrhunderts* (Würzburg 1937) cp.3. On the debate held in the Council, see J. Hefner, *Die Entstehungsgeschichte der Trienter Rechtfertigungsdekrets* (Paderborn 1909) 165-247; H. Rückert, *Die Rechtfertigungslehre auf dem Trienter Konzil* (Bonn 1925) 217-256. You will find the names of the theologians who at the Council held the theory of the twofold justice in CTr 5,632. In the same place you have the vow of P. Laínez, which is also found in H. Grisar, *Jacobi Laynez disputationes tridentinae* 2, 153-192. Salmerón said something similar: J. Olazarán, *Un voto tridentino del jesuita A. Salmerón sobre la doble justicia*: EstEcl 20 (1946) 211-240.

10. See Beraza, 719.

179. Scholium 3. *On the causal connection between the remission of sins and renewal through grace.*

1) *Can sins be remitted without the infusion of grace?*

All theologians teach, in this order of providence we now find ourselves in, that that cannot happen. St. Thomas proves this point by saying (I-II, q. 113, a. 2) that the remission of sins takes place through a special love of God; but God cannot love the sinner in a special way except by the infusion of grace, since the love of God does not presuppose goodness in creatures, but rather produces it. Theologians dispute whether this may be possible in other orders; it is absolutely denied by some Thomists (Cajetan, Salmanticenses, etc.), but it is affirmed by Scotists and by many Jesuit authors.¹¹

2) *Can grace be infused without the remission of sin?*

In the present order of providence this cannot be done. For Trent clearly taught this when it defined in s.5 cn.5 (D 1515-1516) that the guilt of original sin is remitted by grace, and when it taught in s.6 ch.7 (D 1530-1531) that in justification man receives along with the remission of his sins grace and other inhering gifts.

Moreover, theologians commonly hold that grace, by its very nature and therefore at least by physical necessity, drives out mortal sin. The Scotists and Nominalists disagree with this and argue that this incompatibility comes only from an extrinsic decree of God.

Finally, the Thomists, along with many Jesuit theologians, argue for a metaphysical repugnance of the infusion of grace without the remission of sin. However Suarez, with some more recent Jesuits, are satisfied with a physical impossibility.¹²

180. Objections. 1. From Rom. 5:13. *Sin indeed was in the world before the law was given, but sin is not counted where there is no law.* Therefore the conclusion is that sin remains in the justified, and it is remitted only inasmuch as it is not imputed.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent. For in the text the question concerns sin not yet forgiven. Moreover, the meaning of this passage is not fully clear. Probably it means, up until the Law of Moses actual sins were not imputed by God for the punishment of bodily death, because the law that punished some sins with capital punishment had not yet been given.¹³

2. Justification is often expressed in Holy Scripture under the forensic formulas of *judgment, accuser, advocate, decision*, etc. (John 5:45; 1 John 2:1; Luke 16:22, etc.).

11. Cajetan, *In 1.2 q.115 a.2* and 6; Salmanticenses, *De iustificatione* d.2 dub.5-7; N. del Prado, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1,410; Suarez, *De paenitentia* d.9 s.3.

12. Suarez, *De gratia* 7,13 and 18-21; Beraza, 862-868, where many theologians are cited.

13. See Bover, *Teologia de San Pablo* 218. Bellarmine answers the arguments taken from Holy Scripture by the adversaries, *De iustificatione* 2,9-12.

Therefore justification has only a forensic value.

I distinguish the antecedent. Justification is expressed under these formulas in order to represent, under these sensible forms, the effects that happen intrinsically in the soul, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*. *I also distinguish the consequent.* Justification would have only a forensic value, if the matter itself permitted it, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*. For the Holy Scriptures themselves remove all doubt when they teach that sins are truly destroyed and taken away by justification.

3. The verb *iustifico*, in Greek δικαιώω, does not signify “to make just” but “to declare just.” Therefore justification does not imply true and intrinsic justice, but it is only a declaration of it.

I distinguish the antecedent. It has this meaning in the works of profane authors, *conceded*; in the sacred authors, *I subdistinguish*: it has that meaning sometimes, *conceded*; always, and in particular in the present case, *denied*.

The classical Latin authors did not know the verb *iustifico*. Profane Greek authors surely used the verb δικαιώω, but since they were completely ignorant of internal justification, for them it meant only forensic justification.

4. From 1 Cor. 1:30 where it says that Christ “was made our wisdom, our righteousness and sanctification and redemption. Therefore if Christ is made our justice, we are justified by the imputation of Christ’s justice.

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. Christ is made our justice in a meritorious way, inasmuch as he merited internal justice for us, *conceded*; inasmuch as formally his justice is our justice, *denied*. Trent itself gives us this distinction: “If anyone says that men are justified without the justice of Christ, by which he gained merit for us, or that they are formally just by his justice itself, let him be anathema” (D 1560).

5. From 2 Cor. 5:21: *For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, so that in him we might become the righteousness of God.* Hence the argument is made: we are made justice by the same reason whereby Christ was made sin. But Christ was made sin only extrinsically and in an imputative manner. Therefore we also are made just only extrinsically and in an imputative manner.

I deny the parity. For Christ, by reason of his sinlessness, could not become sin intrinsically; but, because he represented sinful humanity, he became a partaker in its fate and punishment.¹⁴ Men, however, when their sins have been forgiven, can be internally renewed and justified.

6. In Holy Scripture justice is compared with a garment (Ps. 132:9, Rom. 13:14; Eph. 4:24). But a garment affects the body extrinsically. Therefore justice affects the soul extrinsically.

I distinguish the major. Justice is compared with a garment because it is not natural to us, but is infused into us by God, *conceded*; because it is not intrinsic to us, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* It affects the soul extrinsically inasmuch as it is not natural to us, *conceded*; inasmuch as it does not truly inhere in us, by the infusion of God, *denied*. Therefore, the reason for the comparison between

14. Bover thinks that this interpretation is more probable, *Teologia de San Pablo* 561f.

a garment and justice is sought from the fact that neither proceeds from nature, but is added to it. Therefore this comparison does not exclude inhering justice. This is clear from the fact that Trent, after it taught that justice inheres in the soul, immediately calls it a resplendent and spotless robe (D 1531).

7. Justification brings with itself divine adoption. But adoption places nothing intrinsic in the one who is adopted. Therefore justification does not say an internal renewal of the soul.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. Human adoption confers nothing intrinsic, *conceded*; divine adoption, *denied*, on the basis of our proof.

ARTICLE III

ON THE GIFTS WHEREBY JUSTIFICATION IS PERFECTED

181. That internal gift in virtue of which we are intrinsically renewed, when adequately considered, according to all theologians includes *sanctifying grace and the theological virtues*; but according to a more common opinion, it also includes *the moral virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit*. But of these sanctifying grace is the fundamental gift. Therefore, leaving the others to a future consideration, now we ask about the nature of sanctifying grace, looking at it in itself. A better knowledge of it, as it shines forth in its own effects, will be proposed in the following article IV.¹

But in addition to the created gifts, in justification there is also given the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, or of the whole Trinity, dwelling in the just soul according to its physical substance.

Therefore, in the present article we will consider these two gifts, namely, created grace and the uncreated grace of the indwelling Holy Spirit.

Thesis 20. Sanctifying grace is a created gift, physically permanent, and really distinct from charity.

S.Th. I-II, q. 110, a. 1-3; Lercher-Lakner, 73-78; Beraza, 720-744, 750-757; Lange, 369-388.

1. A CREATED GIFT

182. Definition of terms. *A created gift*, that is, it is not something uncreated; it is not the person of the Holy Spirit. Certainly it can be doubted whether that by which we are renewed internally is the Holy Spirit, or something produced by him and therefore distinct from him, or both together. We say that sanctifying grace is something created, that it is not the person of the Holy Spirit. For, the Holy Spirit sanctifies *efficiently*, pouring out in us charity, and in a terminative way, by inhabiting the just soul. But he does not sanctify us *formally*, because “the single formal cause [of justification] is the justice of God, not (that) by which he himself is just, but (that) by which he makes us just” (D 1529).

Therefore *it is not a question* about the origin of grace; namely, whether it is produced by creation or by eduction from the objective potency of the soul. On this matter, the *creationistic* opinion prevailed at first, so that from the 13th to the 16th centuries this doctrine was defended by

1. See J. Auer, *Die Entwicklung der Gnadenlehre in her Hochscholastik, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des Kardinals Matteo d'Aquasparta* 1 Part: *Das Wesen der Gnade* (Freiburg i.Br. 1942).

St. Bonaventure, H. Gandavensis, Paludanus, Thomas of Argentina, Capreolus, Biel, Ferrariensis, Vitoria, A. de Vega, etc. But from the 16th century the *eductionistic* opinion gradually became more common, so that today it is the common opinion. It is defended by B. de Medina, Molina, G. de Valencia, Vázquez, Báñez, Ledesma, Lorca, Curiel, Suarez, John of St. Thomas, Godoy, Gonet, Goudin, Billuart, and many more recent authors.²

Therefore, *the present question* is this only: Whether grace is the very person of the Holy Spirit, or a gift produced by God, and one that is adequately distinct from him, whether it arises from creation or eduction. Therefore it is a created gift.

183. Adversaries. Peter Lombard³ said that the grace by which we are justified is the very person of the Holy Spirit. That is, the Teacher makes grace identical with charity, but charity with the Holy Spirit, because we do not elicit an act of charity by the infused habits, like the acts of faith and hope and the other virtues, but we do it by the Holy Spirit assisting us, who performs the function of the habit of charity.

The same opinion was held by G. of St. Theoderic, Hugo of St. Victor, Martin Legionensis.⁴

Recently Stattler, Hermes and Kuhn seem in a certain sense to have adopted this opinion.⁵

184. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, s.6 ch.7 (D 1529), teaches that that by which we are formally justified is not the justice of God, but something that we receive into ourselves, which is different in the individual just persons, and whose measure depends on the dispositions of each one; in cn.11 (D 1561) grace is presented as something made by the Holy Spirit; according to cn.24 (D 1574) this grace can be increased. All of these points suppose a real distinction between justice and the Holy Spirit.

Theological note. *It is at least theologically certain* from the doctrine of the Council of Trent. In a note proposed at Vatican I, this doctrine was said to be Catholic doctrine, either already completely defined by Trent or certainly following manifestly from what it defined; the opposing opinion was condemned as heretical.⁶

2. For more on this matter and on other middle solutions between creationism and eductionism, see E. Fernández, O.P., *El problema de la producción de la gracia y sus diversas soluciones*: CiencTom 70 (1946) 37-82.

3. *Sententiae* I d.17 c.6 n.159.

4. On this see A. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* I,1,202-219.

5. See J. Kleutgen, S.J., *Theol. d. Vorzeit*, 2², 279; C. Schaezler, *Neue Untersuchungen über das Dogma der Grnade* (1865) 343.

6. CL 7,517f.

185. Proof from Holy Scripture. Sanctifying grace is called a *seed* (1 John 3:9), *regeneration* and *renewal* (Tit. 3:5); but God is the one who sows, regenerates and renews. But the seed and the sower, regeneration and the regenerator, renewal and the renewer are really distinguished. Therefore sanctifying grace cannot be said to be the Holy Spirit.

186. Proof from tradition. *The Fathers* distinguish the Holy Spirit, who dwells in the soul of the just, from some supernatural entity that is conferred in justification and that transforms and deifies man. See, v.gr., Origen (R 449), St. Basil (R 944), St. Ambrose (R 1282, 1318), St. Augustine (R 1715, 1730, 1732). St. Cyril of Alexandria writes: "But Christ is formed in us, while the Holy Spirit pours into us a divine form through sanctification and justice. For thus, the character of the substance of God the Father so shines in our souls, that the Holy Spirit reforms us, as I said, by our sanctification into Himself" (R 2099). And St. Augustine: "There is as much difference between the light that illuminates, and what is illuminated, as there is between the wisdom that creates and what is created, as there is between justifying justice and the justice that is produced by the justification."⁷

187. Theological reasoning. Every being exists because of some inhering form. But the justified man has a new accidental being of renovation and sanctification. Therefore the just man has a new accidental form that inheres in him. But again, this new form cannot be uncreated, because it would not be accidental but substantial. Therefore it is necessary to admit that in the justified man there is a sanctifying form, which is a created gift. We call this form "sanctifying grace" (S.Th., *In 1 Sent.* d.17 q.1 a.1).

1) PHYSICALLY PERMANENT

188. Connection. It is readily conceded that sanctifying grace is something physical at the moment of justification; for it is presented as something that is infused into us or poured into our hearts. But how does it continue to exist? Is it only a moral permanence, just as sin remains for which one is guilty of continuing enmity with God, or is it also physical? We say that sanctifying grace is a physical gift and physically permanent. In that way it necessarily differs from actual grace and from the acts of the virtues.

189. Definition of terms. *A physical gift*, that is, it has a true physical

7. *Confess.* 12,15,20; ML 32,833; CSEL 33,322.

reality. Therefore it is not just a moral entity, like rights, obligations, etc.

Physically permanent, inasmuch as it continues to exist in its physical reality, even when acts of the intellect and will are not present. Therefore it is not just morally present, like sin.

Therefore, we *affirm* two things: 1) that the being of sanctifying grace is not transient, like the being of mental acts or actual grace, but it is permanent; 2) that it is not the same as a moral entity, like a right or an obligation, but it is a physical reality. In the thesis, however, we are prescinding from any further determination about whether or not grace is an accident, a quality or a habit.

190. Adversaries. A. Pighius (ca. 1490-1542) thinks that the permanence of grace defended by the scholastics is unfounded; he thinks that sanctifying grace is nothing more than a continuing series of actual graces.⁸

I. Morinus (1591-1659) quite openly suggests that he agrees with the opinion which, after having denied any infused gifts that are physically permanent, maintains that the state of justification consists in a complex of actual graces, by which a Christian life is led and which makes a man to be just. However he holds this opinion as only probable.⁹

191. Theological note. 1) According to all theologians this matter with regard to both elements is completely *certain*, so that the opposite must be called temerarious. However they disagree on whether or not it must be held as defined by Trent.

2) D. Soto, Cano, Salmanticenses, Del Prado, etc., say No, because the Council spoke about this matter only in passing.¹⁰

3) But Vega, Suarez, Bellarmine, Valencia, etc., think that it is defined.¹¹ And this opinion must be followed. For:

a) This is the manifest mind of the Tridentine Fathers. The word *inhere* (D 1530), the words *increase* and *lose* (D 1535, 1574), the metaphor *robe* (D 1531), point to this meaning. Moreover, from the acts of the Council it

8. A. Pighius, *De libero arbitrio* 1.5.

9. I. Morinus, *Commentarius historicus de disciplina sacramenti paenitentiae* 8,2,5.

10. D. Soto, *De natura et gratia* 2,17-19; *In 4 dist.* 1 q.3 a.1; Cano, *De locis theologicis* 7,1; Salmanticenses, *De gratia* d.4 n.19; Bññez, *In 2,2 q.23 a.2*; Ioannes Vicente, *Relectio de gratia Christi* concl.6; N. Del Prado, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1,153f.

11. Vega, *De iustificatione* 7,24; Suarez, *De gratia* 6,3,6; Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1,3; Valencia, p.2 d.4 q.3 punct.4; Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* 1.6 disp.ultima, s.2 n.25-33.

is certain that this was the mind of the Fathers.¹²

b) At Vatican I it was proposed that the doctrine contrary to this physical permanence should be condemned as *heretical*; for, it was argued that the physical permanence of grace is a doctrine either clearly defined by Trent in s.6 ch.7 and 16, and cn. 11, or at least clearly follows from these definitions.¹³

c) *The Roman Catechism* understood the matter thus: "Grace is a divine quality inhering in the soul, and the Council of Trent decreed that it should be believed by all."¹⁴

192. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) In justification we are truly *regenerated* by grace (Tit. 3:5). But in generation something transient is not communicated, but something physically permanent. Therefore grace consists in a physical reality and is physically permanent.

2) Grace is called a *seed, pledge, seal* (1 John 3:9; Eph. 1:13-14). But these words imply that grace is something physically permanent. Therefore it should be held as something physically permanent.

193. Proof from tradition. *The Fathers*, as often as they present grace as a created gift, also say that it is physically permanent. Here are some examples: St. Basil: "Just as art is in the one who has acquired it, so the grace of the Holy Spirit is in the one who receives it; it is always present, but it is not always active."¹⁵ St. Ambrose: "Therefore you have been adorned, O man, adorned by the Lord your God. You have a good craftsman and painter. Do not destroy the good picture, glittering not with deceit but with truth, expressed not with wax but with grace" (R 1319; see 1318 and 1282). St. Augustine (R 1715, 1732). St. Cyril of Alexandria calls grace "the quality of sanctification and a divine image" (R 2063. See 2099).

194. Theological reasoning. The argument presented by St. Thomas above (n. 187) also proves the physical permanence of grace. For the internal renewal and sanctification, which the justified person has, is physical (since it is not a mere imputation) and permanent (since it is a true state, not a mere act). Therefore it demands a certain physical and permanent form.

Looking deeper into the reality of this form, theologians hold the

12. CTr 5,453.520f.682.686-90; Pallavicini, *Concilii Tridentini historia* 1.8 c.13 n.13; c.14 n.3; Vega, *De iustificatione* 7,24; F. Hünemann, *Wesen und Notwendigkeit der aktuellen Gnade nach dem Konzil von Trient* (Paderborn 1926); Prumbs, *Die Stellung des Trienter Konzils in der Frage nach dem Wesen der hlm. Gnade* (1909).

13. CL 7,517 and 661.

14. *Catechismus Romanus* p.2 c.2 q.49.

15. *De Spiritu Sancto* 26,61,51: MG 32.179.

following:

a) Sanctifying grace is an *accident*, not a substance. For, “every substance is either the nature of the thing whereof it is the substance, or is a part of the nature, even as matter and form are called substance. And because grace is above human nature, it cannot be a substance or a substantial form, but it is an accidental form of the soul. Now what is substantially in God becomes accidental in the soul participating the Divine goodness, as is clear in the case of knowledge. And thus because the soul participates in the Divine goodness imperfectly, the participation of the Divine goodness, which is grace, has its being in the soul in a less perfect way than the soul subsists in itself” (I-II, q. 110, a. 2 ad 2).

b) It is *absolute* accident, not relative or modal. For, grace is of such a nature that it is a being infused by God, which is also capable of increase. Hence the opinion of I. Vicente must be rejected; he teaches that the internal change in the soul, which is justification, can take place by a certain mode really identified with the being of the soul and of the will, and is formally distinct from it. Likewise the opinion of D. Palmieri must be rejected; he holds that the justice of man is not something distinct from the soul as one thing from another, but he says it is a mode intrinsic to the soul itself, internally modifying and sanctifying it. This author gathered this opinion from his preconceived conviction about the impossibility of absolute accidents.¹⁶

c) It is a *quality*. For, by it the soul is so affected that it is different from what it was before.

d) It is a *habit*. For, it is a permanent quality (not transient, like an act), difficult to change (from its own nature which is perpetually durable), whereby the soul is well disposed to live a supernatural life. See I-II, q. 49.

e) It is an *entitative habit*, not an operative one. For grace “is not immediately ordained to an act, but to a certain spiritual way of existing, which it produces in the soul, and it is like a disposition, which has a reference to the glory that is the consummation of grace” (*De verit.* q. 27 a.2 ad 7). Indeed St. Thomas says there that grace cannot properly be called a habit, because it is not ordered immediately to actions. However he says this from the mind of Aristotle, as is easily deduced from the following text. Therefore, explaining the matter more accurately in the *Summa Theologiae*, he distinguishes between habits, which dispose one in the order of operation, and habits, which dispose in reference to nature itself (I-II, q. 50, a. 2). That being the case, because an operative habit supposes

16. I. Vicente, *Relectio de gratia Christi* q.1 concl.6; D. Palmieri, *De gratia habituali* (in manuscript form) thes.14 (in Beraza, 746). A similar view was held by E. Amort, *Theologia ecclectica* t.2 tr.2 disp.3 q.7.

some pre-existing nature, for whose perfection to be obtained it disposes one immediately, it is necessary to admit that in the supernatural order there exists a certain habit which disposes the soul immediately, not for some operation, but in order to participate in the divine nature. Afterwards the virtues proceed from that habit, as habits proximately disposing one for supernatural operations, by which that new nature reaches its perfection (I-II, q. 110, a. 3). Therefore grace is of such a nature that it disposes one for supernatural acts, not immediately but only by the mediation of the operative habits of the virtues. It is almost like the essence of the soul which is the principle of the natural acts, not the proximate principle but the ultimate and radical principle (I-II, q. 110, a. 4 ad 2).

f) Therefore *its subject* is not a power of the soul, but the essence of the soul, which it proximately and immediately sanctifies. "For as man in his intellectual power participates in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation" (I-II, q. 110, a. 4).¹⁷

2) REALLY DISTINCT FROM CHARITY

195. Connection. Grace is really distinct from faith and hope, since, if grace is lost, they can remain. But on the other hand, grace is inseparable from charity (D 1530-1531). Therefore there is a question whether these two, which are inseparable, are really distinguished, or only logically distinct.

196. Opinions. 1) *A real identity* is defended by P. Lombard, Scotus and the *Scotists*, Durandus, Catharinus, Láinez, Salmerón, Bellarmine, Lessius, etc.¹⁸

2) *A real distinction*, in the way in which the soul is distinguished from its powers, is defended by St. Thomas, the *Thomists*, many *Jesuit authors*,

17. See T. Graf, *De subiecto psychico gratiae et virtutum secundum doctrinam scholasticorum usque ad saec. XIV* (Rome 1934-1935).

18. Lombard, *Sent.* 1, d.17; Scotus, *In 2 Sent.* dist.27; Mastrius, *De iustificatione* d.7 q.6; Durandus, *In 2 Sent.* d.26 q.1 n.7; Catharinus, *Commentaria in omnes divi Pauli Apostoli et alias septem canonicis epistolas* (Paris 1566) 544-282...; Láinez, *Disputationes tridentinae* 2,156-178...; Salmerón, *CTr* 5,267; Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1,6; Lessius, *De divinis perfectionibus* 12,11,76. It should be noted that Bellarmine and Lessius, although they hold for the real identity of grace and charity, still say that the opposite opinion is probable.

and by many other theologians.¹⁹

Theological note. Our opinion is *more common and more probable*.

197. Arguments. 1) From the time of the *Council of Trent*, even though the Council did not define the matter, de facto the doctrine of the real distinction has been more commonly defended by theologians of all schools. Actually the Council, deliberately, did not favor either opinion. Wherefore it seems pointless to ask which opinion is favored more. De facto many bishops and theologians favored the Scotists; but in the final decree they used ambiguous formulas. Thus,

a) These favor the Thomists: “excluding grace *and* charity” (D 1561); “through the voluntary reception of grace *and* of the gifts” (D 1528).

b) These favor the Scotists: “the love of God is poured into our hearts”; “man receives faith, hope and charity” (D 1530); an increase of justice is had through “an increase of faith, hope and charity” (D 1535).

Therefore, with all these statements Trent openly taught the inseparability of grace and charity; but it did not wish to solve the question about the real distinction between them.²⁰

Holy Scripture does not solve the problem either:

a) The texts quoted by those affirming a real distinction (2 Cor. 13:13; Rom. 5:5) do not certainly refer to habitual grace. For they can be understood to be, not about our charity, but about the charity by which God loves us.

b) The texts quoted by those denying a real distinction (Luke 7:47; 1 Pet. 4:8) are easily explained from the inseparability of grace and charity.

The Greek Fathers speak about deifying grace in such a way that it cannot easily be confused with charity. In contrast, in St. Augustine there is hardly place for a real distinction between both gifts (see, v.gr., R 1798). However St. Augustine often speaks about the act of charity, not about the habit.

198. 2) Grace and charity have distinct formal effects. Therefore they are really distinct forms.

The antecedent: The formal effects of grace, as we shall see, are to make one holy, a partaker of the divine nature, an adopted child of God; the formal effects of charity are to dispose the soul immediately to love God

19. S.Th. I-II, q. 110, a. 3f.; Aegidius, *In 2 Sent.* d.26 q.1 a.2; Capreolus, *In 2 Sent.* d.26 q.1; D. Soto, *De natura et gratia* 2,17; Suarez, *De gratia* 6,12; Valencia, *In I-II* d.8 q.2 n.2; Salmanticenses, *De gratia* d.4 n.77; Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* d.132 n.53 and 67.

20. See A. Prumbs, *Die Stellung des Trienter Konzils zu der Frage nach dem Wesen der heiligmachenden Gnade* (1909).

with a perfect love of friendship.

3) A true analogy exists between the order of grace and the order of nature. But in the natural order, nature comes before the habit which completes it in order to operate. Therefore, also in the supernatural order grace comes before charity.

199. Corollary. From the above it is clear that sanctifying grace exists in the soul like a new nature, just as the infused virtues exist there like faculties or powers. St. Thomas explains it thus, borrowing this doctrine from Pseudo-Dionysius: "Since the purposes of different natures are different, in order to obtain an end in natural matters three things are required: namely, a nature proportioned to that end, and an inclination for the end which is a natural appetite for the end, and then movement towards the end... But man according to his nature is proportioned to a certain end for which he has a natural appetite, and according to his natural powers he can work for the attainment of that end. This end is a certain contemplation of divine things, which is possible for man according to the faculty of his nature; in this the philosophers place the ultimate end of man. But there is also an end for which man is prepared by God and which exceeds the powers of human nature, that is, eternal life, which consists in the vision of the essence of God and which exceeds the capacity of any created being; that life is connatural to God alone. Hence it is necessary that something be given to man, not only by which he works for the end, or by which his appetite is inclined to that end, but by which the very nature of man is elevated to a certain dignity according to which such an end is suitable for him. And grace is given for this. But charity is given to incline the heart to this end. The other virtues are given in order to be able to perform the works by which the aforesaid end is acquired" (*De verit.* q.27, a. 2). Leo XIII supposes this doctrine when he writes: "More than this, the just man, that is to say he who lives the life of divine grace, and acts by the fitting virtues as by means of faculties, has need of those seven gifts..."²¹

200. Objections. 1. *God is love* (1 John 4:16). But sanctifying grace is either charity itself or something inseparably joined with it. Therefore grace is the same thing as God, and so it is something uncreated.

I distinguish the major. God is substantial and uncreated charity, *conceded*; accidental charity dwelling in us, *I subdistinguish*: efficeintly, *conceded*; formally, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* Sanctifying grace is substantial charity, *denied*; it is accidental charity, inasmuch as it is inseparable from it, even though it is really distinguished

21. Encyclical, "*Divinum illud munus*": ASS 29, 634.

from it, *conceded*. Therefore it is clear that the words that follow, *he who abides in love abides in God*, have this meaning: He who possesses accidental and created charity abides in God, since Christ had said: *If a man loves me... we will come to him and make our home with him* (John 14:23).

2. Trent, s.5 cn.3 (D 1513), defined original sin *to be in all men, proper to each*. But from that one cannot conclude that original sin remains physically, but only morally. Therefore, similarly, because the Council taught that grace *inheres* in us, one cannot rightly infer that it is something physically permanent.

I respond that the verb *to be in* (*in esse*) has a broader meaning than the verb *to inhere* (*inhaerere*). Moreover, the mind of the Council is known not only from this word, but also from others that we quoted in n. 191.

3. Habitual sin, in virtue of which man is truly constituted a sinner, is a physically past act and only morally remaining. Therefore, similarly, habitual justice, whereby we are truly said to be just, is also a physically past act, and only morally remaining.

I deny the parity, because habitual sin, unlike grace, is not a principle for eliciting acts, which nature alone cannot elicit. Moreover, we have already sufficiently proved the physical permanence of grace in n. 190-192.

4. Sanctifying grace is a participation in the divine nature. But the divine nature by itself is operative. Therefore also grace is by itself operative and so does not require a new habit of charity.

I distinguish the major. Grace is a participation in the divine nature by way of an ultimate and radical principle of operations, *conceded*; by way of a proximate principle, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor*. The divine nature is by itself operative by way of an ultimate and radical principle, *conceded*; by way of a proximate principle, *denied*.

5. If grace and charity were really distinguished, they could be really separated. But they cannot really be separated. Therefore they are not really distinguished.

I deny the major. Separability is a sign of a real distinction; but inseparability is not a sign of real identity.

Thesis 21. In justification, together with habitual grace the Holy Spirit is also given, existing in the just with a new presence.

S.Th. 1, q. 93, a. 3.5.6; Lercher-Lakner, 98-101; Beraza, 878-909; Lange, 442-455.

201. Connection. The question of the indwelling is treated by recent theologians both in the treatise on the Trinity and in the treatise on Grace, but under different aspects. For, in the treatise on Grace we consider the Holy Spirit as grace or an uncreated gift, and his relation to the created gifts. But the treatise on the Trinity deals with the general missions of the Divine Persons, and the extent to which they are proper or appropriated.¹

Therefore we will consider separately the *fact* of the indwelling, and then *its mode*.

1. ON THE TRUTH OF THE INDWELLING

202. Definition of terms. *In justification*, both the first when a man changes from the state of sin to the state of grace, and the second when grace is increased. But our arguments look primarily at first justification.

Together with grace, therefore, in the same real instant, in addition to grace, the person of the Holy Spirit is also given. But we are not entering into the question about the causal relation between grace and the indwelling.

The Holy Spirit *is given*, and indeed according to his physical substance. Actually *he dwells* in the soul of the just, because he stays there permanently, as being in his own possession, so that he might be worshipped there diligently. Therefore, the soul of the just is very fittingly said to be *a living temple* of the Holy Spirit.

But when we speak here about the Holy Spirit, we are speaking about an appropriation. In justification, therefore, there is a new presence of *the whole Holy Trinity*, and the indwelling of the whole Trinity is what we are defending, and by justification we are also made a temple of the whole Trinity.²

A new presence (or not being distant from the soul of the just), that is, a presence formally distinct from the presence of immensity. This presence, howsoever it is defined, is a presence that is:

- a) *Substantial*, or according to substance, and not just dynamic;
- b) *Special*, or not according to the way in which God is present in all

1. See SThS 2,1,563-567.

2. On the opinion that attributes the indwelling to the Holy Spirit as something proper to him, and not by appropriation, see H. Schauf, *Die Einwohnung des Heiligen Geistes* (Freiburg 1941); P. Galtier, *Le Saint Esprit en nous d'après les Pères grecs* (Rome 1946); J. Solano, *Algunas tendencias modernas acerca de la doctrina de las apropiaciones y propiedades en la Santísima Trinidad*: EstEcl 21 (1947) 5-34; T. Urbánoz, *Influjo causal de las divinas Personas en la inhabitación en las almas justas*: RevEspT 8 (1948) 141-202.

things. Therefore in virtue of this presence, God begins to be present in the just under a new title.

203. Opinions. All Catholic generally admit the fact of the indwelling, but they disagree concerning the more exact explanation of this fact.

1) Some deny the indwelling of the Holy Spirit *in every justification*. Thus: a) Petavius denied it to the just of the Old Testament³; I.H. Oswald and K. Adam deny that substantial indwelling is through baptismal justification, for they reserve it for confirmation⁴; c) St. Bonaventure denies that a new mission of the Holy Spirit is given, when the question concerns the intensive increase of grace; but he does concede it in the quasi extensive increase.⁵

2) Some do not explain correctly the relation of the Holy Spirit *with grace*: a) Lessius, Petavius, Thomassinus, to a certain extent Scheeben,⁶ inasmuch as they make indwelling and grace almost independent; b) P. Lombard, inasmuch as he holds that the Holy Spirit acts in the just in the manner of a habit of charity; this habit, according to him, is really the same as sanctifying grace⁷; the *Nominalists*, inasmuch as they think indwelling can be had by the external acceptance alone of God.⁸

204. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, s.14 ch.4 (D 1678), teaches that attrition is “a prompting of the Holy Spirit, not indeed as already dwelling in the penitent, but only moving him...”; ch.8 (D 1690) says that they have sinned gravely who “have received the gift of the Holy Spirit, and yet have not feared knowingly to violate the temple of God.”

St. Pius V, while condemning de Bay, speaks about the indwelling of the Holy Spirit (D 1915).

Leo XIII describes the indwelling of the Holy Spirit both in the whole Church and in the souls of individual believers. But about the just of the O.T. he says this: “It is indeed true that in those of the just who lived before

3. Petavius, *De Trinitate* 8,4,7. The same opinion seems to have been held by St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Orat.* 41,11 and St. Cyril of Alexandria, *Thesaurus de s. et consubs. Trinitate* 11,105f. ad *In Io* 5,2. On the mind of St. Cyril see Mahé: *RevHistEccl* 10 (1909) 485-492 and M. Gomez: *EstEcl* 14 (1934) 294. On the question of the indwelling in the just of the O.T., see G. Philips, *La grâce des justes de l'Ancien Testament*: *EphThLov* 23 (1947) 521-556; 24 (1948) 23-58.

4. Oswald, *Die dogm. Lehre von den Sakramenten der kath. Kirche* (1894) 353ff.; K. Adam: *ThQschr* 101 (1920) 408.

5. St. Bonaventure, *In I d.15 q.ult.* See Suarez, *De Trinitate* 12,5,16-18; Beraza, 888.

6. On this matter, against Scheeben, T. Granderath, S.J., wrote in *ZkathTh* 7 (1883) 491-540; 8 (1884) 545-579. Previously Granderath had already written something else in *ZkathTh* 5 (1881) 283-319; 7 (1883) 593-638.

7. Lombard, *Sent.* 1 d.17. There is more about the mind of Lombard in *DTC* 12,1941ff.

8. On this, see *Occam* in *DTC* 11,864ff.; *Nominalisme*: *ibid.* 717ff. Others are also cited in n.264 note 2.

Christ, the Holy Ghost resided by grace....”⁹

Pius XII depicted our union with Christ in the body of the Church by participation in the Holy Spirit, who dwells in the souls of the just; and at the same time he hands on some rules for investigating this mystery of the indwelling.¹⁰

205. Theological note. 1) The fact of some indwelling is a truth of *divine and Catholic faith*. 2) It is *certain doctrine* that this indwelling is found in all the just, and that it must be distinguished from the created gifts. 3) It is a *common doctrine* of theologians that it is present in all justification, both first and second.

206. Proof from Holy Scripture. It affirms that the Holy Spirit, according as he is distinct from the created gifts, is given to the just, and that he dwells in them as in a temple. Therefore, beside the created gifts, also the person of the Holy Spirit is given to the just, and he dwells in them as in a temple.

The antecedent: a) *The Holy Spirit is given to the just:* John 14:16. Here Jesus is talking about the person of the Holy Spirit; it is said that he is given, and indeed to the just, as is certain from v. 15. These words, even though they are perhaps addressed to the Apostles alone, are rightly extended to all the just, both because of the interpretation of the Fathers, and from other passages in the Bible (see John 14:23).

b) *The Holy Spirit dwells in the just:* Rom. 8:9-11. He is talking about the person of the Holy Spirit. For, the Apostle says that we should act according to the norms dictated by conscience and by the enlightenments of the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of Christ and the Spirit of the Father (v. 5-9). He says that the Spirit dwells in the just, that is, in those in whom there is nothing worthy of condemnation (v.1 and 10).

c) *As in a living temple:* 1 Cor. 3:16. (See also 1 Cor. 6:19; 2 Cor. 6:16). There he is said to dwell in the just as in a temple.

N.B. Similar things are said about the whole Trinity: *If a man loves me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and make out home with him* (John 14:23).

207. Proof from tradition. 1) *The Fathers*, especially the Greeks, frequently teach that the Holy Spirit is given to the just, dwells in them, and indeed as in a living temple. See a) *among the Easterners:* Barnabus (R 36),

9. Encyclical “*Divinum illud munus*”: ASS 29,651.

10. Encyclical “*Mystici Corporis*”: AAS 35 (1943) 231f.

St. Ignatius of Antioch (R 40), Hermes (R 89), Tatian (R 158), St. Irenaeus (R 219, 251), Aphraates (R 683), St. Athanasius (R 770, 780), St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 813), St. Basil (R 944), Didymus (R 10710, Chrysostom (R 1186), St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2107, 2114)¹¹; b) *among the Latins*: Novatian (R 607), St. Hilary (R 872), St. Augustine, St. Gregory of Elvira and St. Isidore of Spain.¹²

2) *The sacred liturgy also bears witness to it.* In the hymn *Veni Sancte Spiritus*: “Gift of God most high... Sweet guest of the soul.” On Wednesday after Pentecost: “Grant that the Holy Spirit may come and dwell in us, that we may be a temple of his glory.” On Saturday after Pentecost: “The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by his Spirit dwelling within us” (Introit). And in the first prayer: “O Lord, graciously fill our hearts with your Holy Spirit.” One should also consult the rite of Confirmation and Holy Orders.

208. *You say*: Christ is also said to dwell in our hearts, to live in us (Eph. 3:17; Gal. 2:20). But such indwelling is not physical or substantial. Therefore neither is the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

Pius XII *responds* to this difficulty: “Christ is in us, as we explained clearly enough above, through his Spirit, whom he communicates to us and through whom he works in us in such a way that whatever divine things are accomplished in our souls by the Holy Spirit, are necessarily said to be accomplished there also by Christ....”¹³

1) ON THE MANNER OF THE INDWELLING

209. Therefore, this physical and substantial presence of the Holy Spirit, indeed of the whole Trinity, in the souls of the just—how is it to be conceived? What is its nature?

Pius XII responds that this indwelling of the divine persons is a lofty mystery “which during this earthly exile can only be dimly seen through a veil, and which no human words can express.”¹⁴ But in order to gain some understanding of it, it will help to state *negatively* what this indwelling is not, so that we might finally come to investigate what it is *positively*.

11. See J. Gross, *La divinisation du chrétien d'après les Pères grecs* (Paris 1938); P. Galtier, *Le Saint Esprit en nous d'après les Pères grecs*; J. Sagüés, S.J., *El Espíritu Santo en la santificación del hombre según la doctrina de San Cirilo de Alejandría*: EstEcl 21 (1947) 35-83; H. du Manoir, S.J., *Dogme et Spiritualité chez S. Cyrille d'Alexandrie* (Paris 1944).

12. St. Augustine, *In Io* 75ff.; *De Trinitate* 15, 17ff. See S. González, S.J., *La inhabitación del Espíritu Santo según San Isidoro de Sevilla*: RevEspir 1 (1941) 10-33; *según San Gregorio de Elvira*: ibid. 6 (1947) 177-186.

13. Encyclical “*Mystici Corporis*”: AAS 35 (1943) 230.

14. Encyclical “*Mystici Corporis*”: AAS 35 (1943) 231.

210. I. *What the indwelling is not.* 1) It is not God's *omnipresence alone*, in virtue of which God is in all things by his essence, presence and power; for this is common to all things, while the indwelling is exclusive to the just.

2) The indwelling *does not produce a substantial union* between the substance of God being present and the substance of the soul of the just in which he dwells, but only an accidental union by reason of the type of presence that occurs in the nature of every accident. For such a substantial union would have to be according to the union of nature or of the person. But both types are repugnant. For, it is repugnant that the divine nature should be joined in one nature with creatures; a joining together in the union of the person is also repugnant, since we know from revelation that this took place only in the mystery of Incarnation. Indeed, Pius XII warns us, "to reject every kind of mystic union by which the faithful of Christ should in any way pass beyond the sphere of creatures and wrongly enter the divine, were it only to the extent of appropriating to themselves as their own but one single attribute of the eternal Godhead."¹⁵

211. II. *A positive explanation of the indwelling.* Pius XII in the same place, following in the footsteps of St. Thomas, gives a sketch of this positive explanation when he says: "The Divine Persons are said to indwell inasmuch as they are present to beings endowed with intelligence in a way that lies beyond human comprehension, and in a unique and very intimate manner."

Therefore, indwelling involves two things: the *physical presence* of the divine persons who produce and preserve in us the created gifts of justification (dynamic presence); and *intentional presence*, which is nothing else but the power of enjoying God by acts of the intellect and the will, and also in a supernatural and friendly way. As Leo XIII taught, this is a certain anticipation or beginning of the delight we will experience in heaven, and from which it differs "only in degree or state"¹⁶

212. But now, of these two, what constitutes the indwelling *properly and formally*? Dynamic presence alone, or intentional presence alone, or both presences? Or in other words: What is the nature of the reason that requires indwelling?

1) Vázquez¹⁷ places the formal reason of indwelling in the dynamic

15. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 231.

16. Encyclical "*Divinum illud munus*": ASS 29,653.

17. G. Vázquez, *In I d.30 c.3 n.11ff.*

presence alone, because of its production and conservation of grace; he is followed, among others, by the Salmanticenses,¹⁸ Oberdoerfer,¹⁹ etc.; recently, P. Galtier²⁰ refined this opinion and Lennerz²¹ and M. Retaileau²² agree with him. Galtier explain the matter thus: Grace is like a reflection in fluid matter. Therefore just as, for the reflection to remain in the fluid matter, it is necessary that the image being reflected always remain there, for otherwise the reflection would disappear, similarly, for grace to remain, which is an assimilative reflection in the soul of the divine nature, it is necessary that the physical divine nature remain always present. This opinion is proposed by Galtier as representing the thinking of the holy Fathers.²³

But this explanation is rejected by many theologians, because it does not transcend the common way of existing, which God exercises by his power over all created things. However it must be conceded that the cited recent theologians insist on the production of grace not according as it is a new operation, but according as it is a special way of operating.

On the other hand, many theologians since the 14th century understood St. Thomas as placing the formal cause of indwelling in supernatural knowledge and love alone, independently of his presence of immensity, that is, in intentional presence alone. Therefore these theologians, already since that time, rejected this opinion as insufficient and inefficacious.²⁴ And rightly so. Therefore Suarez thought that this opinion of St. Thomas should be completed by the addition of friendship, which the Angelic Doctor hinted at in I-II, q. 28, a. 1, so that this supernatural friendship, an effect of sanctifying grace, could constitute the Divine Persons as physically present. That is, friendship seeks union among friends, not only affective but also effective, through physical and personal presence. But by grace

18. Salmanticenses, *De Trinit.* D.19 dub.5. Z. Teresius a St. Agnete, O.C.D. (*Doctrina Salmanticensium de modo inhabitationis Ss. Trinitatis in anima iusti*: DivThom (Pi) 45 [1942] 373-394), thinks that the Salmanticenses come closer to the opinion of Vázquez than to Suarez, as has generally been stated.

19. Oberdoerfer, *De inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti in animabus iustorum* (Tornaci 1890).

20. P. Galtier, *L'habitation en nous des Trois Personnes* (Rome 1950) 217-240.

21. H. Lennerz, *De gratia Redemptoris* (Rome 1934) 117.

22. M. Retaileau, *La sainte Trinité dans les âmes justes* (Angers 1932).

23. This opinion proposed by Galtier is held also by I.G. Menéndez-Reigada, O.P., *Inhabitación, dones y experiencia mística*: RevEspT 5 (1946) 72-101; T. Urdáñez, O.P., *La inhabitación del Espíritu Santo en al alma justa*: RevEspT 6 (1946) 513-533. But L.D. Sullivan, S.J., thinks (*Justification and the Inhabitation of the Holy Ghost. The Doctrine of Father Gabriel Vázquez, S.J.*, [Rome 1940]), that Vazquezism must be understood in a different way than it has been. See I. Trütsch, *S. Trinitatis inhabitatio apud theologos recentiores* (Trent 1949).

24. See, v.gr., Suarez, *De Trinitate* 12,5,10, where he rejects this theory as inefficacious, because it proposes a presence that is purely intentional or objective. St. Bonaventure and Alexander of Hales propose a presence that is really intentional. See H.C. Koenig, *De inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti doctrina Sancti Bonaventurae* (Mundelein, Ill. 1934); E. Primeau, *Doctrina Summae Theologicae Alexandri Halensis de Spiritus Sancti apud iustos inhabitatione* (Mundelein, Ill. 1936).

the just man is constituted a true friend of God. Therefore sanctifying grace produces the real and substantial presence of God. Here are the words of Suarez: "By grace and charity a certain perfect friendship between God and man is established. But friendship of itself seeks union among friends, not only through affective conformity, but also by inseparable presence and association, as much as is possible. Hence the most perfect, spiritual and divine friendship certainly demands the intimate presence of God in man. In this way he establishes man as friend by his real existence in him, in virtue of this friendship, so that, even if he were not present under some other title, this would suffice...."²⁵ This opinion of Suarez has been embraced by, among many others, Gonet, Billuart, B. Froget, Beraza, Lercher-Lakner, Dalmau.²⁶

However, the exigencies of the known and loved object seem not to be able to be the foundation of this new presence of indwelling, since such knowledge and love are something intentional, which can also be given for objects physically absent. Also, the nature of friendship is not sufficient, because friendship, since it also belongs to the order of affections, cannot formally produce the real presence of the Divine Persons. It is conceded therefore that perfect friendship tends towards the real presence of friends; but we deny that love as such can produce this physical union.

3) Therefore, John of St. Thomas,²⁷ Gardeil,²⁸ Lange²⁹ and *other theologians*³⁰ teach that St. Thomas is to be interpreted in such a way that, given the presence of immensity, the indwelling is had formally through knowledge and love. Therefore, knowledge and love do not constitute the presence of God in us; but, having once supposed this because of the presence of immensity, the special presence of the Divine Persons consists in the supernatural knowledge and love of them, actual or at least habitual, flowing from sanctifying grace.

4) It seems more probable to us that both types of presence, namely dynamic and intentional, must be embraced, if we want to give a convincing

25. Suarez, *De Trinitate* 12,5,13. On the mind of Suarez concerning indwelling, see S. González, *Suarez frente al misterio de la inhabitación*: EstEcl 24 (1950) 341-366.

26. Gonet, *Clypeus thomisticus* tr.6 disp.13 a.3 n.30f.; Billuart, *De Trin.* Disp.6 a.4; B. Froget, *De l'habitation du Saint Esprit dans les âmes justes* (Paris 1900); Beraza, 896-906; Lercher-Lakner, 100; Dalmau in SThS 2,1,569.

27. John of St. Thomas, *Cursus theologicus*, in 1 q.43 disp.17. On the mind if this theologian, see M. Cuervo, O.P., *La inhabitación de la Trinidad en toda alma en gracia, según Juan de Santo Tomás*: CiencTom 69 (1945) 114-120;

28. A. Gardeil, O.P., *Comment se realise l'habitation de Dieu dans les âmes justes*: RevThom 28 (1923) 3-42, 129-141, 328-360; *La structure de l'âme et l'expérience mystique* 2 (1937) 6-87.

29. H. Lange, S.J., 444-453.

30. J.B. Terrien, S.J., *La grâce et la gloire* (1901) t.3 c.4-5; J.F. Sagüés, S.J., *El modo de inhabitación del Espíritu Santo según Santo Tomás de Aquino*: MiscCom 2 (1944) 161-201; M. Cuervo, O.P., *Suma Teológica*, ed. B.A.C., 2 (1948) 601-640.

and adequate reason for the indwelling. Surely, by bringing together in a friendly manner the twofold formula, which St. Thomas uses in this matter when he says that God is present *by grace and by the operation of the creature*,³¹ we can draw the following conclusion: God joins himself to the just by grace in a twofold manner: that is, *as a principle* that is productive and conserves in us grace, which is the reason for our being and our supernatural activity; and also *as the terminus*, while he presents himself as the delight of the soul, habitually or even actually, through the knowledge and love that flow from grace.

Therefore the Divine Persons become present by the creation and conservation of sanctifying grace. But this presence manifests to the soul in some way the Divine Persons, who, for this reason, become the object of knowledge and love. Therefore, indwelling is an *ontological* and *psychological* fact, but it is ontological before it is psychological. That is, indwelling, considered in an adequate way, is constituted by the *dynamic* presence (by the creation and conservation of grace) and at the same time by *intentional* presence (by knowledge and love, actual or at least habitual).

5) Therefore, our opinion is nothing but a synthesis of both solutions which, in the course of the centuries, have been given to this question: For, considering the matter historically, we point out that *the holy Fathers*, whom Vázquez, Galtier and *other theologians* follow, place the indwelling in the production and conservation of grace, while *other scholastic theologians*, following the leadership especially of St. Thomas and Suarez, looking at the indwelling as the formal effect of sanctifying grace, prefer rather to explain it by knowledge and love, or also because of friendship. Indeed neither solution, if they are taken separately, can explain this matter in a satisfactory way, since the first one does not sufficiently distinguish the presence of indwelling from the presence of general immensity, while the second does not sufficiently protect the physical and substantial presence. Therefore we think that both solutions should be taken together, so that the true and physical presence of the Trinity is adequately explained, and at the same time this singular presence is properly separated from the common presence of immensity. Indeed, according to L. Chambat and T.J. Fitzgerald, this must be termed the true mind of St. Thomas.³²

31. St. Thomas, I, q. 8, a. 3: "In this second way God is especially in the rational creature, which knows and loves him actually or habitually. And because the rational creature possesses this prerogative by grace, he is said to be thus in the saints *by grace*." The Angelic Doctor also says in I, q. 43, a. 3: "Since the rational creature by its operation of knowledge and love attains to God himself, according to this special mode God is said not only to exist in the rational creature, but also to dwell therein as in his own temple."

32. L. Chambat, *Les missions de la Sainte Trinité selon saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Saint Wandrille 1943); T.J. Fitzgerald, *De inhabitatione Spiritus Sancti doctrina S. Thomae Aquinatis* (Mundelein, Ill. 1949).

213. Scholium 1. *On the connection between grace and indwelling.* Having proved the existence of the twofold gift, created and uncreated, in justification, one can ask what is first in nature in the just soul: sanctifying grace, or the indwelling. This question, up till now not sufficiently studied by theologians, agrees completely with the way in which the indwelling is explained. Hence, from what has been said in the preceding thesis, the production of grace must be held as prior in nature to the indwelling, since it is its root and foundation rather than its formal effect.³³

But whatever it is, justification includes both: the created gifts and the uncreated gift. But in different ways, namely, grace as the intrinsically informing form and the Holy Spirit as the external assisting form. Justification therefore can be said to be one whole gift, presenting a twofold aspect from the twofold partial element—informative and terminative or as the end. It is almost like supernatural beatitude is a unique gift, coalescing from the light of glory as from the internal form and from the divine essence as the external terminus or end.³⁴ Hence the effect of justification can be attributed both to grace formally and to the Holy Spirit in a terminal way.³⁵

214. Scholium 2. *On the excellence of justification* (I-II, q. 113, a. 9f.).

a) On the part of the thing produced, the justification of the ungodly is a work more excellent than creation; for it terminates in the eternal good of divine participation, while creation terminates in the good of a mutable nature. On the part of the way of acting, creation is more excellent than justification; because it happens out of nothing and supposes no disposition, while justification does not happen out of nothing and requires on the part of the adult subject some dispositions.

b) Justification, however, as it generally takes place, is not a miraculous work. For it does not take place outside of the usual order of providence, but according to the common laws of the supernatural order. But sometimes, v.gr. in the conversion of St. Paul, it is a truly miraculous work.

33. On this question see J.C. Martínez Gómez, *Relación entre la inhabitación del Espíritu Santo y los dones creados de la justificación*: EstEcl 14 (1935) 20-51; K. Rahner: ZkathTh 63 (1939) 137-156; J. Beumer: WissWeish 9 (1943) 22-41; J.M. Alonso, *Relación de causalidad entre la gracia creada e increada en Santo Tomás de Aquino*: RevEspT 6 (1946) 3-59.

34. See Suarez, *De gratia* prol. 3,312.

35. See Lange, 445.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE EFFECTS OF JUSTIFICATION

215. We already know justification considered in itself. In order to understand it better we will now study its effects. There are several effects, but the main ones are participation in the divine nature and the adopted sonship of God.

As we said above in n. 213, since justification coalesces from a created gift and from an uncreated gift, its effects must be attributed to both gifts according to the nature of each one. Therefore these gifts must be said to be given formally by grace and in a terminal way (*terminative*) by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit.

a) *Formally*, or in the genus of a formal cause. A formal cause is that which bestows being on another, not by doing but by informing, not by action but by the communication alone of itself. Therefore that which the form confers on the subject immediately by the communication of itself is called its *formal effect*.

The formal effect can be twofold:

1) *Primary* (internal), is that which primarily and essentially results from the communication of the form. Therefore it is the composite itself, as resulting from the form informing the subject, and it is distinguished only inadequately from the form.

2) *Secondary* (external), is that which follows, as a natural result, from the information of the subject. It is not the composite itself, and it is distinguished adequately from the form.

The effects of justification are had formally through grace. Of course its formal effect is really one, namely, a new man. However virtually it can be said to be manifold under different respects. The first and fundamental one of these, on which the others are founded, is to make man a partaker of the divine nature; therefore this is the primary formal effect of sanctifying grace.

b) *In a terminal way (terminative)*, or by reason of the terminus to which it is joined. By the analogy with an intrinsic and informing form, another external form can be considered as assisting.

The effects of justification are had in a terminal way through the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Also in this way the primary effect is to make man a partaker of the divine nature.

Thesis 22. In justification man truly becomes a partaker of the divine nature, which he obtains formally by grace.

S.Th. I-II, q. 110, a. 3f.; Lercher-Lakner, 79-97; Beraza, 769-803; Lange, 403-419.

216. Definition of terms. *A partaker of the divine nature* is said to be one who participates in the divine nature.

1) A nature can be participated in¹:

a) *Numerically*: if the same unmultiplied nature is in individual participants. Thus the divine nature is in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit.

b) *Not numerically* (specifically or quasi specifically): if the same nature is multiplied in individual participants. Thus human nature is in individual men.

2) But this specific or quasi specific participation of nature can still be:

a) *univocal*: according to the exact same reason. Thus human nature is in individual men.

b) *Analogical*: according to a reason partly the same and partly different; that is, according to some proportion.

3) Participation of the divine nature can be:

a) *Moral only*: by some similitude of the acts of intellect and will with the intellect and will of God, in which the divine life resides.

b) *Physical*: by some ontological similitude with the principle of divine life.

4) Then this participation can be:

a) *Substantial*: if the divine nature is communicated, which then is united to a man in a substantial union;

b) *Accidental*: if some created accidental entity is communicated, which in itself contains a similitude of the divine nature, and which therefore is united to a man in an accidental union.

Truly, that is, not metaphorically, although analogically.

Formally by grace: this participation is the formal effect of sanctifying grace.

Therefore we are saying three things:

a) In justification there is a participation of the divine nature.

b) This participation is had by grace.

c) And also it is as the formal effect of grace.

1. On the concept of participation in St. Thomas, see C. Fabro, *La nozione metafisica de partecipazione secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino* (Milan 1930); P. Parente, *Rapporto tra partecipazione e causalità in S. Tommaso: ActPontAcRomSTh* (1940-1941) 157-172; Geiger, *La participation dans la philosophie de S. Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1942).

a) THERE IS A PARTICIPATION OF THE DIVINE NATURE

217. Adversaries. *Pantheists, false mystics, Quietists*: they defend a certain substantial identity with the divine nature through our change into it.

De Bay, *Rationalists* and *Semi-Rationalists* reduce the whole participation to some kind of moral assimilation with God.

218. Doctrine of the Church. 1) That the participation of the divine nature cannot be numerical is taught by the Church against Eckhart (D 960-963), against Molinos (D 2205), against the pantheists (D 3001f., 3213f.).

2) That the participation is not purely moral was taught by Pius V against de Bay (D 1942), against whom he also defended its supernaturality (D 1921).

3) Leo XIII: "No one can express the greatness of this work of divine grace in the souls of men. Wherefore, both in Holy Scripture and in the writings of the Fathers, men are styled regenerated, new creatures, partakers of the divine nature, children of God, god-like, and similar epithets."²

4) Pius XII: "As if the Word emptied himself, accepting the form of a slave, and he also did this in order that, according to the flesh, he might make us his brothers and partakers of the divine nature, both in our earthly exile by the efficacious grace of holiness, and in heaven by the eternal attainment of beatitude."³

Theological note. *Divine and Catholic faith* from the ordinary magisterium of the Church.

219. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) From 2 Pet. 1:4: *By which he has granted to us his precious and very great promises, that through these you may... become partakers of the divine nature....*

Context. Peter recalls the benefits that God has conferred on Christians, by leading them to faith (v. 3-5), and he urges them to respond to those gifts by their exercise of the virtues (v. 5-9). That is, since God has bestowed so many gifts on you, you ought to adorn your souls with every type of virtue.

Text. *By whom*, that is, through Christ; or in Greek, *by which*, that is, through those things mentioned in v. 3. The meaning is the same. *His precious and very great promises*, that is, the gifts promised either by the prophets or by Christ and the Apostles, and which are conferred on Christ's faithful for

2. Encyclical "*Divinum illud munus*": ASS 29,652.

3. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 214.

a life of piety (v. 3), in order to flee the corruption of this world (v. 4), and indeed when they are called to faith by Christ and they have knowledge of him (v. 3). *Partakers of the divine nature*, or his companions and participators, so that there takes place a certain true communication of nature, such as is gathered from the concept of regeneration.⁴ See 1 Cor. 10:14-22; 2 Cor. 1:7; 1 Pet. 5:1.

*Argument.*⁵ St. Peter is speaking about a certain participation in the divine nature, which is not pantheistic, or merely moral, or merely eschatological. But such participation is given in justification. Therefore in justification truly becomes a partaker of the divine nature.

The Major: In the text some participation of the divine nature is expressed with those very words. This, as we have said, is nothing other than a participation in that nature which the true and only God has. However, this participation cannot be understood as :

a) *pantheistic*: for the pantheistic idea is foreign to Holy Scripture. Moreover, in the very context a distinction is made between God giving (v. 3f.) and man cooperating (v. 5-10).

b) *merely moral*: for the bestowed gifts, among which the participation of the divine nature is mentioned, are the reason because of which the faithful are bound to seek some assimilation with God, which is obtained by the exercise of the virtues and is moral.

c) *purely eschatological*: those promises to a life of piety have already been given to us; the corruption of concupiscence in this world is opposed to this life of piety, which is a result of those gifts. The entrance into eternal life is prepared for by all of these gifts (v. 11).

The minor: Those gifts are present within us through the knowledge of Jesus, which a man acquires when he follows the Lord who is calling him to faith (v. 3).

2) From John 3:5: *Unless one is born of water and the Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God* (see also John 1:13; Tit. 3:5; Jas. 1:18; 1 John 3:9).

Hence we argue: In justification we are generated by God into a new nature. But by generation the nature of the generator is communicated to the one generated. Therefore in justification we become partakers of the divine nature.

The major: Jesus is talking about justification; for the rebirth or generation which is acquired through Baptism, and which is necessary in order to enter into the kingdom of heaven, is justification.

4. U. Holzmeister, *In epistolam primam S. Petri* (Paris 1937) 79ff.; B. Justiniani, *In omnes catholicas epistolas explanationes* (Lyons 1621); J. Chaîne, *Les Épîtres catholiques* (Paris 1939) 41ff.

5. See Lange, 410.

The minor: This is the essential condition of every generation.

220. Proof from tradition. 1) *The Fathers* acknowledge the fact of divine participation in the words of St. Peter. Thus St. Leo the Great: "Acknowledge, O Christian, your dignity; and, having been made a partaker of the divine nature, do not return to your old vices by a corrupt way of life" (R 2103). See also Clement of Alexandria (R 412), St. Basil (R 944), St. Ambrose (R 1318), St. Augustine (R 1468, 1698), St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2063, 2080).

2) *In the sacred Liturgy* our participation in the divinity is celebrated. In the Mass, at the mixing of the water and wine: "Grant us to have part in the Godhead of Him who has deigned to become a partaker of our humanity." In the *Preface of the Ascension*: "That he might make us sharers in his own divinity." In the Secret prayer of *the 18th Sunday after Pentecost*: "You allow us to share in your own divine nature." In the *Office of the Bl. Sacrament*: "Since the Only-begotten Son of God, wishing us to be partakers of his divinity, took to himself our nature, in order that, having become man, he might make men god-like." In the *Postcommunion for the feast of St. Cyril of Jerusalem* we ask to be made worthy "to share in your divine nature."

1. THIS PARTICIPATION IS HAD THROUGH GRACE

221. Doctrine of the Church. Against de Bay St. Pius V attributes participation of the divine nature to grace. Leo XIII does the same and Pius XII with explicit words teaches it in the texts cited above in n. 218.

Theological note. According as the thesis expresses some connection between grace and participation of the divine nature, without more precisely determining it, it must be said to be *Catholic doctrine*.

222. Proof from Holy Scripture. The Bible teaches the participation of divine nature in a just man from the fact that the just man receives a new nature by generation from God. But such generation is explained in Scripture by a created gift that we call grace. Therefore the participation of the divine nature is had through grace.

The major: See above n. 219 2).

The minor: No one born of God commits sin; for God's nature abides in him (1 John 3:9); you were sealed with the promised Holy Spirit, who is

the guarantee of our inheritance (Eph. 1:13-14). “Nature” and “seal” are created gifts, effects of the activity of the Holy Spirit. We call it grace.

223. Proof from tradition. St. Irenaeus speaks often about some participation in the glory of God, which consists in assimilation, union, communion with God, and which is a created entity superadded to nature.⁶ St. Cyril of Alexandria attributes our assimilation to God the Holy Spirit through the created gift of grace (R 2063; see 2039).⁷ St. Augustine: “He calls men gods, deified by his grace” (R 1468).

b) THIS PARTICIPATION IS HAD BY GRACE FORMALLY

224. Adversaries. Lessius (+ 1623), whom Petavius, Thomassinus, Scheeben, Hurter follow more or less,⁸ holds that the participation of the divine nature is produced formally by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. Therefore through grace man becomes just and holy, and for this reason participates in some way in the divine nature; however this participation is had completely and formally only through the indwelling Holy Spirit.

Theological note. *Common and certain.*

225. Theological reasoning. 1) Proof. The divine nature is conceived as the basic principle of the operations by which God sees and loves Himself in the way that is wholly proper to Him. But grace is the formal and physical image of that basic principle. Therefore grace in itself is participation of the divine nature, which therefore it attributes to the just soul by the communication of itself alone.

The major: The nature is always conceived as the basic principle of specific operations. Therefore the divine nature must be conceived as the basic principle of God’s own operations.

The minor: a) It is the *image*: for an image is a similitude expressed in a specific or quasi specific nature in virtue of its production. But grace is a similitude of God, proceeding from the divine archetype, expressing God’s own life, in virtue of an action which in the sources is called “generative.” Therefore grace is an image of the basic principle of the divine life.

b) It is a *physical image*: for it is a physically permanent being, physically inhering, physically disposing for the vision and love of God.

6. See Lange, 273-412.

7. See Lange, 276.

8. Lessius, *De summo bono* 2,1,3; *De perfectionibus divinis* 12,11,75; Petavius, *De Trinitate* 8,4,6; Thomassinus, *De Incarnatione* 8,9ff.; Scheeben, *Dogmatik* 2,832; Hurter, *De gratia* 190ff.

c) It is a *formal image*: for it puts formally in the soul what is formally in God. For, the basic principle of seeing and loving God, in the way proper to Himself, is in God formally, not just virtually. See S.Th. I, q. 93, a. 4.⁹

226. 2) A further explanation. From what has been said it follows that grace presents a certain similitude with God in the supernatural order, and through it a supernatural image of God himself finds expression in the soul. This image is not a mere trace of God, such as is present in all creatures (participation of the divine essence); nor is it a natural image of God, such as is found in spiritual creatures (a natural participation of the divine nature); but it is a special image of God, giving a quasi outline of his divine life, that is, of the Trinitarian life.

But the theologians ask further: what is the nature of the terminus of that assimilation, or what is the divine perfection of which, in this way, there is a similitude in the soul through grace.

a) Ripalda (+ 1648), with whom many *Scotists* seem to agree, like Esparza, Oviedo, Struggi, Kilbur,¹⁰ teaches that we participate through grace in the divine nature, not physically but only morally. That is, just as God by his nature, so also man through grace accepts that moral goodness, in virtue of which sin is removed and a faculty is given in order to perform good works. Other theologians concede further this moral participation in the divine nature, but at the same time they think it is insufficient, because this moral goodness supposes a physical nature, which is the basic principle of these good operations. "Just as moral goodness," says Pesch,¹¹ "in the natural order does not constitute human nature, but is a quality of an intellectual nature, so in the supernatural order that which makes a man a partaker of the divine nature must be thought to be a physical being whose quality is moral goodness."

Therefore *other theologians* defend the position that participation of the divine nature must be understood to be not in the *moral* order alone, but also in the *physical* order. However, not all explain *this physical participation* in the same way.

b) John Vicente, O.P. (+ 1595), whose opinion other Thomists embraced, like P. de Ledesma, Cabrera, Nazario, Araújo, Gr. Martínez, John of St. Thomas, Labat, Gonet, conceives the matter thus: "Grace per se primarily is a certain formal expression and participation of the divine nature, according to what is more excellent and divine in the nature itself

9. See Garrigou-Lagrange, 104f.

10. Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* d.1332 s.9 n.105; Esparza, *De iustificatione* 5,1; Oviedo, *De iustificatione* tr.8 contr 1 n.3; Struggi, *De gratia* p.1 tr.6 d.5 q.1 a.3 n.23; Kilber, *De gratia* 407. See Beraza, 778.

11. Pesch, *Praelectiones dogmaticae* 5,345.

of God; for it is a participation in him, inasmuch as he is unparticipated and independent Being itself, having in Himself all the fullness of being.”¹²

But this opinion was attacked first of all by I.A. Curiel (+ 1609), then by Suarez (1617), and many theologians follow him, because no creature can participate in the divine nature according to the reason by which it is being itself through its essence.¹³ Certainly, the words of St. Thomas do not favor this opinion of John Vicente (*In 1 d.43 q.1 a.2*): “Just as what God is cannot be communicated to any creature, so what pertains to the infinite essence and infinite power cannot be communicated to oneself.”

c) Therefore Suarez, adopting the interpretation proposed by Curiel, summarizes it in these words: “Since the divine nature is a certain intellectual nature of a higher order than any created intellectual substance is or could be, that grade of intellectuality, which is in the divine nature, is participated in a certain divine and supernatural way by habitual grace. But this cannot be participated in by any created substance by itself or by its own connatural power... For the divine essence, as an intelligible object in itself, and by the intuitive vision immediately directed to the very essence of God, is so lofty and excellent by reason of its pure actuality and immateriality, that it cannot be seen by any intellectual substance, except by itself. But by grace and the supernatural gifts the created intellectual nature is elevated to proper participation of the divine nature, not as it is considered under the aspect of nature, but as it has the nature of an intellect, or will, or justice, or of some similar virtue, and therefore, beside these immediately operative habits, there is given another in which these are connected as in nature and essence, which we call sanctifying grace by *antonomasia*. Therefore that is the proper participation of the divine nature, as it is such a nature, because it participates in that grade of divine intellectuality, not as a proximate virtue with reference to one special act, but as the basic principle of all virtues, and of their acts, because it really concerns the nature as the nature is....”¹⁴

227. *This last explanation seems more probable to us.* According to it, the essence of grace consists in some similitude of the divine nature inasmuch

12. John Vicente, *Relectio de habituali Christi Salvatoris sanctificante gratia* (Rome 1590) p. 18. On the life and writings of this theologian, see Beltrán de Heredia, *El padre Juan Vicente Asturicense, Procurador y Vicario General de la Orden*: ArchFrPraed 11 (1941) 5-35. More on this opinion is given by T. Urdániz, O.P., *Juan de Santo Tomás y la transcendencia sobrenatural e la gratia santificante*: CiencTom 69 (65-90); R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *La grâce est-elle une participation de la Deité telle qu'elle est en soi?*: RevThom (1936) 385-470; M. García Fernández, O.P., *La gracia como participación de la divina naturaleza en Juan de Santo Tomás y lugar que a éste corresponde en la tradición tomista*: CiencTom 70 (1946) 209-250; 73 (1947) 5-62.

13. John A. Curiel, *Lecturae seu Quaestiones in D. Thomae Aquinatis Primam Secundae* in q. 110 a.3 dub.1 § 4f.; Suarez, *De gratia* 7,1,24-29.

14. See Suarez, *De gratia* 7,1,30f.

as it is conceived in relation to the proper operations of God himself. Those proper operations are the vision and love of God himself in a very special way, which is rooted in the highest divine spirituality. But the divine nature is conceived by us as the basic principle of these operations. Therefore grace is the image of this basic principle of the knowledge and love of God, in a way that is exclusively divine. This way of knowing and loving God he communicates to the just man by the communication of himself. However he does not communicate his own actual vision and love, but the basic principle of it. For, although in God everything is pure act, our way of conceiving divine things distinguishes between the acts themselves and their principle.

Surely the proper mode of God in knowledge is the beatific vision of himself, and in love it is the love resulting from that vision. However it should not be thought that the assimilative participation in this proper mode, as it is in the soul, should be placed only in our beatific vision and in the resulting love. For, just as in the natural order man is truly the image of God, not only when he actually understands and loves, but constantly, because he always has the basic aptitude for knowing and loving, so also in the supernatural order man is truly a special image of God, not only when he actually sees and loves God in a beatific way, but constantly, because by grace he always has the basic aptitude for that vision and love. Grace therefore communicates the divine nature, because, from the proper and immediate communication of himself, the soul become assimilated to God through the image of those perfections, which are proper and exclusive to the divine life.

This explanation *can be proved in this way*: Where greater immateriality and intellectuality are found, there one finds a greater likeness to God: thus, there is a greater likeness to God in an angel than in man, greater in man than in an irrational creature. Therefore, if some likeness to God is present, which is absolutely supernatural, it will be located in a certain immateriality and intellectuality which is proper to God. But grace is a likeness to God that is absolutely supernatural. Therefore grace must be an assimilation to God in his greatest immateriality and intellectuality, or in his way of knowing which is strictly divine and which also is the foundation of love which is simply divine.

228. Scholium. *On participation of the divine nature understood in a terminal way (terminative).* Many texts of the holy Fathers attribute participation in the divine nature to the indwelling Holy Spirit.¹⁵ This can be understood firstly as signifying that the

15. See J.C. Martínez Gómez, *Relación entre la inhabitación del Espíritu Santo y los dones creados de la justificación*: EstEcl 14 (1935) 24-33.

Holy Spirit produces that participation not immediately, but by the mediating form of created grace. Moreover, it is well understood from the union between the Holy Spirit or the Trinity and the soul, which results from the indwelling, that some participation of the divine nature takes place in the soul. However, because the Holy Spirit cannot be considered as informing the soul of the just, but only as dwelling in it, that participation cannot be attributed to the Holy Spirit formally, but only in a terminal way (*terminative*; i.e., as a result).

Thesis 23. In justification a man becomes truly an adoptive son of God, which he obtains formally and adequately by grace.

S.Th. III, q. 23, a. 1st.; Lercher-Lakner, 79-97; Beraza, 804-828; Lange, 420-434.

229. Definition of terms. *Son of God* is said in three ways: 1) *By natural generation*, in perfect similitude to the generator. Such is the Word (Ps. 2:7; John 1:1; 3:16...). 2) *By creation*, in imperfect similitude of God. Intellectual creatures are of this type. Thus the people of Israel (Deut. 32:5-6; Hos. 11:1). Often the angels also in the poetic books. 3) *By spiritual generation*, by reason of sanctifying grace. Thus all the just. This third type of sonship is called *adoption*.

Adoption is defined by lawyers: The gratuitous assumption of a foreign person as a son with the right of inheritance. Therefore since adoptive sonship is a certain imitation of natural sonship, it implies three things: a) community of nature from the father to the son; b) when this community of nature is already had, it is completed by the paternal affection for the son; c) a right to the paternal inheritance.

These points are valid in human adoption; but they differ in many ways *from divine adoption*. For 1) in human adoption a similitude of nature is necessarily pre-required; but in the divine, since this is not yet present, it is produced by God; 2) human adoption is purely external, by act alone of the will of the one adopting; but the divine is produced by the work of the infusion of an intrinsic gift; 3) therefore, in a divine adoption, the one adopted is rightly said to be generated or born from God; and, in a more particular way than in human affairs, the adoptive son can call God his Father, and is said to be the brother and fellow heir of Christ the Lord; 4) in human adoptions, that one inherit the goods of the adopting parent, it is necessary that his death intercede; but that is not the case in divine adoptions. For always and essentially God is living and we enter into his inheritance, which is nothing else but His essence intuitively known and possessed by fruition.¹

Truly, that is, not metaphorically.

Formally by grace: divine adoption is the formal effect of sanctifying grace.

Adequately by grace: without adding anything else to the entity of grace.

Therefore we are saying three things:

- a.) In justification a man become an adoptive son of God.
- b.) This adoption is had by grace.
- c.) And also as its formal effect.

1. See J. Bellamy, *Adoption*: S.I. Dock, *Fils de Dieu par grâce* (Paris 1948).

a) MAN BECOMES AN ADOPTIVE SON OF GOD

230. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, s.5 cn.5 (D 1515): Men by Baptism “innocent, unstained, pure, and guiltless, have become the beloved sons of God, heirs of God and fellow heirs with Christ, so that nothing henceforth holds them back from entering into heaven.” S.6 ch.4 (D 1524): Justification is “a transition from the state in which man is born a son of the first Adam to the state of grace and adoption as sons of God.” S.6 ch.7 (D 1528): By justification a man “from unjust man becomes just, and from enemy a friend, that he may be an heir in hope of eternal life.”

Theological note. *Divine and Catholic faith.*

231. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) *Text. Rom. 8:14-18*: The faithful, freed from death, from sin, from the slavery of the law, from concupiscence by Christ (ch.5-7), and leading a new life by the indwelling Holy Spirit, must live as becomes saints. For, those who are led by the Spirit of God, they alone are proved to be the sons of God (8:14). For, Christians have received the Spirit of adoption, that is, those internal thoughts that belong to an adoptive son towards his father (8:15). For the Holy Spirit himself together with our spirit (that is, along with the new supernatural nature, or grace) testifies that we are children of God (τέκνα) and heirs (8:16f.). This adoptive sonship, which we now have partially really and partially in hope, will acquire its fullness through the resurrection (8:23).

Gal. 4:4-7: Christ came to bestow on us the adoptive sonship of God, which is the fruit of the redemption. But it is clear that you are his sons, because God has sent his Spirit into your hearts (thus, more probably). Therefore we are sons and heirs.

Eph. 1:3ff.: God predestined us for the adoption of sons through Christ, and as such he made us heirs; the pledge of this inheritance in us is the Holy Spirit (1:13f.).

1 John 3:1f.: We are called and we are children (τέκνα) of God. We are really born of God (3:9; see John 1:13; 1 John 2:29; 4:7; 5:1.4.18), and this divine generation confers on us a permanent principle of a new spiritual life (3:9).

b) *Argument.* In these texts Scripture speaks about a true sonship of God, which is called adoptive, although it is greater than a mere human adoption. But such adoption is joined together with justification. Therefore in justification a man truly becomes an adoptive son of God.

The major: It is clear that the question there has to do with sonship of God. In the same texts this sonship is often called adoptive. And it cannot

be natural, since the natural Son of God in Scripture is the Only-begotten One (John 1:14-18; 3:16.18; 1 John 4:9). But this sonship is greater than a mere juridical adoption among men: we are not just called sons of God, but we are; we are truly sons in such a way that we can be called τέκνα; just as we are said to be adopted, we are said to be generated, to be born of God.

The minor: This adoption is one of the gifts, which the redemption of Christ brings to us, as is clear from the same texts, especially those of St. Paul.

232. Proof from tradition. 1) *The Fathers* often mention this adoptive sonship. At the same time, they speak about the right to the heavenly inheritance conferred on us by that adoption, and about the relation of our adoptive sonship to the natural sonship of Christ. See Tertullian (R 302), Clement of Alexandria (R 407), Novatian (R 607), St. Athanasius (R 766), St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 813), St. Basil (R 948), St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1027), Chrysostom (R 1171), St. Ambrose (R 1273), St. Augustine (R 1433, 1468, 1777), St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2106...).

2) *The holy Liturgy* also testifies to the fact of the adoptive sonship. *In the Preface for Pentecost:* "He sent forth the Holy Spirit upon his adopted children." *On Holy Saturday:* "Preserve in the new members of your family the spirit of sonship that you have conferred on them." *In the Introit for Low Sunday:* "Crave, as newborn babes, spiritual milk."

3) *Archeological monuments demonstrate* how familiar this idea of a new birth or of a divine adoption was to the first Christians. They bring to memory a) the names that frequently occur in the inscriptions on tombs: Reborn, Regenerated, Theogonius, Vitalis, Zoé, etc. b) The symbol of the fish and the little fishes, whose significance is explained by Tertullian: "But we, little fishes, after the example of our ἰχθύς Jesus Christ, are born in water" (R 302).²

233. Theological reasoning. Adoption is the assumption of a foreign person to the rights of a son, especially for inheritance. But the justified person is assumed by God to the right for a divine inheritance.

The minor: The justified a) is a person foreign to God: for he does not have numerically or specifically the same nature of God; b) he has a right to the divine inheritance; for this is nothing but the beatific vision and the resulting love, whereby God himself is ineffably blessed; but the justified person, prescinding from his own merits, has a right to the beatific vision, as is clear in the case of a baptized infant.

2. See Terrien, *La gracia y la gloria* t.1 l.1 c.2.

234. Scholium. *Adoption and generation.* They are analogous ideas.

a) By *generation* a father communicates to his natural son rights to his own temporal and social goods (name, dignity, inheritance), this is so because he communicates to him his own nature or substance (specifically the same in creatures, numerically the same in God). Therefore a natural son is an extension of the father in the physical order, and he makes the father continue in the world as it were physically.

b) By *human adoption* a father communicates to his adoptive son similar rights, although he is not able to communicate to him his own nature. Therefore an adoptive son is an extension of the father in the moral and juridical order, and he makes the father continue morally in the world.

c) *Divine adoption* is something in the middle, approaching much more to a true generation. By it God communicates to a just man rights to the name, dignity and inheritance of God himself. But he does this not merely juridically or morally, because he truly, although analogically, communicates to him his own nature. Therefore this adoption surpasses human adoption, because it is founded on a true communication of the nature of the Father; but it falls short of natural generation, because this communication is not numerical or univocal (specific), but analogical. Therefore the adoptive son of God is a quasi extension of God in the supernatural physical-moral order. Hence it appears that this divine adoption is based de facto on participation of the divine nature. However these two concepts, although they are very closely connected with each other, can be separated from each other. The same thing occurs in Christ, for in him there is a participation of the divine nature (also analogical, through grace), without a divine adoption, which in Him is impossible because He is in no way a "foreign" person.

b) THIS ADOPTION IS HAD BY GRACE

235. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, s.6 ch.4 (D 1524) teaches that justification is a transition to the state of adoption; and s.6 ch.7 (D 1528) says that the same justification is had by the reception of grace.

St. Pius V teaches against de Bay that man by grace is adopted as a son of God (D 1942).

Leo XIII: "No one can express the greatness of this work of divine grace in the souls of men. Wherefore, both in Holy Scripture and in the writings of the Fathers, men are styled regenerated, new creatures, partakers of the divine nature, children of God, god-like, and similar epithets."³

3. Encyclical "*Divinum illud munus*"; ASS 29,652.

236. Theological note. 1) In the sources divine adoption always appears as the effect of justification. But justification is had by grace. Therefore divine adoption is had by grace.

2) The foundation of the relation of sonship, which arises in the justified person towards God, is the communication of the nature from God, or the communicated divine nature. But God communicates his nature to the justified person by grace. Therefore adoption is had by grace.

c) THIS ADOPTION IS HAD BY GRACE FORMALLY

237. Adversaries. 1) Lessius, Petavius, Scheeben: Divine adoption is had formally through the indwelling Holy Spirit, who formally communicates the divine nature and therefore formally makes the justified person a son of God (see n. 224).⁴

2) Scotus, with many Scotists and especially the Nominalists, holds that sonship takes place formally through the extrinsic favor of God, accepting the just as a son and promising him an inheritance. But the reason is because the remission of sins is required for sonship; but this remission does not occur formally through grace alone, because grace does not expel sin by its nature, but only because of a special ordination of God.⁵

3) Ripalda⁶ says that grace indeed confers the dignity or the moral capacity for the inheritance, but not the physical exigency or the strict moral right to it. For this right comes from a free decree of God, by a new favor that is extrinsic to grace. Therefore sonship is not had formally by grace alone.

238. Theological note. That adoption is had formally and adequately by grace is *the more probable opinion*.

239. Theological reasoning. 1) Where the divine nature is first communicated to man by a quasi-generation, man is already an adoptive son of God. But the nature of God is communicated formally to man by grace (see n. 225). Therefore divine adoption is had *formally* by grace.

2) Where the divine adoption is first given in a man, by that very fact, without any further decree, the man has a true right to the inheritance of the Father. But divine adoption, as we have proved, is had formally by grace. Therefore also it is had by it *adequately*.

4. Lessius, *De perfectionibus divinis* 12,11,75; Petavius, *De Trinitate* 8,4ff.; Scheeben, *De ente supernaturali* 1.6 d.ult s.10 n.131-147.

5. Scotus, *In 4 d.16 q.2*.

6. Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* 1.6 d.ult. s.10 n.131-147.

240. Scholium 1. *On the connection between grace and adoption.* Theologians ask whether divine adoption is the primary or the secondary formal effect of sanctifying grace. This question can also be expressed differently: by what kind of necessity does adoption follow from grace—metaphysical or physical?

There are many authors, especially the Thomists, who hold that adoption pertains to the primary formal effect of sanctifying grace, and that it follows from the nature of grace with metaphysical necessity. In this opinion, it is absolutely impossible, on the part of grace, for a man to have grace and not to be an adoptive son of God. The reason for this is that it seems to be contradictory that God, on the one hand, produces and conserves grace, whose essence is to communicate to man the same divine nature and thus to quasi generate him to be a son and heir, and for the same God on the other hand not to accept such a man actually into those things which are contained in the rights of a son and heir.⁷

Other authors, following Suarez, distinguishing between adoption in the first reality (*in actu primo, in being*) (according as it affirms a basic physical right to sonship with the natural exigency of inheritance) and adoption in the second reality (*in actu secundo, in action*) (according as it adds the actual acceptance on the part of God and the formal denomination of son with the full right to inheritance), hold that adoption in the first reality is the primary formal effect of grace, but that adoption in the second reality is the secondary effect. Therefore adoption in the second reality follows from the nature of grace not with metaphysical, but with physical necessity. In this opinion it is not repugnant to the absolute power of God that someone possesses grace and is not an adoptive son in the second reality. The reason for this opinion is this, that grace does not contain formally that divine acceptance.

With this question another one is very closely connected regarding the grace in Christ's soul. For in Christ there was sanctifying grace; therefore also there necessarily was its primary formal effect. In Christ however there was no adoptive sonship. The authors of the above opinion respond to this question: the primary formal effect of grace must be taken in two senses—one absolute (participation of the divine nature), but the other hypothetical (divine adoption). The hypothetical effect supposes a suitable subject in order for it to be given. But Christ is not a suitable subject for adoption, because he is not a foreign person. The authors of the second opinion respond: in Christ there is not adoptive sonship, although there is grace, because adoption is not the primary effect of grace, but the secondary, which can be impeded by God.⁸

241. Scholium 2. *On divine adoption taken in a terminal way (terminative).* In some texts of Holy Scripture a connection of adoption with the indwelling Holy Spirit is affirmed. Thus Rom. 8:16f.; Gal 4:4-7; Eph. 1:13ff. From what is said, this connection is not of such a nature that it signifies that adoption is the formal effect of the indwelling. Hence in these texts a certain relation of the adoptive son to the Holy Spirit is taught,

7. See Lange, 434.

8. See Suarez, *De gratia* 7,4; Billuart, *De gratia* dis.7 a.3; P. Villada, *De effectibus formalis gratiae habitualis* 103-125.

whose terminus therefore is the indwelling Holy Spirit himself. The Holy Spirit manifests himself and renders us as it were conscious of the divine adoption.

242. Scholium 3. *On other effects of sanctifying grace.*

1) *Divine friendship.* That in some sense the just man is called a friend of God is certain both from Holy Scripture (John 15:14f.; Luke 12:4), and from the Fathers, who interpret the words of Jesus to the Apostles about the friendship existing between God and the just. Also, this friendship is a necessary consequence of participation of the divine nature and adoption.

2) *The supernatural beauty of the soul* is stressed very much by the Fathers, like Basil (R 994), Chrysostom (R 1144), Ambrose (R 1319), Cyril of Alexandria, and others.⁹

3) *The singular providence of God*, which both follows the divine adoption, and is explicitly promised to the just in Matt. 6:33; Rom. 8:28 and elsewhere. But this providence, among other things, is manifested by a special protection of the angels, according to this: *Are they not all ministering spirits sent forth to serve, for the sake of those who are to obtain salvation?*" (Heb. 1:14).

9. See J. Bittremieux: EphThLov 5(1928) 426-436.

A R T I C L E V

ON THE PROPERTIES OF JUSTIFICATION

Thesis 24. Justice is increased by good works.

S.Th. I-II, q. 112, a. 4; II-II, q. 24, a. 4-7; Lercher-Lakner, 102f.; Beraza, 938-948; Lange, 484ff.

243. Definition of terms. *Justice*, taken adequately, that is, sanctifying grace, the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, according as these are a physical supernatural entity of the soul. We are concerned with the *fact* of increase, prescinding from the *way* in which it takes place.

It is increased, so that it is different in different men, and it is not the same in the same man in the different periods of his life. However it is increased both by the work done (*ex opere operato*) and by the work of the agent (*ex opere operantis*).

The increase of justice can be conceived in two ways:

a) *extrinsic*, or *extensive*: inasmuch as it is extended to many material objects.

b) *intrinsic*, or *intensive*: inasmuch as it is a physical supernatural entity in the soul.

We are speaking about an intrinsic or intensive increase, which can be called simply an increase.

244. Adversaries. 1) Jovinian, in the 4th century, taught that all good works have the same value; hence there is equal justice of all and equal glory (R 1383, 1975).¹

2) The *Beghards*, in the 14th century, said that such a grade of perfection is possible that there cannot be any greater progress in grace (D 891).

3) The *Reformers*, in the 16th century, held that the justice of all is equal, because this is nothing other than the justice of Christ, equally imputed to all. Bucerus is the one exception; he said that this imputation depends on different grades of fiducial faith.²

245. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, s.6 ch.7 (D 1529) warns that all do not receive equal justice in their first justification, but “each one receiving within himself his own justice, according to the measure that the Holy Spirit apportions to each one individually as he wills and according to

1. There is much more about Jovinian in J. Forget: DTC 8, 1577-1580.

2. See Bellarmine, *De iustificatione* 3, 16.

each one's personal disposition and cooperation"; ch.10 (D 1535) teaches that the justified can increase in their received justice and they can do it indefinitely by the increase of the theological virtues; cn.24 (D 1582) also defines that the justified merit an increase of grace by their good works.

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

246. Proof from Holy Scripture. It teaches that justice is increased, both directly and indirectly from the unequal retribution of the just. Therefore justice is increased, or it is unequal.

The antecedent: a) Directly in Pet. 3:18: *But grow in grace...* And Rev. 22:11: *Let the righteous still do right...* (see also 2 Cor. 3:16; Phil. 1:9; 3:12; Eph. 4:15).

b) Indirectly in 1 Cor. 15:41, where Paul speaks not only about the difference between the mortal and glorious body of the just, but also about the different grades of glory for the diversity of merits: *There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon, and another glory of the stars; for star differs from star in glory.*

247. Proof from tradition. St. Jerome and St. Augustine explicitly hand on this doctrine, both while refuting Jovinian (R 1383, 1975), and also elsewhere. St. Augustine writes: "The saints have clothed themselves with justice, some more and some less."³

This idea is present in all Catholic asceticism, which continually exhorts all to strive for greater perfection.

248. Theological reasoning. a) God confers different grace on the justified, depending on diverse preparation; and these again cooperate differently with the graces they receive. Therefore justice is unequal. See I-II, q. 112, a. 4.

b) The just by their good works merit an increase of glory. But grace corresponds to glory. Therefore grace is increased by good works.

249. Scholium 1. *A further explanation of this increase:* a) On the way of the increase: theologians disagree with each other on this point. For, the Thomists, led by St. Thomas (II-II, q. 24, a. 5), explain it by a greater penetration of the subject. On the contrary, Albert the Great, Bonaventure, Scotists, and Suarez explain it by the addition of one grade to another, which are united together to form one quality. However this

3. Ep. 167,3,13; ML 33,738; CSEL 44,601. See Ep. 187,5,17: ML 33,838; CSEL 57,94.

question depends on the philosophical explanation concerning the increase of habits.⁴

b) On the *terminus*, according to St. Thomas (II-II, q. 24, a. 6) and Suarez,⁵ justice can be increased indefinitely. But there are theologians who disagree with this. Beraza summarizes their opinions.⁶ Certainly grace on its own part does not have any terminus, because the divine nature can be participated in infinitely; nor on the part of the subject, because this is not had in the line of a natural or connatural potency, but only in the line of an obediential potency; nor on the part of the divine power, because it is simply infinite. However a terminus can be assigned to the increase of grace in the just from a positive divine decree, inasmuch as grace cannot be increased without divine assistance. But God will not give the just more helps than he gave to the Bl. Virgin. Therefore the grade of grace that the Bl. Virgin attained can certainly be said to be the terminus that no saint ever reached.⁷

c) On the *cause* of this increase, as it is found in good works, there is not one opinion of the theologians, that is, whether all meritorious acts, even languid ones, increase justice, or only intense ones. For there are some theologians who deny that an increase of grace, or the right to it, is given by languid acts. The greater part of Thomists holds that an increase in the first reality (or some right to really receive the increase at the proper time) is given by those acts, but not in the second reality (or the real reception of the increase). But the time of actually receiving that increase is either the moment of heavenly glorification, or the last instant of earthly life, or at a time when the soul has better disposed itself, according to the different opinions of the authors. Now however it seems that the more common opinion held by theologians, with Suarez and the Salmanticensis, is that all meritorious acts, even languid ones, receive some real increase of justice immediately. This opinion, which seem to be more in accord with Trent which places no restrictions on it, must be said to be more probable, especially since in our case the reality of the morally meritorious causality is more important than the concept of the physical disposition.

d) On the *connection* between the different elements of justification with reference to its increase. Since in justification not only is sanctifying grace found, but also the infused virtues, not all theologians hold that all the virtues are increased at the same time with grace. Thus for some, like Vázquez, faith and hope are increased only by their acts; for others, like Suarez, only the formed habits increase together with grace. But Ripalda holds that all infused virtues increase always and only when grace increases. This last opinion seems to be more true, since Trent (D 1535) speaks in the same way about the increase of justice by grace and about the increase of faith, hope and charity.⁸

250. Scholium 2. *On the decrease of justice.* Justice is not decreased by venial sins. For a venial sin cannot diminish justice either *effectively* or *meritoriously*. Not ef-

4. Suarez, *Disp. metaph.* d.46 s.2. See M. Limbourg, S.J., *Vervollkommungsfähigkeit des Habitus Vermehrung und Verlust der Gnade und Tugend: ZkathTh* 10 (1886) 107-141, 277-312.

5. Suarez, *De gratia* 9,5,4.

6. Beraza, 943.

7. See Suarez, *De gratia* 9,6,8ff.

8. See Lange, 486; Soto, *In 4 d.15 q.2 a.2*; Suarez, *De gratia* 9,4,11.

fectively: for a venial sin cannot take away habitual conversion to God; it only retards a man's tendency to his last end. But also not *meritoriously*, for otherwise the punishment would be out of proportion. For by venial sin a man is not turned away from his last end, but his grace and also his level of eternal glory are diminished. Nevertheless, venial sins, especially fully deliberate ones, gradually bring the just person easily to commit more serious sins.⁹

9. See S.Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 10; Suarez, *De gratia* 11,8,6.

Thesis 25. Justice can be lost, even forever, by any mortal sin.

S.Th. II-II, q. 24, a. 11f.; Lercher-Lakner, 105f.; Beraza, 949-957; Lange, 462-483.

251. Definition of terms. *Justice*, that is, sanctifying grace, concerning which we are directing out attention. But also coming under the name of justice are the theological virtue of charity, the infused moral virtues, the indwelling and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. However the habits of faith and hope are excepted; they are not lost except by sins that are directly opposed to them, that is, despair and a loss of faith. But this takes place providentially so that justification can more easily be recovered (D 1544, 1578, 2312, 2451, 2457).

It can be lost. Therefore, men once justified cannot glory in the idea that now certainly they will preserve their justice until death. And on the other hand, neither sins committed after Baptism, nor the very loss of faith itself, mean that such men were never truly justified.

By any mortal sin, or by every mortal sin alone. *Alone*, therefore it is not lost by venial sin; *every*, therefore not by the sin alone of infidelity, but by any grave sin.

252. Adversaries. 1) Jovinian held that a man cannot sin, once he has accepted the washing of regeneration (R 1975).

2) The *Reformers*, among whom Calvin taught that justice cannot be lost, because the justified person is on the same level as one predestined; Chemnitius held that it can be lost only for a time; Luther conceded that it could also be lost forever, but only by a sin of unbelief, or by the cessation of fiducial faith.¹

3) Agreeing with the above errors are the Beghards (D 891f.), Molinos (D 2972, 2261), Quesnel (D 2443).

253. Doctrine of the Church. 1) On the possibility of losing justice:

Trent, s.6 ch.12 (D 1540) condemns "that the one justified cannot sin anymore or that, if he sins, he should promise himself an assured repentance"; ch.13 (D 1541) says that "of the gift of perseverance... Let no one promise himself any security about this gift with absolute certitude"; ch.14 (D 1542) on the restoration of sinners and all of sess.14 on Penance make the same argument; cn.23 (1573) clearly defines that a man once justified can sin again and lose his grace.

2) By every mortal sin alone:

1. See Bellarmine, *De iustificatione* 3,14.

Trent, s.6 ch.15 (D 1544) teaches “that the grace of justification, once received, is lost not only by unbelief, which causes the loss of faith, but also by any other mortal sin, even though faith is not lost”: cn.27 (D 1577) defines: “If anyone says that there is no mortal sin except that of unbelief or that grace, once received, cannot be lost by any other sin, no matter how grievous or great, except that of unbelief, let him be anathema” (see D 1619, 632). At the same time it also teaches that grace is not lost by venial sin. For, s.6 ch.11 (D 1537) says: “For although... men just and holy fall... into those slight and daily sins that are also called venial, they do not on that account cease to be just”; s.14 ch.5 (D 1680): “As regards venial sins by which we are not excluded from the grace of God....”

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

254. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) *The ability to lose grace* is certain from Exod. 33:12: *The righteous shall not be able to live by his righteousness when he sins*; Rom. 11:22: *Note then the kindness and the severity of God: severity towards those who have fallen, but God's kindness to you, provided you continue in his kindness...* Moreover, Paul himself fears lest perhaps he become a reprobate (1 Cor. 9:27); Judas, once a just man, became such a son of perdition that it would be better for him if he had never been born (John 17:12); Matt. 26:24). On this point Bellarmine says: “We have eight examples—three of them show that justice can be lost and then recovered—Adam, David and Peter; five others—Satan, Saul, Solomon, Simon and Judas—show that some truly just persons can so fall from justice that they are thought to be numbered among the reprobate, not without reason.”²

2) The lists of the vices by which we are excluded from the kingdom of God prove that this can happen *because of any mortal sin* (1 Cor. 6:9; Gal. 5:19-21; Eph. 5:5; Rev. 21:8). But the words of Jas. 3:2 make the argument that we can lose it *only by a true mortal sin*: *For we all offend in many ways* (see Matt.6:12; 1 Cor. 3:10f.).

255. Proof from tradition. 1) St. Jerome deliberately defends *the capacity of losing justice*.³

2) Many Fathers say that justice is lost, and also *by any mortal sin*. Thus St. Athanasius: “When someone abandons the Spirit by some vice, grace among those who desired it remains irrevocable, but only if they

2. Bellarmine, *De iustificatione* 3,14.

3. St. Jerome, *Adversus Iovinianum* 2.1.

repent after they have fallen; nevertheless, the one who falls is no longer in God..." (R 770). St. Augustine: "If, however, being already regenerate and justified, he relapses of his own will into an evil life, assuredly he cannot say, 'I have not received,' because of his own free choice to evil he has lost the grace of God, that he had received" (R 1944). See also Aphraates (R 683), St. Basil (R 973), St. Augustine again (R 1701).

3) In the controversy against Jovinian and the Pelagians, the Fathers taught that justice is lost *only by mortal sin*; they also rejected the perfect sinlessness of man by the means of ordinary graces alone. See above n. 75.

256. Theological reasoning. 1) St. Thomas proves that one can lose charity (II-II, q. 24, a. 11), when he teaches that charity in this life does not fill up the whole potentiality of our mind, as charity in heaven does; and so when our mind is not actually ordered to God, it can lose charity. He shows that it is lost by any mortal sin (II-II, q. 24, a. 12), because "through every mortal sin which is contrary to God's commandments, an obstacle is placed to the outpouring of charity [into the soul by God]."

Finally (I-II, q. 71, a. 4): "Venial sin is neither contrary to charity, nor banishes it...."

2) If justice could not be lost, the many exhortations that the just work out their salvation in fear and trembling would be in vain.

3) Nor could one say that final perseverance is a great gift, if grace once given could not be lost.

257. Objections. 1. From 1 Cor. 13:8: *Love never ends*. But charity is inseparable from grace. Therefore grace is never lost.

I distinguish the major. Charity of itself continues also in heaven, as contrasted with what happens to other gifts, v.gr., prophecies, which come to an end with mortal life, *conceded*; charity, once acquired, now cannot be lost even by reason of the subject in which it is found, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* Grace of itself continues also in heaven, *conceded*; it cannot be lost because of sin, during this life, *denied*.

2. From Mark 16:16: *He who believes and is baptized will be saved*. Therefore justice, once acquired, cannot be lost.

I distinguish the antecedent. He who believes and is baptized will be saved, if he perseveres to death in faith and the acquired justice, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*.

3. Grace is a spiritual being. But the soul and the light of glory, spiritual beings, are indestructible. Therefore also grace is indestructible.

I deny the parity. For the soul is a spiritual substance, but grace is a spiritual accident. The light of glory, although it is an accident, is given in the next life, not in this life, like grace about which we are speaking.

4. Through grace a just man acquires the right to glory. Therefore God would be unjust if he did not grant it; therefore grace cannot be lost.

I distinguish the antecedent. Through grace a just man acquires a true right to glory, but provided that he perseveres in grace to death, so that glory can be given to him, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*. Therefore that right, although it is a true right, can still be lost by sin, just like grace itself, which is its foundation.

5. From 1 John 3:9: *No one born of God commits sin; for God's nature abides in him, and he cannot sin because he is born of God.* Therefore, justice, once acquired, seems to be something that cannot be lost.

I respond that here the inability of grace to be lost is not expressed; for in the same letter (2:1) it is assumed that the just can sin. Therefore, the meaning here seems to be: Divine grace and sin mutually exclude each other; therefore the justified person, either does not sin or, if he does sin, by that fact he ceases to be just. On this point St. Thomas says: "For thus it was said: *No one born of God commits sin*, as if it were said that what is hot cannot become cold (however, that which is hot can become cold, and thus it will be cooled), or as if it were said: 'A just man does not do anything unjust, that is, inasmuch as he is just.'"⁴

4. 4 CG 70.

Thesis 26. Without a special revelation, a man cannot have strict certitude about his own justification.

S.Th. I-II, q. 112, a. 5; Lercher-Lakner, 107ff.; Beraza, 958-971.

258. Definition of terms. *Certitude* is firmness of assent, excluding all prudent fear of error. But a distinction is made between metaphysical, physical and moral certitude, according as these are based on the motive excluding error metaphysically, physically or morally.

Moral certitude, and the thesis is about this, can be either *strict* or *broad*. It is said to be *strict* when it excludes all fear of error, even imprudent fear; but it is *broad* when it does not remove absolutely all fear of error.

259. Adversaries. 1) The *Reformers* erred because they held that all men can and must have this certitude about their state of justice, and that they are justified precisely through this certitude or confidence. Therefore, in addition to the *possibility* of this certitude, they taught that it is *de facto* required and that it is *necessary* for justification.

2) Against this error *Catholic theologians* reacted with one voice and they *denied the necessity* of this certitude concerning justification. But *concerning the possibility* of this same certitude, the theologians disagreed:

a) *Within the Council of Trent*. Many, following St. Thomas, said that without a special revelation only conjectural certitude is possible. Others however (Massarelli lists 21 theologians), who prided themselves on being disciples of Scotus, and they were joined by Catharinus, O.P. and Cardinal Del Monte, argued that, even without a special revelation, the certitude of particular or acquired divine faith is possible, which could absolutely be subject to error. A few, among whom is numbered Salmerón, remained doubtful. Finally, harmony was achieved, when all agreed on excluding "the certitude of faith, which cannot be subject to error."¹

b) *Outside the Council of Trent*. Immediately after the sixth session, in the years 1547-1551, the controversy revived between D. Soto and A. Catharinus. A. de Vega favored Soto.²

Finally, the opinion which prevailed in Catholic schools contained the following points: a) The certitude of faith about one's own justification, indeed a strictly moral certitude, which excludes the very possibility of fear, can be had only from a special revelation. b) Men of outstanding holiness can have moral certitude which excludes any serious act of fear,

1. For more on this see Hefner, *Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Trienter Rechtfertigungsdekretes* 297-328.

2. Vega, *De iustificatione* 1.9.

but not the possibility of fear. c) Also ordinary just persons can have moral certitude in the broad sense or conjectural certitude.³

260. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, s.6 ch.9 (D 1534) rejects the vain confidence of the heretics, “since no one can know with a certitude of faith that cannot be subject to error that he has obtained God’s grace”; cn.12 (D 1562) defines that justifying faith is not the Protestant confidence; cn.13-14 (D 1563-1564) also defines that this confidence is not necessary for true justification.

261. Theological note. 1) That certitude of faith regarding one’s own justice is not necessary is *defined divine and Catholic faith*.

2) That certitude of faith of this kind is not possible is at least *Catholic doctrine*.

3) Indeed, that strict moral certitude is not possible, but only a broad or conjectural certitude, is the *common and certain opinion*.

262. Arguments. 1) St. Thomas proves the point (I-II, q. 112, a. 5) with this reason: “For certitude about a thing can only be had when we may judge of it by its proper principle... But the principle of grace and its object is God, who by reason of his excellence is unknown to us... And hence man cannot judge with certainty that he has grace....”

2) That we might attain the certitude of faith, or strict moral certitude, about the state of our justice, we have to know two things: either that we never sinned mortally after Baptism, or that we did the necessary penance for our sins. But we cannot be certain about either of these, either with the certitude of faith or with strict moral certitude. Therefore we cannot have the certitude of faith or strict moral certitude about the state of our justice.

The minor: a) Not with the certitude of faith, since this is had only from revelation.

b) Not with strict moral certitude. For it is not evident to us that we have always fulfilled the divine commands and, if we have sinned at some time, that we have done sufficient penance for our sin. The situation is different for properly baptized infants.

c) Some of the Fathers commend this incertitude and see it praised

3. Omitting the ancient authors, the following have written about this recently: M. Oltra, O.F.M., *Die Gewissheit des Gnadenstandes bei Andreas de Vega* (Düsseldorf 1941); *La certeza del estado de gracia según Andrés de Vega*: VerVid 3 (1945) 46-98, 325-356, 502-543; V. Beltrán de Heredia, O.P., *Controversia “de certitudine gratiae” entre Domingo de Soto y Ambrosio Catarino*: CiencTom 61 (1941) 133-163; J. Olazarán, S.J., *La controversia Soto-Catarino-Vega sobre la certeza de la gracia*: EstEcl 16 (1942) 145-183; A. Stakemeier, *Das Konzil von Trient über die Heilsgewissheit* (Heidelberg 1947).

in Eccles. 9:1 and Ps. 19:13. Jerome (R 1374), Augustine (R 1800), and Gregory the Great (R 2296) should be read. Basil offers this advice: "Therefore, do not consider yourself justified in comparison with another, lest, being justified in your own mind, you be condemned in the eyes of God."⁴

263. Scholium. *On certain signs of the state of grace.* Both the Fathers and St. Thomas (I-II, q. 112, a. 5) think there are certain signs from which the state of grace is correctly deduced, so that broad moral certitude about one's own justification can be had. However these signs, taken either separately or together, unless there is a special revelation from God, can never produce strict moral certitude. But this is providential according to Augustine: "This presumption, in place of temptations is not helpful where there is such infirmity, so that security would generate pride."⁵ And St. Jerome: "Therefore it is ambiguous and uncertain in order that, while men are doubtful about their salvation, they practice more penance and appeal more to the mercy of God."⁶ And in *The Imitation of Christ* (1,25) we read: "Thou must preserve a good and firm hope of winning the victory; but must not think thyself secure, lest thou grow negligent and proud."

The given signs of justification are more or less these: Continual observance of the commandments, a mind devoted to Christ the Lord and the Bl. Virgin Mary, hatred of sin, contempt for mundane things, love of heavenly things, peace of soul, a good conscience, spiritual consolations and divine favors.

4. *Homilia de humilitate* 4: MG 31,534.

5. *De correptione et gratia* 13,40: ML 44,941.

6. *In Io* 3,9: ML 25,1144.

CHAPTER III

On actual grace

P. Lombard, *Sent.* 2,27-28; S.Th. I-II, q. 111; St. Bonaventure, *In 2 Sent.* d.271; Scotus, *In 2 Sent.* d.271; Suarez, *De gratia* 1,3-5; Salmanticenses, *Cursus theologicus* tr.4 d.5-7; Berti, *De theologicis discipl.* 1.16f.; E. Hugon, *Tractatus de gratia* q.4; I. Hermann, *Tract. De divina gratia* (1904) 37-93, 388-755; L. Lercher, *Instit. theol. dogmat.* Vol.4,1 n.261-356; H. Guillermin, O.P., *De la grâce suffisante*: *RevThom* 9-11 (1901-03); R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *De gratia* p.122-242.

264. Actual grace is ordered to the acquisition, preservation and increase of the supernatural life, which is given to us by justification. Therefore, after speaking about habitual grace, we will now examine actual grace.

In this matter, there are two points to investigate: *the nature of actual grace* in itself, and *its relation to man's free will*, or the sufficiency and efficacy of the same grace. But before we develop individual points, it is necessary to say something about the evolution of this name and doctrine.

On the evolution of the name. St. Thomas (I-II, q. 109, a. 6 and 9); a. 111, a. 2f.) in reality clearly distinguishes between habitual and actual grace, but he does not use the word "actual." For, he states a certain opposition between "the habitual gift" and "the divine help to will and to act well."¹ In the works of Capreolus we find both words—habitual and actual grace. In the Acts of the Council of Trent the phrase "actual grace" appears at least once, although ordinarily the equivalent words are still retained: *the help of God moving, gratuitous motion, special influence*, etc.

On the evolution of the doctrine. Holy Scripture often speaks about the gratuitous and internal influence of God in the soul of man, in order that he might temporarily be helped to act in a salvific manner. This is expressed in various formulas: to enlighten, to open the heart, to knock, to stir up, to teach, to delight, etc. The *Fathers*, especially Augustine and his disciples, often touch on actual graces. However they, like the Pelagians, argue more about the necessity and gratuity of grace in general than they do about the distinction between actual and habitual grace. The

1. See P. de Vooght, O.S.B., *A propos de la grâce actuelle dans la théologie de S. Thomas*: *DivThom* (Pi) 31 (1928) 386-416; Lange, 488-9.

older *scholastics* to some extent neglected internal actual grace.² The *Reformers* never had the right concept of actual grace. De Bay despised the distinction between actual and habitual grace (D 1963-1964). The doctrine on actual grace evolved in the *post-Tridentine controversies*, both of the Catholics against Baianists and Jansenists, and of Catholic scholars among themselves. Because of those controversies many points were surely clarified, even though a complete solution of all questions has not yet been found.

2. In order to know the mind of the scholastics concerning actual grace, the following monographs will help: F. Mitzka, S.J., *Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura von der Vorbereitung auf die Heiligmachende Gnade*: ZkathTh 50 (1926) 27-72, 220-252; J. Stuffer, *Die entfernte Vorbereitung auf die Rechtfertigung nach dem hl. Thomas*: ZkathTh 47 (1923) 1-23, 161-183; V. Heynck, O.F.M., *Die aktuelle Gnade bei Richard Mediavilla*: FranzStud 22 (1935) 297-325; K. Feckes, *Die Stellung der nominalistischen Schule zur aktuellen Gnade*: RömQschr 32 (1924) 157-165; Id., *Die Rechtfertigungslehre des Gabriel Biel und ihre Stellung innerhalb der nominalistischen Schule* (Münster 1925).

ARTICLE I

ON THE NATURE OF ACTUAL GRACE IN ITSELF

Thesis 27. Internal actual graces are presented in the sources as immediate enlightenments of the intellect and immediate inspirations of the will in order to elicit supernatural acts.

265. Definition of terms. *Actual graces*, or helps that are given by God in order to elicit salvific acts. Therefore these actual graces do not constitute a permanent state of justice, as habitual graces do; nor are they given to place an indefinite series of acts, like the infused virtues; but they are something transient, like the acts of the powers of the soul.

Internal. We are not concerned here with external graces (v.gr., preaching, miracles, good examples...), which of course God uses, along with internal grace, for the salvation of souls, and which can truly be called divine graces; nor are we dealing with internal motions that can be stirred up by God and the angels in the sensitive faculties. But here we understand by the name of internal actual grace the grace that is conferred on the higher faculties of the soul, that is, the intellect and will, since only they can elicit acts that are simply supernatural.

They are presented. The sources propose actual graces under the form of illumination and inspiration; these two therefore pertain to the essence of actual grace. However we are not saying in the thesis that the whole essence of actual grace is explained by acts of illumination and inspiration alone. For on this point theologians disagree, as we shall see later.

Illuminations and inspirations. In the sources, these two words do not express exclusively, the first one on the intellect and the second one on the will; but they are used interchangeably. In Trent, s.6 ch.5 (D 1525), both words seem to take on the same meaning; indeed, in Scripture, “inspiration” embraces both of them. However, contemporary theologians generally refer illumination to the intellect, but inspiration to the will. Therefore, the intellect is illuminated so that, elevated by a supernatural light, it can know what leads to salvation; but a holy affection is infused into the will that it might desire and perform salvific acts.

For the illumination of the intellect, one type is mediated (external) and the other is immediate (internal). *Mediated* illumination is present, if the intellect is naturally illuminated by some external grace or by some divine influence on the lower faculties. But it is *immediate*, if God directly and immediately influencing the intellect, brings it about that an act of subjective

higher being is posited than would occur by one's natural powers alone.

The inspiration of the will is either mediated or immediate. *Mediated* is said to be that which, given the illumination of the intellect, naturally and by its own power arises in the will. But *immediate* inspiration is present, if God works directly on the will itself, in a free and undue way, and effects something which cannot be explained by the psychological connection between the exercise of intellect and will, because they are rooted in the same soul.

266. PLEASE NOTE: 1) That these immediate illuminations consist a) in *judgments*, both speculative and practical, which by the Fathers are called "vocation, exhortation, knowledge..."; b) in *simple apprehensions*, especially in those that are suasive and which are virtually equivalent to judgments.

2) That these immediate inspirations can consist in acts of charity, but also in acts of the other virtues, v.gr., fear, hope, penance, etc.¹

3) That both kinds of acts, that is, illuminations and inspirations, are vital acts, inasmuch as they are physically elicited not only by God, but also by our faculties.

4) That they are indeliberate acts, inasmuch as they precede the exercise of freedom, or, as the Fathers say, "they take place in us without us" acting freely, "they precede" us, they are not in our power...." In fact, the essence of actual grace is located primarily in these indeliberate acts; although, deliberate or free acts also take on the nature of actual grace, if they are related to subsequent salvific acts by way of being their principle, v.gr., if someone out of love of God gives alms to the poor.

5) That there is a connection between external and internal grace. For the gentle way of providence requires that God, in granting internal graces, ordinarily adapts himself to external graces. Certainly, God has established many external means by which men are brought to salvation, v.gr., preaching the gospel to unbelievers, pious reading or lectures or the good example of the faithful. Therefore, since some good thought or affection should naturally arise from these external objects, God then inserts himself into this natural occurrence, and in place of concurring naturally, he concurs supernaturally by a hidden and wonderful activity. In this way those thoughts or affections become supernatural, or they are actual graces.

267. Adversaries. 1) The *Pelagians* at first denied all internal grace; then they admitted an internal grace of immediate illumination of the

1. See Beraza, 69f.

intellect; but they always rejected an immediate inspiration of the will or an immediate influence of God on free will.

2) The *Semi-Pelagians* exclude any internal grace which precedes the beginning of faith.

3) Some theologians, v.gr., Vázquez, deny the immediate inspiration of the will; for they hold that the immediate illumination of the intellect is sufficient and from it good affections of the will spontaneously arise.²

268. Doctrine of the Church. *Carthage*, cn.4 (D 226): Through grace “the understanding of the commands is revealed and opened to us;... through this is also given to us to love and to be able to do that which we know ought to be done.” *Indiculus*, ch.8 (D 243): “Because the will is made ready by the Lord, he himself touches the hearts of his children with his fatherly inspirations.” *Orange*, cn.5 (D 375): “Through the gift of grace, that is, through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit”; cn.6 (376): “through the infusion and inspiration of the Holy Spirit”; cn.7 (D 377): “the illumination and inspiration of the Holy Spirit, who gives to all ease and joy in assenting to the truth and believing in it.” *Trent*, s.6 ch.5 (D 1525), describes in general the disposition of an adult for justification through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, so that a man, receiving such an inspiration, can also reject it; ch.6 (D 1526f.) lists in particular the main acts by which a man is usually disposed for justification, but so that these are clearly distinguished from the infusion of the virtues, which follow after justification; cn.3 (D 1553), recalls the prevenient inspiration of the Holy Spirit. *Vatican I*, s.3 ch.3 (D 3010), quotes the same words in cn.7 of the Council of Orange.

269. Theological note. The thesis, as stated, is *certain*. But from that the existence of these illuminations and inspirations follows logically and this is *defined divine and Catholic doctrine*. It is necessary to say the same thing about them according as they are said to be immediate in general. The opinion denying the necessity of immediate inspirations must be said to be *less in harmony with the sources*.

270. Proof from Holy Scripture. Holy Scripture speaks about internal actual graces as immediate illuminations of the intellect and as inspirations of the will.

A. *As immediate illumination of the intellect:*

a) *Illumination*. The word “illumination” is often found in Holy Scripture, although it does not always denote internal actual graces. That is, God

2. Vázquez, *In 2 d.185 c.6*. See Petavius, *De Pelagianorum et Semipelagianorum haeresi* 10,12,15.

illuminates the eyes lest we perish (Ps. 13:3); he lights my lamp, my darkness (Ps. 18:28); he gives me understanding, that I may keep his law (Ps. 119:34); he enlightens the eyes of our heart, that we may know supernatural things (Eph. 1:16-18); he has shone in our hearts to give the light of knowledge (2 Cor. 4:6); the Lord opened the heart of Lydia, so she could understand what was said by Paul (Acts 16:14).

b) *Immediate.* 1) From John 6:44: *No one can come to me unless the Father... draws him.* These words are explained in the context of salvific faith (v. 65-66), by which we are led to Christ. Indeed Augustine, and with him the western Fathers, understood it also to be about the movement of the will. Therefore no adult can believe in a salvific way by the external preaching of the gospel alone, and by natural knowledge and volition, which psychologically follow the preaching of the gospel; but the internal attraction of the Father is also required, which Christ explains in v. 45: *Every one who has heard and learned from the Father comes to me.* Therefore, this attraction consists in the internal illumination of the evangelical doctrine, which the Father produces in the hearers of the Word. Therefore the illumination of the intellect is immediate.

2) From 1 Cor. 3:6: *I planted, Apollos watered, but God gave the growth.* It is as if Paul were to say: I was the first one to evangelize you, I planted the seeds of faith, which afterwards Apollos confirmed; but God alone gave you life and strength to grow in the faith. That is, Paul and Apollos are ministers of God, who preach the Word as external agents; but God works internally. However, what happens through extrinsic ministry is also done by God as the principal cause. Therefore by giving the growth he does something else without the external ministry; for if the growth were given through the ministers, there is no reason why the planting and watering should be attributed to the ministers, but not the growth. Therefore, in addition to the mediate illumination of the preaching of the gospel, something else internal is conferred by God alone.

3) See Acts 16:14; Matt. 11:25; 16:17, etc.

B. *As inspiration of the will:*

The word "inspiration" occurs rarely in Scripture. But the idea is present a) inasmuch as God is presented as inspiring certain affections by which man is helped to act well. Thus, God bestows pleasantness and sweetness on those who observe his words (Ps. 119:103); he expands the heart to run in the way of the commandments (Ps. 119:32)... b) Moreover, God knocks (Rev. 3:20), he wakes up the sleeper (Eph. 5:14), he comforts hearts (2 Thess. 2:17).

271. Proof from tradition. 1) The *Fathers* more or less use the same terms as Holy Scripture to designate internal actual graces. In addition, they quite clearly indicate that these are produced immediately by God in the intellect and will. Thus, v.gr., Clement of Alexandria (R 430), St. Ephraem (R 704), St. Augustine (R 1483, 1485, 1722, 1724, 1729, 1736, 1764, 1822f., 1853), St. Prosper (R 2035, 2043), St. Fulgentius (R 2246).... Regarding St. Augustine, it should be noted that in his early anti-Pelagian writings he often described grace as a mediated movement of the will; but in his later works he insisted more on the immediate movement.³

2) *The Holy Liturgy* petitions God for illumination and inspiration in order to know and to do what is salvific. *Ember Wednesday in Spring*: "Enlighten our minds... that we may understand our duties and fulfill them." *Ember Friday in Spring*: "Enlighten our minds with your grace." *Fifth Sunday after Easter*: "Grant us your inspiration that we may have proper thoughts." *Ember Saturday in Spring*: "O Lord, let our actions be preceded by your inspiration...."

272. Theological reasoning. *For our part*, it agrees with the make-up of human nature that it should be stimulated and helped to do good through the light of the intellect and the movement of the will.

From the side of grace, it is also fitting that its function should be to enlighten the intellect and to strengthen the will. For the wounds inflicted on us by sin are especially ignorance in the mind and weakness in the will.

273. Objection. Immediate enlightenment, since according to the ordinary providence of God it supposes an external object and reveals nothing new, manifests exactly the same thing to the intellect as mediated enlightenment. Therefore immediate enlightenment turns out to be superfluous and unnecessary.

I bypass the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. Immediate enlightenment would turn out to be unnecessary, if the vital acts of the intellect were not elevated to the supernatural order, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*. Therefore, this immediate enlightenment of God, entitatively supernatural, is given by God so that a man can perform a really supernatural act; but the nature of this supernaturality escapes our consciousness. Moreover, these immediate illuminations and inspirations often are also given so that a man can more easily overcome internal obstacles, which turn him away from doing good acts.

3. See *De gratia Christi* 26,27: ML 44,374; CSEL 42,147; *Opus imperfectum contra Iulianum* 3,106: ML 45,1291f.

Thesis 28. The whole essence of stimulating grace is completed by these vital acts alone.

Beraza, 76-89; Lange, 518-529; Lercher-Lakner, 277-281.

274. Definition of terms. *By these vital acts*, that is, the illuminations and inspirations, which are produced by God immediately in us without us (freely operating).

Alone, that is, without any other added reality in addition to these acts.

The whole essence: stimulating grace taken adequately consists in these acts.

Stimulating grace (gratia excitans): is a supernatural help, produced in us by God, by which we are first moved to do good and to avoid evil. This grace is given both to the just and to the sinner.

275. Opinions. The *first* opinion holds that the essence of stimulating grace is to be placed formally in some quality or motion, whose effect is illumination and inspiration. Actually, in order that the intellect might be able to elicit an illumination and the will an inspiration, which are entitatively supernatural, it is necessary that the intellect and will be elevated by a divine supernatural help. But this elevation must be intrinsic to the faculties themselves; hence the divine help must be received in the faculty itself before the act is produced. Such a help is a physical entity, not a vital one (because it does not come from the power, but from God alone); nor is it intentional (because it does not move the power by way of the object, but by the physical impulse to act), which by its nature is fluid (because it ceases to exist when the acts cease). This motion constitutes the complete power in the first reality (*in actu primo*); it is the principle of indeliberate acts and it is called "physical premotion." Thus the *Thomists* generally,¹ and also some of those who do not accept physical predetermination, like Billot, Terrien, Boyer.²

The *second* opinion holds that the essence of stimulating grace adequately must be placed in the immediate illumination and inspiration. These powers must be really elevated in order to elicit those entitatively supernatural acts. But for this elevation no new entity is required, which is first received in the power. Therefore this opinion does not admit an intrinsic elevation of the power, but rather an extrinsic one. That is, God, assisting the power itself, immediately and by Himself supplies what is lacking in nature to produce

1. See Salmanticenses, *De gratia* disp.5 n.34; Billuart, *De gratia* disp.4 a.5; Hugon, *De gratia* q.3 a.1.

2. See Billot, *De gratia Christi* (Prati 1912) 153; Terrien, *La grâce et la gloire*² 2,375ff.; Boyer, *De gratia divina* (Rome 1927) th.19 p.156ff. Similarly Van der Meersch, *De divina gratia* 279-281; Van Noort, *De gratia Christi* 15.

those supernatural acts. Hence the first supernatural being received in the faculty is not a motion previous to the act, but the indeliberate act itself. This act proceeds totally from God and totally from the faculty, with the totality of the effect; but with a partition of the cause, the act proceeds from the faculty as vital, from God as supernatural. This solution presupposes that the natural power/faculty is assumed by God to produce a supernatural effect through an active obediential potency in the strict sense. It consists in the fact that in nature it is in potency to be moved by the activity of the Creator, so that it might be able to produce a supernatural effect with the concursus/cooperation of God which is simultaneous, elevated, powerful and not due to it. In our case it is an act which is indeliberate, entitatively vital and simply supernatural. This is the position of the *Molinists*.

276. We say, in agreement with the second opinion, that stimulating grace formally does not consist in some entity, which is added to the faculty in order to elevate it in order to elicit a supernatural act; but that it consists in the vital acts themselves of illumination and inspiration. They are entitatively supernatural because they proceed from God by an unowed and supernatural concursus; therefore by an extrinsic elevation of the faculty and not by an intrinsic one.

Theological note. *The more probable opinion.*

277. Argument. 1. *There is no intrinsic elevation.* That non-vital entity (physical premotion) would be either a pure physical motion or a transient quality. But it cannot be said to be either. Therefore there is no such entity.

The minor: a) *Not a pure physical motion:* it is impossible to assign some intrinsic terminus for this motion from one state to another. But a motion from one state to another without an intrinsic terminus is repugnant. Therefore that pure motion is repugnant.

This major: Such motion is not a transition from potency to a vital act (because such a transition takes place formally through the becoming of the act); nor is it from the faculty still impotent in a state of complete potency (because this cannot take place without some quality, which confers a new power of acting, and hence it would not now be a pure motion).

b) *Not a transient quality:* any dead entity is not an apt medium by which the will is determined to act. For it is easily understood that the will is moved by knowledge, but there is no way to understand that it is moved by some physical influx.

2) *Extrinsic elevation is possible.* A supernatural act elicited by a vital

faculty through some extrinsic help for the faculty would be repugnant either from its vitality or from its supernaturality. But it is neither. Therefore extrinsic elevation is possible.

a) *Not from the vitality*: for this, according to all, it is not necessary that all the principles producing the act should be intrinsic and vital.

b) *Not from the supernaturality*: for this it suffices that one of the principles of the act is supernatural, and that it operates as such.

3) *Extrinsic elevation is in harmony with the sources*. In the sources, which speak very deliberately about the necessity of grace against the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians, grace is described with words which signify a vital act, and some new non-vital entity is simply not mentioned. But this proves that the theory of extrinsic elevation is in better agreement with the sources. Therefore, the theory of extrinsic elevation is more in conformity with the sources.

Thesis 29. Helping grace is to be placed in illumination and inspiration, according as together with the will they physically produce a deliberate salvific act.

Beraza, 120-139; Lercher-Lakner, 286.

278. Definition of terms. *Helping grace*: is the supernatural help given to us by God, by which we are helped to perform freely that good, or to avoid freely that evil, to which stimulating grace is moving us.

In the thesis helping grace is being considered not *formally* (according as it is the divine help itself in order to perform a salvific act), but *principally or as a principle* (according as it is the principle together with the will to produce a salvific act).

Illumination and inspiration as they were defined in the preceding thesis.

According as they produce a salvific act: for the illuminations and inspirations have the nature of stimulating grace and the nature of helping grace, but under different respects. The former, according as they move the free will; the latter, according as together with the free will they elicit a deliberate act.

Physically: because the will lacks the physical power to produce a deliberate supernatural act, this power must be supplied to the will. We say therefore that it is given by the indeliberate acts of illumination and inspiration, which, together with the will, constitute an adequate physical principle of a deliberate supernatural act.

279. Opinions. The *first one* holds, as a logical consequence of what the same authors said in the previous thesis, that helping grace is a non-vital entity, given by God, by which God moves the will—already constituted in the first reality by stimulating grace (the premotion)—to perform some free act. This entity (which is a new physical premotion, infallibly connected with the free act itself, and therefore called “physical premotion”) supplies the physical power which is lacking in the natural powers in order to elicit a supernatural act. This divine influx is the previous concurrence or cooperation which continues in the operation and so it becomes a simultaneous concurrence. In this opinion, helping grace is really distinguished from stimulating grace. Such is the position of the *Thomists*.

The *second* opinion, after having denied, as in the previous thesis, any non-vital entity, holds that helping grace is the supernatural illuminations and inspirations themselves. But not just in any way whatsoever, but

according as they exercise their influence on the deliberate act. This influence is either moral only, or also physical, according to the different authors of this opinion.

a) If the influence is *moral only*, the physical powers, which are lacking in the will in order to elicit a salvific act, are not given to the will by the illumination and inspiration, but from another special divine influence, which however is not the previous concurrence, but one that is simultaneous. Thus Suarez, Tanner, Kilber, Mendive, Schiffini, and others.¹

b) If the influence is *also physical*, the illumination and inspiration give the will the physical powers which it lacked in order to elicit a supernatural act. Hence, a new extrinsic elevation of the will is not posited, but an intrinsic one through the stimulating grace. Doubtless a new divine, supernatural influx is still required for the act (i.e., simultaneous concurrence); but this concurrence is not special, but connatural to the will already elevated. Thus Molina, Lessius, Vázquez, Valencia, Ripalda, Palmieri, Pesch, Beraza, Lange.²

280. We say that no non-vital entity can be admitted in order to produce a deliberate act. Nor is a new, special divine concurrence required. Therefore, helping grace is not really distinguished from stimulating grace, but only logically, namely, inasmuch as it works physically with the will to elicit a deliberate supernatural act.

Theological note. *This opinion is more probable.*

281. Argument. 1. *No new physical premotion is required.* Illumination and inspiration, which confer new strength, both physical and moral, complete a power/faculty in the nature of a supernatural principle and constitute it in the proximate first reality (*in actu primo proximo*) to act in a salvific way. But the power, by which we perform a salvific act is the very same power by which we can perform it. Therefore, illumination and inspiration is a power by which we perform a salvific act, that is, it is a helping grace.

The major: It is certain from the preceding thesis.

N.B. Because this previous motion is not a mere premotion, but also a predetermination for an act, it has some special difficulties which will be

1. Suarez, *De gratia* 3,4,12; Tanner, *De gratia* disp.6 q.3 dub.10; Kilber, *De gratia*, 268; Mendive, *De divina gratia* 169; Schiffini, *De gratia* 154.
 2. Molina, *Concordia* q.14 a.13 d.37; Lessius, *De auxiliis* 15,3; 17,10; Vázquez, *In* 1.2 q.108 disp.185 c.10; Valencia, *In* 1.2 disp.2 punct.3; Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* disp.110 s.1; Palmieri, *De gratia divina actuali* th.19; Pesch, *Praelectiones dogmaticae* 5,63; Beraza, 99-111; Lange, 528.

considered later.

2. *A special influx of God is not required.* a) That influx is required in order to elevate the will. But the will is already elevated by stimulating grace. Therefore such an influx is not required.

b) An influx would be required because the indeliberate act would not be physically operative. But it is physically operative, as is clear from the production of the habits. Therefore it is not required.

282. Scholium 1. *On the comparison of stimulating grace with helping grace.*

Stimulating grace, as such, precedes the free influence of the will; but helping grace, as such, in no way precedes that activity. For we do not admit that there is any premotion of the will. Therefore the influx of helping grace does not terminate in the will, but in the act. Therefore it is not prior either in time or in nature to the act of the will, but at the same time. Moreover, that concurrence is not only simultaneous, but also indifferent (i.e., not determined to one effect).

283. Scholium 2. *On the causes of a salvific act.* Both grace and the will are the efficient cause of a salvific act. But how are both causes related to the effect?

The Thomists, in order to avoid having to admit any strictly active obediential potency, hold that the will only remotely and fundamentally concurs in a salvific act, inasmuch as it supports the power of grace from which the act proceeds proximally, both as supernatural and as vital.

But to other theologians this does not seem to agree with the Tridentine definition regarding the cooperation of free will in the work of salvation (D 1525-1554). So they explain the matter in this way: the proximate efficient cause of the salvific act is both grace and the will; but both must be said to be a partial cause, not with the partiality of the effect, which is one and simple, but with the partiality of the cause, inasmuch as neither is sufficient of itself alone to produce this act. For God alone cannot produce the act, since it is a vital act; and the will alone cannot produce the same act, since it is supernatural. Hence by reason of its vitality, the will is the principle cause of its own act; but by reason of its supernaturality, God is likewise a principle cause, by using the power which has been extrinsically elevated as the instrument to produce a deliberate salvific act.

284. Scholium 3. *Other divisions of actual grace.* 1) *Operating grace and cooperating grace.* These words occur in Holy Scripture. Thus in Phil. 2:13: *For God is at work (operatur) in you, both to will and to work*; Mark 16:20: *They preached everywhere, while the Lord worked with (cooperante) them*. The Fathers, like St. Augustine and Theodoret (R 1942, 2163) also use these words. St. Thomas (I-II, q. 111, a. 2) divides grace, both actual and habitual, into operating and cooperating; but this division

is explained differently by later theologians.³ Quite commonly today operating grace is understood as that which operates in us without our free cooperation; but cooperating grace is that which operates with our free consent, or which concurs together with the will in producing a deliberate act. Therefore, in reality, *operating* grace is the same thing as *stimulating* grace, and *cooperating* grace as *helping* grace.

2) *Prevenient, concomitant and subsequent grace*. St. Augustine uses this distinction, by appealing to the words of Ps. 59:10 and 23:6: *His mercy will meet me; your mercy shall follow me* (R 1914, 1793). This division is used in the sacred Liturgy, v.gr., in the Collect for Easter Sunday, in the Collect for the 16th Sunday after Pentecost. It occurs in the *Council of Orange* (D 384), *Synod of Quiercy* (D 622), in the Creed of Leo IX (D 685). St. Thomas distinguishes five effects of grace; this grace inasmuch as from two effects it touches the first one is called “prevenient” with respect to the other effect; and inasmuch as it touches this second effect, it is called “subsequent” in reference to the prior effect. Trent teaches that Christ continuously pours strength into the justified and “this strength always precedes, accompanies and follows their good works” (D 1545). Today, for the most part, this division conforms to the former one, so that *prevenient and operating* grace are the same as *stimulating* grace, but *concomitant, cooperating and subsequent* grace are the same as *helping* grace.

3) *Sufficient and efficacious grace*. *Sufficient* grace is said to be that which confers the power to act in a salvific way, but it prescind from the fact of the consent of the will. But *efficacious* grace is that which gives the power to act in a salvific way and it is joined with the consent of the will. Much will be said about this division in the following theses.

3. On the concepts of operating and cooperating grace among recent Thomists, see C. Boyer, S.J., *Tract. de gratia divina* (1938) 242; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., *De gratia* 132-144; F. Zigom, *Gratia operans et cooperans iuxta S. Thomam*: EphThLov (1929) 614f.

ARTICLE II

ON THE RELATION OF ACTUAL GRACE TO MAN'S FREE WILL,
OR ON SUFFICIENT AND EFFICACIOUS GRACE

285. We have already explained the nature of actual grace considered in itself. In order to learn more about this grace, we must proceed to explain its relation to man's free will. For, from the preceding it is clear that salvific acts are performed both by the grace of God and by man's free will. Therefore, St. Bernard wrote: "Remove free will and there will not be anything to be saved; remove grace and there be no source of salvation."¹ Therefore both are required.

If we consider the matter historically, first of all, it is certain from the reading of Holy Scripture that many graces, because of the fault of the human will, do not bear the fruit that God expected. *All the Greek Fathers, and the Latins before Augustine*, put more stress on the influx of freedom; but St. Augustine and his disciples put more stress on the victorious efficacy of grace in their fight against the Pelagians and the Semi-Pelagians. *The medieval scholastics* defend both truths, although they do not yet use this division of sufficient and efficacious grace. St. Thomas uses this twofold vocabulary (I-II, q. 106, a. 2 ad 2; *In Rom* 8,6), but he does not divide grace into these two types. The first one to do it seems to have been Henry Gorcum (+ 1431). According to the *Reformers*, freedom is lost in fallen man: therefore man is attracted either by concupiscence to evil or by grace to the good. Jansen mitigated the Protestant doctrine and he said that man, although he is not forced, is internally necessarily moved by the stronger actual pleasure—either of charity or of cupidity. Quesnel appealed to the irresistible power of the divine will. *Trent* vindicated, even for fallen man, the ability of consenting to grace or of rejecting the divine calling. Therefore, from that time on theologians have examined more carefully the distinction between sufficient and efficacious grace, and they have developed various systems in order to explain the infallibility of efficacious grace.²

Therefore, first we will treat *sufficient grace* and then *efficacious grace*.

1. St. Bernard, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1,2: ML 182,1002.

2. For more on this see Lange, 538.

I. On sufficient grace

Thesis 30. In the state of fallen nature grace truly and purely sufficient is given, not only absolutely but also relatively.

S.Th. I, q. 62, a. 8 ad 2; I-II, q. 106, a. 2 ad 2; Lercher-Lakner, 323-332; Beraza, 449-461; Lange, 539-552.

286. Definition of terms. *In the state of fallen nature*, the state in which we now are, that is, in the state of nature fallen into original sin and restored by Christ the Redeemer, but burdened with concupiscence. For the Jansenists conceded truly sufficient grace to the angels before they sinned, and to our parents in the state of innocence, but they denied it to fallen man.

It is given, at least some times, according to what we said about the universality of grace in theses 13-15. When we speak about the help of sufficient grace to perform salvific acts, it is clear that this applied only to adults.

Truly sufficient grace is called the help by which a man is made capable of eliciting salvific acts. It is *proximately sufficient* if it is completely and immediately capable; *but it is remotely sufficient* if, because of the good use of some grace, v.gr., prayer, it can arrive at new salvific acts.

Purely sufficient grace is said to be that which does not obtain its effect. For truly sufficient grace can be considered in a prescinding way or negatively:

a) *In a prescinding way*, inasmuch as it confers a true sufficiency to act in a salutary manner, while prescinding from whether or not it actually achieves its effect. For this reason it is opposed to *insufficient* grace, and it can be efficacious or inefficacious.

b) *Negatively*, inasmuch as it confers a true sufficiency to act in a salvific way, but de facto the effect does not take place. For this reason it is opposed to *efficacious* grace, and it is called purely sufficient.

Truly sufficient grace is said to be:

a) *Absolutely sufficient*: a grace which, according to nature alone, prescinding from the present circumstances of the man to whom it is given, confers the power of acting in a salvific manner.

b) *Relatively sufficient*: a grace which confers that power, considering also the present circumstances of the man, especially his irregular concupiscence.

We assert in the thesis that graces are given, which are truly sufficient to act in a salvific way, but which remain purely sufficient because of the resistance of the human will.

287. Adversaries. 1) The *Protestants* deny that there is a purely sufficient grace, since they hold that every grace is efficacious. Therefore if someone does not act in a salvific manner, that is due to a lack of grace that is not given.

2) *Jansen* distinguished a twofold help of God: a *necessary* help of God, and a *simple* help. The former was given in the state of innocent nature, the latter in the state of fallen nature. In this last state, man does not have freedom from necessity, but necessarily follows the greater delight—earthly or heavenly. If the heavenly delight is greater than the earthly delight, it infallibly produces a supernatural act; this is called a great grace, victorious, giving not only absolute power, but also relative power, and this is *efficacious* grace. But if the heavenly delight is less, it does not produce the act, because it was not sufficient to overcome the earthly delight; this is a small grace, vanquished, giving absolute power, not relative, and it must be said to be *insufficient* grace (although it is absolutely sufficient). Therefore there is no place remaining for grace that is truly and merely sufficient, with a sufficiency that is not only absolute but also relative. Some *Jansenists* spoke about a small grace, but which would be sufficient and most sufficient; but they understood this to be about absolute sufficiency, not about relative.

288. Doctrine of the Church. *Orange* (D 397), *Valence* (D 627), *Lateran IV* (D 802) testify that man enjoys truly sufficient grace to act in a salvific manner, but that he freely refuses to do it.

Trent, s.6 ch.5 (D 1525), acknowledges the grace, which is necessary so that a man can prepare himself for justification (truly sufficient grace), but which a man can resist (grace which is not efficacious). S.6 ch.11, cn.18 and cn.23 (D 1536-1539, 1568, 1573) defines that a just man can always observe all the commandments because of God's grace (truly sufficient grace), but that he can also sin (grace which is not efficacious). Therefore in these definitions a truly and purely sufficient grace is implicitly contained.

Innocent X condemned the propositions of *Jansen* (D 2001f.). From the condemnation of the first proposition it follows that the just always have grace by which they can keep the commandments: this is a grace that is truly sufficient. From the second proposition the just can resist this grace and sin: so grace is not always efficacious. Therefore there is a grace that is truly and purely sufficient. It is clear that there he is talking about relatively sufficient grace, which *Jansen* denied.

Alexander VIII taught against the *Jansenists* that purely sufficient grace is a gift of God (D 2306).

Clement XI condemned the proposition of Quesnel which contained a denial of purely sufficient grace (D 2419-2429).

Pius VI condemned similar views against the Synod of Pistoia (D 2621).

Vatican I s.3 ch.3 (D 3010) acknowledged the grace of faith, which can be purely sufficient.

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

289. Proof from Holy Scripture. It is certain that God did whatever was necessary on his part so that men might produce salvific fruits, which however sometimes they did not do. But they would not be able to produce salvific fruits, unless God gave them truly sufficient grace, even relative. Therefore, also in the state of fallen nature graces are given that are truly and purely sufficient.

The major: It is illustrated by various passages of Scripture: a) From Isa. 5:1-7: where, under the parable of vineyard, the solicitude of God for men is described and also their iniquity.¹ For there the prophet *speaks about internal grace*: for this was necessary to accomplish the works which God expected of the Israelites (see v.7 and 18-20, and thesis 1). *It is a matter of purely sufficient grace*: because de facto the Israelites did not produce the fruit that God expected (v.7). *On the other hand, the grace was truly sufficient, even relatively*: for God did not have to do anything more on his part, but he would have, if he had not given them grace that is truly sufficient also relatively (see v.1-2, nothing was lacking in the vineyard; v. 2, therefore he expected some fruits; v.4, *what more should I have done*; add that otherwise God would be reprehending the Israelites unjustly). b) From Matt. 11:21: Chorazin and Bethsaida are judged very severely, because they refused to believe, while those in Tyre and Sidon, given the same grace, would have believed. There it is a matter of *internal grace* (not just miracles): because without that grace their conversion would have been impossible, nor could they be condemned because of a failure to convert. It is a matter of *purely sufficient grace*: because de facto they did not repent. It is a matter of *truly sufficient grace, also relatively*: because otherwise they could not be punished because they did not do penance, for they had a true excuse.

290. Proof from tradition. The *Fathers*, both Greek and Latin, constantly affirm that God provides men with whatever is necessary for salvation, even to those who are lost. Therefore they acknowledge grace

1. See Knabenbauer-Zorel, *In Isaiam prophetam* 111f.

that is truly and purely sufficient. Thus Chrysostom: "And if by grace, he says, why are we not all saved? Because you would not. For grace, though it be grace, saves the willing, not those who will not have it, and turn away from it..." (R 1188; see 1158f.). One should also consult St. Irenaeus (R 244, 247, Arnobius (R 622), St. Ephraem (R 704), St. Gregory of Nyssa (R1034). St. Augustine often thought about sufficient grace in his writings before the year 418; but very little in those after that year (see those in the first period: R 1556, 1571, 1722, 1735-6; those in the later period: R 1955, 1957, which speak about the order before the fall of Adam). Here are the words of Damascene: "Without his cooperation and help we cannot will or do any good thing. But we have it in our power either to abide in virtue and follow God, who calls us into ways of virtue, or to stray from the path of virtue" (R 2359).²

291. Theological reasoning. God does not command the impossible. But he commands that all his commandments be observed. Therefore at the same time he offers sufficient grace to keep the commandments. But many *de facto* do not keep the commandments. Therefore there is grace truly and purely sufficient.

A similar argument can be made from the universal salvific will of God, and from the death of Christ for all men.

292. Objections. 1. From Rom. 9:19: *Who can resist his will?* Hence the will of God is always efficacious. Therefore sufficient grace is repugnant.

I distinguish the antecedent. The *antecedent* and *conditioned* will of God is always efficacious, *denied*; the *absolute* and *consequent* will of God, *conceded*. These words are not the words of the Apostle, but of the one who is speaking with him.³

2. From Phil. 1:6: *He who began a good work in you will bring it to completion at the day of Jesus Christ.* And 2:13: *God is at work in you, both to will and to work.* Therefore Paul presents the divine help as joined together with a salvific act. Therefore there is no purely sufficient grace.

I distinguish the antecedent. He presents grace together with a salvific act, inasmuch as it gives the power to act in a salvific way, *conceded*; inasmuch as it always acts, *I subdistinguish*: efficacious grace, *conceded*; any grace whatsoever, *denied*. In this place the Apostle is speaking about the necessity of grace in order to act in a salvific way. Therefore whenever a salvific act takes place, there must necessarily be grace involved. But Paul is not teaching that grace is given only to someone who acts in a salvific way.

3. In Isa. 55:11 the prophet says about the word of God: *It shall not return to me*

2. See I. Habert, *Theologiae graecorum Patrum vindicatae circa universam materiam gratiae... libri tres* (Paris 1647); F. Worter, *Die christliche Lehre über das Verhältnis von Gnade und Freiheit, von den apostol. Zeiten bis auf Augustinus* (Freiburg 1856).

3. See Bover, *Teologia de San Pablo* 245f.

empty, but it shall accomplish that which I purpose. But this cannot be understood except about efficacious grace. Therefore purely sufficient grace does not exist.

I concede the major, bypass the minor and deny the consequent and the consequence. For just because sometimes Holy Scripture speaks about efficacious grace is not an argument that it is ignorant of sufficient grace (see. n. 275).

4. Temptation is often more intense than the grace urging someone to act well. But this grace cannot be truly sufficient. Therefore, at least in this case, there is no truly sufficient grace.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. This grace cannot be truly sufficient in order to restrain cupidity, *conceded*; it cannot be sufficient to act in a salvific manner contrary to this inclination, *denied*. *I also distinguish the consequent.* Sufficient grace is not given in order to restrain cupidity, *conceded*; to act in a salvific manner, *denied*. This objection of Jansen is based on the false assumption that the will is passive, but not actively involved in choosing.

5. In order for grace to confer relatively sufficient powers to overcome the earthly delight, it must establish the will in a true equilibrium. But this equilibrium is not present, since the earthly delight is superior to the heavenly. Therefore in this case there is no relatively sufficient grace.

I distinguish the major. In a true equilibrium of *choice*, so that the will is the master of its own act, *conceded*; in a true equilibrium of *inclination*, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* There is no equilibrium of *choice*, *denied*; of *inclination*, *conceded*. Therefore, an equilibrium of inclination is not required for the exercise of freedom.

6. Grace truly and purely sufficient is a faculty for acting, which however is not able to move into act. But such a faculty is repugnant. Therefore grace truly and purely sufficient is repugnant.

I distinguish the major. It is a faculty which is not able to move into act with an impotency consequent to the resistance of the will which was foreseen by God, *conceded*; with an impotency preceding the exercise of freedom, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* A faculty of acting is repugnant if it brings with itself a preceding impotency, *conceded*; a consequent impotency, *denied*.

293. Scholium 1. *Grace truly and purely sufficient is a true gift of God.* The Jansenists rejected grace truly and purely sufficient, because they said it was useless and pernicious (D 2306). But Catholic doctrine not only defends its existence, but also refutes the reasoning of its adversaries by teaching that such grace is a true gift of God, both material and formal.

A material gift is understood as one which, of itself, can be useful to us. Indeed, such a grace is an unowed gift, given by God because of the merits of Christ so that man can truly act in a salvific way and obtain eternal life. The nature of a material benefit does not disappear just because it is rendered inefficacious because of a lack of cooperation; for this is totally extrinsic to the grace itself.

A formal gift is said to be one that is given with the intention of doing good for another. Now since God confers this grace from a serious and true desire that a man

can attain salvation, this grace is a formal benefit. The following points are not true obstacles: a) *a foreknowledge of inefficacy*, for this does not change the nature of this gift, since God does not choose it because he sees it will be inefficacious, but rather because he confers a help which is truly sufficient, even though de facto it still does not obtain the consent of the will; b) *refusal to give efficacious grace*, in place of a grace foreseen to be inefficacious, because, although it shows that God did not will to confer the greater favor of an efficacious grace, still it does not prove that this sufficient grace does not proceed from the beneficent will of God. Moreover, God can refuse to give efficacious grace, either as a punishment for sins, or because of the abuse of graces; c) *a more grave sin* from the abuse of grace, since this is imputed to man alone, not to God. For God cannot be bound, from the foreseen will of man, to omit that which in itself is good and is given out of benevolence.

294. Scholium 2. *On the nature of sufficient grace.* What strength or power to act in a salvific manner does sufficient grace confer? Does it constitute man in the proximate first reality, in the full sense, or, in addition to the proximately sufficient grace, is another new grace required, really distinct from the first one, so that a salvific act can take place?

Thomists and Molinists give different answers to this question. According to the Thomists, sufficient grace gives the will full power to act; but it cannot really act unless another stronger grace is added to it, which is an efficacious grace, or a physical supernatural predetermination. Hence purely sufficient grace gives the basic possibility without making the will ready to act. The reason for this is: for the will to act, a previous concurrence intrinsic to the will is required, the power of which removes its indifference to acting.⁴

The Molinists say that sufficient grace confers the power to act, so that nothing must be added to it for it to elicit a salvific act. Hence, if the act does not occur, that depends solely on man's freedom, not on any defect in the principle of acting. Therefore, it gives complete and ready sufficiency, not only to be able to act but also to really act. They draw their argument from the very nature of truly sufficient grace, inasmuch as the latter would not be truly sufficient, if it did not confer sufficiency to act.

4. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *De gratia* 168-184.

II. On efficacious grace

1. THE EXISTENCE OF EFFICACIOUS GRACE

Thesis 31. There is also efficacious grace in the first reality, infallibly connected with the consent of the will.

S.Th. I-II, q. 111, a. 3; Lercher-Lakner, 333-341; Lange, 553-571.

295. Definition of terms. *There is efficacious grace, or at least some efficacious graces exist in the first reality (in actu primo), in this state of nature fallen and restored. But the same thing would happen in any order of providence where such helps would be given.*

Efficacious grace is that which obtains its effect, that is, with whose help salvific acts take place. But a double efficacy can be distinguished in efficacious grace:

1) *Efficacy of power*, which is nothing else but the power that grace has to produce the effect, even though de facto it does not produce it. It is grace inasmuch as it is able to produce salvific acts.

2) *Efficacy of connection* with a salvific act inasmuch as it really produces a salvific act. We are talking about this in the thesis. But this can be considered: a) *in the second reality (in actu secundo)*, namely, joined with the actual consent of the will, inasmuch as actually, here and now, it is joined with a salvific act; b) *in the first reality (in actu primo)*, as prior in nature to a salvific act, or inasmuch as antecedently to a free determination of the will foreknown *absolutely*, it has an infallible connection with a free act which is absolutely future, that is, with salvific consent.

Infallibly connected. We say that there are graces which have this infallible connection with an act. But this infallible connection, which efficacious grace has in the first reality with salvific consent, has three forms:

1) *Objective*, which belongs to the object or to the grace, and consists in objective truth, or in a real connection of this logical inference: "Such grace exists; therefore such a salvific act will be placed without failure."

2) *Knowable*, which belongs to the divine intellect, and consists in the fact that God knows infallibly from eternity the objective connection of an efficacious grace with the consent of the will.

3) *Affective*, which belongs to the divine will, and consists in the fact that by such a grace God wills absolutely and without failure to obtain such consent. Therefore it is a decree of God, which cannot fail, to give such

efficacious grace, as a special sign of his divine benevolence towards the creature to whom such grace is given.

296. Adversaries. 1) *Semi-Pelagians*, who, denying a special predilection of God towards some, held that God offers grace to all equally: but the total difference between efficacious grace and purely sufficient grace is had from the actual consent or dissent of the free will. Therefore grace is efficacious in the second reality, but not in the first reality. For, the infallible connection with the salvific act is not had before the will actually determines itself.¹

2) *Certain theologians at the Sorbonne-Alphonsianum* (Ysambert, Duval, Habert, Duplerris d'Argentré, Tournely, St. Alphonsus de Liguori, whom the *Redemptorist theologians* generally follow) deny that efficacious graces in the first reality are given for all works. They do concede that efficacious graces are given for more difficult works; but they deny that they are given for easier works, especially for prayer.²

297. Doctrine of the Church. Paul V lists efficacious grace in the first reality among the main points of Catholic truth. For he wrote, after the meetings on "de auxiliis" were concluded, when he was urged to solve the controversy: "This matter has been treated amply... *both sides agree with the principles of Catholic truth*, and they teach that God, *by the efficacy of his grace*, stimulates us to act, and makes the unwilling to be willing; he both bends and changes the wills of men—this is what the dispute is all about; but both sides disagree in explaining how this takes place...."³

And actually this doctrine is contained in the *Indiculus* c.4, 5, 8, 9 (D 239f., 246ff.). Similarly in *Orange* ch.3-6, 9, 20, 25 (D 373-376, 379, 390, 395).

298. Theological note. a) The thesis, since it expresses the existence of some graces that are efficacious in the first reality, must be said to be *implicitly defined divine and Catholic faith* against the Semi-Pelagians. Other authors in this sense say that it is only theologically certain, because they think it is not contained there formally, but is certainly deduced from it. However this *de facto* was one of the elements in the dispute with the Semi-Pelagians.

1. It has been said falsely by some authors that the Molinists and Congruists do not admit efficacious grace in the first reality.

2. I. Herrmann, *De divina gratia*, 502-513.

3. In Pesch, *Praelectiones dogmaticae* 5,583. See Schnemann, *Controversiarum de gratia historia et progressus* (Friburg 1881) 296.

b) The thesis, since it defends the existence of efficacious grace for every salvific act, that is, not only for the more difficult ones but also for the easier ones, is certainly *more in agreement with the fonts of revelation* (D 248).

299. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) Rom. 9:11: *Though they were not yet born and had done nothing either good or bad, in order that God's purpose of election might continue...* (see v. 6-24).

Context. The Apostle asks, given the messianic promises, why the Gentiles accepted the faith, but the Jews, at least most of them, did not. He replies: Because of the will of God, freely distributing his gifts of grace. This is illustrated by the example of Jacob and Esau (v. 10-13). For God did this in order to establish the gratuity of divine election.⁴

Text. The point here is *about salvific acts* of coming to the faith, and about the grace necessary for this. It is *about grace connected with the effect*, if one asks why de facto Gentiles came to the faith. And surely it is grace *in the first reality (in actu primo)*, for the reason why they come to the faith is not the free consent of the will, as it really would have to be if it were a matter of efficacious grace in the second reality, but it is something pertaining to grace itself: *it depends on God's mercy* (v. 16). *It is about an infallible connection*, because by this grace God gave a salvific act of coming to faith.

Argument. According to the Apostle, the call to faith, or the grace of coming to faith, proceeds from the plan or intent of God, that is, from the absolute and efficacious will of obtaining the call to faith. But this requires the existence of efficacious grace in the first reality, joined infallibly, with affective infallibility, with a salvific act of coming to faith. Therefore efficacious grace in the first reality exists, joined infallibly, with affective infallibility, with the salvific consent of a call to faith.

The minor: For this call depends in God, not on us. Therefore before the human will acts, the grace of that call to faith is already connected infallibly with the salvific act of the call to faith.

Note that from this we conclude to the existence of efficacious grace in the first reality, connected infallibly, *with affective infallibility*, with the

4. Cornely, *Commentarium in S. Pauli epistolas* 487ff.; F. Prat, *La théologie de saint Paul* t.1 1.3 c.2; M.J. Lagrange, *Épître aux Romains* 230f.; J. Bover, *Teología de San Pablo* 234-251.

salvific act. But from this affective infallibility we can deduce: a) *Cognitive infallibility*. For God, as wise and provident, cannot act blindly and without knowledge. Therefore if he decreed to give such grace, it is necessary that he first knew it infallibly. b) *Objective infallibility*. For God's knowledge and will cannot err. For if God knew that such grace would produce such a salvific effect, it is necessary that that grace be of such a nature that, if it is given, it will infallibly produce the salvific act.

2) From Ezek. 11:19f.: *And I will give them one heart, and put a new spirit within them; I will take the stony heart out of their flesh and give them a heart of flesh, that they may walk in my statutes and keep my ordinances and obey them.* Hence God not only gives the power, but he changes the will itself with such infallibility that he can predict infallibly what it will do. But this is to affirm efficacious grace in the first reality. Therefore efficacious grace exists in the first reality.

3) Similar argument are drawn from Rom. 8:28-33; Eph. 1:5, 11; Matt. 22:14.

Note that in all these texts no distinction is made between easy and more difficult works.

300. Proof from tradition. 1) *From the Fathers*: a) The Fathers flourishing before St. Augustine did not treat this matter theoretically, but they teach it practically when they exhort us to ask God for virtues—faith, charity, good works..., and for these they give thanks to God. Listen to what St. Cyprian says: “We also say in addition: *Your will be done in heaven as it is on earth*, not that God may do what he wishes, but that we may do what God wishes. For who stands in the way of God's doing what he wishes? But since the devil stands in the way of our mind and action obeying God in all things, we pray and petition that God's will be done in us. That it may be done in us, there is need of God's will...” (R 558). See also Tertullian (R 348).

b) St. Augustine taught this matter very clearly. See R 1427 and 1985 (God foreknows and predestines); 1572f. (the reason why *de facto* we will something is only the mercy of God, and this mercy cannot be frustrated); 1936 (Paul was converted, because he was called by an efficacious vocation); 1941 (God brings it about that we will, offering efficacious powers to the will); 1940 (he turns to belief wills that are perverse); 1958 (insuperable grace is given), etc.

c) St. Augustine's disciples defend the same doctrine. See St. Prosper (R 2033).

2) *The Sacred Liturgy* asks God for efficacious graces, which produce infallibly a good will and good works. Thus *on Wednesday of the Second Week in Lent*: “Turn the hearts of the people towards yourself. Set them on fire with your spirit, that they may be firm in faith and zealous in virtues.” *Fifth Sunday after Easter*: “O God... grant us your inspiration that we may have proper thoughts, and your guidance that we may carry them into practice.” *Fourth Sunday after Pentecost*: “O Lord... make our rebellious wills submit to you.” *Nineteenth Sunday after Pentecost*: “O Lord, may the gentle working of your grace cure our sinfulness and make us hold to your commandments.”

301. Theological reasoning. If efficacious grace did not depend on the divine “plan” or “decree,” but on the human will alone, there would be no place for predestination, but only for divine foreknowledge. But there is predestination, as was proved in the treatise *On the One God*. Therefore efficacious grace in the first reality exists.⁵

The major: For, the certitude and infallibility of predestination depend on the preparation of this grace. For, predestination, according the Council of Valence (D 628-629) is an efficacious decree of God giving glory to some persons.

Please observe that the distinction between easier and more difficult works is inept, because even for the easier works some helps are efficacious and some are not efficacious; but God not only foreknows these, but must also select and make decisions about them, if he wills to act wisely and providentially.

302. Scholium. *On the divine predilection.* It is clear that efficacious grace is a much greater gift of God than mere sufficient grace. Thus, in efficacious grace one finds a true predilection of God towards the one to whom he gives that efficacious grace in place of merely sufficient grace. But among those efficacious graces is contained the ultimate efficacious grace, which is joined with death. There the gift of final perseverance is given, which is the greatest gift of God.

5. Bellarmine uses this argument, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 1,12, in order to refute the authors who denied the existence of any efficacious grace in the first reality.

2) THE EXISTENCE OF FREEDOM UNDER EFFICACIOUS GRACE

Thesis 32. This efficacious grace, even in this state of fallen nature, does not coerce the will.

S.Th. I-II, q. 106, a. 2 ad 2; Lercher-Lakner, 314-322; Beraza, 481-497.

303. Definition of terms. *This efficacious grace*, about which we spoke in the preceding thesis.

Even in the state of fallen nature, both before and after justification. For, the adversaries concede that grace did not involve any necessity in the state of innocence. But we affirm this also of fallen man who is subject to concupiscence.

Does not coerce the will: even under the actual impulse of efficacious grace in the first reality, the will remains free. *Freedom* in general is immunity from any bond or shackle. But since a bond or shackle can be considered in two ways—one extrinsic to the will but the other intrinsic to it, therefore there are two kinds of freedom:

a) *Freedom from coercion* or from any extrinsic bond: it is immunity from a force extrinsic to the will—one that could force it to act. It is also called the freedom of *spontaneity*, or *voluntary*, because it proceeds from the will without any extrinsic force.

b) *Freedom from necessity* from an intrinsic bond; it is that in which no violence is imposed on the will from an intrinsic point of view. For this reason, it can be defined in general as: “A faculty ordered to many things, and even to opposite things,” according as it is a freedom a) *of contradiction*, that is, of acting or not acting; b) *of contraries*, that is, of doing this or its contrary; c) *of specification*, or of doing those things that are specifically different.

We will not go any further in determining the concept of freedom, because these points, on which all Catholic teachers agree, suffice in order to defend the truth of this thesis against the errors of the adversaries. For it is well known that the Thomists and Molinists disagree with each other concerning the further explanation of freedom.

Indeed, according to the Molinists, freedom is “a faculty which, when everything required for acting is present, can act or not act.” So that freedom consists in a certain indifference, subjective and active, and it has dominion over its own acts, and also complete independence, not from God creating or conserving or concurring, but certainly from God antecedently determining. This definition was common in the schools before the

beginning of the controversy “de auxiliis.”¹

The *Thomists* are opposed to this concept of freedom; they say that it cannot be admitted that an indifferent agent can proceed by himself alone from this indifference and indetermination. They say that the will must be determined antecedently by an extrinsic agent, namely, by God. Hence, in place of the Molinistic definition, they propose this: a) Freedom is “a rational faculty for opposite things.” Therefore, as long as the faculty is ruled by reason, and absolutely can do opposite things, it is now free, even though it is led irresistible to act. b) Freedom is “a faculty which operates under the light of an indifferent judgment. Therefore, the will, as long as it acts under the light of an objectively indifferent judgment, is now free, even though it is led invincibly to act.”²

But, as we said, we prescind from these disputed notions, because the thesis is dogmatic and not disputable.

We assert therefore: even in the state in which we now find ourselves, under the influence of efficacious grace in the first reality, freedom remains in a man, not only from coercion, but also from any necessity whatsoever.

304. Adversaries. 1) The *Protestants*, led by Luther and Calvin, admit after the fall of man freedom from coercion, but deny freedom from necessity. For, they hold, after the fall, that the will is absolutely required to seek the good, if it has grace, but evil if grace is lacking.³

2) De Bay, although not with clear words, but in reality also denied free choice (see D 1927f., 1939, 1966f.).

3) Jansen developed the doctrine of de Bay and systematically proposed it. Here is what he held. In this state of fallen nature, in place of free choice, which he lost by original sin, man is always induced to act by some indeliberate delight. But this delight is twofold: heavenly (grace) or earthly (concupiscence), which can be either greater or lesser in relation to each other. But the will always follows *necessarily* the greater delight. Therefore, after original sin only freedom from coercion remains; but freedom from necessity was lost by original sin (see D 2001-2004).

4) Quesnel held that grace is the omnipotent will itself of God, which

1. D. Soto, *De natura et gratia* 1,16; Suarez, *De requisitis ad formalem libertatem* 3,4 (Vivès, 7,11).

2. N. del Prado, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2,263-279. Also, concerning the concept of freedom, which is concluded from the historical evolution of the controversies, see A. Bonet, *La filosofía de la libertad en las controversias teológicas del siglo XVI y primera mitad del XVII* (Barcelona 1932). See also L. Teixidor, S.J., *El concepto de la libertad*: EstEcl 12 (1933) 473-502; O. Lottin, O.S.B., *Liberté humaine et motion divine*: RechthAncMéd: 7 (1935) 52-69, 156-173; P. Dumont, S.J., *Liberté humaine et concours divin d'après Suarez* (Paris 1936); J. Hellín, S.J., *Sobre el tránsito de la potencia activa al acto según Suarez*: RazFe 138 (1948) 353-407.

3. See Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 6,9.

stirs up in us *irresistibly* good acts (see D 2409-2425).

305. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, s.6 ch.5-6 and cn.4,5 (D 1525f., 1554f.) teaches that we freely assent to grace and cooperate with it, but in such a way that we can reject it; and man's free choice has not been lost or extinguished after Adam's sin. The condemnations of Sixtus VI, Innocent X and Clement XI against de Bay, Jansen and Quesnel were quoted above. According to *Vatican I*, s.3 ch.3 (D 3010) man assents to and cooperates with grace, which he can resist.

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

306. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) *In general*, Scripture presents precepts, counsels, exhortations to do salvific acts, urging men with a retribution of reward or punishment. But all this would be meaningless, if man under the influence of prevenient grace did not enjoy freedom from necessity in performing or omitting good works. Therefore, man under the influence of prevenient, efficacious grace enjoys true freedom from any necessity.

2) *In particular*, from Sir. 31:8-11: *He has had the power to transgress, and did not transgress...* Under efficacious grace freedom is really present, if a man in place of salvific assent could dissent, and in place of a good act could do something evil. But from the quoted words that is the real situation. Therefore under efficacious grace freedom remains.

The minor: For there it is a matter of efficacious grace, if de facto it is joined with a salvific work, or with a victory over temptation, because of which a man is said to be blessed. But still freedom remains, because even under the influence of that grace a man could still do something evil.

3) *Again in particular*, the same argument can be made from Deut. 30:19; Rev. 3:20; Matt. 19:17, etc.

307. Proof from tradition. The adversaries admit that the *Fathers* are against them in this matter. For, Calvin writes: "[God] moves the will, not as it was handed down and believed for many centuries, so that then it is our choice either to follow or to reject his motion; but by efficaciously influencing it..."⁴ Therefore his explanation makes void this traditional argument. However, at least briefly, we will show how this truly was the mind of the Fathers.

1) *All the Fathers*, both Greek and Latin, *before St. Augustine*, clearly

4. Calvin, *Institut.* 2,3.

teach that man freely assents to grace, and that he can resist it.⁵

2) Concerning the mind of St. Augustine, we think these points should be made: a) A short time after his conversion, in his controversy with the Manicheans, he asserted clearly and often the existence of free choice. For, he wrote against them: *De libero arbitrio* (a.388-395); *De duobus animabus* (a.391-2); *De actis cum Felice manichaeo* (a.404) (see R 1558, 1710). b) When he was near death (a.426-7), while he was writing his *Retractationes*, he did not change his mind, but rather reaffirmed it (see R 1966). c) In the Pelagian controversy (a. 412-430), he extols the power and efficacy of grace, but without denying freedom (see R 1436, 1510). Of course he admits the difficulty of reconciling the efficacy of grace with freedom, but this only proves that he maintained both truths (see R 1856). Indeed, towards the end of his life, he wrote a book called *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (a.426-7), in which he teaches that both grace and free will must be defended by Catholics, even though he does not pursue the way of reconciling them (R 1940, 1943...). Therefore St. Augustine often held that both must be admitted, that is, grace and free will (see R 1723, 1735f., 1821, 1823, 1848, 1854, 1890, 1954f.).

Therefore, St. Augustine, even in his old age, contrary to what Jansen and even some Catholic authors said, truly defended human freedom under the influence of efficacious grace. Although actually, in the conflict between the two, because of the circumstances of the Pelagian controversy, he put more emphasis on the victorious efficacy of grace.⁶

3) *The Fathers writing after St. Augustine* defend man's true freedom under the influence of grace. Among the Greeks, here is what Damascene says: "Bear in mind, too, that virtue is a gift from God implanted in our nature, and that he himself is the source and cause of all good, and without his co-operation and help we cannot will or do any good thing. But we have it in our power either to abide in virtue and follow God, who calls us into ways of virtue, or to stray from the path of virtue" (R 2359). Although many *Latins* use Augustine's formulas, still they soften the harshness of his language. Thus, v.gr., St. Prosper,⁷ and the *Fathers at the Council of Orange* (D 373f.).

308. Theologians. St. Anselm presents the true concept of freedom in his little books, *De libero arbitrio* and *De concordia praescientiae et*

5. See Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 5,24-38; R, Index, 334f.

6. See Lange, 347-9; Portalié: DTC 1,2387f.; T. Salgueiro, *La doctrine de S. Augustin sur la grâce d'après le traité à Simplicien* (Porto 1925); K. Kolb, *Menschliche Freiheit und göttliches Vorherwissen nach Augustinus* (Freiburg 1908); L. Booy, *Grâce et liberté chez S. Augustin* (Montreal 1938).

7. St. Prosper, *De vocatione omnium gentium*: ML 51,648f.

praedestinationis necnon gratiae Dei cum libero arbitrio. Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure and other theologians of that age hand on the true concept. St. Thomas (I-II, q. 10, a. 4) defends freedom, even when the will is moved infallibly by God; he also defends this same freedom under the motion of the grace of the angels (I, q. 62, a. 3 ad 2) or of men (I-II, q. 106, a. 2 ad 2). At the time of the controversies with the Protestants, all theologians rejected the idea of irresistible grace as heretical. In the *de auxiliis* controversies the same point was defended by both sides.

309. Theological reasoning. 1) *In general*: a) According to what has been said, grace does not destroy nature but perfects it. But it would destroy the essential nature of a rational nature, if it took away freedom. Therefore it does not take it away. b) The just man, acting with the assistance of God's grace, truly merits an increase of grace and glory. But, if his freedom were taken away, there could be no merit or demerit present. Therefore grace does not take away freedom.

2) *In particular*: A. *Against Jansen*, by rejecting his fundamental principle, namely, that man is moved to act only by delight. For: a) according to Trent, we are also moved by apprehension and faith, by fear and the consideration of the ugliness of sin (D 1526-527, 1677-1678, 1705); b) according to the Fathers, God moves man by fear, rebuke, promises and pleasure, etc.; c) therefore, those propositions have been condemned in which the thesis is defended that no other inspiration draws the will except the delight of love (D 2449, 2457, 2453); d) the object of the will is every good thing; therefore, not only the delightful good, but also what is excellent and useful.

B. *Against the Protestants*, by answering the many arguments they raised against our thesis.⁸

310. Objections. 1. From Rom. 9:21 where God is compared to a potter, and man to clay which is in his hand. Therefore man, preceded by grace, is forced to act.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent. For with this comparison one thing is signified, namely, that God can either justify Christians with his grace or he can permit the rejection of Pharaoh and the Jews. Hence it is said that God is the primary cause of justification, in such a way that a man, without his grace, cannot be justified; but in no way is the free cooperation of the human will excluded.⁹

2. According to Eph. 2:1-5 man is presented as *dead in the way of salvation*; but a dead man lacks all freedom. Therefore a man is also coerced by the grace of God to act in a salvific way.

8. D. Soto did this brilliantly, *De natura et gratia* 1,16 and 18.

9. Bover, *Teología de San Pablo* 234-251, especially 245.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent. For here it is only said that a man without grace cannot raise himself up and be moved in the way of salvation. Therefore the necessity of grace is affirmed, but man's free cooperation is not at all denied.

3. Man is said to be *a slave of sin*; he is freed from this servitude only by Christ (John 8:34; Gal. 4:31). Therefore man does not cooperate in any way in the work of salvation.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent. For there it is said that the grace of Christ is necessary for us to be freed from sin; but the cooperation of our freedom is not excluded.

4. God is at work in man *both to will and to work* (Phil. 2:13), that is, the whole work of salvation. Therefore man, under the influence of grace, is totally passive, without any free cooperation or resistance.

I distinguish the antecedent. God produces the whole work of salvation, with the totality of the effect, *conceded*; also with the totality of the cause, so that He alone while denying man's freedom, *denied*.

5. Justification is called *a new creation* (2 Cor. 5:17; Eph. 2:10;) and *regeneration* (Tit. 3:15). But in creation and generation what is created and generated is only something passive. Therefore the justified person does not do anything freely.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. What is substantially created or generated does not do anything, *conceded*; what is accidentally created or generated, as happens in justification, *I subdistinguish*: does not do anything in the actual creation taken formally, which comes from God alone by the infusion of sanctifying grace, *conceded*; does not do anything in providing the disposition in order to receive the grace of justification, *denied*.

3) THE AGREEMENT OF EFFICACIOUS GRACE WITH FREEDOM

311. The Problem. From what we have proved in the two previous theses, a serious problem arises about the agreement or harmony of efficacious grace with human freedom, or about the intimate explanation of efficacious grace. For it must be explained in a way that does not destroy freedom. Here are the two sides of the problem:

On the one hand, grace is efficacious in the first reality (*in actu primo*). Hence, before the free determination of the will—a determination absolutely future and also foreseen by God, it is infallibly true that this grace will have its effect—and it is so known and intended by God.

On the other hand, the will remains free, even under the movement of grace. Hence, in spite of all this, the will can still omit the salvific act, which however infallibly, as we said, is connected with efficacious grace in the first reality.

312. The solution. a) *The difficulty of the solution.* This problem is so difficult for the understanding of the human mind, as St. Augustine says, “that it very much troubles anyone seeking an answer, namely: we may not so defend grace as to seem to take away free will, or, on the other hand, so assert free will as to be judged ungrateful to the grace of God, in our arrogant impiety” (R 1723). Or, as the same holy Doctor says elsewhere, “as the discussion about free will and God’s grace has such difficulty in its distinctions, that when free will is maintained, God’s grace is apparently denied; while when God’s grace is asserted, free will is supposed to be done away with” (R 1856). Hence the solution must be sought prudently, so that it is in harmony with the weak and limited power of the human mind.

b) *The general principle of the solution.* The quoted words of St. Augustine set limits for us within which the solution of the problem must be sought. For if there is a solution which denies either part of the problem, that solution must be rejected. For this is not to solve the problem, but to take it away. Thus all Catholic solutions retain both parts; otherwise they would not be Catholic. This being the case, one can argue against them because they seem to explain one part of the problem in a way that is less fitting.

c) *Non-Catholic solutions.* Therefore also the following must be rejected as non-Catholic solutions:

The Semi-Pelagian solution: because it does not admit efficacious grace in the first reality.

The Protestant solution: because it denies freedom.

The Jansenistic solution: because it denies true liberty under grace.

d) *Catholic attempts at a solution.*¹ After the Council of Trent, where the dogma of human freedom in the presence of efficacious grace was defined, theologians began to examine more carefully the difference between purely sufficient grace and efficacious grace.

1) Then, what L. Molina, S.J., had taught in his theology classes for twenty years, at Eborá in Spain, he wrote down in his book, *Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis* (1588). In that book, by means of his “middle knowledge” (*scientia media*), he was able to assert the psychological control of man in the determination of his own spiritual activity. About the same time, 1573 and after, R. Bellarmine and L. Lessius made use of a similar solution at Louvain.²

2) In the years 1584 and 1594 D. Báñez, O.P., published his *Scholastica commentaria in 1 and 2.2 Angelici Doctoris*, in which he solved the problem with the help of a “physical predetermination,” in virtue of which the free will is made subject to the divine influence.

3) From these two books arose the *Controversia de auxiliis* (the controversy concerning the aids of grace) between the Dominicans and the Jesuits, which lasted for twenty-five years (1582-1607). Famous theologians of the time took part in it, first in Spain (1582-1598), and then in Rome (1599-1607). There were many disputations and about eighty Congregations, some in the presence of the pope. However, the question finally remained unresolved. Paul V in 1607 decided that the solution of the controversy should be delayed indefinitely; but in the meantime he said it was strictly forbidden that “anyone should judge or censure in any way his opposing party” (D 1997, 2008). But since the solution up to this time has not been given, both sides remain free to defend their opinion.

4) The controversy however revived in a strong way towards the end of the 19th century. But at that time the question was approached not speculatively as previously, but rather historically; that is, they debated about the historical aspects of the former controversy,³ about the mind

1. See Lange, 573-577.

2. X.M. le Bachelet, S.J., *Prédestination et grâce efficace* (Louvain 1931).

3. Schneemann-Gietmann, S.J., *Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia initia et progressus* (1881); A.M. Dummermuth, O.P., *S. Thomas et doctrina praemotionalis physicae, seu responsio ad R.P. Schneemann, S.J., aliosque doctrinae scholae thomisticae impugnatores* (1886); V. Frins, S.J., *S. Thomae Aq., O.P., doctrina de cooperatione Dei cum omni natura creata praesertim libera, seu S. Thomas praedeterminationis physicae ad omnem actionem creatam adversarius. Responsio ad R.P.A. Dummermuth, O.P.* (1893); A.M. Dummermuth, O.P., *Defensio doctrinae S. Thomae Aq. De praemotionali physica, seu responsio ad R.P.V. Frins, S.J.* (1895); H. Gayraud, O.P., *Thomisme et Molinisme* (1899); *Providence et libre arbitre selon S. Thomas d'Aquin* (1892).

of St. Thomas concerning physical predetermination,⁴ about the origin of predetermination in the Scotist school, from which it was said to have moved into the Thomistic school.⁵

5) At this time when the controversy fluctuated back and forth between the speculative and the historical approaches, some new solutions appeared which took a middle position between the former two. They were proposed, among others, by some *recent Scotists, Augustinians, and theologians from the Sorbonne-Alphonsianum*.

e) *Our method of proceeding*. Although there are many Catholic solutions in this most difficult matter, still a twofold fundamental position is found in all of them.

For some theologians seek the efficacy of grace in the intrinsic nature of grace, which for them is *efficacious intrinsically*, although they explain such efficacy differently in order to preserve human freedom.

But other theologians do not seek the efficacy of grace in the intrinsic nature of grace, but rather in extrinsic forms which are essentially connected with it, taken historically and concretely. Hence, for these authors grace is indeed efficacious in the first reality (*in actu primo*), but not for an intrinsic, but for an *extrinsic reason*.

We will examine the two positions in the next two theses.

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4. Card. Pecci, *Sentenza di S. Tommaso circa l'influsso divino e la scienza media* (1885); H. Guillermin, O.P., *S. Thomas et le Prédéterminisme* (1859f.); Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., argues with A. d'Ales, S.J., in *RechScRel*, *RevThom*, *RevPhilosophie* 1916f.; I. Stuffer, S.J., in addition to many articles in *ZkathTh* from the year 1918, wrote *D. Thomae Aquinatis doctrina de Deo operante in omni operatione naturae creatae praesertim liberi arbitrii* (1923). Against the assertion of P. Stuffer that St. Thomas denied any immediate concurrence, the following wrote: R.M. Schultes, O.P.: *ThRev* 20 (1921) 266; *DivThom* 1923-4; G. Holtum, O.S.B.: *DivThom* (Fr) (1922) 188; F. Zigon: *DivThom* (Fr) (1924) 24; G. Huarte, S.J.: *Greg* 6 (1925) 345-352; R.M. Martín, O.P.: *RevThom* 1924-6. Without mentioning some others, F. Zigon treated this matter again, *Divus Thomas arbiter controversiae de concursu divino* (1923); F. Marín-Sola, O.P., in *CiencTom* 1925-6; Lange, *De gratia* 600-4; R.M. del Campo, S.J., *Doctrina S. Thomae de actu et potentia et de concursu* (1944); E. Iglesias, S.J., *De Deo in operatione naturae vel voluntatis operante* (1946); I.B. Manyà, *Theologumena*: 1, *De Deo cooperante* (1946); G. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De comoedia bannezziana et recenti syncretismo*: *Ang* 23 (1946) 3-25; S. González: *EstEcl* 22 (1948) 375-398; J. Sagüés, S.J., *¿Crisis en el bañecianismo?*: *EstEcl* 22 (1948) 699-747.
 5. F. Pelster, S.J., *Thomas von Sutton, O.P., ein Oxfordter Verteidiger der thomistischen Lehre*: *ZkathTh* 46 (1924) 212-256; H. Schwamm, *Magistri Ioannis de Ripa, O.F.M., doctrina de praescientia divina* (1930); Robert Cowton, O.F.M., *über das göttliche Vorherwissen* (1931); *Das göttliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus und seinen ersten Anhängern* (1934); I. Stuffer, *Gott, der erste Beweger aller Dinge* (1936).

Thesis 33. The agreement of efficacious grace with freedom cannot be explained by any system that holds intrinsic efficacious grace.

Beraza, 525-588; Lange, 578-617; Lercher-Lakner, 345-356.

313. Definition of terms. *The agreement of efficacious grace with freedom:* that is, this is a fact that follows from the two preceding theses: there is such an infallible connection of grace in the first reality with the consent of the will that at the same time the free consent of the will is retained under the motion of the same efficacious grace.

It cannot be explained: those systems do not sufficiently explain both sides of the problem. In general, they offer a good explanation of the efficacy of grace, but a poor explanation of freedom under the influence of efficacious grace.

By any system: for there are different systems, as we shall see; but all of them agree on this fundamental point: the efficacy of grace for an intrinsic reason.

Intrinsic efficacious grace: which from its own intrinsic nature, prescinding from the circumstances in which it is given, has an infallible connection with a salvific act. Hence, to whomever it is given, it is always connected with the consent of the will.

314. Adversaries. 1. *Defenders of the system of physical predetermination.* According to this system:

a) Efficacious grace is a physical predetermination, that is, a created being, supernatural, not vital, received in the will, as a physical cause of a salvific act. This supernatural motion physically determines the will to perform this act, antecedent to the free determination of the will, of which determination it is the cause. However this predetermination is so infallibly connected with the salvific act which it determines, that under its influence it is metaphysically impossible that the act not be posited, and without it it is metaphysically impossible for the act to be posited. This grace is efficacious in the same way for any man in any circumstances, for its efficacy resides in its intrinsic nature.

b) Grace efficacious in this way presupposes a decree of the divine will by which God from eternity decreed to predetermine the human will to perform this salvific act. The efficacious grace of this predetermining divine decree is only the instrument for its execution. Hence the efficacy of grace, or its infallible connection with the salvific act, is sought *remotely* in the divine decree extrinsically predetermining, but *proximately* in the grace

which is physically and intrinsically predetermining.

c) Such efficacious grace gives not only the *capability*, but also *the action itself*. Therefore it differs intrinsically and essentially from sufficient grace, which gives only the *capability*, and does not bring about the act without a new efficacious grace.

d) Therefore the infallible connection of efficacious grace with the salvific act is explained very well. For there is an *objective* connection from the very nature of intrinsically efficacious grace; a *cognitive* connection from God's knowledge whose end is the divine predetermining decree; an *affective* connection from the same predetermining decree. Thus, first God wills absolutely to give this grace; then he sees in the same decree an absolutely future act; thirdly, he gives the grace which is a physical supernatural predetermination; finally, the will elicits the act under the influence of that grace.

e) But it also explains how the will, acting in that way under the predetermining motion of grace, still remains free. For that grace predetermines not only to elicit *this act*, but to elicit it *freely*; that is, not only *to act*, but also *to this way of acting*. For it predetermines to an act inasmuch as it is an instrument of God, absolutely and efficaciously intending not only the consent of the will, but its free consent.¹

This system was developed mainly at the end of the 16th century and the beginning of the 17th century by D. Báñez, D. Alvarez, Th. De Lemos; later the Salmanticenses joined them. In general the Thomists follow this opinion.²

315. Defenders of the system of moral predetermination. This system holds:

a) Efficacious grace is not physical predetermination. But it is of such a nature that antecedently to all prevision of the consent of the will, it is so connected with the salvific act that morally it is absolutely repugnant that

1. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *Prémotion physique*: DTC 13,39-45; N. del Prado, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2,141f.

2. D. Báñez, *Scholastica commentaria in 1 et 2.2 Angelici Doctoris* (1584-1594); Id., *Tractatus de vera et legitima concordia liberi arbitrii creati cum auxiliis gratiae Dei efficaciter moventis humanam voluntatem*: Bibl de Teólogos Españoles, 14,351-420; D. Alvarez, *De auxiliis divinae gratiae et humani arbitrii viribus et libertate ac legitima eius cum efficacia eorum concordia* (1610); A. Goudin, *Philosophia iuxta inconcussa tutissimaque d. Thomae dogmata* (1671); *Tractatus theologici* (1723); T. De Lemos, *Panoplia gratiae seu de rationalis creaturae in finem supernaturalem gratuita divina suavisipotentie ordinatione, ductu mediis, liberoque progressu, dissertationes theologicae* (1676); Salmanticenses, *De gratia* d.7; C.R. Billuart, *Summa S. Thomae hodiernis academiis moribus accommodata...* (1759); H.E. Plassmann, *Die Schule des hl. Thomas* (1858f.); C.M. Schneider, *Das Wissen Gottes nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas* (1884f.); N. del Prado, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* (1907); R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Dieu* (1923); *Prémotion physique*: DTC 13,31-77.

the act does not take place.

b) This *connection of efficacious grace with its act* is sought by some in its accommodation with the quality, disposition and circumstances of the will; it is sought by others in the abundance of helps with which in the situation the will will certainly not resist; others seek it in the force which grace exercises on the will.

c) Therefore the *efficacy of grace is explained* from its objective and antecedent connection with a salvific act, which as such is known and intended by God.

d) But *freedom* is explained because grace does not physically move the will beforehand, but only morally.

This system is defended by some Dominican theologians, like González de Albelda, F. Araújo, J. de Vita, H. Guillermin, and some others, like L. Thomassinus, G.F. Albertini.³

316. 3. Defenders of the system of co-determination. This system holds:

a) *The efficacy of grace is explained* by a divine decree co-determining, not predetermining, whose object is a salvific act of the will.

b) This decree is *intrinsically efficacious*, because its efficacy does not depend on the determination of the will, not even conditionally foreseen. Indeed it precedes this determination, not with a priority of causality, but of content; that is, inasmuch as the decree of God co-determining contains virtually the free determination of the will.

c) However this *efficacy* of the co-determining decree is not effective, but *affective*, because the decree of God is connected infallibly with the determination of the created will, not as its cause, but as a pure affection.

d) Hence, *freedom* is saved completely. For the will freely determines itself in the same sense in which the decree of God was intended from eternity; not because the determination of the will is caused by God, but because the will, because of its natural subordination and quasi sympathy owed to the Creator, because of its own inclination and determination wills the same thing God wills.

Thus, under the leadership of Mastrius, more commonly the recent *Scotists*.⁴

3. G. de Albelda, *In 1 q.19 a.8 d.58 s.2*; F. Arauxo, *In 1.2 q.111 a. 5 dub.6 n.41*; Vita, *De proprio et per se principio unde provenit peccatum in actionibus voluntariis* (Panormi 1665); Thomassinus, *Consensus Scholae de gratia* c.18ff. (Vivès, 6,361f.); Albertini, in G. Schneemann, S.J., *Controversiarum de divinae gratiae liberique arbitrii concordia, initia et progressus* (1881) 125; Guillermin: *RevThom* (1895) vol. 9-11.

4. B. Mastrius, *De divino intellectu* d.3 q.3 a.8. His doctrine is compared with the doctrine of Scotus by H. Schwamm, *Das Göttliche Vorherwissen bei Duns Scotus* 85-88.

317. Defenders of the system of conquering delight. This system holds:

a) *Efficacious grace* is conquering delight. Indeed actual grace is an inspiration of holy delight. If this heavenly delight is weaker than the earthly delight, the grace is sufficient (giving only the possibility); but if it is stronger, the grace is efficacious, because it conquers the contrary earthly delight (it gives the act).

b) *The efficacy of grace* is had from the very nature of this grace, according as it is given in these circumstances. Therefore it is also intrinsically predetermining the will, not physically but morally; and it is relative, not absolute, because the heavenly delight, which here and now is greater than the earthly delight, in other circumstances is weaker.

c) *Freedom is saved*, because the grace acts only by attracting the will.

d) This system *differs from Jansenism*, because it defends the freedom and existence of merely sufficient grace.

Thus *Augustinians*, Berti, Noris, Bellelli, and in more or less the same sense recently L. Janssens.⁵

318. Theological note. By command of Paul V, Urban VIII and Clement XII it is not permitted in this matter to qualify theologically opposing opinions (D 1997; see also the note after 1997; also the second note attached to 2008). Therefore since there is no theological note, the thesis seems to us to be *certain*.

319. It is proved. 1. *By a general argument.* A system holding intrinsic efficacious grace either does not explain freedom, or it does not explain the efficacy of grace. Therefore it cannot be accepted.

The antecedent: Antecedently to the free determination of the will that is absolutely future and foreseen, considering the intrinsic nature of the grace, this grace either already has an infallible connection with the salvific act, or it does not; if the first, then it does not appear how freedom remains; if the second, then the efficacy of grace in the first reality is not explained.

320. 2. By a particular argument.

1) *Against the system of physical predetermination.* In this system, neither is sufficient grace truly sufficient, nor does efficacious grace preserve human freedom. Therefore it cannot be admitted.

The antecedent: a) In this system, a salvific act cannot be put together

5. H. Norisius, *Historia pelagiana; Vindiciae augustinianae*; F. Bellelli, *Mens Augustini de statu creaturae rationalis ante peccatum...*; *Mens Augustini de modo reparationis humanae post lapsum*; J. Janssens, O.S.B., *De gratia Dei et Christi* 657-662.

with sufficient grace alone; but it is necessary that a new grace be added, that is, an efficacious grace. But this new grace now is not in man's power. Therefore with sufficient grace a man really cannot posit the act, that is, sufficient grace is not truly sufficient.

They respond by denying the minor. Therefore God denies a further efficacious grace, because man by sinning resists the sufficient grace. *But on the contrary there is this:* Before God denies the further efficacious grace it is supposed that there is a sin of the man by not cooperating with the received sufficient grace. But that sin could not take place without a physical predetermination; concerning this it can again be asked whether it was in man's power, or not.

b) Efficacious *grace* is so intrinsically connected with the salvific act that, while it is present, the act metaphysically cannot be omitted; if it is not present, then the act is metaphysically repugnant. But these are present before the free determination of the will. Therefore there is no place for this determination, but the will necessarily does that for which it was predetermined by grace.

They respond 1., that under efficacious grace a man can not posit the salvific act in the divided sense (*in sensu diviso*), although he cannot do it in the composite sense (*in sensu composito*). That is, that efficacious grace and the *actual omission* of the salvific act cannot be at the same time possible in the same man; although efficacious grace and *the power of omitting* the act really are possible together in the same man. *But we object:* that power of omitting the act is completely absent; at least the full and complete power. For that power is not had fully and completely except by a new physical predetermination to the matter of the sin.

They respond 2., that the will under efficacious grace remains free because God predetermines it not only to the act, but to posit the act freely. *But we object:* this is precisely the question: How can these two be joined together at the same time: on the one hand, a predetermination to one thing which is absolute and irresistible, and on the other hand, a predetermination to an act which is done in such a way that it can truly not be done.

They respond 3., that these two go well together because under efficacious grace the will still acts on the basis of an indifferent judgment, that is, with objective indifference, which suffices to save freedom. *But we object:* even though there can be no freedom without an indifferent judgment, it is necessary to prove that freedom is given always and necessarily with an indifferent judgment. For, freedom seems to be frustrated by a physical predetermination, which moves the will, still undetermined, without failure to one thing.

They respond 4., that a certain mystery is present there, hidden from human reason, but piously to be believed. *But we object:* a mystery must be proved from the sources of revelation. Moreover, it must be shown that it is not a contradiction rather than a mystery. Therefore Bellarmine said: "many do not understand, and I confess that I am one of them, how... it does not contradict the Council of Trent, and how it does not destroy free will." And St. Alphonsus de Liguori: "It does not seem to be able to be understood how, by a physical predetermination, efficacious grace can be perfectly reconciled with the freedom of the human will."⁶

321. 2) *Against the system of moral predetermination.* In this system, efficacious grace is of such a nature in itself, that preceding all foreseen determination of the will, it is morally repugnant that the will does not consent. Now that repugnance either supposes a moral connection only with the act, or an absolute and infallible connection: if the second possibility, then freedom is not preserved, as we said about the previous system; if the first, then the true efficacy of grace is not preserved.

322. 3) *Against the system of co-determination.* A co-determining decree is without failure connected with the salvific act; it is essentially necessary for that act and is really not in the power of man. But such a decree removes freedom. Therefore this system cannot be admitted.

323. 4) *Against the system of the conquering delight.* In this system, the conquering delight is infallibly connected with the salvific act antecedently to every free determination of the will. Therefore freedom is destroyed.

Further, if the conquering delight is absolutely necessary in order to elicit a salvific act, something is lacking in a non-conquering delight which is absolutely required in order that the power of the will to act be considered truly complete. But then the concept of the truly sufficient act is not preserved. Therefore also from this point of view this system must be rejected.

324. Scholium. *The Sorbonne-Alphonsianum system.* It distinguishes between works that are more difficult and more easy. For the more difficult it requires intrinsic efficacious grace, physically or morally connected with the salvific act, according to the different way of thinking among these

6. See Meyer, *Hist. controv. De div. gratiae auxiliis* 1,783; F. Cereceda, *Recurso a las actas del Tridentino en la lucha "de auxiliis"*: EstEcl 14 (1935) 257-269. See St. Alphonsus de Liguori, *De modo quo gratia operatur* n.106. You will find a more extensive refutation of physical predetermination in Lange, 586-597; Beraza, 536-559.

authors. This efficacious grace is obtained infallibly by prayer (for which an efficacious grace is not required), and is given to those who make good use of sufficient grace, which gives not only the possibility, but also the activity (with reference to the easier works). This system is defended, in addition to the Sorbonne authors cited above in n. 296, by St. Alphonsus de Liguori, who is followed by his Redemptorist brothers,⁷ and by other authors, like Katschaler, Marín-Sola; Cardinal Pecci, Cornoldi and Parente seem to agree with him.⁸

This system sufficiently saves freedom because efficacious grace is finally under the control of man. Hence it also sufficiently explains the efficacy of grace for the more difficult works. But with regard to the easier works, God is held to give those sufficient graces in a blind and improvident manner. For, when he gives those graces, he does not know whether he will obtain the consent or the dissent of the will. For, he cannot know it in the graces themselves (which of their nature are not connected infallibly with the act), nor in the act itself of the will (because that act cannot be seen by God as absolutely future before the decree of giving those graces). Therefore the defenders themselves of this system say that there is "the knot of the mystery."⁹

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7. St. Alphonsus de Liguori, *De magno orationis medio pars altera*, c.4. See J. L. Janssens, *S. Alphonsi doctrina de influxu Dei in deliberatam voluntatis creatae activitatem* (1920); J.R. Raus, *La doctrine de S. Alphonse sur la vocation et la grâce* (1926); J. Herrmann, *De divina gratia* 502-755; Lange, 611.
 8. I. Katschaler, *De gratia* (1949); Marín-Sola, *El sistema tomista sobre la moción divina*: CiencTom 32 (1925) 5-54; 33 (1926) 5-74, 321-397. On this, see Garrigou-Lagrange: RevThom (1925-26); Lange: Schol 1 (1926) 533-566; Zigon: EphThLov 8 (1931) 17-44, 225-237. The opinion of M. Sola was revived by F. Muñoz, O.P., *Suma Teológica*, ed. B.A.C., t.I appendix II. See EstEcl 22 (1948) 699-749.
 9. J.B. Manyá, recently proposed a new solution, *La cooperación de Dios al acto libre de la criatura. Corrección y valoración de los sistemas clásicos, tomismo y molinismo*: RevEspT 4 (1944) 345-365. In this opinion, the motion of God is indifferent, but at the same time determining the act of the creature. But opposed to this solution is the following: How can these two be associated together, namely, *a motion that is indifferent and at the same time determining*? The author responds by saying that we do not know, since this association is a true mystery (p. 353). Therefore finally he solves nothing, since he claims to explain one mystery by another mystery. He developed the same doctrine extensively in his work, *Theologumena*. I. *De Deo cooperante* (1946).

Thesis 34. The efficacy of grace and its agreement with freedom is well explained because such a grace is given to man by God, which he knows is appropriate and to which man will consent.

Beraza, 597-642; Lange, 626-658; Lercher-Lakner, 347, 352-356.

325. Definition of terms. The point of this thesis concerns *Congruism*, or *Molinism*. It is called Molinism, because Molina for the first time systemitized ideas which were common at his time. But it is called “Congruism” because it explains the efficacy of grace through a certain congruity or agreement of grace itself with regard to a salvific act. The name comes from something said by St. Augustine: “Therefore it is true: many are called, few are chosen. For those chosen, are the ones who have been called *agreeably* (*congruenter*); but those who were not *agreeable* and did not obey their vocation, were not chosen because they did not follow, although they were called. Likewise it is true: it is not a matter of God willing or hastening, but of being merciful. Because, although he calls many, still he has mercy on those whom he calls in such a way that they are ready to follow him” (R 1573).

Congruism and Molinism *agree* in a negative way, in the sense that they do not wish to explain the efficacy of grace by some kind of grace that is efficacious intrinsically. But they agree in a positive way, in the sense that, in order to explain that efficacy and its agreement with human freedom, they both use the divine knowledge of futurible acts, which precede any absolute divine decree, namely, *middle knowledge* (*scientia media*).

However, they differ from each other on the question of predestination, as either antecedent (Congruism) or consequent (Molinism); and they also differ on the question of predefinitions—formal (Congruism) or virtual (Molinism). But they do not disagree at all on the question of the nature of efficacious grace.

326. Explanation of the system. 1) *Grace is not intrinsically efficacious.* If grace is considered only intrinsically and physically in its nature, no grace is infallibly connected with a salvific act. Hence in that respect efficacious grace still does not differ from truly sufficient grace; but all graces, by their very nature, are truly sufficient. If a certain grace is also efficacious in the first reality, it has this ability from some other source, and so it is extrinsic. Otherwise it does not seem that man’s freedom is sufficiently protected.

2) But *the efficacy of grace in the first reality* must absolutely be retained. Antecedently to a free determination of the will that is *absolutely* future, efficacious grace already has an infallible connection with a salvific act. Therefore from this point of view efficacious grace already differs from a grace

that is only truly sufficient.

3) Therefore the efficacy of grace must be explained by some element which is added to or intercedes between the idea of grace, understood in itself, and the determination of the will which is absolutely future. This element is "middle knowledge" (*scientia media*), that is, the divine knowledge of futuribles antecedent to every absolute decree of the divine will regarding the act to be posited. That is, God knows through his middle knowledge what this man would do, if this concrete sufficient grace were given to him in these definite circumstances. Namely, he knows that this man, if he had this grace, will certainly cooperate with it; but if he had another grace, he will certainly not cooperate.

4) In this expression of middle knowledge this is now infallibly true:

a) If this grace were given to Peter, Peter would cooperate and the grace would have its effect: the grace would be efficacious.

b) If the same grace were given to Paul, Paul would not cooperate, and the grace would not have its effect: the grace would be purely sufficient.

Therefore, in this expression the grace for Peter already has an *infallible connection* with the salvific act, independently of and antecedent to the free determination of the will, which is *absolutely* future and foreseen. This is an *objective connection*; it does not consist formally in the knowledge itself of God, but precedes this middle knowledge, just as a known object precedes the knowledge of it.

5) Given that infallible objective connection, which this particular grace in these circumstances, and given to this man, de facto has with a salvific act, God infallibly knows that connection by his middle knowledge, not indeed as future, but as futurible. Hence a new infallible connection of this grace with the salvific act is had, even antecedently to the free determination of the will, which is *absolutely* future and foreseen. This connection is *cognitive*.

6) Finally, God decrees absolutely to give this grace to this man in these circumstances, while predefining and intending this salvific act. Hence there is a new infallible connection of this grace with the salvific act. This connection is *affective*.

This divine decree can be thought of in two ways, according to the difference of Congruism from pure Molinism:

a) *According to Congruism*: God decrees absolutely that Peter should elicit this salvific act through this determined grace, which he knows by his middle knowledge agrees with this man in order to perform this act, or which he knows by the same knowledge objectively to be connected infallibly with this act, if it were given to this man in these circumstances. This is called *formal predefinition*, because it is an absolute decree of God, which is directed immediately and formally to perform this act.

b) *According to pure Molinism*: God decrees absolutely that to Peter will be given in these circumstances this grace which he knows by his middle knowledge agrees with this man in order to elicit this act (or which he knows by the same knowledge objectively to be connected infallibly with this salvific act, if it were given to this man), willing and intending that this salvific act should be performed by this man. This is called *virtual predefinition*, because it is an absolute decree of God, which is directed immediately and formally to giving the grace, and only virtually to the performance of the act through that grace.

7) In this way, therefore, it is explained how grace, which by its nature is not yet efficacious, *is now efficacious in the first reality (in actu primo)*. For, antecedently to the free determination of the will, which is *absolutely* future and foreseen, that grace already has an infallible connection with the salvific act. This infallible connection is threefold:

a) *objective*: from the *conditioned* futuribility of the consent of the will under the influence of a grace that is not intrinsically predetermining.

b) *cognitive*: from middle knowledge, by which God knows that consent of the will as conditionally future under the influence of this grace.

c) *affective*: from the *absolute* divine decree, predefining, either the consent under this grace foreseen as efficacious (Congruism), or this grace, foreseen by middle knowledge as *conditionally* efficacious, from the benevolent intention that under this grace the consent *de facto* will be given (Molinism).

The first and second connections are had in the hypotheticalal order, but the third one in the absolutely future order. Hence, *in the absolutely future order*, antecedent to the free determination of the will, the grace is already infallibly connected with the salvific act, and therefore it is efficacious in the first reality (*in actu primo*).

8) When the efficacy of grace in the first reality is explained in this way, *human freedom is well defended*. For the will does not receive anything into itself, which would predetermine it physically or morally to perform a salvific act; not even before the free self-determination of the will is any absolute divine decree given which would predetermine the will to act. But the will itself, using its own freedom under the influence of grace, determines itself to do that to which it was moved by the grace.

9) This grace is well said to be *congruous* (agreeing, appropriate, suitable), because in these circumstances it agrees with, is accommodate to, is adapted to this will freely consenting, and therefore also the salvific act. Hence the difference of efficacious grace from sufficient grace is located completely in the extrinsic congruity to the grace itself. So efficacious grace is nothing else but truly sufficient grace, by which God knows that man will cooperate with it if it is given to him, and which God decrees absolutely to give because he

wants the act to be posited. So merely sufficient grace is nothing else but truly sufficient grace, under which God knows that man will not cooperate if it is given to him, but which God gives because he wants man to cooperate.

10) Therefore we distinguish these expressions of reason or stages of divine knowing:

a) *The expression of the knowledge of simple intelligence*: All graces are equally truly sufficient; none is purely sufficient, none is efficacious. Grace is considered only in its intrinsic nature. Thus considered, any grace has the efficacy of power, but none yet has the efficacy of connection with a salvific act.

b) *The expression of middle knowledge*: With those graces that are truly sufficient this man in these circumstances *de facto* would cooperate, if these graces were given to him. But why this man would cooperate with these graces, but another would resist the same graces, is explained from the free self-determination of the will which is conditionally future. Therefore not all graces are equal; for some would be connected with this salvific act, but others would not be connected. Objectively therefore some graces would be efficacious, not indeed intrinsically but extrinsically; just as some graces would be objectively merely sufficient extrinsically but not intrinsically. But that which would take place objectively is known by God.

c) *The expression of predefinition*: God absolutely decrees to give those graces, which he foresees will be efficacious, if they would be given to that man in those circumstances, or he decrees absolutely that those salvific acts should be elicited, which he foresees to be connected with those graces, if they were given. But this divine decree, however it is conceived, carries out the absolute divine will which for this man is a true predilection. For the decree could be ordered to a grace which is not conditionally foreseen as efficacious, or to a salvific act conditionally foreseen as having a connection with this grace; or it could be ordered to a grace conditionally foreseen as merely sufficient, or to the omission of a salvific act conditionally foreseen as not having an objective connection with this grace. Therefore the divine decree contains the true absolute will of God, efficaciously intending this act and this grace instead of other graces.¹

Theological note. *We defend this system as more probable.*

1. For a more complete knowledge of Molinism the following should be consulted: L. Molina, *Liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis, divina praescientia, providentia praedestinatione et reprobatione concordia* (1588); *Commentaria in primam partem D. Thomae* (1592); L. Lessius, *De gratia efficaci, decretis divinis, libertate arbitrii et praescientia Dei condicionata, disputatio apologetica...* (1610); R. Bellarmine, *De gratia et libero arbitrio libri sex*; F. Suarez, *Opusculum de concursu, motione et auxilio Dei*; *De gratia* 1,3-5; M. Limbourg, for some articles in *ZkathTh* 1-4 (1877-1880); H. Quilliet, *Congruisme*: DTC 3,1120-1138; E. Vansteenberghe, *Molinisme*: DTC 12,2094-2187; F. Stegmüller, *Geschichte des Molinismus* (1935); S. González, *Un tratado inédito de Suarez sobre la ciencia media*: MiscCom 9 (1948) 59-132; E. Elorduy, *Suarez en las controversias sobre la gracia*: ArchTG 11 (1948) 131-192.

327. Proof. The system of Molinism or Congruism is to be preferred, if the other solutions are insufficient, if it explains well the agreement (*concordia*) of both parts of the problem (i.e., efficacious grace in the first reality and freedom of the will under the influence of that grace), and if it does not offend against any other truth. But that is the way it is. Therefore the Molinistic system must be admitted.

The minor is explained by parts:

a) From what has been said, the other systems do not explain well either the infallibility of grace or the human free will. Therefore they do not obtain what is intended.

b) It is certain from the exposition of the Molinistic system how it both explains the threefold infallibility and protects freedom.

c) Molinism does not offend against any other truth. For:

1) It protects purely sufficient grace as truly sufficient, since considered intrinsically efficacious grace and sufficient grace are the same; for that grace is rendered purely sufficient from the conditionally future dissent of the will. Therefore, at the same time it is clear how serious *the universal salvific will of God* is.

2) *It preserves the rule of God over his free creatures.* For God not only creates and conserves the will, and concurs with it in all its acts, but he also influences the exercise of freedom, inasmuch as, guided by his middle knowledge, he decrees to place the will in certain circumstances, and predefines absolutely both his help and the act. But God will never lack the means of accomplishing whatever he wishes. Moreover, since he freely decided to create a free creature, he cannot contradict himself by denying the exercise of that freedom. Also, the actual existence of a good act depends completely on the free decree of God, who predefines the act itself, since he could also not predefine it.

3) *It preserves the gratuity of grace even as efficacious,* since a man could in no way merit that the first grace foreseen as efficacious would be chosen by God instead of a grace foreseen as purely sufficient. Therefore, in the final analysis, the whole decision comes from God; and therefore the conferring of efficacious grace, final perseverance, and predestination are a true gift of God.

4) *It preserves the mystery of the choice of efficacious grace instead of purely sufficient grace,* since this choice depends solely on the mysterious love of God, which freely chose this order or providence instead of some other order. But it is gratuitously asserted that the mystery should be placed in the agreement (*concordia*) of freedom with efficacious grace.

328. Objections. 1. From 1 Cor. 4:7: *For who sees anything different in you? What have you that you did not receive? If then you received it, why do you boast as if it were not*

a gift? Therefore he argues: God alone determines who consents and who does not consent. But in the Molinistic opinion, not God, but man himself determines himself not to consent. Therefore this opinion is opposed to Holy Scripture.

I distinguish the major: God alone determines formally, *denied*; effectively, *I subdistinguish*: in the first reality, *conceded*; in the second reality, *I distinguish again*: as the principal cause, *conceded*; as the only cause, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor in the same way.*

First of all, the Pauline text is speaking about natural gifts, not about the aids of grace to perform salvific acts. That is, the intent of the Apostle is to refute the proud leaders of factions, by asserting that they have nothing to distinguish themselves from others; for whatever they have, they received from God. However, it is true that since the time of Augustine, in the Pelagian controversy, this text was applied also to the supernatural gifts and is quoted especially to prove the necessity and gratuity of grace. Therefore, having said this, I now explain the distinction.

It is necessary to distinguish a twofold difference—*formal* and *effective*, or an inhering form by which one thing is distinguished from another, and a cause producing this form. Now consent is an internal form by which the one consenting is distinguished from the one not consenting, just as habitual grace is an internal form distinguishing a just man from a sinner. However in this way God cannot distinguish one man from another.

Moreover, the cause producing this form or distinction can be considered *in the first reality (in actu primo)* and *in the second reality (in actu secundo)*. In fact, only God discerns the one consenting from the one not consenting in the first reality, since only he confers the foreseen efficacious help, and this indeed with the intention of consent. But in the second reality, the discernment is attributed also to the man, since he so assents freely to the divine call that he can also not give his assent. Hence, from the definition of Trent (D 1554) it must be firmly held that man, when he assents to grace, in some way distinguishes himself effectively from the one who does not assent. Therefore, both God and man effect the salvific assent; neither God alone, nor man alone, but man adorned with grace. But God acts as the *principal cause*, inasmuch as He both decreed the foreseen efficacious help, and at the same time brings about the assent from the will. But man acts as the *secondary cause*, elevated and strengthened by the help of the divine grace.

2. From Phil. 2:13: *For God is at work in you, both to will and to work.* Hence we argue: God gives not only the possibility, but also the actual willing. But in the Molinistic system, God gives only the possibility, that is, a grace of itself indifferent, but not at all the will itself. Therefore it contradicts the Apostle.

I distinguish the major: God gives the will itself, inasmuch as a) he gives the help, which provides the physical and moral power, without which a salvific act cannot be produced; b) and indeed a help foreseen to be efficacious; c) and he also cooperates with the will in its activity, *conceded*; inasmuch as God predetermines the will, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

3. From Esther. 4:9: *There is no one who can oppose thy will.* And Rom. 9:21: *Has the potter no right over the clay, to make out of the same lump...* Thus we argue: No one can resist God, so that all men are in the hand of God like clay in the hand of the potter. But this cannot be explained by the Molinistic opinion. Therefore this opinion must be rejected.

I distinguish the major and deny the minor. Holy Scripture bears witness to the infallibility of providence and of divine grace, while preserving man's freedom; but it does not explain whether this efficacy is to be sought intrinsically in this grace or extrinsically. But we have sufficiently proved that it is to be sought in an extrinsic cause.

4. From Orange, cn.4 (D 374): "If anyone contends that God awaits our will..., he opposes the Holy Spirit himself speaking through Solomon: 'The will is prepared by the Lord.'" Therefore: God cannot wait for our will, but rather he prepares it. But in the Molinistic system God waits for our will, inasmuch as he looks at our conditioned future consent, known by his middle knowledge. Therefore the Molinistic system contradicts the definition of Orange.

Before we respond to this difficulty, please note that this canon was written against the Semi-Pelagians, who taught that God waits for the natural effort of the human will, and that this effort is the reason why God confers grace. Hence it is apparent how far the Molinistic system differs from the doctrine rejected by the Council of Orange.

This being the case, *I distinguish the major*: God cannot wait for the natural effort of the will, *conceded*; an effort made with the help of grace, *I subdistinguish*: he cannot wait in the proper sense, as if the divine will remains in suspense while waiting for the decision of the human will, *conceded*; he cannot wait in an improper sense, inasmuch as he confers graces based on his middle knowledge, *I make a further distinction*: and thus in such a way that the conditioned future decision of the will is not the reason for conferring the grace, *conceded*; it is the reason for the conferring of the grace, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way*.

5. According to the holy Fathers, it is not in our power to make grace efficacious or inefficacious. But according to the Molinists, this is in our hand because of the conditioned future consent. Therefore this doctrine is contrary to the Fathers.

I distinguish the major. According to the Fathers, it is not in our power to refuse giving consent to a grace that we actually do give consent to, *denied*; it is not in our power to have an efficacious grace instead of an inefficacious one, *conceded*. *I also distinguish the minor*: According to the Molinists, it is not in our hand to assent to or dissent from an accepted grace, *conceded*; to receive an efficacious grace instead of an inefficacious one, *denied*.

6. St. Augustine in his short works, *De praedestinatione sanctorum* and *De dono perseverantiae*, teaches that God has predestined all good works, and therefore that he fore-knows them because he has predestined them; also, here and elsewhere, he says that grace is omnipotent and irresistible. But this cannot be reconciled with grace that is intrinsically indifferent. Therefore this grace must be rejected.

I concede the major and deny the minor. With these words St. Augustine teaches only the fact of the infallibility of grace, but not the manner of this infallibility. Moreover, St. Augustine hints at the manner of this infallibility, which is neither Banezian nor Molinistic, but rather Augustinian

7. God, as the first cause, is the absolute Lord of everything that exists or will be. But if the will is not predetermined physically by God, but acts indifferently, God would not be the absolute Lord of free acts. Therefore Bandzianism must be admitted, and Molinism rejected.

I distinguish the major. God is the absolute Lord, inasmuch as he creates, conserves, and gives creatures the ability to act, cooperates with them, and gives them the grace foreseen

to be efficacious instead of some other, *conceded*; inasmuch as he physically predetermines creatures, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor*: God would not be the absolute Lord of free acts by physical premotion, *conceded*; by creation, conservation, concurrence and the granting of grace foreseen to be efficacious instead of some other, *denied*.

The absolute dominion of God really demands that God can direct the human will in the way he wishes; but it does not at all demand that by physical premotion he overturn free will, since otherwise God would be contradicting himself, giving man an indifferent will and at the same time determining it to one thing.

8. The will, before it acts, is in potency to act and indifferent to acting or not acting. Therefore it must be determined to act by God's premotion.

I distinguish the antecedent. The will is in potency and in active indifference, inasmuch as, when it considers some object, it can determine itself to act, *conceded*; in potency and active indifference, which needs some previous determination, *denied*. *I also distinguish the consequent*. If it were only passive potency, *conceded*; if it is active, *denied*.

We think that this active indifference is of the essence of human freedom, so that, if it is denied, free will is destroyed. But we do concede that the will is a passive power, inasmuch as by previous knowledge it is determined in an indeliberate way to will something, and inasmuch as it receives in itself the free act by which it is perfected. But where the will through indeliberate movements is constituted in the proximate first reality, it is actively indifferent regarding acting and not acting. Therefore God moves the will by his stimulating grace, but in no way does he predetermine it.

9. The objections, which attack middle knowledge that constitutes the foundation of the Molinistic or Congruistic system, have already been answered in the treatise *On the One God*.²

2. SThS 2,1,172f.

CHAPTER IV

On the fruits of grace

P. Lombard, *Sent.* 2,27; S.Th. I-II, q. 114; St. Bonaventure, *In 2 Sent.* d.27 a.2 q.1-3; Scotus, *In 2 Sent.* d.27; Aegidius Romanus, *In libros Sententiarum* 2,27; Vega, *Opusculum de iustificatione, gratia et meritis: Tridentini decreti de iustificatione expositio et defensio...* 1.15; Bellarmine, *De iustificatione* 1.5; Suarez, *De gratia* 1.12; Salmanticenses, *Cursus theologicus* tr.16 d.1-6; J.L. Berti, *De theologicis disciplinis* 1 s.9 c.6-8; J. Rivière, *Mérite*: DTC 10,574-785; P. Lumberras, O.P., *De Gratia* (1947).

329. Concerning the fruits of grace, both actual and especially habitual, some are *physical* and some are *moral*. The fruits or physical effects of grace are salvific acts and in order to elicit them grace confers the powers, not only moral but also physical. We have already said enough about this. But in addition, a certain moral causality belongs to these salvific acts, which are done under the power of grace, inasmuch as they can impetrate, make satisfaction and merit in the eyes of God. Hence, *impetration*, *satisfaction* and *merit* are rightly called the moral fruits of grace. Now since prayer and satisfaction are treated elsewhere, here we will speak only about merit.

Therefore, concerning merit there are five points to be studied: *the concept of merit, its existence, object, conditions and reviviscence*.

ARTICLE I

ON THE CONCEPT OF MERIT

Beraza, 973-983; Lercher-Lakner, 110f.

330. The concept of merit. *Merit*, considered in general, if it is taken abstractly, denotes *that property of human acts in virtue of which they are worthy of reward or punishment*. For a good act, done in service for another, merits a reward; but an evil act merits punishment. Hence “merit” sometimes refers not only to a good act, but also to an evil one; but the primary use of the word “merit” refers it to a good deed; an evil deed is called a “demerit.” Hence the word “merit,” if it is taken concretely, means *a good deed which deserves a reward*.

It is of the nature of merit that the work is ordered to the service of a superior person, or at least an equal. For, if a superior offers something as a favor to an inferior, that is called a gift rather than a merit.

Also, merit differs from impetration and satisfaction. For, *merit* moves another by means of service; but *impetration* by means of a humble

profession of one's own need and the request for mercy; *satisfaction* moves by means of compensation for an offense against another. Hence, just as imprecation implies need, so satisfaction implies an offense. But merit prescind from both of these.

331. Divisions of merit. Merit is divided: 1) *Into merit with men and merit with God*, according as the person in whose service the good deed is performed is a man or God. We are dealing with merit before God. This is further divided:

2) *Into natural merit and supernatural merit*. The first pertains to works which are done by the powers of nature alone, and deserves a reward in the natural order. But the second pertains to works done with the help of grace, and deserves a reward of the supernatural order. We are considering here only supernatural merit, which is also called theological merit. Therefore, *theological merit* means a good work, performed with the help of grace, which in the eyes of God deserves a supernatural reward.

3) *Into condign merit (de condigno)* (perfect merit) and *congruous merit (de congruo)* (imperfect merit). This division of merit was used already in the 12th century by Alano de Lille and in the 13th century by William of Auvergne.¹

Condign merit then is present when the work done has some equality with the reward, so that, given the promise of the one in whose service the deed is done, the reward is owed in a certain sense out of justice (I-II, q. 114, a. 3).²

a) If this equality is *arithmetic*, or with regard to the quantity of one thing to another, without any concern of the persons involved, then the reward is owed in strict justice: thus, for example, his salary is owed to a worker according to the contract agreed upon.

b) But if the equality is *geometric*, or with regard to a certain proportion, that is, an equality which, in addition to the things involved also considers the persons, so that to confer this reward on the part of the remunerator is not greater or more difficult than it is for the one meriting to offer such service, then the reward is one owed out of justice. Thus, v.gr., in this sense eternal life is owed because of the good works of the just.

Congruous merit is present when the work does not have equality with the reward; in this case the reward is not owed out of justice, but from a

1. See J. Rivi re: DTC 10,687; *Sur l'origine des formules eccl siastiques de condigno et de congruo*: BullLit-Eccl 28 (1927) 75-83. For a more extensive treatment of these concepts *de condigno* and *de congruo*, see H. Quilliet: DTC 3,1138-1152.

2. P. de Letter, S.J., explained accurately the mind of St. Thomas on condign merit: *De ratione meriti secundum Sanctum Thomam* (Rome 1939). There you will find a select bibliography.

certain sense of decency, because of the liberality of the remunerator. This merit to twofold:

a) *Infallible congruous merit*, when a divine promise is present, so that the retribution is given infallibly, not only for the sake of decency but also because of fidelity. In this way the sinner merits justification when he makes an act *of perfect love of God*.

b) *Fallible congruous merit*, when such a promise does not exist. Salvific acts which remotely dispose one for justification are of this kind.

332. Controversial questions. 1) In the very definition of condign merit, as we said, there must be a *promise* in order to give rise to this kind of merit. But a distinction must be made between merit with men and with God.

In human affairs, there is no merit in the second reality, unless there is present a promise, externally manifested, of accepting a particular work with a view to a reward.

In theological merit it is necessary to say that actually a solemn promise is present, given by God, to remunerate the good works of the just. But the question is: what is the source of the condign claim of the works of the just with regard to eternal life? That is, one asks: a) whether a meritorious work of the just already has a claim in justice to eternal life *in the first reality (in actu primo)*, that is, antecedently to the divine promise it is already condignly worthy of eternal life; b) and what divine promise is required to bring it about that a salvific work of the just becomes meritorious of eternal life *in the second reality (in actu secundo)*.

Concerning the first point, Scotus thought that the condign claim to eternal life is derived from the divine promise *alone*. But other scholastics opposed this opinion, both because they hold that the works of the just, by reason of the grace that brings them about, have a certain proportion to eternal life, and because the opinion of Scotus removes the basic reason for condign merit, since in this hypothesis condign retribution would never be present, but rather a free donation made because of a promise.³

Concerning the second point, we hold that a *formal* promise is not required, which indeed is given; but the divine ordination suffices, by which the salvific acts of the just are ordered to the reward of eternal life, because they are elicited with the help of divine grace. Therefore, this divine ordination is inseparably joined with the bestowal of divine grace,

3. See Suarez, *De gratia* 12,17,2-3 and 6.

and can be understood as if it were a *virtual* promise.⁴

2) Likewise, we said in the definition of condign merit that *the reward is due out of justice*. But, with what kind of justice does God reward just persons doing good acts?

According to all theologians, God rewards them *according to distributive justice*. For God, in distributing rewards, always observes due proportion according to the inequality of the merits.

Also, according to many theologians, God also rewards *by commutative justice*, inasmuch as he maintains equality between merit and reward,

However it must be denied that God rewards *according to the rigor of commutative justice*, since all the merits of the just are based on grace, which a man receives gratis from God, according to what is said in the *Indiculus*, ch.9 (D 248): “For so great is the goodness of God towards all men that he wishes those merits, which are gifts from him, to be our own, and he intends to give an everlasting reward for these gifts that he has lavished on us.” See also Trent (D 1548-1550).

4. An opposite opinion is held by Suarez, *De gratia* 12,17-18. See J.C. Martínez Gómez, S.J., *Suarez y la sobrenaturalidad del mérito*: ArchTG 2 (1939) 71-127.

ARTICLE II

ON THE EXISTENCE OF MERIT

Thesis 35. A just man, by his good works done out of grace, truly merits before God.

S.Th. I-II, q. 114, a. 1-3; Beraza, 1015-1025; Lange, 698-713; Lercher-Lakner, 113f.

333. Definition of terms. *A just man*, that is, man as a wayfarer, adorned with sanctifying grace and the other gifts of justification. From the nature of the case an adult person is understood here, or someone capable of acting freely.

By his good works, or human acts, morally good and freely performed, with the help of grace. It is sufficient that he merits *with at least some* of his acts. For we are not considering the question whether *all* the works of the just must be said to be meritorious.

Truly merits, that is, condignly, but we are not determining the object of this merit.

334. Adversaries. 1) *Luther* denied all merit, since, in his view, all the works of the just are sins (D 1481f.). *Melanchthon* mitigated this error; for he spoke about holy, divine and meritorious works. Finally, *recent Protestants*, even though they reject the name, seem to admit the reality of some merit.¹

2) De Bay (D 1901-1918), Jansen (D 2003) and Molinos (D 2240) taught many errors concerning merit.

335. Doctrine of the Church. The existence of merit is professed by the *Indiculus*, ch.9 (D 248), *Orange*, cn.18 (D 388), *Lateran IV* (D 802), *Florence* (D 1351).

The doctrine about the merit of good works was amply proclaimed by *Trent*, s.6 ch.16 (D 1545-1547), and cn.32 (D 1582): "If anyone says that the good works of the justified man are the gifts of God in such a way that they are not also the good merits of the justified man himself; or that by the good works he performs through the grace of God and the merits of Jesus Christ (of whom he is a living member), the justified man does not truly merit an increase of grace... let him be anathema." In this text the word "truly" means condign merit: both because the word itself cannot signify any other

1. See I.A. Möhler, *Symbolik* (19130 203-313).

merit except one that is proper and perfect; and from the comparison with ch.8 (D 1532), where certainly congruous merit is not denied; and because the terms used in ch.16 designate true justice; and because, as Pallavicini testified,² this was the mind of the Fathers. However, they did not wish to use the term *de condigno*, because there was not one opinion of the theologians concerning what is required for condign merit.³

336. Theological note. 1) That the just man *truly merits is a defined divine and Catholic truth*. That the just man merits *condignly*, is *at least theologically certain*, from the Council of Trent.

337. Proof from Holy Scripture. Scripture describes eternal life as a reward, payment, crown, retribution or remuneration for the good deeds of the just. On the other hand, the just are said to be worthy of eternal life, to which they are said to have a right, so that there is a causal connection and a certain proportion between their works and the reward. But this means that the just, by their good works done with the help of grace, truly or condignly merit. Therefore the just man, by his good works, truly or condignly merits eternal life.

The major: Eternal life is called a *reward* (Matt. 5:12; 20:8; 1Cor. 3:8), a *prize* or a reward given to contestants (1 Cor. 9:24), a *crown*, because in the athletic games (from which the metaphor is taken) the reward usually was a crown of laurel (2 Tim. 4:8; see 2 Tim. 2:5; Rev. 2:10; Jas. 1:12), *retribution* or *remuneration* for good works (Col. 3:23-24; Heb. 10:35). The just themselves, by reason of their good works, are said to be *worthy of eternal life* (2 Thess. 1:5; see Luke 20:35; Rev. 3:4), *to have a right to eternal life* (2 Tim. 4:8; see Heb. 6:10); but a *causal connection* is established between the works and the reward (Matt. 25:34; Rev. 7:14), so that the reward preserves *a certain proportion* with the good works (Matt. 16:27; see 1 Cor. 3:8; 2 Cor. 9:6).

The minor: For a) the works of the just have a certain meritorious value in the first reality, as is certain from their *causality*, *dignity*, *reward*, etc.; b) there is also a divine promise, as St. James says in 1:12: *God has promised*, and Heb. 6:12: *they will inherit the promises*; c) hence, this gives rise to a real legal title to a reward (*crown*, *prize*, *retribution*); d) but the reward in a certain sense surpasses the work done (2 Cor. 4:17; Rom. 8:18).

2. Pallavicini, *Historia concilii Tridentini* 8,4.

3. See CTr 5,280 and 381; J. Rivière: DTC 10,735-761.

338. Proof from tradition. *The Fathers*, following the example of Holy Scripture, acknowledge that just men merit eternal life. And indeed from their way of speaking, inasmuch as they use words like *stipend*, *crown*, *just judge*, etc., we conclude that they meant true or condign merit. At the same time, however, they exclude *strict* justice, because the reward surpasses the merit. Thus St. Ignatius of Antioch: "Please the leader under whom you serve, for from him you receive your pay" (R 68). St. Justin: "We have learned from the prophets, and we hold it to be true, that punishments, and chastisements, and good rewards, are rendered according to the merit of each man's actions" (R 123). St. Theophilus of Antioch: "When you have put off mortality, and put on immortality, then will you see God worthily" (R 173). Tertullian: "A good deed has God as its debtor, just as an evil one has too; for a judge is a rewarder of every cause" (R 311).

And surely Tertullian obtains a singular importance in this matter. For Rivière says that Tertullian was the first author to introduce the *word* "merit," in order to express the revealed doctrine; but what A. Harnack says can in no way be admitted, namely, that he also introduced the *doctrine* of merit,⁴ as is clear from the arguments from Scripture and the Fathers who preceded Tertullian.

After Tertullian, the same doctrine is taught by St. Cyprian (R 564, 599), St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 836), St. Basil (R 966), St. Ambrose (R1247), St. Jerome (R 1383, St. Augustine (R 1477, 1502, 1937, 1449, 1453, 1498, 1575, 1807), St. Prosper (R 2045), St. Gregory the Great (R 2316, 2326).⁵

339. Theological reasoning. St. Thomas presents an argument (I-II, q. 114, a. 1-3). *First*, he shows in general (a. 1) that man can merit something before God. For, man moves himself to act by his free will. Therefore, just as he can offer obedience, so can he also offer disobedience. Hence, while he obeys God, he is showing obedience to God and he is doing something meritorious.

Then he affirms (a. 2) that man can merit eternal life only with the help of grace. For, eternal life exceeds the proportion of nature.

Finally, he demonstrates (a. 3) that man, by works done with the help of grace, can merit eternal life condignly. For, through the mediation of grace, the works of the just are now in proper proportion to the excellence of eternal life.

4. A. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte*⁴ 2,179f.; Rivière: DTC 10,620.

5. J. Rivière presents the argument of the patristic tradition very well: DTC 10,612-661. On the existence of merit in the presence of mystical graces, see Alphonsus A St. Joseph, C.D., *La existencia del mérito durante la unión extática*: RevEspir 7 (1948) 151-163.

340. Objections. 1. From Rom. 8:18 and 2 Cor. 4:17, where Paul says: *the suffering of this present time are not worth comparing with the glory that is to be revealed to us, because this slight momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory beyond all comparison.* Therefore the works of the just are not a condign merit of eternal life.

I distinguish the consequent. They are not condign with a *quantitative* condignness, *conceded*; with a condignness of *proportion*, *denied*.

As we explained above, a twofold condignness or equality between the merit and the reward is present—of quantity (arithmetic) and of proportion (geometric). Really, *according to the equality of quantity* we cannot merit eternal life, since the quantity of the act of virtue can never equal the reward of glory; but with the help of grace, which is the seed of glory, we surely can merit *according to the equality of proportion*. Therefore the texts, which are cited as objections, are dealing with quantitative equality, and say that the brief duration of suffering in this life cannot be compared with the duration of eternal glory. But the texts that we cite in order to prove the thesis speak about an equality of proportion.

2. From Rom. 6:23: *but the free gift of God is eternal life*, that is, eternal life is a free gift of God, or it is given out of mercy. Therefore no condignness is present, not even of proportion, between the good works and the reward.

I distinguish the antecedent. Eternal life is a free gift of God, or it is given out of mercy, *radically*, inasmuch as grace, which is conferred out of mercy and gratuitously, precedes man's merits, *conceded*; it is a free gift of God, or it is given out of mercy, *formally*, *denied*. See *Indiculus*, ch.9, and *Trent*, s.6 ch.16 (D 248, 1548-1550).

3. If eternal life were given because of merits, a man could boast that he was saved by his own merits. But this contradicts the words of the Apostle in Eph. 2:8. Therefore man cannot merit eternal life.

I distinguish the antecedent. He could boast that he was saved by his own merits as being done by grace, *conceded*; as done by his own efforts, *denied*.

4. Eternal life is due to the just as an inheritance. But an inheritance is not given because of some merit. Therefore the just do not merit eternal life.

I distinguish the major. Eternal life is due to the just as an inheritance, and on the supposition of good works, also as a reward, *conceded*; it is due only as an inheritance, *I subdistinguish*: the glory which responds to the grace accepted only through the sacrament of Baptism because of the work done (*ex opere operato*), *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*.

Eternal life is given to the just under two titles: from the title of *inheritance*, because they are the adopted children of God, and from the title of *reward*, because of the merits of good works. But these two titles can be separated from each other, or also be together. Thus, v.gr., those who are baptized and die before the use of reason obtain glory only under the title of inheritance. But glory is given to adults who die in the state of grace both under the title of inheritance, because ultimately glory is based on the grace of adoption, and also under the title of reward, because the just man with his good works shows true submission to God.

5. All good works are already due to God under other titles, v.gr., of gratitude, obedience, etc. But no one merits before another through things owed to him for some other reason. Therefore the good works of the just are not meritorious before God.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. No one merits before men through things owed to them for some other reason, *I bypass the minor*, since also among men the nature of a debt does not always rule out the nature of merit; no one merits before God because of works that are due to Him for some other reason, *denied*.

The nature of moral merit is based on the fact that it freely offers what God commands or what is owed to God in any manner whatsoever. For, "God seeks from our goods not profit, but glory, i.e., the manifestation of his goodness; even as he seeks it also in his own works. Now nothing accrues to him, but only to ourselves, by our worship of him. Hence we merit from God, not that by our works anything accrues to him, but inasmuch as we work for his glory" (I-II, q. 114, a. 1 ad 2).

6. If man merits eternal life, by that fact he diminishes the merits of Christ, which are held to be insufficient. Therefore it is repugnant that man should merit.

I deny the antecedent. For, the doctrine concerning the merits of good works, not only does not argue for the insufficiency of Christ's merits, but it even shows their superabundance, since they bring it about that our works have the power of meriting eternal life, which Christ acquired for us by his blood. See *Trent*, s.6 ch.16 (D 1545-1547).⁶

6. See Bellarmine, *De iustificatione* 5,5.

ARTICLE III

ON THE OBJECT OF MERIT

Beraza, 1026-1052; Lercher-Lakner, 118f.; Lange, 714-720.

341. The supernatural gifts, which can become the object of merit, are of three kinds:

- 1) *Gifts of actual grace*, that is, the first grace and subsequent actual graces, especially efficacious grace.
- 2) *Gifts of habitual grace*, that is, the first justification, its increase, reparation, final perseverance.
- 3) *Gifts of glory*, or the first essential glory, its increase, accidental glory.

Now since man is thought to be able to merit, both *for himself*, and *for others*, and indeed *condignly* (*de condigno*) or congruously (*de congruo*), these points will be explained one by one.

1. What can a man merit for himself?

342. A. CONDIGNLY:

Trent defined, s.6 cn.32 (D 1582) that a justified man can truly (or condignly) “merit an increase of grace, eternal life, and (provided he dies in the state of grace) the attainment of this eternal life, as well as an increase of glory.” Therefore he can merit three things for himself condignly:

- 1) *Eternal life and the attainment of eternal life*. However these are not two rewards, but one and the same, namely, eternal beatitude. But Trent used this double formula in order to signify that the just person by his good works acquires a true right to eternal life, but that the payment of this right depends on this condition: that the man dies in the state of grace. Moreover we have already seen how the sources of revelation describe eternal life as the object of condign merit. See I-II, q. 114, a. 2f.
- 2) *An increase of sanctifying grace*. This also applies to the infused virtues and to the other gifts of justification. See I-II, q. 114, a. 8.
- 3) *An increase of glory*. The sources of revelation describe this increase at least of glory, when they say that the just man truly merits eternal life. See I-II, q. 114, a. 3.

Theologians dispute whether *the first glory* can become the object of condign merit for those adults who are justified by an act of perfect contrition, before the actual reception of Baptism or Penance. Lugo,

Ripalda and others deny it,¹ because that adult merits the first glory a) either by an act that precedes the infusion of grace, b) or by an act that follows the infusion of grace, c) or by an act that exists at the same time as the infusion of grace. Not a) because the state of grace is lacking; not b) because then he merits an increase of grace and glory; not c) because that act is not yet proceeding from grace. Other theologians like D. Soto, Cano, Suarez, Vázquez reply to this that, passing over a) and b), it seems to suffice for condign merit of the first glory that grace, by its very presence, dignified that act, even though the act itself does not yet flow physically from the grace.²

343. B. CONGRUOUSLY:

1) *A sinner*, assisted by the help of God, can merit actual graces congruously, even efficacious ones; indeed, according to the more common opinion, he can also merit congruously the first habitual grace.³

2) *A justified man*, beside efficacious actual graces, can also merit with fallible congruity final perseverance. But the theologians disagree on whether he can also merit congruously his restoration after a fall. St. Thomas clearly denies this (I-II, q. 114, a. 7); but St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Bellarmine and Suarez affirm it with regard to fallible congruity.⁴

C. NO MERIT:

No one can merit for himself for any reason the first actual grace; for it is given gratuitously, and any other merit necessarily presupposes it. See I-II, q. 114, a. 4-5.

2. What can a man merit for others?

344. 1) No one, no matter how holy, can merit something condignly for others, for this is the privilege of Christ the Lord. See I-II, q. 114, a. 6. Theologians disagree on this point with regard to the Bl. Virgin Mary.

2) A justified man can merit congruously for others whatever he can merit congruously for himself. Moreover, he can merit for another person the first actual grace which he cannot merit for himself.⁵

1. Lugo, *De Incarnatione* d.6 s.3 n.59; Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* d.89 s.1; Carlton, *De gratia* d.126 s.9 n.5.

2. D. Soto, *In 4 dist.* 14 q.2 a.6; Cano, *Relectio de poenitentia* p.1; Suarez, *De gratia* 12,28; Vázquez, *In 1.2* d.219 c.2; Pesch, *Praelectiones dogmaticae* 5,420-422; Tepe, *De gratia* 516-518; Wirceburgenses, *De gratia* 7,454-458.

3. Billuart, *De gratia* dis.8 a.5; Valencia, *In 1.2* d.8 q.6.

4. See Suarez, *De gratia* 12,38,7.

5. See S.Th. I-II, q. 114, a. 6; Suarez, *De gratia* 12,35,5.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE CONDITIONS OF MERIT

Beraza, 984-1014; Lange, 721-728.

345. Presupposing now on the part of God what we said in *Article I about the divine ordination and promise*, some conditions in order to properly merit concern the person meriting, and others concern the meritorious work itself.

1. On the part of the person meriting.

On the part of the meriting person, a twofold condition is required for any merit, whether it is condign or congruous, namely, that he be a *wayfarer* and that he *act freely*. Moreover, in order to merit condignly, it is required that he be a *just man* or in the state of sanctifying grace.

1) *A wayfarer*. Being on the way is during the time of life, until the moment of death. That the time for meriting is ended by death, or that retribution is given immediately after death are truths demonstrated in the treatise *On the Last Things*.¹ On can consult on this the Council of Lyons II (D 854-859) and the Constitution of Benedict XII (D 1000-1001).

2) *Freedom*. Freedom is required, not only from external force, but also from any necessity or intrinsic determination to one thing. The Church taught this when it condemned the third proposition of Jansen (D 2003); and it is easily proved from the sources of revelation and from the nature of the case.

3) *The state of grace*. That it is required for condign merit is clear from the words of Christ in John 15:4-5: *As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, unless it abides in the vine, neither can you unless you abide in me. I am the vine, you are the branches. He who abides in me, and I in him, he it is that bears much fruit, for apart from me you can do nothing.* Trent also clearly teaches the same thing, s.6 ch.16 (D 1546): "For Jesus Christ himself continuously infuses strength into the justified, as the head into the members, and the vine into the branches; this strength always precedes, accompanies, and follows their good works, which, without it, could in no way be pleasing to God and meritorious." Also Pius V *condemned* some propositions of de Bay that were opposed to this doctrine (D 1912-1918).

Therefore, sanctifying grace affects merit negatively, positively and effectively. For it affects it *negatively*, inasmuch as it removes sin which is

1. See SthS, 4,6, thesis 1.

an obstacle to eternal life; it affects it *positively*, inasmuch as it confers the dignity of being a child of God; finally, it affects it *effectively*, inasmuch as, with the help of the *virtues*, it produces salvific acts. Hence there arises an equality of proportion between the good works of the just and eternal life; for, grace is like a seed with respect to glory. But this is the reason why the state of grace is not required for congruous merit, namely, because merit of this kind does not have as its immediate object the reward of eternal life, but only other supernatural gifts.

2. On the part of the work done.

346. On the part of the work done, in order that it become meritorious congruously or condignly, two conditions are required: the *integrity* and the *supernaturality* of the work.

1) The *integrity*, or moral goodness, both from the object and from the end or intention of the agent. For, an evil work cannot be submissive to God and worthy of a reward. Trent refers to this condition when, after quoting the words of the Apostle in 1 Cor. 15:58 and Heb. 6:10 and 10:35, it goes on to say: "And eternal life should therefore be set before those who persevere in good works 'to the end' and who hope in God, both as a grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Jesus Christ and 'as a reward' that, according to the promise of God himself, will faithfully be given them for their good works and merits" (D 1545).

But what about indifferent works? Indifferent works, if they exist in particular cases, merit neither a reward nor a punishment

2) *Supernaturality*, in an entitative sense, inasmuch as the act is done from grace. For, since the act must have some proportion with the supernatural end, it follows that the act itself must be supernatural.

Further, it is not required that the act be *difficult*. For, the sources of revelation and the Magisterium attribute the power of meriting to all good acts of the just. Nor has it been demonstrated to be necessary that the work be referred to God, known by faith and loved for himself, *by an actual special intention*. Rather, they point in the opposite direction—both Holy Scripture when it promises eternal life because of various virtues (Matt. 5:3; 19:16; 25:34, etc.), and Trent, s.6 ch.16 (D 1545), which does not seem to demand anything else but that the work be good and supernatural.²

2. For more on this question see Beraza, 991-1001; Lange, 725ff.

ARTICLE V

ON THE REVIVAL OF MERITS

347. On the reviviscence of merits two points must be explained:

1) *The fact of revival*, that is, whether the condign merits of grace and glory, which the just man has lost through sin, revive or return, when the sinner is again justified by Penance.

2) *The grade or measure of this revival*, that is, whether they revive with regard to the whole reward, or whether they revive only partially.

The first point will be covered in the following thesis; we will consider the second point in the *scholium*.¹

Thesis 36. Deadened merits revive.

S.Th. III, q. 89, a. 5; Beraza, 1053ff.; Lercher-Lakner, 120f.

348. Definition of terms. *Merits*, means the condign merits of grace and glory. For these two, grace and glory, are related to each other, so that in this order of providence no one is accepted into glory without being intrinsically pleasing to God through the grace of justification.

Deadened, that is, those that have lost their power of bringing someone to eternal life because of mortal sin. For, by sin the grace of justification is lost, and it impedes the attainment of glory.

Therefore we are dealing with good works which were performed in the state of grace, and therefore were meritorious; but because of mortal sin they have lost the capacity of attaining the reward.

Revive, that is, they return again once the sin has been remitted by Penance, so that once again they have the power to bring one to eternal life.

Hence, our works are:

- a) *dead*: if they are done by a sinner;
- b) *living*: if they are done by a justified man;
- c) *deadened*: if they are done by a just man who later sinned mortally;
- d) *revived*: if they were deadened and then grace is restored.

349. Theological note. This doctrine is so *certain*, that it cannot

1. See Scotus, *Opus oxoniense* 4, d.22 q.unica, n.6-13; Suarez, *Relectio de meritis mortificatis et per paenitentiam reparatis* (ed. Vivès, 11,435-513); J. Scheller, *Wiederaufleben der durch eine Sünde ertöteten Verdienste*: ZkathTh 15 (1891) 19f.; I.B. Umberg, S.J., *Pius XI über das Wiederaufleben der Verdienste und der Gnade*: ZkathTh 10 (1925) 298-302; L. Teixidor, S.J., *De doctrina circa reviviscentiam meritorum maxime digna quae ab omnibus fidelibus cognoscatur*: AnalSacraTarrac 6 (1930) 7-34; R. Marino, S.J., *La reviviscenza dei meriti secondo la dottrina del Dottore Angelico*: Greg 13 (19320) 75-108.

be denied without temerity; this is clear from the common consent of theologians.²

350. Proof. 1) From *Trent*, s.6 ch.16 and cn.32 (D 1546, 1582), according to which “we must believe that nothing further is wanting to the justified for them to be regarded as having entirely fulfilled the divine law in their present condition by the works they have done in the sight of God; they can also be regarded as having truly merited eternal life, which they will obtain in due time, provided they die in the state of grace.” Therefore: “If anyone says... that by the good works he performs through the grace of God and the merits of Jesus Christ (of whom he is a living member), the justified man does not truly merit an increase of grace, eternal life, and (provided he dies in the state of grace), the attainment of this eternal life, as well as an increase of glory, let him be anathema.”

Hence, according to *Trent*, good works lead the justified man to eternal life, if they verify these three conditions: a) they are done by a justified man; b) they are supernatural (“done in the sight of God,” “through the grace of God and the merits of Jesus Christ”); c) the man dies in the state of grace. But these three conditions are found in the dead merits, once the sin has been forgiven, if a man dies in the state of grace. Therefore, according to *Trent*, dead merits revive.³

The major is certain from the quoted words.

The minor is clear from a consideration of the terms. *Trent* does not require that a man never lose grace; on the contrary, it requires nothing else but the three quoted conditions, which are also verified in one who sins, but, after his sin has been forgiven, he then dies in the state of grace.

2) From Pius XI, who openly teaches the doctrine of the revival of merits, and he does not restrict it to the Jubilee year: “For, all who with a repentant attitude fulfill the salutary ordinances of the Apostolic See in the course of the great Jubilee..., renew and receive that abundance of merits and gifts which they had lost by sinning...” (D 3670).

3) *From the concept of deadened merit as developed by St. Thomas*

2. See Suarez, *Relectio de meritis...* d.1 s.2 n.2 and 9; Lugo, *De paenitentia* d.10 s.1; Teixidor: *AnalSacra Tar-rac* 6 (1910) 9-10.

3. It seems that from the *fonts of revelation* that the thesis cannot be demonstrated in an efficacious way. For, a) the words of Ezekiel (18:21; 33:12) are not spoken about the recovery of goods which have been lost by sin; b) the texts of Paul in Gal. 3:4 and Heb.6:10, although they look at merits formerly acquired, it is not sufficiently evident that they should be interpreted about lapsed faithful; c) the parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11-32) shows that all the goods were restored that were lost by sin; but it is not certain that those goods were acquired by his own efforts. Therefore a firm argument cannot be drawn *from Holy Scripture*. Nor can it be drawn *from the writings of the Fathers*, v.gr., St. Jerome, Chrysostom, St. Epiphanius, since it seems that they cannot be understood in any way different from the parable of the prodigal son.

(III, q. 89, a. 5): Those works are not “conducive to eternal life..., only as actually existing, but also after they cease to exist actually, and as abiding in the Divine acceptance. Now, they abide thus, so far as they are concerned, even after they have been deadened by sin, because those works, according as they were done, will ever be acceptable to God... That they fail in their efficacy to bring the man, who did them, to eternal life, is due to the impediment of the supervening sin whereby he is become unworthy of eternal life. But this impediment is removed by Penance, inasmuch as sins are taken away thereby. Hence it follows that deeds previously deadened, recover, through Penance, their efficacy in bringing him, who did them, to eternal life, and, in other words, they are revived.”

However, it is necessary to acknowledge that this revival of merits is due to the divine mercy, because God mercifully leads the man to repentance, and he does not require perpetual perseverance in the state of grace as a condition of rewarding good works done in the past. At the same time it should be noted that revived merits are crowned with the same title of justice as if they had never died.

351. Scholium. *On the measure of revival.* Once we have demonstrated the fact of the revival of merits, there is a question about the measure or degree of this revival; namely, whether the penitent, having removed the obstacle by Penance, recovers his right to the total reward he had earned before his fall. There are *three opinions of theologians* on this point:

1) *The first opinion*, holds that the sinner, again justified by Penance, will not receive any other essential reward, except what is due to his conversion according to his present disposition. Thus this reward is given both under the title of his conversion and under the title of his previous merits. Báñez taught this and he says it was the opinion of the old authors up until the time of Francis Vitoria. Therefore Báñez, also acknowledging the harshness of his opinion, defends it with these words: “If a man dies immediately after the revival of his merits by penance, he will not receive a greater essential glory than what responds to the merit of his present disposition... But if he revives in a lesser disposition than he had formerly, he will receive his essential reward in a lesser quantity than he would have received, but he will receive it under more titles of more merits.”⁴

The second opinion, which many Thomists follow, teaches that the merits revive even to the essential reward, although not to the complete reward, but only to a reward proportionate to his disposition present at the time of his conversion. But this proportion is calculated differently by the

4. Báñez, *In 2.2 q.24 a.6 dub.6 concl.3*; Billot, *De sacramentis* 2 (Rome 1908) 111ff.

different authors.⁵

The third opinion, which we embrace as more probable, says that the deadened merits revive according to the whole reward, so that the penitent, if he should die immediately after his conversion, will receive from God, both the actual reward for his disposition at the time of conversion, and the whole reward which was owed to him because of the good works he did in the past. Those who defend this doctrine are: P. Lombard, Albert the Great, Scotus with the *Scotists*, Cano, Suarez, Vázquez, Lugo and generally the *theologians of the Society of Jesus*, *Salmanticenses*, etc.⁶

352. The opinion to be held. If these opinions are carefully examined, it is easy to see that *the first one* seems to deny the very fact of revival; that *the second one* preserves the fact, but arbitrarily restricts it without sufficient reason; and that *the third one* is more in harmony with the arguments presented in this thesis.

For, first of all, Trent does not place any restrictions; but, supposing those three conditions, it simply states that their reward is due to justified men. And this is confirmed by other words of Trent itself, s.6 ch.16 (D 1545): "Therefore, it is with this in mind that the men justified, *whether they have continuously kept the grace they have once received or have lost it and recovered it*, should be asked to consider the words of the Apostle: Abound in the good work of the Lord, knowing that in the Lord your labor is not in vain."

Moreover, *Pius XI* explicitly says those who perform the salutary works of the Jubilee, "*renew and receive that abundance* of merits and gifts which they had lost by sinning" (D 3670).

Finally, the very nature of revival demands the same thing. For, "the revival of merits" means that they recover their former efficacy, which was impeded by sin. But that original efficacy was to the whole reward. Therefore also the efficacy, which is restored by the revival, should be extended to the whole reward.

5. See, v.gr., D. Soto, *In 4 d.16 q.2 a.2* and 5; Gotti, *De paenitentia* q.3 dub.5; Alvarez, *De auxiliis* d.61 n.6; Ledesma, p.1 q.30 n.2; Valencia, *In 3 d.7 q.6* punct.1 and 3.

6. Lombard, *4 Sent* dist.14,1; Albert the Great, *In 4 d.14 a.21f.*; Scotus, *In 4 dist.22 a.2 n.9*; Cano, according to Báñez in the place cited; Suarez, *Relectio de meritis*; Vázquez, *In 1.2 d.221*; Lugo, *De paenitentia* d.11 s.2; Salmanticenses, tr.16 d.5 (on merit).

TREATISE IV

ON THE INFUSED VIRTUES

by
Joseph A. de Aldama, S.J.

Translated from Latin by
Kenneth Baker, S.J.

INTRODUCTION

We have seen in the treatise on grace that the justification of a sinner takes place by a true internal renewal and sanctification, which is caused in the soul by the supernatural gifts infused by God; namely, by the uncreated gift of the Holy Spirit, or of the whole indwelling Trinity, and by the created gift of sanctifying grace. This sanctifying grace is like a new nature, that is, a new ultimate and radical principle of the total supernatural life in the justified man. But as in the natural life faculties and powers are added to nature, which are proximate principles of vital operations, so also in the new supernatural life virtues are added to the sanctifying grace, which are the proximate principles of new supernatural operations.

Therefore the task before us now is to consider these virtues. First of all, we will consider the virtues in themselves, and then their acts. But once we have established the general treatise about the infused virtues, we will restrict our investigation regarding the acts of the virtues to the theological virtues, since they deserve a closer dogmatic consideration.

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BOOK I

ON THE INFUSED VIRTUES IN THEMSELVES

1. We will treat two questions especially: the first is the existence and nature of the virtues; the second is their increase and decrease. To that we will add a brief treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in general.

CHAPTER I

On the existence and nature of the infused virtues

Thesis 1. In justification the three theological virtues are infused; the moral virtues are also infused.

S.Th. I-II, q. 62, a. 1-3; q. 61, a. 2; Lennerz, 560-630; Beraza, 1-50.

2. Definition of terms. A *virtue* is defined as a good operative habit.

Explanation: a) A *habit* is a permanent quality, not easily moveable, by which the subject is well or badly disposed, either in reference to self or in reference to another. It is said to be: a quality (a certain accidental affection, by which someone exists in such a manner), permanent (thus it differs from an act, which is passing), not easily moveable (thus it differs from a disposition, which is easily moveable), well or badly (because a habit can be good, which is called a virtue, and bad, which is called a vice), to self or to another (because a habit can perfect immediately the subject himself, and is called an entitative habit, or immediately a power of the subject, and then it is called an operative habit).¹ On all of this, see I-II, q. 49.

b) *Operative*, that is, immediately affecting not the subject, but the active power as such, and therefore of its nature implying a relation to an act.

c) *Good*, that is, ordained to a morally good act.

3. Please note that in this definition it is necessary to distinguish what is traditional from those things that pertain to the further scholastic development. The idea of a certain permanent principle of good acts is entirely traditional concerning virtue. But the scientific notion of habit, which was borrowed from Aristotelianism, offers an excellent explanation

1. See M. Limbourg, *Vom Wesen des natürlichen und des übernatürlichen Habitus*: ZkathTh 9 (1895) 643-669.

of dogma, but it is distinguished from it. Those traditional elements are sufficiently apparent in the prior definitions of virtue. In this matter, *two historical tendencies* appear in Christian antiquity.

The first, which takes its origin from St. Augustine, is very well expressed in the definition of the Master of the Sentences: *a good quality of the mind, by which we live righteously, of which no one can make bad use, which God alone produces in us*. This definition, which is conflated from various texts of St. Augustine,² has remained in scholastic teaching. Thus Petrus Pictaviensis, Magister Martinus, Praepositinus and others, adopted it. For its explanation, consult St. Thomas I-II, q. 55, a. 4.

The second tendency, taking its origin from Aristotle through Boethius,³ is stated in this way by Abelard: *virtue is an excellent habit of the mind*.⁴ This definition, changed at times slightly (the habit of a well constituted mind, or of a well disposed mind), also remains among the scholastics. Algerus, Gandulphus, Alanus de Insulis, Simon Tornacensis, Rolandus Cremonensis make use of it.

Of these two definitions, the first one is concerned with the infused virtues and the second one with the acquired virtues.⁵ Both tendencies are neatly joined together by Gulielmus Altissiodorensis, St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas.⁶

4. Are infused, that is, they are produced immediately by God. By reason of this origin, the virtues are divided into *acquired* and *infused*. The former are acquired by the use of a power through the repetition of acts; the latter are produced only by a divine operation. But these are said to be *infused per se*, if they cannot be acquired in any other way; they are *infused per accidens* (accidentally), if, even though they can arise from the repetition of acts, they are infused de facto by God.

An acquired virtue from the way in which it occurs, that is, from a power, supposes the existence of the power; hence it does not give the possibility of acting, but only the facility of acting. *An infused virtue* gives the very possibility of acting, by elevating the natural power so that it can elicit entitatively supernatural acts, which it could not do by itself alone; theologians dispute whether it also gives facility of action. Hence an

2. *Sent.* 2 d.27 c.5. See St. Augustine, *De libero arbitrio* 2,18,50; 2,19; *Retractationes* 1.6: ML 32,1267.

3. *In Categorias Aristotelis* 3: ML 64,242.

4. *Dialogus inter philosophum iudaicum et christianum*: ML 178,1651.

5. On all of this, see O. Lottin, *Les premières définitions et classifications des vertus au Moyen Age*: RevScPhTh 18 (1929) 359-407: afterwards in *Psychologie et Morale aux XI^e et XIII^e siècles* (Louvain 1949) 3 n.11; A. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte der Frühscholastik* 1,1 (Regensburg 1952) 161-167. Briefly, A. Michel, *Vertu*: DTC 15,2748-2753.

6. St. Bonaventure, *In* 2 d.27 dub.3 (*Opera* 2,671f.); St. Thomas, I-II, q. 56.

acquired virtue and an infused virtue are not the same univocally. Both are a principle of operation, but an infused virtue is more like a power.

We say in the thesis that virtues are infused by God, that is, that there are such things as infused virtues per se. But we are saying that these virtues are infused at justification, that is, in connection with justification, prescinding in the meantime from a further disputed question which will be treated in a scholium.

5. Virtues by reason of their object are said to be *theological and moral*: according as they look to God himself (as the formal object or motive, and as the principal material object), or the created goodness of the act.

The *moral* virtues are restricted to the four *cardinal* virtues. On this division see St. Thomas I-II, q. 62, a. 2. Note however that a virtue is said to be moral also by opposition to an *intellectual* virtue, that is, by reason of the subject, which can be either the appetite or the intellect (see I-II, q. 58, a. 3).

The *theological* virtues are ordered directly to a supernatural end; the *moral* virtues are ordered directly to those things that pertain to the supernatural end.

We say therefore that those three entities or gifts, which in the sources of revelation are called faith, hope and charity, are infused by God; they are called theological virtues by theologians. We also say that other moral virtues are infused.

PART 1. THE THEOLOGICAL VIRTUES

6. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent*, s.6 ch.7 (D 1530): "God's love is poured... into the hearts of those who are being justified and inheres in them. Hence, in the very act of justification... man receives... the gifts of faith, hope and charity, all infused at the same time." There the Council is not speaking about acts, but about permanent entities, as is especially clear from the word "inhere," as it is expressly stated in the Acts of the Council.⁷ Therefore, according to this text, faith, hope and charity are infused in the act of justification as permanent gifts; charity is understood as not distinct from grace, since the Council did not wish to give any definition concerning this distinction. This applies also to canon 11 (D 1561).

Vatican Council I, s.3 ch.3 (D 3008) defines faith as a supernatural virtue. But it is speaking about the habit, not the act.⁸

7. See DTC 15,2763f.; Lennerz, 589-599, where the various schemas are quoted.

8. See CL, 7,178f. to the emendations of 58 and 60.

7. Further, note should be taken of the documents which deal with the *controversy about the infused virtues in children*. They are the following:

a) Innocent III, his letter to Humbert of Arles (D 780). Some of the Doctors at that time (beginning of the 13th century) held that the virtues are infused by Baptism also into children (there was no controversy concerning adults), although the children possessed them “as a habit, but not for use.” Actually this problem, which was raised in particular about faith because of its necessity, was solved by some of the theologians in the 12th century, as is reported by the Master of the Sentences, Radulphus Ardens and others.⁹ But after the letter of Innocent III, this solution became common among theologians during the whole 13th century.

b) *The Council of Vienne* (D 904) at the beginning of the 14th century. The infusion of the virtues, even in the Baptism of children, was accepted by the Council as the more probable opinion. This conciliar decision was passed because of a certain proposition, which was attributed to Peter John Olivi, namely: “in Baptism children receive neither grace nor the virtues.”¹⁰

8. Theological note. a) It is *defined divine and Catholic faith* that faith, hope and charity are infused as permanent gifts. b) It is *the common and best explanation of theologians* that they are infused as habits in the strict sense.

9. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) Faith, hope and charity form in Scripture *a certain unity* on which rests the whole Christian life: 1 Cor. 13:13: *faith, hope, love abide, these three*; 1 Thess. 1:3: *remembering... your work of faith* (that is, the exercise of faith by works), *and labor of love* (that is, of work done out of charity), *and steadfastness of hope* (that is, the patience with which hope is exercised); 1 Thess. 5:8: *put on the breastplate of faith and love, and for a helmet the hope of salvation*. (See also 2 Tim. 2:22; Col. 1:4f.; Eph. 1:15.18; Rom. 5:1-5; Gal. 5:5f.; Heb. 6:10-12; 10:22-24 (that is, with the counsel that we be stirred up to charity); 1 Pet. 1:3-8; Jude 20).

b) They are *permanent gifts* in Christians. Thus they are said to remain (1 Cor. 13:13), to form a quasi Christian armor in order to fight against the enemies of the supernatural life (1 Thess. 5:8), and to be the foundation of this whole way of life (Rom. 5:1-5; 1 Pet. 1:3-8).

c) They are *principles of good acts*, in which this life is exercised.

9. See a. Landgraf, *Dogmengeschichte* 1,1,202-219; *Kinderstaufe und Glaube in der Frühscholastik*: Greg 9 (1928) 337-372, 497-543.

10. F. Ehrle, *Zur Vorgeschichte des Konzils von Vienne*: ArchLittKirchMA 2 (1886) 369.395f.; E. Mueller, *Das Konzil von Vienne* (Münster 1934) 385; J. Leclercq, *Vienne (Concile de)*: DTC 15,2977f.

d) They are *infused* by God (Gal. 5:5), since they are intimately connected with the new life given by Christ to the faithful.

10. Proof from tradition. 1. The holy Fathers:

a) Number with the virtues: faith, hope and charity (R 72, 1216, 1469, 2324). St. Augustine wrote a book called, *Enchiridion de fide, spe et caritate*, which are “those three virtues by which we said that God must be worshipped.”¹¹

b) They understand these gifts as *permanent*: “The Holy Spirit according to certain virtues always remains in the hearts of the saints” (St. Gregory the Great: R 2324); “the enemy cannot take them away [i.e., faith, hope, charity] except with violence” (St. Augustine: R 1469).

c) These gifts are received by the faithful and *given by God* (R 1216, 1469).

11. 2. In early scholasticism there was a controversy about the infusion of the virtues in the Baptism of children. This controversy on the one hand supposed the already accepted teaching about the infusion of the virtues into adults, and on the other hand it more clearly developed the concept of virtue, until in the 13th century the opinion became common which held for the infusion of the virtues also in children.

3. *From the 13th century on* there is no doubt among theologians about the infusion of these virtues, which are now called *theological* (see D 1000-1001). The naming of the theological virtues does not seem to appear before Magister Martin and Stephen Langton. Before that they were called *catholic* (Peter Cantor), *principal* (Roland), *special* according to the theologians (Peter of Poitiers), etc.¹²

12. Theological reasoning. a) Because the tendency to the supernatural end is accomplished by human acts, it is necessary that there be in man corresponding supernatural principles; and it is necessary that they be permanent, because they pertain to a certain development of human life.

b) But these principles must be distinguished from sanctifying grace, which is more like a nature and ultimate, radical principle.

c) But the human powers that are elevated in this way are the intellect and will. Therefore in order to elevate the intellect *faith* is necessary. But because “two things pertain to the appetite, that is, movement to the end,

11. *Enchiridion* 6.8: ML 40,233.

12. See O. Lottin, *Les premières définitions et classifications des vertus au Moyen Age*: RevScPhTh 18 (1929) 374 in the note.

and conformity with the end by means of love. Hence there must needs be two theological virtues in the human appetite, namely, hope and charity” (I-II, q. 62, a. 3 ad 3).

PART 2. THE MORAL VIRTUES

13. Adversaries. Scotus and the *Scotists* in general, Durandus and Henry of Ghent and *Nominalists* deny infused moral virtues.¹³ Recently still P. De Vooght, O.S.B.¹⁴ and P. Lottin, O.S.B.¹⁵

Theological note. *More common and more probable.*

14. Proof 1. a) This opinion seems to be more in conformity with tradition. For, the *holy Fathers* speak about the four cardinal virtues (thus already St. Ambrose)¹⁶ in connection with the new Christian life, which is supernatural and brings one to a supernatural end. Thus St. Jerome calls them the four horses of Christ the charioteer and the ornament of the soul.¹⁷ St. Augustine says that they are given to us by God (R 1476), and that Christ dwelling in us uses them through faith (R 1849); Iulianus Pomerius calls them gifts of God, which are given to those who live from faith.¹⁸ St. Prosper proves against Cassian that the virtues are from God, and that they are not in sinners.¹⁹ St. Gregory the Great considers them along with the theological virtues as the foundation of the whole spiritual edifice.²⁰

b) At a later time the *controversy about the infusion of the virtues in children* seems to concern not only the theological, but also the moral virtues; such is the intention of the text of Innocent III, in which he speaks about faith, charity and the other virtues (D 780); this text is applied improperly to hope alone. Moreover, at this time the teaching about the infused moral virtues was considered so certain and traditional that there was not even any dispute about it.²¹

c) This tradition agrees very well with the way of speaking of St. Paul regarding the virtues of Christians (see Eph. 6:14f.; 2 Tim. 1:7) and of St. Peter (see 2 Pet. 1:3-8), and especially Wis. 8:7.

13. See Mastrius, *In 3 d. 7 q. 2.*

14. *Y a-t-il des vertus morales infuses?*: EphThLov 10 (1933) 232-242.

15. *Principes de Morale* 2,220-225.

16. *De Paradiso* 3,14,18: ML 14,280-282.

17. *Epist.* 52,14: ML 22,538.

18. *De vita contemplativa* 3,18,3: ML 59,507.

19. *Contra Collatorem* 13: ML 51,247-251.

20. *In Ezechielem* hom.10,17f.: ML 76,1067-1069.

21. See O. Lottin, *Principes de Morale* 2,215.

15. Proof 2. The ordination to the end and the means must to be of the same order. But the ordination to the supernatural end takes place through the infused theological virtues. Therefore also the ordination to the means must take place through the infused moral virtues (see I-II, q. 63, a. 3).²²

16. Objections. 1. Charity sufficiently directs all human acts to the supernatural end to obtain it in a supernatural way. Therefore it is not necessary to have other infused moral virtues. Therefore they do not exist.

I distinguish the antecedent. And so the acts of the moral virtues could take place absolutely, *conceded*; they could take place with the due proportion existing in the first reality (*in actu primo*), *denied*.

The supernatural order requires that it should be perfect in every way in its analogy to the natural order.

2. Sanctifying grace elevates all of our good acts to the supernatural end. Therefore new infused moral virtues are not required.

I distinguish the antecedent. It elevates them finally and radically by way of nature, *conceded*; it elevates them proximately and immediately, *denied*.

Note well in these supernatural realities that what *absolutely* could happen is not sought, but only what God *de facto* did.

17. Scholium 1. *On the moment of the infusion of the virtues.* a) In this matter some things are certain, others are disputed. *It is certain* that charity is never infused unless at the same time with the infusion of sanctifying grace, since between these two intimate gifts there is an unbreakable connection, which is founded on the nature of charity. *It is also certain* that the moral virtues are not infused before grace, because they are intimately connected with charity (I-II, q. 65, a. 1-3). *Finally, it is certain* that all the virtues are infused into children at the same time with grace.

However, *there is a dispute* about the first infusion of faith and hope in adults. Actually the question is not about the adult, who has already been justified and has lost grace and charity, but not faith and hope; rather, it is about the adult who has never been justified and therefore still has original sin. But the adult before justification must make supernatural acts of faith and hope (D 1526-1527). A similar case is present in the adult who has lost faith and hope, and then wants to be justified.

b) In this matter there are three *opinions* of theologians:

1. Faith and hope are infused into that adult before his justification, when he elicits an act of faith and hope. Thus Cajetan, Medina, Suarez, Valentia, Tanner, Salas, Coninck, Torres, Schiffini, Diekamp.

2. Faith and hope are always infused at justification itself, never before that. Thus the Master of the Sentences, St. Thomas (I-II, q. 64, a. 4), St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great, Scotus, Vega, Lugo, Ripalda, Mazzella, Lahousse, Pesch, Beraza, Billot, Lennerz, and others.

22. On this whole question see O. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles* 3 n.11.

3. A middle position. That is, although it generally agrees with the authors of the second opinion, still it admits of some exceptions, namely, the case of a baptized person with some obstacle, who without grace receives the character along with the habits of faith and hope. Thus Sotus, Aragón.

c) *The second opinion is more common and probable.* This is confirmed strongly by the words of the Council of Trent, s.6 ch.7 (D 1528f.). For, according to Trent, grace and the virtues are conferred at the same time on adults at their Baptism. But in the opposing opinion this would *never* take place. For, before justification they must have already elicited, according to Trent (D 1526), acts of faith and hope. Therefore at that moment they would always receive the habits. Therefore never together with grace in justification itself.²³

18. Scholium 2. *On the number of the virtues.* a) *Three theological virtues* are mentioned, as is sufficiently certain from the whole theological tradition based on Holy Scripture. From the same tradition it seems to be established that there are *only three* theological virtues. Some recent authors speak less aptly, when they include religion among the theological virtues. The reason for this is that religion does not have as its formal object or motive something uncreated and divine, but something created; that is, the goodness manifested in giving due worship to God (see II-II, q. 81, a. 5). There is no cogent reason to abandon the traditional position on this.

b) There are many *moral virtues*, but they are suitably reduced to the four cardinal virtues; they are enumerated not only in pagan philosophy, but in Holy Scripture (Wis. 8:7), in the holy Fathers and in the works of theology. But how the reduction of the other virtues to these four ought to be understood is explained by St. Thomas (I-II, q. 61, a. 3 and in II-II) when he treats each of the cardinal virtues.²⁴

19. Scholium 3. *On the facility for supernatural acts.* It is a quality of natural virtues that they confer a facility in operating. But when it comes to the infused virtues, theologians more commonly hold that these virtues give only the power of acting, but not facility in acting. This seems to be the case from experience itself.

On the other hand, it is also a *fact* of experience that justified persons have a true and better facility in performing supernatural acts when they often actually perform those acts. *Therefore what is the source of that facility?*

For the solution of this problem there is not just one opinion of the theologians. For, *some hold* that the facility is explained by transient divine helps, by which the exercise of the virtues becomes easier and more pleasant, because of the special providence of God concerning those justified. *Others explain the same point* by saying that God from the same special providence does not confer positive helps, but rather removes the impediments to the virtues. *Others claim* that a new supernatural habit is generated in the justified by a repetition of the supernatural acts which gives that facility.

23. See Michel, *Virtu*: DTC 15,2786f.

24. See O. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles* 3 n.11.

It seems to be more probable that the facility comes from a natural habit, which is generated in the just by the repetition of supernatural acts. Surely an act elicited by an infused virtue is not only supernatural, but it is also vital. In fact, inasmuch as it is vital, it does not differ from other vital acts that are natural. But natural vital acts have the power to generate in the power a habit with facility. Therefore the same power should be attributed also to vital supernatural acts. Therefore supernatural acts, elicited by an infused virtue, by their own repetition generate a new habit of facility. However this habit does not seem to be supernatural, but natural, since it arises from those acts not as they are supernatural, but as vital.

If this opinion is accepted, it also *explains very well* how, when an infused virtue has been lost by sin, the acquired facility to elicit those acts of virtue remains. For the natural habit generated by the repetition of supernatural acts is not lost.

However, an *objection* has been raised against the above solution: a habit generated by the repetition of acts ought to incline to acts that have the same formal object. But supernatural acts have a supernatural formal object. Therefore the habit generated by them also ought to have a supernatural object. Therefore it ought to be supernatural, not natural. *We respond*, according to the doctrine that will be explained later, by denying the supposition. For, natural and supernatural acts, although they are different entitatively, nevertheless do not differ necessarily in their formal object.²⁵

20. Scholium. 4. *On the middle of the virtues.* Aristotle defined a virtue as “an elective habit existing in the middle.”²⁶ But this concept of the middle in virtues appears also in the holy Fathers, v.gr., in Pseudo-Basil,²⁷ and was the source of the adage: “virtue stands in the middle.”

Therefore a virtue is said to constitute the middle, not because it necessarily exists between two bad extremes (for this is not always the case), but because its object is always between excess and defect in the matter about which the virtue is concerned. But the middle is understood not as *the middle of the matter* (which is true only in justice), but a *middle of reason*, that is, a middle that is recognized by right reason.

Therefore all moral virtues are said to stand in the middle, by their conformity to reason, which regulates and measures human acts.

I have been speaking about moral virtues, because the theological virtues do not stand in the middle. The reason for this is that in their matter it is impossible to sin by excess. And no objection should be raised about hope, in which it is possible to sin by presumption and despair. For, presumption is not an excess in hoping for what God has promised, but a vice in hoping for what he did not promise. Therefore, just as the middle pertains to the nature of a moral virtue, so the nature of a theological virtue is to adhere to God above all things (see I-II, q. 64).²⁸

25. See Beraza, 178-196; Michel, *Vertu*: DTC 15,2767f.; Lercher-Lakner, 133f.. Opposed to this, Mazzella, *De virtutibus infusis* 72-87.

26. *Ethica ad Nicomachum* 2,6.

27. Ps.Basil, *In Isaiam* 5,173: MG 30,410.

28. See Beraza, 89-103.

21. Scholium 5. *On formed and unformed virtues.* A virtue is said by theologians to be formed or unformed, according as it is or is not joined together with charity. For charity is the form of the virtues. That is not so because charity attributes to them the being of a virtue or the being of a supernatural virtue, but because it gives them the capability of performing acts meritorious of eternal life, by ordaining their acts to the last supernatural end. What the nature of this ordination ought to be is disputed by theologians. However, an actual or virtual ordination is not required, so that the acts of charity have an influence on the acts of the other virtues, but a habitual ordination is probably sufficient. For more on this question, see II-II, q. 23, a. 8.²⁹

29. See Pesch, 632-650; Beraza, 1260-1278; V. Urmanowicz, *De formatione virtutum a caritate seu de caritate qua forma virtutum secundum doctrinam S. Thomae Aquinatis* (Vilna 1931); E. Van Roey, *De caritate forma virtutum*: EphThLov I (1924) 43-65; R.M. Schultes, *De caritate ut forma virtutum*: DivThom (Pi) 31 (1928) 5-28; J. Farges and M. Viller, *La charité chez les Pères*: Dspir 2,537-564.

CHAPTER II

On the increase and decrease of infused virtues

Thesis 2. Infused virtues are increased intrinsically.

S.Th. I-II, q. 66, a. 1-2; Suarez, *De gratia* 11,8; Beraza, 111-130; Mazzella, 120-148.

22. Definition of terms. *They are increased*, that is, they become more intense, not in the area of quantity, but of quality.

Intrinsically. A twofold increase of virtues can be considered:

- a) *Extrinsic*, or external: that is, the virtue itself does not grow, but it reaches out to more material objects (extensive increase, or on the part of the object), or it acquires more facility and immobility in acting (perfective increase, or on the part of the subject).
- b) *Intrinsic*, or internal (intensive), or on the part of the virtue: that is, the virtue itself increases.

Therefore we defend the existence of the increase of the infused virtues, and indeed their intrinsic increase, while not saying anything for now about the nature of this increase.

23. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent*, s.6 ch.10 (D 1535), equates the increase of justice with the increase of faith, hope and charity. The justice spoken about is justification, which is treated in ch.7 (D 1528f.); hence here faith, hope and charity must be understood as virtues, not as acts.

Theological note.

- a) The increase of the theological virtues *seems to be a matter of divine and Catholic faith*, as we said when we were treating the existence of these virtues, for the reason is the same. But there are some authors who hold that it is only theologically certain.¹
- b) That the increase is intrinsic is *at least theologically certain*, since it seems that otherwise the words of the Council cannot be saved.
- c) That the same holds for the moral virtues is *more probable*.

24. Proof from Scripture. St. Paul speaks about the increase of faith (2 Cor. 10:15), hope (Rom. 15:13), charity (Phil. 4:9). But these texts can hardly be understood to be about acts, but they should be understood about the virtues themselves. Therefore the virtues are increased.

1. See M. Viller, *Accroissement des vertus*: DSpir 1,137f.

The minor: Because he is speaking about a certain permanent disposition in the progress of the spiritual life.

25. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers speak about spiritual progress in virtue (R 955); they describe the beginning of the virtues, progress and perfection (R 2328); they say that one is more holy than the other (v.gr., St. Augustine²); they explain that in heaven there are many mansions, which have been prepared for the virtues (v.gr., St. Augustine, St. Jerome³); they say that the saints can always increase (v.gr., St. Prosper⁴).

26. Theological reasoning. Sanctifying grace can increase through good works, and it does it intrinsically. But the same reason applies to the infused virtues. Therefore the infused virtues increase intrinsically.

The major: Thus, v.gr., in Trent, s.6 cn.24 (D 1574).

The minor: The virtues are given as a complement to grace as the proximate principles of good works.

27. Scholium 1. *On the nature of the increase of the virtues.* It is disputed among theologians how the virtues increase; this comes from a different way of conceiving the increase of habits in their metaphysics.

Some hold that the virtues increase by developing greater roots in the subject. For the whole being of a virtue, since it is an accident, is to inhere in another; hence its increase will be a greater inhesion. That is, the virtue reduces the power to more unity in operating, which of itself was open to more contrary forms. Therefore it subjects the power to itself, by determining it more to good acts. Therefore to increase in virtue is for the subject to participate more in the virtue. This generally is the Thomistic position.

Others hold that the virtues increase by the addition of grades or levels. That is, the virtue itself in its essence has a certain latitude, according to which it can inhere either according to its whole reality or according to a certain part of itself. These parts, certainly qualitative, are called grades. This is the position of St. Bonaventure, Scotus and most Jesuit theologians.

It is better to say that both solutions not only are not opposed to each other, but mutually complement each other, as Suarez said.⁵

28. Scholium 2. *On the cause of this increase.* This increase takes place both from the work produced and from the work of the agent. But when the question is raised about the increase from the work of the agent (*ex opere operantis*) there is a serious dispute of theologians in trying to explain it.

2. *In Ioannis Evangelium* 67,2: ML 35,1812.

3. *Adversus Iovinianum* 2,28: ML 23,324.

4. *Epigramma* 27: ML 51,507.

5. *Disputationes Metaphysicae* 46 s.3 p.3. There is more on these opinions in Urráburu, *Ontologia* 947-952.

The cause of this dispute seems to lie in the fact that the act of virtue can be considered in two ways with reference to its increase. In the first place, by reason of merit; for just as the act merits an increase of grace, so it also merits an increase of the virtue itself. Secondly, by reason of the physical disposition in the subject which brings it about that a new form (that is, a new grade of virtue) can be infused.

Therefore there are some authors for whom the consideration of merit prevails, or the moral disposition. They teach that through any meritorious act (whether it is more intense than the existing grade of virtue or more remiss) the virtue is increased, and it happens when the act is performed. Thus Suarez, Vázquez, Tanner, Arriaga, Becanus, Ripalda, Mastrius, Van Noort, Pesch, Mazzella, Beraza, Lange, and many others.

Other authors, for whom the consideration of the physical disposition prevails, distinguish a twofold series of acts: some more intense and some more remiss, depending on the virtue that preexists in the subject. Therefore the more intense act, they say, always produces an increase of the virtue when it is performed. But a remiss act, even though it merits an increase, still does not actually obtain it until a more intense act is made. Then the new increase of the virtue is due to the more intense act and to the preceding remiss acts under a twofold title. The basic reason for this opinion is that the disposition cannot be less than the form to which it is disposed. This is the position of St. Thomas and the Thomists generally.

But still there is a *question remaining that must be answered* by the authors just mentioned. For there can be a case in which the new act is not more intense, when however many remiss acts have been performed. These remiss acts merited an increase, which was not obtained because of a defect in the physical disposition. Then when will it be obtained? *Some respond* (Báñez, Sylvius, Contenson) that this increase *de facto* is not given, but that the glory corresponding to their grade of love when they die has the value of a twofold reward—both for it and for those remiss acts. *Others however* (John of St. Thomas, Salmanticenses) think that a more intense act of charity takes place after death, and the necessary disposition is thereby attained; but it happens in such a way that the act is only dispositive, but in no way meritorious.

Therefore it seems necessary to say with the authors of the first opinion: a) that the infused virtues are increased also by acts that are more remiss than the preexisting grade of the virtue; b) that this increase is not deferred, but is given in the same moment in which the act is performed.

This opinion *is proved* in both of its parts: a) The Council of Trent really affirms simply that the justified “by observing the commandments” increase in justice (D 1535), and it does not assign any other condition for the increase except that good works are done by him in union with the grace of Christ (D 1545-1547), or “through the grace of God and the merits of Jesus Christ (D 1582). But all of these points are present in the remiss works of the just. Therefore the virtues are increased also by remiss acts. b) God promised an increase of grace and the virtues, if the good works are done by a just man. But a conditioned divine promise must be fulfilled by the fact that the required condition is verified. Therefore when a good act is done, even a remiss one, then the increase is obtained immediately.

Note however that this increase of virtue does not take place in the way that an elicited act produces it by some physical efficacy. But the influence of the acts in the increase of the virtue should be understood as happening by way of moral causality, and also by meritorious causality, as seems sufficiently certain from the way in which Trent speaks. And we understand this to be condign merit, not just the congruous type.⁶

29. Scholium 3. *On the connection between the increase of virtues and the increase of grace.* There is not just one opinion of theologians on this.

The first one holds that the virtues are increased together with grace, so that when grace increases, they increase; but if grace does not increase, or is absent, they do not increase. Thus Ripalda, Mazzella, Lahousse, Pesch, Beraza, Lennerz.

The second one holds that the virtues are increased together with grace, if grace is present; but if grace is absent, the virtues increase through their own acts. Thus Báñez, Suarez, Valentia, Tanner, Coninck, Hurtado, Schiffini.

The third one holds that the virtues of faith and hope are increased only by their own acts. Thus Vitoria, Soto, Aragón, Vázquez, Torres.

The first opinion seems to be altogether more probable and the one that should be held. For the Council of Trent seems to equate the increase of justification with an increase of the infused virtues. Therefore when grace increases, the virtues also increase; but if grace does not increase, or is absent, then it is necessary to say that the virtues do not increase.⁷

30. Scholium 4. *On the decrease of the virtues.* As we made a distinction in the thesis between an intrinsic and extrinsic increase, so likewise the same must be said about the decrease of the virtues.

An extrinsic decrease, or an improper one, is a remission of facility in acting and of the actual strength of the virtue. It is a fact of experience that there is such a decrease. It is caused by venial sins: because someone who "accustoms his will not to be subject to the due order in lesser matters, is disposed not to subject his will even to the order of the last end" (I-II, q. 88, a. 3). It is also caused by a cessation from the exercise of the acts of that virtue; since that facility, from what has been said, arises from a natural habit, but natural habits are always diminished and even corrupted by a cessation from their acts (II-II, q. 24, a. 10; I-II, q. 53, a. 3). Hence it is that on the one hand the Fathers and ascetical doctors exhort the faithful to avoid venial sins, lest they fall into mortal sins; and on the other hand, they urge the exercise of all the virtues in order that their perfection and that of charity be obtained.

An intrinsic decrease, or proper one, is had when the intensity of the habit of virtue is remitted, or its internal increase is removed. This situation, from its own concept, is not repugnant. But it cannot be caused except by God, since it pertains to habits infused by God alone; therefore they depend on God alone for their being, increase and

6. See Th. Deman, *L'accroissement des vertus dans saint Thomas et dans l'Ecole Thomiste*: DSpir I, 138-156; F. de Lanversin, *Accroissement des vertus d'après Suarez*: DSpir I, 156-166; Mazzella, 149-182.

7. See Beraza, 123-130; Lennerz, 639f.

decrease. Therefore this whole question is reduced to this: whether there is a cause on the part of man because of which God sometimes makes the habit of virtue more remiss. And of course the one cause that can do it is man's sin. This sin can be understood as either mortal or venial. But God does not diminish the infused virtues because of either sin. Not by mortal sin: by such sin charity is not diminished, it is destroyed (as also the infused moral virtues); but faith and hope are also destroyed, if there is a sin of infidelity or despair. Therefore the only question is this: whether because of other sins, beside infidelity and despair, God diminishes the habits of faith and hope. But this does not happen. For if those sins could diminish these virtues, they could also destroy them; since the internal perfection of those virtues is finite, therefore by the many sins diminishing them, eventually it would come to an end. This final argument is equally valid for venial sin. Therefore there is no reason located in sin because of which God would make the habits of those virtues more remiss.

This is the common and certain opinion of theologians, contrary to Dionysius the Carthusian who thinks otherwise about venial sins.⁸

31. Scholium 5. *On the duration of the virtues.* The question about the duration of the virtues is answered in different ways, according as it concerns this life or the next life.

a) *As a wayfarer.* Because the infused virtues are produced immediately only by God, they can be destroyed only by Him. But he will not destroy them, unless an impediment to them is caused by man. This impediment is mortal sin, but it does not act the same way for all the virtues.

Charity is lost by any mortal sin. For by every mortal sin the grace of justification is lost (D 1544, 1577). But charity is joined very closely with this grace, so that together they stand and together they fall. Therefore charity is lost by every mortal sin. The minor is conceded by all theologians, although not all of them explain the nature of that connection in the same way. We are not concerned about the question of a real distinction or no distinction between grace and charity, or the question about a possible separation of one from the other through the absolute power of God; our only concern is the fact that they are not separated.

The infused moral virtues are also lost because of any mortal sin, because they have a similar connection with grace. The reason for that connection seems to be that the moral virtues are given as the means by which man can tend to his last supernatural end; however this tendency is impossible without grace and charity. See I-II, q. 65, a. 2f.

Faith is lost by the sin of infidelity, as is taught by Trent (D 1544); but not by any other mortal sin, as is defined by the same Council (D 1544, 1578). Therefore the state of sin can exist together with the habit of faith. This habit, in the thinking of Trent, must be understood as the very same habit that was present before sin, and it "remains" in the sinner.⁹ Hence a further question asked by theologians is: what is the connection of the habit of faith with grace? In this matter it is better to say the connection of grace with all

8. See Lennerz, 642ff.; Mazzella, 242-256.

9. See Lennerz, 651.

the other virtues, including faith and hope, pertains to the nature of the case. For there is a certain special ordination of God according to which the virtue of faith remains in the sinner, unless he has sinned by a sin of infidelity. Thus it happens, when a seed of supernatural life remains in the sinner, that he can more easily be converted to God again. The same principle, with due proportion, pertains also to the virtue of hope.

Hope is not lost by just any mortal sin. With reasoning similar to the situation with faith, this is commonly held by theologians. But it is lost by a sin of despair, which is directly opposed to hope. It is also lost by a sin of infidelity, because by it faith is lost, which is the necessary foundation for hope. Whether it is also lost by a sin of presumption is disputed by theologians, and the best answer to this is that it is not lost. For, presumption per se is not directly opposed to hope, but it is opposed to the due and ordered way of hoping.¹⁰

b) *In the next life*. It is clear that the habit of charity remains in the *blessed*, for heavenly life is especially a life of charity. In contrast, that the habit of faith does not remain in them is a very common opinion of theologians. For, it would be useless, since it could not perform any acts—certainly with regard to the principal object, and probably also with regard to the secondary object. It is necessary to say the same thing about the habit of hope, in the proper sense, which is directed to a good object, absent, possible, but difficult. But if some theologians oppose acts of love elicited by the blessed to concupiscence towards God, it is necessary to say that the act of hope is not pure love of concupiscence, but a confident desire, as we will see later, and that those acts are elicited more probably by the habit of charity.¹¹

In the damned no infused virtues remain, which would be wholly useless. But they all remain *in the souls of those detained in purgatory*.¹²

10. See Lennerz, 646-660; Mazzella, 183-241.

11. See Michel, *Gloire*: DTC 4, 1422ff.

12. See Lennerz, 661-669.

CHAPTER III

On the gifts of the Holy Spirit

Thesis 3. The gifts of the Holy Spirit are also infused to help the virtues, namely, the seven habits that are really distinct from the virtues.

S.Th. I-II, q. 68; J.A. de Aldama, *Los dones del Espiritu Santo. Problemas y controversias en la actual teologia de los dones*: RevEspT 9 (1949) 3-30.

32. *The gifts of the Holy Spirit* are said to be *in general* all the created gifts which are infused in justification. Thus, v.gr., the Council of Trent, s.6 ch.7 (D 1528) speaks about the voluntary reception of grace and the gifts.¹ But *in particular and in the proper sense* the gifts of the Holy Spirit are called those that are enumerated under the name of “spirit” in Isa. 11:2, where he is speaking about Christ. In the thesis we are considering these and we affirm:

- a) The existence of the gifts in the faithful.
- b) Their physical and permanent entity.
- c) Seven as the number of gifts.
- d) Their real distinction from the virtues.

PART 1. THE GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT EXIST IN THE FAITHFUL

33. Definition of terms. *In the faithful*, that is, in those who are justified, prescinding now from the moment in which they are infused.

The gifts exist, that is, as something at least logically distinct from the virtues.

Theological note. As it is formulated, it is necessary to say that the thesis is *a matter of divine and Catholic faith*; this is sufficiently affirmed in the liturgy and in the ordinary magisterium, as we shall see.

34. Proof from Holy Scripture. Isa. 11:2. This text is about the Messiah. But from Christian antiquity this text has been joined together

1. See J.A. de Aldama, ¿Habló el Concilio Tridentino de los dones del Espiritu Santo?: EstEcl 20 (1946) 241-244.

with the sanctification of the faithful by the Sevenfold Spirit.²

It is said by some that the text is to be understood about the faithful in a consequent sense³; but it is better said to be understood in the fuller sense (*in sensu pleniori*), inasmuch as on the one hand there the great abundance of supernatural riches is described which will come to the Messiah, but on the other hand it is certain from Scripture that the Messiah is in the supernatural life the vine of the branches and the head of the members, from whose fullness we have all received.

35. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers* often speak about “the sevenfold Spirit,” “the sevenfold power of the Holy Spirit,” “the sevenfold office,” “the sevenfold gift of the Spirit,” “the sevenfold grace of the Spirit,” “the week of the Holy Spirit,” “the power of the sevenfold grace of the Holy Spirit,” and they use other similar expressions.⁴

b) This doctrine of the holy Fathers was developed by *the theologians* during the 12th and 13th centuries, and entered in a definitive way into theology by the work of St. Thomas, St. Albert the Great and St. Bonaventure.⁵

c) The holy *liturgy* often speaks about “the sevenfold Spirit” and about “the holy sevenfold gift,” which teaches the faithful to ask God for help.

d) The *Catechisms* commonly speak about the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. It will be found in the Catechisms of St. Peter Canisius, St. Robert Bellarmine, P. Ripalda, P. Astete, St. Pius X, Cardinal Gasparri, and others.

e) Leo XIII openly teaches the existence of the gifts: “More than this, the just man, that is to say he who lives the life of divine grace, and acts by the fitting virtues as by means of faculties, has need of those seven *gifts* which are properly attributed to the Holy Ghost.”⁶

2. See J. Touzard, *Isaiae 11,2-3 et les dons du Saint-Esprit*: RevBibl 8 (1899) 240-266; A. Mitterer, *Die sieben Gaben des hl. Geistes nach der Väterlehre*: ZkathTh 49 (1925) 529-566; K. Schluetz, *Isaia 11,2 in der ersten vier christlichen Jahrhunderten* (Munich 1923); J. De Blic, *Pour l'histoire des dons du Saint-Esprit avant Thomas*: RevAscMyst 22 (1946) 117-180, which seems to be too negative.

3. See A. Vaccari, *Spiritus septiformis ex Isaia 11,2*: VerDom 11 (1931) 133.

4. See Mitterer, *loc.cit.*; C. van Lierde, *Doctrina S. Augustini circa dona Spiritus Sancti ex textu Isaiae 11,3* (Würzburg 1945); F.F. Wetshoff, *Die Lehre Gregors des Grossen über die Gaben des hl. Geistes* (Münster 1940).

5. See B. Lavaud, *Les dons du Saint-Esprit d'après Albert-le-Grand*: RevThom 36 (1931) 386-389; J. Bonnefoy, *Le Saint Esprit et ses dons selon saint Bonaventure* (Paris 1929); I. Omaecheverría, *Teologia mistica de S. Buenaventura* (Obras de San Buenaventura, ed. B.A.C.) 4,29-41; O. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale* 3,327-456. On St. Thomas see what it cited below.

6. Encyclical “*Divinum illud munus*”: ASS 29,654. There is a dispute about the value of this document. Doubtless it is not a question of a definition *ex cathedra*, as Paquet seems to suppose, *Disputationes theologicae. De reparatione* (Quebec 1921) 420f.; and it is not merely an exhortatory document, as de Blic, among others, holds, *loc.cit.*, 179. It is better to say with P. de Guibert (*Les dons du Saint-Esprit. La question théologique*: RevAscMyst 14 [1933] 14), that the encyclical contains a true exercise of the ordinary magisterium of the Supreme Pontiff, since his intention is “that faith may be aroused in your minds... and that piety may increase and be inflamed” (ASS 29,645).

PART 2. THE GIFTS ARE HABITS

36. Definition of terms. We understand *habit* here at least in the broad sense; that is, they are non-transient physical entities, as acts are, but permanent. But that they are habits in the strict sense is the best theological explanation of them.

Theological note. *Certain in theology.*

37. Proof from the consensus of theologians. Although at the beginning of scholastic theology there were some vacillations about this matter, still as soon as the theological elaboration of the gifts took place, the gifts were considered as principles of acts—in one way or another connected with the virtues. However this is true not only for those who admitted only a logical distinction between the gifts and the virtues, but also for others who, defending a real distinction, were investigating especially the formal nature of this distinction. In this consensus of theologians no exception should be made for Vázquez, as some did. For his opinion holds (but with some doubts) that the gifts are not habits different from the virtues, but that the virtues elicit them as special acts.⁷

PART 3. THERE ARE SEVEN GIFTS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

38. Definition of terms. We say that there are *seven* gifts—no more and no less.

Adversaries. Many theologians have said that the number seven should not be taken in the strict sense. This is so either because it signifies only a fullness (as v.gr., Alipide, Estius,⁸ and others), or because it is only a good schema for comprehending all the impulses of the Holy Spirit (as De Guibert seems to think),⁹ or because the whole notion of “seven” is based on numeric symbolism.¹⁰

Theological note. *More probable.*

7. In 1.2 d.89 c.2.

8. Alipide, *In Isaiam* 11,2; Estius, *In 3 d.34*,1.

9. *Les dons du Saint-Esprit. La question théologique*: RevAscMyst 14 (1933) 15f.

10. On this symbolism, see Schluetz, *loc.cit.*, 54-81. That the number of gifts was used by the holy Fathers independently of and before this symbolism is certain from the work of Schluetz, 157ff.

39. Proof. That the number of gifts is seven a) is founded on holy Scripture, b) it cannot be understood as a mere schema for a good classification, c) and in the strict sense it can be accepted, even though it does signify a fullness. Therefore it ought to be accepted in the strict sense.

The antecedent: There is much dispute about the number seven in Isa. 11:2. For although in that text seven gifts appear in the Septuagint version and in all the others, still there are only six in the Masoretic text, in which the *fear of God* is repeated twice.¹¹ This problem was already raised in the 16th to 17th centuries. It has been said that the number of seven gifts in the holy Fathers depends solely on the Septuagint version, without any foundation in the original Hebrew text.¹² This point cannot be correct. For the Syrian church, as is certain from St. Ephraem and Aphraates,¹³ speaks about the seven gifts. But since it uses a version independent of the Septuagint, it is necessary to conclude that a tradition existed, which joined the number “seven” with Isa. 11:2, and which was independent of that Greek version.

That being the case, various explanations have been attempted in order to find the number seven also in the Hebrew text. Thus for some the same Hebrew word (נָחַם) was used in a double sense, that is, for piety and for the fear of God (thus, v.gr., Estius, Tanner, G. Alvarez; recently Knabenbauer,¹⁴ and others). For others, the Masoretic text would have to be corrected (thus Leo de Castro, and recently Linder,¹⁵ and others).

Vaccari, following the steps of the Syrian Fathers, studied this matter intensely and worked out a solution, which seems to be strongly recommended. On the one hand assuming the fact, which we have mentioned, namely, that the number “seven” has traditionally been associated with the text of Isaiah; and on the other hand, that it is very improbable that the prophet, wishing to affirm the fullness, said that there are only six and not seven gifts (since the number seven to express fullness, especially regarding holy things, is common in biblical use): in Isa. 11:2 a distinction is made, in addition to the three pairs of gifts (wisdom and understanding, counsel and fortitude, knowledge and piety), between those and the quasi fundamental gift which at the beginning is expressed with the words: “the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him.” It is almost like the candelabrum of the sanctuary supporting *seven lamps* (the number here is stressed very much), which was only one shaft from which three double

11. See Schluetz, 2-18.

12. See Ceuppens, *De donis Spiritus Sancti apud Isaiam*: Ang 5 (1928) 587.

13. *Aphrahat's des persischen Weisen Homilien* (trad. G. Bert), in TU 3,3-4. See homil. par.8 page 8: “...except the Spirit of God, who descended upon Christ with his *seven* gifts? As the prophet Isaiah says....”

14. *Commentarius in Isaiam Prophetam* (Paris 193) 301.

15. In ZkathTh 57 (19330 444f.

branches protruded. (See Exod. 25:31-37; 37:17-23.¹⁶

Therefore it is necessary to conclude that the number “seven” more probably pertains to the original text of Isaiah.

b) The number seven *is not an apt schema* of classification, as the Decalogue is for the divine commandments. The disparity is very great, since in the Decalogue the concern is with logical propositions, logically arranged and classified. But in the gifts we are dealing with physical entities, really distinct and designated with their own names.

c) It is no obstacle that the number seven signifies a *fullness*. For this fullness can be understood in two ways: either so that “the seven gifts” signify all the gifts without actually saying anything about the number itself, or so that “the seven gifts” signify all the gifts that exist, as if whatever could be conceived to be gifts of the Holy Spirit are summarized in those seven headings. Thus it can be said that the seven sacraments contain the fullness of graces that God confers by the work done (*ex opere operato*), without denying the strict number of only seven sacraments.

St. Thomas explains the number of gifts in I-II, q. 68, a. 4.¹⁷

PART 4. THE GIFTS ARE REALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE VIRTUES

40. Definition of terms. The problem of the distinction of the gifts from the virtues is classic in the theology of the gifts. Here is a brief history of the various opinions:

a) In the 12th century the logical distinction was dominant. Thus Hugo of St. Victor, as it seems, the Master of the Sentences, Gundulphus Bononiensis, Petrus Pictaviensis, Praepositinus, Godofridus Pictaviensis, Gulielmus Parisiensis. However a real distinction is affirmed by the *Summa Sententiarum*, John of Salisbury, Stephen Langton, and especially by Philippo Cancellario.¹⁸

b) In the 13th and 14th centuries the real distinction prevailed completely in the *Summa* of Alexander of Hales, St. Albert the Great, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, Henry of Ghent, Richard of Mediavilla, etc. But Scotus again defended the logical distinction; Durandus thought that the real distinction was not sufficiently proved. Later the *Nominalists* also denied the real

16. A. Vaccari, *Spiritus septiformis ex Isaia 11,2*: VerDom 11 (1931) 131-133.

17. See also John of St. Thomas, *In 1.2 d.18 a.7 n.1-XXIX*.

18. See Lotin, *Les dons du Saint-Esprit chez les théologiens depuis P. Lombard jusqu'à Saint Thomas d'Aquin*: RechThAncMéd 1 (1929) 41-97; *Les classifications des dons du Saint-Esprit au XII^e et au XIII^e siècles*: RevAscMyst 11 (1930) 269-285; M. Caliero, *I doni dello Spirito Santo secondo San Bernardo*: DivThom (Pi) 57-59 (1944046) 267-290.

distinction.¹⁹

c) In the 16th and 17th centuries this question was debated by the theologians; the *Scotists* and some others denied the real distinction, but it was affirmed by far the larger number of theologians.²⁰

d) Recently those holding the real distinction are Beraza, Lange, Lercher, Muncunill, Billot, Van der Meersch and many others²¹; but some deny it, among whom are Pesch, Lottin, and others.²²

41. Theological note. *More common and more probable.*

Proof. If the early theological tradition is considered, the gifts are added to the virtues in order to remedy their imperfection. But this proves that the gifts are really distinct from the virtues. Therefore the gifts really differ from the virtues.

The major: In the theological tradition up to St. Thomas there is constant progress in the formulas with which theologians attempt to explain the relation between the gifts and the virtues;

1) The gifts are given *as a help for the virtues*.

2) The help, which the gifts give to the virtues, is in the fact that the gifts are given *for the performance of loftier acts*.

3) The acts of the gifts are loftier than the acts of the virtues, *by reason of the way* in which they take place.

4) The way is different because the gifts help man to act in a way that is *beyond the human way*.

5) But this supra-human way consists in the fact that with the gifts man

19. See K. Boeckl, *Die sieben Gaben des hl. Geistes in ihrer Bedeutung für die Mystik nach der Theologie des 13 und 14 Jahrhunderts* (Freiburg 1931); Th. Abril, *Die Gaben des hl. Geistes in der Mystik des Johannes Taulers*; ZascMyst 2 (1927) 254-264. See also what is cited in note 5. For St. Thomas, see O. Lottin, *Psychologie et Morale aux XII^e et XIII^e siècles* 3 n.16; P. Olcese, *De donis Sancti Spiritus iuxta mentem Aquinatis* (Genoa 1904); I. Ude, *De organismo septem donorum Spiritus Sancti secundum mentem S. Thomae*; CiencTom 38 (1928, II) 289-299.

20. See J.A. de Aldama, *La distinción entre las virtudes y dones del Espiritu Santo en los siglos XVI y XVII*; Greg 16 (1935) 562-576.

21. See Beraza, *De gratia* 916-922; H.Lange, *De gratia* 460; L. Lercher, *Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae* 1st ed., 4,149; 2nd ed., 4,177; J. Muncunill, *De gratia* 746f.; L. Billot, *De virtutibus infusis* 155; J. Van Meersch, *Tractatus de divina gratia* 249.

22. See Pesch, *Praelectiones dogmaticae* 8,114; O. Lottin, *Principes de Morale* 2,236-240.

is *easily moved* by the divine inspiration.²³

However this last formula, which is introduced by St. Thomas, remained in theology in one way or another, so that it is used by Leo XIII himself: "By means of them (the gifts) the soul is furnished and strengthened so as to obey more easily and promptly his voice and impulse."²⁴

Indeed in all of this the attempt is apparent to supply through the gifts for what is imperfect in the virtues.²⁵

42. Scholium 1. *On the formal effect of the gifts.* When man is said to become docile through the gifts so that he can be led by the Spirit, the action alone of the Holy Spirit is not understood, but His regulation of human acts. For, their rule is reason, which is perfected by supernatural prudence, so that it can be the norm of actions in the supernatural order. But in order that the appetitive powers might become docile to this direction of reason, they are perfected supernaturally by the moral virtues (not by the intellectual virtues). Furthermore there is given in the supernatural order a higher rule of our acts, which is the indwelling Holy Spirit, with whom we are joined by the theological virtues, but especially by charity. Therefore in order that all the powers of the soul, appetitive and rational, may be promptly obedient to this higher rule (not in a transient but in a permanent way), new habits are given, namely, the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

Hence it is also evident that these gifts are operative habits in contrast to the entitative habits, because they perfect the faculties immediately with reference to activity. But it is also clear that they have the nature of a certain passivity, inasmuch as they render the faculties more accommodated to the superior action of the Holy Spirit. See I-II, q. 68, a. 8.

43. Scholium 2. *On the moment of the infusion of the gifts.* The gifts are connected with charity and therefore they are infused at justification. This opinion of St. Thomas (I-II, q. 68, a. 5) and of all theologians should not be abandoned because in Confirmation the sevenfold Spirit is expressly invoked to descend on those being confirmed. For this prayer is found often elsewhere in the Liturgy, v.gr., in the ordination of a priest, and even in that of a subdeacon.²⁶

23. For the explanation of St. Thomas's formula, see J. de Guibert, *Dons du Saint-Esprit et mode d'agir "ultra humain" d'après Saint Thomas*: RevAscMyst 3 (1922) 394-411, finally edited in *Les doublets de Saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Paris 1926) 1001-25; in opposition, R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Le mode suprahumain des dons du Saint-Esprit*: VieSpir 8 (1922) 124-136, finally edited in *Perfection chrétienne et contemplation* 2,45-67. See also Gabriel de S.M. Magdalena, *Le "double mode" des dons du Saint-Esprit*: EtCarm 19 (1934) 215-232. Now a new investigation of St. Thomas's formulas has been instituted by A. San Cristóbal-Sebastián, *Las dos exposiciones de Santo Tomás de Aquino acerca de los dones del Espíritu Santo*: RevEspT 12 (1952) 339-371.

24. Encyclical "*Divinum illud munus*": ASS 29,654.

25. For the explanation of these imperfections, see I. Menéndez-Reigada, *Necesidad de los dones del Espíritu Santo*: CiencTom 59 (1940) 262-284.

26. See J.B. Umberg, *Confirmatione baptismus perficitur*: EphThLov 1 (1924) 514-517, who thinks that the gifts are infused in Confirmation, but not in Baptism.

44. Scholium 3. *On the necessity of the gifts.* It is clear that the gifts are necessary so that the supernatural organism can be perfect from the fact that their existence has been proved. But it is disputed by theologians whether the actuation of the gifts is necessary in every meritorious act because of the text of St. Thomas in I-II, q. 68, a. 2.²⁷ In this matter it is better to say that the actuation of the gifts is not necessary in every good act, but only in perfect acts.²⁸

45. Scholium 4. *On the special relation between the individual gifts and the virtues.* We have said, along with the traditional teaching of theologians, that the gifts are infused in order to remove the connatural imperfection of the virtues, and also of the supernatural ones. Hence it is that a gift is given for each of the virtues. St. Thomas explains this relation in the following way:

- 1) To the virtue of *faith* the gift of *understanding* and the gift of *knowledge* correspond (II-II, q. 8 and 9).
- 2) To the virtue of *hope* the gift of *fear* corresponds (II-II, q. 19).
- 3) To the virtue of *charity* the gift of *wisdom* corresponds (II-II, q. 45).
- 4) To the virtue of *prudence* the gift of *counsel* corresponds (II-II, q. 52).
- 5) To the virtue of *justice* the gift of *piety* corresponds (II-II, q. 121).
- 6) To the virtue of *fortitude* the gift of *fortitude* corresponds (II-II, q. 123).
- 7) To the virtue of *temperance* he assigns no corresponding gift in II-II; but see I-II, q. 68, a. 4.

27. See Gardeil, *Dons du Saint-Esprit*: DTC 4,1779f; I. Menéndez-Reigada, *Necesidad de los dones del Espíritu Santo*: CiencTom 59 (1940) 257-284, 505528; 60 (1941) 5-34; A. Gazana, *Sulla necessità dei doni della Spirito Santo per tutti gli atti sopranaturali del giusto*: Greg 22 (1941) 215-230; M. Ferrero, *Naturaleza de los dones*: RevEspT 5 (1945) 582-590.

28. For a brief treatment of each gift, see Lercher-Lakner, 4,1,179.

B O O K I I

O N F A I T H

What should be treated in particular concerning the virtue of faith will be sufficiently clear from what we have to say about the act of faith. In order to investigate the act of faith in a theological way, we will follow mainly Vatican Council I, s.3 ch.3, in which, although not everything is contained that pertains to the whole theological treatise, certainly the main points are present, and we will complete them from other documents of the Church in the proper places.

C H A P T E R I

On the nature of the act of faith

46. *Assent because of the authority of God revealing* is taught by Vatican I as the main element in describing the nature of the act of faith. On the one hand, this essential element involves an act of the intellect, as the Catholic Church has always held, and on the other hand it involves *consequences* for better determining the nature of faith itself. But since the act of faith concerns our tendency to a supernatural end, it must be supernatural. This gives us our opening to begin an analysis of the act of faith.

A R T I C L E I

ASSENT BECAUSE OF AUTHORITY

Thesis 4. The act of faith is an act of the assenting intellect.

S.Th. II-II, q. 4, a. 1-2; q. 2, a. 1; Lennerz, 106-116, 141-143; Pesch, 124-135.

47. Definition of terms. The act of faith, as we shall see, is an act which is psychologically complex in which both intellect and will have their own part. In the thesis, therefore, we affirm that the act is elicited by the intellect, that is, by the superior knowing faculty (not by the will, nor by some religious sense); we prescind now from the further question of the possible influence of the other faculties in positing this intellectual act. De facto that act, elicited by the intellect, essentially must be commanded by the free will.

48. *The assenting intellect.* The intellect tends towards the truth in two ways. *The first way* is by apprehending something true, whether this apprehension is simple (if its object is only one idea), or it is judging and comparing (if two ideas are its object, whose identity or diversity is perceived). *The second way* is by assenting to or affirming the conformity or non-conformity between the object and the predicate. Therefore we say that the act of faith is not formally an act of apprehending or perceiving some truth, but an act of judging that it is true (of course, after it has understood the meaning of the terms).

49. The *faith*, which we are considering, is the faith to which justification is attributed in revelation; not of course to it alone, but according as it is the foundation and root of the whole supernatural, religious life. For it should not be denied that in the sources of revelation the word “faith” is also used in other senses, v.gr., for the faith of miracles (Matt. 17:20), or for the conscience (Rom. 14:22).

50. Adversaries. 1. *Protestants.* Three periods must be distinguished in the Protestant evolution of the concept of faith:

a) *Old Protestants.* For them justification is nothing but a subjective fiducial appropriation, which a man makes for himself of the justice of Christ. They call this faith fiducial and special. It is confidence (therefore it proceeds from the will), not assent. In it, which is a certain personal and internal religious experience, is found the root of religious knowledge; thus assent is surely given in religion, but it follows confidence, which alone is justifying faith.

b) *Later Protestants.* Schleiermacher (+ 1834) said that faith is a certain religious sentiment of dependence on God. Ritschl (+ 1889) said that faith is the apprehension of extra mundane reality which comes from an intimate subjective experience of Christ. These authors have been very influential up to the present time.

c) *The School of Dialectic Theology*, founded by Karl Barth in our days, intends to oppose “religious experience,” and so return to the original Protestantism, which it acknowledges as uniquely orthodox. God always remains unknown, since our words and concepts cannot express “the Word of God.” Therefore he defines faith as “reverence before the unknown God.”¹

1. See A. Landgraf, *Glaube*: LTK 4,525-527; L. Malevez, *Théologie dialectique, théologie catholique et théologie naturelle*: RechScRel 28 (1938) 385-429, 527-569; G. Rabeau, *Bulletin de théologie protestante allemande*: RevScPhTh 26 (1937) 140-167.

51. 2. Modernists. Faith is a certain intimate *sentiment* which arises in us from the absence of the divine. This “absence of the divine” hides in the subconscious; however, in the presence of the Unknowable, without any preceding judgment, it stirs up a special sentiment which joins man in some way with God. This is faith. Then the experience must be *thought about* (and then the intellectual element enters into it), because by faith God presents himself to man in a confused way. Hence, afterwards man must analyze his experience so that God may clearly be found in it.²

52. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent*, s.6 ch.6 (D 1526-1527). The act of faith described there (which doubtless is an act of justifying faith) is concerned with the true and the revealed, which it affirms; moreover, it precedes the fiducial movement of the will. In cn. 12 (D 1562) the fiducial faith of Protestants is expressly condemned.³

Vatican Council I, s.3 ch.3 (D 3008, 3011). There also the act of faith is directed to the true, which it affirms. It is the same in cn.2 (D 3032) and in cn.5 (3035), where it is called assent. According to ch.4 (D 3015) it pertains to the order of knowledge either in the principle or in the object; in these points it is compared with reason.⁴

St. Pius X in the Encyclical “*Pascendi*” (D 3483) condemns the doctrine of the religious sentiment. In the *Oath against Modernism* (D 3537-3542) he teaches that faith is assent of the intellect.

Theological note. It is *defined divine and Catholic faith* that faith is an act of the intellect; that it is intellectual assent is *at least implicitly defined*.

53. Proof from Holy Scripture. It should be noted that “to believe” in Scripture often contains the idea of a certain total adherence to God revealing. But this adherence is true assent, to which is added the devotion of the soul.⁵ Hence the one is in no way opposed to the other.

In *St. John* justifying faith has as its object facts, either what has been revealed, or what has been preached (not only promises), and one must adhere to that object. But such faith is an act of the assenting intellect. Therefore faith is an act of the assenting intellect.

The major: The object of faith is the divine origin of Christ and His

2. See the Encyclical “*Pascendi*” (D 3475f.).

3. See R. Aubert, *Le problème de l'acte de foi* 73-87.

4. See Aubert, 157-176, 185-191.

5. See J. Huby, *La connaissance de foi dans S. Jean*: RechScRel 21 (1931) 385-421; it was published again in *Le discours de Jésus après la Cène* (Paris 1932) 146-191; F. Prat, *La théologie de Saint Paul*¹² 536-544. On faith in the N.T., see also A. Merk, *Iustus ex fide vivit*: VerDom 3 (1923) 193-198, 231-237, 257-264.

mission (16:27; 17:8), of Christ's messiahship (1:49f.), messiahship and divine sonship (20:21; 8:24ff.), the attributes of Christ (20:25.29), the words of Christ (3:11ff.; 5:38; 6:68f.; 8:45). Therefore faith has as its object facts and revealed and preached words.

The minor is clear, because the faculty concerned with the affirmation of truth is the intellect inasmuch as it is assenting.

54. From the classic text of Heb. 11:1.⁶ Context: The exhortatory part of the letter (10:19—13:17) is wholly concerned with faith and perseverance. The motives for perseverance in the faith are these: the Mediator (10:19-25), punishments to be avoided (10:26-31), rewards to be merited (10:32-39), outstanding examples in the past (ch. 11). Therefore there is an exhortation for patience because of the example of Christ (12:1-3), and to other virtues (12:4—13:7). The epilogue (13:18-25). Therefore in this complex of ideas, the immediate context is this:

Remember the day of your illumination... (10:32-35) and your reward (v. 35).

Because these things are not yet present, you have need of endurance (v. 36); for the Lord will come to reward you (v. 37).

Meanwhile your life ought to be a life of faith, by which the just man lives (v. 38)

But if out of fear you abandon the faith, God will not approve of you, or will have no pleasure in you (v. 38).

Therefore you must not abandon the faith, but live from faith (v. 39).

Therefore this faith, in which you ought to live in order to please God, is... (11:1):

b) The *Text* can be read in two ways, although the meaning is always the same:

ἐλπιζομένων υπόστασις πραγμάτων—έλεγχος ού βλεπομένων
 ἐλπιζομένων υπόστασις—πραγμάτων έλεγχος ού βλεπομένων

There is a parallelism between:

ἐλπιζομένων and ού βλεπομένων on the one hand:

6. See F. Prat, *La théologie de Saint Paul* 1,460-463; J.M. Bover, *Teologia de San Pablo* (Madrid B.A.C., 1946) 841-851; M.A. Mathis, *The Pauline πίστις-υπόστασις according to Hebr 11,1* (Washington 1920), on this last book see Bibl 2 (1921) 252-255; 3 (1922) 79-89. On the text of St. Paul to the Hebrews, see St. Thomas II-II, q. 4, a. 1 and M.M. Schumpp, *Der Glaubensbegriff des Hebräerbriefes und seine Deutung durch den hl. Thomas von Aquin: DivTh(Fr) 11* (1933) 397-410. Finally, see Zorell, *Novi Testamenti Lexicon graecum* on the words of the text.

ὑπόστασις and ἔλεγχος on the other.

In the first one the concern is about the things that are hoped for (which are not yet had) and the things that are not seen (which are supernatural). In the second version, ἔλεγχος clearly signifies an argument, a proof, or an act of demonstration; all of these pertain to the intellect. Hence ὑπόστασις from the parallelism has the same intellectual meaning, which from the word alone cannot be convincing with certainty. For etymologically it signifies substance, or a foundation; hence reality, an object; therefore also firm trust, conviction.

Therefore faith is:

of things that are hoped for, the reality:

that is, through faith there begins to exist in us what till now does not exist in reality (so especially the Greek Fathers);

of things that are not seen, the proof:

that is, through it those things are demonstrated to be true and certain, which otherwise cannot be known by sense or by reason.

c) *Argument*: in this definition the concern is about the faith necessary for salvation. But it is described as an intellectual act. Therefore faith is an intellectual act.

The major: see 10:36.39; 11:6.

The minor: from an analysis made of the words in the parallelism; also from the following context, for in all of chapter 11 he is treating intellectual faith (3, 6, 7), to which sometimes hope is added (v. 11) by reason of the believed object.

55. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers*: according to them faith is “the rational assent of a free soul” (R 421), “the dogmatic assent of the soul” (R 820), “an unseen support of the things that are hoped for” (R 1057). “vision of the things that are not seen” (R 1223), “to think with assent” (R 1980), “the voluntary assent of the soul, or the contemplation of a hidden reality, or of that, which truly is, a definite knowledge or comprehension of things invisible” (R 2144). In a similar way they explain the truths that are the object of faith.

b) *In early scholasticism*: faith is defined by Abelard: “the judgment of things that are not apparent.”⁷ By Hugo of St. Victor: voluntary “a certitude of the mind about things absent that are constituted above reason and beyond science.”⁸ The definition quoted from Augustine was

7. *Introductio in theologiam* 1,1: ML 178,981.

8. *De sacramentis* 1,10,2: ML 176,330.

introduced into scholasticism because of a marginal note of the Master of the Sentences: "to believe is to think with assent." After that both Hugo's definition and the Augustinian definition are explained by the great scholastics.⁹ St. Thomas made the special contribution of explaining faith in the Aristotelian conception of different states of mind.¹⁰

56. Objections. 1. The act of faith is meritorious. But a meritorious act is only from the will. Therefore the act of faith is from the will.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. From the will either eliciting or commanding the act, *conceded*; only from the will eliciting the act, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* Therefore the act of faith is from the will commanding, *conceded*; from the will eliciting, *denied*.

2. To attribute to the intellect the act of faith is to practice vivisection in the religious life. Therefore it should not be attributed to it.

I distinguish the antecedent. To attribute it to the intellect alone, *I bypass the antecedent*; to attribute it to the intellect as eliciting assent and at the same time to the will commanding, *denied*.

9. See St. Albert the Great, *In 3 d.23 a.8*; St. Bonaventure, *In 3 d.23 a.2 q.2*; St. Thomas, *In 3 d.23 q.2 a.1 ad 8*; II-II, q. 2, a. 1; *De veritate* q.14, a. 1-2.

10. See M.D. Chenu, *La psychologie de la foi dans la théologie du XIII^e siècle*: Etudes d'Histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale du XIII^e siècle 2 (1932) 163-191.

Thesis 5. The act of faith is assent because of the authority of God revealing.

S.Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 1; Lennerz, 117-140; Pesch, 196-230; Beraza, 468-508

57. Connection. Since the act of faith is an intellectual assent, we ask what specifies it among the various intellectual assents. The wording of the thesis contains two elements: for the act of faith is first of all a certain intellectual tendency, which is called *to believe* (and as such, the specifying motive is *the authority of the speaker*, or the authority of the witness); but also the act of faith is not just any kind of faith, but it is *divine* faith (and as such, the motive is the authority *of God* speaking).

58. Definition of terms. *Because of (propter)* is a preposition signifying the motive, or that which moves the intellect, or determines it to assent. A motive, however, must first be known. Therefore we are now determining the motive of the act of faith, taken in a precise and formal way; not the remote motives of the will commanding assent, or of the judgments of credibility or of the necessity of believing.

Assent because of the authority (of the speaker). In this matter faith differs from science. That is, the motive of assent can be twofold: *the evidence of the matter* (and then there is science), and *the testimony of the speaker* (and then there is faith). Therefore we say that in the case of faith the intellect is moved to assent from the known authority of the one who testifies to the truth, or from the authority of the witness. The authority of the witness is said to be a certain moral power present in the witness because of which he is worthy of faith or belief. Generally this consists in the fact that he knows what he is talking about (he is a knower) and he says what he knows (he is truthful).

The authority of God revealing. On this point divine faith differs formally from any other kind of faith. Therefore, just as there is no human faith without the speaking of a human witness, so there can be no divine faith without the speaking of God in the strict sense, that is, without revelation.

59. Adversaries. *Rationalists*, who speak about religious faith, but they understand it as the rational science of things pertaining to God and to religion.

Semi-rationalists, who call faith every persuasion about God and divine things, even if it comes from a well known, intrinsic connection of ideas. Indeed they also call the natural knowledge of God's existence faith in a

very sublime sense.¹

60. Doctrine of the Church. *Vatican Council I*, s.3 ch.3 (D 3008) and cn.2 (D 3032). The Council intends to define Catholic truth against rationalists and semi-rationalists with reference of the notion itself of faith. Therefore it teaches that religious knowledge and faith in the strict sense are essentially different. But they differ regarding the motive (*propter*). For the motive of science is the intrinsic truth of things known by the light of natural reason; but the motive of faith is the authority of God revealing.²

The Oath against Modernism teaches the same thing: because of the authority of the supremely truthful God (D 3542).

61. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith*, both concerning the essential difference between faith and science, and concerning the determination of the motive for faith.

62. Proof from Holy Scripture. John 3:11f. a) *Context*: Nicodemus with imperfect preparation, although he had a certain amount of good will, comes to Jesus, thinking that he is acting well if he makes a confession to Jesus without his complete submission (v. 1f.). Jesus wishes to bring him to full submission. With this in mind, he shows him that what he has done so far is not enough, but that something more is required (namely, faith). In order to obtain this, he proposes to him the mystery of our regeneration (v. 3). But this mystery in its presentation is badly understood by Nicodemus (v. 4). Hence Jesus proposes it again in clearer words, lest any ambiguity remain (v. 5-8). In the presence of such a presentation of the mystery (supposing its credibility, which is given in v. 2), the only right way of responding is by *faith*. But Nicodemus, a teacher in Israel, seeks *knowledge* about the mystery (v. 10). But Jesus openly and again demands *faith* (v. 11-13).

b) *Therefore we argue*: in the text it is the same thing to believe (*you do not believe*) and to accept testimony (*you do not accept our testimony*); the testimony is that of Christ speaking (*I told you earthly things, we speak, we testify*), who knows and who is truthful (*what we know we speak and what we see we bear witness to*). But this is to assent because of the authority of God revealing.

63. John 3:31-36. Also here *to believe in the Son* (v. 36) is *to receive his*

1. See CL 7,527.

2. See Aubert, 132-164.

testimony (v. 33), as one who knows and is truthful (v. 32f.). The authority of the Son is the authority of God himself (v. 34). Therefore, to believe is to signify as it were with the seal of one's own adhesion to the veracity of God. "Just as when someone tells what he alone has seen, if another person has faith in his words, his credulity is a certain sign and seal, by which the one who believes confirms that he considers him truthful; for if he did not judge him to be such, he would not have put faith in his words."³

There is an almost parallel text in 1 John 5:9-12. Also there "to believe in the Son of God" (v. 10) is "to receive the testimony of God (v. 9), "to have the testimony of God in himself" (v. 10). But as in the prior text the believer is said to affirm the veracity of God, so in this text, he who does not believe is said to make God a liar (v. 10), because he does not believe the testimony of God himself.

64. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers* compare faith with adhesion, which is offered to a man speaking (R 173, 562, 1303, 1321); they contrast is expressly with science (R 417, 963, 1277); and they do that because in faith there is no search and inquiry into the object believed, as there is in science (R 1181, 2065), but we simply adhere to the words of the one who has knowledge of the object itself (R 1466, 2197).⁴

b) *In Scholasticism*, if William of Paris is excluded (he seems to have denied every intellectual motive, reducing everything to the force of the obeying will),⁵ all theologians held that the motive of faith is the authority of God, which they called "the first truth," especially in knowing and in speaking. The question is treated by the Master of the Sentences,⁶ when he is considering the text of the Apostle *the conviction of things not seen*; all the commentators treat it there. In St. Thomas it is considered also in II-II, q. 1, a. 1 and his formula of "the first truth" remained in the later scholasticism; similarly in *De veritate* q. 14, a. 8. All later theologians hold that the motive of divine faith is "the first truth." But when they explain this formula, they also ask further questions, as we shall see later.

65. Theological reasoning. Human faith is assent given to a speaker because of his dignity, not because of the proof he gives for the things he says. Therefore, similarly, divine faith will be assent given to God revealing

3. Toledo, *In Ioannem* 3,31-36.

4. There is more on this in Harent, *Foi*: DTC 6,109-115. On the opinion of St. John Chrysostom, see E. Bou-larand, *La venue de l'homme à la foi d'après saint Jean Chrysostom* (Rome 1939) 27-41.

5. *De fide* 1. See Espenberger, *Grund und Gewissheit des übernatürlichen Glaubens in der Hoch-und Spätscho-lastik* (Paderborn 1915) 148.

6. *Sententiae* 3 d.24.

because of His authority.

The *parity* is certain: for although divine faith and human faith differ in many ways, still they agree in the act that both are faith. Therefore if the psychological tendency of the act in human faith is that it is assent given because of the authority of the speaker, and therefore it is called faith, in the same way the psychological tendency of the act of divine faith will be that it is assent given because of the authority of the one speaking, and therefore it will be truly faith.

66. Objections. 1. The motive of faith ought to be an influence as something known in every act of faith. But many believers do not know the authority of God. Therefore it is not a motive of faith.

I distinguish the major. As something known either by explicit or implicit knowledge, *conceded*; by knowledge necessarily explicit, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

2. Christ assigns miracles as a motive of faith (John 14:11 f.). Therefore the motive of faith is not the authority of God revealing.

I distinguish the antecedent. As a motive mediating faith, proving its credibility, *conceded*; as an immediate motive of the assent of faith, *denied*.

3. The authority of God revealing is something extrinsic to man. But the intellect cannot be perfected unless it is something that is immanent to man. Therefore the intellect cannot be moved by the authority of God revealing.

I distinguish the major. Something extrinsic to man, but proposing to him supreme goods by which the intimate tendencies of man above the natural mode can be satisfied, *conceded*; extrinsic to man and simply giving it to him, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* Unless it is immanent to man, inasmuch as it agreeable to his natural tendencies, *conceded*; inasmuch as it is totally contained in his powers and faculties, *denied*.

4. Faith is an act of obedience to God (Rom. 16:26). But the motive of obedience is not the authority of the speaker, but the authority of one commanding. Therefore the motive of faith is not the authority of God speaking.

I distinguish the major. Faith taken adequately is an act of obedience, *conceded*; faith taken formally, *denied*. *I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent:* the motive of faith taken adequately is not the authority of God speaking, *conceded*; the motive of faith taken formally, *denied*.

The act of faith can be considered formally, according as it is elicited by the intellect, and adequately, according as it is commanded efficaciously by the will. But under each consideration a different motive for it must be assigned. Here we are considering faith only as it is taken formally, inasmuch as it is intellectual assent. Therefore we are asking about the intellectual motive, the one that moves the intellect to assent in the intellectual order.

5. If the motive of faith is the authority of God speaking, in the same way we would believe both God and man. But we do not believe God and man in the same way. Therefore the motive of faith is not the authority of God speaking.

I distinguish the major. In the same way, that is, in both cases we would believe because of the authority of the one speaking, *conceded*; in the same way, that is, with the same firmness and adhesion, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

The faith given to God is not the same as the faith given to man. That is not because in the latter case the motive is the authority of the one speaking and in the former there is no such motive, but because the authority of God speaking infinitely surpasses the authority of man speaking.

6. God, the supreme Lord, is not sufficiently honored if we believe Him blindly, without any further inquiry and simply because of our obedience to Him. But if the motive of faith is the authority of God speaking, we do not believe Him blindly and simply because of our obedience to him. Therefore the motive of faith is not the authority of God speaking.

I distinguish the major. If we do not believe Him blindly, that is, if we do not carefully scrutinize his words in order to believe, *conceded*; if we do not believe Him blindly, that is, if we give our assent because of the authority of Him when he speaks, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

67. Corollary. 1. From what has been said it is apparent how there is *obedience to God*. For we believe Him, without demanding any demonstration of the matter that he speaks to us; this holds true especially when it concerns belief in a mystery in the strict sense. This is *the faith of authority*, totally different from *scientific faith*, by which we believe someone not because we are submissive to his authority, but because of the evidence given to us in his testimony which here and now evidently cannot be false. In this way a historian believes documents and a judge believes an accused person when he confesses. Also this faith of authority, or faith in the strict sense, is essentially different from the assent given to a *teacher, as such*. For to him a certain submission is given, but it is not the same as what is given in faith. For it is the duty of the pupil to follow the direction of his teacher, but not to believe the teacher. The teacher leads the pupil by giving him reasons so that he finally may find and understand the intrinsic truth of the matter, as far as that is possible. Therefore the pupil does not assent to his teacher because of his authority, but he assents to the reasons proposed to him by the teacher, to the extent that these reasons merit assent.⁷ But in faith assent is given because of the authority alone of the speaker; therefore to the extent that this authority merits assent. Therefore it is a true submission given to the speaker. But this submission of the intellect we offer to God through our faith; this also, as we shall see, is submission of the will. See Vatican Council I, s.3 ch.3 at the beginning (D 3008).

On the other hand, the motive of faith is the authority of God considered as it is in itself; therefore it is something strictly divine. For that which moves us is not our knowledge of this authority, but the authority itself that is certainly known by us. Hence this knowledge is only a condition. Therefore the act of faith is in the strictest sense the act of a theological virtue and *it unites us with God*.

From this twofold consideration *the religious value of the act of faith* for the Chris-

7. See L. Billot, *De virtutibus infusis*² (Rome 1905) 206; Wilmers, *De fide divina* 12.

tian life is very apparent.⁸

3. The motive specifies faith to be in the intellectual order. Hence from this motive, which we have proved in the thesis, *flow all the properties of the act of faith*, as we shall see in the following theses.

68. Scholium 1. *On a further determination of divine authority in the motive of faith.* Theologians have investigated in what sense “the first truth” is the motive of faith, distinguishing the first truth in being (Deity), in knowing (omniscience) and in speaking (veracity). It is clear that the authority of a witness, as a witness, includes essentially both knowledge and veracity. Therefore Vatican I (D 3008) determines the authority of God speaking as being that of one who can neither deceive nor be deceived. But this being the case, theologians have asked whether, in holding that God is neither deceived nor deceiving, *it is required and sufficient* always and formally to have before one’s eyes His knowledge and veracity. In this question, Ripalda, Viva and Schiffini disagree with the common, affirmative opinion of other theologians.

a) *Ripalda* distinguishes between different believed objects in this way:

1. If an assertion or testimony of God is believed, the motive is knowledge and veracity.

2. If a promise of God is believed, the motive is fidelity and omnipotence.

3. If an external proposal of God is believed, the motive is veracity, constancy and omnipotence.

4. If a decree or particular internal judgment is believed, the motive is veracity alone or fidelity alone.

Moreover, Ripalda holds that the excellence of God, as distinct from his attributes, whether in association with the others or even separated from them, is a sufficient motive of faith, because the divine majesty itself immediately confers authority on the testimony of God.⁹

b) *Viva* holds that knowledge and veracity are as a whole the motive of faith, even when it concerns promises. However in the latter case, he thinks that fidelity must be added, but not omnipotence.¹⁰

c) *Schiffini* admits as the motive of faith knowledge and veracity alone in positive assertions, and he adds fidelity and omnipotence in the case of promises.¹¹

69. These position, however, cannot be held. For, in these opinions there is confusion between the ontological foundation of the thing witnessed to and the logical motive of the assent. For, the former is required so that the thing can simply *exist* in the nature of things; but the latter so that the thing here and now can be *believed*. Therefore, whether the event depends on one condition or another, it is sufficient that God *de facto* knows that it will happen and truly says what he knows; that is, knowledge and veracity *are sufficient*. These are always *required*, otherwise we do not have testimony in

8. See E. Hocedez, *Valeur religieuse de l’acte de foi*: Greg 15 (1934) 377-408.

9. *De fide* d.2.

10. *De fide* d.1 q.1.

11. *De virtutibus infusus* 117.

the strict sense, without which there cannot be any faith. But if sometimes the dignity alone of the speaker (in this case the Deity alone) seems to induce faith, that is because underlying it is the implicit affirmation of knowledge and veracity, which as it were per se are demanded of such dignity, and with which there can be no admixture of a lie or levity in speaking.¹²

70. Scholium 2. *On revelation as pertaining to the motive of faith.* Revelation is called internal (or active), if the divine act itself is understood as deciding to communicate something; it is external (or passive), if the effect is understood as produced immediately by God so that there is a communication of what he wanted to communicate; it is complete (or formal), when both elements are designated.

It is clear from Vatican I (D 3008) that revelation, formally, *in some true sense is required* for the motive of faith; there the Council teaches that faith responds to revelation and is real because of the authority of God revealing. But the question is asked about *how it is required*: namely, whether as a cause, or a cause together with the authority of God constituting the only adequate motive of faith, or as the necessary condition so that the authority of God can move the intellect. If the first is said, revelation truly, although not alone, will determine the assent; if the second, it will apply the authority of God only to us so that because of this alone we give our assent.

Many Scotists, like Mastrius,¹³ hold that it is only a condition. More commonly theologians¹⁴ with St. Thomas (*De veritate* q.14, a. 8 ad 16) hold that it is a true motive, although it is an inadequate one. Thus revelation is the material element, which through the authority of a witness, as the formal element, is determined to form the motive.

This more common opinion of theologians will now be proved. For, the motive of faith is the testimony, as such; for, that which on the part of the object determines the intellect to give its assent in this way and in no other, is not the witness alone or only the act of testifying, but the act of testifying precisely by this witness. Indeed the testimony, as such, is established by the speaking as the matter, and it is established by the authority of the witness as the form. Hence the adequate motive of faith is the authority of God revealing together with formal revelation.¹⁵

But it can be *objected*: the motive of theological faith must be something divine. But formal revelation is not something divine. Therefore formal revelation is not the motive of faith.

I respond by distinguishing the major. It must be something divine either adequately, or at least in its formal and determining element, *conceded*; also divine in the material and determinable element, *denied*. *I bypass the minor*, for it is also divine because it contains active revelation. *I also distinguish the consequent.* It is not an adequate motive or formally and in a determining way inadequate, *conceded*; it is not an inadequate motive materially and in a determinable way, *denied*.

12. See F. García Martínez, *A propósito de una opinión de Ripalda sobre el objeto formal de la fe*: MiscCom 2,139-157. For what can be objected against this, see Beraza, 484-495.

13. *De fide* q.2 n.57.

14. See Pesch, 220.

15. See Beraza, 503-508, and also Pesch, 227-229, for objections against this doctrine.

Thesis 6. The act of faith is an essentially obscure assent, but it is certain with the certitude of adhesion and infallibility.

S.Th. II-II, q. 1, a. 3-5; q. 4, a. 8; Lennerz, 194-217, 236-260; Pesch, 394-425, 355-376; Beraza, 734-779, 608-681; Harent, 435-469, 387-393.

71. Connection. Since the assent of faith is not seen because of its intrinsic truth, but because of authority, it follows that it is obscure. But this obscurity is not opposed to its complete certainty; this is so because the act of faith is not assent because of just any authority, but because of the authority of God revealing.

72. Definition of terms. *Obscure*: the assent of faith is said to be obscure inasmuch as it is not evident. Evidence is said properly and immediately about an object, just as certitude is said properly and immediately about the knowing mind. But in both cases these notions are extended, so that evidence is said also about the knowing mind, just as certitude is applied also to the object itself. Hence one kind of *evidence* is objective, which is the clear and necessary intelligibility of the object; another kind is *subjective*, which is a clear perception of the object. Where both kinds of evidence are found together, because the clear perception of the object is based on its necessary and objective intelligibility—there we find *formal* evidence; this is the clear and necessary intelligibility of the object, which *de facto* so appears to the intellect. We are saying that the assent of faith lacks this kind of evidence.

But some evidence is internal, some external. An assent has *internal* evidence, if it affirms the connection between the subject and the predicate, because it appears evident to the intellect immediately (v.gr., a whole is greater than its part), or mediately (v.gr., man is free because he is intellectual). Assent has *external* evidence, if it affirms the connection between the subject and the predicate because it appears evident to the intellect not in itself, nor in a medium intrinsically connected with the terms, but from a medium connected only extrinsically with the terms (v.gr., Rome exists, because so many good witnesses have told me so and they could not be lying). Assent is *simply obscure*, when it lacks both internal and external evidence.

Essentially: it pertains to the idea of the assent of faith *that it be obscure*, so that there cannot be an act of faith which does not have that obscurity.

73. Certain: an assent which enjoys certitude is said to be certain. *Certitude* is said properly and immediately about the state of a knowing

mind, which is firm with no fear of erring. Therefore, if such a mental state is present, and one prescind from the motives, we have *subjective* certitude. But in reality there are such truths that per se demand such a firm assent; this is called *objective* certitude.

However, true certitude exists when both elements are joined together. Then *formal* certitude is had, which is a firm assent of the mind because of the motive infallibly connected with the truth of the thing. Therefore this certitude embraces the subjective element, which consists in a firm adhesion of the intellect; and the objective element, which consists in the infallibility of this assent and in its connection with truth. Indeed, this connection is not only *de facto*, but also *de iure*.

Certitude of adhesion designates the firmness with which the intellect in assent adheres to the truth without doubt or fear of error. This firmness of the assent itself differs from the firmness of the will when it commands a firm assent.

Certitude of infallibility designates the connection with the truth, by reason of the motive of assent. It is present in assent when its motive excludes the possibility of error. In our case, the assent of faith is said to be certain with the certitude of infallibility, because it can never be false for the reason that it is made because of the authority of God revealing.

PART 1. THE ASSENT OF FAITH IS ESSENTIALLY OBSCURE

74. Doctrine of the Church. a) The essential *obscurity* of faith is not taught explicitly by the documents of the Church. But it is *supposed* in Vatican Council I, s.3 ch.4 (D 3015), where it talks about “the veil of faith,” by which the mysteries remain covered even after their revelation; these words are taken from the letter of Pius IX against Frohschammer (D 2856), and seem to indicate that it is a property of faith that the believed object is covered by a certain obscurity. That formula alludes to 2 Pet. 1:19.¹ The essential obscurity of the faith is deduced also from the doctrine of the Council, according to which the motive of faith is not the intrinsic truth of the believed object, but the authority of God revealing (D 3008). b) The *special* obscurity of faith in believing the mysteries *is taught often*: D 824, 2732, 2878, 2909.

1. See CL 7,202.

Theological note. It is *at least theologically certain*, from what has been said; and indeed according as we affirm a certain essential obscurity of faith in opposition to human knowledge.

75. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) 2 Cor. 5:6 (we live in a kingdom of faith, not of vision) and 1 Cor. 13:12 (now we see in a mirror, but mediately; with enigmatic knowledge, but obscurely; then we will know face to face, or immediately). *Therefore we conclude:* faith is opposed to the clarity that is had from intellectual vision; and it is described as having within itself the obscurity that is essentially enigmatic (which is something said obscurely). Therefore faith is essentially obscure.

Please note that from these texts the obscurity of faith can be easily inferred, if it is compared with the clarity of the beatific vision; but the obscurity of faith does not seem to be easily inferred, if it is compared with human knowledge.

b) The definition of St. Paul in Heb. 11:1, *the conviction of things not seen*, contains perhaps more clearly the essential obscurity of faith. For there he gives expression to an essential note of divine faith, since it is included in his definition. Its object is described in such wise that there are things “not apparent,” that is, things which are not seen; or from a parallelism, things “that are hoped for.” However things that are hoped for, are absent, are not present, and therefore they cannot be seen, as St. Paul himself says: *now hope that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees?* (Rom. 8:24). But “to see” in St. Paul is said about any knowledge, even scientific (see 1 Cor. 13:12). Therefore the object of faith, inasmuch as it is such, does not have the clarity and evidence of human science.

76. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers* say that faith is assent to something not appearing in opposition to the evidence of science (R 417); that it is the contemplation of something hidden (R 2144); that by it the thing believed is not seen (1223, 1498, 1826, 2318); that it remains without evidence (R 1057); that it is unknown (R 869); that faith does not have any merit, if human reason attempts to test it (R 2331); that faith is about things not subject to vision.²

b) *For the later period*, it suffices to quote St. Bernard who wrote beautifully: “faith is a voluntary and certain foretaste of not yet manifested truth.”³

c) *Theologians* treat the obscurity of faith in connection with Heb.

2. Sr. Leo the Great, *Sermo* 69,2: ML 54,377.

3. *De consideratione* 5,3: ML 182,791.

11:1. Hence they ask whether the object of faith could be something seen, like St. Thomas (II-II, q. 1, a. 4). But later theologians, having admitted and supposed the essential obscurity of faith, dispute at length about how this obscurity should be explained. This question will be considered by us immediately.

77. Theological reasoning. a) The assent of faith *essentially* is because of the authority of the speaker. But the authority of the speaker, as such, provides no evidence of the object testified to. Therefore the assent of faith is essentially obscure.

The minor: The evidence would be either immediately or mediately intrinsic, or extrinsic. But the authority of the speaker, as such, provides neither. Therefore the authority of the speaker, as such, provides not evidence of the object testified to in the act of faith.

This second minor: The authority alone of the speaker affirms the connection between the subject and the predicate, but it does not clarify the manner of that connection. Therefore in that way it does not make known to the intellect the agreement of the subject with the predicate, either in itself or in some third thing. Therefore the authority of the speaker does not provide the *intrinsic* evidence of the object.

The authority alone of the speaker of course can provide some *extrinsic* evidence. But then we would have scientific faith, not the faith of authority; for the assent would be given in that case because of the given evidence, not because of the authority alone of the speaker.

Therefore the authority of the speaker, as such, in the act of faith taken in the strict sense, does not provide evidence for the object testified to.⁴

b) This proved obscurity is present essentially in every act of faith; for it flows, as we have seen, from the motive of faith, which specifies any act of faith. But also there is a *special obscurity* in the act of faith that is directed to the principal object of faith. That object is the mysteries. But the mysteries are believed in such a way that the agreement between the subject and the predicate is not understood (D 3016). Therefore from this aspect a new and special obscurity pertains to the assent of faith.

78. Note. We have explained the essential obscurity of faith from the essential and necessary lack of evidence, which every believed object has formally because the *motive* of faith, as such, never gives the evidence of the object believed. Therefore the function of the motive is not *to determine* the intellect to assent because of the given evidence; but *to move it sufficiently* in the intellectual order, so that if it is determined by

4. See Suarez, *De fide* d.3 n.3.

some other source (that is, by the free will), it can give its assent.

But there are some authors who are seeking a further explanation and they think that the essential obscurity of faith is greater. And because in the act of faith itself one can consider not only what is believed inasmuch as it is believed (that is, the material object inasmuch as it falls under the motive, or the thing attested inasmuch as it falls under the testimony of the testifier), but also the motive itself (attesting) and what is believed in itself and taken materially (the thing attested), from both of these elements different solutions are given for the obscurity of faith; we will consider them in the scholiums.

79. Objections. 1. Faith in Scripture is called light, clarity, illumination (2 Cor. 3:18; 4:6...). Therefore it is not obscure.

I distinguish the antecedent. Because it makes us know many things with full certitude, *conceded*; because it makes us know them in an evident way, *denied*.

2. Our explanation of the obscurity of faith would hold true in the same way also for human faith. But divine faith has a certain special obscurity. Therefore our explanation does not suffice.

I distinguish the major. Our explanation according as it refers to the essential obscurity, which must be present in every act of divine faith, *conceded*; according as it refers to the greater obscurity, which is had in acts of faith pertaining to the principal object of faith, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

80. Scholium 1. *On the evidence of the testifier.* Evidence in the testifier, or of the one testifying, is had when the object of faith becomes evident, because the motive of believing and its necessary connection with truth is evident. Therefore the first solution of some authors in order to explain the obscurity of faith is derived from the fact that the motive of faith in itself cannot be evident. Therefore there is in faith necessarily a lack of evidence of the one testifying. By these authors this is placed in the lack of evidence of the fact of revelation.

a) Therefore *these theologians say*: if it is evident that God said something, and on the other hand that God cannot err or deceive (that is, if there is evidence in the attestation), by that fact it is evident that what he said is true; therefore the obscurity of faith is destroyed. Therefore it is necessary to hold that the lack of evidence in the testifier is absolutely essential for the faith. Thus Vitoria, Báñez, Suarez, Lugo Kilber, Franzelin. But the contrary opinion is by far more common.⁵

b) *It should be noted* that some evidence in the testifier is now admitted by all, because previous certitude about the fact of revelation before the act of faith must be admitted. Therefore if certitude of the nature kind is present, then there is also necessarily some evidence; but that assent is not of faith, but of science. Therefore all prudent doubt is excluded--doubt with which certitude cannot be joined together. But there is a question about further, full and absolute evidence, which so attracts the intellect to assent concerning the fact of revelation that it excludes any doubt whatsoever, even imprudent doubt.

5. For defenders of this opinion see Harent, 401-403.

c) *This opinion contradicts the facts*, nor is it based on any positive argument; in fact it also labors under a fundamental equivocation. For it cannot be denied that the B1. Virgin Mary had faith in the mystery of the Incarnation; but in her case there was no lack of evidence about the fact of revelation. Something similar can be said about the Apostles in many things. But the evasions invented by these authors in order to explain these cases are of such a nature that they only confirm our opinion.⁶

The equivocation of this opinion lies in the fact that it supposes that the assent of faith is the conclusion of a syllogism, whose premises are the authority of God and the fact of revelation. Therefore, if these premises are evident (evidence in the attestation), the conclusion (assent of faith) necessarily will be evident. But it is necessary to respond that the assent of faith is not the conclusion of a syllogism. That conclusion can be deduced; but that will be scientific faith, not the faith of authority. But if *further* there is an act of faith based on authority, this act will be placed in that case *with evidence*, not *from the evidence of the motive*; not *because of the evident consequence*, but *because of the motive in itself*, which is now known in an evident way accidentally (*per accidens*).⁷

81. Scholium 2. *On the possibility of faith and knowledge together concerning the same object in the same subject.* The second solution in order to explain the obscurity of faith is derived from the fact that the object believed, not only in a reduplicating way as something believed (for this is our solution), but also simply and absolutely cannot be at the same time evident in the same subject.

a) *This question is very old in theology* in these terms: "whether something can be at the same time believed and known." And, obviously, it concerns the same subject. This question, for which the way was prepared by the Master of the Sentences (3 d.24), is treated expressly by Master Hubert at the end of the 12th century; he gave a negative answer, as did also Simon Tornacensis, Praepositinus and Gulielmus Altissiodorensis. In the 13th century the Franciscan school and the early Dominican school up to St. Albert the Great defend the affirmative solution, which was held afterwards by Thomas Argentinas, Aureolus and Durandus. But St. Thomas (II-II, q. 1, a. 4-5), holding the incompatibility of faith with knowledge, introduced this opinion into the Dominican school. Then Richard a Mediavilla and Scotus introduced it into the Franciscan school.⁸ In recent scholasticism the negative opinion is defended generally by Dominicans and Franciscans and they are followed by Molina, Billot, and others; the affirmative opinion is defended generally by Jesuit theologians, to whom can be added Estius, Malder, Wiggers, Herinckx, and others.⁹

b) *The affirmative opinion* seems to us to be both more probable and more in agreement with the teaching of the Church. Of course we are talking about acts, not about habits; and we prescind from the subtle question whether by one single act the same

6. See Beraza, 758-761.

7. See Harent, 400-406.438f.

8. See M. Grabmann, *De quaestione "utrum aliquid possit esse simul creditum et scitum" inter scholas Augustinismi et Aristotelico-Thomismi medii aevi agitata: Acta Hebdomadae Augustiniano-Thomisticae* (1931) 110-139.

9. See Harent, 454f.

thing can at the same time be believed and known according to different motives.¹⁰ But it is necessary to make a distinction between vision in the strict sense (that is, immediate and essentially proper knowledge, or mediated knowledge through an obvious and easy a priori deduction), and science (that is, certain knowledge and mediated knowledge either a priori or a posteriori). Therefore we affirm that the obscurity of faith essentially and by reason of itself does not exclude in the same subject an act of knowledge about the same object. We say “essentially” and “by reason of itself,” because accidentally and by reason of some particular object perhaps there could be incompatibility. We say an act of science, because an act of vision in the strict sense certainly is excluded by the obscurity of faith.

c) *However the main reason* for this opinion is this. Among the objects of faith to be believed by all, many are proposed that can be known, indeed de facto are known by many; thus, v.gr., according to the Tridentine profession of faith, we believe “each and every article contained in the profession of faith” (D 1862). Among these are the existence of one God, omnipotent, creator of heaven and earth, etc. Similar statements are found in the Vatican I profession of faith (D 3001). Furthermore, Vatican I, s.3 ch.3 (D 3008), teaches that *everything* revealed handed on as such by the Church must be believed; among those things many are known naturally, as the Council itself says. Indeed in the opposing opinion these things cannot be proposed to all as necessary for belief, but only to those who have no knowledge about them. Moreover, the Apostle (Heb. 11:6) proposes as objects to be believed the existence of God and his rewards; these can also be known by knowledge.

d) *They of course respond* to these arguments.

When in the creeds we are commanded to believe things that are also known naturally:

It suffices to know those natural things in a general way. *But* the Tridentine profession says that each and every article must be believed.

The existence of God is believed “in the subject”: that is, he who believes that God is triune, by that fact believes that He exists. *But* in this way it cannot be believed, for example, that God is the creator of heaven and earth.

In these articles many things are believed which human reason cannot grasp; thus, v.gr., in the article on the unity of God (“I believe in one God”) at the same time his omnipotence, providence, oneness, etc. are believed. *But* the things cited can be known naturally, even though the pagan philosophers did not reach knowledge of them.

But to the argument of the Apostle they respond:

What the Apostle says holds in general for men, not in particular for the wise. *But* this restriction is not in the text, nor is it in the ecclesiastical or patristic interpretation.

The text should be understood to be about God as the end of grace, not as the end of nature. *But* the same point holds which we just said.

The text should be understood to be about God, manifesting Himself by supernatural revelation. *But* the object of faith, which is what the Apostle is talking about, is not God revealing but God existing.

10. See Beraza, 747.

c) Finally, *they pose this objection* to our opinion: Faith is about things not seen. But naturally things known are seen. Therefore naturally things known cannot be believed. *I respond by conceding the major and distinguishing the minor.* Some naturally known things are seen, *conceded*; all are seen, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way:* not all naturally known things can be believed, *conceded*; none can be believed, *denied*.

Again, where the intellect is perfectly at rest it cannot at the same time not be at rest concerning the same object. But where knowledge is present the intellect is perfectly at rest. Therefore it cannot have at the same time about the same object knowledge by which it is not at rest, as it would be with faith. *I respond by conceding the major and distinguishing the minor.* Where there is vision in the strict sense, *conceded*; where this is not given, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* It cannot have faith about an object fully seen, *conceded*; about an object known but not fully seen, *denied*.¹¹

PART 2. THE ASSENT OF FAITH IS ESSENTIALLY CERTAIN

82. Adversaries. Reference is usually made to Abelard who defined faith as “estimation.”¹² Without doubt this word expresses opinion, not certitude.¹³ But in the mind of Abelard by this word was expressed only, it seems, that faith is knowledge that is not evident.¹⁴

83. Doctrine of the Church. a) It required *subjective certitude* in faith: Vatican Council I, s.3 ch.3 (D 3008), speaks about the full homage of intellect. In the professions of faith and in similar documents this formula is often used: “I firmly believe” (D 76, 680, 800, 870, 900, 1330, 1333, 1337f., 1347-1351, 1550, 1862, 3537).

b) It proposes the *infallible motive* of this certitude: God who can neither err nor deceive (D 2778, 3008), the all-truthful God (D 3537).

c) It defines that faith is so certain that *between faith and reason* a priori there can *never* be *opposition*, because otherwise God would be contradicting himself: Lateran V (D 1440-1441) and Vatican I s.3 ch.4 (D 3017) and cn.2 (D 3042). This doctrine is explained by Pius IX in his Encyclical “*Qui pluribus*” (D 2776-2780).

Theological note. That the assent of faith is certain is *divine and Catholic faith*, at least from the ordinary magisterium.

11. See Lennerz, 205-215; Harent, 458-467.

12. *Introductio in theologiam* 1,1: ML 178,981.

13. See St. Bernard, *De erroribus Abaelardi* 4,9: ML 186,1061.

14. See Chenu, *La psychologie de la foi dans la théologie de XIII^e siècle*: Etudes d'Histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale du XIII^e siècle 2,168-170.

84. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) Heb. 11:1: faith is a conviction (ἐλεγχος). This word signifies not just any kind of reason, but that which leads to a certain conclusion. See John 8:46; 16:8; and St. Chrysostom (R 1223).

b) Rom. 4:16-22: the faith of Abraham is praised because it was not weakened; he did not hesitate out of diffidence; he was comforted by faith, being fully convinced (πληροφορηθείς) about the truth of the divine locution. Hence the element of *adhesion* is present.

c) *The truthfulness of God* is often expressed in Scripture: From Exod. 34:6; Ps. 85:15; John 3:33; 8:20; Rev. 19:11. It is presented as a real characteristic of God in contrast to men, who are liars: Rom. 3:4. Add to this what is said about the *omniscience of God* in the treatise *On the One God*. Hence the element of *infallibility* is present.

85. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers* teach: faith must be without any doubt (R 846, 1686); it is assent without any hesitation (R 972); it is a disposition free of doubt (R 2144); it leaves no room for inquiry (R 1181); what faith says must be held firmly and there can be no doubt about it (R 2270-2275). Therefore *adhesion* is firm.

Against the Priscillianists St. Augustine vindicated the absolute veracity of God.¹⁵ And of course the Fathers insist on the complete truth of the divine testimony: it is not possible to contradict the word of God (R 417); to doubt about the truth of the divine locution is to be completely ignorant of God (R 562); if we do not believe God, whom do we believe? (R 1303); the person alone suffices in order to believe him (R 2055); the strongest reason for banishing all doubts is the divine authority (R 2197). Therefore *infallibility* is complete.

b) *Theologians* right from the beginning hold that “nothing false can come under faith” (II-II, q. 1, a. 3). They give as the reason for this the motive of faith, which is the first truth. Only the *Nominalists* afterwards held that God, according to his absolute power, could lie; thus Holcot, Biel, Almain, and others. All later theologians opposed them on this point.¹⁶

86. Theological reasoning. Formal certitude contains two essential elements: firm adhesion of the mind (*certitude of adhesion*), and the motive infallibly connected the truth (*certitude of infallibility*). But both elements are given essentially in divine faith. Therefore divine faith is essentially certain.

15. *Contra mendacium* 2: ML 40,519f.

16. See Toledo, *In* 2.2 q.1 a.3; Suarez, *De fide* d.3 s.5; Lugo, *De fide* d.1 n.108; Ripalda, *De fide* d.4 s.1 n.2; Salmanticenses, *De fide* d.2 dub.1 par.1 n.3.

a) *Certitude of adhesion*. The adhesion of the intellect is measured by the motive. But in the assent of faith the motive is the strongest possible. Therefore the assent of faith is certain with the certitude of adhesion.

A note on the major: the adhesion of the intellect can depend on the intellectual motive alone (as in *science*), and it can depend on the motive together with a command of the will (as in *faith*). In the last case, if the will commands imprudently, it is clear that the assent is not measured by the motive (as happens in *obstinacy*). But when the will commands prudently, if it commands in order to complete what is lacking in the motive itself (as in an *opinion*), again the assent is not measured by the motive alone. But if the will prudently commands assent, not in order to complete the defect of a motive in itself insufficient for a certain assent, but in order to move the intellect because of a motive in itself sufficient but of its nature (because it is not evident) not actually determining the intellect, then it is clear that the assent is measured by the motive. And this is the case with faith.¹⁷

A note on the minor: the motive in the assent of faith is the authority of God revealing, according as it is in itself. But such authority in itself, as infinite and uncreated, is the greatest possible. Therefore this motive is the greatest.

87. b) *Certitude of infallibility*. The assent of faith is given because of the motive that is always and necessarily connected with truth. Therefore it is certain with the certitude of infallibility.

The antecedent: God revealing is omnisciently and infinitely truthful. Therefore the motive of faith is always and necessarily connected with truth. We suppose his *omniscience* from the treatise *On the One God*. *Truthfulness* is proved: God cannot lie (because to lie is intrinsically evil); but if he revealed something false, he would be lying (because he would be saying that something is that He knows is not, and also obliging men to accommodate their intellect and whole life to something false); therefore God in revealing is necessarily truthful.

Note. There can be a case in which someone assents because *he thinks* God has revealed something, which however *de facto* he has not revealed. In that assent the certitude of infallibility is certainly lacking. But that assent is not a true assent of divine faith, although it is thought to be such. The reason is because that assent *de facto* is not given because of the authority of God revealing, as it is in itself; therefore it is not an assent of divine faith. On the part of the will it certainly has whatever is required for the

17. See Lennerz, 248.

assent of divine faith; but on the part of the intellect it does not have what is required. For, the motive of faith is lacking in it.

88. c) *The certitude of infallibility* in the assent of faith is usually proved *from the supernaturalness of faith*, and it is an excellent argument. That is, the assent of faith is supernatural, as we shall see. But the act of supernatural knowledge necessarily and infallibly is connected with truth. Therefore the assent of faith is certain with the certitude of infallibility.

The minor: We are not saying that *just any supernatural act* necessarily is connected with truth (thus, v.gr., someone gives an alms to a rich man whom he thinks in a pauper, is mistaken, even though he performs a supernatural act), but an *intellectual* supernatural act. The proof goes like this: every faculty achieves its perfection from its tendency to its formal object (the *intellect* from its tendency for truth). Therefore an act perfects the faculty to the extent that its tendency towards its formal object is perfect (an act of the intellect if *it tends perfectly* to what is true). But a perfect tendency to what is true is measured by the conformity of the thing understood with the objective order. Therefore where there is no conformity between the objective order and the thing understood, there cannot be perfection of the intellect. But a supernatural act necessarily perfects the faculty. Therefore the act of supernatural knowledge necessarily is connected with truth.

Please note that with the same argument it can be proved that a supernatural act of the *will* is necessarily *good*, since the will is perfected by its tendency to what is good. But a perfect tendency for the good is not measured by the conformity of the thing willed with the objective order, but by the conformity of the thing willed with right reason. Therefore there can be a supernatural act of the will, which is directed to something false, although it is necessarily good, as in the case of alms given to someone who is only an apparent pauper.¹⁸

89. Objections. 1. The assent of faith does not exclude all fear of error. Therefore it is not certain.

I distinguish the antecedent: all fear, even imprudent, *conceded*; all prudent fear, *denied*. For certitude the exclusion of prudent fear is sufficient.

2. The assent of faith is not caused by an intellectual motive, but by the will. But an assent caused by the will cannot be certain. Therefore the assent of faith is not certain.

I distinguish the major: It is caused by the will commanding an act that is measured by an intellectual motive, *conceded*; by commanding an act that surpasses in its adhesion the intellectual motive, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

The will can command certain assent in two ways. *In the first way*, so that the assent

18. See Lugo, *De fide* d.6 s.6 n.85-101.

in the firmness of its adhesion is not measured by the intellectual motive, but it simply surpasses that motive. Then the assent is commanded imprudently. *In the second way*, so that the assent in the firmness of its adhesion is measured by an intellectual motive, and it is not more firm than what the motive in itself deserves. This consent is commanded prudently. In the first case the assent is not caused by the intellectual motive. In the second case it has a twofold cause: one that it simply be, and this is the command of the will; the other that it be of a particular nature, and this is the intellectual motive. For unless the will commands assent, the assent, even given the necessary motive, will not be elicited, because the intellectual motive is not such that it will determine the intellect to assent; for in order to do this it has to be evident. For the will commands not only so that the assent will be elicited, but that it will be of such a nature as the motive deserves. Therefore the motive regulates and specifies the assent.

3. Not everything that God foretold actually happened (Jonah 3:4; Isa. 38:1...). Therefore God can err or lie.

I distinguish the antecedent. Everything that God foretold either absolutely or conditionally, *conceded*; that God foretold absolutely, *denied*.

4. God de facto deceived men: Exod. 14:9; Job 12:24f.; Isa. 63:17.

I distinguish the antecedent. By permitting deception, *conceded*; directly by himself by uttering a lie or by commanding that someone else lie in his name, *denied*.

5. God put a lying spirit in the mouth of the prophets (1 Kings 22:23) and permits the operation of error so that they will believe a lie (2 Thess. 2:11). Therefore God lies.

I distinguish the antecedent. He permitted deception, *conceded*; he commanded it, *denied*.

6. But perhaps also God revealing permits deception. Therefore the assent of faith is not infallibly certain.

I distinguish the antecedent. If at the same time he does not command that firm assent be given to that revelation under the danger of salvation, *I bypass the antecedent*; if he commands this, *denied*.

7. One who believes because of a supposed revelation, believes with the same certitude as someone else who believes because of a true revelation. But the former does not have certitude. Therefore neither does the latter.

I distinguish the major. With the same certitude of adhesion, *I bypass the major*; of infallibility, *denied*.

90. Scholium. *The assent of faith is firm above all things.* Where there is a comparison between the assent of faith and other certain types of assent, in a very true sense it is necessary to say that the assent of faith is more certain. But a distinction must be made.

a) *By reason of its infallibility* the certitude of faith is greater than any other natural certitude, because it is measured by an infinite and uncreated motive.

b) *By reason of its adhesion*, there were some theologians who said that the assent of faith is measured by knowledge of the motive; hence as a consequence they were forced to hold that the assent of faith is not more certain than every other assent. This opinion is touched by proposition 19 condemned by Innocent XI, which pertains to

the teaching of Aegedius Estrix.¹⁹ But the assent of faith proceeds from the preceding command of the will commanding an assent measured not certainly by motives of credibility, but by the motive of faith as it is in itself.

c) However it should be *noted* that it does not follow from this that in the assent of faith there is a greater impossibility of doubting, even imprudently, than there is in other types of assent. The reason is that this impossibility is measured by the evidence, which certainly in faith is not given. But in spite of this, faith must be said to be *simply more certain* than any natural certitude. See II-II, q. 4, a. 8.²⁰

d) *Hence it follows* that the assent of faith is irrevocable, because, infallibly connected with truth and posited with greater adhesion of the intellect than any other certain natural assent, it cannot be surpassed by any other truth.²¹

19. See Aubert, 93-101; A. Sohler, *La foi probable*: Greg 28 (1947) 521-525.

20. For more on this see Beraza, 618-651.

21. See Lennerz, 256-259.

Thesis 7. The assent of faith is essentially free.

S.Th. II-II, q. 2, a. 1 and 9; Lennerz, 218-235; Pesch, 136-151; Beraza, 600-607; Harent, 393-436.

91. Connection. Since the assent of faith is not because of intrinsic truth, but because of authority, just as it follows that it is obscure, it also follows that it is free. For the intellect is not moved necessarily except by evidence.

92. Definition of terms. *The assent of faith*, that is, the act which we have been describing so far, and not just its prerequisites.

Free, with the freedom especially of indifference, not just from compulsion. It *always* has to do with the freedom of exercise (the act can be placed or not placed); *often* also with the freedom of specification (either this act can be placed or another one).

The act can be free in two ways:

a) *Intrinsically*: as such it is only the act of the will, in which formally there is freedom.

b) *Denominatively*: as such it is the act of any faculty, which is placed under the influence of the commanding will. The assent of faith, since it is formally the assent of the intellect, obviously cannot be free except *denominatively*.

But thus far the command of the will can be concerned with the act itself that is elicited by another faculty (then the act is said to be denominatively and *immediately*, or proximately, free), or with the prerequisites of the act to be elicited (then the act is said to be denominatively and *mediately*, or remotely, free). We say that the assent of faith is free *denominatively and immediately*. In this point it differs essentially from scientific assent, which can be mediately free, but not immediately. For, the will can command the intellect to give attention to the evidence of the motives; and if the intellect does this, then scientific assent follows necessarily. But the will cannot command the intellect to place an act of scientific assent immediately, for this depends on the known evidence of the motives.

Essentially: freedom is so present in the act of divine faith that, if the assent is not given freely, by that very fact it would not be an act of faith.

93. Adversaries. Estrix seems to have restricted the freedom of faith too much, since he reduced it to the influence of the will to the attention paid by the intellect to the reasons for belief.¹

1. See A. Sohier, *La foi probable*: Greg 28 (1947) 528-530, 514-517, 525-527.

Hermes distinguished a twofold faith: *faith of knowledge* (intellectual adhesion to religious truths, from arguments), and *faith of the heart* (the habitual state of the will fully submitting itself to God and conforming its whole life to the believed truths). He said that only faith of the heart is free. Therefore he denied that the assent of faith itself is free, since it is “a necessary persuasion arrived at by evident reasons.”²

94. Doctrine of the Church. 1. Innocent VIII condemned this proposition of John Pico de Mirandula: “I say probably and, unless it were the common way of speaking of theologians who are opposed, I firmly assert: but I say that this statement in itself is probable, and it is, because just as no one thinks that something is so precisely because he wills to think it so, so also no one believes that something is true precisely because he wills to believe that it is true. Corollary: it is not in the free power of man to believe that an article of faith is true, when it pleases him, and to believe that it is false, when it displeases him.”³ The proposition does not seem to be understood in such a way that it denies only the despotic control of the will over the intellect of the believer, but simply inasmuch as it denies or overly restricts the freedom of faith.⁴

2. *The Council of Trent* s.6 ch.6 (D 1526): “they conceive faith from hearing and are freely led to God, believing....” Estrix held that the Council there did not teach that the assent of faith either in itself is free, or is commanded by the free will, but conceiving faith from hearing, it is moved freely to God....⁵ But the Council absolutely teaches the freedom of faith against Luther, as Vega says.⁶ The preceding schemas said: “by the free and spontaneous movement... of our will towards God by faith,”⁷ “by our free will we are moved to God by faith.”⁸ In the final formulation (in D 1526) the word “freely” was substituted for “free will”; but the change to “believing” from “by faith” in order that it might be brought out more clearly that they were talking about acts, and not about habits.⁹

3. *Vatican Council I* s.3 ch.3 (D 3010): by the act of faith “man yields voluntary obedience to God himself....” Note that there it is not said

2. See P. Charles, *Le Concile du Vatican et l'acte de foi*: *NouvRevTh* 52 (1925) 522-525; Aubert, 103-112.

3. The Bull “*Etsi in iuncto nobis*”: *BullRom* 5,328. The propositions in that Bull are condemned in general, some of which are at least “sounding bad and against the faith.” But the commission designated this proposition as erroneous and smacking of heresy.

4. Thus Lennertz, 13 against Harent in *DTC* 6,407 who treats Pico too gently.

5. *Diatriba* 79.

6. *Tridentini decreti de iustificatione expositio* 77f.

7. *CTr* 5,422.

8. *CTr* 5,636.

9. See Aubert, 78; F. Cavallera, *Le décret du Concile de Trente sur la justification*: *BullLittEccl* 50 (1949) 65-76.

expressly that the *assent* itself is free, nor do the words “faith in itself” say that, since they designate the habit of faith. Nevertheless according to the secretary,¹⁰ it is taught there that faith is commanded by the will and always remains a free act, contrary to the error of Hermes. Gregory XVI also rejects Hermes’s view on faith (D 2739).

4. *Vatican Council I* s.3 cn.5 (D 3035): *assent* is free. Against Hermes it is taught that assent itself does not take place without the influence of the will; that is, that assent is not necessary, that it is not produced by scientific demonstration from necessarily convincing arguments, as happens in human science.¹¹ Therefore he would not save the meaning of the definition who admitted that the influence of the will takes place only concerning the prerequisites to assent. For, this can be had also in assent that is produced necessarily from arguments.¹²

Theological note. It is *defined divine and Catholic faith* in Vatican I that the assent of faith is free with the freedom that is not given in science.

It is a *certain theological explanation of the dogma* that this freedom is denominative and immediate.

95. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) The act of faith is commanded under pain of damnation (Mark 16:16; 1 John 3:23), and therefore those who believe are praised (Rom.4:1ff.; Rev. 2:19). But that is not true of a necessary act. Therefore the act of faith is free.

b) Not all who hear the gospel preached, believe (John 3:18ff.; 6:29; Acts 13:46; 17:32ff.; Rom. 10:16ff.; 1 John 5:10). Therefore, those who have heard the gospel can still believe or not believe.

c) Those who believe, *obey the gospel* and therefore the talk is about the *obedience of faith* (Rom. 1:5; 16:26; see Gal. 3:2.5); it seems that it is necessary to understand this in a subjective sense (that is, for the obedience that is shown through faith itself). But obedience supposes the free submission of the will. Therefore the assent of faith is free.

96. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers* affirm freedom in believing (R 245); they say that it is in our power (R 1734); they hold that someone cannot believe unless he wills it (R 1821f.) and therefore that some will not to believe (R 1456). In the definition itself of faith they include the voluntary element: voluntary anticipation (R 417), assent of the

10. CL 7,166; see *ibid.*, 87.

11. CL 7,184.

12. See Aubert, 177,185.

free soul (R 421), voluntary assent (R 2144), a voluntary foretaste.¹³ They speak about the merit of faith (R 1450), which is the merit of obedience.¹⁴

Theologians from the beginning defended the freedom of faith and explained the Augustinian definition of faith (II-II, q. 2, a. 1). Actually the voluntary element was handed on in the famous definition of Hugo of St. Victor (from the *Summa Sententiarum*, as it seems): “voluntary certitude of things absent, constituted above opinion and below science”; this definition was used extensively by medieval theologians.¹⁵ But at a later time theologians debated a great deal about how to explain the freedom of faith, which all of them held as absolutely necessary. We will consider the various theological explanations later.

97. Theological reasoning. The assent of faith essentially is assent because of authority. But this kind of assent cannot be given except by a command of the will. Therefore the assent of faith is essentially from a command of the will, that is, free denominatively and immediately.

The major: The assent of faith is not given because of intrinsic or extrinsic evidence, but simply because of the authority of God revealing as he is in himself.

The minor: The only motive drawing the intellect *necessarily* to assent is evidence. Therefore if the assent is given not because of any evidence, then the assent is not given *necessarily*. But assent is sometimes given, however it is not caused by the motive alone. Therefore it is given from a command of the will. Therefore the motive of faith is such that it does not suffice by itself alone to determine the assent, since only evidence according to the nature of the human intellect can do this. However it is sufficient that, if the will commands assent, it can produce certain assent. These points are explained very well by St. Thomas in II-II, q. 1, a. 4 and more at length in *De veritate* q. 14, a. 1.

98. Note that in this way the *essential* freedom is explained, which faith has in opposition to science. For, the explanation is sought from the motive itself which specifies faith. Therefore this explanation is valid *for all cases*:

a) *If the evidence is present in the testifier:* the will commands assent not because of that evidence, but because of the motive as it is in itself. But this motive by itself alone cannot determine the assent. Another assent can also be given in that case because of the evidence in the testifier; but this assent will not be our act of faith, nor does it im-

13. St. Bernard, *De consideratione* 5,3: ML 182,791.

14. St. Hilary, *In Psalmum 118*: ML 9,568. On St. John Chrysostom see E. Boularand, *La venue de l'homme à la foi d'après saint Jean Chrysostome* 105-122.

15. See Chenu, *La psychologie de la foi* 165f.

pede a true act of faith from being given later. Hence in no way do we require a lack of evidence in the testifier in order to save the essential freedom of faith, as Báñez, Lugo, Franzelin and others think is necessary.¹⁶

b) *If at the same time scientific knowledge about the believed object is present:* the will can still command another assent, which is not scientific, but one of faith (with the freedom of exercise), although it cannot command a contrary assent (with the freedom of specification).

c) But because these two elements are not present in most of the major cases, the assent of faith has *generally* greater freedom. For, it is clear that the assent has more freedom according as there is a greater lack of evidence.

99. Objections. 1. The intellect is a necessary power. Therefore either a sufficient motive for assent is proposed to it, or it is not. If it is proposed, assent *necessarily* follows; if it is not proposed, *it is impossible* that assent will follow.

I respond. A sufficient motive is proposed, but it does *not compel* assent. For it to be a compelling motive the evidence is required. Therefore the indifference of the intellect must be taken away by the command of the will. But the will does not command assent, which is without some intellectual motive, or without a motive; but real and full assent is measured by some motive, which therefore was sufficient for assent.

2. But the command of the will does not supply a new motive. Therefore if the motive before did not move, neither will it move now.

I distinguish the antecedent. It does not supply a new motive, but it determines the intellect to assent according as the motive merits it, *conceded*; it does not determine it, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* If before it did not move because it was not in itself sufficient to provide certain assent, nor will it move it now, *conceded*; if before it did not move because it was not evident, *denied*.

100. 3. Where evidence is given in the testifier there is evident certainty about the authority of God and the fact of revelation. But then the assent of faith which flows from it cannot not be evident. Therefore at least where evidence is given in the testifier, there cannot be freedom of faith.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. The assent which flows *from* the twofold evidence *and because of* it cannot not be evident, *conceded* (but this is not the assent of our faith); assent which is placed *with* that evidence, but *not from* it or *because of* it cannot not be evident, *denied*.

4. Demons have faith (Jas. 2:19). But the faith of demons is not free. Therefore the act of faith is not essentially free.

I distinguish the major. Faith which essentially differs from theological faith, *conceded*; which is the same as that, *denied*. *I concede the minor.* *I also distinguish the consequent.* An act of any kind of faith is not free, *conceded*; the act of theological faith, *denied*. That is, the demons are said to believe, because from the evident knowledge of

16. On these and other explanations, see Harent, 406-435; M.E. Dal Verme, *La libertà nell'atto di fede* (Milan 1945).

the motives of credibility they give assent to revealed truths. But this faith is not free, since it is from evidence and because of the evidence (see II-II, q. 5, a. 2). But it is certain that our faith is essentially different.¹⁷

101. Scholium 1. *On the submission of the will and intellect in faith.* The full submission of the will and intellect in faith is taught by Vatican Council I s.3 ch.3 (D 3008). The *submission of the intellect* consists in this, that, given divine revelation, it elicits assent as the authority of God deserves, without insisting on an inquiry of its intrinsic truth before assent is given. In this assent it submits to God revealing, by accepting His word as the rule of full and definitive assent, since from his own nature he could not do this except by the known evidence of the matter. But this takes place by the free command of the will, for it could not take place in any other way. Therefore the *will* produces the submission of the intellect. It also produces its own *submission*. For, since it is possible for it not to command that assent, it submits itself to God revealing, offers Him the obedience of faith, acknowledges His supreme authority, and thus constitutes Him as his last end.

Furthermore, there is in the will of the believer a habitual disposition of mind, by which it is prepared to believe whatever God reveals and it is ready to believe it. This internal disposition does not diminish merit, but actually increases it (see II-II, q. 2, a. 5 and a. 10). This disposition is given by the habit of faith (see II-II, q. 1, a. 4 ad 3; q. 2, a. 3 ad 2).¹⁸

102. Scholium 2. *On a new explanation of the freedom of faith.* According to P. Rousselot the freedom of faith consists formally in this: God infuses in man such an inclination of will (of love) towards the divine Good that with firm certitude he tends to affirm the object revealed by God, because there is contained the Good that he loves. Therefore the assent is caused by the will that is so inclined; faith is knowledge "by way of nature." But freedom consists in this, that God does not infuse that inclination into the will unless it freely disposes itself to receive it. Hence the freedom of faith does not consist in the fact that man, seeing what should be believed, can believe and not believe and voluntarily chooses faith; but it consists in the fact that man freely disposes himself to accept the divine inclination to believe. Thus therefore because a man wishes to believe, he sees what should be believed; and because he sees what should be believed, he wills to believe; and he does this by one and the same act.¹⁹

But in addition to the fact that in this opinion many things are assumed that cannot be admitted, freedom in the assent of faith is not explained. For it is placed formally in a previous disposition of the will. Therefore the freedom of assent will be only consequent and mediated. This certainly is not sufficient.

17. For the historical evolution of the concept of faith in demons, see I. Beumer, *Et daemones credunt* (Iac 2,19). *Ein Beitrag zur positiven Bewertung der fides informis*: Greg 22 (1941) 231-251.

18. See J. de Wolf, *La justification de la foi chez S. Thomas d'Aquin et le Père Rousselot* (Paris 1946) 43-55.

19. For the explanation of this opinion, see Aubert, 460-470; J. de Wolf, *La justification de la foi* 20-28.

103. Scholium 3. *On the command of the will in the assent of faith.*

As was explained in the thesis, the act of faith is impossible without the free command of the will. This positive command of the will is wont to be called a *pious affection of credulity* (*pious credulitatis affectus*). The motive of this command is the good existing in the fact that the will submits itself to God and makes submission of its intellect to God revealing. The good of this submission is twofold. For, in the first place, it is very good that the created intellect, which can grasp the truth only in a deficient way, should accommodate itself fully to uncreated truth, which speaks to man, since this uncreated truth is the supreme norm of all truth. Then it is also good that the will be obedient to God. But God often commands faith. Beside these motives, there are also others that can move the will to command the assent of faith; as, for example, the motive of religion or of charity or of hope, as in other works.

2. The command of the will *can be directed to* the assent to be placed in a particular truth revealed by God, v.gr., the Trinity, or to all the truths revealed by God in general. In the second case the universality of faith is clearly apparent. For the tendency of that act does not bear on one truth exclusively and as it were by denying other revealed truths (for this would destroy faith itself, since the motive of assent would be affirmed and denied at the same time), but it bears on that truth only in an assertive way, by singling out that act from the other revealed truths.

3. As is clear, the motive, by which the will is moved to command the assent of faith, must first be proposed to it by the intellect. But it is proposed by some judgment, or by a series of judgments. The object of that judgment is the goodness of the command of the will proximately and of the assent of faith mediately; I mean the goodness based on those motives, which we have mentioned. This judgment is called a *judgment of what ought to be believed* (*iudicium credenditatis*). Before such a judgment is proposed to the will, the will cannot command assent. But after that judgment is proposed to it, the will can freely, although under the influence of grace, command the assent, or not command it.

4. But for the will to be able prudently to command the assent of faith, it is supposed further that the possibility of that assent is certain. For, the assent will not be possible, if there is no motive of faith, because it is specified and measured by this motive. In our case this is absolutely necessary. For, the assent that the will commands is an assent firmer than all others. Therefore, such an assent, which supposes a maximum sacrifice of the intellect, would be commanded by the will imprudently, unless it is certainly established that God really has spoken and has revealed that truth. For, that submission,

which is rightly made to God revealing, would be made imprudently if He has not revealed Himself. The judgment (or judgments), according to which the intellect affirms that God really has spoken and has revealed this truth, is called *a judgment of credibility* (*iudicium credibilitatis*). A truth is not credible, which has not been revealed by God; and a truth is not credible to me, unless I am certain that God has revealed it.

5. Therefore we have a *schematic* like this:

1. God revealed some truth.

2. This truth is proposed to the intellect.

3. The intellect forms a certain judgment about the fact of the revelation of this truth. The truth is now *credible*.

4. The intellect forms a judgment about the goodness of embracing that truth as revealed by God. The truth now *ought to be believed* (*credenda*).

5. The will, from the desire of submitting itself to God and thus tending to its last end, freely commands the intellect to assent to God revealing that truth.

6. The intellect assents to that truth, as it was commanded by the will. The truth *is believed*.

6) As is obvious, in this whole process the *freedom formally* is in the pious affection of credulity, that is, in the command of the will. For, the judgments, which precede are a prerequisite so that the will *can* command, but they are not sufficient for the *actual* command. It is still required that the will desires to believe. Hence it comes about that, when the same proposal of revelation is made, one person wishes to believe and the other does not.

The cause of this difference is not to be placed in the grace alone ((which is absolutely required, as we shall see), but in the free cooperation of the will with this grace.²⁰ But because the act of faith is not an act of some abstract knowledge, but an act on which the whole direction of one's life depends, the good or evil preceding works have a great influence on the will to believe. Thus Christ teaches: *men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil* (John 3:19f.); *how can you believe, who receive glory from one another?* (John 5:44). Therefore evil works, especially ambition and the love of one's own glory, are obstacles to the will to believe. St. John Chrysostom has some wise things to say about this question.²¹ This influence of good works, especially of humility, appears not only in the first act of faith of someone who is converted to the faith, but also in the whole further development, which faith has in the soul and therefore it must be considered as a certain law in the life of faith.

20. See the Council of Trent s.6 c.5 (D 1525).

21. In *Ioannem* hom.2,5-6: MG 59,43-46. See Toledo, In *Ioannem* c.5 ann.38.

104. Scholium 4. *On the judgment of credibility.* Even though much has been said about this judgment in fundamental theology,²² nevertheless a few things should be recalled here in order to complete this doctrine.

1) The object of the judgment of credibility is the fact itself of revelation, or that God *de facto* has revealed some truth. This judgment must be *certain*, as the Church has always taught. a) Innocent XI condemned the proposition of Aegidius Estrix: "The assent of the faith, supernatural and useful to salvation, is based on only a probable knowledge of revelation and even on the fear with which one fears that God has not spoken" (D 2121).²³ b) Against the *fideists*, the Church held that human reason, without faith, can arrive at certitude about the motives of credibility. Thus she ruled against Bautain (D 2756). c) Against the followers of Hermes Pius IX taught the necessity of inquiring into the fact of revelation until certitude about it is had (D 2778). d) St. Pius X condemned the teaching of the *Modernists*: "The assent of faith rests on an assembly of probabilities" (D 3425).

Actually, faith would not be reasonable, unless a certain judgment about the fact of revelation preceded it. For, in that case a prudent doubt might remain that perhaps God has not revealed anything. But, if such a doubt persisted, it would be most imprudent with an assent firm above all things and irrevocable (such is the assent of divine faith), to affirm what could prudently be suspected rests on a false foundation.

2) This certitude cannot be had *by an act of faith*, but must precede faith. What the Church taught against the *fideists* (D 2756, 2779), is expressly intended by *Vatican Council I* s.3 ch.3 (D 3009), which had in mind those "who teach that those supernatural facts cannot be understood as motives of credibility, unless faith is already presupposed, and on that account the fact itself of revelation to a man, who has not yet accepted the faith, cannot be demonstrated, and therefore that a certain conviction about the truth of the fact of revelation, or about the existence of revelation, cannot precede the acceptance of Christian faith. But they teach that without such conviction by divine grace faith is produced in such a way that it is a spontaneous and immediate act of reason."²⁴

The reason is that in this hypothesis there is a vicious circle, or an infinite process. For, no one can believe without certitude about the fact of revelation. But if this certitude is assumed to be impossible without an act of faith, it is necessary to say about this new act of faith that it supposes certitude about the fact of revelation, and therefore another act of faith, and

22. See SThS 1,2,115-185.

23. See Aubert, 93-101; A. Sohler, *La foi probable. L'acte de foi d'après Gilles Estrix*: Greg 28 (1947) 532-542. The words of Estrix himself, from which the proposition was derived, are quoted in Lennerz, 27.

24. CL 7,529.

so on into infinity.

3) But it is not required for the formation of that certain judgment that the intellect be illuminated *by the light of faith*. Rousselot proposed this doctrine, according to which, when the motives of credibility have been rightly proposed, the intellect still labors under the physical incapability of perceiving the connection between those motives and the truth of the thing revealed. Therefore, even if it sees miracles, it still cannot see them as signs of revelation. This incapability is removed by supernatural grace, or by the habit of faith, strengthening the intellect, elevating it and offering it "the synthetic power" in order to perceive the connection. He calls this light of faith "the eyes of faith." Miracles of course have *in themselves* the objective ability to prove the fact of revelation; but the intellect cannot perceive that ability, without the light of faith. Furthermore, according to Rousselot, the act by which the intellect, so illuminated and elevated, affirms credibility is not distinguished really from the act by which it believes. To understand miracles as signs of revelation, to believe the fact of revelation, to believe revealed truth, are all one and the same act of faith.²⁵

Finally, this theory teaches that the credibility of the faith cannot be certainly known without faith. This, as we have seen, is contrary to the doctrine of the Church. And it does not help to affirm that the motives have in themselves objective value. For, the mind of the Vatican Council is that these motives have the power to bring it about that the intellect *de facto* perceives the credibility. But if for this it is required to perceive the connection, the intellect doubtless must have that power of perception, in order that the Vatican definition be true. The identification of the act of faith with the act of affirming its credibility must also be rejected. For, according to the doctrine of the Church, certitude about the fact of revelation must precede the command of the will, in order that the command may be prudent and faith can be acquired.

4) *Some recent authors*, strongly urging the role of grace in preparation for faith, hold that a man, by the illumination of grace, performs the act of knowledge which suffices in order to elicit the assent of faith, without the certain judgment of credibility, formed by his reason, being necessary always and for each person.²⁶

Surely grace plays a big part in the preparation for faith. However, its function is not to supply the certain judgment of credibility, but to help

25. Rousselot, *Les yeux de la foi*: RechScRel 1 (1916) 241-259, 447-475; *Remarques sur l'histoire de la notion de la Foi naturelle*: RechScRel 4 (1913) 1-36; *Réponse à deux attaques*: RechScRel 5 (1914) 57-69; *La vraie pensée de Bautain*: RechScRel 5 (1914) 453-458. See J. de Wolf, *La justification de la foi* 13-36; Aubert, 451-470; Harent: DTC 6,260-275.

26. See Aubert, 479-511.

the intellect to perceive better and more easily the objective force of the motives. It seems that the doctrine of the Church (D 2778) cannot be saved in any other way.

105. 5) Among the different ways, by which the intellect can come to forming a certain judgment of credibility, we have excluded the way of faith. But there are some other proposed ways that must also be excluded. *Protestants* held that divine revelation could be known by internal experience alone and by the testimony of the Holy Spirit. *Later Protestants* substituted a certain religious sense for this divine testimony, like the *Pietists* who substituted internal inspiration and the *Modernists* a personal need for God. All of these, which ultimately are reduced to experience, supposed that we attain experimentally the supernatural as such. This certainly is false. See Vatican I (D 3033).

6) Therefore nothing remains except to admit that the way to form a certain judgment of credibility is *objective criteria*, and surely primarily *external ones*, although the internal ones also can help. This is taught by Vatican Council I (D 3009) and is urged against the Modernists by St. Pius X (D 3537-3542). The same doctrine was taught by Pius XII: "although so many and such marvelous external signs have been provided by God, by which even by the light of natural reason alone the divine origin of the Christian religion can certainly be proved."²⁷

7) However, individual faithful Christians would find it very difficult to examine the external signs for the credibility of each truth that must be believed. Therefore Christ instituted his *Church*, the infallible teacher of all revelation, and he bestowed on her manifest notes, so that she by herself, existing as a great and perpetual motive of credibility (D 3013), would constitute the ordinary way for the faithful to know the fact of revelation.

8) But the certitude, by which the Church as the teacher of revelation and the revealed truths through her are known, is not necessarily scientific certitude. "*A popular certitude*" suffices, which is had without examination of the motives actually existing for that certain assent. Surely to demand anything more would be absurd for most of the faithful. Indeed a certitude which is called *respective* is sufficient; that is, one based on such knowledge of the motives, which for that believer in those circumstances is sufficient. This respective certitude is explained by theologians in two ways.

For, some explain it so that certitude in those cases is had *because of a motive in itself insufficient*, but accidentally sufficient for the one who believes. Such is the case of children, or even of uneducated adults, who

27. Encyclical "*Humani generis*": AAS 42 (1950) 562.

believe because of the testimony of the pastor, of a missionary, of their mother, etc.; but his motive, which *in itself* is not sufficient, is *for them at that time* a prudent motive, and therefore sufficient. But since the truth proposed to them in this way is actually revealed, God assists the child or the uneducated adult with his grace to elicit the act of faith. When this grace has been given, the following assent is certain and irrevocable. But this does not hold in a case in which the truth proposed for belief has not been actually revealed by God.

However other theologian hold that certitude is had in those cases *because of a motive in itself sufficient*, but which accidentally is not perceived with the clarity that would suffice for each one in order to believe, but only with the clarity which certainly suffices right now for this child or uncultivated person. This motive is the Church herself existing throughout the world; but they do not know this except in a confused manner on the testimony of their pastor or mother; but for them it is a prudent and sufficient motive. In this explanation, certitude, infallibility, and an irrevocable act of faith do not come from grace, but from the really existing motive. Therefore this solution is more pleasing.²⁸

28. See Lennerz, 264-298, where the authors for each of the explanations given in the last question are also mentioned.

ARTICLE II

SUPERNATURAL ASSENT

Thesis 8. The act of faith is supernatural.

S.Th. II-II, q. 6, a. 1-2; Lennerz, 229-235; Pesch, 162-180; Beraza, 596-599; Harent, 337-366.

106. Connection. Since the will commands the act of faith, it ordains itself and the intellect positively for a supernatural last end. Therefore already from this source supernaturality must be given essentially in the act of faith. Therefore we will now consider this property of divine faith.

107. Definition of terms. The gift of God is *supernatural*: it is not positively due to created nature and it is superadded to it. It is said to be supernatural *according to the substance or entitatively*, if the being of the reality is positively not due to nature, surpassing all of its powers; it is said to be supernatural *according to the manner*, if even though the entity itself is not positively unowed, but is produced in a manner that is not due. We affirm the entitative and intrinsic supernaturality of the act of faith, in whatever way it is explained according to the various theories of theologians. Therefore distinguish well the *fact* of supernaturality entitatively and according to its substance (we affirm this in the thesis), from its *explanation* (from which we are now prescind). Therefore that act cannot be elicited by the natural powers alone without the superadded assistance of grace.

The act of faith can be considered either formally or adequately. *Formally* it is the assent itself, which we have described. *Adequately* it is a psychological complex resulting from the command of the will and from the intellectual assent. We are saying that the act of faith is entitatively supernatural not only if it is taken adequately, but also if it is considered formally.

108. Adversaries. *The Pelagians*, by denying internal grace for salvific acts, thereby deny the supernaturality of the act of faith. Therefore, according to them, it takes place by the natural faculties alone.

The Semi-Pelagians, who attribute “the beginning of faith” and “the affection of credulity” to the natural powers alone. For, they distinguished between the beginning of faith and the increase of faith (or integral faith); they said that the first one comes from free will, and the other from the grace of God. But they understood the beginning of faith as the initial act

of faith, by which a man turns himself and submits himself to God; and also as the complex of the acts of believing, praying, repenting, loving God, keeping the commandments, and of the other acts by which a man prepares himself for Baptism. Thus especially Cassian in his *Collation XIII* (but he does not use the formula “beginning of faith”); according to him all of these acts take place often by free will without grace, but sometimes they are preceded by grace. But they understood the affection of credulity not as the will to believe, but as faith itself. Thus especially Faustus Regiensis in his book, *De gratia et libero arbitrio*.¹

Hermes, while distinguishing between faith of the heart and faith of knowledge (see above 93), requires no grace for the latter, since it is caused necessarily by convincing arguments.

109. Doctrine of the Church. *Indiculus* ch.9 (D 248): God is the author of all good affections, works, desires, virtues, by which we move *from the beginning of faith* to God. This document certainly contains the doctrine of the Apostolic See in the years 435-442.²

The Council of Orange II cn.5 (D 375): *the beginning of faith and the affection of credulity*³ are a gift through grace; cn.6 (D 376): the mercy of God is not conferred on believers without grace, but in order that we believe (see cn. 7-8). In the final profession of faith it is said (D 396): faith is not conferred by the good of nature, but by the grace of God. Boniface II in his confirmation of the Council teaches again (D 398-400): faith comes from grace. It cannot be doubted that in these texts he is talking about internal grace; for, the dispute with the Semi-Pelagians was about the same grace concerning which was the dispute with the Pelagians.⁴ He is dealing also with the acts that precede baptismal justification; for the concern here is with the movements of conversion, and therefore Cassian⁵ speaks about the different ways in which men arrive at conversion.⁶

The Council of Trent s.3 ch.6 (D 1526): awakened and assisted by divine grace, they conceive faith..., believing...; cn.3 (D 1553): without the

1. See J. Chéné, *Que signifiaient “initium fidei” et “affectus credulitatis” pour les semipélagiens?*: RechScRel 35 (1948) 566-588.

2. See H. Cappuyns, *L'origine des Capitula pseudocélestiniens contre le semi-pélagianisme*: RevBen 41 (1929) 158-170.

3. “The affection of credulity” must be understood here in the Semi-Pelagian sense for faith itself. In later theology the “pious affection of credulity” was understood to be about the will commanding the assent of faith. These points must be kept in mind to get a correct interpretation of the text.

4. See Cassian, *Collationes* 13,16: ML 49,942.

5. See Cassian, *Collationes* 13,11: ML 49,922-924 and 939-942.

6. Therefore what was written by E. Neveut cannot be admitted, *Des acts entitativement surnaturels*: DivThom (Pi) 32 (1929) 537-562. For the sources of these canons, see G. Fritz, *Orange (Concile de)*: DTC 11,1089-1103.

prevenient grace man cannot believe....

Vatican Council I s.3 ch.3 (D 3010); the faith of knowledge (against Hermes) is a gift of God because it does not happen without grace; cn.5 (D 305): the grace of God is not necessary only for living faith (or of the heart). Also in s.3 ch.3 (D 3008) faith is described as a supernatural virtue; therefore its act will also be supernatural.

110. Theological note. It is *defined divine and Catholic faith* that the act of faith in general is supernatural. This holds true at least for the act of the will commanding the assent of faith, because Trent and Vatican I are treating this point. *It seems to be in the same way a matter of faith* that the assent itself is supernatural, at least when it is placed from the virtue of faith. This is so because Vatican I, describing the supernatural virtue of faith, says that its act is assent because of the authority of God revealing. It is a *common and certain opinion* that this supernaturality is entitative.

111. Proof from Holy Scripture. John 6:44f. a) *Context:* there is a digression here (6:41-47) in the sermon on the bread of life. Then there is the incredulity of the Jews, who do not believe the divine origin of Christ because they know his human origin very well (v.41f.). But Jesus, not giving any further explanation of that origin, explains their incredulity therefore because they refuse to cooperate (v.45) with the internal grace, which is necessary in order to believe (v.43f.).

b) *Argument:* No one can come to Christ unless he is drawn by the Father. But to come to Christ is to believe, and to be drawn by the Father is to accept internal grace. Therefore without internal grace no one can believe. Therefore the act of faith is supernatural.

The minor: To come to Christ is to believe, as is certain from v.29.35.37.40. To be drawn is to be attracted efficaciously by an internal impulse (see John 12:32); but this internal and efficacious impulse is nothing other than internal grace.

From St. Paul: Faith is a gift of God that is not from the powers of nature, nor from works (Eph. 2:8; Phil. 1:29). Therefore faith is supernatural. The Council of Orange II quotes these texts in this sense (D 375).

112. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers* strongly defend against the Semi-Pelagians the necessity of grace for faith. Thus St. Augustine especially in his book, *De Praedestinatione Sanctorum* (R 1978-1991), St. Prosper in his book, *Contra Collatorem* (R 2034-2038), and St. Fulgentius mainly in his *Epistola ad monachos scythas* (R 2246).

They hand on the same doctrine by explaining the cited texts of Holy Scripture (R 1165, 1204, 1890, 2173). In this matter the most famous text is that of St. Augustine (R 1821f.).⁷

b) *Theologians*. In early scholasticism a distinction was made between acquired faith and gratuitous faith; this distinction was not understood by all in the same way. But the supernaturality of gratuitous faith was taught by all. Thus Abelard, Gulielmus Altissiodorensis, Gulielmus Parisiensis, St. Albert the Great, *Summa Halensis*, then Scotus, etc. St. Thomas expressly proposed the supernaturality of the assent of faith, even in the case of lifeless (*informis*) faith (II-II, q. 6, a. 1f.).⁸

At a later time the question was asked not about its supernaturality (no one doubted this), but about its explanation. Thus the supernaturality of faith regarding its manner only but not regarding its substance was defended by some theologians; they explained this manner in different ways by reason of the intensity of the act or promptness or certitude or facility, etc. Following this opinion were Scotus,⁹ the *Nominalists* and some Thomists, like Paludanus, Capreolus, Cajetan, Soto. But the common and certain opinion of theologians holds for the entitative supernaturality of the act of faith, that is, according to its substance. This opinion was defended not by certain *Thomists* alone, but also by *all Jesuit theologians*.¹⁰

113. Theological reasoning. a) An act positively leading to salvation must be supernatural. But the act of faith positively leads to salvation. Therefore it is supernatural.

The major: Because otherwise there would not be proportion between the means and the end, since the end (salvation) is supernatural; but this

7. On the words of St. John Chrysostom that can be adduced in opposition, see E. Boularand, *La venue de l'homme à la foi* 153-64. The texts are:

a) *Hom. de verbis Apostoli 2 Cor 4,13* n.5: "in the beginning to believe and to prepare for the one calling, it depends on our good will; but after the foundation has been laid, then there is need for the help of the Spirit so that it may remain unshaken and impregnable" (MG 51,276).

b) *In epist. ad Hebraeos* hom.19.1: "to wash and cleanse the conscience is the work of God; but it is our task to make progress in the truth and the full certitude of faith" (MG 63,141).

c) *In epist. ad Romanos* hom.2: "you receive [justice] as a celestial gift; the one thing you bring from yourself is that you believe" (MG 60,409).

d) *In epist. ad Romanos* hom.9.2: "he states two things, both what is from Him and what is from us. But what is from Him are various and many and diverse...; but we bring only faith" (MG 63,468).

But in the works of St. Chrysostom the contrary doctrine is affirmed in many texts (see Boularand, 139-153). Moreover, in the cited texts, with the exception of the first one, he is talking about the acts of the faithful who are disposing themselves in order to receive greater benefits from God. However in the first text the divine vocation is said to precede, but it does not harm the freedom in giving consent.

8. See M.D. Chenu, *Pro fidei supernaturalitate illustranda*: XenThom 3,297-307.

9. See F. Schwendinger, *Duns Scoti doctrina de substantiali supernaturalitate fidei infusae*: Ant 8 (1932) 3-38; omitting questions about the word, he seems to affirm this same point.

10. See Suarez, *De gratia* 1.2 c.4-9; Lugo, *De fide* d.9 s.2 n.29; Ripalda, *De fide* d.9 s.1 n.4.

internal proportion was established in this order by God.

The minor: Because by the act of faith we are positively joined together with God; in fact the act of faith itself is the root and foundation of the whole supernatural religious life.

This argument proves the *entitative* supernaturality of faith.

b) This applies firstly with regard to the *command of the will*; for, the positive ordination to the last end depends on this. But also with regard to the *assent itself*; for the act of faith is formally the assent itself. Therefore if faith must be of the same order as the supernatural end, then the assent itself must be supernatural.

114. Objections. 1. Scripture seems to attribute to man the *beginning* of faith. Thus Prov. 16:1.9; Zech. 1:3; Rom. 7:18.

I distinguish the antecedent. It attributes it to man operating with the grace of God, *conceded*; to man operating naturally, *denied*. See how these texts are explained by the Council of Trent s.6 ch.5 (D 1525), according to the doctrine of the Council of Orange II cn.4 (D 374), which is taken from St. Augustine.

2. Many persons have disposed themselves for a *full* conversion. Thus Zacchaeus, the good thief, the centurion, etc.¹¹

I distinguish the antecedent. And they did this with the prevenient grace of God, *conceded*; by their own natural powers alone, *denied*. See again the Council of Orange II (D 397).¹²

115. Scholium 1. *On the supernaturality of the acts that precede the command of the will.* We distinguished (above, n. 103) the judgment of credibility and the judgment of what ought to be believed. There is a question about whether these judgments also must be supernatural. It is necessary to say: if those judgments are understood concretely (right now for me this is credible and ought to be believed), those judgments are supernatural just like all the other pious thoughts that precede the salvific act; but if those judgments are understood speculatively (what God says is credible and should be believed), it does not seem to be required that they be supernatural.

116. Scholium 2. *On the explanation of supernaturality in the act of faith.* 1) We said in the thesis that the act of faith is entitatively supernatural. But the source of that supernaturality is disputed by theologians. But note well that the disputed question is not whether the act of faith is entitatively supernatural, or is only supernatural according to its manner. For we have already proved its entitative supernaturality, which is the fact that must now be explained.

11. See Cassian, *Collationes* 13,11: ML 49,922.

12. On the other holy Fathers, who seem to have said things like the Semi-Pelagians, see in addition to what is said in note 7, Petavius, *Dogmata theologica*, *De Deo* 1.9 c.5.

Indeed the supernaturality of the act of faith is at least given from the fact that it proceeds from a supernatural principle, whether that principle is the habit of faith (when it is present in a believer), or is an actual grace elevating the intellect (when the habit is not present). Therefore this is admitted by all theologians. The further disputed *question* is this: whether also another fount of supernaturality is required, so that, if it is not present in the act of faith, the act cannot be said to be simply and entitatively supernatural.

The question proposed in this way is not proper or exclusive to the act of faith, but it is posed in the same way for all supernatural acts, as was said in the treatise *On Grace* in n. 115.

2) Therefore in this matter there is a *twofold opinion* of theologians. The *first* one holds that the supernaturality is not explained unless the act has a formal object (or motive) that is supernatural. The reason for this opinion is the well known axiom: "an act is specified by its formal object"; therefore if the formal object of faith is not supernatural, the act specified by it cannot be supernatural. The supernatural object in the act of faith is the authority of God revealing, not just in general, but according as God is the author of the supernatural order and end. Thus commonly the Thomists, Suarez, Vázquez, and others.

The *second* opinion holds that the supernaturality is sufficiently explained from the principle eliciting the act, which, as we have said, is supernatural; and nothing else is required. For if operation follows on the way of being, then the faculty, having been raised to the supernatural level and acting as such, must elicit a supernatural act. In this opinion, therefore, the natural and the supernatural acts can have the same psychological motive, even though essentially they must have a different eliciting principle. Thus, v.gr., a natural act of faith and a supernatural act of faith have as their motive the same authority of God revealing. Note however that in this opinion it is not said that the supernatural act *never* has a motive different from the natural act, but that it is *not required* that the motive be different. For, sometimes this is given, v.gr., in an act of supernatural charity. Thus Molina, Lugo, Ripalda, Billot, Lennerz, and others.¹³

This second opinion seems preferable to us.

3) Actually, in the act *two things must be distinguished*: the *first* is the ontological perfection which it brings to the power, as an accidental form

13. See E. David, *De obiecto formali actus salutaris* (Bonn 1913); E. Lingens, *Muss das Formalobject eines übernatürlichen Actes übernatürlich sein?*: ZkathTh 18 (1894) 293-335, 593-624; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *La foi infuse est-elle surnaturelle par son objet formel?*: Ang 19 (1942) 312-319; T. Urdáñez, *La teología del acto sobrenatural en la escuela de Salamanca*: CiencTom 62 (1942, I) 121-145; 63 (1942, II) 5-24; C. Hubatka, *Actus specificatur ab obiecto formali*: DivThom (Fr) 27 (1949) 412-420.

received into it; the *second* is the habitude that it says to the object, or the psychological tendency, because of which it is an act of knowing, or an act of loving in this or that way. Indeed it is very well understood that this psychological tendency, or habitude to the object, is specified by the object itself; for, the object is the quasi terminus of this tendency, to which it is completely directed. But from this it does not seem to follow that the ontological perfection itself, which the act brings to the power, is specified also by the object. Since this is not something relative, nor does it per se say an order to something, but it is absolute. But it can well be understood that this perfection is specified by its own principle, since the effect reflects the perfection of the cause from which it comes. Thus it seems that we must apply the doctrine which St. Thomas uses regarding habits and their specification. Therefore St. Thomas says: "I answer that, a habit is both a form and a habit. Hence the specific distinction of habits may be taken in the ordinary way in which forms differ specifically; or according to that mode of distinction which is proper to habits. Accordingly forms are distinguished from one another in reference to the diversity of their active principles, since every agent produces its like in species. Habits, however, imply order to something: and all things that imply order to something are distinguished according to the distinction of the things to which they are ordained" (I-II, q. 54, a. 2). Therefore according to this doctrine, the meaning (not the amplitude) of the quoted axiom must be distinguished. For an act, *as an act*, as it says this psychological tendency, as it is this way of attaining the object, without doubt is specified by the formal object. But an act, *as a form*, as it says the absolute perfection of the power, is not necessarily specified by the formal object, but it is specified by the principle eliciting it.¹⁴

4) But if we speak in particular about this opinion in the act of divine faith, it is necessary to say that *the diversity of motives* is not founded in any way on the documents of the Church. For, in them it is not said that the motive of faith is the authority of God precisely as he is the author of the supernatural order and end; but it is simply the authority of God revealing. That is, the motive is the testimony of God as such. Certainly the testimony of God has the same authority and worth, whether it is of the natural order or of the supernatural order. Finally, this diversity of motives contradicts experience. And it is not right to say that the matter is metaphysical, not experimental. For, a psychological motive operates only psychologically,

14. See R. Garrigou-Lagange, *Actus specificatur ab obiecto formali. De universalitate huiusce principii*: ActPon-tAcRomSTh 1 (1934) 139-153; H. Lennerz, *De vero sensu principii "actus specificatur ab obiecto formali"*: Greg 17 (1936) 143-146.

and the motive of an act of knowledge influences only what is known. Therefore a different motive in natural faith and supernatural faith would have to be known. Moreover, the words quoted from Holy Scripture with regard to proving a supernatural motive of faith, signify nothing other than that the act of faith is not elicited without the grace of God; and this is a completely different question.¹⁵

5) As a *consequence* of what we have said, we admit the possibility of a natural act of faith, whose motive is the authority of God revealing, but whose eliciting principle is the intellect alone with the natural concurrence of God. I said that we admit the *possibility* of such an act, not its *necessity*, which some ancient theologians proposed as the terminus in the preparatory process leading to faith, without which supernatural faith itself could not be had. For, we think that that natural terminus before faith is an act of knowledge, not an act of faith. Such natural faith cannot be said to be condemned by the Council of Orange II (D 375), where it says: "For those who say that the faith by which we believe in God is natural declare that all those who are strangers to the Church of Christ are, in some way, believers." For in that text Faustus of Riez is being attacked; he called faith that knowledge of God, which a man can have by the natural light of reason, because in himself he has naturally an image of the divine.¹⁶ This notion does not coincide in any way with our concept of natural faith.

117. Corollary. Everything we have said so far is clearly included in the definition that St. Thomas presents to our theology of faith: "The act of believing is an act of the intellect assenting to the divine truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God" (II-II, q. 2, a. 9).

15. See R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De revelatione* 1,462f.

16. Faustus of Riez, *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2,6-7: ML 58,821-828.

ARTICLE III

THE ANALYSIS OF FAITH

Thesis 9. The act of faith in the matter of assent ultimately is explained only by the previously known authority of God revealing.

Lennerz, 299-336; Pesch, 315-354; Beraza, 518-575; Harent, 469-512.

118. Connection. After we have described the *nature* of the act of faith, we ask what the intimate *causes* are, or what are the ultimate motives or foundation on which it is based. This explanation of the act of faith according to its motives is called by theologians "the analysis of faith."

119. Definition of terms. *Ultimately is explained*, that is, this is the ultimate motive or foundation of the act of faith; beyond this, no other motive *of assent itself* can be sought. For, we are dealing with the logical motive only of the assent; not with the motive of the command of the will, or of the judgments of credibility. Therefore it is the motive internal to the assent itself; any other motives are extrinsic to it.

In the matter of assent, that is, insofar as it is *this* assent, having these essential qualities. For, the explanation of faith could be sought in the matter of virtue, inasmuch as it is a good act; that is, the source from which the act of faith becomes a good act or meritorious. But our question here concerns the explanation of assent itself inasmuch as it is absolutely certain, having been made because of the authority of God revealing.

Only by the authority, that is, the ultimate motive is the motive of the assent of faith, without having to appeal further to the motives of credibility.

Previously known, that is, it is not explained by knowledge of the motive, but by the motive as it is in itself, although, as is clear, that motive must be known. But this knowledge of the motive is not the motive, nor does it cause the assent, nor does it measure it in any way; rather, it is only the condition so that the authority of God as it is in itself can cause the assent and measure it. We say, however, that it is previously known, because the motive must surely be known and in fact known for certain before the free command of the will, as we said above in n. 104. But given this knowledge of the motive, which is had before the assent, nothing else is required for the assent itself of faith, whether it is said to be had by faith, either immediately or in any other way.

120. Here is **our opinion** on this question: In the process of faith there

are three steps:

a) First, the intellect affirms with certainty the existence of the motive of faith for a definite truth: this one, for example the Trinity, has been revealed by God; hence this is for me *credible and ought to be believed*. This judgment is caused by motives of credibility and that it ought to be believed; however this is not the assent of divine faith, but it is scientific assent. By it the Trinity is not believed, nor is the authority of God revealing believed, but it is known that God has revealed the Trinity.

b) Then *the will commands* the intellect to assent to the Trinity because of the authority of God revealing, that is, that it give the assent which that authority as it is in itself deserves, and which therefore is measured by that authority. The motive of this act is the goodness which is found in the submission of intellect and will to God the creator and last end.

c) Finally, *the intellect assents* to the Trinity with that firmness, which the will commanded. The internal motive of this assent is the authority of God revealing as it is in itself. This motive was already known before the command of the will, and it does not have to be known further within the assent of faith. Therefore within the assent there is no such thing as a motive of the motive, because the authority of God is not affirmed further in the assent of faith; its affirmation before the assent is sufficient. But the assent of faith is made *just as it was commanded by the will*. But it was commanded according as the authority of God as it is in itself deserves, not according as our actual knowledge of the authority of God deserves. Hence this knowledge of authority is not the cause of the assent, but it is only a condition so that the assent can be made.

Hence I do not believe in the Trinity because I believe or see or know that God said it; but simply *because God said it*. Thus, in the matter of assent, the act of faith rests on its motive as it is in itself; and one cannot seek further within the assent itself for the motive.

This opinion was formulated by Scotus,¹ who was the first one to raise the problem about the analysis of faith; later it was widely disputed in the 16th century. It is defended by Elizalde and Thyrso González in the 17th century, and in our time by Frins, Semeria, Schiffini, Billot, Pesch, Bainvel, Van Noort, Lennerz.

121. Adversaries. Many systems have been devised to solve this problem.² Since they are developed differently by the various authors, they

1. See F. Schwendinger, *De analysi fidei iuxta Ioannem Duns Scotus*: Ant 6 (1931) 417-440.

2. See Harent, 471-512; Beraza, 518-540; J. Stuffer, *Zur Analyse des Glaubensaktes*: ZkathTh 66 (1946) 183-190.

are difficult to explain. Therefore we will give only the different tendencies of the authors:

a) THE FIRST TENDENCY: The analysis of the act of faith is found in the *motive believed in the same act*. That is, the Trinity is believed because of the authority of God revealing, and by the same act this authority of God is also believed because of itself. Thus expressly Suarez.³ According to him, our divine faith depends on two principles: that God cannot deceive in what he says, and that we believe what God says. The latter cannot be known by natural evidence; for in this case, the assent of a higher order (faith) would be based per se on the assent of a lower order (the natural knowledge of credibility). On the contrary, the whole certitude and firmness of faith rests on its formal object, and so on its knowledge, because as already known it moves one to believe. Therefore he who believes, must believe not only God's revelation, but also that God is truthful. But he must believe this with supernatural and infused faith. And indeed in general with the same assent by which he believes what has been revealed by God. That is: "The one who believes something that God says, because He says it, necessarily believes that God is truthful in what he says; this is not surprising in divine faith, because it is also found in human faith. For, no one can believe to be true, what Peter says, without believing that Peter is truthful in what he says, because they are almost the same... Therefore in this way of believing, which perhaps is per se necessary for faith, the formal reason for the object of faith is not known by the evidence, but by faith, because it is known by the same act by which the believed matter itself is known." But if it is said that divine faith then in this way is explained: "I believe that God is triune, because He said it; but I believe Him when he speaks, because he is truthful; but I believe that He is truthful, because he also said this; but this type of explanation seems incredible"; if this is said, then he responds: "by conceding first of all that this is a great mystery of faith: which, although he does not clearly see the object, nor the things believed, nevertheless he does not accept his object, as it per se rests on it, as known by some other light, but by his own power and efficacy he believes it. In a similar way, St. Thomas said that with the same act we believe God and we believe in God. Moreover such an act is wholly supernatural and it cannot be had without the special help of grace." And he adds that "this mystery is very agreeable with reason; for, this whole certitude is due to the infinite

3. *De fide* d.3 s.12. P. Dulau, *La pensée de Suarez et celle des Salmanticenses dans la question "de ultima fidei resolutione"*: RevThom 9 (1926) 517-522; Teresius a S. Agnete, *De ultima resolutione actus fidei* (Rome 1942); on this book see Garrigou-Lagrange, *A propos du livre du P. Teresio "de ultima resolutione actus fidei"*: Ang 19 (1942) 319-323.

divine excellence, indeed it seems intrinsically to follow from the quality (so to speak) of the divine testimony, inasmuch as it is absolutely infallible and can obligate one to believe what he says as infallible; for, by saying something, by that very fact he says that he is truthful in what he affirms....” In this same tendency, regarding its essential points, are Valencia, Tanner, Coninck, Sylvester Maurus, Platel, Gormaz, Tepe, Wilmers. Thus also recently Garrigou-Lagrange, who holds that the formal object of faith, since it is supernatural, cannot be attained except by faith.⁴

In this tendency all those seem to be included who hold that a new immediate perception of the motives of credibility is had by the light of faith or by a convincing representation, provided that they are speaking about the assent itself. Thus among others are Arriaga, Rassler, Ulloa, Viva and, it seems, Capreolus and Báñez; later Erber, Mazzella; in our time Rousselot, Huby, H. Lang, Stolz, and others. See also K. Adam.⁵

122. b) THE SECOND TENDENCY: the analysis of faith is found *in the motive of faith together with the motives of credibility*, and this whole is affirmed by the same assent of faith *immediately, although obscurely*. Thus Lugo.⁶ According to him the assent of faith takes place by this process: “Divine revelation cannot deceive; but God revealed that the Word is a man; therefore the Word is a man. All of this can be attained by one act, if you say: the Word is a man, because God revealed it, and the revelation of God is infallible.” Total divine faith rests on these two principles.

But *both propositions* of that discourse *are immediate*. Surely the *major*, because it is equivalent to this proposition: if God speaks, he speaks truly; this conditional proposition can be known from the knowledge of the terms. There is a greater difficulty in the *minor* proposition, which contains the fact of revelation. For, it can be asked how some contingent fact can be known immediately.

In order to solve this problem, Lugo says that the assent to this proposition is *immediate and per se known*; however it is not evident, *but obscure*, although certain and supernatural, and elicited by the habit of faith as the first principle of faith itself. Therefore the voice of God speaking can sometimes be heard clearly and evidently; but often it is not heard so clearly, but obscurely, especially when God speaks through messengers and

4. *De revelatione* t.1 s.4 and elsewhere.

5. See J. Stufler, *Der Gewissheitsgrund des göttlichen Glauben*: ZkathTh 48 (1924) 1-36.

Aubert seems to come to the same opinion, 729-734. He proposes a direct and supernatural perception of revelation in the fact of the Church; hence the believer assents because by him the divine speech actually is perceived immediately through the reality of the Church.

6. *De virtute fidei divinae* d.1 s.6 and 7.

ministers. Therefore it is necessary to explain how that assent is immediate.

Lugo explains it like this: "although God does not speak to us immediately, nevertheless he speaks in some way through the mouth of those who propose the mysteries revealed to them"; he speaks "sometimes by proposing mysteries, sometimes by performing miracles, so that we not only perceive the voice of God speaking to us with our ears, but also with vision." For, "just as, when I read a letter from a friend, I judge immediately from the sight of his handwriting, which I recognize, that my friend is speaking with me, and although at times I may fear whether or not it is his handwriting, still I can with probability evaluate it by assent arising immediately from the recognition of the handwriting...: so also, considering the miracles and signs, by which God speaks to me, although I do not see clearly that the letters and voice are God's, nevertheless it does appear obscurely, but immediately and with such proportion, that the will prudently commands that immediate assent be elicited without any fear of error." And that assent cannot be said to be mediated. For, "when I see that the mystery of the Incarnation is proposed to me as revealed by God, and is proposed with such an abundance of miracles, martyrs, doctors, with such harmony of the ages and conformity with reason, etc., I compare that proposition with the idea that I have of the mediated speech of God, and, although it is not manifest, still I judge from the terms: such a way of proposing is absolutely a way that is worthy of God."

Similarly Haunoldus, Mastrius, Hurtado, Ripalda, Franzelin.

123. c) THE THIRD TENDENCY: the analysis of faith relies on *the authority of God as a proximate motive, and on the motives of credibility as on remote motives*, which are known by a scientific act before the assent. According to this opinion, in the act of faith itself the motives of credibility are accepted and affirmed, which are true motives of the assent of faith, not however proximate but remote. However this opinion does not say that those motives of credibility are known a second time in the act of faith by some kind of knowledge which would be truly a knowledge of faith. But it holds that those motives remain known as they were known before, that is, not by the assent of faith, but scientifically. Hence this opinion differs from that of some recent authors (mentioned in the first tendency), who hold a twofold credibility of faith: one natural and scientific—before the assent of faith; the other supernatural and of faith, in the assent itself.

Thus Stentrup, Hurter, Stufler,⁷ Mitzka.⁸

7. *Zur Analyse der Glaubensaktes*: ZkathTh 66 (1946) 190-195.

8. See also F. Schwendinger, *Die Lösung des Problems der analysis fidei?*: ThGl 24 (1932) 26-42.

d) THE FOURTH TENDENCY: the analysis of faith relies *on the motive if faith alone, which is affirmed without any further objective motive, from the command of the will*. That is, the revealed truth is affirmed *in the act of faith itself* because of the authority of God revealing, which is the motive of faith itself. But this authority of God is not affirmed because of any objective motive, but from the command alone of the will. The reason is because the authority of God revealing in that act is the immediate object of the free assent. However it is presupposed necessarily that the authority of God revealing was already known before and affirmed by a certain consent. Indeed this assent (preceding the assent of faith) doubtless has its own objective motive, for it is an assent of science. This motive is the motive or the motives of credibility.

Thus Mazzella, Beraza, Lercher, Straub.⁹

124. Theological note. *More probable.*

It is proved in three steps:

1) *The motive of faith is not affirmed in the assent itself:*

For, a) either it is affirmed from faith, b) or it is affirmed immediately from itself, c) or it is affirmed from the motives of credibility that were previously known, d) or it is affirmed without a motive. But none of these can be said. Therefore the motive of faith is simply not affirmed in the assent itself.

The minor: Not a): In this opinion you believe in the Trinity because God revealed it, but at the same time you believe that God revealed it. Therefore I ask: why do you believe that God revealed it? Either you believe this because of another known motive, and I ask about that one too, and so there is given a process into infinity; or you believe because of the revelation itself of God, and so there is a vicious circle. They say that this is a great mystery of faith. But what is the source of this mystery? For, mysteries must not be admitted unless they are proved expressly from revelation. However nowhere have the founts of revelation or the magisterium of the Church proposed such a mystery that must be admitted. Furthermore, the act of faith essentially is assent because of an extrinsic motive in the matter itself which is the terminus of the assent (for in this it differs essentially from scientific assent, or simply from assent given

9. *De analysi fidei* (Innsbruck 1922) 382ff. See also *Zu meinem Werke "De analysi fidei"*: ZkathTh 48 (1924) 325-336; *Nochmals zu meinem Werke „De analysi fidei“*: ZkathTh 49 (1935) 450-465; *Noch ein Wort zur Analysis fidei*: ZkathTh 50 (1926) 454-463.

because of the evidence). Indeed if the authority of God is believed because of itself, it is not admitted because of a motive extrinsic to itself. Therefore, as such, it cannot be believed in the individual acts of faith.

Not b): In this opinion you believe in the Trinity because the Trinity is proposed in concrete in such a way that it cannot not be a doctrine given by God. But then faith is based on natural knowledge, although it is immediate. Also, the fact of revelation cannot be known from an analysis of the terms of the proposition, because it is a contingent fact. For, that concrete proposition of revelation either is taken conditionally (and it becomes nothing), or categorically (and then it is not immediate, since it must be proved by arguments). But if it is said that the miracles are the voice of God, this is understood only in the sense that they are signs and means by which we can *prove* the divine locution; but not in the sense that the miracles, even taken in the complex with the concrete way by which the revelation itself is proposed, are for us the immediate locution of God.

Not c): In this opinion faith rests finally on natural knowledge. Therefore, if I believe the Trinity because I know that God revealed it, but I know this from rational arguments, the firmness of faith seems to depend on the knowledge I have of these arguments.

Not d): These authors perhaps are in fact saying nothing different from what we are saying, that is, that in the assent the motive is not affirmed, but it is attained as a terminus, namely, as that *by which*. But if they want to say that the motive in the assent is affirmed indeed as *that which*, but that it is affirmed without a motive, then they are positing a blind act that cannot be sustained.

125. 2) *Our opinion does not contradict other theological truths, but rather explains them very well.*

For, a) our opinion does not put anything else into the assent of faith except what the Church puts there: the authority of God revealing, as the motive; and the assistance of divine grace as the principle.

b) Our opinion explains very well: 1) *The obscurity and freedom* of faith, as we have seen; since assent because of authority is essentially obscure and free. 2) *The certitude and firmness of faith above all things*; because the assent of faith is measured by the motive as it is in itself; but the motive is the authority of God revealing, which in itself is infallibly connected with truth, in a way stronger than any other created motive. 3) *The reason for submission* in faith; because the assent of faith, given and specified by the authority alone of God revealing, necessarily is a free and complete submission to God when he speaks. 4) *The supernatural* of

faith; because the eliciting principle of faith is entitatively supernatural; for, every principle operates according as it is in act.

3) *Our opinion sufficiently solves the difficulties*, as we shall see.

When all of these reasons are taken together, our opinion seems to be preferable.

126. Objections. 1. The motive of assent and the formal object of assent are the same. But in every assent its formal object is affirmed. Therefore the motive of faith must be affirmed in the assent of faith.

I distinguish the major. If the formal object is taken broadly they are the same, *conceded*; if it is taken strictly, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* The formal object in the broad sense is affirmed in every assent, *denied*; in the strict sense, *I bypass the minor*, for according to some authors it would have to be distinguished further: it is affirmed as that which, *denied*; as that by which, *conceded*.

Explanation: the motive and the formal object often are used as synonyms; and the reason is because in many cases they really come together. For, both move, both specify. And therefore if the formal object is taken in the broad sense, they are the same. But if we prefer to speak in a more strict manner, when we are considering the intellect a distinction must be made, because in the will they seem always to coincide. For, the formal object always pertains to the object, since it is the reason because of which the object is attained by the faculty. But the motive can be either in the object itself (evidence) or outside of it (testimony).

Therefore if the formal object is taken strictly, without doubt it is attained in every intellectual act. But that object is only what is *true*, and it is unique for every act of the intellect, since the intellect is the faculty whose object is truth. And thus the specification of the faculty is given from the formal object. However, specification among the various kinds of assent is not from the formal object in the strict sense, but from the motive.

However it can still be said that a different formal object is given for the different kinds of assent. Thus, the formal object of scientific assent would be *being as knowable*; the formal object of the assent of faith would be *being as credible*. But it is necessary to note that such a formal object is nothing in the object itself that is known or believed; for, the object in itself is neither knowable nor credible. These are extrinsic denominations resulting in the object from some motive. Therefore, the formal object so understood does not seem to be affirmed in every assent, because the affirmation of assent tends to the object as it is in itself. Indeed, even given that such a *credible* formal object is affirmed v.gr., still its credibility would not be affirmed nor that from which it is credible (i.e., testimony).

If the motive is taken strictly, it is not necessarily affirmed in the assent itself, because the affirmation is concerned with that to which the assent tends; but it tends to the object as it is in itself. Therefore, since the motive can be something extrinsic to the object, it is not surprising that, when the object has been affirmed, its motive is not

always affirmed.¹⁰

127. 2. In scientific assent the material object is affirmed because of the evidence, and by the same act the evidence is affirmed because of itself. Therefore, similarly, in the assent of faith, the believed object is affirmed because of the authority of God revealing, and by the same act the authority of God revealing is affirmed because of himself.

I deny the parity. Evidence is something in the object itself; but testimony is something outside the believed object.

3. I believe revealed truth because of the authority of God revealing. Therefore this authority must be believed even more. For otherwise the effect would surpass the cause.

I distinguish the antecedent. I believe, that is, I affirm because of the authority of God revealing, as he is in himself, *conceded*; as he is known by me, *denied*. *I also distinguish the consequent.* If I were to affirm the truth because of my knowledge of the authority of God, *conceded*; if I affirm it because of the authority as it is in itself, *denied*. It is clear that the effect does not surpass the cause, because the assent in its whole reality is measured by the authority of God as he is in himself.

4. The motive of assent does not move unless it is known. Therefore the knowledge of the motive is the cause of the assent.

I distinguish the antecedent. That is, it does not move unless it is known, *conceded*; that is, it moves in the way in which it is known, *I subdistinguish*: if it concerns an intrinsic motive, *conceded*; if it concerns an extrinsic motive, *denied*. *I also distinguish the consequent.* If it is required only that it be known, *denied*; if it moves in the way in which it is known, *I subdistinguish*: it is the cause of scientific assent, *conceded*; of the assent of faith, *denied*.¹¹

10. See Lennerz, 323-326.343.

11. See A.M. Elorriaga, *De la afirmación del objeto formal en el acto de fe divina*: Greg 10 (1929) 537-574.

CHAPTER II

On the material object of divine faith

128. We have studied the more intimate nature of the act of divine faith without speaking *about its formal object*. The reason for this was explained in the previous article. For, the specification of the faculties doubtless takes place by the formal object taken strictly. Thus the intellect is specified by the true and the will by the good. But within one and the same faculty different acts are specified strictly not by new formal objects, but by specifically diverse motives. Thus within the intellect, the act of science is diversified essentially from the act of faith because the motive of science is evidence and the motive of faith is testimony. Therefore at the beginning we treated the essential motive of divine faith, for without this consideration it is impossible to know anything certain about its nature.

Therefore it remains for us now to consider *the material object of faith*, that is, the objects about which such an act of divine faith, which we have described, can be concerned. It is clear that we are not asking about each individual truth to be believed. But the question is in general: what is required that some truth can be believed with divine faith? After what we have already said the response is obvious. For, since the act of faith cannot be given without its essential motive, and since on the other hand the motive is the authority of God revealing, it cannot be believed by divine faith unless it is a truth that has been revealed by God. Divine revelation, however, can be taken in many different ways. Therefore the question is about how some truth must be revealed so that it really comes under the testimony of God, and therefore can be believed with divine faith.

ARTICLE I

STRICTLY REVEALED

Thesis 10. The material object of divine faith is only what has been revealed by revelation in the strict sense, whether it is immediate or mediated.

Lennerz, 144-185; Pesch, 231-250; Beraza, 230-234.517; Harent, 122-150.

129. **Definition of terms.** 1. *Revelation* is the manifestation of some truth made by God. Revelation *in the broad sense* is a manifestation made

by God through creatures. Because creatures are an effect of God, in them God has manifested to us his own perfections, since a cause is known from its effects.

2. Revelation *in the strict sense* is the attesting speech of God; this idea was treated extensively in fundamental theology.

Revelation *in the broad sense is natural*, since it is founded on creation itself. In man the response to this is religious knowledge gained by the natural light of reason. Vatican Council I treats this in s.3 ch.2 at the beginning (D 3004).

Revelation *in the strict sense is supernatural*, since it is absolutely unowed to man, as the Vatican Council teaches in the same place. In man the response to this is faith.

We say that revelation in the broad sense is not sufficient, but that strict revelation is always required, so that some truth can be believed with divine faith.

3. Revelation is called *immediate* or *mediated* by reason of the subject. Immediate revelation is had if God speaks through himself or through an angel; v.gr., by the prophets in the O.T or by the Apostles through Christ in the N.T. Mediated revelation is had if God speaks through the mediation of others, or by legates; v.gr., to the people of Israel through the prophets, or to us through the Apostles. Therefore there is immediate revelation, if between God speaking and man hearing no other person is involved.

We are saying that immediate revelation is not required in order to establish the object of faith, but that mediated revelation suffices. Or, which comes to the same thing, in order that someone may be able to believe some truth with divine faith, that it is not necessary that the revelation of that truth be made to the believer himself.

PART 1. STRICT REVELATION IS REQUIRED

130. Adversaries. *Rationalists*, who said that faith is all rational knowledge of things pertaining to God and to religion.¹ The natural revelation corresponding to this faith is explained differently by different authors. Thus the works of God in nature, which stir up in us some knowledge of God, some of them called “universal revelation”; the natural existence of outstanding men, who by their own personality and by their works stir us up to a greater knowledge of God, they call “particular revelation.” Some,

1. See CL 7,527.

like Harnack, admit only the last kind.²

Semi-rationalists, who call faith every firm persuasion about God and divine things, although the truth would be held only because of the well known intrinsic connection of ideas.³ Therefore they did not require any strict revelation.

Modernists, for whom revelation can be nothing else than the consciousness acquired by man of his relation to God (D 3420), or the manifest idea of God in his consciousness (D 3483).

131. Doctrine of the Church. *Vatican Council I* s.3 ch.3 (D 3008): we believe what has been *revealed* by God because of the authority of God revealing. Revelation in this text is understood as that supernatural and strict revelation, about which the Council was speaking in the preceding chapter, as is certain from the testimony of the secretary. For the Council wishes to teach that faith on the part of man corresponds to revelation on the part of God.⁴ According to what is said later in the same chapter (D 3011), all those things are to be believed that are contained in the word of God, written or handed down; therefore, *revealed things*.

Vatican Council I c.3 ch.4 (D 3015) established a twofold order of knowledge: namely, on the one hand we know by natural reason those things which natural reason can attain; on the other hand we know by divine faith mysteries hidden in God, which were *revealed* to us by God.

St. Pius X *in the oath against Modernism* (D 3537-3542) teaches that in faith assent is given to truth externally accepted by hearing concerning those things that have been *said, witnessed to and revealed* by God.

The Council of Trent s.6 ch.6 (D 1526) spoke about faith *from hearing*.

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

132. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) *Rom. 10:5-21*: for the faith necessary for salvation one must believe the preaching (v. 8f.). Then he explains it: the Lord must be invoked for salvation (v. 13); but faith is required for this calling; and knowledge of the faith accepted from hearing; and preaching for hearing (v. 14); and for preaching a preacher (v. 15); and for a preacher a mission (v. 15). And for justifying faith it is necessary that it be *from hearing*, which is not had except from preaching (f. 17).

b) *Mark 16:15*: The Apostles are sent to preach what they heard from

2. See Harent, 138.

3. See CL 7,527.

4. See CL 7,166.

Christ (see Matt. 28:18-20). But in the hearers faith is the response to the preaching. 1 Cor. 2:7-10 bears witness to how the Apostles did it.

133. Proof from tradition. a) The Fathers say that faith comes because of the authority of God revealing, as we saw in thesis 6.

b) They insist on the *traditional* character and the immutability of our faith, as we shall see in the second part.

134. Theological reasoning. Divine faith essentially demands the testimony of God as its motive. But this testimony is not given except in revelation in the strict sense. Therefore for divine faith revelation in the strict sense is required.

The minor: Testimony is established by knowledge and veracity. But veracity is not given except where there is speech in the strict sense. Therefore testimony is not given without strict revelation.

PART 2. MEDIATED REVELATION IS SUFFICIENT

135. Adversaries. *The Protestants* admitted revelation given through Christ and through the Prophets, which for us is mediated. But because they admitted no source of revelation except Holy Scripture, understood in the sense that the Holy Spirit privately inspired in each believer, in practice they believed the “revelation” made to each one immediately by God. Actually, many sects embraced this error, like the *Anabaptists* and the *Quakers*.

136. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* s.4 (D 1501) teaches that revelation is contained in Scripture and in the oral traditions, which have come down to us from the mouth of Christ to the Apostles, or from the Apostles by the dictation of the Holy Spirit. All this for us is mediated revelation (see D 3421) where it is taught that revelation was completed with the Apostles).

Furthermore, the Church has often taught the traditional sense of our faith. See the Oath against Modernism (D 3548-3550).

137. Theological note. It is *at least theologically certain*. For everything must be believed that is contained in Scripture and Tradition; and it must be in the same sense that the Church always had. But we have these things through mediated revelation. Therefore mediated revelation is sufficient

for faith. This is so unless someone prefers to say, and perhaps in a better way, that the thesis is *implicitly defined divine and Catholic faith*.

138. Proof from Holy Scripture. The Gospel of Christ must be believed by every creature, assuming that it has been preached (Mark 16:15; Matt. 28:16); Christian doctrine is traditional, so that, having come from revelation, it must be faithfully protected in the deposit of faith (Gal. 1:9.12; 2 Tim. 1:14; 2:2). Hence the apostolic preaching is *the word of God* (1 Thess. 2:13). But these statements say that mediated revelation is the material object of divine faith. Therefore mediated revelation suffices for the material object of faith.

139. Proof from tradition. a) The doctrine, which is preached, must be *the same that* was handed down to us by Christ and the Apostles (R 2, 74, 192, 209-213, 226, 257, 298, 443, 2169).

b) St. Athanasius teaches that the Nicene Fathers in order to define the faith decreed not what seemed good to them, but what the *apostolic faith* was (R 785). Certainly this has been done in all the Councils; this is the source of the dogmatic teaching of the Church.

There is more about this matter in fundamental theology.

140. Theological reasoning. Wherever it can be established with certainty about the existence of divine revelation, faith can be given to God speaking. But it can be established for us with certainty that God spoke to the Prophets and Apostles. Therefore what God revealed to them we can believe with divine faith. But we do not have certainty about this except through mediated revelation. Therefore mediated revelation suffices for divine faith.

The main **objections** against the thesis have been answered already in fundamental theology where we treated the Church's magisterium.

141. Scholium 1. On private revelation. a) Revelation is called *public*, if from the intention of God speaking it is directed to the whole human race or at least to some perfect society. It is called *private*, if from the intention of God speaking it is directed to some private person. Concretely, public revelation is concerned with what is contained in the deposit of faith, and it was completed with the Apostles; every other revelation is private. There is a question about whether for the object of divine faith public revelation is required, or whether private revelation suffices. And there is also a question about the man to whom private revelation was given, namely, whether he can believe with divine faith what has certainly been revealed to him by God.

b) In general, the Thomists hold a *negative opinion* about this⁵; an *affirmative opinion* is more common among Jesuit theologians, and they are followed in this by Billuart and some others. Note, however, that the theologians do not always pose the question in the same way, since they often ask *about the habit* which is the principle from which that assent to private revelation comes. Hence the affirmative opinion, which is at least more probable, must be said to be common and certain, if one prescinds from the further question.

c) *And indeed* in Scripture there are some cases of private revelation (v.gr., Gen. 15:5), in which a true act of divine faith is given (Rom. 4:16).⁶ But if the motive of faith is kept in mind, it is given in the same way both in public and in private revelation.

d) On the contrary, there is a serious *objection*: for the object of faith it is required that the revealed truth should be subordinated to the principal object of faith, namely, to God, to whom it is referred; this is not the case in private revelation. *But* it is clear that by private revelation some truth about God can be revealed. Therefore then at least it will be an object of divine faith. Therefore private revelation of itself suffices.

142. Scholium 2. *On the proposition of the object of faith by the Church.* In Vatican Council I s.3 ch.3 (D 3011) in order to establish the object of faith two conditions are required: that it be contained in the deposit of revelation, and that it is proposed by the Church as revealed. But note that there it is not dealing with divine faith simply (for which the first alone would suffice), but with divine *and Catholic* faith. Therefore the same object, which was revealed by God (of course by a public revelation), and which therefore already was a sufficient object of divine faith, receives now a new extrinsic element, namely, a proposition of the Church. However this proposition does not modify the motive of divine faith, but it is a mere condition making us more certain that God really has spoken. Therefore many things can be believed with divine faith, which cannot be believed with divine and Catholic faith; but the converse is not true. An object of divine and Catholic faith is called a *dogma of faith* (D 3073-3074).⁷

143. Scholium 3. *On the object of attribution.* As St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q. 1, a. 1), among the material objects of faith some are God himself, others are diverse from God. The former because of themselves pertain to the object of faith; the latter only inasmuch as they have some relation to God. Therefore theologians say that God is the object of attribution in faith; this is also called the formal object which (*obiectum formale quod*), in opposition to the authority of God revealing, which they call the formal object by which (*obiectum formale quo*). But not all theologians speak about this matter in the same way.⁸

5. See Salmanticenses, *De fide* d.1 dub.4.

6. See Beraza, 510.

7. See Mazzella, 932-939. On the history of the word and concept of dogma, see A. Deneffe, *Dogma, Wort und Begriff*: Schol 6 (1931) 381-400, 505-538; *Tradition und Dogma bei Leo dem Grossen*: Schol 9 (1934) 551-554; J.M. Parent, *La notion de dogme au XIII^e siècle*: Etudes d'Histoire Littéraire et Doctrinale du XIII^e siècle 1 (1932) 141-163.

8. See Beraza, 228f.; Pesch, 181-189; Mazzella, 284-300.

144. Scholium 4. *To believe God, to believe in a God, to believe in God.* This formula, used often in early scholasticism (see II-II, q. 2, a. 2), was introduced from St. Augustine⁹ by the Master of the Sentences.¹⁰ To believe God signifies the motive of faith; to believe in a God denotes the principal material object or object of attribution; to believe in God signifies total submission, which by faith we offer to God as our last end.¹¹

145. Scholium 5. *On the dogmatic proposition, according as it is an object of faith.* Our faith is directed to God and to other things according as they have some relation to God. But from the human way of knowing, by faith we do not immediately attain the revealed object itself, but by the mediation of some objective proposition. Hence dogmatic formulas must not be rejected as something that separates us from God (K. Barth), but they must be preserved and guarded as human expressions of supernatural reality. The Church has put her own seal of infallibility on them, and therefore authentically declared that they correctly express that divine truth. See the Encyclical, *Humani generis*.

9. *In Ioannem* tr.29 n.6: ML 35,1631.

10. *Sentences* 3 d.23 c.4.

11. See Harent, 64-67.

ARTICLE II

FORMALLY REVEALED

Thesis 11. The adequate material object of faith is formally revealed truth.

Lennerz, 144-185; Pesch, 258-280; Beraza, 235-293.

146. Connection. Because we said that revelation in the strict sense, though mediated, is required to establish the material object of divine faith, a further question must be asked: which, considering not the revelation itself but that which is revealed by it, investigates whether everything, no matter how it is revealed by revelation in the strict sense, is the object of divine faith.

147. Definition of terms. What is revealed is distinguished formally and virtually.

a) *Formally revealed* is a truth which is revealed in itself; or which is not some truth other than that which the words of revelation signify. It can be revealed explicitly or implicitly.

Formally explicitly revealed is a truth which is made known to us by the words themselves of revelation.

Formally implicitly revealed is a truth which, although by the words themselves of the proposition is not signified as explicitly revealed, still it is the same truth as that which is explicitly revealed. Thus the following are implicitly revealed: the definition in the defined (v.gr., Christ is a rational animal, in the proposition: Christ is a true man); the essential physical parts in the whole (v.gr., Christ has a body and a soul, in the proposition: Christ is a man); a particular proposition in a universal proposition (v.gr., Peter was redeemed by Christ, in the propositions: all men were redeemed by Christ); the conclusion in explicitly revealed premises (v.gr., Matthew received the Holy Spirit, in the premises: All the Apostles received the Holy Spirit, and Matthew is an Apostle); the correlative in the relative (v.gr., God is the Father of Christ, in the proposition: Christ is the Son of God); the negative in a contradiction (v.gr., There are not many Gods, in the proposition: There is only one God).

Note that all these propositions are *truly* revealed, because they are one truth (not only one reality), which is accepted as explicitly revealed. However they are *implicitly* revealed, because in the words themselves of the propositions they are not contained as

explicitly revealed, but they must be made known in some other way. But if a syllogism sometimes is used for this, this is not a true discursive or illative syllogism, but merely explanatory or expository. For, someone who would consider the explicitly revealed truth (not just the reality) would see in it by that very fact also these other truths, which are not a truth different from that one.¹ Moreover the assent in that case is given not to the conclusion formally as such (because in this way it is not an object of divine faith), but to the conclusion, which appeared certainly to be identified with the explicitly revealed truth, and therefore with the one revealed premise.

148. b) *Virtually revealed* is a truth which, though different from a formally revealed truth, nevertheless is so connected with it that it can be deduced from it. But it is deduced by a true discursive syllogism, in which one premise is formally revealed, and the other is certain from reason. It is also called a *theological conclusion*.

Note firstly that not all authors speak in the same way. This should be kept clearly in mind, so that the different opinions can be well understood.

Note secondly that the discussion often is about what is revealed immediately and what is revealed mediately in the same sense, so that the immediately revealed is the same as formally, and the mediately revealed is the same as virtually. But confusion must be avoided with the division previously given of immediate revelation and mediated revelation (above, n. 129). In this last division, the immediacy is considered by reason of the subject; and the question is whether between the revealer and the believer another *person* comes between them, or does not come between them. But in the prior division the immediacy is considered by reason of the object; and the question is whether the object, which is believed, is the revealed truth itself directly and immediately, or the object which is believed is some other *truth*, which, by the mediation of that truth, is attained as revealed.

149. Our question. If the object of faith, as we have proved, must be truly revealed, at least it must be said that what has been revealed *formally explicitly* pertains to the object of faith. But because the formally implicitly revealed is not a different truth from what has been revealed formally explicitly, it is clear also that the formally implicitly revealed truth is an

1. In this matter, there are some propositions about which theologians have debated extensively. Thus, v.gr., about these propositions: this baptized boy is in the state of grace; this consecrated host really contains Christ; this Pope is the legitimate successor of St. Peter, and so forth. In these propositions the whole question is about the certitude by which one is certain about the verified condition that is implied in each of them. Thus, the baptized boy will be in the state of grace, *if* he was properly baptized; the consecrated host really contains Christ, *if* it was properly consecrated; this Pope is the successor of St. Peter, *if* he was legally elected. However, all of these points generally cannot be certainly known except with moral certitude in the broad sense, which does not exclude all possibility of error. Also, on the question whether it must be believed with divine faith that this Pope is the successor of St. Peter, there was much debate in the 16th century. See A.J. de Aldama, *Nuevos documentos sobre las tesis de Alcalá*: ArchTG 14 (1951) 129-282.

object of divine faith. The only question can be whether or not something really has been revealed formally implicitly. In the thesis we do not treat this question.

Hence our whole question is about *virtually revealed truths*, which we say *in no case can be* believed with divine faith. We say "in no case," because a twofold hypothesis can be imagined, as we shall see, according to which the magisterium of the Church could define that virtually revealed truth, or not. For, the Church can define the virtually revealed; indeed, in this definition the Church is infallible, as theologians generally hold, although this last is not certainly a matter of faith.² Therefore the virtually revealed can be considered before a definition of the Church and after a definition of the Church. We say that in neither case can it be believed with an act of divine faith.

150. Adversaries. a) Vega and Vázquez held that the virtually revealed, *prescinding from the definition of the Church*, must be believed with divine faith by one who clearly concluded to it from its premises.³

That the virtually revealed *after a definition of the Church* must be believed with divine faith was held by Suarez and Lugo.⁴ And in our time by Schiffini, Grandmaison, Mingès, Gardeil, Beraza, and others.⁵

c) That the virtually revealed can *never* be believed with divine faith as held by Cano,⁶ Molina, Kilber; and in our time by Scheeben, Billot, Pesch, Hugon, Schultes, Lennerz, and others.

d) P. Marín-Sola introduced a somewhat different opinion; he distinguished the virtually revealed in two ways—according as it is connected with the formally revealed with a metaphysical connection or only a physical connection. The first, which alone constitutes a theological conclusion, he holds ought to be believed with divine faith *after a definition of the Church*; the other can *never* be believed with divine faith.⁷ This

2. See SThS 1², 3, 710-713.

3. In 1 d.5 c.3. Cano is incorrectly cited in favor of this opinion, as P. Marín Sola demonstrated, *Melchior Cano et la conclusion théologique*: RevThom 3 (1920) 1-4, 101-115; likewise in his work *La evolución homogénea del dogma católico*³ (Madrid 1952) 696-721. See also E. Marcotte, *La nature de la théologie d'après Melchior Cano* (Ottawa 1949) 151-154.

4. Suarez, *De fide* d.3 s.11 n.11; Lugo, *De fide* d.1 s.13 n.272. In the same sense P. Lugo had written already before González de Albelda, *In 1 q.1 disp.2* n.33-50. See J. Alfaro, S.J., *El proceso dogmático en Suarez*: AnGreg 68,95-122.

5. D. Fidelis García Martínez defended this opinion very effectively, *A propósito de la llamada fe eclesiástica: ¿debe ser admitida en teología?*: MiscCom 6 (1946) 7-45; *La solución de Suarez al problema de la evolución o progreso dogmático*: EstEcl 22 (1948) 151-165.

6. This, contrary to the interpretation of P. Marín Sola, is the opinion of A. Lang, *Die Loci theologici des Melchior Cano und die Methode des dogmatischen Beweises* (Munich 1925) 203s in a note; E. Marcotte, *loc. cit.*, 154-159, has now proved the same thing.

7. *La evolución homogénea del dogma católico* c.3 and 4.

division pays more attention to the reality than it does to the revealed truth. Note that under the first part of this division many things are contained that we call formally implicitly revealed.

151. Theological note. *Our opinion is more probable.*

Proof. a) *Before a definition of the Church.* That is not an object of divine faith that cannot be admitted because of the testimony alone of God. But the virtually revealed is such before a definition of the Church. Therefore it is not an object of divine faith.

The minor: The virtually revealed before a definition of the Church is admitted because of its premises. But one of the premises is known by reason, not by faith. Therefore it is not admitted because of the testimony alone of God.

b) *After a definition of the Church.* The virtually revealed before a definition of the Church is not an object of divine faith, because it lacks the attestation of God. Therefore, if after a definition of the Church it is now an object of divine faith, it will be such because the definition of the Church gives to it the attestation of God which it lacked. But a definition of the Church cannot give this attestation. Therefore after a definition of the Church it is not an object of divine faith.

The subsumed minor: A definition of the Church would attribute the attestation of God only to the extent that it is a divine revelation. But that is not the case. Therefore a definition of the Church does not attribute divine attestation.

This minor: A definition of the Church is a pronouncement of the Church (not of God through the Church), with the assistance (not with revelation) of God. Here a clear distinction must be made: revelation, by which *God* speaks (as the principal cause); inspiration, by which *God* (the principal author) speaks through a hagiographer (the secondary author); a definition of the Church, by which *the Church alone* speaks (as the principal cause). In the three cases there is infallibility, but in different ways: in the first it is given by way of speaking, in the second by way of the principal author, in the third by way of the assistance.

Our proof of the subsumed minor *is distinguished* by the adversaries: "A definition of the Church would attribute the attestation of God to the extent that it is a divine revelation, or the application of divine revelation, conceded; precisely inasmuch as it is revelation, denied."⁸ However they understand *application of revelation* to be a proposition through which,

8. F. García Martínez, *A propósito de la llamada "fe eclesíastica"*; RevEspT 11 (1951) 230.

from a universal revealed proposition, a singular proposition contained in it is explained (not deduced). *However*, it must be denied, since we are considering the virtually revealed, that a definition of the Church in the formal sense is an application of divine revelation, as we shall see in the objections. A definition of the Church is nothing other than a pronouncement of the Church alone.

Note. The virtually revealed before a definition of the Church, according to Suarez, was not really attested to by God; therefore a definition of the Church must as it were complete revelation. According to Lugo, it was implicitly revealed; but this is not apparent to us, except by a definition of the Church. Marín Sola says something similar concerning what is virtually inclusive. D. García Martínez, speaking along the same lines as Lugo, seems to hold that everything virtually revealed is formally implicitly revealed only in the explicitly revealed truth of the infallibility of the Church, not in the particular truth from which it is deduced. We will pay attention to these different ways of conceiving this matter in our answers to the objections.

152. Objections. 1. "What the Church defines, God testifies to through the Church... For the divine testimony is equally certain whether it is by God himself, or by a legate, or by the Church."⁹

I distinguish. He testifies in the strict sense, *denied*; he testifies that the Church is infallible, *I bypass*. *I distinguish the proof.* If it is a true testimony, *conceded*, but *I deny the supposition*, namely, that true testimony of God is given about a virtually revealed truth just because it is defined by the Church.

2. There is no less authority in the defining Church than there is in Holy Scripture. But everything contained in Scripture must be believed with divine faith. Therefore the virtually revealed defined by the Church must be believed with divine faith.

I distinguish the major. That is, both are reductively divine, *conceded*; both are the word of God, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* It must be believed because it is the word of God, *conceded*; only because it has divine authority, *denied*.

3. The assistance of the Holy Spirit is equivalent to revelation and completes it.

I distinguish: Regarding infallibility, *conceded*; regarding testimony, *denied*.

4. The virtually revealed after a definition of the Church is a conclusion that follows from two revealed principles. Therefore it must be believed with divine faith. *I prove the antecedent:* "what the Church defines cannot be false, if the Holy Spirit gives his assistance; but the Holy Spirit assists the Church in defining this concrete truth; therefore this truth is true."¹⁰

I deny the antecedent. I distinguish the major in the proof. It cannot be false because of the assistance of God, *conceded*; because of the speaking of God, *denied*. *I concede the minor. I also distinguish the consequent.* It is true because God revealed it, *denied*; because the Church defined it with the assistance of the Holy Spirit, *conceded*.

9. Suarez, *De fide* d.3 s.11 n.11.

10. Lugo, *De fide* d.1 s.13 n.275.

153. 5. The virtually revealed, defined by the Church, is admitted because of her infallible authority. Therefore it can be believed with divine faith.

I distinguish the antecedent. Because of the infallible authority of the Church, *conceded*; of God, *denied*.

6. But the authority of the Church is the authority of God himself. Therefore the virtually revealed, defined by the Church, is admitted because of the authority of God.

I distinguish the antecedent. It is the authority of God assisting, *conceded*; of God speaking, *denied*.¹¹

7. But God not only assists the Church defining, but also revealed that the Church is infallible in her definitions. Therefore the virtually revealed, defined by the Church, is admitted because of the authority of God speaking.

I distinguish the antecedent. He revealed the infallibility of the Church, *I concede or bypass the antecedent*; he revealed a truth defined by the Church, *denied*.

I say "bypass" because it is not certain that the infallibility of the Church regarding virtually revealed truths is a matter of faith (*de fide*).

154. 8. With divine faith we believe that the Church is infallible when she defines what is virtually revealed. Therefore with divine faith it must be believed that the Church is infallible when she defines this virtually revealed concrete truth. Therefore this virtually revealed truth defined by the Church must be believed with divine faith.

I bypass the antecedent. For, there is no certainty about this point. *I bypass the first consequent. I deny the last consequent* because it does not follow from the antecedents.

9. With divine faith it must be believed that the Church does not err when she defines this virtually revealed truth. Therefore with divine faith it must be believed that this virtually revealed matter is true. Therefore, with divine faith this virtually revealed matter must be believed.

I bypass the antecedent and deny the first consequent. From the fact that God revealed the infallibility of the Church in defining this virtually revealed matter, surely the truth of that virtually revealed matter so defined by the Church does follow. But God, by affirming that infallibility of the Church, must not be said thereby to affirm *formally* the truth of the object defined by her.

10. The Church is infallible in defining this virtually revealed matter. Therefore this definition is infallibly true. Therefore since the Church defined it, she defined infallibly something true. Therefore this matter defined by the Church is infallibly true. But the first proposition must be believed with divine faith. Therefore also the last one.¹²

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the first consequent. It is infallibly true consequently, *conceded*; formally, *denied*. *I bypass the minor and distinguish the last consequent.* If those different consequences were contained formally implicitly in the antecedent, *conceded*; if they must be deduced from it, *denied*.

That is, that the Church is infallible in defining this virtually revealed matter only signifies *formally* that the Church does not err when she defines it. Hence doubtless it

11. See H. Lennerz, *Ist jede Zustimmung wegen der Autorität Gottes ein Glaubensakt?*: Schol 4 (1929) 572-576.

12. See MiscCom 6 (1946) 32, note 53.

follows that the definition is true. But this last is a proposition *formally different* from the proposition which affirms the infallibility of the Church. Hence, even though the first proposition is supposed as revealed by God and therefore must be admitted with divine faith, from that we still do not know that God also revealed the second proposition, and that therefore it can be admitted with the same divine faith. Therefore the first proposition is formally true because of the testimony of God; the second because of the testimony of the Church. This testimony of the Church is formally only of the Church, although reductively it is of God, not as speaking but as assisting.¹³

11. If Peter says to me: what John said is true, I can believe not only John, but also Peter. Similarly, God revealed that what is defined by the Church is true; therefore I can believe not only the Church, but also God.¹⁴

I distinguish the antecedent. If Peter wishes really to say that which John said, *I bypass the antecedent*; if he only wishes to affirm the veracity of John, *denied*. But God did not will to reveal individual things defined by the Church, but he willed only to reveal the infallibility of the Church.

And it cannot be said that this is an arbitrary restriction of divine revelation. For, the restriction is imposed from an analysis of the truth itself revealed by God. Indeed, we think rather that the adversaries are extending the object of that revelation without cause. For, it is not necessary to include in revelation itself whatever *follows* from it as a good consequence, but only what is contained in it *formally*.

12. But all this is just a play on words.

I deny that. This is to preserve the essential difference between revelation and the assistance of God. But if God revealed also the infallibility of the Church, that does not mean that he revealed individual propositions as infallibly true. Just as if someone gives me a book, which he has not read but he knows that the author is very wise, he can say to me: in this book there is no error; he is not therefore thought to tell me the individual propositions of that book, which he perhaps does not know. Or if he says the same thing to me about a book, which he has not read but he knows that it contains no error from the testimony of someone else known to him and trustworthy. For, in these cases he is saying to me nothing *formally* except that the author of the book did not err.

And do not say that this does not apply to God, because he knows each individual proposition defined by the Church and that they will at some time be defined. This of course is true. But the question is not what God knows, but what *he says*, or what he wishes to say when he speaks with us. But he wills to say nothing else except what he understands to be contained *formally* in a human way in the propositions that he does express.

155. 13. One who obstinately contradicts a definition of the Church is a heretic. But heresy immediately opposes divine faith. Therefore a definition of the Church must be believed with divine faith.

13. With this distinction the diverse difficulties seem to be answered that are set forward in RevEspT 11 (1951) 209-253.

14. See MiscCom 6 (1946) 33.

I distinguish the major. If the definition is about something formally defined, *conceded*; if it is about something virtually revealed, *denied*.¹⁵

14. The Church *de facto* has defined many virtually revealed truths that must be believed with divine faith. Therefore virtually revealed truths after a definition of the Church must be believed with divine faith.

I deny that any such example can be adduced, which is certain. Marín Sola offers several examples.¹⁶ But often the concern is with what is formally implicitly revealed and the syllogism used for proof is only expository. Moreover, if when an example of some true deduction is presented, it would still have to be proved that it is not contained elsewhere as implicitly revealed; otherwise nothing has been proved against our thesis. But that has not been proved.¹⁷

15. This whole doctrine is an invention of Molina, contrary to the opinion of all previous theologians. Therefore it must not be admitted.

I deny that Molina in this question spoke contrary to the theologians of a previous age. We have already seen that Cano proposed the same opinion, and perhaps Vitoria had the same idea. Actually this problem before the 16th century was not yet fully formulated. But in the opinions quoted from earlier authors one must proceed with great caution, both because they use a completely different terminology, and because they have different problems in mind, even when they seem to be talking about our question.¹⁸

156. Scholium 1. On ecclesiastical faith. From what has been said it follows that we cannot give assent to definitions of the Church regarding virtually revealed truths with a true assent of divine faith. However, the Church merits our assent also in these matters. But what is the nature of this assent? Surely it is not assent because of the evidence, but because of authority; therefore it must be called *faith*. But the authority of the Church is not merely human authority; in a very true sense it is divine. Not indeed as if, strictly speaking, her testimony is the testimony of God, but inasmuch as her knowledge and veracity are sealed with divine infallibility through the assistance of God.¹⁹ Therefore the assent, which is given to the Church defining, is faith, which is less than divine and more than human. We call this *ecclesiastical faith* (*fides ecclesiastica*).

15. See CL 7,413.

16. *La evolución homogénea* 201-212.

17. Recently it has been affirmed that in preparing the dogmatic definition of the Immaculate Conception it was sufficient for the Commission to prove that this truth was virtually revealed (see Ant 21 [1946] 20-24); but it is necessary to pay attention to the different terminology. For, there a virtually revealed truth is understood as implicitly revealed (see Greg 24 [1943] 356-366). On the most recent dogmatic definition of the Assumption it has also been said that it was a definition of a truth virtually revealed. However, this can in no way be proved. See J.A. de Aldama, *Boletín Asuncionista*: EstEcl 25 (1951) 398-401.

18. Vitoria, *In* 2.2 q.1 a.10 n.3 4.^o; q.11 a.2 n.7 2.^o; A. Lang, *Die Gliederung und die Reichweite des Glaubens nach Thomas und den Thomisten. Ein Beitrag zur Klärung der scholastischen Begriffe: fides, haeresis und conclusio theologica*: DivThom (Fr) 20 (1942) 207-236, 335-346; 21 (1943) 79-97; *Die conclusio theologica in der Problemstellung der Spätscholastik*: DivThom (Fr) 22 (1944) 257-290.

19. Knowledge and veracity cannot be said to be *extrinsic* to the testimony of the Church in defining. For, the testimony of the Church, formally as defining, is infallible; and that is so not just by accident, but because God established her as the infallible teacher of revelation. Therefore one can believe the Church defining, as such, with a true assent of faith, although it is not divine faith. See RevEspT 12 (1952) 219-222.

Today there are many authors who reject ecclesiastical faith as such. Thus Marín Sola, Beraza, and others. But it should be noted that the existence of ecclesiastical faith does not depend on the disputed question about what is virtually revealed, although it does have its place in that. For, when the Church defines something, even though it is formally revealed, many types of assent are possible for us. We agree that the Church has defined that the Immaculate Conception is a doctrine revealed by God. *First*, we can believe in the Immaculate Conception because God has revealed it. *Second*, we can believe in the Immaculate Conception because the Church has defined it. *Third*, we can believe that God revealed it because the Church defined it. *Fourth*, we can believe that the Church defined it infallibly, because God revealed the infallibility of the Church in defining what is formally revealed. It is clear that the first and fourth assents are assent of divine faith. But the second and third are not assent of divine faith, because they do not have for their motive the authority of God revealing, but the authority of the Church defining. Therefore there does not seem to be any difficulty in admitting here ecclesiastical faith.

157. *Therefore ecclesiastical faith* is assent given to definitions of the Church because of the infallible authority of the Church defining.

The difficulties, which are raised by some authors against it, have already been answered partially in the thesis. But if it is still objected that the Church earlier did not make a distinction between the type of assent given to diverse definitions, it must be said that the problem was not yet proposed by those theologians; and in practice it was not necessary to make such a distinction, since the infallibility of the Church, which certainly is formally revealed, is always affirmed in these assents, at least indirectly. Thus someone who obstinately denies a proposition defined by the Church as being erroneous is rightly presumed to be a heretic, because he is thought to deny the authority itself of the Church. And not everything that is condemned under an anathema is condemned as being directly and immediately contrary to divine faith.²⁰

158. Scholium 2. *On the evolution of dogma.* a) The problem of the evolution of dogma arises from the fact that, if what we believe today is compared with what was believed by the early Christians, the material object of our faith seems to have grown considerably. On the other hand, according to the teaching of the Church, nothing can be believed with divine and Catholic faith, except what has been handed down to us from God by public revelation; this public revelation was completed by the Apostles. Therefore no progress has been made *in revelation* after the death of the Apostles.

b) Therefore all solutions of this problem which explain the development by the

20. See R. Favre, *Les condamnations avec anathème*: BullLittEccl 47 (1946) 226-241; 48 (1947) 30-48; P. Fransen, *Die Formel "si quis dixerit Ecclesiam errare" in Kanon 6 und 8 der 24. Sitzung des Trienter Konzils*: Schol 25 (1950) 432-527; *Die Formel "si quis dixerit Ecclesiam errare" und ähnliche Ausdrücke bei der Beratung des 4. und anderer Kanones der 24. Sitzung des Trienter Konzils*: Schol 26 (1951) 131-221; *Réflexions sur l'anathème au Concile de Trente*: EphLov 29 (1953) 657-672; F. Martínez, *Una novísima interpretación de los cánones tridentinos*: RevEspT 15 (1955) 637-653. On Vatican Council I, see J. Salverri in SThS 1², 3, 909-913.

addition of new elements, which are foreign to the revelation (from philosophy, from other religions, etc.), by that very fact are false. Therefore the Church has condemned "the heretical theory of an evolution of the dogmas, (namely), that they change from one meaning to another, different from the one that the Church previously held" (D 3541; see also 3548, 3020, 3043).

c) But certainly progress has been made *in the propositions of the Church*. Surely this element is essential also for the establishment of certain dogmas. In this sense the first scholastics said that from the articles of faith certain things were later explained, which were implicitly contained in those articles (see II-II, q. 1, a. 7). Afterwards in the 14th and 15th centuries this explanation was understood not only about the consequences of the articles, but also about the consequences of certain truths of the faith. I am talking about consequences that were deduced by an expository syllogism. After the Council of Trent the problem of the unfolding of the faith was posed in a different way, once the accurate distinction had been made between truths formally and virtually revealed.

159. d) According to what was said in the thesis, this evolution should be conceived in this way:

Evolution takes place from a truth *formally explicitly* revealed to that which is contained in it *formally implicitly*. So the truth revealed by God remains always the same.

Evolution in the contrary opinion takes place from *formally explicitly* revealed not only to that which is contained in it formally implicitly, but also to everything that is hidden in it *virtually*, provided that these deductions are defined by the Church. But this type of evolution is not understood by all these authors in the same way.

For, in the opinion of P. Marín Sola, all those things that evolve in this way are identical with one and the same revealed reality, with which they are metaphysically connected. But others have to say that the evolution properly speaking does not take place *from the formal to the virtual*, but *from the unique truth of the infallibility of the Church* formally explicitly revealed to all those things that are contained in it formally *implicitly*, given the supposition of a Church definition, as particular propositions under that which is universally revealed.²¹

In fundamental theology many things are said about this dogmatic progress.²²

21. See MiscCom 6 (1946) 40-42.

22. See SThS 1³, 754-766.

CHAPTER III

On the necessity of faith

160. Since faith is a certain foretaste of the knowledge, which in the future will make us blessed,¹ and by which both our intellect and our will are vitally ordered to their final supernatural end, it is clear that faith must be necessary for salvation. But this necessity can be considered in many ways under different aspects; for salvation, to acquire justification, to preserve it, etc. We will not treat this matter. We will add an epilogue to this treatment about a special obligation of persevering in the accepted Catholic faith; this obligation has been taught by the Church in a special way.

Thesis 12. An act of faith in the strict sense is required necessarily for justification, with the necessity of means.

S.Th. II-II, q. 5, a. 5-8; Lennerz, 358-377; Pesch, 430-441; Beraza, 780-868; Harent, *foi*: DTC 6,512-514; Id., *Infidèles*: DTC 7,1748-1827.

161. Definition of terms. *An act of faith.* We are not talking about a habit or virtue, whose necessity for justification is given by the fact that it is poured into the soul in justification itself. Therefore the *justification* is that of an adult, not a child. In fact we are considering the *first* justification to be acquired by an adult.

Faith can be *strict* (if it is assent because of the authority of God revealing), and *broad* (if it is assent from the manifestation of God in creatures). The first kind responds to revelation in the strict sense; the second responds to revelation in the broad sense. Both can be *supernatural and natural*, according to whether or not they have a supernatural eliciting principle.

The *necessary* is said to be that without which something cannot be obtained. Something necessary *with a necessity of means* is that which is necessary as a means in order to obtain some end; therefore, even if it is omitted without personal guilt, the end is not obtained.² Something necessary *with a necessity of precept* is that which is therefore necessary because it has been commanded; it is required as a prohibition arising from the obligation itself of the precept; thus, even if it is omitted without guilt, the end can still be obtained.

1. St. Thomas, *Compendium Theologiae* c.2.

2. See J. A. de Aldama, *La necesidad de medio en la escolástica postridentina*: ArchTG 8 (1945) 70-75.

162. Adversaries. Faustus of Riez defended the possibility of justification *by a natural faith* before Christ, that is, by the knowledge of God had from the natural light of reason alone from the image of God himself in his own soul.³

Vitoria in the years 1534-1535 held that, without an act of faith and *with the natural knowledge alone of God*, someone could be justified, although he could not be saved.⁴

D. Soto in the first edition of his work, *De natura et gratia* (1547), proposed the opinion: among those living in the natural law *perhaps* some could be justified *by a natural faith in the broad sense*. In the second edition of his work (1549) and in his *Commentario ad 4 Sententiarum* (1559) he retracted that opinion.

A. Vega in the year 1548 thought that the opinion could be defended according to which, if there is an adult who is invincibly ignorant of God, he could be justified *by a natural faith in the broad sense*.⁵

Ripalda, not deciding but discussing, proposed that the necessity of faith in the strict sense for justification is not apparent; so that *faith in the broad sense, provided it is supernatural*, seems to be sufficient. For he thinks it is absolutely required that the faith be supernatural. But he says that faith in the broad sense is supernatural which is elicited by a supernatural principle.⁶

Some theologians in Belgium, at the end of the 17th century, held that *supernatural faith in the broad sense* suffices for justification. This thesis was publicly defended at Antwerp in the year 1674 under the direction of P. Arnoldi Marchant, O.F.M. Estrix does not seem to be a stranger to this opinion.⁷

Gutberlet, at the end of the 19th century, defended *the same opinion* as probable, but in such a way that he added as a necessary element a wish or desire for strict faith.

163. Doctrine of the Church. 1. *The Council of Orange II* c.5 (D 375) condemned the natural faith of Faustus of Riez.

2. *The Council of Trent* s.6 ch.7 (D 1528-1529): the instrumental cause of justification is the sacrament of Baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, *without which no one ever attained justification*. The history of these words is something like this: in the second form of the decree it was placed among

3. *De gratia et libero arbitrio* 2,6-7: ML 58,821-828.

4. *In* 2.2 q.2 a.3 n.5.

5. *Tridentini decreti de iustificatione expositio et defensio* 6,20.

6. *De fide* d.17 s.13.

7. See A. Sohier, *La foi probable*: Greg 28 (1947) 548-551.

the causes of justification: “instrumental, the sacrament of Baptism”⁸; these words remained the same in the third form of the decree.⁹ Some Fathers desired that faith be added among the causes, and so they proposed the formula: “instrumental, faith and the sacrament of faith.”¹⁰ Hence in the fourth form of the decree this was added: “Likewise the instrumental cause is the sacrament of Baptism, which is the sacrament of faith, without which no one ever attained justification.”¹¹ The purpose of this addition was, as was explained in the name of the delegates, “in order to show that faith is the cause of justification.”¹² The new formula pleased the greater part of the Fathers very much, with the exception of a few of them; to them the words seemed to be doubtful, since they could be understood about faith already possessed or to be possessed.¹³ Therefore a new question was expressly up for debate: whether a place must be given to faith among the causes of justification, and what kind of faith. The Fathers decided that it would be better not to list faith among the causes of justification; but the majority of them thought that faith is a disposing cause.¹⁴ In this whole question they were certainly considering *the act of faith*, not the habit. Another question is, whether in eliciting that act the habit concurs in the moment itself of justification, as some of the Fathers thought. Finally, the Cardinal Legate gave the final explanation of that formula in these words: “Baptism is the principal sacrament of faith, because in the other sacraments there is no profession of faith, but faith is presupposed.”¹⁵

164. 3. The Council of Trent s.6 ch.8 (D 1532): *faith is the beginning of man's salvation, the foundation and root of all salvation, without which it is impossible to please God.* For the history of these words, note what follows. In the first form of the decree it was said: “by which it comes about that from this faith, which of course comes from God with no preceding merits,

8. CTr 5,512.

9. CTr 5,636.

10. CTr 5,650.659.665.

11. CTr 5,700.

12. CTr. 5,701. This point however does not seem to have been clear to Bituntinus, who spoke for the delegates, since he said: “faith is given principally by the sacrament of Baptism; in the other [sacraments] it is not given, but preserved.”

13. CTr 5,701-704.

14. CTr 5,740-742.

15. CTr. 5,701. Therefore the opinion cannot be admitted of those who say that in this Tridentine text the Council is not talking about the act, but about the virtue of faith. See J. Neveut, *De la nécessité de la foi: EphThLov 7* (1930) 33f.; Aubert, 82. That in chapter 7 they are considering the virtue of faith is true; but not in those words. That Vatican Council I, while repeating these same words, is treating the virtue of faith is also true; but from that it does not follow that the words of Trent from a historical point of view must be understood in that way. See J.M. Porrot, *La nécessité de l'acte de foi pour la justification: EtFranc 47* (1935) 357-369, 453-471.

since from it all good merits begin, all true justice takes its beginning; for it is its quasi foundation and beginning of human salvation; for without faith it is impossible to please God....”¹⁶ These words remain almost unchanged in the second and third forms of the decree.¹⁷ But they were omitted in the fourth form, in which it was only said: “therefore we are said to be justified by faith, because in it, which is a disposition for justification, faith is first.”¹⁸ This new formula did not please all the Fathers, but they wanted the old one to be restored.¹⁹ Therefore a new formula was proposed: “therefore we are said to be justified by faith, because faith is the beginning of man’s salvation, the foundation and root of all justification; for without faith it is impossible to please God....”²⁰ But these words are explained by the Cardinal Legate: “therefore the proposed words seem to be according to the agreement of the Church, because both in disposition, as well as in the instant of justification, and in its exercise and increase faith is always the foundation and root of justification; therefore the word *all* is used.”²¹ It is certain also that in these words the Council is considering the act of faith.

Therefore Trent is teaching the true necessity of the act of faith in the strict sense.²² This necessity is expressed more clearly in the words of chapter 8. It is a necessity greater than a pure necessity of precept (“without faith it is impossible”..., “the beginning, foundation, root...”). The formula “necessity of means” was not yet in use, but the doctrine is equivalent.²³

165. 4. Innocent XI (D 2123) on the condemned proposition 23. The sense is that which was contained in the dispute at Antwerp, from which it was derived. Therefore it is certainly treating *supernatural faith*, not just natural faith, as Gutberlet maintained.

Pius IX in his *Allocution “Singulari quadam”* (D 1645).

Theological note. Some true necessity of the act of faith in the strict sense is *defined divine and Catholic faith*. That it is a necessity greater than by a mere precept is also *defined divine and Catholic faith*. That it is a necessity of means *seems to be at least implicitly defined*.

16. CTr 5,423.

17. CTr 5,512.636.

18. CTr 5,696.

19. CTr 5,696-699, 729-731.

20. CTr 5,733.

21. CTr 5,734.

22. Vega himself says this expressly, *Tridentini Decreti de iustificatione expositio et defensio* fol.66.

23. See ArchTG 8 (1945) 58f.

166. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) Christ teaches that eternal salvation depends on faith, which is proclaimed by the gospel (Mark 16:15f.; John 3:36; 5:24; 8:24). And so the act of faith in the strict sense is necessary.

b) *St. Paul* teaches the same necessity very often, especially in his letter to the Romans (see 1:16; 3:28; 4:1-25; 5:1...) and also to the Galatians (2:16; 3:29...).

c) *But especially in Hebrews 11:6:* 1) *Context:* the Apostle says: by faith Enoch was taken up (v. 5). Then he wants to prove this proposition: that he was taken up, he proves from Gen. 5:24; but that this was due to his faith, he proves with the following syllogism: Enoch pleased God; but without faith it is impossible to please God; therefore Enoch had faith. He proves the major from Genesis; then he proves the minor, because no one pleases God unless he draws near to Him; but no one can draw near to God unless he believes that He exists and rewards those who seek Him; therefore without faith it is impossible to please God. 2) *Therefore:* in this whole text the true necessity of faith in the strict sense is affirmed (the whole chapter is about this). But this necessity is not expressed by way of a fulfilled command, but by way of a certain absolute necessity. If there were an exception to this, then the argument of the Apostle would prove nothing.²⁴

167. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers:* The Council of Trent s.6 ch.8 (D 1532) defined the meaning of the words of St. Paul according to the perpetual agreement of the Catholic Church. But the words in that formula are taken from St. Fulgentius: "faith is the beginning of man's salvation" (R 2260) and from St. Augustine: faith is "whence all justice takes its beginning" (R 1450). Moreover the Fathers urge the necessity of believing with faith in the strict sense (R 289); they suppose that this necessity is something absolutely certain (R 531); they say that faith is required in order to plead for justification (R 1445f.).

168. b) *From the beginning* theologians held for the necessity of real faith. Thus St. Thomas (II-II, q. 2, a. 3). And surely they understood it as having a greater necessity than is found in a precept.

When the formula of the Apostle "justified by faith" was misused by the Protestants, *the Fathers at Trent* with all their force contended that that abuse was efficaciously tolerated, but so that the true influence of faith on justification might be served.

In the 16th century the discovery of new peoples in America moved some

24. See A. Merk, *Iustus ex fide vivit*: VerDom 3 (1923) 231-233.

theologians to assert a certain lesser necessity of faith. Thus Vitoria, Soto, Vega. But immediately other theologians resisted this move unanimously, with Cano in the lead.²⁵

In the 17th century Ripalda did not dare to defend supernatural faith in the broad sense because of the unanimity of theologians; therefore he proposed it as a question to be discussed. But immediately he found the opposition of theologians, especially Lugo.²⁶ Although this supernatural faith in the broad sense at the time was defended by some theologians, it was so attacked by all the others that it obtained a condemnation of the Holy See.

In the 19th century this opinion was renewed by Gutberlet, but since it was not accepted by the theologians it was strongly rejected.²⁷

However this unanimity of the theologians is all the more noteworthy, because from the necessity of faith in the strict sense the result is a huge and difficult problem concerning the justification of unbelievers, which is easily solved if that necessity is denied. However in spite of this, they maintain the necessity of strict faith.

169. Theological reasoning. Justification is the conversion of a man to God as his supernatural end. Therefore a man must first know and acknowledge Him as such. But this takes place by an act of faith in the strict sense. Therefore an act of faith in the strict sense is necessary for justification.

170. Objections. 1. With supernatural faith in the broad sense alone an act of perfect contrition with the help of grace can be elicited. But perfect contrition justifies. Therefore with supernatural faith in the broad sense alone someone can be justified.

I deny the major. For, perfect contrition supposes charity, which cannot be had without previous faith in the strict sense.

2. St. Thomas (*De veritate* q.14 a.11 ad 1) supposes that sometimes an internal inspiration to believe suffices. But that would be faith in the broad sense. Therefore according to St. Thomas faith in the broad sense sometimes suffices.

I distinguish the major. This inspiration would be a true revelation, *conceded*; otherwise, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* If that inspiration were not a true revelation, *conceded*; if it is, *denied*.

3. An adult before faith in the strict sense has supernatural assent about credibility

25. See T. Urdánoz, *La necesidad de la fe explicita para salvarse según los teólogos de la Escuela salmantina*: CiencTom 59 (1940)529-537.

26. *De fide* d. 12.

27. See F. Schmid, *Die ausserordentlichen Heilswege für die gefallene Menschheit* (Bixen 1899); M. Martin, *De necessitate credendi et credendorum* (Louvain 1906); W. Liese, *Der heilsnotwendige Glaube* (Freiburg 1908); C. Pesch, *Theologische Zeitfragen* 5,9.

and what must be believed, and the supernatural act of the will to command assent. Therefore, in a similar fashion, before faith in the strict sense he could have supernatural faith in the broad sense.

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. Which does not suffice for justification, *conceded*; which suffices, *denied*.

171. Scholium 1. *On the necessity of actual faith.* Because many things that are necessary with a necessity of means are not always required in themselves (actually), but sometimes can be supplied (a desire), it is asked by theologians whether there is also such a necessity of the act of faith. Indeed, theologians generally hold as certain that the necessity of the act of faith is not supplied by some kind of desire; therefore an act of actual faith is required. For the sources do not mention any such desire, nor is it easy to know what this desire might be. For, the desire for some necessary means of salvation is not a mere desire of that means, but it is a supernatural act, which contains the power of that means in itself, and therefore it can supply for it; thus, v.gr. an act of perfect charity for Baptism. Indeed, just as from the nature of the matter there is no act that can supply for the state of sanctifying grace and for this reason the state of grace is necessary with a necessity of means actually for salvation, so there is no supernatural act that can supply for the act of faith, since it is the foundation and root of the others.

172. P. Straub²⁸ raised a new question in this matter by introducing a certain act, which supplies for faith in the strict sense with reference to justification. He calls this act, *virtual faith*, in opposition to faith in the strict sense, which he calls *formal faith*. This virtual faith is supernatural assent, firm above all things, which is directed to God as the first truth—not however to God revealing, but as the first truth itself deserves.

He explains this faith in the following way. One act can contain another act in two ways. In the first way *in desire only*, that is, if someone by an act of command or by a proposal wishes to elicit another act, which has a different formal object and different species; v.gr., if someone in a shipwreck because of the fear of punishment *desires* to elicit an act of perfect contrition. In the second way *by desire and by power*, that is, since the act containing another act and the act contained in it have the same formal object, and therefore the same specific perfection; thus the proposal of not sinning is contained in the detestation of a former sin, from the universal formal object.

Therefore he posits a general rule: every act per se necessary for justification with a necessity of means can be supplied by another act, which contains it in a desire that is at least implicit and virtual (so not in desire alone). Hence a formal act of faith per se necessary for justification can be supplied by an act of virtual faith, which contains it *in desire and virtually*. For, virtual faith contains an implicit *desire* of formal faith, because, someone who elicits an act of virtual faith, implicitly wills to elicit an act of formal faith in virtue of the motive itself; but it contains *virtually* (*virtute*) formal faith, because both kinds of faith have the same formal object of the will (the goodness that is had in affirming God with a firm assent) and of the intellect (the first truth).

28. *De analysi fidei* 394ff.; see also Mitzka, *De fide* (in the second edition, vol. I P. Lercher) 694.

Therefore a man, not yet knowing about revelation, from the testimony of creatures necessarily affirms the existence and perfections of God. Moreover, given that testimony of creatures as the condition, the will can freely command the assent by which God is affirmed as existing and as the rewarder of good deeds *with a very firm assent, such as God who is the first truth deserves*. This command of the will is given because of the goodness which is found in affirming that God is above all things. There is contained, by reason of the motive, the implicit desire of affirming the fact of revelation and its truth because of revelation; or a *desire* of formal faith is had. But the assent itself contains *virtually* formal faith; because all assents, whose formal object is God himself, are of the same specific perfection. Surely the assent of formal faith has for its formal object God revealing. But when God is affirmed as the first truth, God is implicitly affirmed as the first truth in knowing and in speaking.

173. *But this opinion* seems not to preserve the essential specific difference between faith from testimony and any other intellectual assent. Moreover, the essential difference must be saved between God existing and God revealing; this supposes again the essential difference between the natural objective order and the supernatural order. Therefore it seems that this new opinion cannot be admitted.

174. Scholium 2. *On the truths to be believed with a necessity of means.* The act of faith in the strict sense must terminate in some truth. Therefore there is a question about what, at the very minimum, must be believed explicitly with a necessity of means.

a) We say that at the very minimum it must be believed that *God exists and is the rewarder*. For this is stated explicitly in the text of St. Paul (Heb. 11:6). However, the rewarder is understood to be in the supernatural order, as this has been made known to us from revelation, that is, God gives the reward of eternal life.²⁹ There indeed faith in God's existence is implicit, according as he is the author of the supernatural order. There are those who hold also that faith in the existence of God in the natural order is required. Actually, the Apostle seems to be speaking only about God, the first principle, the supreme Lord, the last end, as it is had from revelation.³⁰

b) All theologians hold that it is also necessary to believe, at least with the necessity of a precept, *the mystery of the Incarnation and the Trinity*. But they dispute about whether these two truths must also be believed explicitly with a necessity of means. Many Thomists affirm it; but those who deny it are Suarez, Lugo, Salmanticenses, Kilber, Wilmers, Pesch, Lennerz, and others. Really this very serious necessity must not be affirmed unless there is absolute certainty about it. But that does not seem to be the case. Of course the decree of the Holy Office in the year 1703 (D 2380-2381) is brought forward. There a necessity of means is affirmed on the obligation to believe in the mysteries of the Incarnation and Trinity. But a restriction is mentioned ("one who is not entirely incapacitated"), which seems to allow for an exception and which a true necessity of means in this matter does not allow. Hence it seems necessary to say that those

29. Mitzka, 680, does not accept this.

30. See Pesch, 441-447; Beraza, 822-838.

mysteries (at least those in the N.T.) must be believed with a necessity of means; but this is not so absolute that sometimes without it justification accidentally (*per accidens*) cannot be obtained. What is cited from Holy Scripture and the Fathers in opposition does not seem to prove any more than this.³¹

175. Scholium 3. *On negative unbelievers.* From what has been said in the thesis, a difficult problem arises, which usually concerns what are called “negative unbelievers.”

a) Those men are called negative unbelievers who, without any fault of their own, do not know about the fact of revelation. Therefore they cannot believe. Therefore according to the traditional doctrine they cannot be justified nor can they be saved. But since this whole situation is without any fault on their part, there is a question about how this can be reconciled with the universal salvific will and holiness of God. And in reality very many human beings find themselves in this situation.

b) A solution of this problem should not be attempted which ignores the basic elements of this problem. Hence it is necessary to say: if an adult is saved, he is not saved without an act of faith; if an adult is not saved, he is not damned without his own fault. Therefore these two points must be maintained in any attempt at a solution.

c) Many attempts at a solution have been proposed; just now we cannot enter into a discussion of them.³² But this must be said: the Catholic Church is the ordinary way of salvation in the present order of providence; but it is not the only way simply. Therefore if a man does what he can, God will provide for him according to the multitude of his mercies so that he can come to true faith; he will provide for him, I say, even with a miracle, if it is necessary (see *De veritate* q.14 a.11 ad 1).

176. Scholium 4. *On the necessity of precept.* In addition to the necessity of means, the necessity of a precept for the act of faith must also be affirmed. But this concerns a precept, which immediately has to do with the act itself of faith. Concerning this matter, here is the clear teaching of the Church:

a) There is a precept about eliciting the act of faith. This is certain from proposition 1 condemned by Alexander VII (D 2021), and from proposition 16 condemned by Innocent XI (D 2116).

b) This precept applies more than once in life. This is certain from proposition 17 condemned by Innocent XI (D 2117).

c) It does not suffice once to have believed the mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation. This is certain from proposition 65 condemned by Innocent XI (D 2165)

31. See Pesch, 448-458; Beraza, 839-868.

32. See Harent, *Infidèles*: DTC 7, 1827-1930; L. Caperan, *Le problème du salut des infidèles. I. Essai historique. II. Essai théologique* (Toulouse 1934); Mitzka, 684.

A P P E N D I X

On the inculpable loss of faith.

177. In the present order of providence not just any divine faith is necessary for salvation, but *divine and Catholic* faith; in this faith is contained adhesion to all the revealed truths, which as such are declared by the Church, and to the infallible magisterium itself of the Church. This faith cannot be lightly admitted, but it is necessary to inquire into the motives of credibility which make it rationally acceptable.

Hence a *non-catholic*, who is not yet in possession of the truth, has the right and duty to inquire into the truth of his own religion with the intention that, wherever he finds the true religion, he will embrace it.¹ Such a man, sincerely inquiring, will be helped in his search externally by the evident motives of credibility (the Church) and internally by the grace of God moving him to faith. If he cooperates with this grace, he will come to the faith.

But there is a question here about a *Catholic*. Namely, there is a question about whether he also has the right of inquiring into the truth of his own religion. But if he really does inquire, certainly *objectively* speaking he will not find any just cause of abandoning his own faith, because *de facto* objectively that faith is true and it is the only way of salvation.

178. However the question about a Catholic is raised in another sense. Namely, whether that Catholic, while inquiring into the truth of his own religion, can arrive at a *subjective* conviction either about the falsity of the Catholic religion or at least about its uncertainty. But if he does arrive at such a conviction, it is asked further, whether he has the right of deserting the Catholic religion. Finally, there is a very important question about whether this can happen in such a way that a Catholic can arrive at such a state without any guilt on his part.

Therefore the question is not about faith concerning some definite truth, but about faith concerning the totality of the Christian religion, or about faith concerning the truth of the magisterium of the Church. Of course here we are thinking about a Catholic who at one time had certitude about the credibility of the Christian religion and about the magisterium of the Church.

However, since the question is raised *about the subjective condition* of this Catholic, it is necessary to make another distinction. For, either he thinks that he does not now sufficiently understand her credibility, since it not only in general but also by him is really sufficiently known (*a*

¹ SThS I²,2,24-43.

merely subjective condition), or independently of his judgment, *de facto* he does not sufficiently know her credibility, and therefore here and now he cannot make an act of faith (*a subjective-objective condition*). Here we are considering only this last case, for in the prior one there is evidently sin. But this case includes: the divine law of believing, the objective credibility of the Christian religion, easily attainable certitude of its credibility, internal grace by which man is assisted.

But since the question about the culpability of that Catholic for losing his faith is raised, that act of loss of faith can be culpable in several ways:

a) *culpable in itself*: is said to be an act by which a man freely intends a morally evil object and he causes it in some way, whether he intends it as an end or a means.

b) *culpable strictly in the cause*: is said to be an act by which a man in no way intends the object, but he intends and causes another object, which he knows is necessarily connected with the first object.

c) *culpable in the cause broadly* (but truly): is said to be an act which proceeds from a prior act morally evil in itself, because and inasmuch as it is evil; this act would not exist, unless the other act were posited previously; however the causal connection of this was not foreseen (therefore such an act is not imputed as a fault).

179. Therefore, with these points settled, *we say to the question*:

1. A Catholic cannot abandon his faith inculpably; that is, all loss of faith is *truly culpable*.

2. However this culpability is not necessarily and always to be placed in the defection itself taken formally; because perhaps in that moment the obligation of remaining in the Church is not seen. Therefore not all loss of faith is culpable *in itself*, but it can also be culpable *in its cause*.

3. This culpability in the cause must not necessarily and always be culpability in the cause taken strictly. For that Catholic can be found in a subjective-objective condition of abandoning the faith because of some sin or some sins, by which he already previously had abandoned God. By reason of these sins now he is not under that special providence of God which God has for his own children; and hence it is that now he does not see the obligation he has of preserving him in the faith, and so he departs from it. But this man, when he committed those sins, gave no thought to such possible consequences. Therefore that loss of faith can be *culpable in the cause broadly*.

4. Finally, those former sins, in which this loss of faith is said to be culpable, are not necessarily sins against faith, but they can be *other grave*

sins, by which a man turns away from God.

180. *Please note* that the root of the whole question is found in the providence of God. For, God in the present order cannot not protect and govern his children, who sincerely do what they can, so that *de facto* they always persevere in the true faith. *For God does not abandon, unless he is abandoned.* Therefore a believer ought not to fear lest, without any guilt and by doing what he can, at some time he will be found outside of the faith and the Church.

Hence it is that the loss of faith is always treated in the sources of revelation as a very grave sin (see Heb.6:4; 2 Pet. 2:21); and therefore the Church has always considered those who abandon the faith as truly culpable. For, it is necessary to consider, on the one hand that the Church is always a splendid motive of credibility; and on the other hand that the internal grace of God is never lacking, for it is impossible that God will abandon anyone unless he is first abandoned. If therefore the defection is not from a lack of internal grace, nor from a lack of external credibility, there is nothing left except that it comes from a lack of the free cooperation of man, and therefore in one way or another he is truly culpable.

Therefore this doctrine is certain, and must be held firmly, according to the traditional understanding of the Church. Its truth in no way depends on another question which we will treat next. For our question is a dogmatic one, not historical.

181. Another *historical question*, connected with the previous one, is raised by theologians; namely, whether this doctrine is taught by Vatican Council I s.3 ch.3 (D 3012f.) and cn.6 (D 3036).

An analysis of that text goes like this: Faith is necessary. Therefore:

It is one's duty to embrace the true faith and to remain in it.

- a) It is necessary to embrace the true faith and to persevere in it.
- b) God not only commands this, but he helps us to fulfill our duties in two ways: *first*, by the institution of the Church, which has in itself and in its history evident credibility; *second*, by the internal grace which God uses to stir up and to help the non-believer to believe, while confirming the believer so that he will persevere; for, God does not abandon anyone unless he is abandoned.
- c) The consequence of these statements: the condition of the believer is not the same as that of the non-believer, because the believer can never have a just reason of changing faith or having doubts about it (as he who has not yet believed can have).

d) Therefore thanks must be given to God....

The whole *debate among theologians* concerns the explanation of those words “no one can have a just reason to abandon the faith.” That is so whether the words are understood *objectively only*, or *subjective-objectively*. The first view was defended by Ganderath, who was followed by Vacant and others. The second is defended by Harent, Hürth, Lange, Lennerz and many others.

This last opinion is certainly to be held. Therefore the meaning of the Council is: the disparity of condition between a Catholic and a non-catholic is explained in this way:

- a) *The Church by her credibility* invites the non-catholic to herself; she assures the Catholic that his faith is based on a very firm foundation.
- b) *God by his grace* stirs up the non-catholic and helps him so that he can come to acknowledge the truth; he confirms the Catholic so that he may persevere in the light of the truth.

That is, both the Church and God work *in contrary ways* in the soul of a Catholic and of a non-catholic: in the former they act by keeping him at peace in his possession of the truth, in the latter they act by moving him to inquire into the true faith.

The reason for this is that God does not abandon anyone unless he is abandoned.

That this is the true meaning of the Council is gathered both from the reasons, which in this whole question are offered by the Fathers (who from the necessity of faith concluded that God does not abandon, and they sought the firmness in faith from divine grace); and from the errors which the Council intended to condemn (the error of Hermes about the parity between the Catholic and the non-catholic, and the error of the freedom of conscience); and from the opinion of the two theologians who worked especially hard in composing the schema, namely, Fathers Kleutgen and Franzelin.²

2 On this whole question, see Lennerz, 378-405; he also gathered all the documents of Vatican Council I in a collection, *Textus et documenta*, ser.theol. 3 (Rome 1932). See also especially F. Hürth, *De inculpabili defectione a fide*: Greg 7 (1926) 3-17, 203-224. For the historical question, in addition to these authors, see Th. Granderath, *Constitutiones dogmaticae sacrosancti Concilii Vaticani* (Friburg 1892) 61; Vacant, *Etudes théologiques sur les Constitutions de Concile Vatican 2* (Paris 1895); Harent, *foi*: DTC 6, 293; W. Strasser, *Was lehre das Vaticanum über die Schuld eines Katholiken der von Glauben abfällt?*: ThGl 15 (1923) 230-246; H. Lange, *Alois von Schmid und die vatikanische Konzil und die verantwortlichkeit des Glaubensabfalls eines Katholiken*: DivThom (Fr) 7 (1929) 414-445; A. Stolz, *Was definiert das vatikanische Konzil über den Glaubenszweifel?*: ThAschr 111 (1930) 519-559 (see Schol 6 [1931] 628-630); G. Baroni, *E possibile perdere la fede cattolica senza peccato? Dottrine dei teologi dei secoli XVII-XVIII* (Rome 1938); G.B. Guzzetti, *Può un cattolico perdere la fede senza colpa?*: Scuocatt 67 (1939) 75-100, 167-183; *La perdita della fede secondo il Concilio Vaticano*: Scuocatt 67 (1939) 543-553; *E possibile perdere la fede cattolica senza peccato?*: Scuocatt 67 (1939) 677-683. The same author later wrote a book, *La perdita della fede nei cattolici* (Varese 1940).

B O O K I I I

O N H O P E A N D C H A R I T Y

182. Just as *faith* ordains the intellect to the last supernatural end, so *hope* and *charity* ordain the will to that end. For, there is in God, the supernatural final end, a twofold aspect in reference to the good. For, either God is considered as *our good*, or simply as *good in himself*. Hence there is a twofold supernatural tendency in the will. The first is that by which we tend towards God, as our end, *with a love of concupiscence*; the second is that by which we tend towards God, as the absolute good, *with a love of benevolence*. According to that first tendency there is present in us theological hope; according to the second there is charity.

Therefore we will now treat these virtues. We will investigate their acts and in that way we will easily gain some knowledge of them.

C H A P T E R I

O n t h e a c t o f t h e o l o g i c a l h o p e

A R T I C L E I

O N T H E P S Y C H O L O G I C A L N A T U R E O F T H E O L O G I C A L H O P E

Thesis 13. The act of theological hope is a trusting desire of eternal beatitude.

S.Th., *QQ.Disp. de spe* a. 1; Lennerz, 461-485; Pesch, 471-475; Beraza, 938-961.

183. Definition of terms. *The act of theological hope*, that is, that act which in the sources is mentioned under the name of *hope*, *to hope*, and which is often joined together with faith and charity, and simply with the Christian life. See above n. 6-10.

Trusting desire. These words describe the subjective motion of the will, which is the act of hope. An excellent analysis of this movement is given by St. Thomas in his *Disputed Questions, On hope* a. 1:

a) No one hopes except for something *good*; therefore hope is an act of some kind of *love*.

b) That good, which is desired, is not yet possessed, but *it must be*

sought (future); therefore hope is an act of some kind of *desire*.

c) And that good is not easy but *difficult* (arduous)¹ to attain; but it is *possible* to attain it. Therefore the act of hope is an act which, beyond a mere desire, adds *a certain elevation of the soul* in order to overcome the difficulties involved in obtaining the desired object, with the assurance of a will that is not hesitant, but confident.

Therefore St. Thomas teaches in the same place that hope differs from fear (because its object is good), from joy and delight (because it is a future good, or absent), from a mere desire (because it is a difficult good), from despair (because the good is thought to be possible).

Therefore, because hope contains the love of some future thing (that is, what is not had when it is hoped for, prescind from the question whether it is later acquired), it is described as a *desire*; but because it adds confidence of acquiring it in the midst of difficulties, it is described as a *trusting* desire. This does not suppose two acts of the will, but only one²; namely, this special desire, which therefore rightly is called a *trusting desire*.

But note that in the thesis there is only a certain description of hope. Therefore we are saying that all of these elements, *in one way or another* are contained in that movement of the will that is called "hope." We are not taking up the further question whether only one of those elements contains the *essence* of hope, or both of them together.

Eternal beatitude. These words designate the material object of supernatural hope. However in this thesis we are saying nothing expressly about this, because it will be studied in the next thesis.

184. Doctrine of the Church. a) She teaches that salvation *ought to be desired* and that hope for it should be fostered: thus Innocent XI in proposition 12 condemned Michael Molinos (D 2185). She teaches that hope is an *interested desire*, that is, tending towards the good of the desirer as such; thus against Fénelon (D 2352, 2357, 2361)).³

b) She joins hope with *confidence*. *The faithful* are raised up in hope...; thus the Council of Trent s.6 ch.6 (D 1526). Contrition must be *with trust* in the divine mercy, or with a hope of forgiveness: thus the Council of Trent s.14 ch.4 (D 1676f.). She teaches also that hope must be put in divine assistance, or one must believe in the help of God: thus the Council of Trent s.6 ch.13 (D 1541).

From these words, therefore, it is sufficiently established that in the

1. The notion of the *difficult* in hope is not explained in the same way by all the authors. Generally it is said that the object of hope is acquired with difficulty.

2. See G. Mollard, *L'unité de l'expérience*: RevThom 40 (1935) 196-210.

3. Whether *all* theological hope must be interested, we will see later when we treat the formal object of hope.

documents of the Church theological hope is linked together with the desire of beatitude and with confidence in its attainment because of the help of God. Therefore both elements pertain to the notion of theological hope, according to the doctrine of the Church.

Theological note. In the sense just explained, that is, according as we have given a description of the elements that constitute hope psychologically, but not the essence of hope, the thesis must be said to be a matter of *divine and Catholic faith*.

185. Proof from Holy Scripture. Both those elements are mentioned in Holy Scripture in connection with Christian hope.

a) *Desire*: Rom. 8:18-25. "We have been saved by hope." For, we do not yet have perfect salvation, but we have hope for it. That we have hope for it is certain from this, namely, that we ardently desire perfect "*adoption as sons*," which is joined together with the redemption of the body, and therefore "*we groan*" because of the expectation for it which we have.

b) *Trust*: Since the object of theological hope is supernatural, the ability of obtaining it cannot be in us, but must be in God. Therefore we have these biblical formulas:

To hope (to have hope) in God (sperare in Deo): 1 Tim. 4:10; 1 John 3:3.

To hope in Christ, in the Lord: 1 Cor. 15:19; Phil. 2:19.

To hope in God (sperare in Deum): Acts 25:15; 2 Cor. 1:10; 1 Tim. 5:5; 1 Pet. 1:21; 3:5.

Similar statements occur often in the O.T., especially in the Psalms. Therefore also God is called (Ps. 14:6; 61:3; 65:5), or also Christ (1 Tim. 1:1), our hope.

c) Christians, because they can with confidence desire so many great promises, are said "*to have hope*" (Rom. 15:4; 2 Cor. 3:12; 10:15; 1 John 3:3), in opposition to those who do not have hope (1 Thess. 4:13; Eph. 2:12).

d) Often in Scripture the idea of *patience* is joined together with the idea of Christian hope and confidence. However this patience, or constancy, is the virtue by which a man, broken by no adversities, persevered in faith because of the certain faith that he has. Thus, v.gr., Rom. 5:3f. (constancy manifests proven virtue, by which hope is increased); 1 Thess. 1:3 (we remember your hope, persevering in the midst of many tribulations).⁴

4. See J. de Guibert, *Sur l'emploi d'ἐλπίς et de ses synonymes dans le Nouveau Testament*: RechScRel 4 (1913) 565-569; C. Spicq, ὑπομονή patientia: RevScPhTh 19 (1930) 95-106; A.F. Festugiere, ὑπομονή dans la tradition grecque: RechScRel 21 (1931) 477-486; Th. Deman, *La théologie de l'ὑπομονή biblique*: DivThom (Pi) 35 (1932) 30-48.

186. Proof from tradition. a) The holy Fathers speak often about hope as the *desire* for some thing that is not yet had (R 1057, 1491), about the desire for a just reward (R 1312).⁵

b) They define hope as *confidence* about a future reality (R 1187): “for hope concerns only good things, only future things, and those things pertaining to it, which are said to generate hope of those things” (St. Augustine).⁶

187. Theological reasoning. The act of hoping occurs in the sources of revelation as a very special act, different from charity, and this hope is presented as being analogous to natural hope. But natural hope contains these elements. Therefore the act of supernatural hope must also be a trusting desire.⁷

The minor: With St. Thomas we gave an analysis of the psychological act above in n. 183.

188. Scholium. *On the essence of hope.* Concerning these two elements that we said are found in the act of hope, the question is asked about what is necessary essentially in order to obtain a true concept of hope. In this matter there is much disagreement among theologians.

a) For some hold that *trust alone*, or the elevation of the mind, is the essential element, but that the desire is something pre-required. But the nature of this desire is not explained by all the authors in the same way. For, there are those who hold that this desire is a certain natural love; and there are those who think that it is a true love of charity, although imperfect. St. Bonaventure defends this opinion, and it became common among Thomists such as John of St. Thomas, Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart; among Jesuit authors it is defended by Vázquez and Schiffrini; recently Zimara defended it.⁸

b) Others hold, on the contrary, that *desire alone* is the essential element, that is, desire for the God who is absent and difficult to attain. Thus Scotus and generally the Scotists, like Mastrius and Frassen; among the Jesuit authors there are Suarez, Coninck, Arriaga, Granado, Oviedo, Hurtado; then also Ysambert, and recently Lahousse.

c) Still other hold that both elements are essential and therefore that the act of hope is defined (not just described) as *trusting desire*. In this definition “desire” constitutes the genus (the love of concupiscence of an absent good), and “trusting” gives he specific difference. Thus Ripalda, and the later Jesuit authors generally, like Haunoldus, Platel, Mayr, Viva, Kilber, Mazzella, Billot, Pesch, Beraza.

This *last opinion seems more probable*. For, in the first opinion it is not sufficiently clear how Christian hope is conceived as interested, as is required because of the con-

5. See also St. Augustine, *Serm.* 118,8: ML 38,866.

6. *Enchiridion* 8: ML 40,235.

7. See E. Raitz von Frenz, *Analyse der Hoffnung*: Schol 9 (1934) 555-563.

8. *Das Wesen der Hoffnung in Natur und Übernatur* (Paderborn 1933) 247.

demned propositions of Fénelon (D 2351-2358); in trust, as such, this Christian hope is not found. Also, it is difficult to explain, as we saw, that act of desire as preceding hope. Indeed the act itself of the will, which is not love or hate, is hard to understand. But in the second opinion, the frequent and classical way of speaking of Holy Scripture and the holy Fathers, “to hope in God, to place one’s hope in God” does not seem to be explained. Also it is not easy to understand how the sins of despair and presumption are against hope, since in them the desire for God truly remains. Therefore the third opinion, since it explains all of these points better, seems to us to be more probable.⁹

9. See Lennerz, 515-523; Harent, *Espérance*: DTC 5,632-645.

ARTICLE II

ON THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF FAITH

Thesis 14. The object of theological hope is both supernatural eternal beatitude, and the divine help to obtain it.

S.Th. II-II, q. 17, a. 1-2; Lennerz, 461-485; Pesch, 476-484; Beraza, 962-981.

189. Connection. After we have seen the psychological tendency of the movement of the will, which is called hope, we now ask what the objects are concerning which this tendency is exercised in the supernatural order.

190. *The object of hope*, that is, the material object, or that which is hoped for.

Eternal beatitude and the divine help. These words describe the adequate object of theological hope, or of its trusting desire, as we have said. For, as St. Thomas teaches in *Quaestiones disputatae de spe* a. 1, the object of hope, since it includes the difficulty to be overcome so that it is really possible for the one hoping, sometimes is such that the *powers* of the one hoping are sufficient in order to overcome that difficulty, but sometimes they are such that those powers alone are not sufficient, but *other powers* are required. In the case of supernatural hope, because God, to be obtained by supernatural beatitude, is an object surpassing all natural powers, other powers are required which make this object possible. But these powers cannot be anything other than the *powers of God himself*. But whenever something is hoped for, which is possible only by the power of another, that hope has a certain expectation, inasmuch as the one hoping looks for help from another. Then it is necessary that hope be directed to a twofold object: to the good to be acquired and to the one on whom he relies for help. Therefore this occurs in theological hope. Hence theological hope is directed *to obtaining beatitude*, and *to the divine help* with which the beatitude is obtained.

191. *Supernatural beatitude* can be understood as *objective* (that is, the beatifying object itself, namely God) and *subjective* (that is, the possession of the beatifying object—vision, love, the joy of God). There is a dispute among theologians about which one of these is the object of supernatural hope. It seems necessary to say that it is both of them, namely, *formal*

beatitude, or God possessed by vision.¹

Divine helps are necessary in order to obtain beatitude because it is supernatural; and therefore there is in us a physical and absolute impotence with regard to it. These divine helps certainly are based on the universal salvific will of God, which would not be serious and sincere, if these helps on the part of God were sometimes lacking.

Hence the *primary* object of theological hope is God to be possessed by the help of God himself; these helps of God are the *secondary* object, by which we attain God by vision.

192. Doctrine of the Church. a) The object of hope is: eternal life: Constantinople Creed (D 150); joy in the future life: Creed of Toledo XI (D 540); eternal reward: Trent s.6 cn.26 (D 1576). Similarly in Pelagius I (D 443). Indeed, eternal life must be proposed to Christians as the object of hope: Trent s.6 ch.16 (D 1545).

b) The sinner must hope for forgiveness: Trent s.14 ch.14 (D 1677-1678); he must hope that God will be merciful to him: Trent (D 1533).

c) No one should doubt about the mercy of God, about the merits of Christ, about the power of the sacraments and their efficacy in relation to our own salvation: Trent s.6 ch.9 (D 1533-1534). We must have confidence in the divine mercy: Trent s.14 ch.4 (D 1676).

d) One's own salvation, perfection and holiness must be desired: Innocent XI against Molinos (D 2212); it must also be desired by the perfect: Innocent XI against Fénelon (D 2352, 2357, 2361).

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

193. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) Scripture proposes to us as objects to be hoped for: eternal life (Tit. 1:2; 2:13; 3:17), what God has promised (Acts. 26:6f.; Heb. 10:28), resurrection (Acts 24:15; 1 Thess. 4:13-18), our full and perfect redemption (Rom. 8:23f.), what is stored up for us in heaven (Col. 1:5), salvation (1 Thess. 5:8), things that are not seen (Rom. 8:24; Heb. 11:1).

b) But at the same time Scripture teaches us that hope should not be put in ourselves, but in God, as we saw above in n. 185.

Therefore Christ is called *our hope* (1 Tim. 1:1) and God is said to be *the God of hope* (Rom. 15:13).

194. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers:* according to them

1. See Suarez, *De spe* d.1 s.1.

we should hope for our reward (R 1025, 1312), the possession of God (R1474), future beatitude (R 1187), the good of all goods (R 1482).

We should hope to receive these things from God (R 1187), which they explain especially in their comments on Ps. 73:26-28 (R 1474).

Finally, they say that God so helps us attain salvation that he does not abandon us unless we first abandon Him (R 1792, 2227, 2232).

b) *The Liturgy* teaches us to ask for divine help, and also for many temporal goods, that they may be the means to help us obtain eternal life. Indeed the things requested without doubt pertain to the object of hope.

195. Theological reasoning. a) *To possess God by vision* is our greatest good. Therefore, as soon as we know from faith that it is possible for us, we must tend towards Him with desire and confidence, that is, with hope in the proper sense. Therefore, to possess God by vision is the object of our theological hope.

Note, that in this way it is proved that objective beatitude does not suffice, but that formal beatitude is required. For, what we desire and hope for is our own good as such. But God is truly our good inasmuch as we can enjoy Him by subjective beatitude. Therefore, subjective beatitude also is part of the object of hope.

b) To possess God by vision is the object of hope to the extent that it is a possible good for us. But it is not possible for us unless *the helps of God* are given to us. Therefore, God is the object of our hope to the extent that we can also hope for his helps.

196. Objections. 1. The object of hope must be absent. But God is not absent from us. Therefore God cannot be the object of hope.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. God, as known by faith, is not absent from us, *conceded*: as intuitively seen he is not absent from us, *denied*.

2. The possession of God, as something created, must be referred to God. Therefore it is not the last end. But only the last end can be the primary object of our hope. Therefore the possession of God, or subjective beatitude is not the primary object of hope.

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. It is not the last end which is desired (*finis qui*), *conceded*; it is not the last end by which we see God (*finis quo*), *denied*.

3. The primary object of hope must be something divine. But the possession of God is not something divine. Therefore the possession of God cannot be the primary object of hope.

I distinguish the major. That is, it must be either something of God or something immediately formed by God, *conceded*; it must necessarily be something of God, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.* For, the vision is not desired except

inasmuch as it is the vision of God, which is as it were informed by this divine object.²

4. Therefore religion is not a theological virtue, because it includes the adoration of God in its primary object. Therefore, similarly, hope will not be a theological virtue if it includes in its primary object the enjoyment of God.

I distinguish the antecedent. Therefore only, *denied*; therefore also, *I subdistinguish*: because it includes the adoration of God as its primary adequate object, *conceded*; as its inadequate object immediately informed by God himself, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* I denied that religion alone is a theological virtue, because it has a created primary object. For, the main reason why religion lacks the perfection of a theological virtue must be placed in its formal object, which is not something divine, but created goodness of outstanding value because it gives due worship to God.

197. Scholium. *On temporal goods according as they are an object of hope.* Because “petition is a manifestation of hope,” everything can be hoped for, and therefore is an object of hope, which is permitted to be sought from God, provided that it is sought in reference to eternal happiness (II-II, q. 17, a. 2 ad 2). But we can pray for and lawfully desire temporal goods, not indeed in order to place our last end in them “but as helps whereby we are assisted in tending towards beatitude, in so far, to wit, as they are the means of supporting the life of the body, and are of service to us as instruments in performing acts of virtue” (II-II, q. 83, a. 6). Therefore in this sense also the good of the present life, whether spiritual or temporal, can pertain to the material object of hope; certainly not primarily, as is obvious, but secondarily. In this sense the Roman Catechism says: “Wherefore they are not to be listened to who say that it is not lawful for Christians to ask God for the earthly goods of this life. For, many examples from both the Old and New Testaments, and also from the favorable opinion of the Fathers, are opposed to this error.”³

2. See Ripalda, *De spe* d.23 s.4 n.34.

3. *Roman Catechism* 4,13,9.

ARTICLE III

ON THE MOTIVE OF THEOLOGICAL HOPE

Thesis 15. The motive of theological hope is the relative goodness of God with the helping divine power.

Lennerz, 443-460, 486-492; Pesch, 492-503; Beraza, 982-1019; Harent, *Espérance*: DTC 5,632-645.

198. Connection. Because we said that hope is the movement of the will towards a possible difficult good, which is supernatural beatitude, we must now ask what the motive is that determines the will to elicit such an act.

199. Definition of terms. *The motive of supernatural hope* can be considered under a double aspect, which this act contains in itself: namely, according as it is an act of desire, and therefore of a certain love of concupiscence, and according as it is an act of trust from the elevation of the mind. Under this double aspect we will consider the motive of hope in the thesis. However, we are not saying that hope has two motives (from that it would follow that hope has two acts, not just one), but only one complex motive composed of two formal elements, which correspond to that double aspect. This is similar to what we said about hope as not being mere desire or mere trust, but essentially a trusting desire.

200. The relative goodness of God. God can be loved by us either as he is in himself or good for himself (from his absolute goodness), or as he is good for us (from his relative goodness). Therefore we are saying that the motive, which moves the will to elicit an act of hope, *inasmuch as it is the desire of possessing God*, is God as he is good for the one hoping, according as he is our remuneration and our reward.

With the helping divine power, that is, the omnipotence of God, by which he can help us, but precisely inasmuch as he will actually help us, because he certainly promised that he would. Therefore we are saying that the motive, which moves the will to elicit an act of hope, *inasmuch as it is our trust in God*, is the divine power which we know is available to help us because of the certain promise of God.

We defend this opinion along with Ripalda, Kilber, Mazzella, Billot, Pesch, Harent, Beraza, Lennerz.

201. Adversaries. a) Those who hold that hope is only trust remove *the relative goodness of God* from the motive of hope. Thus St. Bonaventure, many Thomists, Vázquez, Schiffini, Zimara.

b) Those who hold that hope essentially is only the desire of God, an absent and difficult to attain good, remove *the helping power of God* from the motive of hope. Thus Scotus and many Scotists, Suarez and many Jesuit authors after him, mentioned above in n. 188.¹

202. Doctrine of the Church. a) She teaches us to hope for our reward: Trent s.6 ch.11 (D 1536-1539), cn.26 (D 1576): see s.6 ch.9 (D 1545-1547); and she condemns those who think that such an act is evil because it is interested love: *Council of Trent* s.6 cn.31 (D 1581), proposition 38 of de Bay (D 1938), propositions 10 and 13 of the Jansenists (D 2310, 2323); and those who think that such an act must be omitted by perfect men: propositions 7 and 12 of Michael Molinos (D 2207, 2212) and propositions 1, 2, 6 and 8 of Fénelon (D 2351f., 2356, 2358). Indeed from the doctrine of the Church our reward and beatitude is nothing other than God himself (see D. 1000-1001). Hence by hope we tends towards God as the good for us; the motive of this act is the relative goodness of God.

b) She teaches us to hope in the consideration of God's mercy: *Council of Trent* s.6 ch.6 (D 1526) and ch.9 (D 1533-1534); to place hope in the help of God: *Council of Trent* s.6 ch.13 (D 1541); in the promise and fidelity of God: *Council of Trent* s.6 ch.16 (D 1545-1547). Therefore hope is based on, as on its own motive, the helping power of God.

203. Theological note. It is a matter of faith (*de fide*) that these elements truly pertain to the motive of hope, as least in its prerequisites or consequences. The *more common and more probable opinion* is that they are the motive of hope in the strict sense.

204. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) It teaches us to hope for our beatitude and the reward of good works (Matt. 5:12; 1 Cor. 3:8; 9:25; 2 Cor. 1:10; Phil. 3:14; 2 Tim. 4:7f.). But beatitude and our reward is God himself to be possessed by us, or God inasmuch as he is a good for us, as is proved in the treatise *On the Last Things*. Therefore hope has as its motive the relative goodness of God.

b) It proposes expressly as the motive of our hope God as our helper (Ps. 146:5; 62:8; 2 Cor. 1:10; 1 Tim. 4:10; 1 Pet. 1:21); or also while

1. See Mönichs, *Bemerkungen zum Formalobjekt der zweiten und dritten göttlichen Tugend*: ZkathTh 22 (1898) 61-77; he defends the Suarezian opinion.

supposing the omnipotence of God, it presents God as faithful in fulfilling his promises (Heb. 10:23).²

205. Theological reasoning. a) Hope is a motion of the will containing the *love of concupiscence* towards God. But the motive of the love of concupiscence towards God is the relative goodness of God. Therefore the motive of hope is the relative goodness of God.

The major: The act of hope is a desire of God as an absent good, but as one to be possessed. Therefore it is of God as the good is to the one desiring it. But such a desire is the love of concupiscence towards God.

The minor: The motive of any love of concupiscence is the relative goodness of the object loved. For the love of concupiscence so tends towards the loved person that it does not remain in him, but returns to the one loving.

b) The act of hope is a motion *of the will strengthening itself* regarding the difficulty of obtaining beatitude. But this strengthening of the mind cannot happen except from the motive of God who is powerful, willing and promising to help. Therefore the motive of hope is the power, mercy and fidelity of God, or the power of our helping God.

The minor: The difficulty of obtaining beatitude lies in its supernaturalness. Therefore the motive capable strengthening the will against that difficulty can only be God himself. But God cannot be such a motive formally unless he can, wills and promises to help to overcome that difficulty. Therefore the helping power of God is the motive of strengthening the mind in hope.

206. Objections. 1. If the motive of hope is the relative goodness of God, everyone hoping makes himself the end and God the means. But this is morally evil. Therefore if the motive of hope were the relative goodness of God, hope would be morally evil.

I distinguish the major. If he intended to love God because of himself as hoping, he would be making himself the end and God the means, *conceded*; if he intends to love God for himself, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

Distinguish the love of one *because of another* and the love of one *other*. In the first case there is a true subordination of the means to the end; for the goodness moving to love is the means apt for obtaining something that is loved more. But in the second case there is not a true subordination of the means to the end; for the goodness moving is the relative goodness of the loved person, or that by which that person is good to the one loving him; where rather the loving person is subordinated to the loved person, because he finds perfection in him.³

2. One who hopes in this way loves himself more than God. But this is inordinate.

2. See J.M. Bover, *La esperanza en la epístola a los Hebreos*: Greg 19 (1938) 110-120.

3. On this difficulty, see Lennerz, 453-458, with the other authors cited there.

Therefore if such a motive is attributed to hope, the act of hope will be inordinate.

I distinguish the major. If he were to love God only because of his own good, *conceded*; if he loves God for Himself, *denied*. Because in this case he himself is not really the object, but the subject who loves.

3. By the act of hope our union with God can be desired. But union with God is desired with a love of friendship, not with a love of concupiscence. Therefore not every act of hope contains the love of concupiscence, and therefore it does not have the relative goodness of God as its motive. That being the case, it would also follow that not all hope is necessarily self-interested.

I distinguish the major. Our union with God can be desired, inasmuch as that union is our greatest perfection, *conceded*; inasmuch as it is a necessary consequence of love existing among friends, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* Union with God as it is a necessary consequence of love existing among friends is not desired with a love of concupiscence, *conceded*; inasmuch as it is our greatest perfection, *denied*.⁴

207. Scholium. *On the interested subject in hope.* Because, as we have said, all hope is necessarily interested, as involving essentially the love of concupiscence, the question can be asked whether it is impossible for us to hope for something not for ourselves but for another person. On this point St. Augustine says: "But hope is only for good things, things that are future and pertain to hope, which causes the hope for them to bear fruit."⁵ With these words he seems to exclude positively the hope, by which the one hoping does not hope for himself but for another. St. Thomas (II-II, q. 17, a. 3) solves this problem with the following principles. Directly of course hope "concerns one's own good, but not what pertains to another person." But since there can be a true union of friends, which arises from a love of friendship, if at the same time such a love is presupposed as existing between two friends "a man can hope for and desire something for another man, as for himself; and accordingly, he can hope for another's eternal life, inasmuch as he is united to him by love, and just as it is the same virtue of charity whereby a man loves God, himself and his neighbor, so too it is the same virtue of hope, whereby a man hopes for himself and for another."

4. You will find some other difficulties in Beraza, 1009-1019, 1028-1037.

5. *Enchiridion* 8: ML 40,235.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE PROPERTIES OF THEOLOGICAL HOPE

208. It is clear that the act of theological hope is *entitatively supernatural*. However, we explain its supernaturality from the principle eliciting it, as we said concerning the act of faith.

But that it is an *essentially free* act is clear from the fact that the whole act follows from the assent of faith which is essentially obscure; moreover, no one is bound to place his trust in another, unless he freely wills to do so.

That the act of theological hope is *reasonable* is explained in the following way. The act of hope cannot be elicited unless a certain judgment precedes it, whereby it is established that the object can be hoped for. But an object cannot be hoped for unless it is good, absent, difficult and possible. Therefore, since the object is supernatural beatitude, it is certain that it is for us good, absent and difficult to obtain. The whole question is about the possibility of beatitude for the one hoping; it must be made certain to him about this possibility so that he can make an act of hope. The certain judgment about this possibility is expressed thus: supernatural beatitude is possible for me. This certain judgment includes certain assent about the conditioned futurity of beatitude (God will give me beatitude, *if* I cooperate with him), and certain assent about the absolute futurity of the help of God (God will give me the necessary helps). However, certain assent about the absolute futurity of beatitude itself is not necessarily included therein; but certain assent about the absolute exclusion from beatitude is certainly excluded. Therefore, in this way the *hoped for* object is had. But it must also appear to the will as something to be hoped for. But this is had from the certain judgment, by which the intellect proposes to the will the goodness of the act whereby he entrusts himself totally to God, by obeying His commandments concerning the positive tendency towards beatitude.¹

Therefore our next step is to consider a property of theological hope, which is of the greatest importance in order to have the correct concept about hope, namely, about its *firmness* or *certitude*.

Thesis 16. Theological hope is very firm; fear about his own cooperation of the one hoping in no way is opposed to this firmness.

S.Th. II-II, q. 18, a. 4; Lennerz, 493-511; Beraza, 1038-1059; Pesch, 504-513.

1. See Lennerz, 512f.

209. Definition of terms. Hope is said to be *very firm* inasmuch as it is the motion of the will adhering to its object with no hesitation, because of a motive infallibly connected with that object. Therefore the firmness of hope has a twofold element: security (*adhesion without hesitation*) and infallibility (*connection with the object*).

Many theologians call the firmness of hope *certitude*. However they do not understand it as a certain purely denominative certitude derived from the certitude of faith, but a property of hope, which is manifested often in the founts of revelation.

Fear is an act of the will fleeing from an imminent future evil. The fear we are concerned with here has for its object the cooperation of the one hoping with the grace or help of God.

210. Adversaries. Simon Tornacensis seems to have denied the certitude of hope.²

The *Protestants* professed a certain hope (fiducial faith) so absolutely and infallibly that fear could in no way be included in it.

211. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* s.6 ch.13 (D 1541):

a) the firmest hope must be placed in the divine help; for God will bring to completion the work of salvation if they remain faithful to the grace of God.

b) but *we must be in dread* of the battle we still have to wage; because the just can still live according to the flesh, and so not cooperate with the grace of God.

In the same *Council of Trent* c.9 (D 1533) *the vain confidence of heretics* is rejected; see also ch.12 and cn. 15 and 16 of the same session (D 1565f.).

Theological note. It is *defined divine and Catholic faith* that hope is most firm, but that it does not exclude all fear.

212. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) *The infallible security* of one hoping in God is shown clearly in the O.T.:

Sir. 2:7-14: in tribulations we must wait for the Lord, lest we fall (v. 7). But one who hopes in the Lord (believe—hope), will certainly have his reward; therefore he has reason to hope for better conditions of life, everlasting joy and mercy (v. 8f.). *Note* that verse 10 is not in the original. But the reason for hoping firmly in the Lord is derived from historical experience: if the ancient generations are considered (Patriarchs, Prophets,

2. See I. Ramírez, *De certitudine spei christianae*: CiencTom 57 (1938) 184.

Kings of Israel) it is apparent that no one trusting in the Lord was deceived (v. 10a), no one persevering in piety was abandoned, no one calling on the name of the Lord was forsaken (v. 10b). But the ultimate reason is this: because the Lord is compassionate and merciful; he forgives sin and saves in time of affliction (v. 11).³

Jer. 17:5-8: cursed is the man who trusts in man (v. 5); in contrast, blessed is the man who trusts in the Lord (v. 7). The reason is: because the former will produce no fruit (v. 6); but the latter, even in the midst of heat and drought will produce fruit (v. 8).

In the Psalms this idea is expressed often and in a beautiful way. Here are a few examples: *They put their trust in thee..., because thou hast not forsaken those who seek thee* (9:10); *In thee our fathers trusted; they trusted and thou didst deliver them. To thee they cried, and were saved* (22:4f.); *The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want... Even though I walk through the valley of the shadow of death, I fear no evil; for thou art with me* (23:1.4); *I have trusted in the Lord without wavering* (26:1); *Be strong, and let your heart take courage, all you who wait for the Lord!* (31:24); *In God, whose word I praise, in God I trust without a fear. What can flesh do to me?* (56:4.11); *Those who trust in the Lord are like Mount Zion, which cannot be moved, but abides for ever* (125:1). But especially Ps. 91—the whole Psalm celebrates the firmness of hope: the Psalmist teaches the security which is possessed by the one who hopes in the Lord (1-13); then God himself is introduced and confirms what was said by the Psalmist (14-16).

213. b) *The same security* is preached in the N.T. Here are a few examples:

Rom. 5:5-8: Our hope does not deceive (there is no danger to anyone lest he be deceived by it); because we have at heart the pledge of certitude, namely, because God's love has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us. The reason for this security comes from the fact that Christ died for us.⁴

Heb. 6:11-20: You must show your perfect and full faith (in confidence and firmness) until the end (v. 11). In order to increase this security of faith, the Apostle places before their eyes the firmness of the promise which was given to Abraham for himself and for all the faithful. The way in which God made that promise is the greatest assurance for us in our hope (v. 13f., 16-18). For he gave both a promise and an oath; because both of them were divine, it is impossible that he should err or deceive. Therefore we have

3. See Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in Ecclesiasticum* (Paris 1902) 56f.

4. See J. Huby, *Épître aux Romains* (Paris 1940) 184f.

great security in hoping for what has been promised to us. Thus our hope is like a secure and firm anchor. An *example* of this firmness is Abraham himself, constantly persevering in his expectation; therefore he received his reward from God (v. 15).⁵

Heb. 10:23: Let us remain secure and firm in hope, because God, whose promise is the foundation of our hope, is faithful.

214. c) But Scripture teaches us that it is also necessary *to have fear*:

Prov. 28:14: *Blessed is the man who fears the Lord always*; namely, one who does not have a bad mind, who does not harden his heart or spurn the law, but takes care lest he break the commandments.⁶

Rom. 11:17-24: Do not become proud, but stand in awe (v. 20), lest perhaps God will not spare you (v. 21), if you do not continue in his kindness (v. 22).

1 Cor. 10:12: *let him who thinks he stands take heed lest he fall*.

Phil. 2:12: *work out your own salvation with fear and trembling*; that is, with the solicitude and will of not displeasing God.

1 Pet. 5:8: *be sober and be watchful*; that is, lest you lose your spiritual gifts.

215. Proof from tradition. a) The holy Fathers *speak about the certitude of hope*: St. Chrysostom mentions, as a motive for preserving a firm hope in the future, the gifts which God has given in the past (R 1187). In another place, while commenting on *Heb. 10:23*, he says: “for just as the dropped anchor of a ship does not allow it to be moved, even though strong winds rage against it, but the fixed anchor makes it firm and stable, so also hope... But he did not speak about the anchor absolutely, but a firm and stable one, in order to show the security of those who are on the way to salvation.”⁷ Similarly St. Augustine: “If we have certain hope in Him that is fixed and firm, whom shall we fear?”⁸ And elsewhere: “Hope very firmly in what you do not see; patiently wait for what you do not yet have; because you are faithfully holding on to the truthful promise of Christ.”⁹ In the same way, St. Gregory the Great: “Thus holy men were despised among the people and as being unworthy they tolerate all things; but being confident that they are worthy of heavenly dwellings, they await

5. See J. Bonsirven, *Épître aux Hébreux* (Paris 1943) 304-312.

6. See Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in Proverbia* (Paris 1910) 216.

7. *In Heb 11,2*: MG 63,91f.

8. *In Ps 26 enarr.2,3*: ML 34,200.

9. *Serm. 157,6*: ML 38,862.

with certitude the glory of eternity.”¹⁰ St. Bernard also speaks beautifully about this in his sermons on Ps. 91.¹¹

216. b) The holy Fathers *encourage the need for salutary fear*: Thus, they comment on the words of the Apostle in Phil. 2:12, “the man who lives without fear cannot bring forth anything that is noble or admirable.”¹² “Therefore they live with fear and trembling, and not rather with security, if God is acting; for, because of our will, without which we cannot act well, it can suddenly enter into a man’s mind that what he does well is his alone, and so he says in his abundance: I will not be moved for eternity.”¹³ “For the saints this is a cause of fear and trembling, lest puffed up by their works of piety they are abandoned by the help of grace and remain in the infirmity of nature.”¹⁴ Similarly, St. Gregory the Great: “For, although in a state of security fear always seems to be absent, still for us nothing is more secure than always under the influence of hope to maintain fear, lest the careless mind either by despairing immerses itself in vice, or by exulting loses his gifts; for, before the eyes of a busy and just judge, the more humbly he remains anxious under the power of his hope, to that extent does he stand more firmly.”¹⁵ And St. Bernard: “In truth I learned that there is nothing as effective in order to obtain, retain and recover the grace of God as at all times before God to be found not thinking highly of yourself, but living in fear. Blessed is the man who is always fearful. Therefore fear when grace comes, fear when it is absent, fear when it again returns; and this is always to be fearful.”¹⁶

217. Theological reasoning. a) *Hope is very firm*. The raising up of the mind, which is an essential aspect of hope, is measured by its motive, that is, by the helping power of God. But the helping power of God merits the firmest adhesion. Therefore hope is very firm.

The minor: The helping power of God contains the omnipotence, mercy and fidelity of God. Therefore it has an infallible connection with its object. Therefore it merits the firmest adhesion. Under this motive it would be a great injury to God to doubt or to hesitate.

b) *There must be fear*. The real attainment of beatitude, which is hoped for, depends on the help of God and on the cooperation of the human will.

10. *Moralia* 6,24: ML 75,742.

11. ML 183,185-254.

12. St. John Chrysostom, *In epist. ad Philippenses* hom.8: MG 62,239.

13. St. Augustine, *De natura et gratia* 27,31: ML 44,262.

14. St. Leo, *Serm.* 38,3: ML 54, 262.

15. *Moralia* 30,83: ML 75,570.

16. *In Cantica* serm.54,9: ML 183,1042.

But we can and must fear about our cooperation. Therefore there must be fear about the real attainment of beatitude.

The minor: Regarding our cooperation with the grace of God not only do we not have absolute certitude, but we have much experience of our human instability and weakness in the face of temptations. Therefore we can and must have fear about this.

c) *But this fear does not destroy the firmness of hope.* The firmness of theological hope is measured by the motive of hope. But fear neither destroys nor touches that motive. Therefore fear does not destroy the firmness of hope.¹⁷

218. Objections. 1. Not all who hope are saved. Therefore hope can be frustrated. Therefore it is not firm.

I distinguish the antecedent. They are not saved on the part of the hoping subject, *conceded*; on the part of the motive of hope, *denied*. I distinguish the consequent in the same way. If they are not saved on the part of the motive of hope, *conceded*; if they are not saved on the part of the hoping subject, always having preserved the motive of hope, *denied*.

2. Fear must be joined together with theological hope. But hope joined together with fear cannot be firm. Therefore theological hope cannot be firm.

I distinguish the major. Fear of one's own cooperation of the hoping subject, *conceded*; fear about the necessary divine help, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* With fear about the necessary divine help, *conceded*; with fear about one's own cooperation, *denied*.

3. Efficacious grace is the necessary divine help for salvation. But God does not give efficacious grace to all. Therefore we can have fear about divine help itself.

I distinguish the major. It is efficacious grace extrinsically, *conceded*; it is efficacious intrinsically, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* He does not give to all grace intrinsically, *conceded*; he does not give to all grace extrinsically, *I subdistinguish*: because of a defect of human cooperation, *conceded*; because of a defect in the nature of grace, *denied*.

4. That God should give grace, which he foresees to be inefficacious, depends on the divine will alone. Therefore the lack of human cooperation really redounds to God himself.

I distinguish the antecedent. It depends on the divine will freely choosing a definite order of things, in which a serious salvific will surely has its own place, *conceded*; it depends on the divine will reprobating souls antecedently, either positively or negatively, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* It would redound to God, if the conferring of inefficacious grace depended on the divine will reprobating antecedently,

17. On this whole question, see I. Ramírez, *De certitudine spei christianae*: CiencTom 57 (1938) 184-203, 353-378; L.G. Gillon, *Certitude de notre esperance*: RevThom 45 (1939) 232-248; *De augmento spei certae sub influxu donorum*: Ang 16 (1939) 136-147.

conceded; if it depended on the divine will only choosing this order of things, *denied*.¹⁸

219. Scholium. *On the necessity of hope.* a) The act of hope is necessary for adults with the necessity of means for justification. See the Council of Trent s.6 ch.6 (D 1526).

b) It is also necessary in order to persevere. For, on this point, begging for divine help is required, as the Council of Orange II teaches in cn.10 (D 380); actually, prayer without hope is impossible.

c) It is also necessary for those who have attained a high level of perfection in the spiritual life, as the Church teaches against Molinos and Fénelon (D 2212, 2352, etc.).

d) There is also a precept to make an act of hope (D 2021) more than once in a lifetime (see D 2117).¹⁹

18. For other objections, see Beraza, 1053-1059.

19. See Beraza, 1060-1078; Pesch, 523-530. On the loss of faith, see I. Ramírez, *De spei christianae fideique mutua dependentia*: DivThom (Fr) 18 (1940) 211-284.

CHAPTER II

On the act of theological charity

ARTICLE I

ON THE PSYCHOLOGICAL NATURE OF THEOLOGICAL CHARITY

Thesis 17. An act of theological charity is an act of the love of friendship for God.

S.Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 1; Lennerz, 410-426; Pesch, 586-595; Beraza, 1121-1130.

220. Definition of terms. *An act of theological charity*, that is, a proper act of that virtue which in the sources of revelation is enumerated together with faith and hope.

Love is an activity of the will whereby the will, as an appetitive faculty, is drawn to its object.

In love these distinctions must be made: he who loves (*the subject who*), that which is loved (*material object*), that because of which it is loved (*motive or formal object*), he for whom it is loved (*the subject for whom*). Therefore, granted this, there can be a *double tendency* in love: the first is located in the object or the person loved; the second reverts from the object or person loved to the lover himself. In the first case we have the love of *benevolence*; in the second the love of *concupiscence*.

A *double motive* also corresponds to this double psychological tendency: in the first case the person is loved because of his absolute goodness; in the second case he is loved because of a relative goodness which he has for the lover, that is, because of the utility, advantage and perfection of the lover.

Therefore there are two kinds of love:

a) *Of concupiscence*: the love of some person or object because of the relative goodness to the one loving; the lover loves the loved one for the personal gain of the lover. This is an interested love whose motive is the relative goodness of the loved object, and the subject who benefits, namely, the lover himself.

b) *Of benevolence*: the love of some person (not an object) because of his absolute goodness; the lover loves the loved one for the sake of the loved one. This is a non-interested love whose motive is the absolute goodness of the person loved, and the subject who benefits, namely, the person loved.

221. *The love of friendship.* *Friendship* in a proper sense is a state which by its nature results in an act of special love. Therefore this type of love is called a love of friendship. St. Thomas describes this love as a mutual love of benevolence which is based on some kind of communication. It is said to be a *love of benevolence* whereby the lover wishes good for the beloved, not for himself. It is also called *mutual*, that is, with a return of love (therefore this mutual love *must be made manifest to both lovers*).¹ These two elements constitute essentially the love of friendship. But the *communication*, which St. Thomas mentions, is, as he explains, the necessary foundation so that a true love of friendship can exist between two persons. This communication must be understood as a similarity in some form (I-II. q. 27, a. 3), that is, a common possession of some good.²

We are saying, therefore, that the act of theological charity is a supernatural act of the will, which loves God with a return of love on God's part.

222. Doctrine of the Church. She bears witness to the existence of a state of friendship between God and the just person. That is, the just man, by the very fact that he is just, truly is a friend of God: *the Council of Trent* s.6 ch.7 (D 1528) and (D 1535). Here implicitly is contained the existence of an act that is the love of friendship of man towards God. This friendship is not something static, but it is essentially dynamic. That such a love of friendship is an act of theological charity is not explicitly taught there, although it can be readily deduced from it.

223. Theological note. The thesis is *defined divine and Catholic faith* that there exists a state of friendship between God and the just man. *It seems to be implicitly defined* that the just man can love God with a love of friendship. It is *theologically certain* that this love is an act of charity, because the love of friendship is both the highest form of love and there cannot be in man a greater love for God than the act of charity.

224. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) *In the N.T.* the just are called *friends of God*: John 15:14f.; Luke 12:24; they are also called members of the household of God (that is, of God's family): Eph. 2:1. *In the O.T.*

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1. Consult the words of St. Augustine: "In order to avoid an offense of friendship, do we not take care lest a friend think either that we do not love him or that we love him less than he loves us? But if he believes this, he will become cooler in the love with which men enjoy a mutual familiarity with each other" (*De catechizandis rudibus* 8,7: ML 40,315).
 2. On the dispute concerning the way of understanding this "communication," about which St. Thomas speaks, see BullThom 7 (1930) 75-77f.

those who possess wisdom (Wis. 7:14.27) are said in general to participate in the friendship of God. Also, in the O.T. only Abraham is called a friend of God (2 Chron. 20:7; Jud. 8:22; Dan. 3:35; Isa. 41:8); Jas. 2:23 alludes to this title.

b) Moreover, in Scripture such a *relation between the just and God* is described, which includes the familiarity of friendship. Thus they are called sons, brothers of Christ, etc. The soul is also said to be the spouse of God.

225. Proof from tradition. The just man is a friend of God (R 1187); charity makes one a friend of God (R 1251); the dignity of men is so great that they are friends of God.³ Generally the Fathers say similar things while commenting on Ps. 138:17⁴; thus Hilary,⁵ St. John Chrysostom,⁶ St. Athanasius⁷; also those commenting on John 15:15, like St. Augustine.⁸

226. Theological reasoning. 1) There is friendship between God and the just man:

a) There is a *foundation* of friendship, namely, the communication of man with God according as God communicates his beatitude to us. That is, the greatest gift that God can communicate to us is his own beatitude which consists in his contemplation and love of himself. Therefore he communicates this to us not only in the future, and not only now as a reward, but also in reality, inasmuch as this divine life now is begun by the theological virtues, but will reach its perfection in heaven. Finally, this immediate and dynamic communication of life and divine beatitude supposes in us a new, radical similitude and communication in sanctifying grace; by it we are made partakers of the divine nature and children of God, who are communicating in the very nature of the Father.⁹

b) There is a *mutual love of benevolence*: For God cannot love us in any

3. St. Gregory the Great, *Homiliae in Evangelia* 27,4: ML 76,1206.

4. In the Vulgate or in the Septuagint, but not in the Hebrew.

5. *Tractatus in Psalmis* 138,38: ML 9,812.

6. *Expositio in Psalmum* 138:17: MG 55,417.

7. *Expositiones in Psalmos* 138:17: MG 27,534.

8. *In Ioannis Evangelium* tr.85: ML 38,1848.

9. See T. Keller, *De virtute caritatis ut amicitia quadam divina*: XenThom 2 (1925) 254-257.

other way, since we cannot bring Him any advantage or utility.¹⁰ However, we can love God in such a way that we wish Him well, while prescinding from the relative goodness of God.

2) *Charity is a love of friendship.* Hence it is that we can love God with a love of friendship, without which a state of friendship would be impossible. Indeed that love of friendship for God must be an act of charity itself. On the one hand, our greatest tendency of love for God must be given in charity, since all the other virtues are directed towards it; on the other hand, the most perfect way of loving is located in the love of friendship. Therefore the act of charity coincides with the love of friendship for God.

227. Corollary. From St. Thomas (*In 3 d.27 q.2 a.1*) are gathered the signs and consequences of friendship, which are found in a special way in our divine friendship. They are: the desire of his presence, benevolence (they will good mutually for each other), beneficence (they give good things mutually to each other), concord (they will the same things), rest in love.¹¹

228. Objection. Between a servant and his master there cannot be friendship. But man essentially is a servant of God. Therefore between man and God there cannot be friendship.

I distinguish the major. Between a servant and his master simply, *conceded*; between a servant and his master from nature, but between a son and his father from grace there cannot be friendship, *I subdistinguish*: a friendship of equality, *conceded*; a friendship of superexcellence, *denied*. *I distinguish the minor in the same way.* He is a servant from nature but son from grace, *conceded*; he is a servant only, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* There cannot be a friendship of equality, *conceded*; of superexcellence, *denied*.

10. *You will say*: God must refer his own love to his own glory. Therefore the love of God, by which he loves us, cannot reside in us. Therefore it is not the love of benevolence. *I respond* that the relation of love to its final end is such that it does not exclude a true love of benevolence; therefore friendship among men can be good without it ceasing to be true friendship.

You will say again: but God cannot be moved to love except by the goodness which is in Himself. Therefore not by the goodness in man. *I respond* that in God there cannot be placed anything, strictly speaking, that moves Him, and which is not Himself. But the whole tendency of the love, by which God loves, is not located in the loved term, that is, in us, whom of course he makes good and lovable by his own divine love (see Lennerz, 422-424).

For these and other reasons it is true that our friendship with God is not in all things similar to human friendship, because human friendship is always between equals. And therefore Scotus calls this divine friendship "superfriendship" (*Opus Oxoniense 3 d.27 s.un. n.20*).

11. On the friendship of man with God, which is found in charity, see T. Keller, *De virtute caritatis et amicitia quadam divina*: XenThom 2 (1925) 233-276; this article was published later in French with some additions: *La charité comme amitié d'après Saint Thomas*: RevThom 24 (1929) 446-475.

ARTICLE II

ON THE MOTIVE OF THEOLOGICAL CHARITY

Thesis 18. The motive of theological charity is the goodness of God inasmuch as He is the object of beatitude.

S.Th. II-II, q. 23, a. 4; Lennerz, 427-442, 526-530; Pesch, 537-552, 567-570.

229. Connection. We have seen that the act of charity is an act of the love of friendship for God. Hence it follows that the motive is the absolute goodness of God. But because this divine friendship does not agree in all things with human friendship, we must investigate its own proper motive where there can be a certain difficulty.

230. Definition of terms. *The absolute goodness of God*, that is, the divine good inasmuch as it is good in itself and for itself. Therefore, we defend the idea that the act of charity is a true and strict love of benevolence for God, and therefore that it is not self-interested as part of the motive. That is, in charity the lover is not moved to love for his own sake (utility, advantage), which he could find in the loved one or in loving.

Therefore, we exclude concupiscence on the part of the motive determining the love, which is a real and strict concupiscence. But we do not exclude the desire of union with the loved one; this desire is included in all friendship.¹

Moreover, it should be noted that we are looking for the motive that *psychologically* influences the will to make an act of charity; and in this sense we exclude any self-interested motive. It is another question, whether *ontologically* such love is impossible in created beings, unless the loved object not only is good in itself, but also good for the lover; this of course must be affirmed, since otherwise there would not be a sufficient reason for that love. Therefore the will could not tend towards God with love either of concupiscence or of benevolence, unless it found ontologically in this tendency its own good and perfection. But having granted this as an *ontological condition*, the will can be directed to God psychologically as He is good in Himself, without being moved *psychologically* by his own

1. The desire to possess God is one thing (and this occurs from hope), and the desire of union with God (and this occurs from charity) is something else. On this question see J. de Guibert, *Charité parfaite et désir de Dieu*: RevAscMyst 7 (1926) 225-250; J. de Vries, *Der Akt der Gottesliebe nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas*: ZAszMyst 5 (1930) 17-34.

utility, which in that love is found *de facto* for the will itself.²

231. *Inasmuch as He is the object of beatitude.* That is, in the absolute goodness of God there is a special lovability inasmuch as he transcends the whole natural order, and so truly is our heavenly Father. Therefore, God as the object of beatitude is not understood inasmuch as he is good for us, but in his own goodness which we will enjoy in supernatural beatitude. Because this beatitude expresses the intrinsic life of God, God understood in this way is thought of especially under the aspect of his intrinsic and absolute goodness.

Therefore, by the words *absolute goodness of God* we determine the motive of charity inasmuch as it is a true love of benevolence; by the words *inasmuch as He is the object of beatitude* we determine the motive of charity inasmuch as it is a love of friendship—adding something beyond the love of friendship.

232. Adversaries. Bolgeni held that a non self-interested love of benevolence for God is impossible, but that man in loving always seeks his own good.³

Theological note. *Common and certain.*

233. Proof from Holy Scripture. According to Scripture man can love another with a non-interested love because of his absolute goodness. Therefore he can also love God in that way. But according to Scripture our love for God must be the greatest love. Therefore charity is a non-interested

2. On the double tendency in charity, "physical" and "ecstatic," recently much has been written. See P. Rousselet, *Pour l'histoire de problème de l'amour au moyen âge* (Münster 1908); K. Egenter, *Gottesfreundschaft. Die Lehre der Gottesfreundschaft in der Scholastik und Mystik des 12. und 13. Jahrhunderts* (Augsburg 1928); *Die Idee der Gottesfreundschaft in vierzehnten Jahrhundert*: Aus der Geisteswelt der Mittelalter 2, 1021-1036; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *Le problème de l'amour pur et la solution de Saint Thomas*: Ang 6 (1929) 83-124; *De amore puro secundum S. Thomae principia*: Ang 7 (1930) 3-16; H.D. Simonin, *Autour de la solution thomiste du problème de l'amour*: ArchHistDoctrLittMA 6 (1931) 174-276; L.B. Gillon, *Genèse de la théorie thomiste de l'amour*: RevThom 46 (1946) 322-329; L. von Rudloff, *St. Thomas über die Liebe*: DivThom (Fr) 11 (1933) 344-351; F. Zigon, *Der Begriff der caritas beim Petrus Lombardus und dem hl. Thomas*: DivThom (Fr) 4 (1926) 404-424; J. Stüfeler, *Petrus Lombardus und Thomas von Aquin über die Natur der caritas*: ZkathTh 51 (1927) 399-408; J. Kaup, *Die theologische Tugend der Liebe nach der Lehre des h. Bonaventura* (Münster 1927); J. Klein, *Die Charitaslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus* (Münster 1926); *Nochmals die Charitaslehre des hl. Johannes Duns Scotus*: FranzStud 24 (1937) 87-93; *Die Überlegenheit der Charitaslehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*: FrnzStud 16 (1929) 141-155; J. Reuss, *Die theologische Tugend der Liebe nach der Lehre des Johannes Duns Scotus*: ZkathTh 58 (1934) 1-39, 208-242; *Die theologische Tugend der Liebe nach der Lehre des Richard von Mediavilla*: FranzStud 22 (1935) 11-43, 158-198; M.M. Davy, *L'amour de Dieu d'après Guillaume de Saint-Thierry*: RevScRel 18 (1938) 319-346; Z. Alszeghy, *Grundformen der Liebe* (Rome 1946).

3. *Della carità o amor di Dio* (Rome 1788) 1,8,68.

love because of the absolute goodness of God.

The antecedent: a) Christ teaches us how far a true love of friendship among men reaches, that is, even to the death of the lover for the loved good (John 15:13), so that he wishes us to love our neighbor in this way (1 John 3:16). Such love is not self-interested, but because of the absolute goodness of the loved person. Therefore according to Scripture man can love another with a non-interested love because of his absolute goodness.

b) Similarly, Christ tells his Apostles that they should rejoice over the good of Christ himself, rather than to be seeking their own advantage, if they truly love Him (John 14:28). But again such love is not self-interested. Therefore a non self-interested love of the Apostles for Christ was possible.

This minor: By the precept of charity we are commanded to love God with our whole heart, with our whole soul, with our whole mind, with our whole strength, or with all our power (Matt. 22:27; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27; see Deut. 6:5). But these words signify the greatest love for God. Therefore according to Scripture our charity ought to be the greatest love for God.

234. Proof from tradition. a) The holy Fathers designate the motive of charity for God with these formulas: not because of what he gives, but because of his nature and before his gifts⁴; because He is truly lovable⁵; because of his beauty⁶; because of his goodness⁷; because he is good in Himself.⁸

b) To seek one's own good, they say, is to have the love of friendship and charity⁹; it is to be united to the good because of the good itself¹⁰; to cultivate the good and to embrace it because of itself¹¹; to do good only from an affection of goodness¹²; to enjoy God because of Himself.¹³

c) They speak about the three ways or states of the spiritual life, in which fear, hope and charity prevail; there they teach that charity does not seek its own reward: thus Clement of Alexandria,¹⁴ St. Basil,¹⁵ St. Gregory

4. Eusebius, *De eo quod ait Dominus, non veni pacem mittere*: MG 24,1171.

5. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 4,22: MG 8,1356.

6. St. Basil, *Regulae fusius tractatae* 2,1: MG 31,909; St. Augustine, *Confessiones* 7,17; Theodoret, *De divina caritate*: MG 82,1517; St. Maximus, *De caritate* 1,19: MG 90,964.

7. Cassian, *Collationes* 21,15: ML 49,1191.

8. St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 79,14: ML 36,1028.

9. St. Ambrose, *Epistolae* 37,23: ML 16,1090.

10. St. Gregory Naz., *Contra Iulianum* hom.4,60: MG 35,582.

11. St. Gregory Naz., *Orationes* 36,9: MG 36,276.

12. Cassian, *Collationes* 36,9: MG 49,852.

13. St. Augustine, *De doctrina christiana* 3,10,16: ML 34,72.

14. *Stromata* 4,18: MG 8,1320.

15. *Regulae fusius tractatae* prol.3: MG 31,896.

Nazianzen,¹⁶ St. Gregory of Nyssa,¹⁷ Eusebius Emyssenus,¹⁸ St. John Chrysostom,¹⁹ Julianus Pomerius,²⁰ St. Jerome,²¹ Cassian.²²

d) By the same non-interested love they also explain the words of St. Paul in Rom. 9:3: thus Clement of Alexandria,²³ St. Gregory Nazianzen,²⁴ St. Augustine,²⁵ St. John Chrysostom,²⁶ Isidorus Pelusiota,²⁷ Cassian,²⁸ Victor Vitensis,²⁹ Theophylactus,³⁰ Oecumenius,³¹ Theodoret,³² and others likewise.³³

235. Theological reasoning. a) The act of charity is the highest act by which man can love God. But the highest love of God must be because of the absolute goodness of God. Therefore the motive of an act of charity is *the absolute goodness of God*.

b) An act of charity is the love of friendship. Therefore it must be specified from the motive specifying friendship. But the motive specifying friendship is derived from the foundation of friendship, that is, from the diverse "communication," which in this case is the common possession of the same divine beatitude. Therefore the motive of charity is the absolute goodness of God, *according as it is the object of beatitude*.

Note that there is not the same love of benevolence of a man towards a non-friend and that of friends with each other; also it is not the same between two friends and between a son and his father, or between spouses. Surely God can be loved naturally with a love of *benevolence* (see II-II, q.

16. *Homilia in sanctum Baptisma* 13: MG 36,373.

17. *Homilia 1 in Cantica*: MG 44,765.

18. *Opusculum* 6: MG 24,1174.

19. *In Ioannem hom* 77,4: MG 59,418.

20. *De vita contemplativa* 3,11-13: ML 59,490-493.

21. *Epistolae* 21,14: ML 22,386.

22. *Collationes* 11,6: ML 49,852.

23. *Stromata* 4,22: MG 8,1348.

24. *Orationes* 2,55: MG 35,465.

25. *In Psalmum* 68,2,13: ML 36,859.

26. *Ad Stagyrum* 3,11: MG 47,488.

27. *Liber 2 Epistolarum* 58: MG,500.

28. *Collationes* 9,18: ML 49,790f.

29. *De persecutione vandolica* 5,4: ML 58,244.

30. *In epistolam ad Romanos*: MG 124,457-460.

31. *In epistolam ad Romanos*: MG 124,496f.1224.

32. *In epistolam ad Romanos*: MG 82,148.

33. See J. Farges-M. Viller, *La charité chez les Pères*: DSpir 2,433-438.

23, a. 4)³⁴; but that love, even in its psychological tendency differs from the love of charity, precisely because it is not between friends, or between son and father. However, the supernatural love of God, existing between a just man and God, is a true love of *friendship*. It is a true love of a son for his Father, whose motive cannot now be the absolute goodness of God taken simply (for it cannot be attained simply by a son for his father), but according as it is the goodness of the heavenly Father, who is infinitely lovable in Himself.

236. Objections. 1. According to the holy Fathers, an act of charity includes the desire and concupiscence of God. Therefore its motive is self-interest.

I distinguish the antecedent. The desire and the concupiscence of a friendly union with God, *conceded*; of the possession of God because of the good of the lover, *denied*.

2. But the will cannot love anything except its own good. Therefore all human love is because of self-interest.

I distinguish the antecedent. Except that which is his own good, *conceded*; except because it is his own good, *subdistinguish*: ontologically, *conceded*; psychologically, *denied*.

3. Holy Scripture always proposes to us that we should love God as our good, our benefactor, our strength, our beatitude. Therefore Scripture does not know about a love for God that is not one of self-interest.

Response 1: I deny the antecedent based on our argument from Scripture.

Response 2: I distinguish the antecedent. So that God as our good, benefactor, strength and beatitude can still be loved because of his absolute goodness, which is reflected in all these things, *conceded*; so that he must be loved necessarily because of our advantage, *denied*.

4. God as the object of beatitude is the motive of hope. Therefore it cannot be the motive of charity.

I distinguish the antecedent. God as the object of beatitude, that is, God because he is our beatitude, *conceded*; God because He is good in Himself with that same goodness which will be the object of our beatitude, *denied*. *I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

5. Charity is the love of man for God. But it pertains to the notion of any kind of love that it tends to the proper good of the lover. Therefore charity also must tend towards God, as the proper good of man. Therefore the motive of charity is the relative goodness of God.

Response 1: If this argument proved anything, it would prove also the impossibility

34. Theologians generally admit a natural love of God because of His absolute goodness, known by the light of reason. On some questions connected with this love, see E. Neveut, *Est-il possible au pécheur, tant qu'il demeure dans son péché, d'avoir pour Dieu un simple amour de bienveillance?*: DivThom (Pi) 32 (1929) 162-166; H.D. Simonin, *La doctrine de l'amour naturel de Dieu d'après le Bienheureux Albert le Grand*: RevThom 36 (1931) 361-370; F. Stegmüller, *Robert Kihvard, O.P., Über die Möglichkeit der natürlichen Gottesliebe*: DivThom (Pi) 12 (1935) 306-319.

of a love of benevolence not only for God, but also among men. It is obvious that this is false.

Response 2: I distinguish the major. It is a love of benevolence for God, *conceded*; a love of concupiscence, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* It pertains to the notion of any kind of love that it tends to what ontologically is for the good of the lover, *conceded*; that it tends to the proper good of the lover psychologically inasmuch as it is such, *denied*. *I distinguish the first consequent in the same way.* Charity must tend to God who ontologically is the proper good of man, *conceded*; it must tend psychologically to God according as he is the proper good of man, *I subdistinguish*: if charity were a love of concupiscence, *conceded*; if it is a love of benevolence, *denied*.

6. The love of friendship essentially involves wishing what is good for a friend. But we cannot wish what is good for God, since he lacks no good. Therefore we cannot love God with a love of friendship.

I distinguish the major. To wish good for a friend, that is, to desire that he have a good thing he does not have, or to rejoice in the good he does have, *conceded*; to wish good for a friend, that is, only to desire a good for him that he does not have, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor.* We cannot desire for God a good that he does not have, *conceded*; we cannot rejoice in the good that he does have, *denied*.

237. Scholium. *On the absolute goodness of God, reflected in the various divine attributes.* The question is raised by theologians, whether the absolute goodness of God is required for the motive of charity, according as it includes the divine essence and all its attributes; or whether the goodness reflected in one or another attribute is sufficient, v.gr., in the divine wisdom. Theologians have spoken in different ways about this. But it seems necessary to say that any absolute goodness of God suffices for the motive of charity, even that which is contained in the individual attributes. For the goodness contained in any divine attribute, since it is infinite and divine, is both the goodness of God and His absolute goodness, not relative. Therefore the *absolute* goodness, which shines forth also in the relative attributes of God, v.gr., in His mercy or in the divine beneficence, suffices as a motive for charity. For, it is not less absolute, or less divine, than the goodness of any other attribute. But in this way, through a consideration of God's beneficence, we are introduced to true charity; not resting in the fact that God was good to me (from that would follow only gratitude, which is not a theological virtue), but proceeding to a consideration of His supreme and absolute benignity which makes Him infinitely good in Himself; the signs and indications of this are His benefits to us (see II-II, q. 106, a. 5).³⁵

35. See Lennerz, 441f.; Pesch, 553-564; Beraza, 1188-1192; F. Hatheyer, *Die Lehre des hl. Thomas über die Gottesliebe*: ZkathTh 44 (1920) 78-105, 222-241.

ARTICLE III

ON THE MATERIAL OBJECT OF THEOLOGICAL CHARITY

Thesis 19. The material object of theological charity, in addition to God, is every intellectual creature capable of beatitude.

S.Th. II-II, q. 25; Lennerz, 531-558; Pesch, 601-621; Beraza, 1208-1251.

238. Connection. Having investigated the intimate nature of the act of charity from its psychological tendency and from its specifying motive, it remains to ask what the objects are about which such an act of charity can be exercised.

239. Definition of terms. *In addition to God.* Obviously God himself must be the object of the act of charity, and of course the primary object. On this point there is no difficulty. For in him primarily and per se is found the specific motive of this love. Therefore there is no question about this. But the whole question is whether, *in addition*, there is some other object of theological charity, even though it is secondary. We are saying yes to this question.

Every intellectual creature capable of beatitude, that is, all men in this life, the souls detained in purgatory, the saints and angels in heaven.

Material object, that is, that about which the act of charity can be concerned, or that which can be loved with the love of charity in the strict sense. However, since we said that charity is a love of friendship and its motive is the absolute goodness of God inasmuch as he is the object of beatitude, our thesis now is this: an intellectual creature, capable of beatitude, can be loved with the love of friendship because of the absolute goodness of God inasmuch as God is the object of beatitude.

I am saying always that *he can* be loved with this love. For, we are not treating directly with the obligation of loving one's neighbor in this way, nor with the possibility or impossibility of loving one's neighbor with another supernatural love, which is not the love of charity in the strict sense and the love of divine friendship. But it is clear that we are considering the act of love itself for the neighbor, elicited by the will because of the motive of charity in the strict sense, and not about the *habit*, which gives rise to the act; this act manifestly is elicited by the habit of charity, if it is a true act of charity in the strict sense, but not conversely.

240. Theological note. It is a matter of *divine faith from Holy Scripture*

and tradition that there is some intrinsic connection of charity for God and love of one's neighbor. It is a *common and certain opinion* that the neighbor can be loved with the same habit of theological charity by which we love God himself. It is *the more probable opinion* that he can be loved by the act which has the same motive as the act of charity for God has.¹

241. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) There is an intimate connection between the love of God and love of the neighbor: 1 John 4:7-13.

b) So that one can argue from one to the other: 1 John 4:19-21; 5:2.

c) This intimate connection is based on the mutual relations of the same divine family (not just on the will to keep the commandments): 1 John 5:1.

d) Therefore it is allowed to speak in an unclear manner about the love of God and the love of neighbor: 1 Cor. 13:13.

e) Therefore love of one's neighbor can be a certain sign of adherence to Christ by faith and charity: John 13:35.

242. Proof from tradition. 1) *The holy Fathers:* a) They teach an intrinsic *union between the love of God and neighbor*: the neighbor is not to be loved with a charity that is different from that whereby God is loved²; one who loves God also loves his neighbor very much³; one who neglects love of neighbor also neglects the love of God and vice versa⁴; he does not love the Father, who does not love the Son whom the Father loves⁵; he who does not love his neighbor, is not counted among the children of God⁶; one who has great love for God, loves his brothers spiritually⁷; by the love of God the love of neighbor is begotten, and by the love of the neighbor the love of God is nourished⁸; the love of God and the love of neighbor are united together, like contemplation and action.⁹

b) They teach that the love of neighbor is *a sign of the love of God*: just as by the love of God there is also the love of neighbor, so by the love of neighbor the love of God is manifested¹⁰; we do not see the invisible God,

1. Not all authors give the same theological note to this thesis; see Beraza, 1214 (a matter of faith); Pesch, 601 (theologically certain). But this distinction, which we borrowed from Lennerz, 550f., seems to define the matter better and more accurately.

2. St. Augustine, *Serm.* 265,8,9: ML 38,1223.

3. St. Maximus, *De caritate* 1,23: MG 90,965.

4. *Liber de perfectione spirituali* 11: MG 34,849.

5. St. John Chrysostom, *In 1 Cor* hom.32,6: MG 61,272.

6. St. Leo the Great, *Serm.* 49,6: ML 54,305.

7. Diadochus, *De perfectione spirituali* 15: MG 65,1162.

8. St. Gregory the Great, *Moralia* 7,24: ML 75,780.

9. Theodoret, *In epistolam ad Romanos* 13: MG 82,196f.

10. St. Isidore, *Differentiae* 2,143: ML 83,92.

but we find the path to God in his servants¹¹; true love for one's neighbor is found only in the disciples of Christ¹²; love for one's neighbor is a sign of a true Christian and of true Christianity.¹³

c) They teach that the *motive* of love of neighbor is *God himself*: love is true when both a friend is loved in God, and because of God the enemy is loved¹⁴; the neighbor must be loved because of God,¹⁵ in Christ Jesus,¹⁶; neighbors are loved as members of the mystical body of Christ¹⁷; and there are many other quotes like these.¹⁸

243. 2) All later *theologians* teach *the unity of the virtue of charity*. Indeed, generally they reduce to charity also the *act* of charity towards one's neighbor. However, they explain this in different ways, and not always so that it is the motive of charity for God and of charity for one's neighbor. Here are a few explanations: the Master of the Sentences teaches: "he who loves men, either because they are just or in order that they might be just must love; that is, in God and because of God."¹⁹ St. Bonaventure explains: because to love is to wish good and charity loves only one good, namely, the divine good, "according as he desires it for his neighbor, thus he is said to love his neighbor."²⁰ And elsewhere: "since charity is a weight inclining someone to the supreme Good and to perfect beatitude, it makes him love everything that is blessed or can be blessed."²¹ St. Thomas says: "the neighbor is loved with charity, because God is in him or that God may be in him."²² Scotus somewhat differently: "I love myself and my neighbor out of charity, wishing to desire for myself and for him and by love to have God in ourselves."²³ In the 14th and 15th centuries in many authors this formula is common: the object of charity is God and everything that God wants us to love. Thus Peter de Alliaco, Gabriel Biel, and others.²⁴

11. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia* hom.30,10: ML 76,1226f.

12. St. Maximus, *De caritate* 4,100: MG 61,275.

13. St. John Chrysostom, *In 1 Cor* 32,8: MG 61,275.

14. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evangelia* hom.38,11: ML 76,1289.

15. St. Maximus, *De caritate* 249: MG 90,985.

16. St. Ignatius, *Ad Magnesios* 6,2: MG 5,667.

17. Tertullian, *De paenitentia* 10: ML 1,1245; St. Hilary, *In Psalmum* 118: ML 9,637; St. Ambrose, *In Psalmum* 118,8,53: ML 15,1317.

18. See J. Farges-M. Viller, *La charité chez les pères*: Dspir 2,564-266.

19. 3 d.27 c.5.

20. *In* 3 d.27 a.1 q.2.

21. *In* 3 d.38 a.un. q.4. On St. Bonaventure, see I. Kaupp, *Die theologische Tugend der Liebe nach der Lehre des hl. Bonaventura* (Münster 1927) 61.

22. *Quaestiones Disputatae, de caritate* a.4; see II-II, q. 25, a. 1.

23. *In* 3 d.28 q.un. a.2.

24. See E. Vansteenbergh, *Charité. Les auteurs séculiers du XIV^e et du XV^e siècle*: DSpir 2,598f.

244. Theological reasoning. Everything is the material object of charity in which can be found the nature of the absolute goodness of God as it is the object of beatitude. But this is found in every intellectual creature capable of beatitude. Therefore the material object according to charity is an intellectual creature capable of beatitude.

The minor: Any intellectual creature of this kind has the communication of beatitude (which is the foundation of friendship) either perfectly or imperfectly, or in divine ordination and destination. See II-II, q. 25, a. 6.

245. Objections. 1. Nothing is loved except because of its goodness. But a creature is not good with the goodness of God as Father. Therefore a creature cannot be loved because of the goodness of God as Father.

I distinguish the major: Because of its goodness, by which it is constituted in its being, or by which supernaturally it becomes a partaker of the divine goodness, *conceded*; only because of the goodness by which it is constituted in its own being, *denied*. *I also distinguish the minor:* A creature is not good, that is, is not constituted in its being by the goodness of God as Father, *conceded*; it is not good, that is, supernaturally it does not become a partaker of the goodness of God as Father, *denied*.

2. The worship of latria, by which we adore God, differs specifically from the worship of dulia, by which we honor the saints, even though we honor the saints because of God. Similarly, therefore, the charity with which we love God differs specifically from the charity with which we love our neighbor, although we love the neighbor because of God.

I deny the parity. The internal motives in the worship of latria and in the worship of dulia are different specifically. Therefore these two forms of worship are essentially different. But in love for God and in love for one's neighbor the motive is one and the same, as was explained in the thesis. Therefore they are acts of one and the same theological virtue.²⁵

246. Scholium. 1. On the love of oneself from charity. From what has been said it is clear that we can love ourselves with a true love of charity. For, inasmuch as we are capable of beatitude, and we already have it in a beginning way, there is in us something of the goodness of God as our Father. Therefore if we love ourselves because of this goodness, the motive of that act is a true motive of charity. Indeed we can even love our own body from the same love. For, it also is capable of beatitude by way of redundancy, just as it is also the instrument for acquiring that beatitude. And the notion of otherness, which seems to be necessary in the case of friendship, is not an obstacle; for, there is no friendship with oneself. For, towards ourselves we have "something more than friendship." Friendship certainly implies union; but towards ourselves we have a unity that is greater than any union. See II-II, q. 25, a. 4f.

25. There are more objections in Beraza, 1221ff.

247. Scholium 2. *On the love of neighbor because of his supernatural created goods.* Theologians ask whether the act of love of neighbor because of the gifts of grace, which are in him, is a true act of theological charity and supernatural friendship. Indeed it seems that both must be affirmed, since the motive of that love is only the inchoative communication of supernatural beatitude, in which is located the foundation of friendship and charity.²⁶

248. Scholium. 3. *On the love of other creatures from charity.* That even irrational creatures can be loved with a love of charity is explained by St. Thomas in this way: "First, there is the love for the friend to whom our friendship is given, secondly, the love for those good things which we desire for our friend. With regard to the first, no irrational creature can be loved out of charity... Nevertheless we can love irrational creatures out of charity, if we regard them as the good things that we desire for others, in so far, to wit, as we wish for their preservation, to God's honor and man's use; thus too does God love them out of charity." (II-II, q. 25, a. 3).

249. Scholium 4. *On the order of charity.* Because the motive of charity is found first of all and principally in God himself, in whom is located His absolute goodness, as it is the object of beatitude, and then secondarily and in a different way it is found in those being that are capable of the same beatitude, a certain order in charity must be established. In this order God is principally and especially to be loved out of charity; for he is loved as the cause of beatitude. But other things afterwards, as participating in his beatitude.

But among all participants in beatitude there is some order. For, a man must love himself out of charity more than he loves his neighbor, because, as St. Thomas says, "man, out of charity, loves himself by reason of his being a partaker of the aforesaid good, and loves his neighbor by reason of his fellowship in that good." However, unity is stronger than union. But because association in the full participation of beatitude is a greater reason for loving than participation in beatitude by redundancy, the neighbor should be loved more than one's own body.

However, not all neighbors are to be loved equally out of charity, but according to the greater or lesser propinquity they have to God and to us. These points and many others are treated by St. Thomas in II-II, q. 26.

250. Scholium 5. *On the acts of charity.* The principal act of charity is love. This act "implies a certain union according to the affections of the love for the loved one, inasmuch, that is, as the lover considers the loved one as one with himself, or as pertaining to himself." Therefore it differs from mere benevolence, because it adds to it the union of affection. By this act we must love God *totally*, according to the precept of charity; that is, not only because the *whole*, which pertains to God, must be loved by us, but also because God must be loved *out of our whole possibility* and everything we have must be ordered to love of Him. See II-II, q. 27.

26. Pesch, 617f.

The acts of charity follow from the act of love as its effects. Of these, as St. Thomas says, some are internal, like joy, peace and mercy (II-II, q. 28-30); others are external, like beneficence, whose special part is giving alms, and also a special part of this is fraternal correction (II-II, q. 31-33).

251. Scholium 6. *On the necessity of the act of charity.* That this act is not necessary for justification, unless the latter is extra-sacramental, is clear from the treatise on the sacraments. But the act of charity is especially necessary for salvation with the necessity of means, since it constitutes the true and intrinsic tendency to the last end. Moreover, it is given as the first and greatest precept concerning the act of charity (Matt. 22:37f.). This precept obliges one to elicit an act of charity (D 2021), even outside of the necessity of obtaining justification through it (D 2107), not just once (D 2105), but oftener than every five years (D 2106).²⁷

EPILOGUE

252. From what we have said about the acts of faith, hope and charity it is easily apparent in what sense these virtues are really theological virtues. For they have God as their motive and as their primary or principle material object.

For, *faith* does not believe except on the authority of God revealing, according as this authority exists in himself. And it believes only what has been said by God, among which those things stand out which have been revealed about God himself. *Therefore it believes God in God.*

Again, *hope* does not hope except in God himself as its primary objective. Nor does it hope from anyone else except from God himself and his helping power. *Therefore it hopes in God from God.*

Finally, *charity* has God as its primary and principal object. But it loves him only because of God himself. *Therefore it loves God because of God.*

27. See Lennerz, 569.

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