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SACRAE THEOLOGIAE SUMMA

IVA

ON THE SACRAMENTS IN GENERAL



ON BAPTISM, CONFIRMATION, EUCHARIST, PENANCE AND ANOINTING

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THEOLOGICAL NOTES

USED IN THIS "SACRAE THEOLOGIAE SUMMA"

Divine faith (de fide divina): what is contained in the word of God written or handed down. The opposite is: *an error in faith (error in fide).*

Divine and catholic faith (de fide divina et catholica): what is contained in the word of God written or handed and is proposed by the Church either by a solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium to be believed as divinely revealed. The opposite is: *heresy.*

Defined divine and catholic faith (de fide divina et catholica definita): what is contained in the word of God written or handed down and is proposed by the Church by a solemn judgment, that is, by the infallible Magisterium, exercised in an extraordinary way, either in an ecumenical council or by the Roman Pontiff speaking "ex cathedra" and to be believed as divinely revealed. [N.B. Even the Chapter Titles in Trent and Vatican I are considered as true *definitions.*]

Proximate to faith (fidei proxima): a truth that by an almost unanimous agreement of theologians is contained in the word of God written or handed down. The opposite is: *proximate to error or heresy.*

Faith based on the authority of the Church (fides ecclesiastica): a truth not formally revealed, which is proposed infallibly by the Magisterium of the Church. The opposite is: *error in ecclesiastical faith.* [Those who do not admit there is such a thing as ecclesiastical faith give a different theological note for such a truth.]

Catholic doctrine (doctrina catholica): a truth that is taught in the whole Church, but not always proposed infallibly (for example, what the Roman Pontiffs wish to teach explicitly in encyclical letters). The opposite is: *error in catholic doctrine.*

Theologically certain (theologice certa): a truth that in the theological schools is certainly recognized as necessarily connected with revealed truths; this connection can be either virtual or presupposition or final. The opposite is: *error in theology.*

A doctrine to be so held that its contrary is temerarious (doctrina ita tenenda, ut contraria sit temeraria): a truth proposed by the Roman Congregations, which proposition however does not enjoy the special approbation of the Roman Pontiff.

Common and certain in theology (communis et certa in theologia): what by the common agreement of theologians is taught in the schools as well founded. The opposite is: *false in theology, temerarious.*

Probable (probabilis): a theological opinion with a lesser grade of certainty.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAS ..... Acta Apostolicae Sedis

ActPontAcRomSTh..... Acta Pontificae Academiae Romanae S. Thomae Aq. et Relgionis Catholicae

AltAbhand ..... Alttestamentliche Abhandlungen

AmCl..... L'Ami du Clergé

AnalSacraTarrac ..... Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia

Ang ..... Angelicum

Ant ..... Antonianum

AnTh..... L'Année Théologique

Anthr..... Anthropos

Arb ..... Arbor

ArchHistDoctrLitMA..... Archive d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age

ArchLitKirchMA..... Archiv für Literatur und Kirchen-Geschichte des Mittelalters

ArchFrancHist ..... Archivum Franciscanum Historicum

ArchGeschPh..... Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie

ArchPh..... Archives de Philosophie

ArchTG..... Archivo Teológico Granadino

ASS..... Acta Sanctae Sedis

BAC..... Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos

BeitrGPhMA..... Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie (und Theologie) des Mittelalters

BenedMschr..... Benediktinische Monatsschrift

B..... Biblische Zeitschrift

BiblStud..... Biblische Studien

B..... Bijdragen

BollFil..... Bolletino Filosofico

B..... Broteria

BullLitEccl..... Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique

BullThom..... Bulletin Thomiste

Cath..... Catholica

CathEnc ..... The Cathoic Encyclopedia

Cav..... F. Cavallera, S.I., Thesaurus Doctrinae Catholicae

CE ..... Ch. G. Herbermann and associates, The Catholic Encyclopedia

ChrPädBlätt ..... Christliche Pädagogische Blätter

CIC..... Codex Iuris Canonici

CiencFe..... Ciencia y Fe

CiencTom ..... La Ciencia Thomista
CitNouv ..... Cité Nouvelle
CittVit ..... La Citta di Vita
CiudD ..... La Ciudad de Dios
CivCatt ..... La Civilta Cattolica
CL ..... Acta et Decreta sacrorum Conciliorum Recentiorum … Collectio Lacensis.
ClerRev ..... The Clergy Review
CollatBrug ..... Collationes Brugenses
CollatDioecTorn ..... Collationes Dioecesis Tornacensis
CollatGrand ..... Collationes Gandavenses
CollFranc ..... Collectanea Franciscana
CollMech ..... Collectanea Mechliniensis
CollTh ..... Collectanea Theologica
Crit ..... Criterion
CSEL ..... Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiastiorum Latinorum.Academiae. Vindobonensis
CTr ..... Concilium Tridentinum.Ed. Societas Goerresiana
D ..... H. Denzinger – Peter Hünermann, Enchiridion Symbolorum 43
DACL ..... F. Carrol – H. Leclercq- H. Marrou, Dictionnaire d'Archeologie chrétienne et de Liturgie
DAFC ..... A. d'Alès, Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique
DB ..... F. Vigouroux, Dictionnaire de la Bible
DBS ..... L. Pirot-A. Robert, Dictionnaire de la Bible. Supplément
DivThom (Fr) ..... Divus Thomas. Freiburg i. der Schweiz
DivThom (Pi) ..... Divus Thomas. Piacenza
DocCath ..... La Documantation Catholique
DocComm ..... Doctor Communis
DomSt ..... Dominican Studies
DTC ..... A. Vacant-E. Mangenot-E. Amann, Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique
EcclRev ..... The Ecclesiastical Review
EchOr ..... Echos d'Orient
Elt ..... Enciclopedia Italiana de Scienze, Lettere Ed Arti
EstBibl ..... Estudios Biblicos
EphCarm ..... Ephemerides Carmeliticae
EphRhLov ..... Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses
ERel ..... An Encyclopedia of Religion
EstEcl ..... Estudios Ecclesiasticos

EstFranc ..... Estudios Franciscanos
EstMar ..... Estudios Marianos
Et ..... Etudes
EtCarm ..... Etudes Carmelitaines
EtFranc ..... Etudes Franciscaines
EtPhMéd ..... Etudes de Philosophie Médiévale
EtRech ..... Etudes et Recherches
EuntDoc ..... Euntes Docete
Forsch ..... Forschungen zur christlichen Litteratur- und Dogmengeschichte
FranzStud ..... Franziscanische Studien
GChS ..... Die griechischen cchristlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter-Commission der Königlichen preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
GeistMitt ..... Aus der Geisteswelt der Mittelalters. Studien und Texte Martin Grabmann zur Vollendung des 60. Lebensjahres von Freunden und Schülern gewidmet (Münster 1935)
Greg ..... Gregorianum
Hrd ..... J. Harduini, S.I., Conciliorum Collectio regia maxima
JahrbPhTh ..... Jahrbuch für Philosophie und spekulative Theologie
Kat ..... Der Katholik
Kch ..... C. Kirch, S.I.-L. Ueding, S.I., Enchiridion Fontium historiae ecclesiasticae antiquae 5
KL ..... J. Hergenroeter, F. Kaulen, Wetzer und Welte's Kirchenlexikon2
Lettr ..... Les Lettres
LTK ..... M. Buchberger, Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche
Manr ..... Manresa
MedSt ..... Mediaeval Studies
MélScRel ..... Mélanges Thomistes
ML, MG ..... J. P. Migne, Patrologiae cursus completus Series prima latina. Series graeca.
MiscAgost ..... Miscellanea Agostiniana
MiscBibl ..... Miscellanea Biblica
MiscCom ..... Miscellanea Comillas
Msi ..... J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collection
MünsterBeitr ..... Münsterische Beiträge zur Theologie
MussLess ..... Mussaeum Lessianum
NewSchol ..... The New Scholasticism
NouvRevTh ..... Nouvelle Revue Théologique
OnGel ..... Ons Geloof

Or ..... Orientalia
OrCh ..... Orientalia Christiana
OrChP ..... Orientalia Christiana Periodica
PalCl ..... Palestra del Clero
Pens ..... Pensamiento
PerMorCanLit ..... Periodica de re morali canonica liturgica
PhGrenzwiss ..... Philosophie und Grenzwissenschaften
PhJahrb ..... Philosophisches Jahrbuch
PO ..... R. Graffin-F. Nau, Patrologia Orientalis
QuestBibl ..... Questioni Bibliche alla luce dell'enciclica Divino afflante Spiritu
R ..... M. J. Rouët de Journel, S.I., Enchiridion Patristicum 10-11
RazFe ..... Razón y Fe
RechScRel ..... Recherches de Science Religieuse
RechThAncMéd ..... Recherches de Théologie ancienne et Médiévale
Rel ..... Religio
REPT ..... J. J. Herzog, Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche
RelCul ..... Religión y Cultura
RevApol ..... Revue Apologétique
RevAscMyst ..... Revue d'Ascétique et Mystique
RevBibl ..... Revue Biblique
RevClerFr ..... Revue du Clergé Francais
RevDiocNam ..... Revue Diocésaine de Namur
RevEcclLiège ..... Revue Ecclésiastique de Liège Revista Ecclesiastica
RevEspir ..... Revista de Espiritualidad
RevEspT ..... Revista Española de Teología
RevHistEccl ..... Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique
RevHistLittRel ..... Revue d'Histoire et de Littérature Religieuse
RevNéoscolPh ..... Revue Néo-scolastique de Philosophie
RevPh ..... Revue de Philosophie
RevPhLov ..... Revue Philosophique de Louvain
RevQuestSc ..... Revue des Questions Scientifiques
RevScPhTh ..... Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques
RevScRel ..... Revue des Sciences Religieuses
RevThom ..... Revue Thomiste
RevUnivOtt ..... Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa
RivFilNeosc ..... Rivista di Filosofia Neo-scolastica
Sa ..... Sapientia
Sap ..... Sapienza

Sc ..... Sciencia
ScEccl ..... Sciences Ecclésiastiques
Schol ..... Scholastik
ScSacr ..... Scientia Sacra. Theologische Festgabe zugeignet seiner Eminenz dem Hochwürigsten Herrn Karl Joseph Kardinal Schulte
ScuoCatt ..... Scuola Cattolica
SpicSacrLo ..... Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense
SThS ..... Sacrae Theologiae Summa
Stimm ..... Stimmen (aus Maria-Laach; ab anno 1915: der Zeit)
Stud ..... Studien
StudCath ..... Studia Catholica
StudFranc ..... Studi Francescani
StudTest ..... Studi e Testi
SyllExcerpDiss ..... Sylloge excerptorum e dissertationibus ad gradum Doctoris in Sacra Theologia vel in Iure canonico consequendum conscriptis (Louvain)
TextDoc ..... Textus det Documenta
TextStud ..... Text and Studies
ThGl ..... Theologie und Glaube
ThPraktQschr ..... Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift
ThQschr ..... Theologische Quartalschrift
ThRev ..... Theologische Revue
ThSt ..... Theological Studies
TU ..... Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
VerbCa ..... Verbum Caro
VerDom ..... Verbun Domini
VerVid ..... Verdad y Vida
VieDioc ..... La Vie Diocésaine
VieInt ..... Vie Intellectuelle
VieSpir ..... Vie Spirituelle
WissWeish ..... Wissenschaft und Weisheit
XenThom ..... Xenia Thomistica
ZaltW ..... Zeitschrift füf die alttestamentliche Wissenschaft
ZAscMyst ..... Zeitschrift für Aszese und Mystik
ZkathTh ..... Zeitschrift für KatholisdcheTheologie
ZNTWiss ..... Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche

TREATISE I

THE GENERAL THEORY OF THE SACRAMENTS

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INTRODUCTION

The Council of Trent at the beginning of session 7 says this: "In order to bring to completion the salutary doctrine of justification promulgated with the unanimous consent of the Fathers in the session immediately preceding, it seemed fitting to deal with the holy sacraments of the Church. For all true justification either beings through the sacraments or, once begun, increases through them or, when lost, is regained through them" (D 1600).

Therefore also we, after we have explained the Catholic doctrine on redemption and after we have considered our justification, which is its main fruit, now move on to consider the sacraments, by which grace and the divine gifts are communicated to us.

Certainly the sacraments are the principal means of the communication of the divine life to us. This divine life lives in us to the extent that, wonderfully joined together with Christ our Head, we constitute with Him and under Him one Mystical Body. For the divine life, which is communicated ineffably to the Only-begotten Son, cannot be participated in by us unless we become one with Him: that is, unless our whole life is given to the Son, both in his personal reality and in his mystical extension. Therefore, this is the first thing the sacraments must do: namely, that they incorporate us into the Mystical Christ, that we are united to him daily more and more, that, if when we are separated from Him in some way by sin, we be finally joined together with Him. Thus at last we will be able to live the divine life.

Now we will offer a general consideration of these sacraments in which everything is included that is common to all the sacraments. We call this a *general theory of the sacraments,* constituting a body of doctrine which has been handed down to us by the magisterium of the Church. Then there is another particular consideration, dealing with the special elements of the individual sacraments. In this what first appears to us is the beginning of the divine life and of incorporation into Christ, which takes place through those sacraments which we call *the sacraments of Christian initiation;* they are Baptism and Confirmation. Then the most holy sacrament is considered, in which, from the real presence of the Author himself of grace, an increase and a type of consummation of that truly divine life and of union with Him is given to us; therefore we will have to treat next the *Holy Eucharist, or the sacrament of union with Christ.* Next there is the remedy given by God for the loss of the divine life and it recuperation, which we call *the sacraments of reparation after*

a fall, and they are Penance and the Anointing of the Sick. But because the Christian life is not just an individual thing, but also social, provision has also been made by Christ for this necessity by certain quasi social sacraments, which we then call *the sacraments of Christian social life,* and they are Holy Orders and Matrimony. Power is given to these to initiate, increase and restore the divine life in others. By these sacraments the office is made holy of continually producing new members of the Mystical Body until it develops and grows according to the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ.

Therefore we will treat each one of these singly and in this way we will present a complete treatment of the divine life flowing from Christ into us.

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CHAPTER I

On the existence of the sacraments

1. First of all, what the Magisterium of the Church teaches us about the sacraments is that there are seven sacraments of the New Law, neither more nor fewer.

But this doctrine can be explained in two ways. *In the first way,* so that, having examined the essential elements that are required for a true and proper sacrament, we find that they are found in only seven rites of the Church. Thus this reflection leads us to the number of seven sacraments. However, this would suppose that we already know completely what the essential elements are for all the sacraments of the New Law, or what a sacrament is "truly and properly." But it is obvious that this is not possible until the conclusion of our treatise. And even then it is hardly possible to obtain for certain the exclusiveness of this truth.

In the second way, the doctrine of the Church can be explained in such a way that we accept it as it is proclaimed by the Church. Thus, this truth, which would be obtained for us by reflection, is handed on to us directly by the Magisterium of the Church, as something given to us by revelation. In this way a complete knowledge of the essential elements for a true and proper sacrament is not presupposed in us, although doubtless those elements will be found necessarily and exclusively in those seven rites.

We will proceed according to this second way.

Thesis 1. There are seven sacraments of the New Law properly so called.

S.Th. III, q. 65; Lennerz, 50-85; Lercher-Dander, 12-21; Puig, 11-25.

2. Definition of terms. *Seven,* that is, numerically and not just symbolically; and only seven exclusively, no more and no fewer.

Sacraments properly so called, that is, those that are called such by the Church, among many other rites which in a broader sense could be called sacraments.

3. Adversaries. Luther spoke about them in different ways. In the year 1520 he retained only baptism, the Supper and penance.[1] In the year 1523 he taught that Scripture has only two sacraments: baptism and the Supper,

1. *De captivitate Babylonica: Opera* (ed. Weimar) 6,501.

since penance is only an exercise of the power of baptism.[2]

The Confession of Augusburg in 1530 speaks about baptism, the Supper of the Lord and penance.[3]

Melanchthon in 1531 taught that there are properly only three sacraments: Baptism, the Supper of the Lord and absolution.[4]

Zwingli in 1525 retained only two sacraments: baptism and the Supper of the Lord.[5]

Calvin also recognized two sacraments: baptism and the Lord's Supper.[6]

4. Doctrine of the Church. a) *Before the Council of Trent. The Profession of Faith Prescribed for the Waldensians* (D 793-794). This profession of faith, directed against the increasing errors of the time, was prescribed to be signed not only by Durandus of Osca and companions,[7] but also later by Bernhard Prim and William Arnaldo.[8] Therefore it cannot be doubted that this was the faith of the Roman Church in the thirteenth century, even though at Lateran Council IV (D 802) the complete numbering of the sacraments was not given.

The Council of Lyons II in the profession of faith of Michael Paleologus (D 860) affirms already expressly the number of the sacraments as seven in the part of the profession which at the time, because of the errors of the Greeks, was added to the profession of faith of Leo IX (D 680-685), taken from the Ancient Statutes of the Church.[9]

The Council of Florence in the Decree for the Armenians (D 1310-1313).

5. b) *The Council of Trent* sess.7 cn.1 (D 1601). Note that the number seven here is affirmed expressly as exclusive. The origin and history of this matter is certain. For, the first error of the heretics proposed to the theologians at the Council for examination was: "There are not seven sacraments of the Church, but either more or fewer, which can truly be said

2. *Vom Anbeten des Sacraments des heil. Leichnams Christi: Opera* (ed. Erlangen) 28,418. He said the same in 1528 in his work, *Bekenntnis vom Abendmahl Christi: Opera* (ed. Erlangen) 30,371.
3. I.T. Müller, *Die symbolischen Bücher der evangelisch-lutheranischen Kirche* (Gütersloh 1912) 41f.
4. *Apologia* 2.ª a.13: *Corpus Reformatorum* 27,570.
5. *De vera et fasa religione: Opera* (Zurich 1832) 3,321.
6. *Institution chrétienne* 4,18: *Corpus Reformatorum* 1,940.
7. Although the doctrine of Durandus and companions at the time was said to be orthodox: ML 215,1510.
8. Letter "*Cum inaestimabile pretium*": ML 216,289-293.
9. The definitive value of this conciliar document was acknowledge at Vatican I: see CL 7,362f. See *ibid.* 1473f. the treatise by Döllinger written in opposition.

to be sacraments."[10] After the opinions of the theologians were heard, this error was placed among the articles, which seemed to many theologians should not be condemned without some declaration. The declaration was this: "Some wish to condemn this article only as to the first part, that is, that the sacraments of the Church are not seven, without mention of the second part, namely, that there are not more or fewer, as was done at the Council of Florence. Others think that the whole article should be condemned, since it was already condemned at the Councils of Constance and Florence."[11] The Acts express the opinion of the Fathers in this way: "That there are not seven sacraments, some say was already condemned at the Council of Florence, because, since it determined that there are seven sacraments, it seems to conclude that there are not more or fewer."[12] Hence the exclusive canon was proposed and was approved by all. However, this exclusive sense should be understood in such a way, from the mind of the Council, that the question about the unity of some sacraments, like Orders and the Eucharist, would not be pre-judged. Therefore the seven are from the Council in such a way that one of them could have several sacraments under it, which are reduced to it, and because of the identity of purpose and signification are just one by aggregation.[13]

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

6. Proof from prescription. Before the Council of Trent during four centuries the number of seven sacraments was maintained in the explicit and universal profession of the Church without any doubt or controversy. But this fact signifies that the number of seven sacraments pertains to revealed doctrine. Therefore from revelation there are seven sacraments.

The major: a) An explicit affirmation of seven sacraments is not had before the twelfth century. And that is not surprising: for this affirmation supposed an abstract idea of a sacrament, which, even though heretics were not urging the issue, could be elaborated only by a lengthy consideration and accurate reflection. This elaboration took place on the occasion of the error of Berengarius about the truth of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist, as we shall see later.

b) After this time theologians apply a common notion of a sacrament

10. Ctr 5,835. For the historical exposition of the Council of Trent on this whole treatise, see F. Cavallera, *Le décret du Concile de Trente sur les sacrements en général:* BullLittEccl 6 (1914) 361-377, 401-425; 7 (1915-1916) 17-33, 66-88; 9 (1918) 161-181.
11. CTr 5,865.
12. CTr 5,971.
13. See what was said in the Council by the General of the Carmelites: CTr 5,968) 161-181.

to the various rites and they gradually form a numbering of the sacraments properly speaking. Abelard speaks about baptism, confirmation, the Sacrament of the altar, anointing, marriage, the forgiveness of sins; he does not treat orders.[14] A similar numbering of the sacraments is found in Roland Bandinelli.[15] But a complete number is had about the year 1145 in *Sententiis Divinitatis,* by an unknown author, and also in Master Simon.[16]

c) Hence Peter Lombard wrote: "Now we will consider the sacraments of the New Law, which are: baptism, confirmation, the bread of blessings or the Eucharist, penance, extreme unction, orders, marriage.[17] From that time all the commentators on the Master unanimously retained the number of sacraments as seven, although in many other questions they often disagreed with the Master.

d) At the same time the number of sacraments as seven was held by the Canonists.[18]

e) Many particular Councils in the thirteenth century bear witness to the same profession: *Council of Dunelmense* (1217) received the Constitutions of bishop Richard Poore, according to which "there are seven sacraments"[19]; *the Council of Oxford* (1222) received the Statues of archbishop Stephen Langton, which treat expressly the seven sacraments[20]; *The Ancient Precepts of Rotomagnesia* (ca. 1235) command that the people be instructed diligently "in the faith of the seven sacraments"[21]; other documents say the same thing; *the Council of London* (1237) likewise teaches seven sacraments[22]; similarly the *Synodal Statutes* of bishop Richard Cicestrensis (1246), of the Church of Cenomanensis (1247), of the diocese of Valentine (1255), of the Church of Claromontane (1268).[23]

7. *The minor:* a) Consensus in these conditions proves the truth of

14. *Epitome theologiae christianae* 28-37: ML 178,1738-1758.
15. *Die Sentenzen Rolands, nachmals Papstes Alexander III* (ed. Gietl) 154-270.
16. *Die Sententiae Divinitatis, ein Sentensenbuch der Gilbertschen Schule* (ed. Geyer) 108f.; H. Weisweiler, *Maître Simon et son groupe, De Sacramentis* (Specilegium Sacrum Lovaniense 17) LXXII; J. De Gellinck, *A propos de quelques affirmations du nombre septénaire des sacrements au XII^e siècle:* RechScRel 1 (1910) 493-497; A. Debil, *L'attestation du nombre septénaire des sacrements chez Grégoire de Bergame:* RevScPhTh 6 (1921) 332-337; E. Dhanis, *Quelques anciennes formules septénaires des sacrements:* RevHistEccl 26 (1930) 577-608; 27 (1931) 5-26.
17. *Sententiae* 4 d.2 cp.1.
18. See Fr. Gillmann, *Die Siebenzahl der Sakramente bei den Glossatoren des Gratianischen Dekretes* (Mainz 1909); *Die Siebenzahl der Sacramente und der sakramentale Charackter in der Summa Coloniensis:* Kath 92 (1912) 453-458. J. De Gellinck: „*species quadriformis*" *sacramentorum des canonistes du XII^e siècle et Hugues de Saint Victor:* RevScPhTh 6 (1912) 527-537.
19. Msi 22,1110.
20. Msi 22,1173-1178.
21. Msi 23,396f.
22. Msi 23,448
23. Msi 23,703.735.887ff.1188.

seven as the number of sacraments, for otherwise the Church would err in a matter pertaining to the faith.

b) That truth cannot be explained except from revelation; for the number seven of the sacraments is a truth that surpasses natural reason, since it depends on the positive will of Christ.

c) A merely natural reflection on the revealed doctrine about the individual sacraments is not sufficient; for, it would be very difficult to do this completely, in such a way that it would exclude the possibility that there are more than seven sacraments. Even if this were done, it could not be done with such universality, certitude and facility, with which de facto the consensus is had in the Church since the twelfth century about seven as the number of sacraments.

8. It is confirmed by the agreement of the Latin Church with the Eastern Church. Since the thirteenth century the separated Eastern churches, whether Greek-Russian, or Nestorian, or Monophysite, under the influence of Latin theology profess the number of sacraments as seven and they defend it expressly against the Protestants. But this fact cannot be explained, unless it is supposed that they found an identity between this explicit doctrine and that which they retained implicitly from ancient times. Therefore the doctrine about seven sacraments pertains to the ancient tradition of the Church.

The major: a) This fact is established expressly from the special treatises of eastern theology.[24]

b) When the Protestants, especially those at Tübingen (in the years 1573-1581), attempted to draw the Greeks to their way of thinking, they strongly resisted because of the doctrine about the number of sacraments being seven. Indeed, against Cyril Lukarim, who had Protestant ideas about this matter, the Greek bishops drew up an orthodox profession of faith in which they expressly professed that there are seven sacraments.[25]

c) Therefore, whenever attempts were made concerning union with the Eastern churches, the doctrine about seven as the number of sacraments did not cause any difficulty. That was the case at the Councils of Lyons II (D 860) and Florence (D 1310-1313).

The minor: The psychological character of the disunion between the Oriental and Latin Churches in no way made it possible that the Orientals

24. See M. Jugie, *Theologia dogmatica christianorum orientalium ab Ecclesia catholica dissidentium* 3,15-25; 5,280f.637f.; Th. Spacil, *Doctrina Theologiae Orientis separati de sacramentis in genere:* OrChAn 113,65-80.

25. See Schelstrate, *Acta Orientalis Ecclesiae contra Lutheri haeresim,* I, 139-155.504f; *Der protestantische Bischof Alexander von Jerusalem, Cyrillus Lukaris, und die Tübinger Professoren, oder die alten und neuen Versuche, den Orient zu protestantisieren:* ThQschr 25 (1843) 541-616.

would easily accept any new doctrine of the faith.

9. Theological reasoning. Since the existence of the sacraments cannot be proved by reason, so also the number of them as seven, since they depend completely on the free will of Christ. But, having assumed as known from revelation the truth of the seven sacraments, its suitability is easily shown. Thus, in the Decree for the Armenians, an analogy is developed from the life of the body (D 1310-1313). St. Thomas explained this analogy in III, q. 65, a. 1.[26] There he also adds another reason of suitability from the fact that the sacraments are a remedy for sin: "For Baptism is intended as a remedy against the absence of spiritual life; Confirmation, against the infirmity of soul found in those of recent birth; the Eucharist, against the soul's proneness to sin; Penance, against actual sin committed after Baptism; Extreme Unction, against the remainders of sins,--of those sins, namely, which are not sufficiently removed by Penance, whether through negligence or through ignorance; Order, against divisions in the community; Matrimony, as a remedy against concupiscence in the individual, and against the decrease in numbers that results from death." In the same place he also adds still more points of suitability.[27]

10. Objections. 1. The number of seven sacraments is not included in Holy Scripture. Therefore it does not pertain to revealed doctrine.

I bypass the antecedent and deny the consequent. For it can be contained in tradition. Among the articles of the heretics, which theologians thought should be added to the first list, this article was singled out by them as one to be condemned: "There is no sacrament unless it is contained in Scripture."[28] The censures of the Fathers concerning this article are collected in the Acts thus: "Some wish it to be omitted [that is, not condemned], because it implies that we have a sacrament that is not had in Scripture; but it cannot be condemned, since it is true that there is no sacrament that is not contained in Scripture, since all the sacraments are contained in Scripture either explicitly or implicitly."[29] Therefore nothing was said in the defined canons.

2. The number of seven sacraments is not contained in the doctrine of the Fathers. Therefore it does not pertain to revealed doctrine.

I distinguish the antecedent. The number seven is not contained in the doctrine of the Fathers explicitly, *conceded;* it is not contained implicitly, *denied.*

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26. On this reason, see Suarez, *In 3* q.65 a.1 n.7-10.
27. See also St. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium* 6,3 (ed. Quarrachi 5,267f.). Others can also be considered in reference to the Mystical Body of Christ and to the kingdom of Christ on earth, which are mentioned in Lercher-Dander, 17. For the whole historical development, see Pourrat, 232-267; B. Geyer, *Die Siebenzahl der Sakramente in ihrer historischen Entwicklung:* ThGl 10 (1918) 325-348.
28. CTr 5,867.
29. CTr 5,972.

11. 3. The Fathers mention three or four sacraments only. Therefore they did not know seven sacraments.

I distinguish the antecedent. The Fathers mention only three sacraments, speaking from a practical end as the occasion presented itself to them, *conceded;* the Fathers mention only three sacraments, intending to give the complete doctrine on the sacraments, *denied.*

That is, the Fathers never wrote a general theory of the sacraments. Therefore nowhere do they speak about all the sacraments, which they knew formally or equivalently as sacraments. Actually, the abstract notion of a sacrament was developed only gradually. Thus, the Fathers often speak about baptism, confirmation and the Eucharist, while explaining the rites of Christian initiation the way it was done at that time; examples of this are found in St. Cyril of Jerusalem and St. Ambrose.[30] It was not necessary for them on that occasion to speak about the other sacraments. Likewise Tertullian, while he is speaking about the cooperation of the flesh in the work of our salvation, mentions those rites that contribute most to that end: baptism, confirmation, Eucharist (R 362); this text was transcribed almost verbally by Gregory Illiberitano.[31] At that time there was no reason for mentioning all the sacraments. Elsewhere Tertullian himself speaks about the Catholic rites which the unbelievers were imitating (R 299f.). Again, in that place it was not necessary to mention all of them. St. Augustine, who in another place mentions explicitly among the sacraments only baptism and the Eucharist (R 1419), nevertheless adds in the same text: "and if something else is mentioned in the canonical Scriptures." For he certainly knew about confirmation (R 1647), orders (R 1617), matrimony (R 1642), and more probably penance and extreme unction (R 1635).

4. Before the twelfth century the number of seven sacraments is not found. Therefore this doctrine cannot be revealed.

I distinguish the antecedent. Before the twelfth century the number of seven sacraments is not found explicitly and in a reflex manner, *conceded;* it is not found implicitly and directly in the profession of the individual sacraments, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

12. 5. The washing of feet is a sacrament. Therefore there are not seven sacraments only. *The antecedent.* The washing of feet is a sensible rite signifying the internal cleanness of the soul, and actually conferring it by the perennial institution of Christ (John 13:8). Therefore it is a sacrament. This was also taught by St. Ambrose (R 1331, 1336), St. Bernard,[32] Arnaldus.[33]

I deny the antecedent. As proof, I deny that that rite from the institution of Christ confers grace from the work done (*ex opere operato*), as the sacraments do confer it, as we shall see later. Christ recommends it only as an exercise of humility in imitation of

30. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catecheses mistagogicae* 1f. (on Baptism), 3 (on Confirmation), 4f. (on the Eucharist), which are for initiation. St. Ambrose, *De Mysteriis,* while speaking to neophytes treats Baptism (c.3ff.), Confirmation (c.6) and Eucharist (c.8).
31. *Tractatus Originis* 17 (ed. A. Vega 182).
32. *Sermo de Coena Domini* 4: 183,273.
33. *De cardinalibus operibus Christi:* ML 189,1650f.

Himself. Therefore, the Church never acknowledged washing of feet as being among the sacraments in the proper sense.

In those texts St. Ambrose does not say that the washing of feet is a sacrament. But he describes that rite as it was done among the ceremonies of Christian initiation in the church at Milan (never in the Roman church). He does indeed say that by the washing of feet "hereditary sins" are taken away; but it seems that these cannot be understood to be about original sin, which is one and not many, but more suitably about asking for help against concupiscence, which we inherit from original sin; this is implied more clearly in the second text.[34]

St. Bernard and Arnaldus certainly say that the washing of feet is a sacrament. But they understand this word in a broader sense, since at the time this word was used in several different ways, and examples of this are found in the same works.[35] Similarly, Fathers like St. Augustine and St. Basil, spoke about the sacraments in a broad sense.[36]

13. Scholium. *Not all sacraments are equal.* Although there are seven sacraments, which possess all the essential notes of a sacrament in the same way, still not all have the same dignity. Canon 3 in session 7 of Trent (D 1603) teaches this: "If anyone says that these seven sacraments are so equal to one another that one is not in any way of greater worth than another, let him be anathema." This canon took its origin from the third error proposed to the theologians: "no sacrament has greater worth than another."[37] A summary of the opinions of theologians goes like this: "because some of the sacraments under different respects can be more worthy than others, it seemed to some theologians that this article should not be condemned without some further declaration; however, others said that it was erroneous and false and already condemned."[38] But the Fathers thought: "let it be condemned as it stands and let it be declared how some sacraments are more worthy than others."[39] Perhaps in order to avoid ambiguity it was stated in the first draft of the canon: "if anyone says that these seven sacraments are so equal to each other in all ways, that in no way one is more worthy than another, let him be anathema.[40] The Acts pronounce the censure of the Fathers on this canon thus: "it was considered that the sacrament of the Eucharist be expressed, and that it be placed in the article."[41] Therefore in this way there was a return to the first redaction of the error; but the Eucharist was not mentioned. However, the mind of the conciliar Fathers is sufficiently clear there, which was not different from that of St. Thomas in III, q. 65, a. 3.[42]

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34. See also *In Ps 48,9:* ML 14,1159. See J. Huhn, *Der dogmatische Sinn des Ambrosiuswortes: Planta Petri abluitur, ut hereditaria peccata tollantur, nostra enim propria per baptismum relaxantur:* MünchThZeitschr 1 (1951) 377-389.
35. See Bellarmine, *De sacramentis in genere* 3,24; A. Malvy, *Lavement des pieds:* DTC 9,31-36.
36. St. Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* 2,26: ML 44,176f.; *Contra Faustum Manichaeum* 19,14: ML 42,356; St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto* 27,65: MG 32,186.
37. CTr 5,836.
38. CTr 5,865.
39. CTr 5,971.
40. CTr 5, 984.
41. CTr 5,991
42. On this article, see Suarez, *In 3* q.65 a.3 n.1ff.

CHAPTER II

On the essence of the sacraments

14. The essence of the sacraments can be considered either metaphysically or physically. Metaphysically according as it is a sign, which was instituted to signify and to cause grace; but physically according as it is a definite sensible rite, to which a certain significance and efficacy has been given. Metaphysically a sacrament is constituted, like any sign, out of some thing signifying and the signification. In our case, it is from a sensible rite and from the signification of grace. But physically the rite itself, or rather the sensible sign itself, is constituted out of things and words. We will explain both aspects in what follows. When that is done, we will have the first element of the definition of a sacrament explained sufficiently. For a sacrament is a sensible and symbolic sign of grace.

Thesis 2. A sacrament is in the genus of a symbolic sign, metaphysically coalescing from a sensible rite and from the signification of grace; but it is a practical sign.

S.Th. III, q. 60, a. 1f.; Suarez, *In 3* q.60; disp.1; Lennerz, 86f.; Lercher-Dander, 5-11.

15. Definition of terms. We understand a *sacrament* as one of those rites about whose existence we dealt in the previous thesis, and which by the Church are called sacraments in the true and proper sense.

Evolution of the word.[1] Sacrament is a Latin word, but in Greek it is μυστήριον. Μυστήριον, which in virtue of the word seems to designate something hidden and sacred made known only to the initiated, in Holy Scripture is never used for sacramental rites, but only for hidden truth, which can be known by revelation alone. In Christian antiquity it retains this meaning until Clement of Alexandria and Origen, who speak about the cultic mystery both of pagans and Christians.[2] This way of speaking continues in the later authors.

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1. See a Michel, *Sacrements:* DTC 14,485-493; V. Groene, *Sacramentum oder Begriff und Bedeutung von Sakrament in der alten Kirche bis zur Scholastik* (Brilon 1853); E. De Backer, *Sacramentum. Le mot et l'idée représentée par lui dans les oeuvres de Tertullien* (Louvain 1911); H. von Soden, Μυστήριον *und Sacramentum in den ersten zwei Jahrhundertem der Kirche:* ZNTWiss 12 (1911) 188-227; I.B. Poukens, *Sacramentum dans les oeuvres de saint Cyprien:* BullAncLittarchChr (1912) 275-288; De Gellinck, de Backer, Poukens, Lebacqz, *Pour l'histoire du mot „Sacramentum." I. Les Antenicéens* (Louvain 1924); O. Casel, *Das Wort sacramentum:* ThRev (1925) 41-47.
2. See K. Prümm, *Christentum als Neuheitserlebnis* (Freiburg 1939) 439f. On Clement, see H.G. Marsh, *The Use of* Μυστήριον *in the Writings of Clement of Alexandria:* JThSt 37 (1936) 64-80.

"Sacrament" was first used for the money that was placed in the treasury by the litigating parties in a lawsuit, and which having been lost by the condemned party, by that very fact it became holy to God. Next it was transferred to designate an oath, especially for those who for the first time entered military service. Hence Tertullian used the word "sacrament" for baptism, since it constituted initiation into the Christian life, at the same time joining together the idea of a hidden and sacred truth, which was contained in the profession of baptismal faith.[3] From the middle of the fourth century "sacrament" signifies (although not uniquely) the sacred rites which by the Church are said to be sacraments in the proper sense.

16. *In the genus of a sign.* A sign is that which as previously known leads one to the knowledge of something else. This second thing, to whose knowledge we are led by a sign, *is signified* by the sign; and by means of that signification a transition takes place from something known to some other thing until now unknown. Therefore the whole essence of a sign as such is to signify something.

Symbolic. In order for a sign to have the power of signifying something, a connection is required between both objects, namely, the one signifying and the thing signified. This connection can be from the very nature of the thing (as smoke signifies fire), and then the sign is said to be *natural*; or it can be from a mere extrinsic institution (as a flag signifying one's country), and then the sign is said to be *arbitrary;* or it can be something in between, which from itself has a certain similarity with the thing signified, but this similarity is completed by its institution (just as washing with water cleans the body offers some similarity with grace that purifies the soul and this similarity by the will of Christ has been elevated to truly signify grace), and then the sign is said to by *symbolic.* That is what we say the sacraments are.

17. *Metaphysically coalesces.* A sacrament is not something simple, but it is complex; that is, it takes its origin from several different things. But the composition can be either *physical* or *metaphysical,* according as the parts, which are united in order to form the composite, are distinct among themselves really or only logically. In this thesis we are dealing with metaphysical composition.

A sensible rite is an external action, which appears visibly in the conferring of a sacrament. This rite in a sacrament acts like the subject receiving the signification, or like the undetermined matter which must be

3. See E. de Backer, *Pour l'histoire du mot "Sacramentum"* 147-150; A. Kolping, *Sacramentum Tertullianeum. Untersuchungen über die Anfänge des christlichen Vocabel sacramentum* (Münster 1948).

further determined. For, a natural rite, even though it may have a certain similarity with grace, nevertheless of itself it cannot properly signify grace.

The signification of a sacrament is that by which the sensible rite is determined to signify grace, in which there was already a certain similarity. The signification of a sacrament acts like the form, and so it precisely determines the rite (which of itself was not determined to signify grace rather than some other things) in order to signify grace.

That metaphysical composition, which arises from the sensible rite as the subject, and the signification of grace as the form, establishes the *substance of a sacrament,* inasmuch as it is a sign of some kind.

A practical sign is said to be one that not only signifies something, but also produces what it signifies. This is the quasi specific characteristic of a sacrament in the strict sense.

Therefore we intend to prove two things. The first is that a sacrament is a practical symbol of grace. The second is that a sacrament, in the nature of a sign, coalesces metaphysically out of the sensible rite and out of the signification of grace. The first point pertains to dogma, while the second is a theological explanation.

18. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* sess.13 ch.3 (D 1639-1641): a sacrament is a symbol of a sacred thing and a visible form of invisible grace. This definition, taken directly from the Body of Canon Law,[4] makes use of words found in various places in the works of St. Augustine, as we shall see later. In sess.7 cn.6 (D 1601) the Council says that the sacraments confer the grace that they signify.

Leo XIII: the sacraments are "sensible and efficacious signs of invisible grace" (D 3315).

Pius XI: a sacrament is "a sign and source of internal grace" (D 3713).

Pius XII repeats the words of Leo XIII.[5]

Theological note. It is a matter of *divine and Catholic faith* that a sacrament is a practical sign of grace. It is a *certain theological explanation* that in the nature of a sign a sacrament is composed of a sensible rite and the signification of grace.

19. Proof of the first part: *a sacrament is a symbolic and practical sign of grace.* This is the conclusion in the evolution of the abstract notion

4. CIC Decr. Grat. III de consecr. II c. Sacrificium 32 (ed. Fridberg, 1,1324).
5. *Const. Apost. "Sacramentum Ordinis":* AAS 40 (1948) 5.

of a "sacrament" which developed gradually in tradition.[6]

a) *In Holy Scripture* the abstract notion is not yet given. But its two essential elements, that is, a symbol of sanctification and sanctifying efficacy, appear already in the concrete reality of the individual sacraments, as a careful investigation of the Scriptures reveals about each of the sacraments. Just now it is sufficient, for example, to call to mind the symbolism of the baptismal washing mentioned more than once by St. Paul (Rom. 6:1-11).[7]

b) *The holy Fathers before St. Augustine,* giving special attention to Baptism and the Eucharist, but also to Confirmation, teach the same sensible symbolism which effects sanctification. Thus St. Justin explains the symbolism of regeneration and enlightenment in Baptism[8]; similarly, St. Basil and St. Cyril of Jerusalem baptismal immersion as a symbol of death and burial for sins.[9] Thus, St. Cyril teaches the same thing about Confirmation: "while your body is anointed with the visible ointment, your soul is sanctified by the Holy and life-giving Spirit" (R 842). But in a general way Tertullian says: "The flesh, indeed, is washed, in order that the soul may be cleansed; the flesh is anointed, that the soul may be consecrated; the flesh is signed [with the cross], that the soul too may be fortified; the flesh is shadowed with the imposition of hands, that the soul also may be illuminated by the Spirit; the flesh feeds on the body and blood of Christ, that the soul likewise may fatten on God" (D 362). And St. Ambrose: "Since man is composed of two natures, that is, out of soul and body, the visible is consecrated by the visible, and the invisible by the invisible. For the body is washed with water, and the sins of the soul are cleansed by the Spirit."[10]

c) St. Augustine, having formed an abstract notion of a sacrament, made an accurate distinction: "a sacrament is one thing, the power of the sacrament is something else."[11] He understands a *sacrament* as a sensible sign. And indeed as a symbolic sign: "For if the sacraments did not have some similitude to those things of which they are sacraments, then they would not be sacraments" (R 1424). But he understands *the power of the sacrament* as both the grace itself conferred by the sacrament, and that which is contained in the sensible sign that is capable of conferring grace.

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6. For this whole question, see A. Michel, *Sacrements:* DTC 14,495-531; Pourrat, *La théologie sacramentaire* 1-46.
7. See A. Michel, *Sacrements:* DTC 15,495-598.
8. *Apologia I.ª* 61: MG 6,420f.
9. St. Basil, *In sanctum baptisma:* MG 31,423f.; *De spiritu sancto* 15,35: MG 32,130; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Cateches,* 3,12: MG 33,442f.; 20,4: MG 33,1079ff.
10. *In Lc 2,79:* MG 15,1663; see J. Huhn, *Die Bedeutung des Wortes Sacramentum bei dem Kirchenvater Ambrosius* (Fulda 1928).
11. *In Io* 26,11: ML 35,1011.

From this it is clearly apparent that for Augustine a sacrament is a practical sign of grace.[12]

20. d) *Immediately after St. Augustine* there was no further progress in the evolution of the abstract notion.[13] However, in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, because of the error of Berengarius who stressed especially the nature of a sign[14] in contradistinction to the thing signified (hence in the Eucharist the sacrament, that is, the sign of the Body of Christ, he did not admit the reality of Christ's presence[15]), it was expressly declared by the theologians that a sacrament is not just a mere sign, but an efficacious and practical sign.[16]

In this way gradually progress was made towards a more accurate *definition of a sacrament.* For St. Augustine penned these words, among others, defining a sacrament in a certain sense: "a sacrament is a visible sacrifice of an invisible sacrifice, that is, it is a *sacred sign"* (R 1745). "The Lord [sanctifies] with his invisible grace by the Holy Spirit, where there is the whole fruit even of the visible sacraments. For without that sanctification *of invisible grace*—of what value are *the visible sacraments?*"[17] Berengarius attributed to St. Augustine this twofold definition of a sacrament: "sacrament, that is, a sacred sign," and "a sacrament is the visible form of invisible grace."[18] Lanfranc, Algerus Leodiensis and others repeat this position with the same words.[19]

Abelard is more accurate: "a sacrament is a visible sign of invisible grace"; or also: "a sacrament is the visible species of invisible grace, or a sign of a sacred thing."[20] *Summa Sententiarum:* "the visible form

12. See C. Spallanzani, *La nozione di sacramento in sant'Agostino:* ScuoCatt 55 (1927) 175-188, 258-268; H.M. Féret, *Sacramentum, Res, dans la langue théologique de saint Augustin:* RevScPhTh 19 (1940) 218-243.
13. St. Isidore wrote: "they are called sacraments, because under the covering of corporal things the divine power in a hidden way effects the salvation of the same sacraments; therefore they are called sacraments from their hidden and sacred powers" (*Etymologiae* 6,19,40: ML 82,255). In this definition the essence of a sign is not completely absent, but it is certainly not stressed. But this definition was used by many authors at a later time.
14. See *Epistola ad Adelmannum Leodiensem* (Martene-Durand, *Thesaurus novus anecdotorum* 4,112f,).
15. "But you cannot contradict the Scriptures that the sacraments are signs. The sacrament of the Body is one thing, the Body is something else; you necessarily establish that the sacrament of the Blood is one thing, but the Blood is something else" (*loc.cit.*).
16. See N.M. Haring, *Barengar's Definitions of Sacramentum and Their Influence on Medieval Sacramentology:* MedSt 10 (1948) 109-146.
17. *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* 3,84: ML 34,312.
18. *Epistola ad Adelmannum Leodiensem* (Martinez-Durand, *Thesaurus* 112).
19. Lanfranc, *Liber de Corpore et Sanguine Domini* 14: ML 150,424; Algerus Leodienses, *De sacramentis Corporis et Sanguinis dominici* 1,4: ML 180,751. See also Durandus Troarnensis, *Liber de Corpore et Sanguine Domini* 15: ML 149,1396; Guitmundus Aversanus, *Liber de Corpore et Sanguine Domini veritate* 2: ML 149,1428; Hildebertus Cenomanensis, *Tractatus Theologicus* 150: ML 171,1145.
20. *Epitome theologiae christianae* 28: ML 178,1695.1738.

of invisible grace contained in it, which the sacrament itself confers."[21] Peter Lombard is more precise: "A sacrament is properly said to be that which is a sign of the grace of God and the form of invisible grace in such a way that it produces his image and is its cause."[22] Hugo of St. Victor proposed the nature of the similitude in this sign still more distinctly: "a sacrament is a corporal and material element presented externally in a sensible manner; it represents by similitude, signifies by institution, and contains by sanctification some invisible and spiritual grace."[23] Along the same line St. Bonaventure wrote later that the sacraments are sensible signs "representing by a natural similitude, signifying by an added institution, and sanctifying by a superadded blessing."[24]

f) St. Thomas, taking up the Augustinian notion of a "sacred sign," clarified further the definition of a sacrament: for a sacrament is in the genus of a sign (III, q. 60, a. 1); and it is a symbolic sign (III, q. 64, a. 2 ad 2); signifying from its institution (III, q. 64, a. 2); and it is "a sign of a sacred thing, inasmuch as it sanctifies men" (III, q. 60, a. 2); or as he says elsewhere, sacraments are "certain sensible signs of invisible things whereby men are sanctified" (III, q. 69, a.3); that is, a sacrament is a practical sign (see III, q. 62, a. 1).[25]

Therefore the notion of a sacrament has for its generic element that it is a symbolic sign of signification; for its specific sign, that it is efficacious of sanctification.

21. Proof of the second part: *a sacrament, as it is in the genus of a sign, coalesces metaphysically from a sensible rite and the signification of grace.* a) Every sign, as such, coalesces metaphysically from some signifying thing and from the signification of that thing. But a sacrament is a sign of grace. Therefore, it coalesces from some thing signifying grace, which is the external rite, and from the signification of grace itself.

The major: A sign, as such, is not just a thing signifying, but it is a thing signifying inasmuch as it signifies, that is, inasmuch as it has a relation to the thing signified and is directed to make that thing known. But a thing signifying is not considered formally as signifying and having a relation to the thing signified, except by reason of its signification. Therefore a sign, as such, coalesces from the thing signifying and from the signification.

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21. *Summa Sententiarum* tr.4 c.1: ML 176,117.
22. *Sententiae* 4 d.1 n.2.
23. *De sacramentis* lib.1 p.9 c.2: ML 176,317.
24. *Breviloquium* 6.1.
25. See E.R. Frutsaert, *La définition du sacrement dans saint Thomas:* NouvRevTh 55 (1928) 401-409; F.H. Dondaine, *La définition des sacrements dans la "Somme Théologique":* RevScPhTh 31 (1947) 213-228.

b) If the metaphysical composition of a sign is considered more carefully, it is apparent that the signifying thing in itself is indifferent with regard to signifying this or that (in arbitrary and symbolic signs); but that this indifference is formally removed by the signification which limits that thing to signify this rather than that. Therefore, the sign coalesces from the signifying thing as being the matter or subject, and from the signification as the form. Therefore in a sacrament the sensible rite is present as the matter or the subject, being indifferent in itself with regard to signifying grace (even supposing a similitude, which is not sufficient to signify grace); but the signification which comes to it from its positive institution is present as the form, thus limiting the external rite in order to signify grace rather than anything else. All of these points hold true for the metaphysical composition, or for the consideration of a sacrament inasmuch as it is a sign of grace.

22. Scholium 1. *On the relation between signification and efficacy in a sacrament.* Because a sacrament is an efficacious sign of sanctification, it both signifies and causes this internal sanctification. Therefore there is a double relation of a sacrament to sanctification. The first is in the order of sign, inasmuch as internal sanctification is signified by a sacrament; or in other words, inasmuch as the external rite leads us to the knowledge of the interior sanctification. The second is in the order of causality, inasmuch as internal sanctification is caused by a sacrament; or in other words, inasmuch as the external rite confers interior sanctification. However, there is a big difference between these two relations.[26]

For the first, which is in the order of sign, is broader than the second one. It can be explained in the following way. In this order of providence true sanctification takes place through sanctifying grace; but in such a way that this grace, as it is given de facto in this life, is not yet full and perfect sanctification, but only the beginning of that complete sanctification which will be given in heaven; for we are saved now by hope (Rom. 8:24). Hence the sacrament signifies not only the sanctification begun in grace, but also the perfect sanctification of glory; but it does not cause the latter. Furthermore, because complete sanctification is only the singular application of the one total sanctification, which Christ merited for us by his passion and death, this is also signified by the sacrament, which sacrament is a reminding symbol; but again this is not caused by the sacrament. See S.Th. III, q. 60, a. 3). Therefore the adage "sacraments cause what they signify" must be understood as referring to grace; however not in such a way that the

26. Note that both of these relations are in some sense causal; the first one doubtless in the line of intentional causality, which must be affirmed in every sign as such; the second one we cannot determine a priori inasmuch as it is in the line of causality which will be treated later. However it should be noted that the second relation in the order of causality is not of the essence of a sign as such (for there are signs that are not practical), but is joined to this sign so that it may be made a practical sign. See Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.1 s.3 n.25ff.

signification and the causality of sacraments are the same thing.[27]

Therefore for this reason the recent theory of "the presence of the mysteries" (Mysteriengegenwart) proposed by some monks of the Monastery of St. Mary of the Lake, especially by O. Casel, must be rejected, at least inasmuch as it intends to be based on this adage. According to this theory, the whole mystery of our salvation (birth, passion, death, resurrection of Christ) is not only signified in each one of the sacraments, especially in the Eucharist, but it is made present under the veil of symbols. This presence is mysterious. For it is not a new historical repetition of a fact that happened once, nor is it a bare commemoration of it. For they invoke some new presence, sacramental, transcending space and time, although it takes place symbolically in space and time (metahistorical).[28]

23. Scholium 2. *On the sacraments of the Old Law.* In the historical evolution of the notion of "sacrament" theologians often have spoken about the sacraments not only of the New Law, but also of the Old Law. Because of that many problems arose about the definition of a sacrament. For, if there were sacraments also in the Old Law, some common notion could be formed which is verified in both of them. But the specific difference of their and our sacraments will have to be studied. Hence finally an accurate idea of the sacraments of the New Law will be obtained.

a) *That there were some sacraments in the Old Law* is supposed in the Council of Trent sess.7 cn.2 (D 1602) and before that in Florence (D 1347, 1310). Surely there were many religious rites in the Old Testament, instituted by God, whereby some sanctification was produced, as appears especially in Leviticus. Indeed, from the doctrine of St. Paul (1 Cor. 10:11; Heb. 10:1), those rites truly signified the future sanctification in the time of the Messiah. This doctrine is taught by St. Justin (R 134), St. Augustine (R 1475, 1646), St. Gregory the Great (R 2306), and St. Thomas explains it in III, q. 61, a. 3.

What those sacraments were, and *how many,* is uncertain. All theologians admit that at least *circumcision* was a sacrament, since it was a sign of the covenant made by God with Abraham (Gen. 17:11ff.) and acceptance in the chosen people which it effected (Gen. 17:14); it was also a sign of future grace through Baptism (Col. 2:11f.). That circumcision was also a remedy for original sin, and therefore in some sense a cause of grace, is held commonly by theologians,[29] although some disagree with this.[30] The more common opinion is based on the teaching of St. Ambrose,[31] St. Augustine (R

27. See J.B. Umberg, *Sacramenta efficient quod significant:* ZkathTh 54 (1930) 92-105.
28. See Lercher-Dander, 10; Pius XII, Encycl. "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 580. On this whole theory, see Th. Filthaut, *La théologie des mystères* (Paris 1954); I. Oñatibia, *La presencia de la obra redentora en el misterio del culto* (Vitoria 1954).
29. S.Th. III, 70, a. 4; Suarez, *In 3* q.71 disp.5 s.1 n.15; Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* p.5 s.3; they discuss the question at great length.
30. St. Bellarmine, *De sacramentis in genere* 2,17; M. Cano, *Relectio de sacramentis in genere* p.5; Vázquez, *In 1.2* disp.184 c.3; Estius, *Absolutissima in omnes B. Pauli et septem catholicas Apostolorum epistolas,* in Rom 4,11; Coninck, *In 3* q.73 a.6. And recently E. Ermoni thought that this is more probable, *Circoncision:* DTC 2,2525.
31. *De Abraham* 2,11,81: ML 14,495.

1646, 1875),[32] St. Fulgentius,[33] St. Gregory the Great,[34] St. Isidore.[35] In the middle ages this view is retained by St. Bede,[36] St. Bernard,[37] Hugo of St. Victor,[38] the Master of the Sentences,[39] St. Bonaventure,[40] St. Thomas in III, q. 70, a .4. The same opinion was accepted into the Body of Canon Law from the decree of Innocent III (D 780).[41]

That there are *other sacraments* in the Old Testament, besides circumcision, is affirmed by St. Thomas I-II, q. 102, a. 5, Suarez,[42] Lugo[43]; and it seems to be more in conformity with the way of speaking of Florence (D 1310, 1347) and Trent (D 1602). Therefore the sacraments of the Old Law are said to be circumcision, priestly consecration, eating the paschal lamb and the breads of propitiation, various purifications and expiations. St. Thomas explains in I-II, q. 102, a. 5 ad 3 how the sacraments of the New Law were signified by these sacraments of the Old Law.

24. b) Therefore having admitted the existence of sacraments in the Old Law, these *are also explained as being in the genus of a sacred sign*, inasmuch as they signified some sanctity, and perhaps even caused it. In order to solve this question, it is necessary to point out that there is an essential difference between the sacraments of the Old Law and the sacraments of the New Law. The Council of Trent taught this difference in sess.7 cn.2 (D 1602): "If anyone says that these same sacraments of the New Law do not differ from the sacraments of the Old Law, except that the ceremonies and external rites are different, let him be anathema." On the meaning of this canon take note of what follows.

Among the errors proposed for the consideration of the theologians, here is the sixth one on the sacraments in general: "That immediately after the fall of Adam sacraments were instituted by God in which grace was given."[44] A summary of the opinions given by the theologians about this article is printed in the Acts among the articles which the theologians thought should not be condemned but just passed over in silence: "to some of the theologians it did not seem that that article should be condemned without some explanation, since there are various opinions about it among the scholastics and immediately after the fall the marriage of Adam was a sacrament. And since there was always sickness, it must not be said that God did not use always some medicine. And the rainbow was given to Noah, circumcision to Abraham, the staff to Moses. Because of this they think it better to pass over this article in silence. However, there are not lacking those who think that it should be absolutely condemned according to the mind of the Master of the sentences and of other Doctors. And grace would not have been given

32. See also *Contra Iulianum* 2,6: ML 44,686 and often elsewhere.
33. *Epistola* 17,31: ML 65,470f.
34. *Moralia* 4 praef.3: ML 75,635.
35. *Quaestiones in V. Testamentum,* in Gen. 13,5f.: ML 83,242f.
36. *Homilia* 10 in *Circumcisione Domini:* ML 94,54.
37. *Tractatus de Passione Domini* 2,2: ML 184,637.
38. *De sacramentis* lib.1 p.12 cp.2: ML 176,349.
39. *Sententiae* 4 d.1 n.6.
40. *In 4* d.1 p.2 a.2 q.2.
41. See Ermoni, *Circoncision:* DTC 2,2519-2525.
42. *In 3* q.71 disp.5 s.2.
43. *De sacramentis in genere* disp.1 s.2 n.12.
44. CTr 5,835.

before the advent of the giver of grace and all sacraments have been instituted by Christ and it has already been condemned at Florence."[45] Also there were various opinions of the Fathers; some said that this article should be omitted because grace de facto was given by the sacraments of the O.T., while others said that grace was not given in the sacraments of the O.T by the work done (*ex opere operato*), but because of faith. In the Acts these opinions are gathered together in this one sentence: "all thought that it may be condemned, because it was condemned by the Council of Florence."[46] Hence in the first redaction of the canons, canon 2 was proposed, whose form had already been suggested by bishop Portuensis.[47] This canon was pleasing to all the Fathers, except that it seemed to two Fathers that it should read "they do not differ in the reality itself"; one wanted it to say "but only because" instead of "except"; others wanted to add "and they are not more excellent."[48]

Therefore, concerning the meaning of the canon it seems necessary to say: the sacraments of the Old Law and the sacraments of the New Law differ more than in the mere external rite; at the very least they are different, because the former did not confer grace *ex opere operato*, as the latter do; perhaps also because they simply did not confer grace; on this point nothing was decided.

However the explanation of the Decree for the Armenians at the Council of Florence remains (D 1310); according to it the sacraments of the Old Law did not cause grace, but they only prefigured that it would be given through the passion of Christ; but our sacraments both contain and confer grace.

Actually these points were a matter of dispute among theologians since the twelfth century,[49] especially because of circumcision. For, the Summa of Hales, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Durandus, Paludanus[50] defended the view that circumcision produced grace *ex opere operato,* at least in children; and in the Council of Trent itself the General of the Friars Minor.[51] However, this is more commonly denied by St. Thomas in III, q. 70, a. 4, Soto, Cano, Bellarmine, Vázquez, Suarez, Coninck.[52] However this question can be for the most part a dispute about words. Thus St. Thomas, affirming (III, q. 70, a. 4) that grace is not conferred in virtue of circumcision but in virtue of faith in the passion of Christ, inasmuch as the one accepting circumcision professed by himself or by someone else that he would embrace that faith, certainly affirms more than just some efficacy *ex opere operantis.* But Lugo, holding that circumcision conferred grace *ex opere operato,* understands that grace is not given only in virtue of some merit, but in virtue

45. CTr 5,866.
46. CTr 5,972.
47. CTr 5,908.
48. CTr 5,991.
49. St. Thomas (III, q. 62, a. 6 ad 3) quotes some opinions of previous theologians on this point.
50. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.4 q.5 m.3; q.7 m.5 a.1; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.1 p.2 a.2 q.3; Scotus, *In 4* d.1 q.6f.; Durandus, *In 4* d.1 q.5-8; Paludanus, *In 4* d.1 q.5 a.4.
51. CTr 5,959.
52. D. Soto, *In 4* d.2 q.1 a.4; Cano, *Relectio de sacramentis in genere* p.5; Bellarmine, *De sacramentis in genere* 2,13f.; Vázquez, *In 1.2* disp.184 c.3; Suarez, *In 3* q.62 disp.10 s.2 n.8-13; *De legibus* 9,7,4-7; Coninck, *In 3* q.62 a.5.

also of the external work done.[53] Thus also Suarez[54] defends the view that circumcision does not confer grace simply *ex opere operato*, but sometimes in addition to the work of the doer (*opus operantis*) from the special favor of God in a case of extreme necessity.

Therefore, given these disputes among the theologians, the words of the Decree for the Armenians seemingly must be understood in such a way that they teach that the sacraments of the Old Law do not cause grace *ex opere operato*, although when conferred, because of the profession of faith in the coming of Christ, grace is obtained. In this they have an essential difference with the sacraments of the New Law. For these both signify and cause true sanctity; but the former signified and caused legal sanctity, but they signified true sanctity only as something future in the sacraments of the New Law.[55]

25. Scholium 3. *On the sacraments of the law of nature.*[56] Theologians agree in denying the existence of sacraments in the state of innocence, as St. Thomas teaches in III, q.61, a. 2.[57] On the other hand, in the state of fallen nature before the Mosaic Law or outside of it, they affirm the existence of sacraments, admitting with St. Thomas some remedy of original sin for children. About this Suarez says: "Thus, all theologians teach this in 4 dist. 1 and 2, without any controversy or difference of opinions; this is a sign that it was a certain and undoubted teaching among them."[58] This opinion is based especially on the authority of St. Augustine (R 1909), St. Prosper,[59] St. Gregory the Great (R 2306). Later this view was held by St. Bede, St. Bernard, Hugo of St. Victor, St. Thomas (III, q. 70, a. 4 ad 2), St. Bonaventure.[60] But it is based on the universal salvific will of God, who could not deny to all children outside the Jewish people and to the Hebrew children the means of obtaining salvation.

That remedy seems to have been some sensible and exterior profession of faith made by the parents whereby their children were dedicated to God: III, q. 61, a. 3.[61] But by what external and sensible action that profession had to be made was not instituted concretely by God, but left to the free choice of men; see III, q. 60, a. 5 ad 3.[62] By that

53. *De sacramentis in genere* disp.10 s.2 n12f.
54. *In 3* q.62 disp.10 s.2 n.12f.
55. See Suarez, *In 3* q.60 disp.1 s.2; somewhat different, Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.1 s.2.
56. See A. Michel, *Sacrements préchrétiens:* DTC 14,644-655.
57. See Suarez, *In 3* q.61 disp.3 s.3; Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.3 s.1; John of St. Thomas, *Cursus theologicus* 9 disp.23 a.2. But this consensus of theologians is to be understood about the fact. But whether, if the state of innocence had lasted, there would have been some sacraments, is denied by Vázquez, *In 3* disp.130 c.2; Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.3 s.1; John of St. Thomas, *loc.cit.*, b.23f.; Billot, *De sacramentis Ecclesiae* th.3 § 2; Hugon, *Tractatus Dogmatici* 3 q.2 a.2; but Suarez is in favor of it, *In 3* q.61 disp.3 s.3 n.11f.
58. *In 3* q.61 disp.4 s.1 n.5.
59. *De vocatione omnium gentium* 2,23: ML 51,702.
60. St. Bede, *In Lc* 3,8; St. Bernard, *Tractatus de Baptismo* 1,4: ML 182,1084; Hugo of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* lib.1 p.11 c.6: ML 176,345; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.1 a.1 q.1.
61. See Suarez, *In 3* q.61 disp.4 s.2; Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.3 s.2 n.28-32.
62. See Suarez, *In 3* q. 61 disp.4 s.3.

action original sin was remitted and grace was given in a way similar to circumcision.[63]

It is disputed among theologians whether in the law of nature there were other sacraments beside the remedy for original sin.[64]

63. Many later theologians used this remedy of original sin in order to solve the difficult question about the salvation of unbelievers, even after the coming of Christ. But that could be valid only to the extent that it is supposed that the Gospel has not yet been sufficiently promulgated. For once it has been promulgated, it is necessary to say that the other means cease. See Michel, *Sacrements préchrétiens:* DTC 14,650-653.

64. See Suarez, *In 3* q.61 disp.4 s.4.

Thesis 3. A sacramental sign physically coalesces out of things as the matter and out of words as the form.

S.Th. III, q. 60, a. 4-7; Lennerz, 89-102; Lercher-Dander, 23-28; Puig, 26-42.

26. Definition of terms. *A sacramental sign* is a sensible rite according as falling under signification it is formally constituted in the being of a sign (*in esse signi*).[1] We are considering only the sacraments of the New Law. A sacrament is not something permanent (excluding the Eucharist for which there is a special consideration; but it also is transient if it is looked at in its becoming); it is something transient. Therefore the sacramental sign itself in the proper sense does not exist, but it must be accomplished and performed: it is an action. But it is accomplished, as we shall see in this thesis, when the form is applied to the matter. When this application takes place, the sign is formally and physically constituted.

Physically coalesces, that is, it is composed out of its physical parts.

Things are understood in a broad sense; sometimes they are sensible things and sometimes they are external actions.

Words are understood formally or equivalently, since they could be nods or other such gestures.

Matter and form are used as in the Aristotelian theory of a physical composition. But because the sacramental sign is not some one thing physically, but morally, the notion of matter and form concerning it can be said only in an analogical way. Therefore the "things" are called the matter inasmuch as they are the more undetermined element in the sacramental sign; in this sense we speak about the things not only as this word designates the sensible things themselves, v.gr., the water in Baptism (the remote matter), but also according as it designates the use of that thing, v.gr., the actual washing with water (the proximate matter). But the "words" are called the form, because they are the element determining the "thing" in the nature of the sacramental sign.[2]

1. It seems to us for fitting that the sensible rite must be so understood in this thesis. For the analogy with matter and form is not found in the sensible rite except inasmuch as the "things" involved are determined by the words to signify grace.
2. In this sense we speak about the form of the sacramental rite, or about the form of the sacramental sign in a metaphysical consideration; in this sense we said that the form is the signification itself. D. Soto, *In 4* d.3 a.un a.1, speaks in this way about the form of a sacrament. When one talks about the form of a sacrament, it is necessary to note whether one is dealing with a physical consideration or a metaphysical consideration. Still there is a third way of speaking about the "form of a sacrament," used, for example, by St. Augustine (*De peccatorum meritis et remissione* 1,34: ML 44,146), when he calls the form of the sacrament the gathering together of all the ceremonies, which are performed in the administration of the sacrament. In this sense the Council of Carthage cn.2 (D 223) speaks about the "form of Baptism"; see the Council of Trent sess.5 cn.4 (D 1514), Alexander VIII prop.28 condemned (D 2328). Similarly, Hugo of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* lib.2 p.6 cp.2 and 6: ML 176,445f.451. See Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.2 s.2 n.35f.

This physical composition can be understood *in two ways. In the first way,* so that it is only affirmed in the sacramental sign that the words and things must be used, which have some analogy with any physical matter and form, because they are the determining element and the determinable element. *In the second way,* so that it is affirmed further in such a way that the words and things are the parts intrinsically constituting the sacramental sign itself, by insisting on a greater analogy with hylemorphic composition. Therefore, in this way the sign is adequately constituted neither by the words alone nor by the things alone. We affirm both points in the thesis.

27. Adversaries. *The Scotists,* admitting the thesis from the facts, and also in the second regarding the other sacraments, deny the thesis in the second sense regarding the sacrament of Penance. They do this because they say that the sacramental sign in this sacrament consists only in the words of absolution, since there is no matter that enters essentially into the internal constitution of the sign.[3]

28. Doctrine of the Church. Martin V in the questions posed to the followers of Wycliffe and Hus (D 1262) speaks about the matter and the form in the confection of the sacrament.

The Council of Florence in its Decree for the Armenians (D 1312): the sacraments are accomplished by things as the matter and by words as the form.

The Council of Trent sess.14 ch.2 (D 1671) speaks about the matter and form, "which constitute the essence of a sacrament." See sess.14 ch.3 (D 1673-1675) and cn.4 (D 1704). In sess.14 ch.1 on extreme unction (D 1695) the Council speaks again about the matter and form of the sacraments.

Leo XIII (D 3315) explains that the essential rite in a sacrament includes both the matter and the form, but that it is from the form especially that the signification of grace is had.

Pius XII determined what is required for the validity of the sacrament of Holy Orders, accurately designating the matter and form.[4]

29. Theological note. a) *It seems to be a matter of divine and Catholic faith* from tradition and from the magisterium of the Church that the sacraments in some way are accomplished with things and words; b) it is *Catholic doctrine* that the things and words in the sacraments are well

3. See C. Frassen, *Scotus Academicus* t.10 tr.1 disp.2 a.2 q.2; Minges, *Compendium theologiae* 2,234; F.X.ab Abárzuza, *Manuale theologiae dogmaticae* 3 (Padre Las Casas, Chile 1947) 23,505.
4. *Const. Apost. "Sacramentum Ordinis":* AAS 40 (1948) 5-7.

explained under the notion of matter and form; c) it is the *more common and more probable opinion* that the things and words are the parts intrinsically constituting the sacramental sign.

30. Proof from tradition.[5] The historical evolution of this doctrine is approximately like this:

a) *In Holy Scripture* a twofold element for the sacraments is implied: Eph. 5:26 (Baptism); Jas. 5:14 (extreme unction); Acts 6:6 (Orders).

b) In the tradition of the *first centuries* there is talk about sensible things and about the sanctifying word. Thus St. Irenaeus (R 249), Tertullian (R 303f., 307), St. Cyprian (R 592), St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 842), St. Basil (R 954), St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1062), St. Ambrose (R 1330, 1339f.).

c) St. Augustine, who more clearly distinguished the material element and the word (R 1817), wrote down his opinion which was very influential on the later development: "take away the word, and then what is the water? *The word is added to the element, and then there is a sacrament,* even as a visible word" (R 1854).

d) It is said further *in the first centuries of the Middle Ages* that the power of the Holy Spirit (which is had by the word) must be added to the material element in order to accomplish the sacrament. Thus Alcuin, Agobard of Lyons, Jonas of Aurelia, Rabanus Maurus.[6]

e) Hugo of St. Victor explains the Augustinian statement in such a way that the material element now by a similarity representing grace, since it signifies it because of its institution, is sanctified by the words in order to contain it.[7] Now he is speaking about the matter and form of the sacraments. But he understands the form as the sum of all the ceremonies[8]; but he says that the matter is had "in things or in facts or in words,"[9] here speaking about sacraments in a broader sense.[10]

31. f) Peter Lombard[11] expressly says: "a sacrament consists of two things, namely, words and things. The words, as the invocation of the Trinity; the things like water, oil and such like things." Also, he often calls

5. See A. Michel, *Matière et forme dans les sacrements:* DTC 10,335-355; Pourrat, *La théologie sacramentaire* 47-83.
6. Alcuin, *Epistola* 36: ML 100,194; Agobard of Lyons, *De privilegiis et iure sacerdotum* 18: ML 104,165; Jonas of Aurelia, *De institutione laicali* 1,7: ML 106,134; Rabanus Maurus, *De clericorum institutione* 1.25: ML 107,310.
7. *De sacramentis* lib.1 n.9 cp.2: ML 176,317ff.
8. *De sacramentis* lib.2 p.6 cp.2 and 6: ML 176,445-471. See above note 2.
9. *De sacramentis* lib.1 p.9 cp.6: ML 176,326.
10. Similar views are to be found in Robert Paululus, *De officiis ecclesiasticis* 1,12: ML 177,310.
11. *Sententiae* 4 d.1.

the "words" the "form."[12]

g) Gulielmus Altissiodorensis at the beginning of the thirteenth century was the first author[13] to apply completely the terminology of matter and form to the sacramental things and words: "We say that as three things are said to be of the essence of Baptism, namely, the matter and form of the words and the intention of baptizing[14]; similarly three things are said to be of the essence of the Eucharist, namely, priestly Orders and the form and matter, that is, the bread and wine; in the same way, three things are said to be of the essence of this sacrament, namely, priestly Orders and the prayer of faith and the matter, that is, the oil consecrated by the bishop. But the prayer is not the anointing or a part of it; but in this way it is said to be of its essence, because by the prayer the anointing has the power to be a sacrament, that is, because it produces the similitude of what is signifies."[15]

h) *From this time* this concept becomes general, not excluding Scotus who says: "In each sacrament the matter and form are distinguished; the matter is said to be the visible sign, but the form is the words."[16] Durandus and Hadrian really cannot be excluded here; they deny that matrimony is accomplished by things and words, inasmuch as they understand the things in limited sense and the words formally.[17]

i) Then the *analogy* with matter and form is pushed further, so that the things and the words are said to be the essential parts intrinsically constituting the sacramental sign. Thus St. Thomas: "in the sacraments, words and things, like form and matter, combine in the formation of one thing" (III, q. 60, a. 6 ad 2). The reason is because a sacrament is a sign; but "in order to insure the perfection of sacramental signification it was necessary to determine the signification of the sensible things by means of certain words" (*ibid.* in the corpus). See also III, q. 60, a. 7. And elsewhere he gives a further explanation: "the essential parts are naturally the form and the matter. In this way, each sacrament is divided into matter and form as its essential parts. Hence it has been said above that sacraments consist of things and words" (III, q. 90, a. 2). From this time on this new analogy is more commonly admitted by theologians.

12. Thus, for example, while treating Confirmation in *Sent.* 4 d.3 c.2 n.24. Here however the way of speaking is older. See A. Landgraf, *Beiträge der Frühscholastik zur Terminologie der allgemeneinen Sakramentenlehre:* DivThom (Fr) 29 (1951) 4f.
13. Or perhaps the first one was Stephen Langton; see F. Gillmann, *Taufe "im nomen Iesu" oder "im namen Christi"?* (Mainz 1913) 11.
14. See the Decree for the Armenians: "All these sacraments are accomplished by three elements: namely, by things as the matter, by words as the form, and by the person of the minister who confers the sacrament with the intention of doing what the Church does" (D 1312).
15. *Summa aurea* lib.4 (ed. Paris 1500 fol.283).
16. *In 4* d.8 q.1 n.7.
17. Durandus, *in 4* d.1 q.3; Hadrian, *De baptismo* q.2. See Bellarmine, *De sacramentis in genere* 1,18.

32. Therefore, these stages of development can be identified:

1. Before the first attempts at a general theory of the sacraments, Scripture and the Fathers hint at a twofold element in the sacraments which they mention.

2. When for the first time a general theory is outlined by St. Augustine, the "element" and the "word" are distinguished.

3. The "things" and the "words" are more accurately distinguished by the Master of the Sentences; this distinction is equivalent to the distinction between the "things" and the "form."

4. "Matter" and "form" are distinguished by Gulielmus Altissiodorensis as being equivalent to the "things" and "words."

5. The analogy is stressed by St. Thomas so that the "things and words" are the essential parts intrinsically constituting the sacrament, like the "matter and form" that intrinsically constitute a physical composite thing.

With this evolution in view, it is clear that the doctrine about the coalescing of a sacrament out of things and words, which are then accommodated to matter and form, has been admitted by all theologians,[18] because they clearly see that the seeds of this doctrine are found in the founts of revelation.

33. Theological reasoning. a) The sacramental sign coalesces out of those things without which it cannot be thought to be essentially constituted. But without things and words it cannot be thought to be essentially constituted. Therefore a sacramental sign coalesces *out of things and words.*

The minor. A sacramental sign cannot be thought to be essentially constituted, unless the elements are present that truly signify grace. But neither things alone nor words alone, but only both together, signify grace. Therefore without the things and words the sacramental sign cannot be thought to be essentially constituted.

b) From things and words there comes about one thing, which is the sacramental sign. But this unity is not obtained, unless the things and words have a mutual relation to each other like potency and act, or matter and form. Therefore the sacramental sign coalesces *from things as the matter and from words as the form.*

c) The things in the sacramental sign conduct themselves as something determinable, and the words as something determining for the signification of grace. But in this way they come together intrinsically to constitute a sign like that of matter and form in a hylemorphic composition. Therefore

18. Suarez (*In 3* q,60 disp.2 s.1 n.3) writes: "This assertion is sufficiently proved by the common consent of all theologians."

the things and words are *the parts intrinsically constituting the sacramental sign, like matter and form.*[19]

34. Objections. 1. The sacrament of matrimony does not coalesce out of things and words. Therefore every sacrament does not coalesce out of them. *Re the antecedent.* There are no things in matrimony and the words can be omitted.

I deny the antecedent. Regarding the proof I distinguish. Things are not present in matrimony, if things are understood formally, *conceded;* if they are understood by opposition to the words as something indeterminate that will be determined by them, *denied.* Words taken formally can be omitted, *conceded;* what is equivalent to words can be omitted, *denied.*

In what sense in the sacrament of matrimony matter and form are found has not always been explained by all theologians in the same way; this is because of the special difficulties of this sacrament, which will be considered in the proper place. For now it will suffice to quote the words of Benedict XIV: "A legitimate contract of the sacrament of marriage is the matter together with the form; namely, a mutual and legitimate handing over of the bodies with words and gestures, expressing the interior assent of the mind as the matter; and likewise the mutual and legitimate acceptance of the bodies as the form."[20] But the handing over and the acceptance must take place in some sensible way, either by words or by gestures or in some other way.

2. In the sacrament of Penance there are no things. Therefore not all the sacraments coalesce out of things and words.

I distinguish the antecedent. In the sacrament of Penance there are no things formally, *conceded;* there are no things, according as by this word the element to be determined by the word is signified, *denied.* "Things" in this sense in the sacrament of Penance are the acts of the penitent, namely, contrition, confession and satisfaction (see D 1323); because these things are not material, by Trent they are called the "quasi material" (D 1673, 1704), as they already earlier were so called by Florence (D 1323).

3. For the constitution of the sacrament of the Eucharist the words are not pertinent. Therefore things and words are not the parts intrinsically constituting every sacrament. *The antecedent.* The Eucharist is a permanent sacrament. But the words of consecration are not permanent. Therefore for the constitution of the sacrament of the Eucharist the words are not pertinent.

I deny the antecedent. Concerning the proof I concede the major and distinguish the minor. The words of consecration are not permanent physically, *conceded;* they are not permanent morally, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* For the constitution of the sacrament of the Eucharist the words are not pertinent as pronounced only physically, *conceded;* the words are not pertinent as continuing morally, *denied.*[21] Moreover, all of this is said about the Eucharist according as it is a sacrament already accomplished; for, according as it is a sacrament in the process of becoming

19. See Suarez, *n 3* q.60 disp.2 s.1f.
20. Letter "*Paucis abhinc hebdomadis*" in 1758. See Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.2 a.1 n.7-33.
21. See *De Eucharistia* thesis 19.

there is no difficulty.

4. A sacrament is a sign. Therefore it coalesces out of the signifying thing as the matter or subject, and out of the signification as the form. But the signifying thing does not coincide with the thing as it is opposed to the words, nor is the signification gathered from the words, but from its institution. Therefore a sacrament does not coalesce out of things as the matter and out of the words as the form.

I concede the antecedent and I distinguish the consequent. It coalesces metaphysically out of the signifying thing as the subject and out of the signification as the form, *conceded;* it coalesces in this way physically, *denied. I bypass the minor. I also distinguish the last consequent.* The sacrament does not coalesce metaphysically out of the things as the matter and the words as the form, *conceded;* it does not coalesce thus physically, *denied.*

These two compositions do not coincide in all cases. However, note that the signification is had indeed in an efficient way from its institution, but it is had formally from the words.[22]

22. See Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.2 s.2 n.38.

CHAPTER III

On the causality of the sacraments

35. Up to this point we have explained how a sacrament of the New Law is essentially a symbolic sensible sign of grace. And we have seen that a sacramental sign is composed—metaphysically out of the signifying thing and the signification, but physically out of things and words, as from matter and form.

Now it must be explained further in what sense a sacrament is a *practical sign of grace*. But, as we have said, a sacrament does not have this power only because it is a sign, but it comes from another source; namely, because it has been elevated by Christ to produce grace.

However, the complete Catholic teaching about the efficacy of a sacrament is complex. *First*, with regard to the end of that efficacy, for all the sacraments of the New Law confer grace, but some of them also have another effect, namely, a character. *Secondly*, also with regard to the manner of that causality, for the sacraments confer grace not in just any way, but "by the performance of the rite itself" (*ex opere operato*). To this *it will be necessary to add* a further investigation of theologians about the intimate nature of this sacramental causality.

Hence we will take up the following four points:

1) On the general effect of all the sacraments.
2) On the special effect of some of the sacraments.
3) On the manner of sacramental efficacy.
4) On the intimate nature of the causality of the sacraments.

ARTICLE I

ON THE GENERAL EFFECT OF ALL THE SACRAMENTS

Thesis 4. The sacraments of the New Law confer grace.

S.Th. III, q. 62, a. 1; Lennerz, 262-272; Lercher-Dander, 30-33.

36. Definition of terms. *They confer*, that is, they not only signify grace, but the conferring of this signified grace in a very true sense depends on the sacrament. For now we are prescinding from the manner of this dependence, nor do we say that it is causal in the strict sense. These points will be considered later.

Grace, that is, sanctifying grace. Here again we affirm only the fact,

prescinding from the further question, whether sacramental grace is in some sense different from sanctifying grace considered by itself.

37. *Protestants,* because of their false notion of justification by fiducial faith.[1] Among them Luther held that the sacraments are a sign of divine promises, whereby the fiducial faith concerning promised justification is stirred up and strengthened; justification however is due to this faith alone. Calvin held a similar view. But Zwingli considered the sacraments as signs by which a man proves to the Church that he is a soldier of Christ. In this way the Church is made certain about the faith of that man.

Modernists restrict all the effects of the sacraments to this point "that they recall to man's mind the ever-beneficent presence of the Creator" (D 3441). Just as there are some voices that have a special ability to promote certain ideas, so the sacraments have a special power to stir up the religious sense (see D 3488). For, according to them, the sacraments have a certain efficacy, but it is merely psychological.

38. Doctrine of the Church.[2] Benedict XII (D 1014) points out among the errors of some Armenians that in the sacraments of the New Law there is no sanctifying grace. However this letter is not properly a pontifical document; rather, it was presented to the Pontiff by individuals denouncing the errors of the Armenians.[3] But it does present the doctrine of the Roman Church at that time.

The Council of Florence in the Decree for the Armenians (D 1310) teaches: the sacraments contain grace and communicate it to those who worthily receive them.

Leo X (D 1451) condemned the error of Luther for denying the doctrine of this thesis.

The Council of Trent sess.7 cn.5-8 (D 1605-1608). See also the Foreword of sess.7 (D 1600) and the Profession of Faith (D 1864-1865). Because canon 8 will be treated later, note now what follows concerning the meaning and history of the other canons.

a) *In cn.5* (D 1605) the opinion of the Protestants is rejected. The canon arose from error 14 of the Protestants which was proposed to the theologians: "the sacraments were instituted only to nourish faith."[4] The

1. See Lennerz, 6-17, where the opinions of various authors are explained at length.
2. We are considering only those documents in which the authors are treating all the sacraments. Many things could be added about each of the sacraments, but this will be done in the sections dealing with each sacrament.
3. See S. le Bachelet, *Benoit XII:* DTC 2,696-704.
4. CTr 5,836.

theologians judged that this error had been condemned already and should be condemned again.[5]

b) *Cn.6* (D 1606) has two parts: in the first part the Catholic doctrine is proposed positively; in the second part the Protestant explanation is rejected. *The first part* arose from error 4 of the prior list: "the sacraments of the New Law do not confer grace, even on those who do not place an obstacle in the way."[6] The theologians judged this error as already condemned and to be condemned,[7] which was also pleasing to the Fathers. *The second part* arose from the articles of the heretics added by the theologians: "the sacraments are only signs and marks of our profession, or also allegories of good works."[8] Concerning this article many Fathers thought that it should be condemned when they condemned the view that the sacraments do not confer grace.[9] Hence, here is the *first draft* of the canon: "If anyone says that the Sacraments of the New Law do not contain the grace they signify, or that they do not confer that grace on those who rightly and worthily receive them, as if they were only external signs of the grace or justice received through faith and marks of the Christian profession by which among men the faithful are distinguished from the unbelievers, let him be anathema."[10] The Fathers desired that the phrase be added "on those who do not place an obstacle in the way."[11]

c) *In cn.7* (D 1607) the infallibility of the conferring of grace is taught. This canon arose from error 8 of the previous list: "grace is not given always and to all, as far as God's part is concerned, but only when and where it pleases God."[12] The Fathers thought that the last phrase should be deleted.[13] Hence *the first draft* of the canon reads: "If anyone says that grace is not given in these sacraments always and to all those who receive them, as far as God's part is concerned, but only sometimes and to some, let him be anathema."[14] The Fathers made these corrections: "through these sacraments"; "even if they receive them rightly"; and they deleted "only."[15]

Leo XIII (D 3315): the sacraments signify the grace that they effect and effect the grace that they signify.

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5. CTr 5,963.
6. CTr 5,863.
7. CTr 5,863.
8. CTr 5,867.
9. CTr 5,972.
10. CTr 5,984.
11. CTr 5,991.
12. CTr 5,836.
13. CTr 5,971.
14. CTr 5,984.
15. CTr 5,991.

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

39. Proof from Holy Scripture. The conferring of sanctifying grace is attributed to the sacraments as their effect. Thus, sanctification, spiritual cleansing (Eph. 5:26), regeneration and renewal (Tit. 3:5), regeneration and entrance into the kingdom of heaven (John 3:5) are attributed to *Baptism.* The conferring of the Holy Spirit is attributed to *Confirmation* (Acts 8:17; 19:6). Life and union with Christ are attributed to the *Eucharist* (John 6:51-58). The forgiveness of sins is attributed to *Penance* (John 20:23). Salvation and the forgiveness of sins are attributed to *Extreme Unction* (Jas. 5:14f). *On Matrimony* the matter is not so clear, nevertheless the text of St. Paul to the Ephesians without grace more probably is not understood.

40. Proof from tradition. a) The Fathers, speaking about the individual sacraments, connect with them the conferring of grace. Thus, v.gr., on Baptism St. Theophilus of Antioch (R 181), Tertullian (R 304, 362), St. John Chrysostom (R 1179), St. Augustine (R 1423). Similar things will be said about the other sacraments when they are treated at length in their own treatises.

b) In a special way the Fathers speak about the conferring of grace joined with *the imposition of hands.* Thus, v.gr., Tertullian (R 304, 362), St. Cyprian (R 569, 595), St. Basil (R 919), St. Ambrose (R 1295), St. Jerome (R 1359).

c) The Fathers speak about the conferring of grace in the sacraments *in virtue of the Holy Spirit* who is in them. Thus, v.gr., Tertullian (R 303), Novatian (R 607), Aphraates (R 683), St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 835), St. Basil (R 947), St. Ambrose (R 1282, 1329), St. Augustine (R 1423m 1834), St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2110).

d) St. Augustine says about all the sacraments of the New Testament that they "give salvation" in contrast to the sacraments of the Old Testament that only promised a Savior (R 1475). Hence our sacraments have "greater power and better utility" (R 1602).

e) *Theologians in the twelfth century*, because of the error of Berengarius, speak more clearly about the conferring of grace which is in the sacraments. That is especially the case with Hugo of St. Victor, who in the very definition of a sacrament includes that it is "from its sanctification containing an invisible and spiritual grace. For, every sacrament must have sanctification, through which it contains grace and is efficacious in order to confer it on those to be sanctified."[16] Likewise the *Summa Sententiarum*

16. *De sacramentis* lib.1 p.9 cp.2: ML 176,317f.

when it defines a sacrament: it is "a visible form of invisible grace conferred on the one who receives the sacrament. For it is not only a sign of a sacred thing, but it is also efficacious."[17] Finally, Peter Lombard introduced the notion of a cause: "a sacrament is said properly because it is so much a sign of God's grace and a form of invisible grace that it produces an image of it and is its cause."[18] From this time on all theologians speak about the conferring of grace by a sacrament; also, they develop the doctrine further, as we shall see later.[19]

41. Theological reasoning cannot prove that the sacraments confer grace. But, once this truth has been known from positive divine revelation, it can explain that it is most fitting that grace should be given to men through certain sensible signs, which especially correspond with the nature of men. It can also explain that it was very fitting that, in the economy of grace and supernatural salvation, grace should not depend on human actions alone, but would be given more easily and more certainly.

17. *Summa Sententiarum* tr.4 cp.1: ML 176,117.
18. *Sententiae* 4 d.1 n.2.
19. Among the scholastics of this time the special difficulty with the sacrament of matrimony was so great that they thought it was only a remedy for concupiscence and in order to preserve grace, but not to confer grace. See Lennerz, 272.

Thesis 5. Sacramental grace is nothing else but sanctifying grace itself, inasmuch as, having been conferred by such a sacrament, it has annexed to it the right to special divine helps, which correspond to the purpose of that sacrament.

S.Th. III, q. 62, a. 2; Suarez, *In 3* q.62 disp.7 s.2; Lennerz, 273-281; Puig, 160-168.

42. Connection. In the preceding thesis we said that sanctifying grace is conferred by the sacraments. However, since sanctifying grace is also conferred without the sacraments, there is a question about what the difference is between both of these graces. Moreover, the grace, which is conferred by the sacraments, is conferred not by one but by seven different sacraments. It seems, therefore, that there is some difference between the graces that are given by the different sacraments; otherwise, one sacrament alone would be sufficient. Now these points will be explained.

43. Definition of terms. *Sacramental grace,* that is, the grace that a sacrament signifies and confers.

Sanctifying grace itself, or habitual grace, which in justification is given with the infused virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the infusion of the Holy Spirit to dwell in the soul.

Inasmuch as it has annexed to it the right. In this way is stated what distinguishes sacramental grace from extra-sacramental grace. Therefore it is not the reality itself of the grace, but its connection with actual graces, which are different from the connatural graces of the state of grace as such.[1]

Diverse special divine helps are given with each sacrament (as conferred by each sacrament) and they are recognized as different from the purpose of each sacrament. Thus the sacramental grace of Baptism, v.gr., is sanctifying grace with the annexed right that God will give the baptized person those special actual graces that correspond to the end for which Baptism was instituted. But these *helps* will be given at the opportune time, that is, when they are demanded by the end of the sacrament. However, the *right* to them is permanent, according as it is rooted in habitual grace, and so it is also lost with it.

The purpose of that sacrament. For each sacrament has its own special end. The end or purpose of each sacrament is explained by the Council of

1. Although the terminology is not the same and is not always found firm among all theologians, it seems that the authors who speak about a special manner or formality of common grace really think the same way, like John of St. Thomas (*De sacramentis* disp.24 a.2), Salmanticenses (*De sacramentis* tr.22 disp.4 dub.9). Thus Billuart (*De sacramentis in communi* diss.3 a.5) writes: "Sacramental grace is *a new intrinsic way of perfection*, or a special vigor added to grace commonly so called, *with an order or exigency and right* to actual help to be conferred at the proper time.

Florence in the Decree for the Armenians (D 1310-1311).

44. Adversaries. *Some older authors,* according to St. Bonaventure,[2] held that sacramental grace adds, beyond the common sanctifying grace, a special habit, really distinct from grace. Recently Billot adopted this view, holding that sacramental grace "adds beyond grace commonly so called certain habitual dispositions more or less diminishing concupiscence in it various and multiple ramifications.[3]

According to other theologians, sacramental grace adds to common grace actual helps in order to attain the proper effects of the sacrament. Thus Cajetan, Soto, Gonet.[4]

45. Doctrine of the Church. Pius XI (D 3713-3714) uses this opinion in explaining the grace of sacramental matrimony.

Theological note. *By far more common and more probable.*

46. Argument. a) Sacramental grace adds something beyond common grace. But it does not add a new habit, nor does it add actual divine helps alone. Therefore it adds a new title or right to receive those helps.

The major. Sacramental grace is conferred by the sacrament. Therefore it says some essential relation to it, which extra-sacramental grace does not say. Therefore it is not common grace alone, but it adds something beyond that.

The minor. A new habit (there is nothing in the founts of revelation about this) would be superfluous; for, by its other infused habits it already has what could be obtained by such a habit. Concerning actual divine helps alone, that is, those without a new title or right, it does not appear how they could be said to be conferred by the sacrament. For, there is no objective reason why they should be given to this sacrament rather than to other works.

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2. *In 4* d.1 n.1 a.un. q.6 (ed. Quaracchi 4,27).
3. *De Ecclesiae sacramentis* 1,95.
4. Cajetan, *In 3* q.62 a.2; Soto, *In 4* d.1 q.3 a.2; Gonet, *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae* t.5 disp.5 a.6; and others. Note however that these authors perhaps intend nothing more than what we say in the thesis, although they seem to be talking about actual helps, not about the right to such helps. Thus, v.gr., Suarez (*In 3* q.62 disp.7 s.3 n.5), according to whom sacramental grace is "common grace itself, inasmuch as it is given by such a sacrament and is ordered to such an end and inasmuch as for that reason such help *responds to it and is due to it* from divine institution" (which is our opinion); he states his thesis in this way: "Sacramental grace adds to the grace of the virtues and gifts *some special help* of grace ordained to the proper end of the sacrament." Lugo speaks in the same way (*De sacramentis in genere* disp.4 s.3 n.19), when he explains that sacramental grace differs from habitual grace "with a special *title and right* to divine helps"; his thesis runs like this: "sacramental grace adds to habitual grace *special divine helps* for some acts."

b) Sacramental grace cannot be the same in each sacrament, but it must be different for each one of them. But this difference cannot be explained except by the title and right to divine helps, which is suitable for each sacrament. Therefore sacramental grace is explained by those rights superadded to sanctifying grace.

The major. If sacramental grace were the same in each sacrament, the sacraments, inasmuch as they are the practical signs of grace, would not be many, but only one. For, there are many sacraments, because each one of them has a different end, which it must obtain inasmuch as it is this definite practical sign and not something else.

The minor. All sacramental grace is explained, as we have proved, from its title and right to special actual helps. Therefore the difference between the different sacramental graces must be explained by the difference between those titles and rights.[5]

47. Corollary. Thus it is clearly understood that *sacraments confer the grace that they signify.* For each sacrament signifies a different grace. Thus Baptism signifies regenerative grace; Confirmation strengthening grace; the Eucharist nourishing grace; Penance resuscitating grace; Extreme Unction medicinal grace; Holy Orders grace giving authority over the members of the Mystical Body; Matrimony grace reproductive of new members of the same Mystical Body.

48. Objections. 1. Any grace, even extra-sacramental, confers a right to all the divine helps, which are required to act well. Therefore in this sacramental grace does not differ from common grace.

I distinguish the antecedent. Any grace confers a right to all the divine helps in general and universally, *conceded;* any grace confers a right specifically according to the different needs and opportunities, *I subdistinguish:* it confers that right from the extrinsic providence alone of God, *conceded;* it confers that right from the objective reality itself, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* Sacramental grace does not differ from common grace in the generic right to divine helps, *conceded;* it does not differ in a special right, *I subdistinguish:* which is had from ordinary divine providence, *conceded;* which is had from the objective reality of the sacrament, *denied.*

The state of grace brings with it a general right to the graces necessary to act well. This is valid also for the opinion that holds that the special help to persevere is different from the sum of actual graces, which are due connaturally to the state of grace,[6] inasmuch as God has special providence for his own children. That general title becomes particular, when it is necessary to keep a commandment or to resist a grave temptation;

5. On sacramental grace, see E. Neveut, *La grâce sacramentelle:* DivThom (Pi) 38 (1935) 249-285; Brazzarola, *La natura della grazia sacramentale nella dottrina di S. Tommasso* (Grottaferrata 1941).
6. See STHS 3^2, 3,60.

but, as we said, it is based on the providence of God alone and brings with it the help which often is only remotely sufficient. But the right conferred by sacramental grace is special for those particular helps, which are in agreement with the end of each sacrament; it is conferred in virtue of that sacrament by the performance of the rite itself, and, as it seems, it is always at least proximately sufficient.[7] Hence this help is given more certainly and abundantly and it is more easily obtained.

2. The right to divine helps, which may be given by sacramental grace, would be either for efficacious helps or for sufficient helps. But neither can be affirmed. Therefore sacramental grace cannot be explained by rights to special helps. *The minor.* There is no right to efficacious helps, because then the one receiving a sacrament would never sin. There is no right to sufficient helps, because that is already had even without a sacrament.

I add a third alternative to the major: there is a right to helps, which sometimes will be efficacious and sometimes will be merely sufficient; for this does not depend on sacramental grace, but on other principles. *I distinguish the proof of the minor.* There cannot be a right to efficacious helps, that is, those that are always efficacious, *conceded* for the added reason; there cannot be a right to helps, which sometimes are efficacious, *denied.* In this sense I also deny that there cannot be a right to sufficient helps. *And I distinguish the proof of this assertion.* A sufficient help is already had without the sacrament always and for the totality of good acts, *denied;* some helps can be had absolutely, *I subdistinguish:* either proximately or remotely sufficient, *conceded*[8]*;* proximately sufficient, *I distinguish again:* which may be given from God's providence, *conceded;* which may be given from the objective reality of the sacrament, and therefore more securely, abundantly and easily, *denied.*

49. Scholium. *On the sacraments of the living and the dead.* From the different graces signified by the different sacraments it is easily gathered that some sacraments confer the first grace, others the second grace. For, the former per se suppose in the soul the absence of sanctifying grace, but the latter suppose grace already in the soul and they increase it. Therefore the sacraments that per se and primarily confer the first grace are called the sacraments of the dead; the sacraments that per se and primarily confer the second grace are called the sacraments of the living. But theologians ask whether the sacraments can confer that grace for which per se and primarily they are not ordained. Certainly, that the sacraments of the dead can confer the second grace when the subject receiving them is already in the state of grace is certain. But that the sacraments of the living can at times confer the first grace is hotly disputed among theologians, but it seems more probable that it should be affirmed.[9]

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7. A. Vermeersch thinks (*Annotationes ad Encycl. "Casti Connubii":* Per 20 [1931] 50) that help can also sometimes be remotely sufficient. The reason is that Pius XI in the quoted text (D 3714) speaks about sacramental grace giving the right to *implore* the help of actual grace when it is necessary to observe a commandment. But we think that the word "implore" there is not used for impetration in the strict sense, but for the general obtaining of help. See Puig, 165, note 17.
8. See *De Eucharistia* n.277 and thesis 24.
9. See Puig, 178-187.

ARTICLE II

ON THE SPECIAL EFFECT OF SOME SACRAMENTS

50. Besides the conferring of grace, which is common to all the sacraments, another effect of some sacraments, based on the doctrine of the Church, must be affirmed. This effect is called the sacramental character, which is produced by Baptism, Confirmation and Orders.

Now we will deal with this, by studying first its existence and then its nature.

Thesis 6. Baptism, Confirmation and Orders imprint a character on the soul.

S.Th. III, q. 63, a. 5f.; Lennerz, 282-317; Lercher-Dander, 36-41; Puig, 188-199.

51. Definition of terms. *Character* is defined by the Council of Trent (D 1609): "a kind of indelible spiritual sign." It is called a *sign*, that is, something distinguishing both the faithful from unbelievers and the faithful among themselves. A character in virtue of the word (from χαράσσειν, to engrave) is a mark imprinted or inscribed in some thing, v.gr., on a coin; this can be either an inscription or a linear figure or an image or a configuration of something (used in this way in Heb. 1:3); because of that impressed mark beings can be distinguished from one another. It is said to be *spiritual* in opposition to material, whether it is physical or moral, absolute or relative; for now we will not consider this point. It is also *indelible*, at least de facto and in this life.

They imprint, that is, they effect or cause.

On the soul, that is, on the spiritual part of man, prescinding from the further question about the immediate subject of the character (that is, whether it is on the substance of the soul, or on its faculties).

52. Adversaries. *Protestants.* Of them it was Chemnitius who said that the character was invented by Innocent III.

Doctrine of the Church. a) *Before the Council of Trent.* Innocent III (D 781) proposed the doctrine about the character, not as something new, but as commonly admitted. Gregory IX[1] wrote in the same way: "we respond that those who, outside of the stated times, have received Holy Orders,

1. CIC 3 X 1 11 (ed. Friedberg 2,124).

without doubt have received the character."

The Council of Florence in the Decree for the Armenians (D 1313) gave a definition of the character which Trent adopted afterwards.

b) *The Council of Trent* sess.7 cn.9 (D 1609). On the meaning and history of the canon this is what must be said: *the origin of the canon* is had in the ninth error of the previous list of errors: "a character is imprinted in none of the sacraments, but it is only something fictitious."[2] Among the theologians "some thought that this article should not be condemned simply as heretical, but that the contrary view should be embraced as more probable. Others said that it should be condemned as heretical, and that it was condemned."[3] The Fathers in this diversity of opinions "thought that it should be condemned as it is proposed, and that it should be stated that it is imprinted in those three: Baptism, Confirmation and Orders."[4] *The first redaction* of the canon is: "If anyone says that in the three sacraments, namely, baptism, confirmation and orders, a character is not imprinted on the soul, that is, a kind of indelible spiritual sign by reason of which they cannot be repeated, let him be anathema."[5] This redaction pleased the Fathers, except that they wanted it not to say "by reason of which"; for, as one of them pointed out, "that is not the reason why the sacraments are not repeated."[6] Hence this change was made in the second redaction of the canon. On the character in Trent see also sess.23 ch.4 (D 1767-1770) and cn.4 (D 1774).

Note that, both in the Decree for the Armenians and in sess.7 of Trent, some connection is expressed between the character and the repeatability of the sacraments; on this point, however, one should keep in mind what we just said in our explanation of the canon. But in Trent's profession of faith (D 1864; see also D 2536), while retaining the doctrine of unrepeatability, nothing is said explicitly about the character.

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

53. Argument. The existence of the character is expressly and constantly affirmed through many centuries before the Council of Trent; this sufficiently explained idea appears in St. Augustine, it is implicitly supposed in the doctrine and practice of the preceding Fathers, and it seems to be hinted at in Holy Scripture. But a doctrine endowed with such

2. CTr 5,836.
3. CTr 5,865.
4. CTr 5,971.
5. CTr 5,984.
6. CTr 5,987.

qualities cannot not be revealed. Therefore the existence of the character is certain from revelation.

The minor. No other reason can be given for the constancy and universality of these factors, except that this doctrine is connected with revelation.

54. *The major.* a) *The existence of the character is expressly and constantly affirmed through many centuries before Trent.* In the middle of the twelfth century the character is already mentioned when Baptism is being treated. Thus Rufinus (ca. 1157-1159) speaks about the character of the Christian soldier, which is imprinted in Baptism.[7] Towards the end of that century Alanus de Insulis[8] speaks about the character of Baptism and Peter Cantor[9] about the character of Baptism, Confirmation and Orders as about something known by theologians. Peter Cantor established the connection between the character and the unrepeatability of the sacrament. At the end of the twelfth century or the beginning of the thirteenth century Praepositinus speaks about the *mark,*[10] and Robert Curtonus about the *character and mark.*[11] Also, he already has the basic element of a theory about the nature of the character. At the same time, Gulielmus Altissiodorensis explains the character of each sacrament.[12] Gulielmus Parisiensis says that the doctors are already in agreement about the doctrine of the character.[13] The words quoted from Innocent III (D 781) and Gregory IX present the indications of this consensus; they are repeated in Decrees of the latter Pontiff (ca. 1230-1234).

In the middle of the thirteenth century two definitions of the character are circulated: "the definition of Dionysius" ("a holy sign of the communion of faith and of holy ordination, conferred by a hierarch on the one receiving it") which, however, is not found anywhere in the works of Dionysius[14]; and "the definition of the Master" ("a distinctive mark printed in a man's rational soul by the eternal Character, whereby the created trinity is sealed with the likeness of the creating and re-creating Trinity, and distinguishing

7. *Summa* ad c.97 C I q.1. Peter Lombard uses the word "character" (*Sententia* 4 d.6 and 24); but he seems to be speaking about the external rite, which is done according to the precept from Christ. See S.Th., *In 4* d.24 q.1 a.1 q.2 ad 1.
8. *De articulis catholicae fidei* 4,5: ML 210,614.
9. *Summa de saramentis* (in F. Brommer, *Die Lehre vom sakramentalem Charakter in der Scholastik bis Thomas von Aquin inklusive* [Paderborn 1908] 15).
10. In Brommer, 14f.
11. In Brommer, 16f.
12. *Summa* lib.4 tr.3; see Brommer, 48-69.
13. *De sacramento baptismi* 3. Chapter 7 speaks about the character of Orders. He also connects the unrepeatability of the sacrament with the character.
14. See St. Albert the Great, *In 4* d.6 a.4; St. Thomas, *In 4* d.4 q.1 a.2 q.1; Scotus, *In 4* d.6 q.9.

him from those who are not so likened, according to the state of faith")[15]; this definition is explained at length by St. Albert the Great and by St. Thomas in the cited texts.[16] From this time the doctrine on the existence of the sacramental character is fully common among theologians, and constantly through three centuries it is taught up the Council of Trent.

55. b) *This doctrine is sufficiently proposed by* St. Augustine. For, in his controversy with the Donatists, he acknowledged some effect of the sacraments, which is distinct from the grace and the infusion of the Holy Spirit (R 1621, 1625, 1636); it remains in the soul even when grace has been lost (R 1621, 1637, 1867); and it is the reason why the sacrament of an apostate or of a heretic, when received back into the Church, is not repeated as part of the reconciliation (R 1617, 1619, 1621). He calls this effect a sign,[17] a character from the Lord ("and you are the sheep of Christ—you bear the character of the Lord in the sacrament you have received")[18]; it is like the sign that is impressed on sheep, or the mark cut into soldiers in order to distinguish them (R 1619, 1713). He certainly teaches that this character is imprinted in Baptism (R 1617, 1620) and Orders (R 1617, 1620, 1642); probably also in Confirmation (R 1647). Note finally that St. Augustine hands on the doctrine on the unrepeatability of these sacraments as pertaining to the faith of the Church (R 1623).

56. c) *The existence of the character is supposed implicitly in the doctrine of the preceding Fathers.* Thus, in the fourth century: St. Ambrose speaks about a "spiritual seal" whereby "we are sealed in our hearts" (R 1282, 1330, 1337). St. John Chrysostom: in Baptism "you are sealed. For, just as a certain mark (σφραγίς) is imposed on soldiers, so also the Spirit is imposed on the faithful. In this way it happens that, if you abandon your order, you are recognized by all. For, in the place of a sign the Jews have circumcision, but we have the pledge of the Spirit." [19] St. Gregory of Nyssa: "I do not know whether the angels receive a soul not illuminated and not adorned with the grace of regeneration after it has been separated from the body. For how can that be, since it is not sealed, and does not bear any sign of its Lord?"[20] St. Gregory Nazianzen says that Baptism is called

15. See Brommer, 69-77.
16. In the *Summa* both definitions recur; the first one is introduced with these words: "by some the character is defined in this way" (III, q. 63, a.2 dif.3); but the second one with these words: "some define the character in this way" (III, q. 63, a. 3).
17. *Epistola* 185,23: ML 33,803.
18. *Epistola* 173,3: ML 33,754. See *Sermo ad Caesariensis Ecclesiae plebem* 2: ML 43,691f.
19. *In 2 Cor* hom.7: MG 61,418.
20. *Adversus eos qui differunt baptismum:* MG 46,423.

a seal "because it is conserved and is the sealing of dominion."[21] He says that the faithful through Baptism is signed with anointing and the Spirit, "as formerly Israel by the nocturnal blood, which protected the first-born." Indeed this is of great importance for security; "for a branded cow is not easily desired by thieves; but one that is not branded can easily be stolen by thieves."[22] St. Basil calls Baptism "*a seal* which cannot be removed by any attempt" (R 968).[23] St. Cyril of Jerusalem speaks in the same way about "the holy, indissoluble seal" of Baptism, and about the "indelible seal,"[24] about the "mystical seal,"[25] about the "seal of salvation, that wondrous seal, which devils tremble at, and angels recognize" (R 808), about "the seal of communication of the Holy Spirit" in Baptism, about "the seal which you have from God,"[26] whereby we are made "the engraving of the signet, holiness unto God" (R 847). According to St. Athanasius, "the seal of Christ signing preserves the image; those sealed by it are made partakers who are conformed to it. However, sealed in this way, we are fittingly made partakers of the divine nature."[27] St. Ephraem: "The Holy Spirit imprints his seal with oil on his sheep" (R 712).

In the third century: St. Cyprian speaks about "the Lord's seal" in Confirmation (R 595). Clement of Alexandria said the same thing.[28] Tertullian calls Baptism a "seal,"[29] "a seal of faith"[30]; he speaks about "the seal of washing."[31] For St. Hippolytus also Baptism is "a seal given by Christ to the faithful," like the sign of the beast the Anti-Christ will give to his followers."[32]

In the second century: Theodotus was familiar with a similar way of speaking, calling Baptism a "seal"[33]; he also knew about the analogy between "the seal of truth," whereby we carry the stigmata of Christ with us, and the image on a coin and the mark on the soul.[34] Abercius in his epitaph speaks about Roman Christians as a people "marked by a splendid seal" (R 187). There is also a reference to the "seal" in the *Pastor Hermes*

21. *Oratio* 40,4: MG 36,363.
22. *Oratio* 40,15: MG 36,378.
23. See also in the same homily n.4: MG 314,31.
24. *Procatecheses* 16f: MG 33,359-366.
25. *Catecheses* 1,2: MG 33,371.
26. *Catecheses* 18,33: MG 33,1055.
27. *Epistola 1 ad Serapionem* 23: MG 26,586.
28. *Quis dives salvetur* 42: MG 9,647.
29. *De spectaculis* 4: ML 1,709.
30. *De spectaculis* 28: ML 1,734.
31. *De pudicitia* 9: ML 2,998.
32. *De Antichristo* 6: MG 10,734.
33. *Excerpta,* in Clement of Alexandria 83: MG 9,695; *Eglogae ex scripturis propheticis,* in the same place, 2: MG 9,703.
34. *Excerpta,* 86: MG 9,698.

(R 92) and in the second letter of *Clement.*[35]

All of these ideas, if they are considered together, contain the implicit doctrine about the character, although it is not yet fully developed.

57. d) *The same doctrine is contained implicitly in the praxis of the same time.* When the great controversy started in the third century about re-baptizing heretics, all of those involved on both sides recognized that a valid Baptism could not be repeated, and this was always supposed during the whole controversy. The whole question was whether Baptism conferred by heretics was valid or not (see R 593, 592a). Surely this fact supposes implicitly the doctrine about the character. For, not just in the Council of Trent, but also in Florence, among theologians, in St. Augustine and in others, the existence of the character is connected with the unrepeatability of the sacrament.[36] Similar things are also said in the same controversy about Confirmation and Orders.

58. e) *The existence of the character is suggested in Holy Scripture.* Eph. 1:13 is quoted by the Fathers and then by the theologians (*in him you also, who have heard the word of truth. were sealed with the promised Holy Spirit*), together with 4:30 (*in whom you were sealed for the day of redemption*) and 2 Cor. 1:21f. (*he has put his seal upon us*).[37] This exposition of the Fathers should not be rejected, even though these texts, as they are in themselves, today are explained in a different way. Namely, 2 Cor. 1:21f. on the conferring of the apostolic ministry; Eph. 1:13 and 4:30 about the Holy Spirit indwelling through grace.[38]

59. Theological reasoning. Baptism, Confirmation and Orders are sacraments by which Christians are designated directly for the worship of God. But all those who are designated for some office are wont to be authenticated by some public sign. Therefore a character is given by these three sacraments.

The major. It is clear concerning Orders; but having entered the Church by Baptism, we receive the power to worship God in a Christian and supernatural way; by Confirmation we receive the power to defend the

35. Ps. Clement, 2.ª *epistola ad Corinthios* 7,6; 8,6.

36. We assert the fact of this connection, not its nature, as if the only reason for unrepeatability were the character; there is no certainty about this.

37. See St. Athanasius, *Epistola 1.ª ad Serapionem* 23: MG 23,583; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catecheses* 17,35: MG 33,1010; St. Chrysostom, *In 2 Cor* hom.4,7: MG 61,418; *In Eph* hom.2,1: MG 62,18; St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto* 6,78ff.: ML 16,723. See S.Th. III, q. 63, a. 1; Suarez, *In 3* q.63 a.1 and 3.

38. See R. Cornely, *Commentarius in epistolam ad Corinthios alteram*² 49f.; J. Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in epistolam ad Ephesios* 54ff.

faith and the worship of God. See S.Th. III, q. 72, a. 5.[39]

60. Objections. 1. The seal and sign among the Fathers can be understood about grace or about a sacrament. Therefore it is not about a character.

I distinguish the antecedent. The seal and the sign among the Fathers can be understood sometimes about grace, *conceded;* always, *denied.* For, often they speak about the sign remaining in apostasy, having been received illicitly from heretics and others. *I distinguish the antecedent again.* The sign can be understood about the sacrament itself, because it designates the cause for the effect, *conceded;* because they know they are speaking about the cause alone, *denied.* This is clear from the fact that they speak about the sign as remaining, not as transient in the way the sacrament is transient.

2. The character is either sensible or it is useless. But it is not sensible. Therefore it is useless. *The major.* The character ought to be a sign by which the one who possesses it is distinguished and differentiated from others. But it cannot do this unless it is sensible. Therefore the character is either sensible or it is useless.

I deny the major. And to prove this I deny the supposition, namely, the function of the character is only to distinguish, as we shall see immediately. *I distinguish the minor of the first syllogism.* The character is not sensible by itself, *conceded;* it is not sensible by the sacrament which is received exteriorly, *denied.* See III, q. 63, a. 1 ad 2.

61. Scholium 1. *On the function of the character.*[40] a) The sacramental character is a *distinctive sign.* The holy Fathers, as we have seen, designate the character as the proper mark of one who pertains to Christ, just as from a mark sensibly impressed one can discern to whom a sheep belongs (above Theodotus, St. Gregory Nazianzen, R 712, 1713), or which king a soldier serves (St. Augustine, R 1619, 1713), or also as from external circumcision it is known who belongs to the people of God (St. Chrysostom), or from the blood smeared on the lintels which houses belonged to the Hebrews (St. Gregory Nazianzen). Where the existence of the character was first established by theologians, in the definition of the "Master," the character is designated as "distinguishing from those who are not configured according to the status of faith." Alexander of Hales gives this explanation: "by this [because the character makes one like to God] it distinguished one from those not belonging to the flock, or also it makes a distinction in the same flock according to this or that mode of assimilation."[41] St. Bonaventure offers a further explanation of this: "There are three states of faith, that is, generated, strengthened and then multiplied; and according to this we note a threefold distinction among the people, namely, of the good from the bad [which is had by the character of Baptism, "because there faith is born and a man is separated from the Egyptians"], of the strong from the weak [which is had by the character of Confirmation, 'because there faith is strengthened and like a boxer a man is anointed in order to fight and he is distinguished from the

39. See Suarez, *In 3* q.63 disp.1 n.6; Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.6 s.1 n.8f.12ff.

40. See Lennerz, 319-336; B. Durst, *De characteribus sacramentalibus:* XenThom 2 (1925) 541-581; G. von Holtum, *Von sakramentalem Charakter:* ThGl 18 (1926) 687-692.

41. *Summa* p.4 q.8 m.8 a.1 § 2. St. Bonaventure has something similar, *In 4* d.6 p.1 a.un q.2.

weak"], of the clergy from the laity [which is had by the character of Orders, because there "a man as holy in order to minister in the temple is separated from the laity"].[42] St. Thomas teaches the same thing in III, q. 63, a. 3 ad 3; q. 72, a. 5 ad 1; he had already taught this before in *In 4* d.4 q.1 and a. 2; q. 2 ad 1.[43] According to this common teaching of theologians, the Decree for the Armenians defines the "spiritual" sacramental character as a sign distinguishing from others (D 1775).

62. b) The sacramental character is *an assimilating and configuring sign.* Having been hinted at by the Fathers, v.gr., by Cyril of Jerusalem (R 847) and by St. Ambrose (R 1282), the definition of the "Master" expressly affirmed it: "the created trinity is sealed with the likeness of the creating and re-creating Trinity." In the *Summa* of Hales this configuration is derived from the fact that the character disposes one for grace, which is a likeness of God.[44] St. Bonaventure explains this assimilation "through the imitation of one quality" in this way: "Such a sign configures one to Christ more properly; hence, since Christ had a threefold office, namely, of a servant in acting, of a fighter in suffering, of a redeemer in dying, there is a threefold sacrament according to which a man is configured to Christ in these three ways; therefore there are only three sacraments in which there is the imprinting of a character. For Baptism configures to Him dying and redeeming, hence man is buried with him in death; Confirmation configures to Him suffering and fighting, therefore the sign of the cross is made on the forehead; but Orders configures to Him ministering and acting.[45] St. Thomas explains configuration to the priesthood of Christ, and the sacramental character of this priesthood is a certain participation (III, q. 63, a. 3 and 5). But this participation is had through the character, because men are sealed with this character inasmuch as they are designated to give true worship to God (III, q. 63, a. 1) and for that they receive an instrumental spiritual power (III, q. 63, a. 2).[46]

63. c) The sacramental character is a sign of *grace.* A certain relation between the character and grace is taught by theologians from the beginning. Gulielmus Parisiensis explains it from the fact that the character is a sign at whose presence God confers grace, almost like a royal administrator who gives gifts from the king to someone who shows him a document with the king's signature.[47] For Gulielmus Altissiodorensis the character is the final preparation for grace.[48] Alexander of Hales holds that the character

42. *In 4* d.6 p.1 a.un q.4. A similar view is found in Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.4 q.8 m.8 a.1 § 7.
43. Hugo A St. Caro had distinguished "*the character of discretion,*" which is given in Baptism, and then is strengthened in Confirmation, by which Christians are distinguished from non-Christians, and "*a character of excellence,*" which is given in Orders to the ministers of the Church, who should excel others" (in Brommer, 67 note 2).
44. *Summa* p.4 q.8 m.8 a.1.
45. *In 4* d.24 p.2 a.1 q.2 ad 2.
46. Pius XI supposes this doctrine in his Encyclical "*Casti Connubii*" (D 2238), when he speaks about the Christian life in matrimony in virtue of the sacramental grace.
47. *De sacramento baptismi* 3: *Opera* (ed. Paris, 1624, I 422).
48. In Bommer, 60 note 2; Hugo A St. Caro says something similar.

disposes one for the reception of grace and is a sign of it.[49] This is also the opinion of St. Thomas; however, since in his *Commentarius ad Sententias* he had said expressly that the character is a disposing cause of grace (*In 4* d.1 n.1 ad 4 and ad 5), in the *Summa* he holds that the character disposes immediately and directly for divine worship, and hence remotely and indirectly for grace, because those things that are suitable for divine worship are not accomplished except by those who have grace (III, q. 63, a. 4 ad 1). With these last words he seems to be talking about only a moral and remote disposition. Moreover, this question is surely connected with the question about the intimate nature of the causality of grace in the sacraments.

64. d) The sacramental character is *the reality and the sacrament* (*res et sacramentum*).[50] Thus St. Thomas teaches in III, q. 63, a.3 ad 2: "The sacramental character is a thing as regards the external sacrament, and a sacrament in regard to the ultimate end, "that is, of the grace that it signifies. See III, q. 66, a. 1. This way of speaking, which at first was used for the Eucharist,[51] already in the twelfth century was extended to all the sacraments. It is explained in this way: "a sacrament" is called that which is a sign or signifies; "the reality" is called that which is signified by the sacrament and depends on it; "the sacrament alone" is called that which signifies and is not signified; "the reality alone" that which is signified and in no way signifies; "the reality and the sacrament" that which is signified by the "sacrament alone" and depends on it and which further signifies and in some way causes "the reality alone." Thus therefore the "sacrament alone" is the sensible rite, the "reality alone" is the sacramental grace; the "reality and the sacrament" is said differently in the different sacraments. But in the sacraments that imprint a character, the character is called the "reality and the sacrament"; in the Eucharist the real presence of Christ is so designated; in matrimony it is the conjugal bond. In Penance and Extreme Unction this naming is more difficult, unless we recur to some previous endowment of grace, as those theologians say who defend the disposing causality of the sacraments. St. Thomas the junior recognized this endowment (see *In 4* d.1 q.1 a.4 sol.1); but he makes no further mention of it in the *Summa* (see however III, q. 84, a. 1 ad 3).[52]

65. Scholium 2. *On the physical nature of the character.*[53] a) The sacramental character is not just some relation of reason, through which by the institution or plan of God man is deputed for divine worship, as Durandus said[54]; nor is it just a moral entity, as Drouven held,[55] when he said that the canonists commonly have the same position.[56] But

49. *Summa* p.4 q.8 m.8 a.1 § 4.
50. See Lercher-Dander, 59f.
51. See *Summa Sententiarum* tr6,3: ML 176,340; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 4 d.8; Innocent III (D 783).
52. See B.T. Argenlieu, *La doctrine de saint Thomas d'Aquin sur le charactère sacramentel dans les Sentences:* RevThom 12 (1929) 289-302; E. Doronzo, 318-338; I. Bonetti, *"Res et sacramentum" nella concezione tomista dei sacramenti:* DivThom (Pi) 29 (1952) 228-237.
53. See Lennerz, 337-345.
54. *In 4* d.4 q.1.
55. *De re sacramentaria* lib.1 q.5 § 3.
56. See Van Espen, *Iuris ecclesiastici universi* p.3 tit.1 cp.1.

it is an *absolute physical entity* which is the foundation of the relations that the character implies. This entity is suitably said to be a quality. This is the common opinion of theologians.[57]

b) *On the subject of the character,* in which this quality is to be found, is a matter of dispute among theologians. Indeed, most probably it can be said that the character is not in the three powers of the soul,[58] not in the will,[59] not in the intellect,[60] but in the substance of the soul.[61] The reason for this is that the character directly and immediately does not perfect the soul in the order of operation, but in the order of its embellishment and being sealed.

c) The sacramental character is an *indelible quality* of life, as the Council of Trent defined (D 1609). That it will continue to exist in eternity is the common opinion of theologians. St. Thomas proves this (III, q. 63, a. 5) from the fact that the sacramental character is a certain participation in the priesthood of Christ. But since this priesthood is eternal, the sanctification also, which is had from participation in it, must be said to be eternal, if the subject remains eternally as the soul de facto does remain.[62]

57. See Suarez, *In 3* q.63 disp.11 s.2; but he seems to be excessive in his qualification of Durandus, in spite of whatever Lugo holds contrary to Vázquez, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.6 s.2 n.19-23. But in what species of quality the character must be placed is discussed at length by Suarez, *ibid.*, s.3 and by Lugo, *ibid.* s.3.
58. Thus Hales, *Summa* p.4 q.8 a.1 § 3; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.6 p.1 a.un q.3; St. Alberrt the Great, *In 4* d.6 a.4 col. Ad 8 q.9.
59. Thus Scotus, *In 4* d.6 q.11.
60. Thus S.Th. III, q. 63, a. 4 and many Thomists as cited in Salas, *In 1-2* tr.2 disp.8 a.3 n.70. See also Lercher-Dander, 46.
61. See Bellarmine, *De sacramentis in genere* 2,19; Suarez, *In 3* q.63 disp.11 s.4 n.9; Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.6 s.4 n.55.
62. On the character, see Pourrat, *La théologie sacramentaire* 185-231; F. Gillmann, *Der sakramentale Charakter bei den Glossatoren Rufinus, Ioannees Faventinus, Sikard von Cremona, Huguccio und in der Glossen ordinaria des Dekretes:* Kath 90 (1910, I) 300-313; M. Jugie, *La doctrine du charactère sacramentel dans l'Eglise greco-russe:* EchOr 31 (1928) 17-53; B.T. D'Argenlieu, *La doctrine d'Albert le Grand sur le caractère sacramentel:* RevThom 11 (1928) 295-311, 479-496; *Note sur deux définitions médiévales du charactère sacramentel:* RevThom 11 (1928) 271-275.

ARTICLE III

ON THE MANNER OF SACRAMENTAL EFFICACY

66. We said that all the sacraments confer grace and some of them a sacramental character. But the manner in which they depend on the sacraments for their existence is very special. For the sacraments confer them by the performance of the rite itself (*ex opere operato*). This is what we will now explain.

Thesis 7. The sacraments of the New Law confer grace by the performance of the rite itself on those who do not place an obstacle in the way.

S.Th. III, q. 62, a. 3-6; Lennerz, 354-395; Lercher-Dander, 48-54; Puig, 103-123.

67. *An obstacle* is said to be an impediment, which is opposed to the infusion of grace for an adult receiving a sacrament. In the sacraments of the living the obstacle is a conscience in the state of mortal sin; in the sacraments of the dead it is a defect of the internal penance.

Grace, that is, sanctifying grace. Note that the same thing, which we say about grace, also applies to the character, but for the latter there can never be an obstacle. Therefore a valid sacrament, if it produces its effect, always produces the character.

By the performance of the rite itself, that is, not in virtue of the subjective disposition (*ex opere operantis*), but in virtue of the sacrament itself. For grace is given sometimes because a man performs some act which merited it, or by which he asked for it; then that act is considered subjectively, according as it was performed by that person, and it is called *the work of the agent* (*opus operantis*). But sometimes grace is given because such a work was performed, prescinding from the subjective merits of the persons who had some influence on its performance; then that work is considered objectively and it is called *the work performed* (*opus operatum*). Therefore we are saying that a sacrament confers grace because such a work acts objectively, and independently of the merits of the recipient and the minister. However, we do not deny that some dispositions are required in the one receiving the sacrament.[1] But these dispositions, as meritorious acts, do not influence the conferring of this grace that we are now considering.

68. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* sess.7 cn.6 (D 1606)

1. See Mélanchton, *Apologia Confessionis Augustanae,* a.13.

and 8 (D 1608). In canon 6 it is defined that the sacraments confer grace on those who do not place an obstacle in the way, having slightly changed the formula of the Decree for the Armenians (D 1310) so that Luther's error might be condemned more clearly (D 1451).

In canon 8 it is defined that the sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato*. The history and meaning of the canon can be determined as follows. It has its source in the seventh error of the prior list proposed to the theologians: "by the sacraments grace is given only to those who believe that their sins have been forgiven,"[2] and from error 5: "the sacraments never give grace or the forgiveness of sins, but only the faith of the sacrament."[3] On the seventh error some Fathers thought that "it should not be condemned without some declaration, since the one who wants to receive the sacraments must believe that through them his sins are forgiven, especially in Baptism and Penance."[4] For the fifth error the Fathers proposed this form: "through the sacraments grace or the forgiveness of sins has never been given, but only by the faith of the sacrament."[5] The first redaction of the canon was: "If anyone says that through the works of the sacraments grace is in no way conferred, but that faith alone in the divine promise is sufficient to obtain grace, let him be anathema."[6] The words "through the works of the sacraments" were Luther's words and so it was pleasing to some of the Fathers of the Council. But they were displeasing to many others, and so they proposed various formulas: v.gr., "by the sacraments themselves," "by the sacraments themselves as instruments," "by the sacraments *ex opere operato*," "through the use of the sacraments," "by the work performed of the sacraments," "in virtue of and by the power of the sacraments"[7]; with all of these formulas the Fathers wanted to affirm more forcefully that the conferring of grace must be attributed to the sacramental rite itself. Hence in the definitive redaction of the canon this formula was adopted: "through the sacraments by the performance of the rite itself (*ex opere operato*)."

Because the sacraments confer grace of themselves, not because of the merits of the minister or the recipient, they are said in canon 6 "to contain" grace," a formula taken directly from the Decree for the Armenians (D 1310).

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

2. CTr 5,936.
3. CTr 5,836.
4. CTr 5,971.
5. CTr 5,971.
6. CTr 5,984.
7. CTr 5,991.

69. Proof from Holy Scripture. Where in Scripture there is mention of the sacraments, the conferring of grace is not attributed to the acts of the subject or of the minister, but to the rite itself or to Christ operating through the sacramental rite. Thus, John 3:5: *unless one is born of water and the Holy Spirit;* Tit. 3:5: *he saved us by the water of regeneration;* Eph. 5:26: *having cleansed her by the washing of water with the word;* Acts 2:38: *be baptized every one of you. for the forgiveness of your sins;* see 1 Pet. 3:20f. Acts 8:17: *Then they laid their hands on them that they might receive the Holy Spirit. Now when Simon saw that the Spirit was given through the laying on of the apostles' hands.;* John 6:55f.: *he who eats my flesh and drinks by blood has eternal life.; for my flesh is food indeed and my blood is drink indeed.* 1 Tim. 1:6: *rekindle the gift of God that is within you through the laying on of my hands.* On the other hand, the proper disposition of the adult subject is supposed in Scripture, but the conferring of grace is never attributed to it: see Acts 2:38; 8:36f.

70. Proof from tradition. a) The holy Fathers attribute the conferring of grace to the sacrament, when the causal elements have been used. Thus Theophylus of Antioch (R 181), Novatian (R 607), St. Chrysostom (R 1179), St. Augustine (R 1834).

b) They also say that there is a certain sanctifying power in the sacraments from the Holy Spirit. Thus Tertullian (R 303), Aphraates (R 683), St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 842), St. Basil (R 947), St. Ambrose (R 1282), St. Augustine (R 1423).

c) Hence they compare the water of Baptism with the womb of the Virgin from the power given to it by the Holy Spirit. Thus St. Ambrose,[8] St. Leo the Great.[9]

They explain the whole matter with various comparisons, which connect the conferring of grace with the sacramental rite itself. Thus St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 835), St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2110).

e) Later theologians develop this doctrine further, using the formula *ex opere operato* (by the performance of the rite itself). The first delineation of this formula is found in Peter of Poitiers (+ 1205) who wrote this: "that [the exterior washing] is a certain work, either of the baptizer or of the one baptized. Therefore if it is of the baptizer and is from charity, then the baptizer merits that baptism. Similarly he merits baptizing, as the baptizing is said to be the action of the one who baptizes, which is a work different from the baptism, because it is a *performing work* (*opus operans*), but

8. *De mysteriis* 9,59: ML 16,409f.
9. *Sermo in nativitatem Domini* 4,3: ML 54,206; *Sermo in nativitatem Domini* 5,5: ML 54,211.

baptism is a *performed work* (*opus operatum*), so to speak."[10] At that time Innocent III uses the same formula when speaking about the Eucharist: "although the *performing work* (*opus operans*) at times is unclean [by a sinful priest], nevertheless the performed work (*opus operatum*) is always clean."[11] The same way of speaking is used by Praepositinus, Stephen Langton, Gulielmus Altissiodorensis, Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, Scotus, Durandus,[12] especially when they are treating the distinction between the sacraments of the Old and the New Law.

The formula itself "*ex opere operato*," more or less as it is now used, is found in St. Albert the Great: "a good life *ex opere operante* (by the work of the performer) effects salvation, but the sacrament does it *ex opere operato* (by the performance of the rite itself)."[13] Gabriel Biel also uses it and according to him the sacraments of the Old Law did not confer grace in virtue of the sacrament, or *ex opere operato,"* but only *ex opere operante* (by the work of the performer), or by way of merit because of the devotion of the recipient, since they produced results from faith and charity.[14]

From all of this the meaning of this formula in pre-Tridentine theology becomes quite clear. The work performed is understood in the passive sense for the work which is done (the sacramental sign itself); the performing work is understood in the active sense for the good and meritorious act of the one who performs the work (the action of performing or receiving the sacrament).[15]

71. Proof from the praxis of the Church. Infants are baptized so that they are thought to receive grace in Baptism. But this conferring of grace cannot be attributed to the work of the performer. Therefore sacramental grace is conferred by the performance of the rite itself (*ex opere operato*).

The major. This is certain from the many declarations of the Church: *The Council of Carthage* cn.2 (D 223), Innocent III (D 780), *The Profession of Faith for the Waldensians* (D 793-794), *The Council of Vienne* (D 903),

10. *Sententiae* 5,6: ML 211,1235. Peter of Poitiers seems here to be making a new application to a formula that already existed in theology. For elsewhere (*Sententiae* 1,16: ML 211,863) he writes: "Works performed, *as is usually said*, not performing works," which he applies to the passion of Christ, which in itself is a performed work, although as something done by the Jews it is their performing work.
11. *De sacro altaris mysterio* 3,6: ML 217,844.
12. The text of Praepositinus can be found in F. Gillmann, *Zur Sakramentenlehre des Wilh. von Auxerre* (Würzburg 1918) 10; the text of Stephen Langton in the same author, *Taufe im Namen Iesu oder im Namen Christi?* (Mainz 1913) 17 note 4; the text of Gulielmus Altissiodorensis in Strake, *Die Sakramentenlehre des Wilh. von Auxerre* (Paderborn 1917) 15 note 3; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.4 q.3 m.3 a.1; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.1 p.1 a.un q.5; S.Th., *In 4* d.1 q.1 a.5 q.1 sol.; Scotus, *In 4* d.1 q.5; Durandus, *In 4* d.1 q.5. St. Thomas does not mention this formula in the *Summa.*
13. *In 4* d.1 a.5; see also *ibid.*, a.2 ad 11.
14. *In 4* d.1 q.3.
15. See A. Michel, *Opus operans, opus operantis:* DTC 11,1084-1087.

The Council of Florence (D 1348-1349), *The Council of Trent* (D 1514f.).

The minor. The conferring of grace cannot be attributed to the performing work of the one being baptized, who in this case is not capable of performing a human act; and it is not attributed to the one doing the baptizing, in whom a morally good act is not required for validity.

72. Objections. 1. Holy Scripture attributes justification *to faith:* Acts. 15:9; Rom. 3:22-30; 4; 5:1; 9:30; 1 Cor. 15:1f.; Gal. 2:16; 3:8.11-24; Phil. 3:9; Heb. 10:38). Therefore it is attributed to the work of the performer.

I distinguish the antecedent. Holy Scripture attributes justification to faith alone, *denied;* it attributes justification to faith together with the sacramental rite, *I subdistinguish:* so that it attributes it in the same way to both, *denied;* so that it attributes it in a different way, *conceded.*

Holy Scripture attributes justification also to the sacramental sign, as we saw in the proof of the thesis; and it attributes justification to the sacramental sign in such a way that grace is conferred because of it. But when it speaks about justification from faith, it attributes justification to that same faith not as effecting grace but as disposing the subject for it; but as disposing not itself alone, but together with other acts, although it is designated as the foundation and root of justification.[16]

2. In Holy Scripture justification is attributed to faith alone (Rom. 3:28; Eph. 2:8f.; see John 3:15; 1 John 5:1; Acts 10:43; 13:39). Therefore grace is not had *ex opere operato.*

I distinguish the antecedent. In Scripture justification is attributed to faith alone excluding the works of the Old Law and the works which merit justification condignly, *conceded;* it is attributed to faith alone, excluding the sacraments, *denied,* as in the thesis it has been proved in a positive way.

3. But in Scripture justification is attributed to faith *in the same way* as it is to a sacrament. For, Scripture uses the same causal phrases in both cases: compare John 3:5 and Rom. 5:1; Tit. 3:5 and Rom. 3:22; Eph. 5:26 and Acts 6:9.

I distinguish the assertion. In Scripture justification is attributed to faith and the sacrament in the same way, that is, as true causes, *conceded;* that is, as causes in the same type of causality, *denied.* For, faith is a cause of justification inasmuch as it disposes the subject to believe. But this dispositive causality is not such that it demands the infusion of grace; for, the faith of a sinner does not condignly merit justification. Therefore such a disposition is one that removes impediments and together with other preparatory acts merits congruously to obtain grace through the sacrament.

73. 4. Since *Scripture* speaks about faith and the sacraments together, it attributes justification to faith, not to the sacraments. Therefore in the sacraments grace is not given *ex opere operato.*

The antecedent. a) In Mark 16:16 it says: *he who believes and is baptized will be*

16. See STh S 3^2, III 151-165.

saved; but he who does not believe will be condemned. Hence: the lack of faith is a sufficient reason for damnation. Therefore faith is the sufficient cause of salvation. Therefore when faith and baptism are mentioned, justification is attributed to faith alone. b) In Eph. 5:26 it says: *having cleansed her by the washing of water in the word of life.* Hence: the cleansing is attributed to the word of life. But the word of life is the preached word to which faith corresponds. Therefore the cleansing is attributed to faith. c) In 1 Pet. 3:21 it says: *Baptism now saves you. as an appeal to God for a clear conscience, through the resurrection of Jesus Christ.* Hence: salvation is attributed to faith in the resurrection of Christ. Therefore not to Baptism *ex opere operato*.

I deny the antecedent and I respond to each of the proofs.

a) *I concede the antecedent and deny the first consequent* which does not follow from it. For, where two things are necessary to obtain some effect, even if one is required as the cause and the other as the necessary condition, from the lack of either of them (even the one that is only a condition) it follows that there will be no effect. But from the positing of either one of them the positing of the effect does not follow, since the element that is truly the cause must be present.

b) *I bypass the major and deny the minor.* "The word of life" more probably is the form of Baptism. But if someone claims that it should be understood to be the preached word, still in the text nothing is said about the subjective faith of the recipient, but about objective faith.

c) *I distinguish the antecedent.* Salvation is attributed to subjective faith in the resurrection of Christ, *denied;* it is attributed to the resurrection itself, *I subdistinguish:* inasmuch as it gives sanctifying power to Baptism, *conceded;* to resurrection considered in itself, *denied.*

74. 5. *St. Augustine* attributes sanctifying power to subjective faith, not to Baptism *ex opere operato*. For, he explains that water from the word has sanctifying power; but it is from the word "not because it is said but because it is believed" (R 1834).

I deny the assertion and I distinguish the proof. That the word has efficacy "because it is believed" refers to the subjective faith either of the one baptizing or of the one being baptized, *denied:* it refers to the objective faith which the word signifies (which therefore is not efficacious from the material sound alone), *conceded.* That there he is not talking about the subjective faith of the one being baptized is clear from the fact that, in the same context, St. Augustine extends this doctrine to children who are not yet capable of believing. However, that he is not treating the subjective faith of the one baptizing is clear from the constant teaching of St. Augustine against the Donatists concerning the minister of the sacraments. See S.Th. III, q. 60, a. 7 ad 1.[17]

6. To say that material things can confer grace *ex opere operato* is to attribute some *magical power* to them. Therefore the sacraments do not confer grace *ex opere operato*.[18]

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17. But E. Hocedez thinks otherwise, *La conception augustiennne du sacrement dans la Tractatus 80 in Ioannem:* RechScRel 9 (1919) 1-29.
18. See Calvin, *Antidotum Conc. Tridentini* ad sess.7 cn.5.

I deny the antecedent. Magic is attributing to things an effect that is not proportioned to them independently of the will of God, who in this way is forced to do what man wills.[19] There is nothing like this in the sacraments.

7. If the sacraments are efficacious *ex opere operato*, then God is bound by the sacraments to confer grace. But this cannot be said. Therefore the sacraments are not efficacious *ex opere operato*.

I distinguish the major. By the sacraments God is bound to confer grace with a necessity following upon His free decree, *conceded;* with a necessity antecedent to that decree, *denied. I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

8. A sacrament essentially is a *sign*. But a sign causes thought by stirring it up. Therefore a sacrament causes grace by stirring up thought and that is faith.

I distinguish the major. A sacrament essentially is a speculative sign, *denied;* it is a practical sign, *conceded. I also distinguish the minor.* A speculative sign causes by stirring up thought, *conceded;* a practical sign, *denied.*

75. Scholium 1. *On the measure of sacramental grace.*[20] Since grace in the sacraments is given *ex opere operato*, it could seem that the quantity of sacramental grace given is the same always and for all, for it is the same sacrament. However, it is a common and certain opinion that more or less sacramental grace is given according to the different dispositions of the subjects receiving the sacrament. This is so not because the disposition of itself merits the grace,[21] but from the free determination of God who wishes to give sacramental grace *ex opere operato* according to this law of the disposition of the subject. Thus the Council of Trent in sess.6 ch.7 (D 1529) teaches that men receive sacramental grace "according to the measure that the Holy Spirit apportions to each one individually as he wills, and according to each one's personal disposition and cooperation." See S.Th. III, q. 69, a. 8. But these proportions of the divine plan or law are aptly explained: "First, because it pertains to the sweet providence of God and his wise and most just dispensation that more grace is conferred on one who is better disposed. Second, this was necessary so that men would be motivated to receive the sacraments with more devotion and reverence, at least because of the hope a greater reward. Third, because natural causes operate better with a better disposed pace; therefore it was fitting that gratuitous causes (so to speak) observe the same proportion."[22]

76. Scholium 2. *On a valid sacrament and a formless sacrament.* a) A sacrament is said to be valid when it has been administered and received according to all the essential elements, that is, with the proper matter, form, intention, minister and subject. If in the reception of the sacrament no obstacle has been placed by the recipient, that sacrament

19. See F. Bolvier, *Magie et Magisme:* DAFC 3,61-74.
20. See Lennerz, 396ff; Lercher-Dander, 55.
21. If the subject so disposed is justified, without doubt he also merits grace condignly; but he does not have this formally from the fact that by those acts he disposes himself to receive grace in the sacrament, but for another reason, namely, because those acts are meritorious. Hence in that case there is a twofold increase of grace: one is *ex opere operato* because of the sacrament and the other is *ex opere operantis* because of the meritorious value of the act. But only the first of those graces is sacramental.
22. See Suarez, *In 3* q.62 disp.7 s.5 n.5; Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.9 s.2.

not only is valid, but also it confers grace *ex opere operato*; therefore it is fruitful. But if some obstacle is placed, the sacrament is unfruitful and formless, that is, it is not informed with charity and grace. It is generally held that this last case is possible, although the matter is not clear concerning the sacrament of Penance.

b) Therefore given such a case, there is a question about whether one who receives a valid but formless sacrament always remains without the grace to which he placed the obstacle, or perhaps with the removal of the obstacle (or with the lapse of this supposition, that is, the lack of a proper disposition), sacramental grace is conferred on him in virtue of the sacrament previously received. Generally theologians admit this revival of the sacrament, although not in the same way for all the sacraments. It is certain with regard to Baptism; and the same holds for Confirmation and Orders. It seems to be more probable also for Extreme Unction and Matrimony. For Penance the question is very doubtful. Regarding the Eucharist it is generally denied.

c) Having admitted the fact of revival, at least for some of the sacraments, a completely different question is about how it is to be explained; something will be said about this in n. 89. This question depends on the different opinions of theologians about the intimate nature of the causality of the sacraments.[23]

23. See S.Th. III, q. 69, a. 10; Suarez, *In 3* q.62 disp.8 s.3; q. 69 disp.28 s.6; Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.9 s.3 and 6; A. Haynal, *De reviviscentia sacramentorum fictione recedente:* Ang 4 (1927) 51-80, 203-223, 382-405. For the historical evolution, see Von Schatler, *Die Lehre von der Wirksamkeit der Sakramente ex opere operato in ihrer Entwicklung innerhalb der Scholastik und ihrer Bedeutung für die christliche Heilslehre* (Munich 1860); Pourrat, 84-184.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE INTIMATE NATURE OF THE CAUSALITY OF THE SACRAMENTS

77. After we have seen that grace is conferred by all the sacraments, also a character by some of them, and the manner of this conferring is from the sacraments themselves and not from the meritorious value of the action, or, what come to the same idea, that it comes *ex opere operato*, it is now necessary to inquire more carefully into the nature of this conferring. We will see that the sacraments really are causes in the strict sense, but instrumental causes. Hence, after having taken this new step, we will seek the answer to what order of causing the sacraments should be placed in.

Thesis 8. The sacraments of the New Law are causes in the strict sense, but instrumental causes.

S.Th. III, q. 62, a. 1,3f.; Lennerz, 424-446; Lercher-Dander, 48-52f.

78. Definition of terms. *A cause* is a principle per se influencing the being in something,[1] or the principle determining by its influx the existence of another. In the thesis we are considering the efficient cause, which is defined: a principle influencing by its action the being in another,[2] or by its action determining the existence of another.

Cause in the strict sense is said in opposition to a *condition*, which is a certain pre-requisite of the action, but it has no influence on the effect and no power of producing it. A necessary condition is said to be one that is absolutely required so that, without it, the effect is not produced. But that the effect is produced is from the cause; but that the effect is not produced can be from the cause or from the condition.

Cause in the strict is also opposed to an *occasion,* which is something that of itself is not required in order for the cause to produce its effect (hence it differs from a condition), but it makes its causality easier.

Instrumental causes are said in opposition to principal causes. A *principal* cause is one that operates in virtue of its own form, to which it assimilates the effect. An *instrumental* cause is one that operates in virtue

1. See Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae* disp.12 s.2 n.4. In this definition the words "per se influencing" distinguish the cause from other things, which in some way concur in the effect; "influencing" here is taken for "conferring" or "communicating."
2. Suarez (*Disputationes Metaphysicae* disp.17 a.1) defines efficient cause as: "a principle per se extrinsic, from which primarily comes the action or the making of some thing."

of the principal cause and it assimilates the effect to that cause, not to itself. See S.Th. III, q. 62, a. 1.

Therefore, *we affirm* that the sacraments are not just occasions at whose presence God produces grace; and that they are not just conditions without which God does not produce grace; but that the sacraments themselves *in a causal way influence* the production of grace; but this is not with principal causality (which must be attributed to God), but with *instrumental causality*, that is, according as they are moved by God and elevated so that they concur in producing the effect.

79. Adversaries. *In the twelfth century* among many theologians there was a common opinion that the sacraments are "vases of grace"; therefore they really did not cause grace, but the grace, which was contained in them, conferred salvation. Thus Hugo of St. Victor, Praepositanus, Gulielmus Altissiodorensis. Afterwards also Henricus Gandavensis.[3]

In the thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth centuries other theologians seem to have held that the sacraments are causes of grace because of the assistance of the divine power infallibly producing it when the sacrament is conferred; for, God had bound himself to give grace to every person receiving a sacrament. Hence they called a sacrament a cause "with the extended name of a cause," or also "a necessary cause" (*sine qua non*). These words seem to say nothing else but that the sacraments are conditions, but not truly causes. However, this matter is not certain. For, these authors can be so understood that they are speaking about true moral causality, inasmuch as the performance of the sacrament is the true reason because of which God alone produces the grace. In this sense they are denying that the sacraments are physical causes and that this notion should be "extended," that is, to moral causes. Indeed, it is more probable that this is affirmed by the authors of the Franciscan school. Thus, Gulielmus Parisiensis, St. Bonaventure, Richard Fishacre, Hugo Argentoratensis, Scotus, Petrus de

3. Hugo of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* lib.1 p.9 cp.2: ML 176,317. Praepositinus, in M. Gierens, *De causalitate sacramentorum. textus scholasticorum principaliorum* (Rome 1935) 24; Gulielmus Altissiodorensis, in Gierens, 27ff.; Henricus Gandavensis, *Quodlibitum* 4 q.37. But Henricus Gandavensis gradually changes this theory, because he understands "vases of grace inasmuch as they contain him, who is the fountain and source, from which flows the grace that is in them." From the formulas used by the authors of this opinion, in later theology the formula "sacraments contain grace" remained; later it was used by Florence (D 1310) and from there it was passed on to Trent (D 1606). On these authors, see H. Weisweiler, *Die Wirksamkeit der Sakramente nach Hugo von St. Viktor* (Freiburg 1932); A. Van Hove, *Doctrina Gulielmi Altissiodorensis de causalitate sacramentorum:* DivThom (Pi) 33 (1930) 305-342; B. Xiberta, *Una teoria dimenticata sulla causalità dei sacramenti:* DivThom 42 (1939) 513-528; L. di Fonzo, *Appunti in torno ad "una teoria dimenticata" sulla causalità dei sacramenti di Enrico di Gand:* DivThom (Pi) 43 (1940) 223-256.

Alliaco, Durandus and the *Nominalists.*[4]

80. Doctrine of the Church. a) The ordinary formula in the Church was that the sacraments *confer* grace (D 780, 1310, 1515, 1606, 1608, 1678, 1717, 1801, 1864, 2536), or that they *give* grace (D 1014, 1607). These words are more general and can also be understood to be about a necessary condition.

b) *In the Council of Trent* sess.6 ch.7 (1528-1529) Baptism is called "the instrumental cause" of grace; and this is said in a context which seems to suppose the scholastic explanation of causes. Must it be said that the Tridentine doctrine should be understood to be about causality in the strict sense? Actually, the Council, while speaking about the causality of the sacraments, uses the terms which were used by all the theologians of the time, even by those who perhaps did not admit that the sacraments are causes in the strict sense. But they not only used the word "cause," but also the phrase "instrumental cause" and "necessary cause." Thus, v.gr., Scotus: "Briefly I say that every disposition requiring its form, which is not the reason for receiving it, can be said to be in a certain sense the active cause or the instrumental cause with respect to the form; but the sacrament itself, or the reception of the sacrament, is such a disposition; therefore. it can be said to be in a certain sense the active or *instrumental cause* with respect to grace."[5] Durandus: "the sacraments "are *the cause without which* grace is not conferred, because it is a matter of divine ordination that the one receiving a sacrament also receives the grace, unless he places an obstacle, and he receives the grace not from the sacrament but from God."[6] The way of speaking of many theologians of the time appears in these texts; according to this a rather broad notion of a cause is applied to the sacraments. Hence the words of the Council should be understood in such a way that the doctrine of these authors is saved. But because we think

4. Gulielmus Parisiensis, *De sacramento baptismi* 1f.; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.1 p.1 a.un q.4, where however he remains uncertain as *In 3* d.40 dub.3; but in *Breviloquio* p.6 cp.1 he speaks more confidently (see W. Lampen, *De causalitate sacramentorum iuxta scholam franciscanum* {Rome 1935] 34f.); Richard Fishacre, *In 4* d.1 see H.D. Simonin and G. Meersermann, *De sacramentorum efficientia apud theologos Ordinis 1229-1276* [Rome 1936] 16ff); Hugo Argentoratensis, *Compendium theologiae* 6,4 (see Simonin-Meerssermann, 53); Scotus, *In 4* d.1 q.2 n.5 q.5; Petrus de Alliaco, *In 4* d.1 q.1 a.1 concl.3; Durandus, *In 4* d.1 q.14 n.29; G. Occam, *In 4* d.1 q.1 2.º; G. Biel, *In 4* d.1 q.1 a.2 concl.7. Likewise, Gulielmus Guarra, *In 4* d.1 (see Lampen, 37-45) and Richard A Mediavilla, *In 4* d.1 a.4 q.2 (see Lampen, 33-36). On the true sense of these authors, see A. O'Neill, *La causalité sacramentelle d'après le Docteur Subtil:* EtFranc 30 (1913) 141ff.; R.M. Hueber, *The Doctrine of Ven. John Duns Scotus concerning the Causality of the Sacaments:* FrancStud 4 (1927) 9-38; P. Remy, *La causalité des sacrements d'après saint Bonaventure:* EtFranc 42 (1930) 324-339; W. Lampen, *De causalitate sacramentorum iuxta S. Bonaventuram:* Ant 7 (1932) 77-86; Fr.M. Henquinet, *De causalitate sacramentorum iuxta codicem autographum S. Bonaventurae:* Ant 8 (1933) 377-424.

5. *In 4* d.1 q.5.

6. *In 4* d.1 q.14.

that these theologians really did not deny causality in the strict sense in the sacraments, it seems to us more probable that the Council is speaking about causality in the strict sense, whether (according to our current terminology) it is physical, or moral or intentional. But the Council certainly avoided treating this last question.

c) Similar things should be said about the words "effect" (D 1314-1326, 1673-1675, 1696), "efficacy" (D 1673-175), "strength" (D 1639-1641), "power" (D 1629) of the sacraments.[7]

Theological note. *Common and certain;* for the mind of Trent is not certain on this point.

81. Proof from Holy Scripture. The conferring of grace in the sacraments is expressed by the words "through" (Tit. 3:5; 1 Pet. 3:20f.; Acts 9:17; 1 Tim. 4:14; 2 Tim. 1:6), "of" (John 3:5f.) and the instrumental dative (Eph. 5:26). But this way of speaking, if it is taken in the whole complex, signifies true causality. Therefore the sacraments are true causes.

We understand the *minor* to refer to a true causality, whether it is physical or whether it is moral. And we think it is more probable in this sense. For that way of speaking per se suggests a true causality, especially if it is used not just once in passing, but often and in different ways. But if in contrast the case is opposed to faith, to which justification is also attributed, we fully concede it; for, faith exercises a true causality in justification, which it merits of course not condignly but certainly congruously.

82. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers in designating the causality of the sacraments use expressions similar to those of Holy Scripture. Thus, v.gr.: through water and washing (St. Theophilus of Antioch: R 181), with water (Novatian: R 607). They compare the action of baptismal water with the action of a mother giving birth: "at the same moment you are both dead and born, and that salutary wave became for you both a tomb and a mother" (St. Cyril of Jerusalem[8]). They say that the waters have the power of sanctifying after they have been sanctified by the Holy Spirit (Tertullian: R 303); that water produces sanctified souls (St. Chrysostom[9]); that oil works excellently after its sanctification (St. Gregory of Nyssa: R 1062); almost like the womb of the Virgin from the presence of the Holy Spirit (St.

7. See Pourrat, 160-166; D. Iturrioz, *La definición del Concilio de Trento sobre la causalidad de los sacramentos* (Madrid 1951).
8. *Catecheses mystagogicae* 2,4: MG 33,1079.
9. *In Io* hom.26,1: MG 59,153.

Ambrose,[10] St. Leo the Great[11]); because in this way the power of the water is transformed like water exposed to fire (St. Cyril of Alexandria: R 2110); in this sense it must be understood that the Holy Spirit is present and works in the water (Aphraates: R 683; St. Basil: R 947; St. Ambrose: R 1282, 1329; St. Augustine: R 1423).

All of these statements of the Fathers are very convincing that the sacramental rite is a cause in the strict sense.[12]

83. Proof from the consensus of theologians. a) After the Council of Trent almost all theologians defend the sacraments as *causes of grace in the strict sense.* They try to explain this according to their systems and theories as a certain truth that must be held, because they think it is connected with revelation. But such a consensus makes this doctrine certain. Therefore the sacraments are causes in the strict sense. But it is clear from the same consensus that the sacraments are proved to be instrumental causes; for the theologians speak in this way about the true causality of the sacraments.

The major. Let us consider some statements of the theologians. Suarez[13]: "Many serious theologians deny that the sacraments produce grace by a true and physical efficacy. But since the faith teaches that the sacraments are causes and instruments of grace, although these authors agree on the stated negative proposition, in explaining this affirmation, which they cannot deny, they disagree very much among themselves." Lennerz: "Although former theologians for the most part did not attribute true causality to the sacraments, after the sixteenth century the opinion affirming true causality prevailed, and today it seems possible to say that it is common."[14] Minges: "All agree that the sacraments are instrumental efficient causes of grace."[15] Puig: "After the Council of Trent the sacraments of the New Law are no longer said not to be causes in the strict sense."[16] Abárzuza: "That the sacraments of the New Law are instrumental causes of grace is an absolutely certain doctrine, which is supported by all theologians."[17]

b) However, they are *instrumental causes:* S.Th. III, q. 62, a. 1.

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10. *De Mysteriis* 9,59: ML 16,409f.
11. *Sermo in nativitatem Domini* 4,3; 5,5: ML 54,206.211.
12. See Lennerz, 445, who however seems to weaken too much the words of the Fathers.
13. *In 3* q.62 disp.9 s.2 n.7
14. Lennerz, 446. Elsewhere the same author writes: "among post-Tridentine theologians, if not common, certainly the opinion prevails that the sacraments are not conditions only, but truly causes with respect to grace" (Lennerz, 421); but he omits the names of authors who disagree.
15. *Compendium theologiae dogmaticae* 232.
16. Puig, 124.
17. *Manuale theologiae dogmticae* 3,77.

Thesis 9. The sacraments of the New Law are immediate causes of grace.

Lennerz, 424-446; Lercher-Dander, 52ff.

84. Connection. From what has been said we know that the sacraments truly cause grace. Now moving on, we will establish that the sacraments cause grace in such a way that formally they produce nothing previous to grace itself.

Definition of terms. *Immediate causes of grace.* That is, the sacraments, inasmuch as they are said to be the causes of grace, produce no other effect that is previous to the grace itself. Hence at this point it is not said that the sacramental action terminates physically in grace itself; but it is only said that no other *effect* is interposed, although perhaps another *cause* is interposed between the sacrament and the grace.

85. Adversaries. From the thirteenth century on there were many theologians who argued that the efficient action of the sacraments terminates immediately in the character or some adornment of the soul which in this way was disposed for the infusion of grace. This opinion, which apparently was first proposed by Alexander of Hales,[1] was then admitted by Peter of Tarantasia,[2] St. Albert the Great[3] and St. Thomas[4]; and after him commonly

1. *Summa* p.4 q.5 m.3 a.5.
2. *In 4* d.1 a.6
3. *In 4* d.1 B a.6 q.2 ad 1.
4. Certainly in his *Commentarius ad Sententias* 4 d.1 a.4. It is disputed whether he changed his opinion later. And really in the questions in *De Ver.* q.27 a.4 and a. 7 (see also *De Pot.* q.3 a.4 ad 8) the same idea seems to be present. But in the *Summa* III, q. 62, as in Quodl. 12 q.9 a.14 nothing is said about the causality of the sacraments as dispositive for grace. Therefore at least a change in terminology should be admitted. Indeed, more probably also in the doctrine itself. For, it is hard to understand how the holy Doctor would say nothing about dispositive causality when he is speaking about the causality of the sacraments, since he knew well that this opinion was held in the schools, in fact that it was advanced by himself, unless he thought that the causality of the sacraments was sufficiently explained by instrumental physical causality, which is terminated at grace itself. But it seems much less to be admitted that St. Thomas in the *Summa* held some kind of moral or juridical causality of the sacraments, although this has also been claimed. For the whole history of this question, which Cajetan seems to have raised for the first time, see E. Neveu, *De causalitate sacramentorum iuxta D. Thomam et quendam recentem theologum:* DivThom (Pi) 5 (1904) 9-36; L. Billot, *In articulum B. Neveu circa causalitatem sacramentorum animadversiones:* DivThom (Pi) 5 (1904) 179-184; E. Neveu, *De causalitate sacramentorum. Responsum animadversionibus R.P. Billot, S.J.:* DivThom (Pi) 5 (1904) 297ff.; R.M. Ricciardelli, *De causalitate sacramentorum iuxta Thomam et R.P. Billot:* DivThom (Pi) 5 (1904) 525-542; A. Unterleidner, *Controverse thomiste: l'effet immédiat des sacrements:* RevAug 1908) 193f.; J. Stufler, *Bemerkungen zur Lehre des hl. Thomas über die virtus instrumentalis:* ZkathTh 42 (1918) 719-762; M. Tuyaerts, *Utrum S. Thomas causalitatem sacramentorum respectu gratiae mere dispositivam umquam docuerit:* Ang 8 (1931) 149-186; H. Bouessé, *La causalité efficiente instrumentale de l'humanité du Christ et des sacrements chrétiens:* Rev Thom 17 (1934) 370-393; M. Gierens, *Zur Lehre des hl. Thomas über die Kausalität der Sakramenten:* Schol 9 (1934) 321-345; E. Gómez, *La causalidad de los sacramentos de la Ley Nueva, según Santo Tomás:* DivThom (Pi) 40 (1937) 56-68; E. Neveu, *La pensée de saint Thomas sur la causalité des sacrements de la Nouvelle Loi:* DivThom (Pi) 40 (1937) 266-269; F. Diekamp, *Katholische Dogmatik* 3,36-39; A. Michel, *Sacrements:* DTC 14,581-586; J. Roig Gironella, ¿Que opinión tuvo Santo Tomás sobre la causalidad de los sacramentos?: EstEcl 16 (1942) 351-374.

by pre-Tridentine thomist theologians.[5] This opinion is called *the theory of physical dispositive causality.*

In another sense, it has been proposed by P. Billot that the sacraments are the causes of grace only mediately. According to him the sacraments immediately cause a juridical title which precedes grace. This title, as such, is not a physical form, but something moral or juridical (although at times it may coincide with a physical entity such as a character); therefore it is an intentional form. Hence it happens by the ordination of the intellect by which the internal intention is made known exteriorly. The sacrament makes known the divine decree of sanctifying this man, and at the same time it efficaciously applies this decree, ordains this man efficaciously for grace and causes in him a juridical title that requires the infusion of grace from God. This is the causality of a practical sign. This opinion is embraced by Van Noort, Bellevue, De Smet, Richard, Van Hove, Lehmkuhl, Lennerz,[6] Abárzuza; and Lercher-Dander[7] are inclined in the same direction. This theory is called *the theory of intentional causality.*

86. Theological note. *More probable.*

Argument. a) *A sacrament does not produce immediately a physical disposition for grace.* Such a disposition is introduced uselessly. For, if the sacrament is able to produce a physical disposition for grace, by the same token it can immediately produce grace. Moreover, this disposition produced by the sacrament is gratuitously imagined: first of all, in the sacraments that do not confer a character; and then also in those that do imprint the character, for the character cannot be said to be either something that by its nature demands grace, or something that by its nature it demanded before grace.[8]

b) *A sacrament does not produce immediately a juridical title.*

First of all, because such a title is found nowhere in the sources of

5. Thus Hervaeus Natalis, *In 4* d.1 q.1 § 1; Peter de Palude, *In 4* d.1 q.1; Ferrariensis, *In Summa contra Gentes* 4,57; Capreolus, *Defensiones theologicae D. Thomas Aquinatis* 4 d.1-3 q.1 a.1. Recently this opinion was defended by C. Gonthier, *De la causalité des sacrements:* Et 58 (1893,1) 213-238, 471-498.
6. Lennerz, 432 does not explain the matter in exactly the same way, and the whole point is in affirming the juridical title, which is produced immediately by the sacraments. In his theory the causal connection between the sacrament and grace is saved much better; for between the sacrament and the juridical title he affirms a connection of efficient causality, and between the title and the infusion of grace also a connection of efficient causality, not just a disposition.
7. L. Billot, *De Ecclesiae sacramentis* 1,114-141; Van Noort, *De sacramentis* 1,57f.; Bellevue, *La grâce sacramentelle* (Paris 1900) 66f.; De Smet, *De sacraamentis in genere* 38ff.; Richard, *La causalité instrumentale, physique, morale, intentionelle:* RevNeoSch (1900) 5-31, 266-269; Van Hove, *La doctrine du miracle chez saint Thomas* (Weteren 1927) 148-159; A. Lehmkuhl, *Theologia Moralis* 2,7; F.X. ab Abárzuza, *Manuale theologiae dogmaticae* 3,85-88; Lercher-Dander, 66-68.
8. See Suarez, *In 3* q.62 disp.9 s.1 n.3.

revelation. Secondly, because what is obtained by the title, is obtained in the same way without it: for, the action of Christ itself, which is the sacrament, immediately demands the conferring of grace on this man.[9]

9. On the theory of intentional causality, see A. Maltha, *De causalitate intentionali sacramentorum animadversiones quaedam:* Ang 15 (1938) 337-366.

Thesis 10. The sacraments of the New Law are not physical causes of grace, but moral causes.

Lennerz, 447-474; Lercher-Dander, 62-65; Puig, 125-150.

87. Connection. So far we have determined two things: a sacrament is truly a cause of grace, and it produces nothing previous to grace itself. Now we ask in what order this causality operates.

Definition of terms. *A physical cause* is said to be a cause that by its own real action or physical influx produces a physical effect.

A moral cause is said to be a cause that does not produce immediately a physical effect, but by its moral influx efficaciously induces another physical cause to produce the effect.[1]

Because in this whole question the point is to explain the way in which a sacrament causes grace, which is something physical, the moral cause is not to be considered except inasmuch as it is connected with a physical cause so that the effect (grace in this case) is produced by both causes, but with a different kind of causality, as is obvious.

From what we have said in thesis 8, a sacrament is understood as a moral cause, not the principal but the instrumental cause. However, *the instrumental moral cause* is a cause, which by its goodness or dignity, not its own but accepted from another higher cause, induces the physical cause to act.

88. Adversaries. Cajetan, who seems to have been the first to have proposed expressly this explanation; he contended that it was the opinion of St. Thomas, at least in the *Summa Theologiae.*[2] This opinion is called *the theory of perfective physical causality,* in opposition to dispositive physical causality, which we spoke about in the last thesis. In addition to almost all post-Tridentine Thomists, many other authors follow this opinion, like Bellarmine, Suarez, Valentia, Ripalda and others.[3] However, among these

1. Sometimes it is denied that an efficient cause can be a moral cause, and it is said that all moral causality is reduced to final causality; see F.X. ab Abárzuza, *Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae* 73. But the difference between the two kinds of causality must by all means be retained. For the end, among other things, moves so that its goodness may be obtained or produced; but a moral cause moves so that something else distinct from itself should be produced.
2. *In 3* q.62 a.1; we said about that this probably was the mind of St. Thomas.
3. St. Bellarmine, *De sacramentis in genere* 2,11; Suarez, *In 3* q.62 disp.9 s.2; Valentia, *Commentaria theologica* 4 disp.3 q.3 p.1; Ripalda, *De ente supernaturali* disp. 40 s.3 n13; Bucceroni, *Commentarius de sacramentorum causalitate* (Paris 1884); A.D'Ales, *De baptismo et confirmatione* 131-135; I.H. Oswald, *Die dogmatische Lehre von den hl.Sakramenten* 1,68-74; F. Diekamp, *Katholische Dogmatik* 3,35-44. On Cajetan, see M.H. Laurent, *La causalité sacramentaire d'après le Commentaire de Caieton sur les Sentences:* RevScPhTh 20 (1931) 77-82. On the special opinion of M.J. Scheeben, see Lercher-Dander, 63.

authors there is still a twofold tendency to distinguish; according as, based on principles established elsewhere, they consider the elevation, which in the sacraments is required to physically produce grace, as something intrinsic to the sacrament flowing from the quality or from a positive movement communicated cursorily (*Thomists),* or as something extrinsic to the sacrament itself from the supernatural concurrence of God in order to produce the sacramental action (Suarez).

Theological note. *More probable.*

89. Argument. 1. *Sacraments are not physical causes of grace.* This theory has incurable difficulties, without any positive reason whatsoever that can persuade us to admit them. Therefore, this theory is not to be held.

a) *It has incurable difficulties.* A sacrament is a moral composite, consisting of physical parts somewhat separated in time among themselves. Therefore the physical power of acting cannot be attributed to the composite as such, because it is not a physical entity. Therefore, to what should it be attributed? to the matter? to the form? to which part of the form?

Moreover, a sacrament sometimes would be a physical instrument acting where it is physically not present; v.gr., in the case of matrimony contracted among absent persons by way of proxy. Furthermore, the matter is not explained from the fact that the principal cause is physically present at the same time to both the instrument and the effect, that is, God being present at the sacramental rite and to the grace that is conferred on the absent person. For, in this way it is still not explained how grace by a physical influx proceeds from an instrument physically absent.

Again, the reviviscence of the sacraments is not explained.[4] For, reviviscence supposes that grace is physically produced when the sacramental rite does not exist. In order to solve this difficulty, *some authors* held that for reviviscence one must admit moral causality[5]; but then it is more easily admitted for every case. *Other authors* distinguished between the sacraments that imprint a character and those that do not. Concerning the first group, the sacramental character itself, as the effect of the sacrament, contains virtually the sacrament itself; and hence from this power of the sacrament remaining in it, it physically produces grace. In the other sacraments, they either deny reviviscence[6] or they hold that this same power of the sacrament remains in any physical modification of the will, which results in it from a

4. See A. Michel, *Reviviscence des sacrements:*DTC 13,2618-2629.
5. See Gonet, *De sacramentis* disp.3 a.3 § 2. Suarez had said the same thing, *In 3* q.62 disp.9 s.2 n.20.
6. See Salmanticenses, *De sacramentis in communi* disp.4 dub.6 n.91.

valid sacrament.[7] But it is hard to understand what that permanent power of the sacrament is, since the active sacramental power in its whole reality is something fluid. *Others,*[8] finally, held an explanation from the special nature of the baptismal character, which is a passive potency of the valid reception of all the sacraments. But since the potency is modified by its act, the baptismal character is modified by the reception of every valid sacrament. This modification is nothing else but the "reality and the sacrament" (*res et sacramentum*) (in Confirmation and Orders it is the sacramental character; in Matrimony it is the relation between the spouses coming from the bond of marriage; in Extreme Unction it is the spiritual anointing, that is, the positive removal of the incapacity for the acts of glory and grace). This physical modification is the instrument to physically produce grace in reviviscence. But it is hard to understand how the characters of Confirmation and Orders are modifications of the baptismal character by way of an act modifying the passive potency. It is much harder to understand this in the relation between spouses.

If it is supposed that the sacrament acts through the intrinsic elevation from a received flowing quality, the difficulty increases. For, it must be explained how a spiritual quality, even if it is in this life, can be received in a non-spiritual subject.

90. b) *There is no positive reason forcing us to admit these difficulties.* For, the way of speaking of Holy Scripture, even if more probably (as we said) it speaks about a strict causality, certainly it does not mention any physical causality, since a similar way of speaking is used in Scripture for faith (see above n. 72), whose influx is not physical but moral.

Regarding the holy Fathers, some of them surely can be cited who admit some sanctification involved in the sensible rite itself, and therefore they attribute to it a power of sanctifying. However, there are not many of them. But other things that the Fathers say, when they make a comparison between physical things and physical causes, should not be pressed too much. For, they are making a comparison in order to explain true causality. There is no better way to explain this than by an analogy with physical and material causality, which is much clearer to all uneducated persons, especially to those who are being catechized.

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7. See John of St. Thomas, *In 3* q.62 disp.24 a.1 n.264ff.
8. Fr. Marín-Sola, *Proponitur nova solutio ad conciliandam causalitatem physicam sacramentorum cum eorum reviviscentia:* DivThom (Fr) 3 (1925) 49-63. Similarly, A. Haynal, *De reviviscentia sacramentorum fictione recedente:* Ang 4 (1927) 51-80, 203-223, 382-405. See also E. Vansteenberghe, in RevScRel 7 (1927) 736f.; S. Corrà, *Teoria della seconda reviviscenza:* ScuoCatt 81 (1953) 375-384.

90. 2. *The sacraments are moral causes of grace.* a) This opinion of moral causality was proposed first by M. Cano and M. de Ledesma, perhaps having borrowed it from Vitoria.[9] The same explanation is defended by Vázquez, Lugo, Tournely, Wirceburgenses.[10] Finally, Cardinal Franzelin completed its formation; he insists especially on the fact that the sacraments are morally the actions of Christ who applies the fruit of his Passion. Many have followed him, such as Pesch, Lahousse, Sasse, Puig.[11]

b) *We understand* the opinion of moral causality in this way. Christ the Redeemer by his redemptive sacrifice merited grace for all men; he did it in such a way that the application of that redemption must still be made to each individual in particular and so grace will be given to each one. This application and conferring of grace must be done in the way that Christ the Redeemer has decided and instituted. Therefore de facto he instituted that it should be done through the sacraments. But the sacraments are morally the actions of Christ, which are administered by the ministers of Christ, as we shall see later. Through them Christ efficaciously manifests his will that this definite grace should be conferred on this man. Because of this will of Christ, God physically produces grace in this man. Thus Baptism is the objective will of Christ willing efficaciously that regenerative grace, which incorporates into his Mystical Body be given to the baptized person, and also the character designating him for worship. Confirmation is the objective will of Christ, willing that the grace strengthening him and constituting him a soldier of Christ be given to the one confirmed, and also the character deputing him to defend his religion. Penance is the objective will of Christ, willing that the grace restoring him from the death of personal sin be conferred on the penitent. Extreme Unction is the objective will of Christ, willing that the grace comforting him in soul and in body be given to the sick person. Orders is the objective will of Christ, willing that the grace constituting his worthy minister be given to the newly ordained man, and also the character designating him for this ministry and authority. Matrimony is the objective

9. Vázquez says this about Cano, *In 3* disp.132 ch.5 n.74. But if the theologians, whom we mentioned above in n. 79, extending the notion of cause to the sacraments, really did not wish to deny anything except physical causality, as we think is more probable, then we will find in them a preliminary sketch of this theory of moral causality. This of course, having been considerably corrupted by the Nominalists, was adopted in Paris by Francis Vitoria and then improved by his disciples. In this evolution one must also consider the opinion about the causality of the sacraments which was developed by D. Soto; on him, see A.F. Feliziani, *La causalità dei sacramenti in Domenico Soto:* Ang 16 (1939) 50,58, 148-194.

10. M. Cano, *Relectio de sacramentis in genere* p.4; M. De Ledesma, *In 4* q.3 a.1 (see Gierens, 106ff.); Vázquez, *In 3* disp.132 ch.5; Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.4 s.4; Tournely, *De sacramentis* q.3 a.2; Wirceburgenses, *De sacramentis in genere* Diss.1 ch.2 a.2.

11. J.B. Franzelin, *De sacramentis in genere* th.10; C. Pesch, *De sacramentis in genere* prop.12; J. B. Sasse, *Institutiones theologicae de sacramentis* 54-69; Puig, 137-150.

will of Christ, willing that the grace be conferred on spouses to make them suitable parents of new members of the Mystical Body. In the Eucharist it is not so much the will of Christ but the Lord himself really present, whose physical influx in the production of grace can be admitted (see the difference hinted at in Trent sess.13 ch.3: D 1639-1641).

92. c) *Therefore this opinion is proved:* In it no entity is to be admitted. either physical or juridical, which is not in the sources of revelation. Then it is based on the traditional truth according to which it is certain that the sacraments are morally the actions of Christ. Moreover, it brings together two stages of redemption, which attribute the application and the dispensation of the fruits to the Redeemer himself. Also, it explains reviviscence of grace very well; for, while the sacramental action physically is transient, it still remains morally until it obtains its effect, namely, inducing God to produce the grace as soon as the obstacle is removed. Furthermore, in this explanation a sacrament is well said to be an efficacious sign of grace, because objectively it signifies the will of Christ, with which the conferring of grace is infallibly connected, if there is no obstacle. Finally, the true causal connection between a sacrament and grace is explained; for, God truly wills the conferring of grace because of the will of Christ and the sign of this is the sacrament itself. Of course, this influx is instrumental, because Christ elevates the sensible sign in order to manifest his will efficaciously and thus morally he produces the grace. Therefore a sacrament is an instrument of Christ the Redeemer in order to apply the fruits of the redemption.[12]

93. Objections. 1. A moral cause must move a physical cause to act. But the sacraments cannot move God, who physically produces grace. Therefore the sacraments cannot be moral causes.

I distinguish the major. A moral cause must move a physical cause to act, so that truly the effect of the physical cause is because of the moral cause, *conceded;* so that the physical cause is changed in itself from the influx of the moral cause, *I subdistinguish:* if it is dealing with a created physical cause, *conceded;* if it is dealing with God, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* The sacraments cannot move God, that is, they cannot change Him, *conceded;* that is, they cannot bring it about that grace is given because of the sacraments, *denied.* For example, here as in many other things, God does not will this because of this, but he wills that this be in order to obtain a certain end.

2. But the same thing would be had if the sacraments were only conditions without which grace would not be given. Therefore in this theory the true causality of the sacra-

12. For the historical evolution of this whole question, see Reinhold, *Die Streitfrage über die physische oder moralische Wirksamkeit der Sakramente* (Stuttgart 1899). See also D. Bertetto, *Nota sulla causalità sacramentaria presso i cattolici moderni* (Turin 1950).

ments is not preserved.

I deny the antecedent. It the sacraments were only conditions, God would not produce grace because the sacrament requires this, but simply because, having administered the sacrament, God would produce the grace. That is, grace would be produced there *after* the conferring of the sacrament, but not *because* of it.

3. An instrument must be a middle point between the principal cause and the effect. But in this theory the sacraments are not the middle point between God and grace. Therefore in this theory the sacraments are not instruments of grace.

First response. *I concede the major, bypass the minor, but I deny the supposition.* For the sacraments properly are the instruments of Christ.

Second response. *I concede the major and deny the minor.* For God, through Christ, applies to us the fruits of the redemption by conferring grace. Christ himself does this through the sacraments, signifying efficaciously his will that the grace of God be given to us.

4. In this theory the causality of the sacraments and the causality of the sacrifice are the same. But these two causalities must be different. Therefore this theory cannot be admitted.

I distinguish the major. In this theory the causality of the sacraments and the causality of the sacrifice are the same, that is, both are moral, *conceded;* they are the same, that is, also within the limits of moral causality in no way do they differ, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* These two causalities must differ, that is, within the limits of moral causality they must have essentially the same difference, *conceded;* that is, they cannot be moral causes, *denied.*

The primary end of the sacrifice is the honor of God, from which other things flow secondarily; but the primary end of the sacraments is the sanctification of men. Therefore the sacrifice offers to God the will of Christ honoring Him in an infinite way; but a sacrament offers to God the will of Christ willing that a definite grace be given to a definite man. Therefore within the limits of moral causality, these two causalities are completely different.

94. Scholium. *On a new theory to explain the causality of the sacraments.* a) Recently a theory has been proposed whose fundamental idea is that the causality of grace is not necessarily the same in all the sacraments. For, since operation follows being and the nature of each sacrament is different, then it will be necessary to investigate a posteriori in each sacrament what kind of causality is proportioned to each sacrament. But the different nature of each sacrament must be determined from the different function it performs in the activity of the Mystical Body of Christ.

Therefore some sacraments permanently constitute the subject in a different way of being, and so of functioning in the Mystical Body; to do this a previous possession of supernatural life is required, which is proper to that Body. In this case they are Baptism, Confirmation, Orders and Matrimony. Of these the causality of grace both mediated and intentional is defended. For they produce immediately that permanent way of existing, which is of the intentional order and which intentionally requires the infusion of grace.

There are other sacraments, namely Penance and the Eucharist, having no previous reality that demands grace, but they produce grace immediately. But they do it in different ways. For, in the Eucharist, Christ himself being present produces the grace physically and instrumentally; in Penance however the judicial absolution has a certain juridical efficacy of grace itself.

Finally, Extreme Unction, which is not found properly in either the first or the second kind of sacrament, has immediate moral causality by way of a certain permanent impetration of Christ.[13]

b) This theory has the great advantage that it considers the sacramental grace of each sacrament in light of the Mystical Body of Christ, to whose intimate activity and life it doubtless pertains.

But it pays too much attention to the differences in the sacraments. That being the case, in virtue of the axiom "operation follows being" it concludes to diverse ways of causality. Truly each sacrament does have something special because it is this sacrament and not another. Otherwise there would not be seven sacraments, but only one. Hence it is that the effect of each sacrament is peculiar to it and not to another (see above n. 47). Indeed, some similarities can be considered according to which certain sacraments are more like each other than they are to the other sacraments. Thus, v.gr., Baptism and Confirmation have a similar moral composition of a physical thing with words, and differ greatly from Penance which is composed in a different way.

Nevertheless, even given these differences, all the sacraments agree in this that they are objective signs of the efficacious will of Christ that this grace should be conferred on this man. Therefore if they agree in this, we should consider the sacraments as being common in their way of being, not in the being of each one. For the individual sacraments participate in that common reality, just as the individuals participate in the being of a species, or species participate in the same genus. Therefore in this consideration of the sacraments, which is proper for our treatise and which is essential, not accidental, to the nature of the sacraments, *operation follows being.* Therefore also a certain way of operating will be given in which all the sacraments agree and which responds to the common and essential nature of the sacraments. Without this consideration, perhaps we will have the special causality of this or that sacrament, but not the causality of a sacrament as such. Therefore the sacrament operates as such, by way of a moral cause, as we have said, signifying objectively the efficacious will of Christ in the distribution of sanctifying grace *ex opere operato.* But that this sensible will of Christ takes place through this or that rite, using various material things, manifests the formal and essential nature of a sacrament as such.

13. See A. Temiño, *La causalidad de los Sacramentos y el Cuerpo Mistico* (Burgos 19450; ¿Es identica o diversa la especie de causalidad en los distintos Sacramentos?: RevEspT 10 (1950) 491-515; *La diversa causalidad de los Sacramentos:* RevEspT 12 (1952) 219-226.

CHAPTER IV

ON THE MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENTS

95. From what we have said so far it is apparent how the sacraments are a symbolic sensible sign of grace, not just any kind of sign but a practical sign. But a sacrament is a ritual sign pertaining to the worship of the Christian religion; hence it is not surprising that it cannot be performed by just anyone, but by a definite minister of worship.

And first of all, the minister of the sacraments does not act except as an instrument of Christ; therefore it is required that he have ministerial power in order to confer a sacrament.

But from the doctrine of the Church this power de facto cannot be exercised unless it is by one who has the intention of exercising it; otherwise he would not be acting under the power and authority of Christ.

On the other hand, according to the same doctrine of the Church, such power can be exercised also by someone who is not in the state of grace, and is not a believer.

We will explain these points in what follows.

ARTICLE I

ON THE POWER OF THE MINISTER

Thesis 11. The minister of the sacraments is the vicar of Christ.

Lennerz, 103-110; Lercher-Dander, 81-86; Xaverius ab Abárzuza, *De sacramentis in genere* 140-143.

96. Definition of terms. The man who confects the sacraments is called *the minister of the sacraments.* The one who, by applying the form to the matter, completes the sensible rite, confects the sacrament. Because the sacraments are actions, confecting the sacrament is also conferring the sacrament inasmuch as he applies it to the receiving subject. However the Eucharist is an exception because it is a permanent sacrament. Therefore in it there is a formal distinction between the confecting minister and the conferring minister. The former performs the sensible rite of the sacrament in its becoming (transubstantiation), the latter applies the sacrament in its use (communion). What we say in this thesis is valid also for the minister confecting the Eucharist.

A vicar is said of someone who takes the place of another. His act is done physically by himself; but in the moral and juridical order it is thought

to be and really is the act of the one in whose name he is acting. So that this can take place it is required that the vicar does not act on his own authority, but on the authority of another. This is *vicarious authority,* for which it is not sufficient that it be an authority accepted by another, nor that it be exercised because of the command of another, but it is necessary that the act be endowed with the moral worth of the other, by whose power he acts, and therefore it can truly be said to be his act. Thus, v.gr., a royal legate has vicarious power, and his acts, which he does as legate, are juridically the acts of the king under whose direction he functions.

97. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Florence* in the Decree for the Armenians (D 1320-1322) teaches about the Eucharist: "the priest speaking in the person of Christ confects this sacrament."

The Council of Trent sess.14 ch.5 (D 1679-1681) teaches that Christ left priests as "vicars of himself" for the sacrament of Penance.

Pius XII: "In every liturgical action her divine Founder is present together with the Church; Christ is present in the sacraments with his own power... Certainly it is necessary to maintain that the sacraments and the intimate sacrifice of the altar have in themselves power, since they are the actions of Christ himself, which transmit and communicate the grace of the divine Head to the members of his Mystical Body."[1]

Theological note. *Catholic Doctrine.*

98. Proof from Holy Scripture. Eph. 5:25f.: *Christ loved the Church and gave himself up for her, that he might sanctify her, having cleansed her by the washing of water with the word.* In these words the action of baptizing is attributed to Christ. Therefore: baptism is performed by the minister in such a way that it truly can be said that Christ baptizes. But this cannot be said unless the minister baptizes as the vicar of Christ. Therefore the minister of Baptism is the vicar of Christ.

99. Proof from tradition. a) This doctrine is expressly proposed by St. Augustine in his *controversy with the Donatists.* "It is he [Christ] who baptizes in the Holy Spirit; and it is not as Petilianus says, that he has now ceased to baptize, but he is still doing it, not by the ministry of his body but by the invisible work of his majesty."[2] Therefore these things take place because the act of baptizing is thought to be the act of Christ:

1. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 528.533.
2. *Contra litteras Petiliani* 3,49,59: ML 43,379.

"Peter baptizes, he is the one who baptizes; Paul baptizes, he is the one who baptizes; Judas baptizes, he is the one who baptizes."[3] Therefore both the human minister and Christ administer the sacrament: the latter with his own power, the former with vicarious power (R 1810). St. Ambrose uses similar words (R 1280).

b) St. Thomas sees this doctrine included in that other: the sacraments are *instruments*. For, an instrument does not act with its own power, but with the power of the principal cause, inasmuch as it is moved and elevated by it. "Because the minister in the sacraments acts instrumentally, he does not act with his own power, but with the power of Christ" (III, q. 64, a. 9; see a. 5 ad 1; *In 4* d.5 q.2 a.2 so.2 and 3; *C.Gent.*4,76).

100. Objections. If the sacramental actions were morally the actions of Christ, Christ would have to be said to contract matrimony. But this is absurd. Therefore sacramental actions are not morally the actions of Christ.

I distinguish the major. If the sacramental actions taken materially were the actions of Christ, Christ would have to be said to contract matrimony, *conceded;* if sacramental actions are the actions of Christ taken only formally, *denied. I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.* A sacramental action is the action of Christ only inasmuch as it is an action by which an efficacious sign of grace as such is placed. In the proposed case those contracting matrimony give their consent and therefore contract matrimony; but that consent is elevated by Christ so that it is also an efficacious sign of grace, and as such it is truly and morally an action of Christ, or of those contracting in the name of Christ.

101. Scholium. *On the subject of this vicarious power.* This vicarious power, as is clear, is not given except to those to whom Christ wills to communicate it. This must be determined for each sacrament; we do not intend to do that here. But from the doctrine of the Church against the Protestants,[4] in general it is necessary to hold that this power does not reside in all Christians. Hence it follows that not just any Christian can administer all the sacraments. This was defined by the Council of Trent sess.7 cn.10 (D 1610). The source of this canon was the eleventh error of the prior list which says: "all Christians of both sexes have equal power in administering the word and the sacraments."[5] The theologians of the Council thought that this article had already been condemned and that it should be condemned again[6]; this was pleasing to the Fathers. Hence the first redaction of the canon was: "If anyone says that all Christians have equal power (to preach) the word and to confect and administer the sacraments, let him be anathema."[7] Many Fathers wanted to omit the words "confect" and "equal"; the first one because it

3. *In Io evangelium* 5,7: ML 35,1428.
4. See CTr 5,836.
5. CTr 5,836.
6. CTr 5,863.
7. CTr 5,984

was superfluous[8]; the second because, as it seems, it caused a certain ambiguity, since the meaning is that not all Christians have the power, that is, the power required to administer the sacraments validly. Therefore the meaning of the canon is that not all Christians can validly administer the sacraments, because all do not have the requisite power; or, which comes to the same thing, in order to constitute someone a minister of the sacraments a special power is necessary, which is not had just because someone is a Christian.

8. CTr 5,989

ARTICLE II

ON THE INTENTION OF THE MINISTER

Thesis 12. In the ministers, when they confect the sacraments, an intention is required at least of doing what the Church does.

S.Th. III, q. 64, a. 7; Lennerz, 115-173; Lercher-Dander, 92ff.; Puig, 72-83.

102. Definition of terms. *When they confect the sacraments,* that is, when they perform the sacramental sign; or, when they perform the sacramental action, which we said is the vicarious action of Christ.

An intention is a deliberate act of the will, whereby someone wishes to do or to omit something. Therefore a sacramental action is not just the act of a man, but it is truly a human act.

Doing what the Church does, that is, of performing the rite which is prescribed by the Church. This intention is understood as general, or even unclear; even though the minister might not know what it really is.

Is required, that is, it is necessary simply in order to have a sacrament. Therefore if that intention is lacking, even if he uses the sensible sign with the proper matter and form, then there is no sacrament present.

At least is said because this intention is required as a minimum; but other more lofty intentions in the minister are not excluded.

103. Adversaries. Luther, based on his theory of justification by fiducial faith alone, held that a penitent is truly absolved if he believes he is absolved, even if the priest absolves him in a joking manner.[1] Calvin for the same reason ridiculed the Tridentine doctrine concerning the intention.[2]

104. Doctrine of the Church. Innocent III in the Profession of Faith for the Waldensians (D 793-794) speaks about the necessary faithful intention of the one confecting the Eucharist.

The Council of Constance (D 1262), requiring from the Wycliffites and Hussites that they believe that the probity of the minister does not influence the validity of the sacrament, supposes that an intention is necessary "of doing what the Church does."

The Council of Florence in its Decree for the Armenians (D 1310-1313) teaches that the same intention is required that the sacraments be

1. *Sermo de paenitentia: Opera* (ed. Weimar) 1,323; see *De Captivitate babylonica:* ib. 6,570f,
2. *Acta Synodi Tridentinae cum Antidoto,* ad sess.7 ch.11: *Corpus Reformatorum* 35,946f.

performed validly.

Leo X condemned the error of Luther (D 1462). See the Council of Trent sess.14 ch.6 (D 1684-1685) and cn.9 (D 1709). Note however that neither Luther himself in his response to the Pontiff, nor the first theologians opposing him, considered this doctrine in particular; but their whole concern was the efficacy which was attributed to fiducial faith. Therefore this seems to be the main point of this condemnation.[3]

Regarding *The Council of Trent* sess.7 cn.11 (D 1611), here is the history and meaning of this canon. Error 13 proposed to the theologians was this: "the intention of the minister is not required, and he does nothing in the sacraments."[4] The ambiguity, which could arise is the question about the required intention, appears immediately; and therefore the Acts state the opinions of the theologians in this way: "since the intention of the ministers (as some assert) is not simply necessary, but only that they intend to do what the Church intends, therefore they wanted to condemn this article with a declaration. Other theologians think that this article must be totally condemned and that it has already been condemned."[5] That ambiguity, still not removed, appears even more in the opinions of the Fathers: "some said that it should be condemned as it stands, others that it should be said that no intention of the ministers is necessary; but that these words should be deleted "he does nothing in the sacraments," because in truth he does nothing in the sacraments."[6] Because of a wise suggestion the traditional formula was added in the first redaction of the canon: "if anyone says that in the ministers, when they confect or confer the sacraments, the intention of doing what the Church does is not required, let him be anathema."[7] And this version pleased the Fathers, except that many wanted to add the word "at least" (*saltem*).[8] The reason for this addition seems to have been this: that that intention was determined to be what was required as a minimum.[9] Therefore that being the case, since among the theologians of the time a twofold opinion was defended, one of which held that in the sacraments that intention suffices which is contained and expressed in the external performing of the sensible rite, the formula "an intention of doing what the Church does" does not demand a greater intention than what was demanded by those theologians. Only the Reformers are condemned, for whom an

3. See G. Rambaldi, *L'oggetto dell'intenzione sacramentale nei teologi dei secoli XVI e XVII* (Rome 1944) 4-36.
4. CTr 5,836.
5. CTr 5,866.
6. CTr 5,971.
7. CTr 5,984.
8. CTr 5,991.
9. CTr 5,987.

intention was not necessary in any way.[10]

105. Alexander VIII in 1690 condemned the proposition: "Baptism is valid when conferred by a minister who observes all the external rite and form of baptizing but within his heart resolves, I do not intend what the Church does" (D 2328). In Belgium F. Farvacques defended the doctrine of this proposition in 1671 and afterwards in public disputations, and then also in 1680 in a small publication.[11] At that time this doctrine was then accepted by others. Therefore, Farvacques demanded in the minister at least a confused *knowledge* of the will of the Church intending by that rite to confer a sacrament, and moreover a serious *will* and not a jesting one of performing that rite. But that being the case, even if he had no intention within himself, he said that the sacrament was confected, that is, valid. For he thought that a legate, who honors a king with some external ceremony, even though interiorly he has no intention of honoring him, really does give honor to the king; and similarly, that someone making a contract, who observes the external formalities of the contract, even though internally he has no intention of obligating himself, really makes a contract. He said the same thing about the minister of a sacrament; so in this teaching the minister really does not have an intention.[12] Therefore the meaning of the condemned proposition is again to demand the intention that was taught by Trent; moreover, they added to it that the *mere* performance of the rite is not sufficient. Namely, the external rite, performed in a serious way, ordinarily is connected with the intention of actually doing it; but not absolutely and necessarily, since that intention can be positively excluded, or simply not be present.[13]

Leo XIII (D 3318-3319) declared Anglican ordinations invalid also from the defect of the necessary intention in order for them to be a sacrament.[14]

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

106. Proof from prescription. Before the Council of Trent through three centuries and more the necessity of the intention in the minister of the sacraments in the explicit and universal profession is present without any

10. See Rambaldi, *L'oggetto dell'intenzione* 40-61.
11. *Opusculum in quo de sacramentis Novae Legis generatim agitur* (Leodici Eburorum 1680).
12. Farvacques, *Opusculum* ch.6 q.4. Note that Farvacques begins his question by requiring not only an intention, but also an internal intention (see *ibid.* q.2); however he develops the matter in such a way that he destroys any true intention.
13. See G. Rambaldi, *La "intentio externa" di Fr. Farvacques:* Greg 27 (1946) 444-457.
14. See J. Bittremieux, *De intentione ministri in sacramentorum administratione iuxta ecclesiam anglicanam:* EphThLov 15 (1938) 103f.

hesitation or controversy, even given the known difficulties which arise from this doctrine for some other questions. But this fact proves that the necessity of the intention pertains to revealed doctrine. Therefore, from revelation the intention in the minister of the sacraments is required.

The major. a) The question about the necessity of the intention in the minister of the sacraments does not begin to be treated explicitly until the twelfth century when sacramental theology began to be developed scientifically. Then a concrete question was raised about those who baptize in mimicry or as a joke, and if they do, whether a true sacrament of Baptism is conferred. It is stated in this way by Hugo of St. Victor, who absolutely required an intention and thought the opposite opinion was ridiculous.[15] This same opinion is expressed by the *Summa Sententiarum, Sententiae Divinitatis,* Peter Lombard, *and all the other theologians of the twelfth century,*[16] with the exception of Robert Pullus, Gandulphus and his school, and Rolandus Bandinelli.[17]

b) From the beginning of the thirteenth century there is full and universal consensus on this point. The formula "an intention of doing what the Church does" was used already around the year 1231 by Gulielmus Altissiodorensis who explains it in this way saying: "that we take the word confusedly, that is, if he intends to do what the Church is wont to do."[18] From this time this formula is used constantly by the theologians.[19] Of the same opinion are the great doctors in this century: Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas.[20] Other theologians hold the same thing, like Hervaeus Natalis, Richardus A Mediavilla, Scotus, Petrus de Palude, Thomas Argentinas, Aureolus, Durandus, Baconthorp, Biel,

15. *De sacramentis* lib.2 p.6 ch.13: ML 176,458. He says very well: "I perhaps took my son to the baths. I came to the water, not to baptize him, but in order to bathe; not to give a sacrament, but to cleanse or refresh the body. I placed my little son in the water, but because I wanted him to grow and make progress, perhaps I said as I had said while we were eating and drinking, as in cultivating and seeding, or while doing something else: in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Then you come and say to me that my son is baptized. I know that he had a bath, I do not know that he was baptized."
16. *Summa Sententiarum* tr.6 ch.9: ML 176,135; *Sententiae Divinitatis* (ed. Geyer) 131; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 4 d.6 ch.5; d.13 ch.1. See F. Gillmann, *Die Notwendigkeit der Intention auf Seiten des Spenders und des Empfängers der Sakramente nach den Anschauungen der Frühscholastik* (Mainz 1916).
17. Robert Pullus, *Sententiae* 5,15: ML 186,841f.; Rolandus, *Sententiae* (ed. Gielt) 206. For the whole history of this question, see A.M. Landgraf, *Beiträge der Frühscholastik zur Terminologie der allgemeninen Sakramentenlehre:* DivThom (Fr) 29 (1951) 10-34.
18. *Summa aurea* lib.4 q.7.
19. Innocent IV (In quinque Decretalium libros, in c.2 X III 42) denies that the intention of doing what the Church does is required, because he does not take it in a confused or general way; for he requires that the minister intends to baptize.
20. Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.4 q.8 m.3 a.1; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.6 p.2 a.2 q.1; St. Albert the Great, *In 4* d.6 a.11; S.Th. III, q. 64, a. 8-10.

Sylvester Prierias, Hadrianus, Cajetan.[21]

c) The difficulties, which arise from the necessary intention of the minister, were immediately apparent to the theologians. In order to solve them they took different paths, but in such a way as to save the necessity of the intention. Thus there is a difficulty coming from the minister who does not believe that Baptism is a sacrament or that it gives grace, or he just does not believe in the Church. Some said that the intention of saying and doing what others do is sufficient (Peter Lombard), or that the intention of baptizing so that Baptism confers whatever it can confer (Innocent IV) is sufficient, or that the intention of doing what the Church does is sufficient, and by intending this, although actually he does not intend the effect, still he intends what follows from it (St. Bonaventure); see S.Th. III, q. 64, a. 9 ad. 1. Similarly in the difficulty coming from the hidden intention of the minister; it is not possible to be certain about that, and hence there is no certainty about the validity of the sacrament nor about the salvation of the recipient. In order to solve this problem, some simply held, having supposed the necessary diligence, that God supplies for the salvation of the one who de facto because of a defect in intention was not actually baptized (Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure). Others held that the saying of the words is sufficient to be certain about the mental intention of the minister (St. Albert the Great, Hervaeus Natalis, Durandus); see S.Th. III, q. 64, a. 8 ad 2.

The minor. a) That consensus in these circumstances proves that the intention of the minister is really necessary; otherwise the Church would be in error in a matter pertaining to faith, and in a matter of the greatest necessity for the salvation of men.

b) That truth cannot be had except from revelation; for it depends on the free will of Christ who instituted the sacraments in this way, since he could have instituted them in a different way.

107. Theological reasoning. a) A man confecting the sacraments can act either in his own name or in the name of Christ, as he wishes. Therefore in order to act precisely in the name of Christ he must will positively to do this, and therefore to have the intention of so acting. But he does not confect a sacrament unless he is acting in the name of Christ and as his vicar. Therefore a man does not confect a sacrament unless *he has the*

21. Hervaeus Natalis, *In 4* d.6 q.3; Richardus A Mediavilla, *In 4* d.6 a.2 q.2; Scotus, *In 4* d.6 q.5; Petrus de Palude, *In 4* d.6 q.2; Thomas Argentinas, *In 4* d.5 q.2; Aureolus, *In 4* d.5 q.1 a.1; Durandus, *In 4* d.6 q.2; Biel, *In 4* d.5 q.1; Sylvester Prierias, *Summa* v. Baptismus a.3 q.12; Hadrianus, *Quaestiones de baptismo: in 4 Sententiarum* (Rome 1522) fol.18; Cajetan, *In 3* q.64 a.8. Lennerz has usefully assembled the texts of these theologians, as also those of their predecessors, 115-141.

intention of acting in the name of Christ as his vicar.

b) What the Church does in conferring the sacraments is nothing other than what was instituted by Christ. But the sacraments were instituted by Christ as vicarious actions of Himself. Therefore what the Church does is a sacrament as a vicarious action of Christ. Therefore if a minister intends confusedly *to do what the Church does,* by that very fact he has a sufficient intention of acting as a vicar of Christ. See S.Th. III, q. 64, a. 8.[22]

108. Objections. 1. According to St. Chrysostom (R 1169) the minister only says the words and extends his hand. But these can be done without an intention. Therefore according to St. Chrysostom an intention in the minister is not necessary.

I distinguish the major. According to St. Chrysostom the minister says the words and extends his hand as a living instrument and as a human act, *conceded;* as an inanimate instrument, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* With an intention these things can take place as by an inanimate instrument, *conceded;* as by an animated instrument and as a human act, *denied.* The only thing St. Chrysostom wishes to exclude with those words is the necessity of probity in the minister, as will be clear from what follows.

2. *St. Augustine* (R 1834) says: "The word is added to the element, and there results the sacrament." Therefore nothing else is required. Therefore an intention is not necessary.

I distinguish the antecedent. From St. Augustine, the word is added to the element, and by that fact there is a sacrament, that is, from that the sacrament has the power of sanctifying, *conceded;* that is, the sacrament in its being is now complete, *I subdistinguish:* if the word is a true word uttered in a human way, *conceded;* if the word is a mere sound of syllables, *denied. I also distinguish the first consequent.* Nothing else is required as a sanctifying element, *conceded;* nothing else is required as a perfecting element, *I subdistinguish:* nothing else besides a word uttered in a human way, *conceded;* nothing else besides a word uttered in any way whatsoever, *denied.*

3. *St. Augustine* says that a baptism is valid when it is deceitfully conferred by a minister.[23] Therefore he supposes that an intention is not required.

I distinguish the antecedent. He says that baptism is valid when it is conferred deceitfully by a minister, that is, by a minister interiorly ridiculing baptism but seriously wishing to confer the rite of the Church, *conceded;* that is, by a minister not intending seriously to confer the rite of the Church, *denied. I also distinguish the consequent.* He supposes that an intention is not required, if he admitted the validity of a baptism by a minister not seriously intending to confer the rite of the Church, *conceded;* if he does not admit this, *denied.*

There has been much debate about the true meaning of this text of St. Augustine. Some hold that the deceitful minister here must be understood to be a heretic, and there-

22. For the historical evolution of this, see Hahn, *Die Lehre von den Sakramenten in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung innerhalb der abendländischen Kirche bis zum Conzil von Trient* (Breslau 1864) 218-232; Pourrat, 316-361; A. Trouvenin, *Intention:* DTC 7,2268-2280.

23. *De baptismo* 7,55,101f,: ML 43,242f. The whole text is quoted by Lennerz, 160f.

fore in the text he is not considering the intention.[24] Others think that the deceitful minister must be understood to be a minister who seriously wants to confer the external rite of the Church, but he does not think the rite accomplishes anything. And this opinion seems to be more probable. Therefore in the same place St. Augustine does not attempt to define anything regarding the validity of a baptism conferred in jest. Moreover, in the whole context St. Augustine says expressly that he is speaking only about probability, without prejudice to a more diligent inquiry or to greater authority.

109. 4. Baptism *conferred in jest* at times has been considered as valid. Therefore then the intention of the minister was not thought to be necessary. *The antecedent.* Rufinus says that St. Athanasius as a boy, while pretending to be a bishop as a joke with other boys, baptized a catechumen. Later Alexander, the real bishop, after having examined the matter carefully, definitely said that the baptism was valid.[25]

I deny the antecedent. As a proof, I say that the whole story seems to be false, since Athanasius, born in the year 295, in the first year of the episcopacy of Alexander (312) was seventeen years old. But what is narrated in that story requires that the boys be much younger.

5. Sacraments are *signs.* But the meaning of a sign is independent of the intention of the one making it. Therefore a sacrament is independent of the intention of the minister.

I distinguish the major. A sacrament is an efficacious sign, *conceded;* it is a sign signifying only, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* The making of a sign signifying only is independent of the intention of the one making it, *I bypass the minor:* the making of an efficacious sign is independent of the intention of the one making it, *I subdistinguish:* if that is what the maker of the sign wanted, *conceded;* if his will were different, *denied.*

6. If a sacrament cannot be efficacious without the intention of the minister, then *the minister gives it its efficacy.* But the minister does not give the efficacy to a sacrament. Therefore a sacrament can be efficacious without the intention of the minister.

I distinguish the major. If a sacrament cannot be efficacious without the intention of the minister because without it the sign of grace already fully constituted would not yet have efficacy, then the minister would give to the sacrament its efficacy, *conceded;* if it could not be efficacious because without the intention an efficacious sign of grace is not yet had as it was instituted by Christ, *denied. I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

The intention of the minister is required simply so that this sign of grace instituted by Christ might exist, but not that it be efficacious.

7. The sacramental sign coalesces *out of the matter and form alone.* But the matter and form can be posited without an intention. Therefore the sacramental sign can be had without the intention of the minister.

I distinguish the major. The sacramental sign coalesces out of the matter and form expressed in a human way, *conceded;* from the matter and form expressed in any way whatsoever, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* The matter and form can be posited in

24. See Franzelin, *De sacramentis in genere* th.16 sch.2; Pesch, *De sacramentis in genere* 284.
25. See Pourrat, 332-336.

any way without the intention of the minister, *conceded;* they can be posited in a human way without that intention, *denied.*

110. Scholium 1. *On the required intention.* The intention of the minister can take many different forms, and the same one is not required for each of the sacraments. However, a further determination of this intention pertains to moral theology.

Scholium 2. *On the required intention in the subject of the sacrament.* Also in the recipient of the sacrament an intention is required to receive it; this intention is directed not only to the external rite, but also to its sacramentality. However this is not absolutely necessary for every sacrament and always, for it is not required in infants. The reason for the necessity of this intention does not seem to be in the sacrament considered in itself, but a more general reason according to which God does not force his gifts on men.[26]

26. See Lercher-Dander, 118ff.

Thesis 13. The intention in the minister of the sacraments of doing what the Church does must be the intention of doing the external rite not only materially, but also formally as something holy.

Lennerz, 115-173; Lercher-Dander, 95-103; Puig, 84-100

111. Connection. Having established the necessity of an intention in the minister, the next question concerns the object of that intention. The response is that the object, which is minimally required, is this: to do what the Church does. But because the Church makes the external rite, which also is holy, sacramental and productive of grace, it must be determined further which of these formal reasons is required as a minimum for validity.

112. Definition of terms. *The intention of doing what the Church does*, that is, what we said is necessary in the minister of the sacraments.

Must be, that is, it is necessary in order to attain the object.

The external rite is understood *materially,* when the intention is directed only to accomplish the external action (that is, in the application of the due form to the due matter). The object of this intention is what the Church *does.* This is usually called *the external intention.*[1]

The external rite is understood *formally as a holy thing,* when the intention is directed to the religious formality of the rite, as it is meant by the Church. The object of this intention is what the Church *intends.* This is called *the internal intention.*

We say that *an internal intention* is required; or that the external rite by itself alone is not sufficiently determined in its sacramental being, and therefore that it must be further determined by the intention of the minister. Thus it must be done in such a way that what before was profane (even though done seriously), now becomes holy through the intention of the minister, wishing to do what the Church intends to do by that rite.

113. Adversaries. a) *In the middle ages* there were some theologians who admitted that the intention in the minister suffices which is sufficiently

1. Every intention, as an act of the will, is *subjectively* internal. But it is called external or internal in this question *objectively,* according as its object is something external or something internal: that is, the sensible rite itself, or its sacramentality.

expressed by the words of the form.[2] Thus Aureolus.[3] This opinion continued until the sixteenth century, at which time it was defended, v.gr., by Sylvester Prieras: "A mental intention is not required, but the expression of the intention suffices through the words prescribed by the Church."[4]

b) *At the time of the Council of Trent* Caterinus and Salmerón, who were present at the seventh session of the Council, did not actually defend the idea that the intention of doing the external rite suffices, but that an intention of doing the sacrament suffices. But because the rite in itself is holy and as such is sufficiently determined by the holy form, a serious performance of the external rite proves, according to them, that the minister intends to administer the sacrament, that is, to do what the Church does, since she intends this through this rite.[5]

c) *In the seventeenth century* Pasqualigo, Stribonio and Contenson held that an intention of seriously performing the rite suffices, which in the Church is a sacrament and is recognized to be such by the minister.[6]

d) *In the eighteenth century* Juenin, Drouin and Serry defend the same opinion[7]; sometimes they use more difficult formulas.[8]

Theological note. *More common and more probable.*

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2. Those who mention this opinion are Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.4 q.8 m.3 a.3; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.6 p.2 a.2 q.1 ad 5; Petrus de Palude, *In 4* d.6 q.3; Antonius de Asti, *Summa* libl4 titl5 a.3; Hervaeus Natalis, *In 4* d.6 q.3; Durandus, *In 4* d.6 q.2, and on this occasion he defines the terminology: "It must be understood that the intention is twofold—one *interior and mental,* the other *exterior and vocal,* which consists in the words prescribed by the Church"; Hadrianus, *Quaestiones de sacramentis in 4 Sententiarum* (Rome 1522) fol.18. St. Thomas mentions the same opinion, III, Q. 64, a. 8 ad 2, where he seems to approve it. And he was understood in this way, in the cited texts, by Hadrianus, *Summa Astensis et Summa Sylvestrina* (v. Baptismus a.3 q.12), and later Cajetan (*In 3* q.64 a.8) in his defense of the Doctor.
3. *In 4* d.5 q.1 a.1.
4. *Summa Sylvestrina* v. Baptismum a.3 q.12.
5. Catarinus, *De intentione ministri* (Rome 1552) fol.205; Salmerón, *Commentarii in omnes B. Pauli Epistolas* lib.1 p.3 disp.2. See Rambaldi, *L'oggetto dell'intenzione* 65-94; he began a careful and accurate investigation and he also examined all the other writings of Catarinus which are usually cited in connection with this question.
6. Z. Pasqualigo, *Sacra Moralis doctrina de statu supernaturali humanae naturae* disp.72f. 3ff. (Venice 1650); M. Stribonio, *Panthalitia* lib.4 de sacramentis in genere disp.1 ch.5ff. (Paris 1620); V. Contenson, *Theologia mentis et cordis* 3 lib.11 p.1 diss.2 append. On these authors, see Rambaldi, *L'oggetto dell'intenzione* 119-132.
7. G. Juenin, *Institutiones theologicae* 7 diss.1 q.6 ch.2; H. Serry, *Vindiciae Vindicarum Ambrosii Catarini* ch.5; H.R. Drouin, *De re sacramentaria* lib.1 q.7 ch.3.
8. This opinion of an external intention must be clearly distinguishes from the opinion that Farvacques defended; therefore here we cannot use the condemnation of Alexander VIII that we spoke about in the previous thesis in n. 104. The difference between both opinions lies especially in the fact that the advocates of the external intention absolutely demand a true intention of the minister beyond the mere serious performance of the external rite; for them this performance of the rite is a certain argument for the intention of the minister. On the contrary, Farvacques really separated the external performance of the rite from the true intention of the minister, after having admitted a certain extrinsecism which conceded the possibility of the external rite without any intention. See Rambaldi, *La "intentio externa" di Fr. Farvacques:* Greg 27 (1946) 456.

114. Argument. From the time of the Council of Trent Catarini's opinion was so attacked by theologians that always the greater part of them denied it; in fact, now no one defends it. But this proves that an internal intention is required. Therefore an intention of doing what the Church does must be internal, or considering the rite as something holy.

115. Theological reasoning. The external rite, even when seriously done, has not been so determined by Christ that it must be sacramental. Therefore it must be further determined by the intention of the minister. But it cannot be further determined unless the rite is formally intended as something holy and sacramental. Therefore in order for the rite to be really sacramental the intention of the minister is required, whereby he formally desires that it be holy and sacramental.

116. Objections. 1. For a sacrament an intention *of doing what the Church does* suffices. But the Church performs a holy rite. Therefore the intention of performing a holy rite is sufficient.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. The Church does a holy rite as holy, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* An intention of doing what the Church does suffices, that is, formally as the Church does it, *conceded;* an intention of doing what the Church does suffices, that is, the holy rite taken materially, *denied.*

2. The holy rite also as sacramental is sufficiently *determined by the form.* Therefore, when the form is done, another intention of the minister is not required.

I distinguish the antecedent. The holy rite is sufficiently determined by the form also as sacramental, that is, as a sign, *conceded;* as sacramental, that is, as the vicarious action of Christ, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.*

3. *In a heretical or unbelieving* minister the internal intention is lacking. Therefore if this is required, a sacrament conferred by them will always be invalid. But it is not invalid. Therefore an internal intention is not required.

I distinguish the antecedent. In a heretical or unbelieving minister the internal intention is lacking, that is, it can be lacking, *conceded;* that is, it is always and necessarily lacking, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* If an internal intention is required, a sacrament conferred by them would always be invalid, if this intention in them were always and necessarily lacking, *conceded;* if it is not always lacking, *denied.*

There is no difficulty that an unbeliever may have the intention of performing the rite as it is requested by the recipient and as it is done by the Church; and the heretic can intend to do the rite as it is intended by the true Church. Moreover, often the sacrament will be invalid, because the proper intention in the minister is not present, or at least often one cannot be certain about this.

117. If an internal intention is required, we would never be able *to be certain about the valid reception of a sacrament.* But we can be certain. Therefore an internal intention is not required.

I distinguish the antecedent. We could never be certain with metaphysical or physical certitude, *conceded;* with moral certitude, *denied. I distinguish the minor in the same way.*

5. *St. Thomas*, because of this final difficulty, denies that an internal intention is required: III, q. 64, a. 8 ad 2.

I deny that St. Thomas denied the internal intention, although some authors, as we said, have said that he did. The words of St. Thomas are: "Consequently, others with better reason hold that a minister of a sacrament acts in the person of the whole Church, whose minister he is; while in the words uttered by him, the intention of the Church is expressed; and that this suffices for the validity of the sacrament, unless the contrary be expressed on the part either of the minister or of the recipient of the sacrament." There he is not treating the required intention for a sacrament, but about the way in which we can be certain about the presence of an intention, and therefore about the validity of the sacrament. For, St. Thomas expressly required the intention of conferring a sacrament, or an internal intention: III, q. 64. a. 10.[9]

6. Baptized persons who intend only *to contract matrimony,* by that fact receive the sacrament. But these persons do not have an internal intention. Therefore an internal intention is not required.

I distinguish the major. Baptized persons contracting in this way by that very fact confect the sacrament, because from the institution of Christ a valid matrimonial contract among the baptized has been clearly determined to be always a sacrament, *conceded;* because such further determination of the external sign is not required in any sacrament, *denied. I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* An internal intention is not required from the nature of the sacrament, *denied;* it is not required from the special nature of matrimony, *conceded.* But others respond differently.[10]

9. See Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.8 s.4.
10. See Lennerz, 171; Lercher-Dander, 103, objection 9.

ARTICLE III

ON THE FAITH AND UPRIGHTNESS OF THE MINISTER

Thesis 14. The worth of the sacraments does not depend per se on the uprightness of the minister.

S.Th. III, q. 64, a. 5; Lennerz, 174-261; Lercher-Dander, 104-108; Puig, 57-70.

118. Definition of terms. *The worth of the sacraments,* that is, that a sacrament is valid, or it can truly be conferred.

Uprightness is understood concretely as being in the state of grace.

It does not depend. Even if the minister lacks that uprightness, or is in the state of mortal sin, still a sacrament conferred by him can be valid.

Per se, or formally the uprightness of the minister does not influence the validity of the sacrament. But it can influence it accidentally, if the sin of the minister is involved in changing essentially the matter and form, or if it concerns the omission of the necessary intention.

Therefore we say that the ministerial or vicarious power of validly conferring a sacrament can be found equally in a just minister or in one who is a sinner

119. Adversaries. In the fifth century the *Donatists,* who held that Baptism and Orders cannot be conferred by a schismatic minister.[1]

In the thirteenth to fourteenth centuries the same error was repeated by the *Waldensians and the Fraticelli* (D 914), according to whom the sacraments conferred by a sinning minister are invalid; then Wycliffe, who held that a priest in the state of mortal sin does not confect the sacrament (D 584).[2]

In the sixteenth century the *Anabaptists,* who held that a bad minister does not confer a sacrament.

120. Doctrine of the Church. a) *Before the Council of Trent:* St. Leo the Great: "Maximus, also from the laity, although he was ordained in a reprehensible manner, still if he is not now a Donatist and if he is far removed from the spirit of schismatic perversity, we do not reject him from the episcopal dignity which he obtained in some way. Therefore, by

1. See A. Palanque, *L'affaire donatiste* in Fliche-Martin, *Histoire de l'Eglise* 3,41-52. On the real doctrine of the Donatists, see G. Nicotra, *Dottrina sacramentaria ed ecclesiologica presso i Donatisti:* ScuoCatt 70 (1924) 141-147, 227-236.
2. See L. Cristiani, *Wycclif:* DTC 15,3605.

sending us his petition he manifests that he is a Catholic."[3]

Anastasius II accepted the Baptism and Orders which were conferred by schismatics (D 356).

Pelagius I writes about a schismatic cleric: "I accepted him and we ordered him to be united together with the communion of the Catholic faith, because, as you skillfully and truthfully said, there is nothing exceptional in him except that the Church grieves over his separation from herself. For, he has the same faith in the creeds, the same form in the sacrament of Baptism, the same mysteries in the consecration of the Lord's Body."[4]

Gregory II accepted the Baptism rightly conferred by adulterous and unworthy priests (D 580).

Nicolas I wrote: "No matter how polluted someone may be he cannot pollute the divine sacraments, which are the purgatorial remedies for all diseases.; therefore, of whatever kind a priest may be, he cannot defile things that are holy."[5] See D 619.

Innocent III in the Profession of Faith for the Waldensians (D 793-794) professes that the sacraments conferred by a sinful priest are valid.

John XXII (D 914) condemned the error of the Fraticelli. See D 912).

The Council of Constance condemned the error of Wycliffe (D 1154). See also Martin V on the questions proposed to the Wycliffites and Hussites (D 1262).

121. b) *The Council of Trent* sess.7 cn12 (D 1612): "If anyone says that a minister in the state of mortal sin, though he observes all the essentials that belong to the effecting and conferring of the sacrament, does not effect or confer the sacrament, let him be anathema." Here is the history of this canon. The tenth error of list proposed to the theologians was this: "A bad minister does not confer a sacrament."[6] This article, according to the theologians, was already condemned and should be condemned again.[7] However, it was the opinion of some of the Fathers that it should not be condemned without some declaration, "since, if he were per se evil, he would do no harm; on the other hand, if he administered the sacrament badly, then he would cause harm." Others proposed this formula: "a minister who is in the state of mortal sin does not confer a sacrament."[8] Hence the first version of the canon was: "If anyone says that a minister, who is in sin and

3. *Epistola* 12,6: ML 54,653.
4. See the text for this in A. Saltet, *Les réordinations* (Paris 1907) 83.
5. *Responsa ad consulta Bulgarum* ch.71: Msi 15,425.
6. CTr 5,836.
7. CTr 5,863.
8. CTr 5,971.

without grace, if in other respects he observes all the essentials that pertain to the conferring of a sacrament, does not confer the sacrament, let him be anathema."[9] The Fathers then offered some corrections to this version.[10]

See also *The Council of Trent* sess.14 ch.6 (D 1684-1685) and cn.10 (D 1710).

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

122. Proof from tradition. a) *In the first centuries* the validity of a sacrament conferred by a sinner was maintained in the peaceful and quiet possession of the faith and practice of the Church. Therefore, later St. Augustine was able to invoke the apostolic tradition, which was gathered from the universal praxis of the Church (R 1623).

b) As soon as *the controversy with the Donatists* arose, St. Optatus Milevitanus[11] and St. Augustine (R 1634, 1635, 1645, 1810) opposed them vigorously.

c) There are also other *testimonies* of the Fathers. V.gr., St. Gregory Nazianzen says: "Take the case of two rings, one gold and the other iron; and they both have the same image of the emperor embossed on them; and then they are pressed into wax. In what way does this imprint differ from the other one? There is no difference. For the difference is in the matter, not in the ring. Thus all those who perform the rite of Baptism for you are on the same level. For, although one may excel another in the goodness of his life, nevertheless there is the same power of Baptism."[12] St. Chrysostom: "For neither would it be just that through the wickedness of another, those who come in faith to the symbols of their salvation should be harmed" (R 1169); "in no respect is the grace of baptism damaged by the conduct of the priest" (R 1189).

d) *All proposals against this truth* have been suppressed immediately and constantly by the magisterium of the Church, as we have seen.

123. Theological reasoning cannot prove that the validity of a sacrament is de facto independent of the holiness of the minister; for this comes from the positive will alone of Christ who instituted the sacraments in this way. But given that fact, it can prove:

9. CTr 5,984.
10. CTr 5,991
11. *De schismate Donatistarum* 1,11f.: ML 11,906f. See P.V. Kornljak, *Sancti Augustini de efficacitate sacramentorum contra Donatistas* (Rome 1953).
12. *Oratio* 40,26: MG 36,395.

a) That a sacrament *from its own nature* does not demand holiness in the minister. For, the minister acts as a vicar of Christ; hence the power effecting the sacrament is the power of Christ himself. But this can be had in the same way in a sacrament conferred by a good or a bad minister. Therefore a sacrament from its own nature does not demand holiness in the minister for its validity.

b) *That it is most fitting* that the validity of a sacrament does not depend on the holiness of the minister. For, there would be great uncertainty about the validity of the sacraments, which would be very serious, especially in the sacraments of Baptism and Orders.

124. Objections. 1. No one can give what he does not have. But a sinner does not have grace. Therefore he cannot give it. Therefore he cannot confer a valid sacrament.

I distinguish the major. No one can give by his own power what he does not have, *conceded;* no one can give with vicarious power what he does not have, *I subdistinguish:* what he in no way has, *conceded;* what he does not have as his own, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* A sinner does not have grace as his own, *conceded;* he does not have grace in any way, *I deny the minor,* for he has it as an instrument of Christ.

2. To confect a sacrament in the state of sin is a sin. Therefore, if such a sacrament were valid, it is necessary to say that grace is given by sin, which is absurd.

I distinguish the antecedent. To confect a sacrament in the state of sin is a sin inasmuch as the conferring of the sacrament is the minister's own action, *conceded;* inasmuch as it is a vicarious action of Christ, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* It would be necessary to say that grace is given by sin, if the sacrament caused grace according as it is the action of the minister, *conceded;* if it confers the grace according as it is an action of Christ, *denied.*

3. The minister of the sacraments is the instrument of Christ. Therefore he must be united with Christ as the principal cause. But the sinner is not united with Christ. Therefore the sinner cannot be a minister of the sacraments.

I distinguish the antecedent. The minister of the sacraments is the instrument of Christ formally inasmuch as he performs the vicarious action of Christ, *conceded;* he is the instrument of Christ inasmuch he is this particular person, *denied. I distinguish the first consequent in the same way.* He must be united with Christ formally as performing a vicarious action of Christ, *conceded;* he must be united with Christ inasmuch as he is this particular person, *denied. I also distinguish the subsumed minor.* A sinner is not united with Christ as he is this particular person, *I bypass the minor;* he cannot be united with Christ formally inasmuch as he performs a vicarious action of Christ, *denied.*

For a minister to be united with Christ formally as performing a vicarious action of Christ, the only requirement is that he have ministerial power (which Christ did not give only to the just) and the necessary intention. But these two elements can be had also by a sinner, who is not personally united with Christ by grace.

125. 4. Pelagius I denied the validity of the consecration of the Eucharist performed by a schismatic: "What a schismatic confects is not the Body of Christ, if we are directed and led by the truth. For, no one can imagine that Christ is divided, without the disapproval of the Apostle."[13]

I respond that Pelagius I certainly admitted the validity of the Eucharist confected by a schismatic, as we saw above in n. 120. In the quoted text he does not deny the consecration of the Body of Christ, but that the schismatics can gather together the truth of the Body of Christ, which is the Church. Therefore, immediately he goes on: "it is certain that there is one Church, as has often been said, which is the body of Christ and which cannot be divided into two or several."[14]

5. The Lateran Council in the year 769 declared invalid the ordinations conferred by Constantine, who invaded the Holy See after the death of Paul I.[15]

I respond that that text probably should be understood to be about the removal of the right to exercise the Orders, not about the validity of those Orders. Hence the *new* ordination, which the Council is talking about, should be understood as a new restoring of those rights. However, it must be conceded, because of the great confusion about this case, that this whole matter at that time was quite confused. This is also apparent in Sergius III, who seems to have re-ordained those whom Formosus had ordained[16]; and in Urban II, about whom it is disputed whether he re-ordained the deacon Daibertus, who had been ordained by a schismatic archbishop.[17]

6. The Council of Soissons in 853 declared the invalidity of the ordinations which Elbo, the archbishop of Rheims, had conferred after his deposition.[18]

I respond that that text can surely be understood to be about a private right to exercise holy orders, especially since it makes an appeal to the Roman tradition.

13. *Epistola ad Viatorem et Pancratium:* ML 69,412f.
14. *Ibid.* See Lennerz, 223.
15. MGh *Concilia* 2,85f.
16. See Lennerz, 237.
17. See Lennerz, 229.
18. Msi 14,986f.

Thesis 15. The worth of the sacraments does not depend per se on the faith of the minister.

S.Th. III, q. 64, a. 9; Lennerz, 174-261; Lercher-Dander 104-108; Puig, 57-70.

126. Connection. We have seen that the state of grace is not required in the minister to be able validly to confer a sacrament. Now we say further that not even the faith of the minister is required.

Definition of terms. *The worth of the sacraments,* that is, that a sacrament is valid, or can be administered.

Faith is understood as divine.

It does not depend, that is, even if the minister lacks faith, or is a heretic, Jew or pagan; even if he believes absolutely nothing; still a sacrament confected by him can be valid.

Per se, or the unbelief of the minister does not formally influence the validity of the sacrament. However, it can influence it accidentally, if the lack of faith in the minister vitiates the necessary intention or form.

Hence we say that the ministerial or vicarious power to validly confer a sacrament can be found in the same way in a believer and in an unbeliever.

127. Adversaries. *In the third century some bishops in Africa and Asia Minor* held that Baptism conferred by heretics is invalid; therefore, those baptized by heretics must be re-baptized. Tertullian (R 308) preceded them in this point.[1] The *Donatists* held the same doctrine.[2]

128. Doctrine of the Church. a) *On Baptism.*

In the third century there arose *a controversy about re-baptizing* heretics; here is a brief summary of its history. About the year 220 Agrippinus, bishop of Carthage, convoked a synod for the province of Africa and Numidia in which it was decreed that those who were baptized as heretics and then converted must be re-baptized (see R 592a, 593). At almost the same time a synod in Iconium in Asia Minor decided the same thing.[3] But in particular it was defended by St. Cyprian, bishop of Carthage from 248 or 249; he also assembled several synods in order to determine this question, and he

1. See G. Nicotra, *Interpretazione di Cipriano al cp.4 vers.12 delle Cantica:* ScuoCatt 68 (1940) 380-387; *Dottrina di Cipriano sull'efficacia presso i Donatisti:* ScuoCatt 68 (1940) 496-504.
2. See G. Nicotra, *Dottrina sacramentaria et ecclesialogica presso i Donatisti:* ScuoCatt 70 (1942) 141-147, 227-236.
3. See Firmilianus, *Epistola ad Cyprianum 7:* ML 3,1209; Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 7.7,5: MG 20,651.

persisted in this opinion until his martyrdom in 258.[4]

Therefore, in this controversy St. Stephen I (D 110f.) rejected the re-baptism of those who had been baptized in heresy, because the prior baptism was valid.[5]

The Council of Arles I in 314 cn.8 defined the validity of Baptism conferred by heretics (D 123). There is a dispute about the meaning of this canon. In it doubtless the validity of just any baptism of heretics is not acknowledged, but a distinction is made: those baptized in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are validly baptized, even by heretics; but not others. In order to discern this they must interrogate the *symbol.* If the symbol signifies the form of Baptism, the meaning of the canon is: the baptism of heretics is valid, if the form of baptism was properly observed by them. But more probably perhaps the symbol signifies in this text a profession of faith. In this case, the canon would seem to affirm the invalidity of the baptism of those heretics who are in error regarding the mystery of the Trinity. However, even in this case it would be necessary to say that the invalidity does not come directly from the trinitarian heresy itself, but indirectly because the heretics, not thinking correctly about the Trinity, translate their heresy to the form of baptism itself and to the necessary intention.[6]

129. *The Council of Nicaea I* in the year 325 cn.8 (D 127) and cn.19 (D 128) again speaks about the baptism of heretics. There a distinction is made between "the Cathars" (Novatianists) and the Paulianists (disciples of Paul of Samosate); the baptism of the former is recognized as valid, but that of the latter as invalid. Innocent I (D 214) gives the reason for this distinction—because the former use the correct form, but the latter do not. If that is so, then we have the same distinction of St. Stephen I and the Council of Arles.[7] The explanation of St. Augustine was the same.[8] However, St. Athanasius says that the disciples of Paul of Samosate used the true form of Baptism.[9] Therefore perhaps cn.19 of Nicaea can be understood in such a way that

4. St. Cyprian proposed his opinion already in 251 in his book, *De unitate Ecclesiae* ch.11: ML 4,324. The synods were held in 255, when 31 bishops of Proconsular Africa and 18 from Numidia attended (see R 591); in 256, 71 bishops from both provinces attended (see St. Cyprian, *Epistola* 72: ML 3,108.3ff.); and again in 256 at Carthage 87 bishops from Africa, Numidia and Mauritania attended (the acts of this synod are preserved under the title, *Sententiae episcoporum numero 87 de haereticis baptizandis;* see R 600). On all of this, see J. Lebreton, *Les écrivains chrétiens d'Afrique,* in Fliche-Martin, *Histoire de l'Eglise* 2,199-204.
5. See Ernst, *Die Ketzertaufangelegenheit in der altchristlichen Kirche nach Cyprian* (Mainz 1901); *Papst Stephan I und der Ketzertaufstreit* (Mainz 1905); A. D'Ales, *La question baptismale au temps de Cyprien:* RevQuestHist 41 (1907) 253f.
6. See Lennerz, 184, who however seems to have a different view.
7. The imposition of hands mentioned in cn.8 probably is not ordination, but reconciliation with the Church, which was spoken about at the Council of Arles (D 123) and often also elsewhere.
8. *De haeresibus* 44: ML 42,34. See also R 1626.
9. *Oratio 2ª contra Arianos* 43: MG 26,238.

those heretics by baptizing wished to consecrate men to that Trinity which they, in opposition to the Catholic faith, understood. Hence their Baptism would be vitiated by a defect in the necessary intention.[10]

St. Siricius also teaches that the heretics should not be re-baptized and he also says that this was decreed by Liberius (D 183). The same thing was taught by St. Innocent I (D 211),[11] Pelagius I (D 445) again insisting on the defect of form, St. Gregory the Great (D 478) with whom the same things recur that we said above, St. Zachary,[12] Nicolas I (D 646).

The Council of Florence in the Decree for the Armenians (D 1315) teaches that a valid minister of Baptism can also be a pagan and a heretic.

The Council of Trent sess.7 cn.4 on Baptism (D 1617) defines: "If anyone says that baptism, even that given by heretics in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, with the intention of doing what the Church does, is not true baptism, let him be anathema." This canon had its origin in the third error on baptism proposed to the theologians which went like this: "Baptism given by heretics is not true and because of this must be repeated."[13] This article for the theologians had to be condemned and was already previously condemned.[14] Some of the Fathers said that it should not be condemned without some explanation, since for the baptism of heretics to be valid it is required that it be according to the Catholic rite, otherwise it would not be valid.[15] Hence the first draft of the canon reads: "If anyone says that baptism, which is given by heretics in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit with the intention of doing what the Church does, is not true baptism, given also that the heretic thinks otherwise than is necessary about baptism, about the Holy Trinity or about the intention of the Church, let him be anathema."[16] Some Fathers wanted to omit the words "about the Holy Trinity," and others proposed that it should say "about the doctrine" instead of "about the intention."[17] Therefore in the final version that whole clause was omitted.

130. b) *On Orders.* In the controversy about re-baptism they also dealt with the problem of the validity of Orders conferred by heretics. Therefore

10. Thus Lennerz, 191. On this whole question, see G. Bardy, *Paul de Samosate* (Louvain 1923) 411-423. A similar distinction among heretics is found in the Council of Laodicaea cn.7 and 8: Msi 2,565; and in the Council of Arles II cn.16 and 17: Msi 7,880.
11. The "Montanists" are Donatists; see St.Augustine, *De haeresibus* 69: ML 42,43; St. Epiphanius, *Ancoratus* 13: ML 43,39.
12. *Epist. "Sacris liminibus":* ML 89,943f.
13. CTr 5,837.
14. CTr 5,864.
15. CTr 5,971.
16. CTr 5,985.
17. CTr 5,986ff.

the documents of the Church already quoted also apply to this question.

St. Leo the Great: "Concerning them [converted Pelagian clerics] we decree that the constitution of canons also be observed, so that they may have a great benefit, if all hope of promotion has been taken away from them, so that they may remain with perpetual stability in the order in which they are, provided that they were not stained by a repeated dipping.[18]

St. Gregory the Great admitted the validity of the Orders in converted Nestorians (D 478).

Leo XIII declared the ordinations of Anglicans invalid from a defect of form and the necessary intention (D 3315-3318), not because they were conferred by heretics.

131. Theological note. On baptism conferred by heretics the thesis is a matter of *divine and Catholic faith.* On baptism conferred by Jews or pagans the same thing must be said, *at least from the ordinary magisterium of the Church,* which always considers this matter in a single manner. On the other sacraments, the thesis is *at least common and certain* because of the agreement of theologians.

132. Argument. It is composed of two steps:

1. *From the controversy about rebaptism it is certain that baptism rightly conferred by heretics is valid:*

a) This doctrine was in the peaceful possession of truth during the first two centuries. Thus it is made clear from the words of St. Stephen: "let nothing be introduced except what is already handed down" (D 110); from the testimony of St. Cyprian: "neither must we prescribe this from custom, but overcome opposite custom by reason" (R 592a); "therefore surely those who are overcome by reason in vain oppose us with a custom, as if a custom is greater than the truth"[19]; from the testimony of the book, *De rebaptismate,* by an unknown author of the time: "In this type of question, as it seems to me, there could not arise any controversy or debate, if each one of us, content with the venerable authority and necessary humility of all the churches, decides not to introduce anything new."[20]

b) Once that peaceful possession had been disturbed, the traditional doctrine was immediately restored. Thus we know from St. Jerome: "Those bishops who decreed with him [St. Cyprian] that heretics must be re-baptized, when they had returned to the ancient custom, published a new decree [that

18. *Epistola* 18: ML 54,708.
19. *Epistola* 73,13: ML 3,1163.
20. *Liber de rebaptismate* 1: ML 3,1233.

is, at the Council of Carthage in 348, where it was decided]: we order that re-baptisms are illicit, and are quite foreign to sincere faith and Catholic discipline."[21] Likewise St. Augustine: "Cyprian says that this healthy custom [that is, early] by Agrippinus, his predecessor, in some sense began to be corrected; but just as a more carefully investigated truth taught, which after much doubt was brought to the confirmation of the plenary council, that custom is more truly believed to have begun to be corrupted and not corrected by Agrippinus."[22] Finally, from St. Vincent of Lérins: "Agrippinus. thought that he should be re-baptized. Stephen. among others resisted. Therefore, what was the result of that whole affair? Surely what was customary and usual? The ancient custom was retained, the novelty rejected."[23]

133. 2. *From the proved validity of baptism conferred by a heretic we can argue to the validity of all the sacraments, which are conferred by them:*

a) From that it is now certain that the faith of the minister is not required by the formal nature of a sacrament.

b) There is no positive indication that an exception was introduced by Christ for baptism.

c) Rather, the positive indications are contrary, because the argument of the adversaries, namely, that a heretic cannot give the Holy Spirit whom he lacks, is valid in the same way for all the sacraments.

d) Therefore, since occasionally the question of Orders comes up, their validity is judged in the same way by Catholics and by the adversaries. Thus St. Cyprian,[24] St. Augustine (R 1717, 1620).

e) Therefore the holy Fathers also often speak in more general terms. Thus St. Augustine: "Therefore it is not that they are not the sacraments of Christ and the Church, because not the heretics only but all the wicked and impious use them in an illicit manner; however they must be corrected or punished, but the sacraments must be acknowledged and venerated" (R 1624). St. Jerome: "If he that baptized a person into our belief has had no injurious effect upon the person baptized, it follows that he who consecrates a bishop in the same faith causes no defilement to the person consecrated." (R 1360).

f) All of these points explain the universal consensus of theologians, during many centuries, about the independence of the sacraments from the faith of the minister.

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21. *Dialogus contra Luciferianos* 23: ML 23,186.
22. *De baptismo* 2,7,12: ML 43,133f.
23. *Commonitorium* 9: ML 50,645.
24. *Epistola* 72: ML 3,1083-1090.

134. Theological reasoning of course cannot prove that the validity of the sacraments is independent from the faith of the minister, for this is based on the positive will alone of Christ who instituted the sacraments. But given that fact, it is possible to prove:

a) That a sacrament *of its own nature* does not require the faith of the minister. For the minister does not act as the principal cause, but as an instrument; therefore not by his own power, but by the vicarious power of Christ, but this is independent of the faith of the minister. And per se there cannot be a difficulty in the intention of the unbelieving or heretical minister. For, he either believes in the effect of the sacrament and then he can intend to do it, or at least he can will to do the holy rite as intended by Christ, or by the Church or by the one asking for the sacrament.

b) *That it was very fitting* that the validity should not depend on the faith of the minister. First of all, because the faith of the minister often can be hidden, so the sacrament could be exposed to great anxiety. Then, because in this way it is made known more clearly that the sacrament is the work of Christ himself, who is the supreme and true sanctifier of men.

135. Objections. 1. The sacraments were given to the Catholic Church alone. Therefore, someone who is outside of it cannot be their minister.

I distinguish the antecedent. They were given to the Catholic Church alone to be administered either by herself immediately or with essential subordination to her, *conceded;* they were given to the Catholic Church to be administered necessarily by her alone, *denied.*

A heretical or unbelieving minister by his intention, whereby he wills to do the sacrament as it is done and intended by the Church, subordinates himself to the Catholic Church in the administration of that sacrament, for it is conformed to her by his intention. Therefore a sacrament conferred by him is a true Catholic sacrament. Hence St. Augustine says: "Surely I know that the Christian sacraments are with you. The Church fully acknowledges in you everything that is hers; and therefore they are not hers just because they are found among you. For among you they are someone else's property."[25]

2. One who has false faith about God does not consecrate the baptized person to the true God. But many heretics have a false faith about God. Therefore they do not consecrate the baptized person to the true God. But a baptism, in which the baptized person is not consecrated to the true God, cannot be valid. Therefore many heretics cannot baptize validly.

I distinguish the major. One who has false faith about God *is capable of* not consecrating the baptized person to the true God, *conceded; necessarily* he does not consecrate him to the true God, *denied. I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent in the same way.* One who has false faith about God is capable of not consecrating the baptized person to God, *conceded;* necessarily he does not so consecrate him, *denied.*

25. *Contra Cresconium Donatistam* 2,10: ML 43,473.

3. *Many Fathers* thought the baptism of heretics, who erred concerning the Trinity, to be invalid. Thus St. Athanasius, St. Basil, St. Cyril of Jerusalem; Optatus Milevitanus seems to hold that the baptism of all heretics is invalid.[26]

I distinguish the assertion. Those Fathers thought the baptism of those heretics to be invalid, because they were heretics, *denied;* because they thought their heresy influenced them either to change the form or to corrupt their intention, *conceded.*

It is necessary to say regarding the cited texts that the *praxis* was really uncertain at that time in the East. Witnesses to this are not only the cited texts, but also cn.7 of the Council of Laodicaea[27] and the supposition of cn.7 at the Council of Constantinople I,[28] which bears witness to the eastern praxis in the fifth century. St. Epiphanius mentions this variety in the praxis of the time: "Others, who seem to be more bold on the Catholic side, having established their own private group, contrary to the custom of the Church and against the decree of the general council, have not hesitated to re-baptize those who came to them from the Arians; for this matter, as I have said, had not yet been decided by the judgment of a universal synod."[29]

136. 4. In the reconciliation of heretics there was an imposition of hands and they received the Holy Spirit. But this means that the *Confirmation* of heretics was not considered valid. Therefore at least for Confirmation the faith of the minister is required.

In concede the major and deny the minor. For there the subject is not Confirmation. The fact to which it alludes is made up more or less of these testimonies: St. Stephen I (D110), the Council of Arles I (D 123), the Council of Nicaea I (D 127), St. Basil,[30] the Council of Laodicaea cn.7,[31] St. Siricius (D 183), Innocent I (D 211), St. Leo the Great,[32] Timothy of Constantinople,[33] St. Gregory the Great, St. Theodorus Studita.[34]

It is necessary to concede that this rite of imposition of hands, with the invocation of the Holy Spirit and in the East also with an anointing, is very much like the rite of Confirmation; but in no way is it certain that this was a true Confirmation. For this a mere similarity in the rite is not sufficient. Indeed, the contrary is more probable, even historically, since it is certain from many documents that the purpose of that imposition of hands was to confer the Holy Spirit "in order to cleanse those reconciled," which is not the purpose of Confirmation. However, it can be conceded, because of the great similarity in the rites, that at times a certain confusion was

26. St. Athansius, *Oratio 2.ª contra Arianos* 42f.: MG 26,235-240; *Epistola 1.ª ad Serapionem* 30: MG 26,597f.; St. Basil, *Epistola 1.ª canonica* 1: MG 32,663-667; *Epistola* 199,47: MG 32,729; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Procatechesis* 7: MG 33,436 (see also *Constitutiones Apostolicae* 6,15: ed.Funck 337); St. Optatus, *De schismate Donatistarum* 1,11f.
27. Msi 2,565.
28. Msi 3,563.
29. *Expositio fidei* 13: MG 42,807.
30. *Epistola 1.ª canonica* 1: MG 32,670.
31. Msi 2,565; see also false cn.7 of the Council of Constantinople I: Msi 3,563.
32. *Epistola ad Nicetam* 6f.: ML 54,1138f.
33. *De receptione haereticorum:* MG 86.14.
34. *Epistolae* lib.1 n.40: MG 99,1051.

caused on the part of some Catholics.[35]

137. 5. *St. Innocent I* writes about clerics converted from Arianism: "Since their authors abandoned the Catholic faith, they lost the perfection of the Spirit which they had received; and they cannot give His fullness, which is especially operative in ordinations, which they had lost but not their faith, as I said, by the perfidy of their impiety."[36] Therefore, St. Innocent thought that their ordination was not valid.

I deny the consequent. It is said there only that they were not accepted among the clergy, in order to exercise clerical power. For it is one thing for them not to have sacerdotal power, but something else for them not to be able to exercise it because of a prohibition of the Church.[37]

6. *Pelagius I* thought that the episcopal ordination of Paulinus, a schismatic, conferred by a heretic was invalid.[38]

I respond that Pelagius elsewhere admitted those ordinations. Therefore the text is explained by a tendency to prevent the formation of communities of schismatics.[39]

7. Clerics coming from heresy often were *re-ordained.* Therefore Orders conferred by a heretic were considered invalid. *The antecedent.* John Scholasticus, Patriarch of Constantinople (565-577) re-ordained monophysite clerics[40]; Theodorus, legate in England of Pope Vitalian, re-ordained Ceaddam[41]; at the time of St. Leo IX some bishops repeated the ordinations received from bishops guilty of simony (who were considered to be heretics).[42]

I bypass the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. Orders conferred by a heretic were thought by someone or by some few persons to be invalid, *I bypass the consequent;* it was thought to be so by the whole Church, *denied.*

The case of John Scholasticus could be suspect, because it is reported by a monophysite. The case of Theodorus remains doubtful, since we do not know for what reason Theodorus thought that the ordinations received from the Britons or from heretics were invalid. It can be admitted, because of the great confusion of ideas that was common at the time, that some bishops in the eleventh century re-ordained those guilty of simony. This confusion is also evident among the theologians and canonists.[43] However, a perfect consensus among them is had from the thirteenth century on.

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35. There has been much debate over this point. See F. Dölger, *Das Sakrament der Firmung, historischdogmatisch dargestellt* (Vienna 1906); L. Saltet, *Les réordinations* (Paris 1907); P. Galtier, *Absolution ou Confirmation?:* RechScRel 5 (1914) 201-235, 339-394, 507-544; *Imposition des mains:* DTC 7,1397-1480; J. Coppens, *L'imposition des mains et les rites connexes* (Wetteren 1925) 387-392.
36. *Epistola* 24,4: ML 20,549.
37. See Lennerz, 209.
38. See Lennerz, 221.
39. See Saltet, *Les réordinations* 83; Lennerz, 223.
40. See Saltet, *Les réordinations* 52ff.
41. See Saltet, *Les réordinations* 85-101.
42. St. Peter Damian says this, *Liber gratissimus:* ML 145,99. It is not proved that St. Leo IX himself did it, and St. Peter Damian (*Actus Mediolanensis:* ML 145,93) does not seem to say anything except that Leo imposed a canonical limitation on those ordained because of simony. See Lennerz, 228.
43. On this confusion and on further speculative questions that derive from it, see Lennerz, 230-235.

CHAPTER V

On the author of the sacraments

138. From what has already been proved it is certain that a sacrament is a sensible, symbolic sign and producing grace; it is also ritual and a form of worship, so that it is really an act of supreme worship of God, of Christ Jesus.

But we have seen that the sacraments are not merely natural signs; hence they cannot signify grace, and even less cause grace unless they have been efficaciously instituted as practical signs of grace. This institution is twofold. The first is that by which it is efficaciously established as a definite sensible rite, which already of itself was in some sense symbolic, and one that really *signifies grace;* thus the signification is added to the thing signifying, without which the sign cannot be understood; hence the rite is instituted *as a sign.* The second institution is that by which it is efficaciously determined as a sensible symbol, now signifying grace, and one that really *causes grace;* thus efficacy is added to the already established sign, without which it cannot be understood as a practical sign; hence the sign is instituted as *a practical sign.*

Both institutions come from Christ the Lord who administers the treasure of all sanctification, as the fruit of his Redemption. However there can be a dispute about the way in which Christ accomplished that institution. Therefore we will now take up this question.

ARTICLE I

ON THE FACT OF THE INSTITUTION OF THE SACRAMENTS BY CHRIST

Thesis 16. Christ as man instituted immediately all the sacraments of the New Law.

S.Th. III, q. 64, a. 2f.; Lennerz, 475-515; Lercher-Dander, 71-76; Puig, 44-55.

139. Definition of terms. *Christ as man,* that is, Christ by his human will. A threefold power must be distinguished concerning the sanctification of men:

a) *The power of authority:* it is a supreme and independent power of all sanctification. This belongs to God alone. According to this power God is said to have instituted the sacraments, or also Christ inasmuch as he is

God; namely, as the principal cause, and it is from this that the sacraments ultimately have the power to be efficacious signs of grace.

b) *The power of excellence* (or of the principal minister): it is the power communicated by God to the humanity of Christ, hypostatically united with the Word. This belongs to Christ. According to this power Christ as man is said to have instituted the sacraments; namely, as the instrumental cause united to the Divinity, from which proximately the sacraments have the power to be efficacious signs of grace.

c) *The power of the minister:* it is the power communicated by Christ to some man, as His vicar. This can belong to any man to whom it is communicated by Christ. According to this power the question can be raised whether the Apostles or the Church, in the name of Christ, ever instituted a sacrament.[1]

Instituted sacraments, that is, he determined efficaciously the existence of the sacraments. The concept of the institutor of a sacrament comprehends two more points: that he makes it to exist both as a sign signifying grace and as a sign conferring grace. The first requires that the institutor decide what graces *are to be signified*, and that he gives them the *power of signifying* with sensible signs. The second requires that the institutor give to those signs, which already signify grace, *the power of conferring it.* We say that Christ did these three things, concerning all the sacraments, by his human will.

Immediately, that is, Christ did these three things we just mentioned directly by himself, and not through someone else. There is no obstacle to this immediacy to be found in the fact that Christ also communicated to someone the authority to determine the external rites more accurately. However, this must be done in such a way that the rite has the signification and efficacy already determined by Christ. For in this case Christ really per se and directly would decide to give *sanctifying grace,* would give to the rite its *full meaning* and would give it *the power of sanctifying.*[2]

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1. St. Thomas acknowledges this threefold power in III, q. 64, a. 3f.; see Suarez, *In 3* q.22 disp.47 s.1.
2. There is a dispute among theologians about what is required that someone truly be able to be said to the institutor of a sacrament. For they suppose that God would be able to give someone the power of designating the matter and form of a sacrament. In this case, some hold that this does not suffice that he be thought to be the institutor of a sacrament; thus among others Scotus (*In 4* d.1 q.3 a.2), Durandus (*In 4* d.2 q.1), Biel (*In 4* d.2 a.3 dub.2) and Vázquez (*In 3* disp.135 ep.2). On the contrary, others hold that it does suffice; thus among others Suarez (*In 3* q.64 disp.12 a.2) and Lugo (*De sacramentis in genere* disp.7 s.2 n.24); see S.Th. III, q. 64, a. 4. On this occasion Lugo (*loc.cit.*, n.29-36) accurately distinguishes what is required for someone really to be considered the institutor of a sacrament and he says more or less what we have in our text. On this matter see also, J.P. Haren, *Christus secundum quod homo instituit sacramenta:* ThSt 7 (1946) 189-212.

140. Adversaries. *Protestants* deny that the sacraments have a divine origin or that they are from Christ. "Confirmation and Extreme Unction are rites accepted by the Fathers; wherefore it is not useless to distinguish these from the higher ones [from Baptism, Absolution, Eucharist] which have an express mandate of God and a clear promise of grace."[3] "The rest of the sacraments [besides Baptism and the Lord's Supper] are only ceremonies; for they introduce nothing in the Church of God. Therefore not undeservedly they are taken away; for they were not instituted by God so we do not find anything in them in the Church."[4]

Modernists held that the sacraments were instituted by Christ only mediately, as also the Church herself. See D 3429-3451.

Scotus and many *Scotists* denied that Christ as man instituted the sacraments, inasmuch as they did not admit that Christ by his human will could infallibly join the efficacy of grace with a definite sensible sign chosen by his human will. Thus also Biel.[5]

141. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* sess.7 cn.1 (D 1601): "If anyone says that the sacraments of the New Law were not all instituted by Jesus Christ our Lord., let him be anathema." This canon took its origin from the first of the articles that the theologians added to the previous list of Protestant errors: "All the sacraments were not instituted by Christ."[6] To the first version of the canon the only words added were "our Lord." Therefore, by this canon the Protestant opinion is condemned which denied the divine origin of some of the sacraments. Hence in the canon it is defined that there is no sacrament that was not instituted by Christ, at least according as Christ is God; nothing is said about Christ the institutor *inasmuch as he is a man.* On the other hand, the meaning of the canon is extended to the *immediate* institution of all the sacraments by Christ. For, the Protestants really denied this (although they did not use the word);

3. Melanchton, *Apologia Confessionis Augustanae* a.13: *Corpus Reformatorum* 27,286f.
4. *Zwingli, De vera et falsa religione: Opera* 3,231.
5. Scotus, *In4* d.1 q.3; Jerome A Montefortino, *In 3* q.64 a.3; Frassen, *Scotus Academicus* 10 disp. prooem a.2; G. Biel, *In 4* d.1 q.2 dub.2. Scotus admits both that Christ as God instituted all the sacraments, and as man was the meritorious cause of the sacraments. Many older theologians speak in such a way that they seem to deny that some of the sacraments were instituted immediately by Christ. However, although they speak obscurely from a defect of terminology and of a sufficient development of the problem, they are treating rather the determination of the matter and form of each sacramental sign. See L. Guillaume, *De institutione sacramentorum et speciatim confirmationis iuxta Alexandrum Halensem, O.F.M.:* Ant 2 (1927) 437-468; J. Bittremieux, *L'institution des sacrements d'après Alexandre de Halès:* EphThLov 9 (1932) 234-251; *L'institution des sacrements d'après saint Bonaventure:* EtFranc 35 (1933) 129152, 225-240, 337-365; H. Baril, *La doctrine de saint Bonaventure sur l'institution des sacrements* (Montreal 1954); Fr. Scholz, *Die Lehre von der Einsetzung der Sakramente nach Alexander von Hales* (Breslau 1940). Lennerz has gathered together the main texts of these authors, 483-498.
6. CTr 5,867.

but this point was defended by all the theologians of the time. Moreover, the Council expressly attributes this immediate institution to Christ with regard to the Eucharist sess.13 ch.1 and 2 (D 1636f.); regarding Penance sess.14 ch.1 and cn.1 (D 1668, 1701); regarding Extreme Unction sess.14 ch.1 and cn.1 (D 1695, 1716); regarding Orders sess.23 ch.1 and cn.3 (D 1764, 1773); regarding Matrimony sess.24 ch.1 (D 1801; see 1797-1799).[7]

Therefore, the *Tridentine Profession of Faith* must also be understood in this sense (D 1864, see 2536).

St. Pius X condemned the errors of the Modernists (D 3439-3451).

Theological note. The immediate institution of all the sacraments by Christ is *defined divine and Catholic faith.* Their institution by Christ as man is *the more common and probable* opinion.

142. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) It is taught expressly in Scripture that Christ instituted immediately Baptism (Matt. 28:19), the Eucharist and Orders (1 Cor. 11:23-26), and Penance (John 20:22f.). Nothing is said in it about the immediate institution of the other sacraments.

b) But on the one hand, it is certain from Scripture that Christ had the power to institute all the other sacraments, since universal power had been given to him which he uses to institute Baptism (Matt. 28:18f.); on the other hand, in Scripture the Apostles are shown only as ministers and dispensers of the mysteries of God (1 Cor. 4:1). Therefore, this convinces us that all the sacraments were instituted immediately by Christ.[8]

c) Where perhaps it may be possible to suspect that an Apostle instituted a sacrament (Jas. 5:14), we know for certain that that text cannot be so understood, but that James in it was only promulgating a sacrament instituted by Christ (D 1695).

143. Proof from tradition. a) The Fathers speak about the immediate institution of several sacraments by Christ, and on the other hand they are totally silent about an institution made by the Church. St. Justin (R 135), Origen (R 500), St. Ephraem (707f.), St. Ambrose (R 1297). They say expressly that Christ is the author of the sacraments: St. Augustine (R 1419). They say that the sacraments flowed forth from the side of the dead

7. See M. de Baets, *Quelle question le Concile deTrente a entendu trancher touchant l'institution des sacrements par le Christ:* RevThom 14 (1906) 31-47; W. Hoch, *Die Anfänge der Firmung in Lichte der Trienter Konzilsverhandlungen:* ThQschr 94 (1912) 428-452; F. Cavallera, *Le décret du Concile de Trente sur les sacrements en général:* BullLittEccl 6 (1914) 407-417; J. Bittremieux, *La doctrine de saint Bonaventure et le Concile de Trente:* EtFranc 35 (1923) 225-240.

8. Suarez, *In 3* q.64 disp.12 s.1 n.4.

Christ: St. Augustine (R 1814).

b) Theologians, when the question is raised expressly about the institution of all the sacraments,[9] affirm the immediate institution by Christ, although then in the further determination of the question they differ from each other considerably.[10]

144. Theological reasoning. a) Christ is *the immediate institutor of the Church.* Therefore, he had to constitute by Himself the essential elements of the Church. But among the essential elements of the Church are the sacraments, not only in general, but also in concrete cases. Therefore, Christ immediately instituted all the sacraments.

b) The institution of the sacraments pertains *to the redemptive work* of Christ. But Christ effected Redemption as a man, that is, by the acts of his human nature. Therefore he also instituted the sacraments as a man.

The major. The institution of the sacraments is only the determination of the way in which men can participate in the fruit of the Redemption. Therefore, it pertains to the redemptive work of Christ, not indeed in the first stage of meriting grace, but in the second stage of applying grace.[11]

145. Objection. God in the work proper to him, such as the production of grace, cannot be subject to any creature. But he would be subject to the humanity of Christ, if Christ as man instituted the sacraments.[12]

I distinguish the major. God cannot be subject to a creature acting independently of Him, *conceded;* to a creature acting with the power given by Himself, *denied. I distinguish the minor in the same way.* God would be subject to the humanity of Christ, acting with power given to him by Himself, *conceded;* to him acting with a power independently from God, *denied.* Christ as man instituted the sacraments not with the power of authority, but with the power of excellence.

9. It seems that the first one to pose this question expressly is Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.4 q.1 m.3; q.5 m.2.
10. See what we said above in n. 140, note 5.
11. On this whole question, see Pourrat, 268-315.
12. Scotus, *In 4* d.2 q.1.

ARTICLE II

ON THE WAY OF THE INSTITUTION OF THE SACRAMENTS BY CHRIST

146. We have seen that Christ instituted the sacraments at least in the sense that he both determined the sacramental graces and imposed on them the power of signifying them with certain signs, and he endowed them with the power of sanctifying by the same signs. So therefore Christ at least established the rite as a sign signifying and conferring grace.

But it can be asked further whether this immediate institution of Christ went all the way *to the determination of the sensible rite itself.* Of course, it is clear that the signifying matter itself was in some sense already determined by Christ. But we now ask what limits this determination exercised. For, since the rite coalesces out of matter and form, it can be asked further whether Christ determined *the matter and the form of each sacrament.*

Thesis 17. It is not certain that Christ instituted all the sacraments according to an unchangeable species.

Lennerz, 516-532; Lercher-Dander, 77-80; Puig, 55.

147. Definition of terms. *It is not certain,* that is, it is not proved, or there is no cogent argument for affirming the institution of all the sacraments by Christ according to an unchangeable species. Therefore the thesis is negative only.

He instituted according to a species, that is, he determined the essential parts of the sacramental rite, the matter and the form, in the way that today is required for the validity of the sacraments, v.gr. for Confirmation the anointing with chrism and the use of definite words. This institution as to species is opposed to *institution in general,* that is, whereby the sacramental rite is determined by its institutor (by Christ) only in a general way, as a rite (coalescing out of one part less determined and out of another part more determined and determining something else) signifying this or that grace in concrete, without further determining what that rite would be; v.gr. for Confirmation a rite, which of itself is apt to signify the conferring of the Holy Spirit, whatever it might be. In this second case, it is required that the immediate institutor of the sacrament give to someone (the Church or the Apostles) the power to determine more accurately the rite in a specific way; v.gr., for Confirmation, the imposition of hands, or the anointing.

The institution of the sacraments is said to be *according to a changeless*

species, if the matter and form have been so determined by Christ the institutor that they must be preserved without any change according to the common estimation of men; v.gr., what always remains the same is the wine, whether white or red; the bread, whether unleavened or leavened; washing, whether by immersion or infusion or aspersion. All of these are not essential changes according to the common estimation of men. It is opposed *to an institution in a changeable species,* according to which Christ is said to have so determined the matter and form that he gave the Church the power of determining it more accurately or of even increasing it with new essential elements, provided that it always remains what Christ instituted; v.gr., if Christ instituted for Confirmation the imposition of hands, and then the Church (based on the power received from Christ) determines to add anointing.

148. A problem presents itself from this consideration: On the one hand, the Church cannot change the "substance" of the sacraments, that is, what was established by Christ as essential for each sacrament. On the other hand, from a historical point of view many changes seem to have been made in the matter and form, which pertains to the validity of the sacraments. Thus, "baptism by immersion, infusion, aspersion; the trinitarian form of baptism, and baptism in the name of Jesus or in the name of Christ (which many theologians thought was valid and in use, at least during the time of the Apostles); confirmation by the imposition of hands only, or by an anointing made with chrism, or the imposition of the hand of the one anointing; various forms of confirmation; in the Holy Eucharist unleavened bread or leavened bread; in penance, words asking for absolution or declaring it; in extreme unction oil blessed by the bishop, or by a simple priest; conferring of orders by the imposition alone of the hands (as among the Greeks) or by the handing over alone of the instruments (as some theologians think), or by both together (as other theologians believe."[1]

A priori it must be said that either these changes *de facto did not take place* (that is, historically it is not proved that what was done in the past concerned the validity of the sacraments); or, that they do not pertain to the *substance* of the sacraments as it was established by Christ. Hence there is a question: what is the nature of the substance of the sacraments that was determined by Christ?

1. Lennerz, 517.

149. Opinions. *The first opinion* holds that Christ instituted all the sacraments according *to an unchangeable species.* In this opinion some changes are admitted; but they are such that they do not essentially change the matter and form already established by Christ, according to the moral estimation of men. The substance of the sacrament is understood to be the matter and form in a species (not individually) determined by Christ. Thus Toledo, Suarez, St. Bellarmine, Vázquez, St. Alphonsus Liguori, Franzelin, Pesch, Sasse, and many others.[2]

The second opinion holds that Christ instituted all the sacraments *according to an unchangeable species;* but in such a way that he gave the Church the power of adding *conditions of validity* on the part of the rite itself, whereby the matter and form themselves are not changed, but they do not have an effect unless that necessary condition is fulfilled; v.gr., for confirmation Christ instituted the imposition of hands, and the Church added the anointing; the former remains even now the one essential matter of Confirmation, the latter is only a condition of validity. In this opinion the substance of the sacraments is understood to be the matter and form specifically as determined by Christ. Thus Umberg.[3]

The third opinion holds that Christ instituted the sacraments *in a changeable species.* In this opinion changes are admitted, which pertain to the validity of the sacraments; by these, however, what was instituted by Christ concerning the matter and form is not taken away by the Church, but it is more accurately determined and developed. The substance of the sacrament is understood to be what was instituted by Christ regarding the matter and form. Thus F. Schmid; De Smet holds something similar.[4]

The fourth opinion holds that Christ did not institute all the sacraments specifically, but *some of them only in general.* Christ in some sense determined the sacramental signs. But he gave the Apostles and the Church the power to determine the matter and form, when these were not determined by Himself. In this opinion changes are admitted in the matter and form, inasmuch as these were not determined by Christ. The substance of the sacrament is understood to be its signification, and in the matter itself signifying whatever was instituted by Christ. Thus, v.gr., the substance

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2. Toledo, *In 3* q.64 a.2; Suarez, *In 3* q.64 disp.12 s.1; disp.2 s.3; St. Bellarmine, *De sacramentis in genere* 1,21; Vázquez, *In 3* disp.129 ch.5; St. Alphonus Liguori, *Theologia Moralis* lib.2 n.12; Franzelin, *De sacramentis in genere* th.5; Pesch, *De sacramentis in genere* 222; Sasse, th.22; De Augustinis, *De sacramentis* th.13; Tepe, *De sacramentis in genere* 23f.
3. *Systema sacramentorum* 33-42. An example of this is found in a last will and testament, whose essence is the expression of the will of the testator, but the civil law can attach to it essential conditions in order for that will to have actual validity.
4. Schmid, *Die Gewalt der Kirche bezüglich der Sakramente:* ZkathTh 32 (1908) 43-54, 254-288; De Smet, *De sacramentis* 90ff.

of Confirmation is the signification of the conferring of the Holy Spirit and such matter and form, in which some action and certain words would signify that conferral; but the Church could determine the action, so that at one time it was the imposition of hands, and at another time anointing. This change does not pertain to the substance of the sacraments. Therefore it is necessary to study each sacrament to see whether it was instituted by Christ specifically, or only in general. Thus Lugo, Arriaga, Salmanticenses, Gonet, Billuart, Wirceburgenses, Hurter, Billot Van Noort.[5]

150. We say that the institution of all the sacraments in unchangeable species by Christ *has not been proved.*[6] But from that an institution in general still does not follow; for there could be an institution in a changeable species; or even in an unchangeable species, if some new arguments are presented which are totally convincing.

Theological note. Our opinion is *more probable.*

151. Argument. a) Pius XII in a recent Apostolic Constitution "Sacramentum Ordinis" supposes that something can pertain to validity in the matter of a sacramental rite, which was not instituted by Christ, which is determined by the Church and which as such is changeable. But this supposition proves that the possibility of a generic institution of some sacraments is not excluded from the mind of the Church. Therefore it is not certain that Christ instituted all the sacraments in an unchangeable species.

The major. The Pontiff says that the Roman Church always recognized the validity of the ordinations of the Greeks, which were made without the handing over of the instruments; and that the Council of Florence did not order the Greeks to change the essential rite of ordination, or that the handing over of the instruments should be added to it. "From this it is concluded, also according to the mind of the Council of Florence, that the handing over of the instruments was not required by the will of our Lord Jesus Christ for the substance and validity of this sacrament. But if because of the will and prescription of the Church those things at one time were necessary, even for validity, everyone knows that the Church can change and abrogate what it previously decided."[7] Therefore, the handing over of the instruments was not instituted by Christ as the matter of the

5. Lugo, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.7 s.2 n.2-37; Arriaga, *De sacramentis in genere* disp.6; Salmanticenses, *Cursus theologiae moralis,* tr. De sacramentis in genere ch.4 n.48; Wirceburgenses, *De sacramentis in genere;* Hurter, *De sacramentis in genere* 207; Billot, *De Ecclesiae sacramentis* 1,35.171; Van Noort, *De sacramentis* 1,101.
6. Lennerz also says the same, 516-532.
7. AAS 40 (1948) 5.

sacrament of Orders; it is possible that at one time it was established by the Church as necessary for validity; therefore it is something changeable.

The minor. It is true that the Pontiff there is speaking only hypothetically. But Hürth points out very well: "This way of speaking supposes: that according to the judgment of the Church the institution of the sacraments by Christ in general up till now has not been proved to be impossible; for, with simply impossible things or with things that certainly do not exist, the Church in her documents is not accustomed to be concerned.[8]

152. b) *The documents of the Church,* which are quoted in opposition, are really not convincing:

Clement IV (D 1061) asks an Armenian Catholic: "Whether you have believed and still believe that, with respect to the administration of the Church's sacraments, the Roman Pontiff, *while always preserving those matters that pertain to the integrity and necessity of the sacraments,* can tolerate diverse rites of the churches of Christ and even grant that they be maintained." In this text it is said that there are some things concerning which the Roman Pontiff can do nothing; and that they are what pertains to the integrity and necessity of the sacraments. But what does pertain to that integrity and necessity is not explained.

The Council of Trent sess.21 ch.2 (D 1728) declares: "that, in the administration of the sacraments—*provided their substance is preserved*—there has always been in the Church that power to determine or modify what she judged more expedient." This power of the Church over the sacraments is limited to what does not pertain to the substance of the sacraments. But it is necessary to ask what is understood in the text by the "substance of the sacraments." There has been much debate over this point. Some hold that the substance of the sacraments there must be understood concretely to refer to the matter and form, according to the common estimation of men. Others say that it must indeed be understood about the matter and form, but only inasmuch as they have been instituted by Christ. Finally, others defend the idea that it must be understood about the metaphysical composition of the sign, inasmuch as the substance is given first in the signification, and then according to certain limits in the thing signifying, according as these two elements have been defined by Christ.[9] But now we have an

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8. *Commentarius in Const. Apost. "Sacramentum Ordinis":* Per 37 (1948) 13.
9. See H. Lennerz, *Salva illorum substantia:* Greg 3 (1922) 358-419; J. B. Umberg, *Die Bedeutung der tridentinische, "salva illorum substantia":* ZkathTh 48 (1924) 161-195; A. D'Ales, *Salva illorum substantia:* EphThLov 1 (1924) 497-504; Puig, 55; H. Dondaine, *Substantia sacramentorum:* RevPhTh 29 (1940) 218-243; A. Poyer, *A propos du "salva illorum substantia":* DivThom (Pi) 56 (1953) 38-66; *Nouveaux propos sur le "salva illorum substantia":* ibid. 57 (1954) 3-24.

authentic declaration of the Church: "Since. the Church has no power over the substance of the sacraments, that is, over those things which, based on the testimony of the sources of revelation, Christ the Lord himself said must be preserved in the sacramental sign."[10] Therefore from that text of the Council nothing can be concluded regarding a specific institution.

St. Pius X (D 3556) condemned the opinion, "which holds that among the Greeks the words of consecration do not produce any effect unless the prayer called the epiclesis is recited," and which was instituted by the Church, not by Christ; "while it is known that the Church does not possess in any way the right to innovate in regard to what pertains *to the very substance of the sacraments.*" In this text the Church is denied the power to establish anything that changes the nature of the essential elements instituted by Christ. Hence the proposed solution "of the conditions of validity" seems to be excluded. Again in the text the substances of the sacraments are called the essential elements established by Christ. But it is not said what those elements are.

Hence the *possibility* of a generic institution is not excluded. Therefore *it is not certain* that Christ instituted all the sacraments *in an unchangeable species.*[11]

153. Scholium 1. *On the necessity of the sacraments.* The Council of Trent sess.7 cn.4 (D 1604) expresses the necessity of the sacraments in this way: "If anyone says that the sacraments of the New Law are not necessary for salvation, but that they are superfluous; and that without the sacraments or the desire for them men obtain from God the grace of justification through faith alone (although it is true that not all the sacraments are necessary for each person), let him be anathema." In order to have a full understanding of this canon, these points should be noted about its history:

a) The second error of the Protestants, proposed for the judgment of the theologians, was this: "the sacraments are not necessary, and without them or the desire of them, by faith alone, men can obtain the grace of God."[12] Already there the origin of the canon appears and especially *its first part*, which proposes the general necessity of the sacraments in opposition to the Protestant theory of justification by fiducial faith alone.

b) After the debate of the theologians, this article was stated which seemed to many theologians that it should not be condemned without some declaration: "Some think that this article should not be condemned in its present form, but with an addition, in order to say that they are not necessary in the Church; because the individual sacraments are not necessary for each person. Others wanted it to be condemned outright, since it had already

10. Pius XII, *Const. Apost. "Sacramentum Ordinis":* AAS 40 (1948) 5.
11. On this whole question, see Harent, *La part de l'Eglise dans la détermination du rite sacramental:* Et 72 (1897) 315-336; Hugueny, *L'institution des sacrements:* RevScPhTh 8 (19140 236 257; J.B. Umberg, *Zur Gewalt der Kirche über die Sakramente:* Kath 95 (1915, II) 25-40; G. Sola, ¿Instituyo Jesucristo en especie todos los sacraamentos?: RevEcl 18 (1926) 522-525; A. Michel, *Sacrements:* DTC 14,536-577; D. Van den Eynde, *De modo institutionis sacramentorum:* Ant 27 (1952) 3-10.
12. CTr 5,835.

been condemned."[13] Here a new element appears, which is found *in the second part of the canon*, that is, a limitation of that necessity because not all the sacraments are necessary for each person. But at the same time something else pops up, which was then debated, namely, the phrase "in the Church"; according to this the meaning of the canon would have been rather a social necessity only, not an individual necessity of the sacraments.

c) The Fathers thought that this article should be simply condemned and they proposed that this should be said: "necessary for the salvation of men."[14] This phrase again gave the canon the meaning rather of individual necessity. Also, many thought that the words "in the Church" should not be added.

d) However in the first draft of the canon this was added: "If anyone says that sacraments of this kind in the Church are not necessary for salvation, but that they are superfluous; and that without them or the desire of them, by faith alone, men obtain the grace of justification from God, let him be anathema."[15] *The last part of the canon,* which had already been proposed by the theologians, does not yet appear; also, the words "in the Church" are there. These two points give no small ambiguity to this first draft of the canon. Hence the various criticisms of the Fathers concerned especially the phrase "in the Church" and also the word "justification."[16]

e) To remove all ambiguity, the bishop theologians, to whom had been committed a new draft of the canon, thought that the phrase "in the Church" should be dropped," and at the end should be added "although it is true that not all the sacraments are necessary for each person"; they also decided to substitute "of the New Law" for "of this kind."[17] This new version of the canon pleased all the Fathers and so it was defined.

154. Scholium 2. *On the rites of the sacraments.* The Council of Trent sess.7 cn.13 (D 1613) deals with the power of the minister regarding the rites of the administration of the sacraments. This canon takes its origin from the Protestant error: "Any pastor has the power to lengthen or shorten or change the forms of the sacraments as he wishes."[18] The first draft of the canon read: "If anyone says that the accepted rites of the holy Roman Church that are customarily used in the solemn administration of the sacraments may be despised or omitted without sin by the ministers or that they may be changed to other new rites by any pastor in the Church, let him be anathema."[19] This error was not new in the Church. Thus, v.gr., among the errors of the followers of Wycliffe and Hus there is a similar error (D 1255). The Tridentine definition appears also in the profession of faith (D 1864).

13. CTr 5,865.
14. CTr 5,971.
15. CTr 5,984.
16. CTr 5,991.
17. CTr 5,992.
18. CTr 5,836.
19. CTr 5,984.

APPENDIX

ON THE SACRAMENTALS

155. The sacramentals are in accordance with the concept and the reality of the sacraments.

Sacramentals come in two forms: a) Rites, which the Church observes in the administration of the sacraments; b) Other rites, which outside the administration of the sacraments are made use of by the faithful for pious purposes.

The *sacramentals* taken in a precise sense are understood in this second sense and are *defined:* they are sacred signs, customarily used by the Church, in order to implore fruits for the faithful by the prayer of the Church. This definition should be understood by its similarity with the sacraments. For the sacramentals are also sacred signs; however, they were instituted not by Christ, but by the Church. They should be considered as the objective will of the Church, similar to the way in which the sacraments are the objective will of Christ. And just as by this signification of the efficacious will of Christ God produces grace in the sacraments, so by that will of the Church, imploring for her children, God produces the effects of the sacramentals.

The *number* of the sacramentals varies greatly. But they are customarily reduced to six kinds: praying (the Lord's prayer and other public prayers), dipping (holy water and various anointings), eating (eating blessed foods), confessing (general confession at holy Communion, at Mass, in the Divine Office), giving (alms), blessing (various blessings). However, the Lord's Prayer and alms hardly seem to be listed among the sacramentals.

The *effect* of the sacramentals is not sanctifying grace. But what effect each one has must be gathered from the nature of each one. Therefore, the sacramentals have the power to drive out devils, but this is a moral and not a physical power; they also free one from sins and from the punishment for sins, that is, from venial sins and from their temporal punishments by stirring up in the faithful good feelings of compunction; they also obtain from God temporal goods.

This efficacy of the sacramentals is not *ex opere operato,* and it is also not *ex opere operantis,* as if their efficacy were the same as that which the good works of the faithful have. The efficacy of the sacramentals is found in the fact that they are the petitions of the Church, which, as being acceptable to God, are efficacious in a special way; but they do not infallibly produce an effect. Therefore the efficacy of the sacramentals is quasi *ex opere operato,* or *ex opere operantis Ecclesiae* (from the work of the imploring Church).[1]

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1. See Pesch, *De sacramentis in genere* 328-346; Sasse, *Institutiones theologicae de sacramentis Ecclesiae* 1,191-195; A. Michel, *Sacramentaux:* DTC 14,465-482; Doronzo, 539-560.

TREATISE II

ON THE SACRAMENTS OF CHRISTIAN INITIATION

OR

ON BAPTISM AND CONFIRMATION

by

Francisco A P. Solá, S.J.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

On the sacraments in particular, one by one

Although the individual sacraments agree with one another in the nature of a sign, and also have many things in common, nevertheless they also are quite different so that all the various points cannot be treated in just one treatise. Therefore, after what is more general and common to all the sacraments has been treated, it is necessary next to consider each of the sacraments individually.

But since already in the preceding treatise some of the questions covered are absolute, the same points will not be repeated, or will be mentioned only briefly. Therefore, we will treat the matters that present a special difficulty, or are peculiar to the nature of each sacrament and seem to demand their own special demonstration.

Moreover, the sacraments concern practical Christian life, and by their very nature are subject to their own juridical, moral and liturgical directives. Therefore we will consider only those aspects that pertain to dogmatic theology; other points are referred to their proper disciplines.

BOOK I

ON THE SACRAMENT OF BAPTISM

INTRODUCTION

1. In the N.T. the word βάπτισμα (Matt. 3:7; 21:5 etc.) occurs frequently and also βαπτισμός (Mark 7:4; Heb. 6:2; 9:10), which is derived from the word βάπτω (Luke 16:24; John 13:26; Rev. 19:13), whose usual form of βαπτίζω is more common.[1] The word βαπτιστής also occurs at times, which refers to St. John the Precursor of Christ.

The verb βαπτίζω, which had already been used by profane authors,[2] signifies *I immerse, I wash;* but it can also have a metaphorical sense and signify *I am freed from evils, I am immersed in good or evil.*

Both meanings are found in the N.T.: *The Pharisee was astonished to see that he did not* first wash (baptizatus) *before dinner* (Luke 11:38; see Mark 7:4); *I have a* baptism *to be* baptized *with; and how I am constrained until it is accomplished* (Luke 12:50; see Mark 10:38); *I have* baptized *you with water; but he will* baptize *you with the Holy Spirit* (Mark 1:8; see Matt. 3:11; Luke 3:16; John 1:33).

2. But the word is used especially to signify a rite of sacred washing which has a connection with the forgiveness of sins. This rite appears in three forms:

a) used by John the Baptist (Matt. 3 passim);

b) used also by the disciples of Christ (John 3:32; 4:2);

c) instituted by Christ the Lord (Matt. 28:19).[3]

Besides the verb βαπτίζω the substantive word is also found, which appears under the forms of βαπτισμός, βάπτισμα, to which in the Vulgate translation the Latin words *baptismus, baptisma* correspond. The meaning of these words is the same as that of the verbal form.[4]

3. Baptism is described by the holy Fathers with different names:

1. All the texts of the New Testament in which the words βάπτισμα, βαπτισμός, βαπτίζειν are found are quoted by D'Ales, *De Baptismo et Confirmatione,* p.VIf. (Paris 1927); DBS 1,852f.
2. See G. Kittel[2], *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* 1,527ff. (Stuttgart 1949); D. Walter Bauer[4], *Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Berlin 1950) 1,239ff.
3. F. Zorell, *Lexicon graecum N.T.* col.208-211 (Paris 1931); Kittel, *loc.cit.;* J. Ballamy: DTC 2,167.
4. For the meaning of the expressions "to baptize in Christ," "to baptize into Christ," etc., see H. Lennerz, *De Sacramento Baptismi;* Zorell, *op.cit.,* 210; E. Reñé Y Oró: βαπτίζειν (ἐσθαι) εἰς τινα εἰς ὄνομα τινος: Anal-SacraTarrac 1 (1925) 115-143.

a) *From its matter* it is called a washing, the sacrament of water, the water of life, the fountain of life, the fountain of salvation, etc.[5]

b) *From its form* it is called the Sacrament of the Trinity, the Sacrament of faith, etc.[6]

c) *From its effect* it is called: washing, regeneration, spiritual renascence, genital water, washing of renewal, a new birth, the sacrament of a new life, the sacrament of eternal salvation, the seal of faith, the seal of the Trinity, seal of the Lord, seal of faith, seal of water, seal of regeneration, the unbreakable seal, illumination, the burial of man in Christ, etc.[7]

4. From the first centuries of Christianity the Catholic doctrine on Baptism always remained invariable and fixed, although it was not always proposed in the same way.

The Fathers, both Greek and Latin, following in the steps of the Apostles, treat Baptism as a washing that cleans the soul, a way of communicating the Holy Spirit to men, a sacrament of regeneration and entrance into the Church; against heretics they defend it as efficacious *ex opere operato* and as not repeatable because of the character which it imprints on the soul.[8]

During the following centuries the theologians, especially the scholastics, as in general they developed all theology, so also the doctrine on Baptism; and they clarified many questions, but in particular they determined the effects of this sacrament.

Doubts, if there were any, pertained rather to the praxis rather than to the doctrine; therefore it is not surprising that the doctrine on Baptism was peacefully transmitted in the Catholic Church until the Protestants vigorously attacked it.

5. *The Reformers* completely overturned the doctrine on Baptism, although apparently they were said to admit its sacramentality. For, in addition to the fact they rejected the true notion of a sacrament, Luther denied the baptismal character and said that Baptism is only a certain

5. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 1,6: MG 8,281; *Didaché* 7,1: ed. Funk. 1,16-18; St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 73,11: ML 3,1116; Tertullian, *De Baptismo* 1: ML 1,1187;
6. St. Augustine, *Serm. 269,2:* ML 38,1235; Tertuallian, *De Paenitentia* 6: ML 1,1239.
7. Tit. 3:5; Rom. 6:4; Heb. 6:4; 10:32; St. Hilary, *In Ps.63* 11: ML 9,412; *De Trinitate* 12,56: ML 10,472; Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 4,25: MG 8,1369; Tertullian, *De Bapt.* 420: ML 1,1204-1224; St. Justin, *Apologia* 1,61: MG 6,420; St. Augustine, *Contra Cresc.* 2,13.16: ML 43,476; *Epist.* 88,9: ML 33,307; Ps. Dionysius, *De Eccl. Hierarch.* 2,1.2: MG 2,392; Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 3,23: MG 20,260; St. Basil, *Advers. Eunom.* 3,5: MG 29,665; *De Bapt.* homil.13,4,5: MG 31,432-433; St. John Chrysostom, *In 2 Cor.* homil.3.7: MG 61,418; *Ad illuminat.* Cat.1: MG 49,225; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* 3,4: MG 33,432; *Catech.* 1,2: MG 33,372. See also G. Bareille: DTC 2,179. See DBS 1,864-871.
8. DTC 2,200-206.

covenant between God and the neophyte.[9] Zwingli considered Baptism as a rite of initiation, whereby a believer enlists himself in the army of Christ, declares that he wants to be his disciple and is admitted into the people of God.[10] According to Calvin, Baptism is something more than a mere initiation; it is a certain divine legation and sign by which the baptized person manifests his crucifixion with Christ.[11] The *Anabaptists* consider Baptism as a simple washing without any internal effect; it is a symbol or symbolic rite whereby men enter into a more perfect society.[12]

The Anglican church was not more faithful to the ancient tradition, and gradually they relaxed the ancient notion of Baptism.

Neo-Lutherans wanted to regain the value of Baptism, but all they did was to attribute to it the effect of a certain spiritual union with Christ and of a public confession of faith in the Trinity.[13]

Rationalists claim a dogmatic evolution based on the rites of purification of the Jews. The first community of Christians under the influence of John the Baptist accepted the baptismal rite to signify a purity of life which it hoped to attain. But when the "divinization" had been perfected by the Christians, baptism became the rite of initiation and a symbol of union with Christ, who had wanted to be baptized. However, the opinions of the rationalists about the evolution of baptism differ widely among them; for, while some admit a Pauline influence (Holzmann, Hetmüller, Dietrich.), others (Loisy, Bousset, Reitzenstein.) totally reject this influence.[14]

More recent Protestants appear to be no less in disagreement. We will treat later the controversy between Karl Barth and Oscar Cullmann when we consider the subject of Baptism (n. 87).

9. *Sermo de Baptismo,* Luthers Works 2,724-737.
10. *De vera et falsa religione* 3,229.
11. *Opera Omnia* 45,822.
12. *Corpus Reformatorum* 3,197.
13. A.H. Strong, *Systematic Theology* vol.3.
14. For a summary of these opinions, see V. Iacono, *Il battesimo nella dottrina di S. Paolo* 15,28; DSB 1,877-886.

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CHAPTER I

On the institution of Baptism

Thesis 1. Christ instituted Baptism as a sacred rite whereby men can enter the Church.

Lennerz, n. 7-9.

6. Connection. On beginning the treatise on Baptism, first of all there is a question about its institution and its sacred use in the Church, into which the faithful are received through it. Just now we do not intend to determine its matter and form; also we do not intend to prove its sacramentality, but for now only to demonstrate its divine origin.

7. Definition of terms. *A sacred rite* is a religious ceremony performed by a competent authority. As a holy thing pertaining to public worship, it must be carried out by a competent person, who will be a religious authority, or some other person endowed with the power delegated to him either implicitly or explicitly.

The Church is understood as the assemblage of the faithful living in a society founded by Christ.

Baptism, as a sacred rite, is a washing with water according to the ceremonies prescribed by the Church. Of them, some are essential, others are accidental; the latter, established by the Church in the course of time, can be omitted in a case of emergency, but the former, mandated by Christ, can never be omitted without the danger of nullity.

8. Adversaries. Real adversaries of this thesis are not found, except those who deny the necessity of Baptism, as we shall see in the following theses.

9. Doctrine of the Church. *The Synod of Valence III,* cn.5: "Likewise, we believe that we must hold most firmly that all the multitude of the faithful—who have been regenerated from water and the Holy Spirit and, by this, truly incorporated into the Church." (D 632).

The Council of Florence in it Decree for the Armenians: "Among all the sacraments, holy baptism holds the first place because it is the gateway to the spiritual life; by it we are made members of Christ and belong to his body, the Church" (D 1314).

The Council of Trent, in session 14, ch. 2: "It is beyond question that the minister of baptism need not be a judge since the Church does not exercise judgment on anyone who has not first entered her through the gate of baptism (D 1671). The same Council teaches a similar doctrine where it says that men, even children, once they are baptized are subject to the Church (D 1621, 1627).

Pius XII in the Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": "He (Christ) also established Baptism by which those who become believers are inserted into the Body of the Church."[1]

10. Theological note. The thesis is *defined divine and Catholic faith.*

11. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1. John 3:5: *Unless a man is born of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God. Explanation of the text*[2]*:* According to the Greek text it would be: Unless a man is born of water and the Spirit he cannot enter the kingdom of God (or: he cannot see the kingdom of heaven). *Reborn* or *born* have the same meaning; for, they respond to a second birth, as Christ had said above: *Unless a man is born* [Vulgate = reborn] again *he cannot see the kingdom of God* (v. 3). Therefore to be born of water and the Holy Spirit is the same as to be born again γεννηθήναι άνωθεν.

However this saying allows for a double interpretation: άνωθεν = ύψωθεν, from above; άνωθεν = αύθις, again. 1) For the first interpretation this can be said in its favor: a) the context; for it is dealing with a spiritual birth, or heavenly, which also looks to the kingdom of heaven;

b) the frequent use of a similar saying is found also in St. John: 5:31; 19:11; 19:23, together with the Johannine doctrine about the birth of the sons of God (1:1.13; 8:23.47, etc.).

c) the interpretation of the Apostolic Fathers[3] and of the Greeks after Origen[4]; and among the moderns Lagrange[5] and others.

2) In favor of the meaning *again* are the following points: a) the text itself: for, Nicodemus is speaking about rebirth: *how can a man be born when he is old? Can he enter a second time* (δεύτερον) *into his mother's*

1. AAS 35 (1943) 204-205; see also 201.
2. The commentators on this text can be consulted, especially Knabenbauer. Also P. van Imschoot, *Baptème d'eau et Baptème d'Esprit:* EphThLov 13 (1936) 653-666; L. Murillo, *Haurietis aquas in gaudio de fontibus Salvatoris:* VerDom 4 (1924) 169-175; J. Havet, *Les Sacrements et le rôle de l'Esprit Saint d'après Isidore de Sevilla:* EphThLov 16 (1939) 32-93.
3. *2* Clem. 14,2; Funck, 1,200-202; Pastor Hermes, *Mand.* 9,11; 11,5,8.20: ed. Funk, 1,498.506.510.
4. St. Athanasius, *De Incarn.* 8: MG 26,996; Origen and St. John Chrysostom are doubtful about this, *Homil.* 24: MG 59,146.
5. *Evangile selon Saint Jean* (1925) 74-76, note.

womb and be reborn [Greek = be born]? (v. 4) The Lord does not correct his words but explains: *Unless one is born of water and the Spirit... Do not marvel that I said to you: 'You must be born anew* (v. 5-7);

b) The Greek lexicons usually admit this meaning[6];

c) this interpretation is also common among the Fathers[7] and ancient and modern commentators.[8]

This second interpretation is to be preferred, but it is not opposed to the first one, because the new and second generation is spiritual.

Of water and the Holy Spirit. The omission of "*of water*" in one codex only has no value. Therefore this reading is by all means to be retained. In Greek the word "holy" is omitted, but the meaning is not changed. For πνεύμα is spirit in opposition to flesh: *That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit* (v. 6). John had said the same thing in 1:12-14, and in many other places both in the Gospel and in his Epistles.

To enter the kingdom of God or *the kingdom of heaven* (as it appears in many Greek codices) refers to heavenly glory as the last end or terminus of man, but in a beginning way in the Church of Christ, which is often called the kingdom of God.

12. Having made these points, *we ague:* The words of Christ show to Nicodemus the necessity a) of receiving the sacred rite, b) in order to enter the Church. Therefore.

I prove the antecedent. a) The question concerns a sacred rite, because they are talking about spiritual rebirth; and on that must be attained with water; that is, about a sacred rite whose matter or material element will be water.

b) The kingdom of God directly is eternal glory, but one does not attain it except by entering into the Church of Christ,[9] and therefore the Church is also called by Christ "the kingdom of God."[10]

13. 2. Matt. 28:19: *Make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in*

6. F. Zorell, *Lexicon graecum N.T.* 130; G. Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* 1,378; D.W. Bauer, *Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch* 1, the word ἄνωθεν.
7. St. Justin, *Apologia* 1,61: MG 6,420; St. Irenaeus, *Adv. Haeres.* 1,21,1.2: MG 7,657 and elsewhere; Tertullian, *De Baptismo* 13: ML 1,1215; St. Cyprian, *Ad Donatum* 4: ML (*Epist.* 1,4) 4,200: CV 3,3-11; St. Methodius, *Conv.* 8,6: MG 18,148; St. Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto* 15,35: MG 32,128; St. Gregory Naz., *Orat.* 39,1.2: MG 36,386; St. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 51: ML 40,256; *De pecc. mer. remis.* 2,27.43: ML 44,177.
8. V.gr. Knabenbauer, Corluy, at this place.
9. See L. de Grandmaison, *Jésuchrist. Sa personne, son message, ses preuves* (Paris).
10. Salaverri, *De Ecclesia:* Sacrae Theologiae Summa 1,37.53-63; P. Pous, *Evangelium Regni Dei:* VerDom 5 (1952) 193-199, text of John 3:5 on p. 198.

the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Therefore Baptism was instituted by Christ as something necessary in order to enter his Church. For primarily he is speaking about the conversion of men; for Christ sends the Apostles to preach so that they will make disciples: he says "make disciples" [μαθητεύσανε]; if men do not accept baptism they cannot be disciples of Christ. Moreover, when Christ gives this command to the Apostles, he gives them the necessary power: *All authority in heaven and on earth has been given to me. Go therefore and make disciples...* (v.18f.); and, as St. Mark says in the parallel passage: *he who believes and is baptized will be saved* (Mark 16:16).

14. 3. Matt. 3:11: *I baptize you with water for repentance, but he who is coming after me... will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire.* Mark 1:8: *I have baptized you with water; but he will baptize you with the Holy Spirit* (see Luke 3:16; Acts 11:16). With these words John the Baptist announced that the Messiah would institute another baptism which will be similar to what John administered, but not completely the same. For, his baptism was only for penance and in water, but the baptism of the Messiah would be in the Holy Spirit. The baptism that John spoke about is the baptism that Christ (the Messiah) revealed to Nicodemus "in water and the Holy Spirit." But that the Baptist does not speak about water, when he announces the rite to be instituted by Christ, depends on the intention he had of opposing both baptisms, and therefore in his baptism he considers only the material and efficacious element, that is, water and internal penitence. But in the baptism of Christ one must pay attention rather to the internal effect: justification through the purification (fire) of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, what St. John announces in this place refers evidently to the baptism that Christ de facto instituted. Therefore it is that sacred rite necessary for entrance into the Church of Christ.

15. 4. The Apostles baptized all those who wanted to be converted to the Christian way of life. That is what Peter did, on the day of Pentecost, when he added to the Church three thousand men (Acts 2:37-41) and afterwards when he converted the Centurion Cornelius and his family (Acts 10:44-48). Philip, who baptized the Samaritans, did the same thing (Acts 8:12-16). Saul was baptized when he was converted (Acts 9:10-18), etc. This praxis of baptizing neo-converts is constant and universal in the early Church, and indeed as coming from the Apostles as can be seen in the Acts of the Apostles and of St. Paul. But the Apostles would not have done or taught this unless they had received a command from Christ to do this,

or, what comes to the same thing, unless baptism has been prescribed by Christ (for they proclaimed themselves not the initiators but the *dispensers* of the sacraments: 1 Cor. 4:1). Therefore baptism was really instituted by Christ in order to enter into his Church.

16. Gal. 3:25-26: *For in Christ Jesus you are all sons of God, through faith. For as many of you were baptized into Christ have put on Christ*[11] (see also 1 Cor. 12:12). According to St. Paul "to put on Christ" is the same as to follow Christ, to be a disciple of Christ, etc.; but this supposes that one belongs to the Church of Christ. Therefore if by baptism Christians belong to the Church of Christ, it is a sign that this rite was instituted in order to enter the Church.

17. Proof from tradition. It is not necessary to quote texts in favor of this thesis. For, from the following theses it will become clearer how the holy Fathers embraced the present thesis.[12] For there has never been any doubt about the institution of Baptism by Christ, nor about its necessity for entrance into the Church.

18. Theological reasoning. The Church is a visible society. But in every visible society (especially religious) there is customarily some external rite (taken at least in a broad sense) to manifest one's admission and entrance into that society. Therefore it was necessary that Christ also, when he instituted his visible religious society, should establish some external rite, to make clear one's entrance into his society.

19. Scholium. 1. *When did Christ Institute Baptism?* There are different answers to this question:

a) St. Thomas: "A sacrament seems to be instituted when it receives the power to produce its effect. Baptism received this power when Christ was baptized. Therefore then Baptism was really instituted and became a sacrament."[13] This opinion of St. Thomas and of other theologians,[14] should be understood in such a way that it intends to signify that Baptism was in some sense foreshadowed by the matter (water) and form (presence of the Holy Trinity) in the baptism of Christ, but not that it was then instituted with regard to its power and sacramental signification.[15]

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11. On this place, see V. Iacono, *Il battesimo nella dottrina di S. Paolo* 39-44; Lagrange, *Epître aux Galates* at this place.
12. H. Lennerz cites many texts, *De Baptismo* 15-25.
13. III, q. 66, a. 2.
14. Among modern authors this opinion is defended by M. Daffara, O.P., *De Sacramentis et de novissimis* (1944) 243-246; Doronzo, *loc.cit.*, 30-34.
15. Suarez, *De Sacramentis* d.19 s.2 n.4.

b) Estius[16] and a few others place the institution of baptism in the conversation of Christ with Nicodemus. However most theologians do not admit this opinion, because it does not seem probable that such an important sacrament was instituted in a private and secret conversation.

c) The institution was made after the passion of Christ when he commanded his Apostles to teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Thus Alexander of Hales[17] and a few others.[18] They rely on some of the holy Fathers who, like Tertullian,[19] take this position because the sacraments suppose that the passion of Christ has already taken place. But this reason is not valid, because Christ could surely could establish the sacraments before his passion in virtue of his foreseen merits, and actually confer them, as he de facto did at the Last Supper when he committed the Eucharist to the Apostles.

d) Finally, most theologians place the institution of Baptism before the passion of Christ; but there is no agreement on determining the exact moment. Scotus, from the fact that the disciples of Christ baptized (John 3:26; 4:2), draws the conclusion: "It is certain, therefore, that the time of the institution was before the time during which the disciples of Christ were baptizing, although the exact time of the institution is not given in the Gospel."[20] This opinion is generally admitted by theologians and Suarez says of it: "Some modern authors think it is a dogma of faith; however I do not think it is such... but only that this opinion is more probable, more in conformity with Scripture and more common with theologians."[21]

e) At another time St. Thomas had said: "The institution of Baptism took several stages.[22] For it was at first instituted with regard to the matter in the baptism of Christ... And in some way the form was prefigured by the presence of the three persons in a visible sign... And also the fruit of baptism was prefigured there, because the heavens opened up over him. But its necessity was declared in John 3:5... Its use was begun when he sent his disciples to preach and to baptize, as is clear in Matt. 10. It had its efficacy from the passion of Christ with regard to its ultimate effect which is the opening of the door. But its promulgation for all nations was made known in Matt. 28:19 where he said: *Go and make disciples of all nations.*"[23] St. Bonaventure speaks in a similar way: "It should be noted that the Lord first gave some hints about the sacrament of Baptism, secondly he instituted it and thirdly he confirmed its institution."[24] The Seraphic Doctor finds the hint in Christ's baptism and in his conversation with Nicodemus, its institution in the baptism by the Apostles commanded by Christ and carried out before his passion;

16. *In 4* dist.3 s.11.
17. *In 4* q.12 memb.3 a.1; see *Summam* p.4 q.8 membr.2 a.3.
18. M. Cano, *De locis theologicis* 1.8 c.5, where he cites many others.
19. *De Baptismo* 11: ML 1,1212; St. John Chrysostom, *Hom.1.29 in Ioannem* 1: MG 59,170.
20. *In 4* dist.3 q.4.
21. *De Sacramentis* d.19 s.1 n.4.
22. A. Piolanti accepts this synthesis proposed by St. Thomas: "All the opinions contain some truth, but the full truth perhaps is grasped in the synthesis... and this interpretation is strengthened by the authority of St. Thomas" (*De Sacramentis* 129f.).
23. *In 4* dist.3 q.1 a.5 sol.2.
24. *In 4* dist.3 p.2 a.1 q.1.

its confirmation, both in the water flowing from the side of the dead Christ and in his commission to the Apostles before the Ascension as reported in Matt. 28:19.[25]

20. Scholium 2. *On the difference between the baptism of Christ and that of John.* The main difference consists in the sacramentality of Christ's baptism, which John's baptism lacked; for it was only a sacramental disposing people for Christ's baptism.[26]

John himself had already said: *I baptize you with water for repentance, but he who is coming after me is mightier than I...; he will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire* (Matt. 3:11). Here he showed sufficiently that his baptism did not confer grace *ex opere operato*, but only *ex opere operantis*, inasmuch as it disposed people for repentance through humility. Therefore it was called "a baptism for repentance," but the baptism of Christ is for the forgiveness of sins (Acts 2:38), producing its effect *ex opere operato*. Therefore St. Paul, when he learned that the Ephesians had received only the baptism of John, baptized them with the baptism of Jesus (Acts 19:3-5).

The Protestants, and later the rationalists, contended that the baptism of Christ was only an evolution or quasi repetition of John's baptism, so that between the two baptisms there is no real difference. But the Council of Trent defined against the Reformers: "If anyone says that the baptism of John has the same power as the baptism of Christ, let him be anathema" (D 1614).[27]

21. Scholium 3. *On the baptisms or purifications of the Jews.* Rationalists, in search of an evolution of dogma, try to demonstrate the existence of baptism among Christians from the Jewish influence. Therefore they mention, as the origin of Christian baptism, different baptisms and purifications which were in use among Hebrews. There were always among Jews, and also prescribed by Moses,[28] many legal purifications. But the rationalists see a special influence on our baptism in the following points: in the legal ablutions and purifications; in the baptism of proselytes; in the ablutions of the Essenes; in the baptism of John. We covered the last point in the previous scholium; now a brief word about the others.

22. A. *Legal purifications.* They can be reduced to two kinds:

a) Those by which the Levites were separated from the people to constitute a sacerdotal class (Num. 8:6) and those by which they became holy (Lev. 11:14; see the Hebrew text). But these purifications did not constitute a rite of initiation, nor of consecration (for consecration took place through the imposition of hands of the priests: Num.8:10), and they were nothing more than preparations and dispositions.

b) Other purifications were common to all Jews; and they were related to legal cleanliness, lost because of a contamination contracted by some crime or sin. Thus someone who touched a corpse was unclean (Num. 19:11), etc.

25. The opinion of Aphraates is unique, since he places the institution of baptism at the Last Supper: R 690; *Demonstr.* 2,10.
26. III, q. 38, a. 1 ad 1.
27. See St. Robert Bellarmine, *De Baptismo* c.19.
28. F.X. Kortleitner, *Archaeologia biblica* (1917) 355.

It is clear that such purifications do not concern the interior state of the soul but only the external purity, which was required by the law. Although the unclean person was excluded from participation in the external worship and from Jewish society, nevertheless it was not supposed that he had any internal stain if he were not purified, unless he omitted purification out of contempt for the law, or his impurity came from a crime or some grave sin. But in this case the impurity came from the sin, not from the omission of purification.

23. B. *Baptism of proselytes.* According to Jewish custom followed in the first century, proselytes, who converted from the Gentiles to Judaism, if they were men, in addition to circumcision, had to be purified by a washing or baptism; but for women only a washing or baptism was prescribed.[29] And the use of the baptism of proselytes so prevailed that at the end of the first century it was held to be a true and special rite of initiation, even more so than circumcision.[30]

Although proselytes, having been baptized with this Jewish rite, were sometimes called "reborn," still this renascence can in no way be compared with Christian spiritual renascence. For, among the Jews it had to do only with a legal enrollment in the chosen people. But although by conversion to Judaism, after having been circumcised or treated in a similar way, original sin was remitted (unless it has already been remitted), nevertheless, in the case of adults, the effect was obtained *ex opere operantis*, but not *ex opere operato.* And this effect was not attributed to the baptism, but to circumcision or the act of faith and to charity.

24. C. *The baptism of the Essenes.* The Essenes, being part of Judaism, professed a more pure life.[31] From sunrise to noon they worked at farming; and before lunch they were cleaned by a solemn and ritual washing. After lunch they again returned to their work. In addition to this solemn baptism they undertook other purifications or partial or total ablutions, as when, v.gr., a member was touched by someone foreign or unknown to the sect.

The novices were subjected to daily purifications of this kind, however, for perfect purification, which was performed with purer water, and which those who were members of the sect used, they were not admitted; this took place only two years after their admission into the community.

Since the Essenes belonged to the Jewish people, these washings do not seem to have a value different from those used by the other Jews, except for the fact that the Essenes required for their legal purification more care and diligence.[32]

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29. W. Brandt, *Die jüdischen Baptismen:* Beihef. z.Zeitschrift.f.Altestamentliche Wissenschaft 18 (1910) 57-62.
30. Flavius Josephus, *Antiquitates* 12,5,1.
31. H. Cerfaux, *Le Baptême des Esséniens:* RechScRel 19 (1929) 248-265; W. Brant, *loc.cit.*, 64-69; V. Ermoni, *L'essénisme:* RevQuestHist 40 (1906) 5-27; Ch. Bugge, *Zum Essaenerproblem:* ZNTWiss (1913) 145-174.
32. On this whole question one can consult J. Thomas, *Le mouvement Baptist en Palestine et Syrie* (150 B.C. to 306 A.D.) (Louvain 1936); and the review of this book by W. Goossens: EphThLov 14 (1937) 467-476. C.M. Edsman offers a copious bibliography with great erudition: *Le Baptème de feu* (Upsala 1940), but the doctrine he proposes is quite rationalistic.

Thesis 2. Baptism, instituted by Christ, is a true sacrament of the New Law.

S.Th. III, q. 66, a. 1f.; Suarez, d.19 s.1f.; Pesch, 348; Otten 264f.; Lercher[3], 1310138; Lennerz, 89-94; Doronzo, 19-27.

25. Connection. It has been demonstrated that Christ instituted a sacred rite in order to enter his Church, and that this rite is baptism. Now it is necessary to show that Christ constituted Baptism as a true sacrament. Hardly any adversaries deny the sacramentality of Baptism. The Protestants also do not deny that Baptism is a sacrament. For this reason the Fathers at the Council of Trent judged that it was not necessary to treat its special sacramentality or to define anything, except what already had been said in canon 1 on the sacraments in general. However in our time, and among the later Protestants, Baptism as a sacrament has been rejected. Therefore this thesis must now be established.

26. Definition of terms. *Baptism* is an ablution of water, with an express invocation of the Trinity, for the spiritual regeneration of man. In the sources it is designated with different names, as was said above (n.3): *by the washing of water with the word of life* (Eph. 5:26); *the washing of regeneration and renewal in the Holy Spirit* (Tit. 3:5); *buried with Christ* (Rom. 6:4); etc.[1]

Sacrament of the New Law is understood in the sense it was given in the previous treatise. Therefore we understand sacrament in the strict sense, that is, as a sensible and symbolic sign that produces grace and was instituted by Christ.

27. Adversaries. Besides some ancient heretics, *liberal Protestants, Modernists* and *Unitarians* are opposed to the thesis; according to them Baptism is only an external rite and it is not necessary. *Rationalists* and *Modernists* try to explain Christian Baptism by dogmatic-historical evolution and they claim that its beginning can be found in John's baptism (D 3440, 3443). Loisy proposed something similar.[2]

28. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Florence:* "Among all the sacraments, holy baptism holds the first place" (D 1314).

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1. See G. Kittel, *Theologische Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* 1 527-529; W. Bauer, *Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch* 1,239-241. On the different definitions of Baptism, see Landgraf, *Das Frühscholastische Definition der Taufe:* Greg 27 (1946) 200-219, 353-383.
2. *L'Evangile et l'Eglise.*

The Council of Verona: "We bind by the same bond of perpetual anathema all those who. have no fear of thinking or teaching otherwise than the holy Roman Church preaches and observes concerning the sacrament of the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ or concerning baptism" (D 761).

The Councils of Lateran IV (D 802), *Lyons II* (D 860) and *Trent* (D 1601) list Baptism among the sacraments of the Church, which are seven and only seven. Moreover, in the Council of Trent in the canons on the sacrament of Baptism, especially 1, 2 and 3: "If anyone says that the Roman Church. does not have the true doctrine concerning the sacrament of baptism, let him be anathema" (D 1614ff.).

Code of Canon Law, cn. 737,1 (1917): Baptism is the door and foundation of the sacraments.

29. Theological note. The thesis is *defined divine and Catholic faith.*

30. Proof from Holy Scripture. A sacrament of the New Law is a sensible and symbolic sign that produces grace and was instituted by Christ for all time. But according to the text of the New Testament that is what baptism is. Therefore baptism is a true sacrament of the New Law.

The major is certain from the definition of a sacrament. *The minor is proved:* a) *It is a sensible sign;* for the rite, which we considered in the previous thesis, is truly sensible, since it consists in the use of water and also in the use of audible words (as will be seen in the thesis on the matter and form of baptism), just as the Apostles did and as Christ himself instituted it (John 3:5; Matt. 28:19; Mark 16:16; Acts 8:36);

b) *It is symbolic,* because by water and the used words the cleanness of the soul, which must be cleansed of its sins, is signified; by this washing is signified the internal cleanness which those must have who want to belong to Christ's Church.[3]

c) *It is efficacious of grace,* and therefore it is contrasted with the baptism of John which was only *for repentance,* that is, to arouse contrition for committed sins by which the sins were forgiven. But the baptism instituted by Christ removes sins, since it is a cleansing in the Holy Spirit, that is, by

3. On the symbolism of water in the New Testament, L. Murillo, *Haurietis aquas in gaudio de fontibus Salvatoris:* VerDom 4 (1924) 169-175, especially p. 170f.

grace.[4]

d) *The institution is perennial or for all time.* For, on the one hand, the Church of Christ must endure until the end of the world (Matt. 28:20), and on the other hand, all those who want to enter the Church must of necessity receive Baptism.

31. Proof from tradition. If something is a sacrament concerning which, according to the teaching of the Fathers, it is wrong to have doubts it is surely Baptism. In fact, sacramental teaching often is based on what the Fathers said about Baptism. Thus, the effects of grace *ex opere operato,* the reviviscence of the sacrament, its unrepeatability, etc. Also, they did not treat Baptism just in passing, but wrote whole books on it: Tertullian,[5] St. Ambrose,[6] St. Pacian,[7] St. Maximus of Turin,[8] etc. Among the Orientals, Dionysius of Alexandria,[9] St. Basil,[10] St. Cyril of Jerusalem,[11] St. Gregory Nazianzen,[12] St. Gregory of Nyssa,[13] etc.[14] But especially in the fourth century St. Augustine[15] wonderfully described the nature of the sacramentality of Baptism and defended it against the Donatists and the Pelagians.

32. Objections. 1. John 3:5 must not necessarily be understood about baptism with water, because it also says that baptism must be in the Holy Spirit, and therefore it only intends to signify a spiritual renascence.

I deny the antecedent and distinguish the proof. The Holy Spirit is required in such a way that water is not required, *denied;* it is required in such a way that without it regeneration is not given, *conceded.* To be reborn of water and the Holy Spirit signifies that water is the remote matter of baptism which is used for the ablution; however the bodily ablution signifies the spiritual ablution of the soul, which takes place by the Holy

4. In the treatise on the sacraments in general, when it is proved that the sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato,* it is precisely the sacrament of baptism that is mentioned, and therefore at this point we do not have to dwell on it. See J. Havet, *Les sacrements et le rôle de l'"Esprit Saint d'après Isidore de Sevilla:* EphThLov 16 (1939) 32-93; P. van Imschoot, *Baptême d'eau et baptême d'Esprit Saint:* EphThLov 16 (1936) 653-666, with an ample bibliography; L. Murillo, *Haurietis aquas in gaudio de fontibus Salvatoris:* VerDom 4 (1924) 169-175.
5. *De Baptismo:* ML 1,1197ff.
6. *De Mysteriis:* ML 16,389ff.
7. *De Baptismo:* ML 13,1089ff.
8. *De Baptismo* tr,3: ML 56,771ff.
9. *Epist.* 1: MG 10,1313-1316.
10. *Epist. ad Amphil.* 199: MG 32,128ff.
11. *Catecheses:* MG 33,369ff.
12. *Oratio* 40: MG 36,360ff.
13. *Oratio catechetica magna:* MG 45,9ff.
14. For a more ample bibliography see the Index to *Patrologia Latina,* and Barreille: DTC 2,218-219.
15. *Serm. Ad competentes* 56-59, 212-215.294: ML 38,377.1058.1335; *De Baptismo contra Donatistas:* ML 43, etc.

Spirit or by grace.

2. *Objector insists:* In this place the water should be understood metaphorically, since John the Baptist said about the baptism of Christ: *he will baptize you with the Holy Spirit and with fire* (Matt. 3:11). But fire is taken metaphorically. Therefore also water.

I deny the assertion and the proof. For to baptize with fire, that is, to wash with fire (πυρί) or to wash something with fire, is certainly a metaphorical expression, as is per se clear; but not to baptize or wash something with water.[16]

3. The baptism of Christ is only the baptism of John; for it is not certain that He wished to institute a new baptism, and He Himself wanted to be baptized with the baptism of John.

I deny the assertion and its proof. For it has been proved in the previous thesis that Christ instituted a true baptismal rite, different from the baptism of John. For, the baptism of John was only for repentance, while Christ's baptism is for the remission of sins and entrance into his Church.

33. Scholium. *On the biblical figures of Christian baptism.* In the Old Testament there were some figures of the baptism instituted by Christ, as the Apostles, Fathers and theologians explain it. The main figures of this kind are:

1. St. Peter finds baptism prefigured in Noah's Ark in which Noah and his children are saved from the flood (Gen. 7). From this figure the Fathers call baptism a board or plank in shipwreck.[17]

2. Circumcision. Rather than a figure of baptism it was a supplementary rite for future baptism, inasmuch as it was a means of remitting original sin; but in the baptism of Christ it was something different.[18]

3. *Passing through the Red Sea and the pillar leading the people through the wilderness* (Exod. 13:21). St. Paul in 1 Cor. 1-2. Likewise St. Basil,[19] St. Augustine,[20] and other later theologians.[21]

4. *The water drawn from rock by Moses:* 1. Cor. 10:4; Origen[22] and other Fathers.

5. *Manna, probatic pool, water flowing from the side of Christ, the cleansing of Naaman.*[23]

16. Some modern Protestants follow Calvin in this teaching, but generally they are refuted by other Protestants. See D'Ales, *De Baptismo et Confirmatione* 18, where he cites B. Weiss, T. Zahn, A. von Stromberg.
17. Tertullian, *De Paenitentia* 12,9: ML 1,1247.
18. III, q.70, a. 2.
19. *De Spiritu Sancto* 14-15: MG 32,121-124.
20. *Sermo* 352,3; 363,2: ML 39, 1551.1635.
21. Thus St. Thomas, III, q. 90, a. 1 ad 2; and many others.
22. *In Iosh* hom.4,1: MG 12,842.
23. For more on this see D'Ales, *loc.cit.*, 24-26; Bellamy: DTC 2,168, where he cites places in which the authors see baptism being foretold by the prophets. P. Lundberg, *La typologie baptismale dans l'ancienne Eglise* (Upsala-Leipzig, 1942).

CHAPTER II

On the essence of the sacrament of baptism

Thesis 3. The matter of the sacrament of baptism is the washing of the body with natural water; but the form is constituted by words by which the divine unity and Trinity are distinctly expressed.

S.Th. III, q. 66, a. 3f. 7f.; Suarez, d.20 s.1; St. Bellarmine, *De Bapt.* C.2; Puig de la B., 208-227; Lercher[3], 141-150; D'Ales, 30-59; Lennerz, 9-42; Doronzo, 37-77.

34. Connection. In every sacrament its essence is perfected by the matter and form (D 1671); therefore also in the sacrament of baptism the matter and form must be determined, if we want to know the essence of this sacrament. The matter however can be remote or proximate; we will treat both of these, since natural water (the remote matter) is required for the ablution (the proximate matter). The licit matter, the way of washing, the words by which the form is expressed, and other similar aspects are customarily treated in moral theology. Therefore we will pass over these points; in the scholiums we will cover what seems necessary and more in accord with dogmatic theology.

35. Definition of terms. *The matter* is the part of the sacrament to be determined by the words, by which the *form* is expressed and which determines the meaning or use of the matter. Thus, water can serve many purposes, v.gr., to refresh; but with the words it is indicated that it is being used to cleanse or wash away. However, the *form* is that by which the meaning or use of the water is determined (see what was said in the previous treatise).

The remote matter, or that from which the sacrament of baptism is confected, is natural water; but the form is the pronouncing of words by which is expressed the oneness and the trinity of God and at the same time is expressed the reason because of which the water is poured over the person who receives the sacrament. Meanwhile, we prescind from the question about whether at times a baptism is valid that is conferred with another form by which the trinity and divine unity are not expressed explicitly[1]; for *now* some other form would be invalid.

The washing signifies the proximate matter, that is, the action by which the water is poured on the one being baptized. It is not our intention just now to determine the way in which the water should be poured, that is, we are

1. Whether a formula with the express and same words, which are in the Gospel and are found in the Roman Ritual, is required for validity, scarcely anyone demands. Equivalent words can be used, as we will explain in scholium 4.

prescinding from the ritual form by which the administration of the sacrament of baptism is accomplished.

Natural water is understood to be true water in opposition to artificial waters,[2] or to water understood in a metaphorical sense, as Calvin wished.

The form, as was said, is understood as the determining part, or what specifically designates the use for which the water of baptism is employed. This form, from the will of Christ, must be such that it expresses with its words, explicitly and definitely, not implicitly and indefinitely, the Unity and divine Trinity. Thus, this form would not be valid: *I baptize you in the name of the Trinity* (an explicit form but indefinite). The form prescribed in the Roman Ritual is this: *N. I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.* On the validity of other formulas, see scholium 4, n. 47-49.

36. Adversaries. Some ancients, like the *Gnostics* and *the Manichaeans,*[3] considering water to be inferior matter and proceeding from a principle of evil, denied that baptism should be administered by natural water, so the words of John 3:5 were interpreted to be about water in a metaphorical sense. The *Cathari* and the *Albigensians* took this position; among the moderns the Quakers followed them, since they say that baptism is merely a Jewish rite. Others, relying on Matt. 3:11, thought that fire should be used.[4] Finally, others used different materials.[5]

Luther admitted in a case of necessity "whatever can be called by the name of bathing" is suitable for the sacrament of baptism.[6]

Regarding the form, in antiquity there were the *Gnostic*[7] heretics, the *Sabellians* and those who were called *Paulinists, Eunomians, Priscillianists,* and other heretics in error regarding the trinitarian doctrine, who either omitted or perverted the trinitarian formula in the administration of baptism; the *Montanists* added to the formula the name of Montanus.[8] St. Damasus I cites certain heretics who baptized in the name of the angels and archangels (D 176). On baptism in the name of Jesus or of Christ, see n. 47.

2. Water produced by chemical means from hydrogen and oxygen is true natural water and is suitable for baptism. See Ferreres-Mondria, *Theologia Moralis* 2,288, 3,; Catechism of the Council of Trent 2,2,7.
3. St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haeres.* 1,21,4: MG 7,666; St. Epiphanius, *Haereses* 34: MG 41,620; St. Augustine, *De Haeres.* 46: ML 42,38; Tertullian, *De Baptismo* 1: ML 1,1306; *Auctor de Rebaptis.* C.16: CV 3,3,89; Calvin, *Inst. Rei christ.* 17; see D'Ales, *De Baptismo et Confirmatione* 34,4.
4. See *Auctor de Rebapt.* C.16: CV 3,3,89; *Baptê par le feu:* DTC 2,355-360; C.M. Edsman, *Le baptême de feu* (Upsala 1940).
5. Those whom Ioannes Moschus mentions used sand, Laimon, 166: MG 87,3045; or oil with the water, as St. Irenaeus reports, *loc.cit.;* others in a case of necessity have used saliva, wine, beer, etc. (see D 787, 829).
6. *Colloq. Sympos.* c.17.
7. According to the testimony of St. Irenaeus, *Haeres.* 1,21,3: MG 7,661; Theodoret, *Haeret. Fab.* 1,9: MG 83,360, says that this form was used: "In the name of the unknowable Father of all, in the truth which is the mother of all, in the one descending in Jesus, in the unity and redemption and society of the powers."
8. *Corpus Inscrip. Latinorum* 8,2272; A. de Labriolle, *Sources de l'histoire du Montanisme* 195: DTC 2,182f.

Luther, Zwingli, *Unitarians and other Protestants sects* either change the form of baptism or permit it to be changed.[9]

37. Doctrine of the Church. The doctrine of the Church was constant concerning the matter and form of baptism; this is apparent in the different decrees and responses on the occasion of the errors of the adversaries. Thus, Pelagius said in his letter to Bishop Gaudentius of Volterra: "They assert that they were baptized only in the name of Christ. while the evangelical precept. admonishes us to administer each holy baptism in the name of the Trinity. as our Lord, speaking to his disciples, said: 'Go, baptize all nations in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit'" (D 445). St. Gregory the Great, in his response to the Spanish Bishop Leander, says that baptism can be administered with one or three immersions.[10]

Alexander III: "Certainly if someone immerses a child in water three times in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, Amen, and does not say: 'I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, Amen,' the child is not baptized" (D 757).[11]

Innocent III was asked by Thorias, Archbishop of Trondheim (Norway), whether a baptism was valid conferred by saliva on one occasion because of the lack of water. Here is his response: "We answer that, because two things are always required for baptism by necessity, namely, the word and the element, the Truth says with respect to the word: 'Go into the whole world," etc., and with respect to the element the same one says, 'Unless one has been born again," etc., you should not doubt that they lack a true baptism not only when both of the above-mentioned (things) are omitted but also when one of them is missing" (D 787).

Gregory IX, also when asked about the licitness of baptism administered with beer in the place of water, said to Sigurd, Archbishop also of Trondheim: "We respond to you in the following manner: since, according to the teaching of the Gospel, one must be born again of water and the Holy Spirit, those who are baptized in beer must not be considered as rightly baptized" (D 829).

The Council of Vienne: "All are faithfully to profess that there is one baptism that regenerates all those baptized in Christ, just as there is one God and one faith. We believe that when baptism is administered in water in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, it is a perfect means

9. Luther, *De Captivitate Babyl.;* Zwingli, *De vera et falsa religione; etc.* For more on this see Nouvelles Religieuses (1924) 239f.

10. *Epist.* 43: ML 77,497.

11. I. Morinus (*Disc. Paenit.* 8,16,21) and F. Farvacques thought that the baptism conferred under the form condemned by Alexander III was sometimes valid, but this opinion was again condemned by Alexander VIII (D 2328). On this point, see Lercher-Umberg, *De Baptismo* 149.

of salvation for both adults and children" (D 903).

The Council of Florence in its Decree for the Armenians: "The matter of this sacrament is true natural water; it does not matter whether it is cold or warm. The form is: *I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.* We do not deny, however, that true baptism is also effected by these words: *May the servant of Christ, N., be baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,"* or: *By my hands N. is baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.* For as the principal cause from which baptism derives its virtue is the Holy Trinity, while the instrumental cause is the minister who confers the sacrament externally, the sacrament is accomplished whenever the act is carried out by the minister is expressed along with the invocation of the Holy Trinity" (D 1314). Also Benedict XII against the errors of the Armenians (D 1016).

The Council of Trent declared against the Protestants that water must be understood in the proper sense and not in a metaphorical sense (D 1615); Leo XIII[12] permitted in a case of sickness the use of water mixed with mercury bichloride corrosive (D 3356).

38. Theological note. The thesis is *defined divine and Catholic faith.*

39. *Proof of the first part:* The matter of baptism is washing by the use of natural water.

Proof from Holy Scripture. 1. John 3:5: *unless one is born of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God.* But this concerns baptism (as we showed above) and the use of water is stated expressly, as is clear. Therefore.

2. The same point is hinted at in Matt. 28:19 and Mark 16:16, since Christ simply says that they should be *baptized* in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. Surely "to baptize" must be understood in the way in which the Jews used the word in the ordinary way of speaking, that is, for "to wash" or "to cleanse with water."

3. The Apostles also appear as baptizing with water alone: Acts 8:36; 1:47; and also as alluding to water when the concern is with baptism, both with express words (Tit.3:5; Eph. 5:26), and when they use comparisons or biblical figures (1 Cor. 10:2; 1 Pet. 3:20) (see above n. 33).

40. Proof from tradition. Right from the beginning of Christianity only water is used as the matter of the sacrament of baptism, and indeed by washing,

12. Decree of the Holy Office, August 21, 1901: ASS 34 (1900-1901) 319.

which customarily was done by one or three immersions, and also by infusion, as we will see later.[13] A very ancient document (which pertains more to the liturgy), the *Didache,* while introducing the question about water with express words, says: "Regarding baptism, baptize thus. After giving the foregoing instructions, 'Baptize in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit' in running water. But if you have no running water, baptize in any other; and if you cannot in cold water, then in warm. But, if the one is lacking, pour the other three times on the head in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (R 4). And it does not allow the use of any other thing, but he says that water alone is to be used, in whatever way this water is found.

The Shepherd of Hermas, by synecdoche, calls baptism itself water: "A man is dead before he receives the Name of the Son of God, but, when he receives the seal, he puts off death and receives life. The seal, therefore is water. The dead go down into the water and come out of it living."

In the same way St. Justin, while explaining the liturgy of baptism, says: "They then are brought by us where there is water, and are regenerated in the same manner in which we were ourselves regenerated. For, in the name of God, the Father and Lord of the universe, and of our Savior Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, they then receive the washing with water. The reason for this we have received from the Apostles" (R 126).

The other Fathers do not speak differently about the water of baptism, as when they compare baptism with the plank saving someone in a shipwreck, with the water which the Hebrews passed through at the Red Sea, or which flowed from the side of Christ, etc.

41. *Proof of the second part.* The form of baptism consists in the words by which the divine unity and Trinity are expressed distinctly.

Proof from Holy Scripture. In Matt. 28:19[14] the Lord tells the Apostles: *Make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.* Christ himself, therefore, teaches the formula by which baptism is to be administered. But the formula or words constitute the form of the sacrament, as is certain from what has been said. Therefore the baptismal form must consist in these words. Moreover, these words distinctly express the unity and Trinity of the divine Persons, for when they say *in the name of* (in the singular number) the unity is designated; but when the three Persons are named separately, the Trinity is understood. If, therefore, Christ determined the form to be used in baptism, it is not permitted to depart from it;

13. See R 302, 307, 703; Index 461f.

14. D'Ales has a discussion about this passage, *De Baptismo et Confirmatione* 50B-54.

for, what Christ instituted cannot be changed. Therefore the form must have the expression of the Trinity and the Divine unity, both expressed distinctly.

42. Proof from tradition. As in the first part the testimonies of tradition show, the Fathers not only hand on that water is to be used in baptism, but they also determine the form, which is the same that Christ prescribed.[15] Thus the *Didache* (R 4), St. Justin (R 126), *The Shepherd of Hermas* (R 92); to these can be added:

The Canons of Hippolytus: "each time [the catechumens are anointed] the priest says: I baptize you in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit."[16]

Tertullian: "The command is that they moisten in the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, not in just one; for, we are immersed not once but three times at the mention of each name and each person."[17]

St. Ambrose: "Unless he is baptized in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, he cannot receive the remission of sins or receive the gift of spiritual grace."[18]

And it is something so obvious that St. Augustine could say: "Who does not know that there is no baptism of Christ, if the evangelical words, which are in accord with the creed, are lacking from it? But it is easier to find heretics, who do not baptize, than those who do not baptize with these words."[19]

In the same way, all baptismal rites, whether in the western Liturgy or even in the eastern, use the form established by Christ.[20]

43. Theological reasoning. "Baptism receives its consecration from its form, according to Eph. 5:26: *Cleansing it by the laver of water in the word of life.* And Augustine says (*De Unico Baptismo* iv) that *Baptism is consecrated by the words of the Gospel.* Consequently the cause of baptism needs to be expressed in the baptismal form. Now this cause is twofold; the principal cause from which it derives its power, and this is the Blessed Trinity; and the instrumental cause, namely, the minister who confers the sacrament outwardly. Wherefore both causes should be expressed in the form of baptism. Now the minister is designated by the words, *I baptize thee;* and the principal cause in the words, *in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.*"[21]

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15. R Index 464; D'Ales, *loc.cit.*, 52f.
16. Canon 122: ed. Achelis, 97.
17. *Adversus Prax.* 26: ML 2,190.
18. *De Mysteriis* 4,20: ML 16,394.
19. *De Baptismo contra Donat.* 6,25,47: ML 43,214.
20. Puniet: DACL 2,251-346.
21. III, q. 66, a. 5.

44. Objections. 1. John said that he baptized in water, but that Christ would baptize with the Holy Spirit and with fire (Matt. 3:11). Therefore the matter of Christ's baptism is not water.

I distinguish the antecedent. St. John the Baptist with these words wished to contrast the effect of his baptism with the effect of Christ's baptism, *conceded;* he wished to contrast the matter of both baptisms, *denied.* Actually, the words of St. John the Baptist show that the effect of Christ's baptism is per se spiritual, since it directly remits sins; while the baptism conferred by him is a baptism of water, that is, it does not directly produce a spiritual effect, but only inasmuch as it disposes the person for contrition or charity. Acts 1:5 and 11:15 (see n. 20) are explained in this way.

2. In order to express the spiritual effect which baptism produces, it suffices that the action of washing be determined. Therefore it is not necessary that the trinitarian formula be used.

I bypass the antecedent and deny the consequent. For, we do not argue from the necessity of signifying the sacramental effect (which we concede is sufficiently signified by the words "I baptize you"), but from the words of Christ determining the form.

3. The Apostles were baptizing "in the name of Jesus." Therefore the trinitarian form does not pertain to the essence of baptism.

The meaning of "to baptize in the name of Jesus" will be explained in the scholium (n. 47).[22]

4. St. Bernard says: "Without prejudice to those full of wisdom, I think he is truly baptized [that is, someone baptized with the formula: 'I baptize you in the name of God and of the holy and true cross']. for we read in the Acts of the Apostles that some were baptized not only in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, but also in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ."[23] Therefore the trinitarian form is not required.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent. That is, we admit that they are the words of St. Bernard (although some wish to doubt that), but we deny that his authority in this singular matter can lead to a true conclusion.

45. Scholium 1. *On the way of doing the washing in a baptism.* It is certain that in the first ages of the Church baptism generally was administered by immersion.[24] In fact, the word βαπτίζειν means to immerse. Therefore there can be a doubt whether baptism conferred in some other way is valid or not.

a) The *Didache* already recommended: "Regarding baptism, baptize thus. After giving the foregoing instructions, 'Baptize in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit,' in running water. But, if you have no running water, baptize in any other; and if you cannot in cold water, then in warm. But, if the one is lacking, pour the other three times on the head in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (R 4). "Running water" is understood as water in a river, in the sea, or in some other place where

22. Some authors distinguish between the form used by the Apostles before the Ascension of the Lord and after the Ascension (see Lercher 154 obj. 3); but such a distinction misses the point, because the precise question has to do with the form used after the Ascension.
23. *Epist.* 403: ML 182,560.
24. Acts 836; Rom. 6:3-4; and the Fathers very often: DTC 2,185f.

there is running water. Other water that is not running will be water in a bath or pond or in some similar place. If neither can be had, that is, if the one being baptized cannot be immersed in water, then he can receive baptism by infusion.

Novatian, when sick, received baptism in bed (R 547). St. Cyprian hands on the common teaching about these cases, when he said that the mercy of God could not be denied to those who can be baptized only by infusion.[25] And in the acts of the martyrs, in the lives of the saints and in other documents it is certain that such practice was in use from the earliest times.[26]

Also, examples are not lacking of baptism being administered by aspersion, as the Apostles probably did on the day of Pentecost when three thousand men were baptized (Acts 2:41). Ladislaus Jagellon, a Polish King in the fourteenth century, had a multitude baptized from a distance by aspersion. See Cyprian. R 590.

It is also true that in Christian antiquity baptism by immersion was required, so that *handicapped* or *bed-ridden men* (as those were called who were baptized by infusion) sometimes were barred from the priesthood.[27] But even in these cases the baptism was considered certainly valid, and re-baptism was not permitted.[28]

b) Also in Christian antiquity a triple immersion or triple infusion of water took place,[29] so that St. Basil said that this rite was received "from the tradition of the Apostles."[30] However, this rite was not thought to be necessary for the essence of the sacrament, as is clear from the declaration of St. Gregory the Great to St. Leander when he approved of the Spanish custom of omitting the triple immersion, lest they seem to use the same rite as the Arians.[31] Among later authors only Alcuin [32]considered the triple immersion essential, while St. Thomas required it as a grave obligation only for licitness[33]; but Scotus,[34] following Peter Lombard,[35] favored as licit a single or triple immersion, or even infusion according to the customs of different places.

c) Therefore concerning the development of the baptismal rite, here is what can be established with sufficient probability: Up to the fourth century baptism was administered by

25. *Epist.* 76,12: ML 3,1147; CSEL (*Epist.* 69) 3,2,760.
26. According to the testimony of Eusebius, *Hist. Eccles.* 6,43: MG 20,623; Martène says that St. Laurence baptized St. Romanus in prison; similar events are related about others, as in the acts of St. Bacchi: *De antiquis Ecclesiae ritibus* 1 c.1 a.14 n.5.
27. Council of Caesar. c.12: Msi 2,541; Kch 388.
28. Since S. Cornelius de Novatian says: "when the one lying in bed receives baptism by infusion, *if however it is necessary to say that he received baptism of this kind*" (R 547), it does not mean that he had doubts about the validity of the baptism, because of the way in which it was administered, but because of the disposition of the recipient. For, he then adds: "But after he has been freed of his sickness he is not aware of the other things which, according to Church rules, he should be aware of." See I. Puig de la B., 218. The Greek schismatics sometimes seem to have required a triple immersion for validity (Spácil, *Doctrina theologiae Orientis separati de Sacramento Baptismi:* OrCh 6,12). See M. Jugie: DAFC 2,369f.
29. *Didaché* 3,7; ed. Funk 16-18; Tertullian, *Adversus Prax.* 26: ML 2,189. See D'Ales, *loc.cit.*, 40 schol. IV.
30. R 954. Likewise Tertullian, *De Corona* 3s: ML 2,98f.; St. Jerome, *Dialog. Contra Lucifer.* 8: ML 23,163f.; Pelagius I: D 222.
31. *Epist.* 43 (ML 77,497f.) quoted in the Council of Toledo IV (in the year 633), ch. 6: Msi 10,618.
32. *Epist.* 90 and 130: ML 100,289.342.
33. III, q. 66, a. 8.
34. *In 4* dist.3 q.2.
35. *4 Sent.* d.3 q.2: ML 192,1092.

total immersion, except in a case of necessity. From the fourth to the eighth century partial immersion in the baptismal font was done, along with infusion of water at the same time; from the seventh to the eleventh century infants were immersed completely in a basin or goblet, but in the case of adults, who because of the size of their body could not be immersed in a basin,[36] the custom and use was different; and this was the practice during the whole middle ages. The immersion of children customarily was vertical; but from the eleventh to the thirteenth century the immersion was always horizontal and it was used both for children and for adults (like a bath); in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries immersion was both total and partial, and also infusion was used depending on local customs. But later, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, infusion was frequent and immersion rare; finally, in the seventeenth century immersion is scarcely found to be in use, and it was preserved only in the Ambrosian and Mozarabic rites and in the practice of some sects. But already in the nineteenth century infusion prevailed almost completely, even in those sects.[37]

46. Scholium 2. *Blessing of baptismal water.* The Roman Ritual prescribes: "The water for solemn baptism is that which has been blessed on the preceding Vigil of Easter or Pentecost, and carefully preserved in a clean font to keep it pure and unsullied" (2 Tit. 1,5). This blessing, which was already present in antiquity,[38] is not necessary, although some Fathers at times seem to have required it as pertaining to the essence of the sacrament.[39] But the Fathers of this mind take the word "baptism" for the whole baptismal rite. Moreover, we know that baptism in a river, in the sea, and in "running water" (R 4) was in common use; these waters could not have this blessing.

Ecclesiastical law prescribed the blessing of the baptismal water, as it seems, perhaps under a grave obligation, but not for validity. Also, this prescription concerns solemn baptism, but not the private form. But, if it is possible, it is fitting that also in these cases water destined for baptism, or blessed water, should be used.

47. Scholium 3. *On baptism "in the name of Jesus."* In Acts 2:38; 8:12.16; 10:48; 19:5 and elsewhere, the Apostles are said to baptize *in the name of Jesus, in the name of the Lord;* hence some great theologians of the middle ages say that the Apostles, *by a privilege* received from Christ, could baptize in the name of Jesus in place of using the trinitarian formula.[40] They support this view from the testimony of St. Ambrose,[41] Nicolas I to the Bul-

36. W. Strabo, *De rebus Eccles.* 26: ML 114,959f.
37. M. Corblet, *Histoire du Sacrement du Baptême* (1881) 248f.
38. St. Basil, *De spiritu Sancto* 27: MG 32,191; and consult the ancient liturgical books.
39. Pourrat, *La théologie sacramentale* 53.
40. Much has been written about this question: Harduinus, *De baptismo quaestio triplex: De baptismo pro mortuis, De baptismo in vino, De baptismo in nomine Christi?:* (Paris 1687); Gillmann, *Taufe "im namen Jesu" oder "Im namen Christi?:* (Mainz 1913); C. de Clerq, *A propos de la formule de Baptême "in nomine Jesu":* Collectanea Mechlinensia 5 (1931) 313-318; M. de Ionghe, *Le baptême au nom de Jésus d'après les Actes des Apôtres:* EphThLov 10 (1933) 647-653; DTC 2,271-273. Often in the manuals on the sacrament of Baptism. H. Lennerz, 43-47; I. Puig de la Bellacasa, 222-229; H. Dondaine, *La forme du Baptême selon Caietan:* RevScPhTh (1940) 331f. Doronzo, 67-72.
41. *De Spiritu Sancto* 1,3,39-45: ML 16,742f. In addition to the authors mentioned in the previous note, others who wrote on this text are: O. Faller, *Die Taufe im namen Iesu bei Ambrosius:* 75 Jahre Stella Matutina. Festschrift (Feldkirch) 1,139-150; I. Puis de la Bellacasa, *El Bautismo en el nombre de Jesús según S. Ambrosio:* Las Ciencias 6 (1940) 707-716; DTC 2,184.

garians (D 646), and from a certain text of St. Basil.[42]

First of all, the following must be said: Baptism conferred in this way after the Apostles was never valid; this is clear from the whole tradition and from the documents cited in the thesis. In practice such a rite cannot be used, because in those things that pertain to the validity of the sacrament it is not permitted to follow a probable opinion (D 2101).

It is questioned, therefore, whether the Apostles really did baptize with this formula: "I baptize you in the name of Jesus," or "I baptize you in the name of the Lord." Nothing for certain has been defined about this, and therefore it is permitted to hold for the validity of this formula *for the Apostles.* But the reasons, because of which the authors admit this probability, are not totally convincing, and among modern authors scarcely anyone now admits such a probability.

Ancient theologians, because of these texts of the Acts of the Apostles, more or less admitted that baptism in the name of Jesus is valid, unless the trinitarian formula was omitted out of contempt or because of some dogmatic error[43]; the early scholastics conceded the use of this formula only to the Apostles, and this was only because of a privilege or from a special revelation given to them[44]; but the reason for this was given by St. Thomas: since "the apostles baptized in the name of Christ, in order that the name of Christ, which was hateful to Jews and Gentiles, might become an object of veneration, in that the Holy Ghost was given in Baptism at the invocation of that Name."[45] Cajetan wanted to renew that earlier opinion, but Pius V ordered it to be expunged from the Roman edition of his works.

48. In the sixteenth century another interpretation was proposed: "To baptize in the name of Jesus" is an expression that places the baptism of Christ in opposition to the baptism of John[46]; and it does not state precisely the *formula* to be used in the administration of baptism. This interpretation prevailed, and almost all modern authors hold it. In this sense the words of St. Ambrose and Nicolas I are interpreted. While writing to the Bulgarians, Nicolas says: "You say that in your country many (have been) baptized by a certain Jew (you do not know whether he is Christian or pagan), and you are asking what should be done about them. If they were truly baptized in the name of the Holy Trinity or only in the name of Christ, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles (for it is one and the same thing, as St. Ambrose explained), it is clear that they should not be baptized again"[47] (D 646). In this place "to baptize in the name of Jesus," or "in the

42. *De Spiritu Sancto* 12,28: MG 32,116 (R 945). I. Puig de la Bellacasa also deals with this text, *loc.cit.*, 714f.
43. St. Albert the Great, *In 4* dist.3 a.2 q.5; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.3 a.2 q.2.
44. See Joughe, *Le Baptême au nom de Jésus d'après les Actes des Apôtres:* EphThLov 10 (1933) 647-653; he follows the opinion of St. Thomas.
45. III, q. 66, a. 6 ad 1.
46. Thus the great theologians of the sixteenth century: M. Cano, *De locis theologicis* 6,8 ad 7; Suarez, *De Sacramentis* d.21 s.3; St. Robert Bellarmine, *De Baptismo* c.3; and commentators on Scripture. Card. Orsi was opposed to this opinion: *De Baptismo in nomine Iesu Christi* (Milan 1733); *Vindiciae dissertationis De Baptismo in nomine Christi* (Florence 1738).
47. On this difficult text of Nicolas I, those who wrote about it. among others, are: Hadrian VI (when he was not yet the Pontiff), *Quaestiones de Sacramentis in IV librum Sententiarum* (Rome 1522) fol.XI; Suarez, *De Sacramentis* d.21 s.3; Wirceburgenses, 9,182,47; Ch. Pesch, 389; Puig de la Bellacasa, *De Sacramentis* 229; Lennerz, *De Baptismo* 46f.; DTC 2,272f.

name of the Holy Trinity" evidently refers rather to the intention of the one baptizing than to the formula used. But that he adduces the authority of St. Ambrose in order to show that it is the same thing to baptize in the name of Jesus and in the name of the Holy Trinity, confirms even more the given explanation. For, St. Ambrose is not dealing with the formula, which is spoken by the baptizer, but with the profession of faith, which the one being baptized had to make before his baptism. For he says: "Therefore they [the Ephesians mentioned in Acts 19:2], because they had not been baptized in the name of Christ, nor with faith in the Holy Spirit, could not have received the sacrament of baptism. *Therefore they were baptized in the name of Jesus Christ; and baptism was not repeated in them, but it was a new baptism, since there is only one baptism* (Eph. 4:5). *But where there is not the full sacrament of baptism, there some other form of baptism is thought to be present. But it is full, if you profess the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. If you deny one, you destroy the whole sacrament.* And just as if you comprehend one of them in your speech, either the Father or the Son or the Holy Spirit, but with faith you deny neither the Father nor the Son nor the Holy Spirit, the sacrament is full of faith; thus also, although you say the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, and then you diminish the power of the Father or of the Son or of the Holy Spirit, the whole mystery is made void. Finally also those who said: We have never even heard that there is a Holy Spirit, afterwards were baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ (Acts 19:5). And this poured grace into them, because now, at the preaching of Paul, they knew the Holy Spirit. And it must not seem to be the contrary, because even though later the Spirit is not mentioned, still there was faith in him; and what was not spoken verbally, was expressed in their faith. For, it is said: in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ, by the unity of the name the mystery is fulfilled: and the Spirit is not separated from the baptism of Christ, because John baptized for repentance and Christ did it in the Spirit."[48] Evidently these words of St. Ambrose cannot be referred to the baptismal formula, because otherwise one would have to hold that baptism conferred in the name of the Holy Spirit is valid, and this is something unheard of. He proceeds, for: "Now we will consider whether, just as we read that the sacrament of baptism is complete in the name of Christ, so also having named only the Holy Spirit, nothing is lacking to the fullness of the mystery. We follow the reason, because the man who said one, signified the Trinity. If you say Christ, then you have designated also God the Father, by whom the Son was anointed, and the one anointed is the Son, and the Holy Spirit by whom he was anointed. For, it is written: this Jesus of Nazareth, whom God anointed with the Holy Spirit (Acts 10:38). And if you say the Father, you have indicated also his Son and likewise the Spirit of his mouth; if however you also comprehend this with your heart. And if you say the Spirit, then you have named God the Father from whom the Spirit proceeds; and the Son, because he is the Spirit also of the Son. Hence, in order that authority may be joined together with reason: Scripture indicates that we can also rightly baptize in the Spirit, since the Lord says: 'You shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit' (Acts. 1:5). And elsewhere the Apostle says: 'For by one Spirit we were all baptized into one body' (1 Cor. 12:13). One work, because one mystery: one baptism, because

48. *De Spiritu Sancto* 1,3: ML 16,743.

of one death for the world: unity therefore of operation, unity of preaching which cannot be separated."[49] Therefore St. Ambrose's argumentation goes like this: the unity of the divine Persons is such that, while preserving the faith, they cannot be separated. If, therefore, you the catechumen who is to be baptized, profess faith in the Father, already in that profession you include also the Son and the Holy Spirit, without making a special mention of the three Persons. The point is not the form of baptism, but the intention in the heart of the one being baptized: "If however you also comprehend this with your heart," that is, if you confess the unity and the Trinity.

49. Scholium 4. *On equivalent formulas.* a) The documents so demand the expression of the three divine Persons and their unity in the formula of baptism, that the formulas that do not express the unity or distinction of Persons are held to be absolutely invalid. Therefore these forms are held to be utterly invalid: I baptize you in the name of the Trinity; I baptize you in the names of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; I baptize you in the name of the divine Persons, etc.

Expressions of this kind are doubtful: I baptize you in the name of the Father and in the name of the Son and in the name of the Holy Spirit; or: in the name of the Unbegotten, and of the Begotten and of the Paraclete, and other similar forms. Because even if, from a speculative point of view, they may be valid, still from the authority of theologians who disagree with that, they cannot simply be used; and therefore a baptism, having been conferred with one of these formulas, can be repeated conditionally, although it seems that a strict obligation is not required.

b) In the form of baptism the subject of the baptism and the action of baptizing must also be expressed in some way, and this under the danger of invalidity if either one is omitted. Suarez says that this is "a conclusion of faith."[50] This point is certain from the pontifical documents of Alexander III (D 757), Alexander VIII (D 2327) and Eugene IV (D 1314). From these sources it is clear that the sacrament conferred without saying, "I baptize you," is not valid and never was valid.[51]

In the rituals and in the ancient liturgical books the formula is always found that expresses the same thing. Western Catholic always use the words of Christ (Matt. 28:19); Eastern Catholics, especially the Greeks, say: "May the servant of Christ, N., be baptized in the name of the Father." This formula is surely licit (D 1314).

St. Thomas derives the reason for this from the necessity of determining the signification of the use of water for the sacramental sign.[52]

49. *De Spiritu Sancto* 1,3: ML 16,744.
50. *De Sacramentis* d.21 s.1 n.1.
51. Lennerz gives a more ample treatment of this point, nn. 56-65.
52. III, q. 66, a. 5 ad 2.

CHAPTER III

Necessity of the sacrament of baptism

50. Connection. In the Old Law the way of salvation was different for the different conditions of men: for the Jews membership in the chosen people was prescribed, which for men was obtained by circumcision; but for pagans some act of faith with charity was demanded. For all the way to salvation was made possible by their own acts by the agent's action (*ex opere operantis*) and by the grace of God; but for infants salvation could be obtained in the faith of their parents. However, the New Law established a new kind of means, and, as has been said, baptism is the means instituted by Christ in order to enter into the Church founded by Him. Indeed, as is shown in Fundamental Theology, the Catholic Church is necessary for salvation; therefore it follows necessarily that baptism is also necessary in order to obtain eternal life. But this necessity can have different grades, and so we must now study the nature of this necessity.

Thesis 4. Baptism, after the promulgation of the Gospel, both for infants and for adults, is necessary for all to obtain salvation, with a necessity of means.

S.Th. III, q. 68, a. 1; Suarez, d.27 s.1 n.3; Pesch, 190-194; Otten, 295-306; Puig de la B., 230-244; Lennerz, 120-144; Doronzo, 104-134.

51. Definition of terms. *Both for infants and for adults,* that is, both for those who at least at one time had the use of reason, and for those who have not yet arrived at the use of reason, baptism is necessary. Meanwhile we do not consider those who are not born, or those who die in their mother's womb.

The necessity of means is opposed to the necessity of a precept, and refers to those helps without which something cannot be obtained. Therefore such a means is so necessary that, even if it is inculpably omitted, the effect cannot be obtained.[1]

A necessity of means can be absolute (v.gr., grace to act supernaturally), and hypothetical, if the means has been established by God as necessary, but of its nature not necessarily joined with the effect. Baptism is like that.

Where the necessity of a precept is involved, only those are obliged who are capable of being under the precept, and here and now are bound

1. See J. A. de Aldama, *La necessidad de medio en la escolástica postridentina:* ArchTG 8 (1945) 57-84.

by it. However, invincible ignorance, physical or moral impossibility and other such situations, excuse one from the precept. But no one is dispensed from a necessity of means. But if the necessity of means is not absolute, but only relative, or hypothetical, surely in ordinary circumstances that means must be considered necessary, but in extraordinary circumstances God provides in some other supplementary or extraordinary or equivalent manner. Therefore we are saying that baptism is necessary in ordinary circumstances and without it salvation cannot be obtained. However, in certain circumstances, to be determined in the next thesis, God can supply for baptism with other means, but they are not totally independent of baptism.

52. *After the promulgation of the Law of the Gospel.* Men are not bound by the law, unless the law has been legitimately promulgated to them; but the promulgation of the law must not necessarily be made to each one individually. Therefore in order for all men to be held to the observance of the law of baptism, it is required that the Law of the Gospel can be said to have been promulgated to them in a general way. Whether de facto such promulgation is given here and now, does not concern our thesis. Wherefore, if in some place, or in some particular case, the evangelical law is thought to be not yet promulgated, there they would not be held to the law of baptism. Ch. Pesch thinks "according to the common opinion of theologians already for many centuries the promulgation has been accomplished for the whole world."[2] However D'Ales observes: "Now however they [theologians] more generally distinguish the condition of adults and infants. They deny that adults can be saved without implicit faith in the Redeemer; in what pertains to infants, they claim that in each region now the ancient helps have been abolished, since in that region the promulgation of the Gospel can be thought to be morally accomplished. Hence it follows that, in those regions which still lack the promulgation of the Gospel, there is no change regarding infants: for it does not seem to pertain to the goodness of God that the condition of those infants should be made worse because of the advent of the Lord."[3]

These words, "after the promulgation of the gospel," are taken from the Council of Trent, ch. 4 on justification: "After the promulgation of the gospel, this transition [from the state of sin to the state of grace] cannot take place without the bath of regeneration or the desire for it" (D 1524).

2. *Praelectiones Dogmaticae* VI, 417.
3. *De Baptismo et Confirmatione* 142f.

53. Adversaries. In Christian antiquity there were some *heretics* (*Caiani, Manicheans*),[4] who denied the necessity of baptism. *Pelagians* required baptism by a necessity of precept to enter into the kingdom of heaven, and no necessity in order to obtain eternal life.[5] The *Reformers* do not share one opinion about baptism: *Socinians, Unitarians* and *Zwingli* simply deny its necessity; *Lutherans* and *Calvinists* admit a necessity of precept, but not of means, even though they concede in certain special circumstances that salvation can be obtained without baptism, because of a divine dispensation. *Liberal Protestants* and *Modernists* (D 3442-3443) require absolutely no necessity. Moreover, the whole Protestant doctrine based on justification by faith alone, must reject the necessity of the sacraments.[6]

Cajetan made an exception for children, as will be seen in the scholium.

54. Doctrine of the Church. The documents cited above on the sacramentality of baptism not only establish the nature of baptism, but they also assert or suppose its necessity. In particular they are:

The Synod of Carthage approved by Zosimus: "Likewise, it has been decided: Whoever says that little children right from their mothers' wombs ought not to be baptized. let him be anathema" (D 223).

Celestine I: "Both little children and young persons need the sacrament of regeneration" (D 247); Innocent II (*Lateran Council IV*) condemned as heretics and expelled from the Church those who denied the baptism of children (D 718). Innocent III also condemned those who said that it was useless to confer baptism on children (D 780); and in the *Profession of Faith Prescribed for the Waldensians* he demands that they accept the baptism of infants (D 793, see also 802).

Clement V at the *Council of Vienne* against John Olivi (D 903), Eugene IV at the *Council of Florence* in the Decree for the Armenians (D 1314) and in the Decree for the Jacobites (D 1348), not only defend the necessity of baptism for little children, but also say that they cannot be helped in any other way, and therefore that it is necessary that they be baptized as soon as it is reasonably possible, although it is not necessary for them to be baptized immediately, unless there is a danger of death.

55. *The Council of Trent* in the decree on justification already indirectly dealt with baptism by affirming that justification without the bath of

4. Tertullian mentions them: *De Baptismo* 1: ML 1,1197; then also St. Augustine, *Haereses* 46: ML 42,38.
5. St. Augustine, *Serm.* 294: ML 38,1335-1348; *Contra Iulianum* 3,3,8: ML 44,705.
6. St. Robert Bellarmine, *De Baptismo* c.4, where he refutes the doctrine of Wycliffe. See Otten, 297. On the Protestant doctrine, see C. Crivelli, *Directorio Protestante de la América latina* (19330 15.

regeneration cannot be obtained (D 1524); and further on, in the same decree, it again affirmed the necessity of baptism when the Council said that it is the instrumental cause of justification (D 1529). But when it came to the discussion about the sacrament of baptism itself, the theologians proposed that this proposition be condemned: "Children in the mother's womb are saved by the invocation of the Trinity and a blessing." This article was the occasion of much discussion; and although the Fathers generally did not accept this opinion, nevertheless they wished to keep away from it, lest the Catholic theologian Cajetan be condemned (for this was his opinion). Indeed they did not want to speak expressly about little children, nor to determine whether baptism would be necessary for them with a necessity of means, or only or precept. Therefore, having rejected that proposition and the question about the baptism of the young, the Synod considered only in general the necessity for all and decreed the following canons: Cn. 5: "If anyone says that baptism is optional, that is, not necessary for salvation, let him be anathema" (D 1618). Cn. 12: "If anyone says that no one is to be baptized except at the age at which Christ was baptized, or on the point of death, let him be anathema" (D 1625). Cn. 13: "If anyone says that little children, because they do not have an act of faith, are not to be numbered among the faithful after receiving baptism and that, therefore, when they have reached the age of discretion, they are to be rebaptized; or that it is better to omit their baptism, [if] they do not believe by an act of faith of their own, rather than to baptize them solely by the faith of the Church, let him be anathema" (D 1626). Cn. 14: "If anyone says that when the little children thus baptized have grown up, they are to be asked whether they wish to ratify what their sponsors promised in their name when they were baptized; and if they answer that they are unwilling, they are to be left to their own judgment and are not, in the meantime, to be compelled to a Christian life by any penalty other than the exclusion from receiving the Eucharist and the other sacraments until they repent, let him be anathema" (D 1627).[7] These canons agree with what the same Council declared in the decree on original sin, where they say that children should be baptized in order to obtain the remission of sins (D 1514). Later, during session XIV on the sacrament of penance, the Council said: "This sacrament of penance is necessary for salvation for those who have fallen after baptism, just as baptism itself is for those who have not yet been regenerated" (D 1672).

7. This canon is directed against Erasmus who, although he admitted the necessity of baptism, nevertheless said that little children should not be baptized before they reached the years of discretion, so that they could freely embrace their religion.

7* AAS 43 (1951) 841. The Latin version (with some exceptions, which we have translated less elegantly, but more literally) is to be found in PerMorCanLit 40 (1951) 358-359; it was composed by P. Springhetti.

From these words it is clear that the mind of the Council is to determine the absolute necessity of baptism, although it does not say expressly that it is a necessity of means.

Benedict XIV in the Profession of Faith Prescribed for the Orientals said: "Likewise, (I profess) that baptism is necessary for salvation, and hence, if there is imminent danger of death, it should be conferred at once and without delay and that it is valid if conferred with the right matter and form and intention by anyone and at any time" (D 2536). St. Pius X condemned the teaching of the Modernists on the evolution of baptism because they denied its necessity (D 3442) and because they rejected its use for little children (D 3443).

Pius XII in his allocution to the members of the "Union of Italian Catholic Midwives" said: "If what we have said so far concerns the defense and care of natural life, it must have all the more value for supernatural life, which the newly born infant has just received. For, in the present economy of things, *there is no other means* to communicate this life to the child who still lacks the use of reason. But being in the state of grace at the moment of death is absolutely necessary for salvation; without this grace it is not possible to arrive at supernatural happiness, at the beatific vision of God. *Indeed an act of love can suffice for an adult to obtain sanctifying grace and to take the place of baptism; but for an unborn child or for one just born this way is not available* (October 29, 1951).[7*]

Finally, CIC 737 (1917) calls baptism the door of the sacraments, and it says that it is necessary for all in reality or in desire.

56. Theological note. The thesis is *defined divine and Catholic faith.*[8]

57. Proof from Holy Scripture. John 3:5 proposes baptism as the means without which salvation cannot be obtained. But that is the necessity of means. Therefore.

I prove the major. Christ used the negative form, and consequently he says without any exception: *Unless one is born of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God.* Here regeneration is opposed to generation; and just as all are generated without any possible exception,

8. Taking this position are: Lercher[3], 170; Otten, 332; M. Daffara, 300; A. Piolanti, *De Sacramentis* 137. Some authors made a distinction: if one's attention is directed to the necessity of means, the thesis is a matter of Catholic faith (*de fide catholica*) (F. Dander, *Summarium Theologiae dogmaticae. De Sacamentis Christi* 1,39), at least theologically certain (Puig de la Bellacasa, 234), or contrary and temerarious (Doronzo, 108); but if one considers it as simply necessary, then it is defined faith (*de fide definita*). These authors find the reason for this distinction in the fact that the Council of Trent did not want to condemn Cajetan. On the mind of Trent, see P. Hörger, *Concilii Tridentini de necessitate baptismi doctrina in decreto de iustificatione (sess. VI):* Ant 17 (1942) 193-222, 253-268: DTC 2,296-328.

so also without exception they must be regenerated in order to enter into eternal life. But this regeneration is available only through baptism.

Note. Clearly this text concerns generation and regeneration, and as we noted above, we are prescinding from infants who die in their mother's womb; Trent said nothing about this "because it does not seem to pertain to baptism."[9] But generation is not the same thing as birth, and therefore unborn children can be included in the general affirmation of Christ. We will treat this matter later in the scholium (n. 63-65).

58. Proof from tradition. We already said in the first thesis that the Fathers affirm that baptism is the necessary entrance into the Church, outside of which there cannot be any salvation. Therefore the texts favoring that thesis are also applicable here. For example, here are some testimonies: Tertullian says: "It is prescribed that no one can obtain salvation without baptism, based on that important statement of the Lord: Unless one is born of water, he does not have life."[10]

Origen: "Any soul born in the flesh is contaminated with the filth of iniquity and sin. In addition to this there is the matter of the cause, since the baptism of the Church is given for the remission of sins; according to the practice of the Church, baptism is given even to little children; since also, if there were nothing in children which required remission and pertained to forgiveness, then the grace of baptism would seem to be superfluous."[11]

St. Cyril of Jerusalem: "If any man receive not Baptism, he has not salvation; except only Martyrs, who even without the water receive the kingdom."[12]

St. John Chrysostom: "Weep for the unbelievers; weep for those who differ in nowise from them, those who depart hence without the illumination, without the seal! They indeed deserve our wailing, they deserve our groans; they are outside the Palace, with the culprits, with the condemned: for, Amen, amen I say unto you, except a man be born of water and the Holy Spirit, he shall not enter into the kingdom of Heaven."[13]

St. Ambrose: "Jew and Greek, whoever believes, must know that he is cut off from sins so that he can be saved.; because no one enters into the kingdom of heaven except by the sacrament of baptism. Unless one is born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. Surely he excuses no one, not the infant, not one prevented by

9. See J.B. Umberg, *Kajetanus auf dem Trienter Konzil:* ZkathTh 39 (1915) 452-464.
10. *De Baptismo* 12: ML 1,1213; R 306.
11. *In Levit.* Hom.8,3: MG 12,496.
12. *Catech.* 3,10: MG 33,440; R 811.
13. *In Epist. ad Philip.* Hom.3,4: MG 62,203; R 1206.

some necessity. However, they may obtain that secret immunity from punishment, but I do not know whether they will have the honor of the kingdom."[14]

59. And especially St. Augustine, while arguing against the Pelagians, often bears witness to the necessity of baptism, even for little children: "Whoever says that in Christ they will live, even little children, who exit from this life without participation in his sacrament—that person is really opposed to the preaching of the Apostle and is condemning the whole Church; she hastens and runs to baptize the little children, because without doubt she believes that otherwise they will not at all be made to live in Christ."[15]

"The Christians of Carthage have an excellent name for the sacraments, when they say that baptism is nothing else than salvation. Whence, however, was this derived, but from that primitive, as I suppose, and apostolic tradition, by which the Churches of Christ maintain it to be an inherent principle, that without baptism. it is impossible for any man to attain either to the kingdom of God or to salvation and everlasting life? So much also does Scripture testify."[16]

60. From these and from many other texts it is certain from the testimony of the Fathers that baptism:

a) *is necessary for salvation, because*: 1. outside of the Church there is no salvation, and baptism is the door to the Church;

2. the words of Christ (John 3:5) must be taken in the most universal way and without exception:

3. baptism is spiritual regeneration, and without this regeneration no one can come to eternal life;

4. baptism was instituted to destroy original sin; but from original sin no one, not even a little child, is exempted;

b) *is necessary with the necessity of means, because*: 1. spiritual regeneration is just as necessary as natural generation;

2. even little children must be baptized, if they wish to be saved; and they are not capable of obeying a precept;

3. this is the universal doctrine of the Church (St. Augustine).

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14. *De Abraham* 2,11,79.84: ML 14,494-497; also, *De obitu Valent. cons.* 51: ML 16,1374.
15. *Epist.* 166,7,21: ML 33,730.
16. *De peccat. merit et remiss.* 1,24,34: ML 44,128; also *Serm.* 294: ML 38, 1336ff.; *De Baptismo* 4,22,29: ML 43,173; *De anima et eius origine* 4,11,16: ML 44,533.

61. Theological reasoning. It is based on the words of John 3:5. Just as some means, which is generation, is required for bodily life; so also for spiritual life some means, which is regeneration, is required. And just as generation is the means without which bodily life is not given, so also regeneration is the means without which there cannot be any spiritual life. That means is baptism, which therefore is the means which is necessary for salvation with a necessity of means.

62. Objections. 1. John 3:5 proves too much, because otherwise the Eucharist would also be necessary with the necessity of means for salvation; for, Christ said: *Unless you eat the flesh of the Son of man.* (John 6:53). But the Eucharist is not necessary with a necessity of means. Therefore.

I deny the major and the parity of its proof. For, from the grammatical form the difference is apparent. For, when Jesus is speaking to Nicodemus, in a general way about anyone born, he says: *Unless one is born again;* here there is no distinction, not even from the context, between children and adults, and no exception is permitted. However, in his Eucharistic discourse Christ is speaking to adults, whom he commands: *Unless you eat.* Moreover, in the concerned matter there is also a big difference: birth and rebirth affect all, that is, it affects all who because of original sin must be born for supernatural life; while to eat flesh cannot refer, for examples, to nursing babies. Then, finally, spiritual eating, which is what is involved in the promise of the Eucharist, can pertain only to the one who already has spiritual life and is able to lose or injure it, namely, an adult.[17]

2. According to St. Paul (1 Cor. 7:14) the children of Christians are already sanctified in their parents. Therefore they do not need baptism.

I distinguish the antecedent. They are sanctified with internal holiness, *denied;* with external holiness, *conceded.* The children of Christian matrimony already have a certain legal destination to the Church, as the fruit of sacramental marriage, and inasmuch as Christian parents have an obligation of educating their children according to the laws of the Church. In this sense they have a certain external, legal or remote holiness, whereby they are removed, as it were, from the power of the devil and are disposed for internal and intrinsic holiness, because for them the reception of baptism and the acquiring of faith is made easier.[18]

3. What is necessary with a necessity of means cannot be obtained by other means. But eternal salvation can be obtained by martyrdom or also by charity. Therefore.

I distinguish the major. It cannot be obtained by other means independent of that means, *conceded;* by means dependent on it, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* Martyrdom and charity justify independently of baptism, *denied;* dependent on it, *I subdistinguish:* as if baptism itself would justify in this case, *denied;* inasmuch as charity requires a desire for baptism and in martyrdom an adult cannot reject baptism, *con-*

17. III, q. 73, a. 3. See D'Ales, *De Baptismo et Confirmatione* 140f.; St. Augustine: R 1716f.
18. J. Bover, *Las Epistolas de S. Pablo* (1940) 1,195.

ceded. Regarding martyrdom and charity, inasmuch as they supply for baptism, we will treat these points immediately. Here it will suffice to note: Martyrdom is a special privilege and the effect follows as it were *ex opere operato*; wherefore if it is a question of children, it totally supplies for baptism and independently of it (but this is a case of a privilege); if it is a question of adults, at least attrition and a general desire of loving God are supposed, and in this love the desire of doing whatever God requires for salvation is involved. Therefore also in some sense baptism is included; and Christian martyrdom cannot be understood properly, unless it is in an adult who knows what the Christian religion is, at least in a confused way, and therefore he desires to take the necessary means. If such an adult were to exclude positively the will of not sinning, he would not truly be a martyr. Charity includes, at least implicitly, the desire of baptism, and it can be only in adults.

4. God desires all men to be saved, little children not excepted. But many little children are not able to receive baptism. Therefore at least for those children baptism is not necessary.

I distinguish the major. The salvific will of God includes also little children with a universal will, *conceded;* with an individual will, *I subdistinguish:* so that he must provide some remedy by which all children can be saved, *conceded;* so that he must provide that individual children without such a remedy will not die, *denied.* Eternal life with the enjoyment of the beatific vision is a gratuitous and unowed gift of God; therefore no injury is done to anyone if God leaves the obtaining of eternal salvation sometimes to the general economy of things, even though, because of this ordination, without any individual guilt some concretely may be deprived of this salvation. Moreover, since little children have original sin, they cannot obtain the beatific vision; but that sin is not a personal sin, and so it is not punished with a positive punishment, but only with a privation, that is, with a lack of the beatific vision.[19]

63. Scholium. *On the necessity of baptism for children.* In the thesis we assert that baptism is necessary with the necessity of means for salvation, even for infants. However, there were some Catholics who maintained that little children in some circumstances could have a substitute for baptism.

First of all, one must distinguish carefully between the necessity coming from a sufficient promulgation of the Gospel, and from the very nature of the case. If there is a question about whether the Gospel has been sufficiently promulgated, so that really all men are required to be baptized, this question will have to be handled in another place. Here we suppose that the Gospel has already been sufficiently promulgated, or at least we are talking about those places in which the Gospel has been sufficiently promulgated.

For adults baptism can be supplied by charity or the desire of baptism, and by martyrdom. However, little children who are not capable of a wish or desire, do not have

19. The limbo of children is examined in the treatise on God the Sanctifier; see J.F. Sagüés, *On God the Creator and Sanctifier* in this *Summa,* vol. IIB, 1021. One can also consult DTC 2,366-378; D'Ales, *loc.cit.*, 155-158 with ample patristic documentation. The universal salvific will of God is covered in the treatise On the One God; see J.M. Dalmau, *On the One and Triune God* in this *Summa*, vol. IIA, 230-235, and especially about children in n. 231.

any other means except baptism of water or martyrdom. *Hence the question with those Catholics is about positing or rejecting a particular disposition of God for those children who die without baptism.* And we are not speaking about some particular case (for God can, as he wishes, grant eternal life without the sacraments), but we ask whether there is *some general law* in favor of infants.[20]

64. 1. *Different opinions.* a) Ancient authors considered this case in general terms, while paying attention to the necessity of the intention in the minister; for, if the minister of baptism did not have the intention of baptizing, a remedy was available for adults, that is, the desire for baptism; but for infants, if they should die in such circumstances, no salvation would be possible. Therefore they responded: "I reply without prejudice that in such a case, it can be piously assumed that the High Priest will supply"[21]; "It is pious to believe that the High Priest will supply; but if he does not, he acts justly."[22]

b) Moving on from there to a more general order, these theologians asked what would happen to little children for whom baptism could in no way be administered. For this case Durandus thought that a law had been especially established by God of coming to the aid of such infants, who perhaps would be saved by the prayers of their parents.[23] A similar opinion was held by Gerson[24] and Amort.[25] Biel says that God revealed the remedy for salvation which is manifested in the Church, and that is the sacraments; but for those who do not see the light of day, he has reserved the remedy to himself.[26]

c) Cajetan proposed this opinion: "It seems necessary to say, not unreasonably, that in a case of necessity for the salvation of little children, baptism would seem to be supplied by the desire of the parents, especially if some exterior sign is present"[27]; he said this based on the authority of St. Gregory, on the impossibility of any other means, on the goodness of God, on the better economy of the New Law, and on the authority of St. Bernard who did not attempt to deny it.

d) Klee[28] supposed that such infants are given a special enlightenment of God at the

20. On this whole question see especially: W. Stockums, *Das Los der ohne Taufe sterbende Kinder* (1922); A. Landgraf, *Kindertaufe und Glaube in her Frühscholastik:* Greg 9 (1928) 337-372, 497-543. You will find a more ample bibliography in NouvRevTh 71 (1949) 588 Note de la Redaction. J.N. Walty, *Controverses au sujet du Baptême des enfants:* RevScRel 36 (1952) 52-70. J.-C. Didier, *Un cas typique de développement du dogme: A propos du baptême des enfants:* MélScRel 9 (1952) 191-213; A. Michel, *Enfants morts sans Baptême* (Paris 1952), where are found what was published in L'Ami du Clergé 1922-1954, and afterwards in 1956, 49-59: *Nouvelles remarques.*

Among the man explanations published during the past four years, the following deserve special mention: Leeming, *Is Their [Infants] Baptism Really Necessary?:* The Clergy Review (1954-1955 passim); Gumbel, *Unbaptized Infants—May They Be Saved?:* The Downside Review 1954 342-368; W.A. van Roo, *Infants Dying without Baptism. A Survey of Recent Literature and Determination of the State of the Question:* Greg 35 (1954) 406-473; D.-L. Greestock, *En torno al problema de los niños que mueren sin bautismo:* Salmanticensis 2 (1955); A. Winklofer, *Das Los der ungetauft verstorbenen Kinder:* MünchTheoZeit 7 (1956) 45-60.

21. Alexander of Hales, *Summa Theol.* 4 q.8 membr.3 a.1.1.
22. St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.6 p.2 a.2 q.1; Durandus, *In 4* d.6 q.2; H. Natalis, *In 4* d.6 q.3.
23. *In 4* d.6 q.1.
24. *Sermo. De Nativ. Virg.* 3 cons.2.
25. *Theologia Moralis* (Innsbruck 1758) 2,120ff.
26. *In 4* d.4 q.2 dub.2.
27. *Comment. in Summa S.Thomae* in III, q. 68, a. 2 and 11.
28. H. Klee, *Katholische Dogmatik* 3,158.

moment of death, by which they can elicit an act of charity and the desire for baptism. This teaching from the beginning did not please some, but it was put into the catechism of the diocese of Luxembourg[29] as a probable solution.

e) Schell[30] admits that the death of these infants must be considered as martyrdom in expiation for the sin of Adam, by association with the expiating death of Christ.

f) Bianchi[31] proposed something similar, but for the case in which the mother would accept the death of her child in the name of him.

g) Recently Boudes[32] proposed a new theory. All men by the law of solidarity or moral union with Adam have sinned, but also having been redeemed by Christ, they have solidarity with Christ. Can it happen that children of this kind must remain outside of this solidarity? Also, the souls of these children will be united with their own bodies; whence is this gift derived, if because of original sin they are deprived of the gifts lost by Adam? The effects of martyrdom *ex opere operato* in children can be explained only because of solidarity with Christ. Why can there not also be some general means of supplying for baptism?

h) L. Laurenge[32*] recently proposed another theory: according to St. Thomas, when a child "begins to have the use of reason. the first thing that occurs to him to think is to deliberate about himself, and if then he ordains himself to the necessary end by grace he acquires the remission of original sin; but if he does not order himself to the necessary end. he will sin mortally".[32**] Indeed, children who die without baptism have up to this point performed no moral or intellectual act; therefore, when they die God grants them a "medicinal" grace whereby they can freely ordain themselves to the last end. If they do it, original sin is forgiven in them, and they obtain beatitude; if they do not, they are damned in hell. In this way the will of God to save all men is preserved.

65. 2. *Evaluation of these opinions.* a) Those ancient scholastic authors proposed their solution, while having doubts about it and not asserting it; many others rejected the possibility of salvation without baptism, and they solved this case by appealing to the value of baptism from the intention of the Church. Hence children, who were baptized by a minister who does not have the intention of baptizing, still receive a valid baptism because the Church supplies for it in this case.[33]

b) For the general law which Durandus, Gerson, Amort and Biel *piously* suppose or consider possible, other theologian reply that it is not licit to suppose special laws or divine decrees unless they are expressly stated, since on the contrary there is a very general and universal law which excludes all exceptions. Suarez refutes these opinions.[34]

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29. Ed. (1879) 228; see H. Lennerz, *De Baptismo* 144.
30. H. Schell, *Katholische Dogmatik* 3,479f.
31. *De remedio aeternae salutis pro parvulis in utero clausis sine baptismate morientibus* (Venice 1768).
32. 32* L. Laurenge, S.M., *Esquisse d'une étude sur la sort des enfants morts sans baptême:* AnTh 12 (1952) 145-186.

32** I-II, q. 89, a. 6 c.

33. Thus, for example, S.Th. III, q. 64, a. 8.
34. *De Sacramentis* d.27 s.2 n.6.

c) Minor theologians and some Fathers wanted to condemn Cajetan's opinion.[35] Franciscus Romeus and Seripandus defended Cajetan. But finally the article condemning this opinion was rejected "because it does not seem to pertain to baptism." The opinion of the Council was not in favor of Cajetan, but it is certain that the Council did not expressly condemn that author.[36] However, considering the declarations of the Fathers and of Eugene IV in the Decree for the Jacobites (D 1348), it is clear that it cannot be said with any probability that there exists some universal law because of which unbaptized infants are saved by an invocation of the Trinity made by the parents. Such a doctrine is false. D. Soto rejected this opinion of Cajetan more strongly: "That there is some ordinary remedy [for unborn infants] instituted by God *is manifest heresy.*[37] And Toledo said: "As far as I can see it is not free of temerity and error in faith"[38]; and Suarez said, "at the very least it is temerarious and proximate to error."[39] Modern authors generally do not seem to be less rigid[40]; however, sometimes they distinguish between born and unborn infants; for the born they demand baptism, for the others they do not venture to proceed with such rigor.[41] But really their reasons are only sentimental.

d) The doctrine proposed by Klee is totally gratuitous, and it is not known how in the act of the separation of the soul from the body it could be enlightened; unless this enlightenment takes place shortly before the soul is separated from the body, for that separation consists in being indivisible, so that the soul is either in the body or outside of the body. Therefore it is required that such enlightenment take place by a true miracle, while the soul is still in the body. For the infant in the mother's womb cannot perform any intellectual act; indeed, such miracles performed as a general rule must be rejected, unless there is certainty about them. Pacios López proposes a similar doctrine.[41*]

e) The supposition of H. Schell is also false. For, the death of children is not in expiation for the sin of Adam, like the death of Christ, but, at most, as punishment for sin that is proper to each one. Therefore in no way can it be compared to martyrdom. Soto already anticipated this opinion: "If they imagine [the adversaries] that they will receive grace at the point of death, like the grace given to martyrs for full remission of sins, the assertion would be temerarious, namely, that a child, not killed for Christ, by a fortuitous death, without the exercise of any personal act or the reception of the sacra-

35. See P. Hörger, *Concilii Tridentini de necessitate baptismi doctrina in decreto de iustificatione (sess. VI):* Ant 17 (1942), especially pp. 304-308.
36. See Pallavicini, *Hisstoria Concilii Tridentini* 9,8,2-4.
37. *In 4* dist.5 q.unic. a.2.
38. *In 3* q.68 a.2.
39. *De Baptismo* d.27 a.3.
40. Here are some examples: Ch. Pesch, *Praelect. Dogmat.* 6,415f.: "The opinion of Cajetan and others. cannot be admitted" (he also reviews the opinions of the ancients); D'Ales, *De Baptismo et Confirmatione* 152: "Clearly it is certain that these children are excluded from heaven and from the intuitive vision of God"; Van Noort, *De Sacramentis* 1,222 adheres to the opinion of St. Augustine who says: "Do not say."; Otten, p. 304, rejects these opinions as vain and futile; A. Piolanti, *De Sacramentis* 143: "The doctrine. now alone reigning holds that little children who die before baptism are for this reason deprived of the beatific vision"; M. Daffara, *De Sacramentis et de Novissimis* 310, refutes the opinions of Cajetan and others as contrary to Holy Scripture, the Fathers, the Councils and doctors, and also as lacking a foundation.
41. Lercher[3], 175.
41* A. Pacios López, *La muerte de los niños muertos sin bautismo:* RevEspTeol 14 (1954) 41-58.

ment, would be cleansed of original sin."[42]

It is not right to say, as Schell does, that "the prince of death pursues Christ in every infant whom he kills"; this is asserted gratuitously, for these children are not killed by the devil. Rightly, therefore, did the Holy Congregation of the Index reject the doctrine proposed by Schell as a way of speaking that is audacious and temerarious,[43] and so some of his works were put on the Index of forbidden books.

f) For a similar reason the opinion of P. Bianchi has no foundation; for, if the death of these children cannot be considered as expiatory in itself, it is not apparent how the intention of the mother could make it such.

g) Boudes asks a question rather than taking a position. In the law of solidarity[44] with Christ, he wants to find a foundation for the salvation of unbaptized infants, but this law is not as clear as Boudes claims. St. Paul in the cited texts, especially in Eph. 1:9-10, talks about the recapitulation of all things in Christ, about the redemption of all, etc.; but from this it does not follow that absolutely everyone, for whom Christ died, will be saved, if for other reasons it is certain that the salvation given by Christ must be applied to each person according to the means established by him. Therefore the reasons proposed lend credence only to a certain proportion; but contrary to that there remains the general principle established by Christ and sanctioned by the Church: Unless one is born again of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God. Once again we recall an important point: we do not ask what God could do if he wishes; but what he actually established as a general law and we know if for certain.

h) The medicinal grace, which Laurenge proposes, is asserted gratuitously. Moreover, it must be admitted, in this hypothesis, that the state of life is not finished by death. Also the texts of Lateran Council IV (D 854-859) and the Council of Florence (D 1304-1306) must be interpreted in a false manner, for the author claims that they are not a matter of faith.

3. The general *objections*, which are proposed against the necessity of baptism for little children, can be reduced to these:

a) The salvific will of God cannot be saved, if he does not provide by a general law for the salvation of these children.

Response: I deny the assertion. For this difficulty has already been solved in the treatise on the One God, where the salvific will of God is treated (see above, n. 62, 4).

b) The doctrine on the limbo of children is not certain. Therefore it cannot be certain that baptism is necessary for these children.

Response: I bypass the antecedent and deny the consequent. For, if it is certain that children without baptism cannot be saved, the question about limbo is secondary, or the question about where they are kept; just as it is secondary to determine the nature of the pain of sense in hell, since it is a matter of faith that hell exists and that there is pain of sense there.

We bypass the antecedent, because although there are many questions about limbo,

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42. *De natura et gratia* 2,10.
43. Decree of the Holy Office, December 15, 1898.
44. E. Hocedez, *Notre solidarité en J.C. et en Adam:* Greg 13 (1932) 373-404.

its existence *must be held for certain,* even though it is not a defined doctrine of faith.

4. Against these objections, and others like them, these points must certainly be held; they help greatly to solve this problem and they show how we should think, if we want to have *the mind of the Church:*

a) It does not help to distinguish between children who die in the womb and outside of the womb, since in their power there is no personal remedy for salvation; and the Magisterium of the Church has never made use of such a distinction.

b) Original sin is contracted by all, and children are not exempt.

c) Human life is ended by death; and it cannot be understood that there is a moment between life and death in which a special enlightenment is given.

d) No one has a right to grace. Indeed, the grace of perseverance is totally gratuitous, just like predestination itself. God grants it to whom he wishes and in the way he wishes.

5. All of these points apply to the general law; but for particular cases, and by way of an exception, God in his utter freedom can come to the aid of the little children in any way he desires lest they perish. But we do not have certain knowledge about these cases.[45]

Therefore it seems that we should embrace these serious words of St. Augustine, the outstanding Doctor, regarding the question of original sin: "Do not believe, do not say, do not teach that infants before they are baptized, and taken by death, can obtain the forgiveness of original sins, *if you wish to be a Catholic."*[46]

45. On these questions, in addition to the bibliography cited above and NouvRevTh 71 (1949) 589, one can consult: Sfrondati, *Nodus praedestinationis resolutus* (Rome 1936).

46. *De anima et eius origine* 3,9,12; ML 44,516.

Thesis 5. Baptism of water can be supplied by the desire of baptism and also by martyrdom.

S.Th. III, q. 68, a. 2; q. 66, a. 11f.; Suarez, d.27 s.2 d.29 s.2f.; Pesch, 418-431; Puig de la B., 245-254 (he treats martyrdom only); Lercher[3], 177-185; Doronzo, 188-237.

66. Connection. Although baptism of water is necessary for salvation with a necessity of means, nevertheless there are not lacking other means of obtaining this salvation; but they are not independent of the sacrament itself. They are the desire of baptism for adults, and martyrdom for all. Therefore baptism is said to be necessary in reality and in desire. Therefore there are three types of baptism: water, desire and blood.

67. Definition of terms. *The desire* for baptism can be explicit or implicit. It will be *explicit* in the case in which, for example a catechumen, sincerely and ardently desiring baptism, dies before he is actually baptized. It is *implicit* when it is included in an act of charity with a general desire of doing whatever God requires for salvation. Since, therefore, baptism has been established by God as the means necessary for salvation, and still it can happen that many men do not want to receive this baptism (whether from a physical impediment, or from invincible ignorance), therefore adults, who are capable of desiring it, can supply for baptism by their desire or act of charity. In this case the desire of baptism obtains its principal effect, namely, conferral of grace with the remission of sins; but it does not necessarily remit the whole punishment of guilt or all the venial sins. But it can produce these effects more or less according to the disposition of the subject and the intensity of charity. Certainly it does not imprint the character, and therefore there always remains the obligation to receive real baptism of water. It is clear that it does not open the way to the other sacraments. Little children are not capable of such desire or charity, and so this way is closed to them, and their only hope of salvation rests in baptism of water or martyrdom.

The desire of baptism must be joined to an act of charity, because this is the means necessary for justification without the sacrament (see the treatise on Penance, theses 12-13), or *ex opere operantis* (from the work of the performer). The act of charity supposes the will to take the means necessary for salvation, and therefore it includes an explicit or implicit desire of baptism, and it does not justify independently of this desire. Therefore there are not two ways (baptism and charity), but only one: real baptism or baptism of desire.

68. *Martyrdom*[1] is deadly suffering and execution in hatred of the faith, or because of the exercise of Christian virtue, inflicted by others and endured patiently. Therefore three conditions are required: a) the torture must be *lethal*, although de facto death does not occur, or God by a miracle impedes death; b) it must be inflicted *in hatred of the faith* or the exercise of virtue, v.gr., to protect purity, as in the case of St. Maria Goretti, or to protect the rights of the Church, the secret of confession, etc., as is recorded of many martyrs; therefore he is not a martyr who is killed for political reasons or for some other reason; c) death *must be endured patiently:* therefore those who die in war, even in a just war, cannot be called martyrs, and the Church does not venerate them as such.[2]

Martyrdom supplies all the effects of baptism concerning the conferral of grace and the full remission of sins; but not the character and other effects, namely, entrance into the Church militant and the right to receive the other sacraments. Therefore the martyr who, after his suffering does not die, must receive baptism of water, otherwise he cannot receive the other sacraments and he will not be a member of the Church.

Martyrdom supplies for baptism by way of a *privilege,* not by way of an institution by Christ, for martyrdom supposes a persecutor of the Church.[3]

69. Adversaries. *Some heretics said* that "no adult can be saved if he dies without having actually received baptism, even though he has an earnest desire for it, but he was not actually washed."[4] De Bay also taught that charity is not always joined with the forgiveness of sins (D 225, 1933, 1969ff.).

There are hardly any adversaries against the second part,[5] except for a few theologians, who dispute about the way in which martyrdom obtains its effect; we will consider this in the scholium.

70. Doctrine of the Church. Concerning the desire for baptism, when the bishop of Cremona asked about a presbyter who died without baptism, Innocent II replied that he should not be anxious because "he persevered in the faith of Holy Mother Church and in the confession of Christ's name" (D 741); and for this he invokes the authority of Saints Ambrose and

1 We have already treated martyrdom in the treatise on Christian Revelation (1, II, 730-735); here we are considering only what pertains to our subject.

2 The Church, for the same reason, reproves those who on their own initiative approach a tribunal and provoke the judges. Such Christians, often afterwards, were found to be weak.

3 E. Hocedez, *Le concept du martyre:* NouvRevTh (1928) 21-200, especially 178-188.

4 See St. Bernard, *Epist.* 77: ML 182,1036; Suarez, *De Sacramentis* d.27 s.2,1.

5 St. Robert Bellarmine mentions Kemnitz and Illyricus as real adversaries (*De Baptismo* 1,6); according to Suarez (*De Sacramentis* d.29 s.1,2) Alex. of Hales, Armachanus and Hadrian denied that there is true martyrdom for infants.

Augustine. Likewise Innocent III (D 788), concerning a Jew who baptized himself when he was in the danger of death, said that his baptism was surely invalid but if he died in good faith "he would have entered into his heavenly home without delay because of his faith in the sacrament, even if not because of the sacrament of faith."

The Council of Trent deals with the desire of baptism on the occasion of justification, which, it says, after the promulgation of the Gospel, cannot be obtained without baptism "or the desire for it" (D 1524).[6]

St. Pius V condemned the propositions of de Bay mentioned above (D 1932f., 1969ff.), from which it follows that perfect charity in the non-baptized does not remit sins.

There are no church documents *concerning martyrdom;* and this is not surprising, since it concerns a matter that rarely happens. The Council of Trent said nothing about martyrdom either in the discussion about justification or in that of the sacraments, because the Council was treating the ordinary means of obtaining justification, not privileges. Indirectly there is value in the liturgical documents and in the praxis of the Church in praying to the martyrs.

Innocent III quotes the words of St. Augustine, which he applies to all canonized saints: "Since the authority of Holy Scripture says that one who prays for a martyr is inflicting an injury on the martyr, the same thing must be thought for a similar reason about the other saints who do not need our prayers..."[6*]

71. Theological note. The first part is *proximate to faith.*[7] The second part is *theologically certain.*

72. Proof of the first part from Holy Scripture. 1. From Scripture it is certain (as will be seen in the treatise on Penance, thesis 13) that perfect contrition with charity reconciles a sinner with God, or removes all mortal sins. Therefore also original sin, if it is present. Therefore perfect contrition with charity takes the place of baptism. Proof of the *first consequent:* For mortal sins are personal and deserve the eternal punishment of damnation and sense; but original sin is not personal, and it does not deserve the eternal punishment of sense, but only the loss of the vision of God, and it is not an object for penance.

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6 See P. Hörger, *Concilii Tridentini de necessitate baptismi doctrina in decreto de iustificatione:* Ant 17 (1942) 183-222, 268.302.

6* *Epist. cum Marthae:* ML 214,1122.

7 Some authors say the thesis is theologically certain so that the contrary will be at least temerarious, but the doctrine of Trent is very clear (D 1524).

2. It can also be proved (at least according to the traditional interpretation) from Acts 10:44-48, where the conversion of Cornelius is recounted; before he was baptized he had already received the Holy Spirit: *While Peter was still saying this, the Holy Spirit fell on all... Then Peter declared: Can anyone forbid water for baptizing these people who have received the Holy Spirit just as we have?* The effect of the Holy Spirit was charismatic, but that did not prevent them from truly receiving justification, for it says that they received ἡ δωρεά τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος (v. 45), and St. Peter says it is the same Spirit they (the Apostles) had received (v. 47). But afterwards Peter himself insists in the presence of the other Apostles, when he explains how the Gentiles were baptized, because even before he baptized them, already *the Holy Spirit fell on them just as on us at the beginning* (11:15), that is, on the day of Pentecost. Indeed, when Peter in his vision accepted the invitation to eat common foods and he refused, God said to him: *what God has cleansed you must not call common* (11:9). St. Cyprian and St. Augustine point out that Cornelius was truly already sanctified before his baptism.[8]

The thesis is supported also by Matt. 3:11; Mark 1:8; Luke 3:16; John 1:33; 3:8; Acts 1:5, etc.; in these texts the baptismal action is attributed to the Holy Spirit, who is the Spirit of love.

73. Proof from tradition. St. Ambrose perhaps was the first one to propose this thesis in express words, when he was talking about a catechumen, Valentinian II: "But I hear that you are weeping because he did not receive the sacrament of baptism. Tell me, what else is there in you except will, except petition. And not long ago he had the desire that, before he could come to Italy, he should be initiated, and then he said he wanted to be baptized by me, and therefore he thought that I would set aside other affairs and come to him. Therefore does he not have the grace he desired? Does he not have what he asked for? Certainly because he asked for it, he received it. And where do we find this: By whatever death a just man undergoes, his soul will be at rest? (Wis. 4:7). Grant, therefore, Holy Father, this favor to your servant... Grant therefore to your servant the favor of your grace, which he never denied; before the day of his death he rejected the privileges of the temples, at the request of those whom he could have revered. He stood before a crowd of gentiles—he appealed to the senate: he did not fear to displease men in order that he might please you alone in Christ. *Since he had your Spirit, how could he not receive your grace?*"[9]

8 St. Cyprian, *De Rebaptism.* 5: ML 3,1187; St. Augustine, *De Baptismo* 4,21-28: ML 43,172.

9 *De obitu Valentiniani consolatio* n.51-52: ML 16,1435-1436.

St. Augustine[10] says that a Catholic catechumen is to be preferred to a baptized heretic; indeed also to a bad Catholic; and that thereby no injury is done to baptism. And in confirmation of this assertion he cites the example of Cornelius the centurion (Acts 10:44-48).[11] He also concludes that the desire of baptism supplies for actual baptism from the words of Christ to the thief dying on a cross: "Blessed Cyprian assumes that suffering at times can take the place of baptism, as in the case of that thief to whom, though he was not baptized, it was said: 'Today you will be with me in Paradise' (Luke 23:43). Having considered this case again and again, I find that not only suffering for the name of Christ can supply for a lack of baptism, but also faith and a conversion of heart, if by chance in order to celebrate the mystery of baptism it cannot be administered in difficult situations. But then it is invisibly conferred, since it is not the contempt of religion but a condition of necessity that prevents the administration of baptism.[12]

Supported by the authority of Saints Ambrose and Augustine, St. Bernard said that baptism of desire could take the place of baptism of water, provided that "there is no contempt of the water, but only impossibility prevents it."[13]

In order to clearly understand the doctrine of the Fathers, D'Ales rightly points out: "This question is very broad, since it concerns the way of salvation which alone was open and is open to innumerable men, who do not have the water of baptism and who are by far the greater part of the human race. The Fathers understood this very well. But since access to God requires two preparations—the first being of the intellect by faith and the second of the will by charity, many Fathers paid more attention to the preparation of the intellect, which naturally comes first, according to Hebrews 11. However they did not completely neglect the preparation of the will; already among the ancient Fathers the seeds of the doctrine are apparent, which was brought to maturity by Ambrose and Augustine."[14]

74. Theological reasoning. In this matter all theologians[15] are in agreement, according to Suarez.[16] St. Thomas gives the reason for this: "The

10 Some think that Augustine at times spoke rather severely (see A. Piolanti, *De Sacramentis* 139 note); but, as it seems, in objective places the holy Doctor extols rather the necessity of an internal disposition so that it can be said to be a true desire of baptism. Ch. Pesch collects the objective places in *Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae* 4 n.75.

11 *De Baptismo* 4,21,28: ML 43,172.

12 *De Baptismo* 4,21,29: ML 43,173.

13 *Epist. 77 ad Hugonem.* 8: ML 182,1036.

14 *De Baptismo et Confirmatione* 147.

15 The teaching of theologians is explained by Lercher[3], 178, and De Smet, *De sacramentis in genere* n. 259.

16 *De Baptismo* d.27 s.2 n.2.

sacrament of Baptism may be wanting to someone in two ways. First, both in reality and in desire; as is the case with those who neither are baptized, nor wished to be baptized... Consequently those to whom Baptism is wanting thus, cannot obtain salvation... Secondly, the sacrament of Baptism may be wanting to anyone in reality but not in desire: for instance, when a man wishes to be baptized, but by some ill-chance he is forestalled by death before receiving the sacrament. And such a man can obtain salvation without being actually baptized, on account of his desire for Baptism, which desire is the outcome of faith that works by charity, whereby God, whose power is not tied to visible sacraments, sanctifies man inwardly."[17]

75. Proof of the second part from Holy Scripture. Christ promises entrance into the kingdom of heaven for those who suffer persecution for the same of righteousness (Matt. 5:10); one who loses his life for the sake of Christ will save it (Matt. 10:39; 16:25; Mark 8:35); He will acknowledge before his Father those who have acknowledged him before tribunals or men (Matt. 10:33); martyrs in the book of Revelation appear as having a special glory (Rev. 7:14; 6:9-11). Indeed, these texts *are dealing with martyrdom;* for, Christ promises a certain and quasi immediate reward to those who place their life for him; but here to place one's life is the same as to die. Moreover, implicitly *the forgiveness of sins is promised;* for, the kingdom of heaven or eternal life is being promised, which cannot be obtained without the forgiveness of sins. But that it is *not dealing with Christians alone,* or with those already baptized, is clear from the universality of Christ's words. In fact it can happen, and de facto did happen more than once, that a catechumen was in danger of his life by giving testimony to the faith before he was able to receive baptism. Therefore in such cases martyrdom removes sins, including original sin and so supplies for baptism.

Then also these texts of Scripture have value especially from the Tradition, which sees in them the absolute promise made by Christ to the martyrs of entering immediately after death into the kingdom of heaven.[18]

76. Proof from tradition. 1. All the Fathers,[19] already from the beginning of Christianity, exalt the excellence of martyrdom, and they extol the martyrs with the greatest praises and honors. St. Ignatius, having been condemned to the lions, strongly urged the Romans not to intercede for him, lest he be deprived of the grace and privilege of martyrdom: "I

17 III, q. 68, a. 2.

18 St. Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* 13,7: ML 41,381; St. Cyprian, *De Rebapt.* 11: ML 3,1196; Origen, *Exhortat. Ad martyr.* 30: MG 11,599; *In Levit.* Hom.2,4: MG 12,417; *Comment. In Matth.* 16,6: MG 13,1383.

19 There are many texts in Lennerz, *De Sacramento Baptismi* 153-160.

beseech you not to show me any untimely benevolence. Allow me to be food for the beasts, by whom it will be possible for me to attain God. I am the wheat of God and I will be ground by the teeth of beasts so that I may be found the pure bread of Christ... If I suffer, I will become a freedman of Jesus Christ and I will rise again in him free. Now being in chains I have learned to desire nothing."[20] In *The Martyrdom of St. Polycarp* the author shows the desire of celebrating a feast day on the anniversary of his glorious triumph.[21] The martyrs are also praised in the *Shepherd of Hermas,*[22] by St. Irenaeus,[23] and generally in the acts of the martyrs and in sermons in their honor.

In these places the concern is with martyrs who are baptized Christians; but from the way of speaking the singular efficacy of martyrdom is shown when considered in itself. Also there are many texts in which the concern is with martyrs who were not baptized. Examples are given by: Tertullian (R 309), Origen (493), St. Cyprian (R 598) who say that there are two remissions of sins: baptism and suffering or martyrdom. St. Cyril of Jerusalem says: "If someone does not receive baptism, he does not have salvation, with of course the exception of the martyrs alone, who receive the kingdom without water" (R 811). Melito Sardensis,[24] St. Hippolytus,[25] St. Fulgentius (R 2269) and many others either say simply that martyrdom replaces baptism, or also that it surpasses baptism. The famous saying of St. Augustine applies not only to the baptized but also to all the martyrs: "Ecclesiastical discipline has something known by the faithful, when the martyrs in that place are commemorated at the altar of God, where prayers are not offered for them; but prayers are offered for the other dead. For it is an offense to pray for a martyr, to whose prayers we should commend ourselves."[26]

77. 2. The cult of the martyrs shows that in the Church there is a doctrine about the efficacy of martyrdom. For she not only venerates all the Apostles and the other martyrs, but also expressly there are numbered among them some about whom it is certain that they did not receive baptism. She venerates the Holy Innocents, only because they suffered for Christ, and she does not ask whether or not they were circumcised; the same applies to catechumens who died as martyrs and also to St. Genesius, a mimic actor,

20 *Ad Romanos* 4, especially 2-6: ed. Funk, 1,256-258.
21 *Martyrium Polycarpi* 18,3: ed. Funk, 1,336.
22 *Vis.* 3, 1,9; 21; *Simil.* 9,28,1-8; ed. Funk, 1,432-434, 624-626.
23 *Adversus Haeres.* 3,16,4: MG 7,924.
24 *Corpus Apologet.* 9,418.
25 *Apost. Traditio* cn. 101.
26 *Sermo* 159,1,1: ML 38,868.

and many others mentioned in the Roman Martyrology. As St. Augustine and Innocent III said, the Church does not pray for them.[27]

78. Theological reasoning. According to the testimony of Christ himself *greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends* (John 15:13). Therefore martyrdom is the greatest act of charity. But an act of charity reconciles a sinner with God. Therefore also martyrdom.

79. Objections. 1. The holy Fathers often say that no matter what a catechumen believes, if he is not baptized, that he still carries the burden of his sins and his faith does him no good—and other things like that (St. Ambrose,[28] St. Augustine[29]). Therefore the desire of baptism has no value.

I concede the texts but I deny the interpretation. For in these texts these Fathers show the necessity of actual baptism; and therefore catechumens cannot omit or neglect the sacrament. If they do so culpably or omit it out of disrespect, they will not obtain the forgiveness of their sins. This is evident if one pays attention to the nature or dignity of baptism in blood, which has value to the extent that it contains the desire of actual baptism.[30]

Objector insists: Even if someone is endowed with the works of the virtues, and he does not receive the seal of water, he will not enter into the kingdom of heaven.[31] Therefore St. Cyril does not admit that an act of charity supplies for baptism.

I distinguish the antecedent. In this place St. Cyril is thinking about a man who voluntarily omitted baptism, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.* The case is completely the same with the Fathers cited above; for the concern is with extolling the necessity of baptism, so that good works without it have no value, if out of contempt or culpable negligence it is omitted.[32]

2. Trent, while treating baptism (sess.VI c.4) does mentions only the desire of baptism as a supplement for baptism. Therefore at least martyrdom does not supply for it.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent. Trent does not treat extraordinary cases, such as martyrdom, as we already said above. And for this same reason it does not apply to our case the text of St. Paul (1 Cor. 13:3) in which he extols charity so that *if I deliver my body to be burned* and I do not have charity, I gain nothing.

3. Baptism is necessary in reality or in desire. But infants who suffer martyrdom are not capable of the desire of baptism. Therefore baptism is in no way necessary for these infants.

I concede the major and minor and I deny the consequent, namely, that baptism of

27 3 Decret. Tit.41 c.6,2: ed. Friedberg, 2,639.
28 *De Myster.* 4,20: ML 16,394.
29 *In Ioann.* Tr.13,7: ML 35,1946.
30 See Ch. Pesch, *Compendium Theologiae Dogmaticae* 4 n.73.
31 *Cateches.* 3,4: MG 33,431; see also n, 10: MG 33,439.
32 On this see Suarez d.27 s.2 n.5.

desire is necessary for infants. These children receive baptism of blood, which comes to them in the form of a privilege, as we already said.

80. *Corollary.* From what has been said it is inferred that both charity, or the desire of baptism, and martyrdom justify immediately, even if death does not follow. Hence it can happen that many adults approach baptism already justified, that is, if they have made an act of charity before their baptism. And therefore when it is said that *in a case of necessity* baptism in blood supplies for baptism with water, we want to signify the strict necessity of receiving actual baptism, although a definite time for receiving it is not assigned.

81. Scholium 1. *For what reason martyrdom obtains its effect.* In explaining the reason why martyrdom has the efficacy to forgive sins completely, theologians are in disagreement. St. Thomas[33] and other outstanding theologians held that the efficacy of martyrdom comes from charity, without which martyrdom would have no value. But this opinion now is generally not admitted, for:

1. In the acts of the martyrs it is certain that sometimes the martyrs endured their sufferings while having before their eyes the eternal fire, which they could avoid with a few torments[34];

2. Christ himself commends the fear of hell (Matt. 10:28) and indeed to suffer death rather than offend God;

3. The Fathers simply say that martyrdom has greater efficacy than baptism with water[35];

4. The Church venerates innocent infants as martyrs, and many other infants, who of course could not elicit an act of charity;

5. Finally, if the question concerns the act of charity, the efficacy of martyrdom must be compared with the desire of baptism, but this does not appear in the Fathers.

82. Scholium 2. *How martyrdom obtains its efficacy.* As we said immediately above, martyrdom does not have its efficacy from charity. Therefore we conclude that it operates *ex opere operato.*[36] However it is not said to be such simply *ex opere operato,* but *quasi ex opere operato.* The reason is, because, although the effect is obtained *ex opere operato,* that is, from the death suffered for Christ, nevertheless, since martyrdom is not a means instituted by Christ to remit sins and to cause grace, therefore its efficacy is accomplished *quasi ex opere operato*, that is, it produces its effect in the way in which the sacraments produce grace, as if it were a sacrament.

83. Scholium 3. *Whether martyrdom without charity has value.* As we stated above, charity is not required for martyrdom; but some retraction of sins, if any are present, is certainly necessary; however, the retraction does not have to take place through charity.

33 III, q. 66, a. 12 as 2; II-II, q. 124, a. 2 ad 2.

34 This is the case with those mentioned by the author of *Martyr. Polycarpi* 2,3: ed. Funk, 1,316.

35 V.gr., St. Gregory Naz., *Oratio* 39,17: MG 36,356. See scholium 4.

36 The contrary was maintained by D. Soto, *In 4* t.1 d.3 s.11; and Vázquez, *In 3* t.2 d.153 c.3.

But if someone expressly rejects charity, he could hardly be called a martyr; and such a case is not thinkable, for it seems to be a contradiction in terms: to give one's life for God and to refuse to love God. (Cf. the Bollandists [February 9] where it is reported that Sapricius, shortly before his martyrdom, denied the faith because he did not want to be reconciled with his enemy.)

84. Scholium 4. *On the baptisms of water, desire and blood as compared with each other.* If these three kinds of baptism are compared with each other, they have one thing in common: the remission of mortal sins, the conferring of sanctifying grace and the adoption of children of God, with the right to eternal life. But they do not obtain this end in the same way and to the same degree.

For, baptism of desire does not necessarily remit all venial sins nor all the temporal punishment due to mortal sins. But martyrdom and baptism with water totally remove all guilt and punishment.

Water baptism is in agreement with martyrdom because both obtain totally the remission of all sins and their punishments; however, they disagree inasmuch as martyrdom, even though it justifies, still does not make one a member of the Church militant nor does it confer the right to the other sacraments, and it does not imprint the character, while baptism in water obtains all of these. But if the martyr dies, he enters into the heavenly Church triumphant, in which he does not now obtain the sacraments, but he does obtain the complete possession of God through the light of glory.

Perfect charity is required for baptism of desire, but it is not necessary in baptism of water and of blood.

Finally, if baptism of water and martyrdom are compared with regard to their excellence, baptism of water surpasses martyrdom (given a case in which death does not take place) in the sense that it confers the right to the other sacraments, imprints the character and makes one a member of Christ. But martyrdom is most excellent from the fact that it proceeds from a privilege and the great love of God for that man who gave his life for Him, it covers the martyr with grace and glory and endows him with a special beauty in heaven. Therefore the holy Fathers extol the excellence of martyrdom and prefer it to the other kinds of baptism. Thus, for example, St. Cyprian said: "We who, with the Lord's permission, gave the first baptism to believers, also prepare individuals for another one, implying and teaching that this is a baptism greater in grace, more sublime in power, more precious in honor—a baptism in which the angels baptize, a baptism in which God and his Christ exult, a baptism after which no one ever sins again, a baptism which consumes the increase of our faith, a baptism which joins us, who are leaving this world, immediately with God. In the baptism of water the remission of sins is received, in baptism of blood the crown of virtues. This matter must be embraced and desired and sought with all our prayer of petition, that we who were servants of God may be also his friends."[37]

37 *Ad Fortunatum* n.4: CSEL 3,319; ML 4,654.

CHAPTER IV

On the subject and minister of baptism

85. In the previous theses, on different occasions, indirect reference was given to the subject of baptism; now we will take up some special questions which concern the subject.

I. The *subject* of baptism is each and every living human being who has not yet been baptized (CIC 745 [1917]). This is clear from the law of Christ: *Preach the gospel to the whole creation* (Mark 16:15) and from the universal practice of the Church from the very beginning. Those who are already baptized cannot be baptized again, as is certain from the controversy with the Donatists in the fourth century.

If there is a question about adults, it is required that the subject of baptism have the *intention* of receiving it; an *habitual* intention suffices. Therefore those can be validly baptized (and in an emergency, must be) who, having become unconscious or insane, previously manifested a desire of receiving the sacrament and there is no evidence they ever retracted it. It must also be *free,* even though it can come from a motive of spiritual or even external fear and force. Thus the Lord himself said: *He who believes and is baptized will be saved; he who does not believe will be condemned* (Mark 16:16), and Innocent III declared the same thing (D 781). In these cases the baptism is valid, because the consent is simply voluntary.

Moreover, for licitness but not for validity, it is required that an adult have faith, hope and charity and, if he has committed mortal sins, a retraction of them, at least by attrition. No retraction is required for original sin, since it is not a personal sin but one contracted by generation. And sacramental confession must not precede baptism, because a catechumen is not capable of receiving the other sacraments. "If, however, any persons about to be baptized, wish, out of devotion, to confess their sins, their confession should be heard; not for the purpose of enjoining them to do satisfaction, but in order to instruct them in the spiritual life as a remedy against their vicious habits."[1] But absolution cannot be given, nor per se can a penance or some satisfaction be imposed; but it can be imposed in order to obtain more merit and a medicinal effect.

86. Infants, namely, those who have not yet acquired the use of reason (the perpetually insane are on the same level), because they are incapable of having an intention, can be validly and fruitfully baptized. Baptism

1. III, q. 68, a. 6.

administered to them confers all the effects, even with regard to the infused virtues and habits, and it must not be repeated when they arrive at the age of discretion. This latter practice was affirmed *by some Catholics, Anabaptists, Baptists, and Modernists,* who were preceded by Erasmus (D 1627). These groups usually quote the text of Mark 16:16, from which they wish to deduce a universal law for the necessity of faith before baptism. Of course, infants cannot have such faith, and therefore later on they were to be asked about their consent concerning their baptism.

A *fetus* must also be baptized, if it is certainly living or even if it is probably alive. Canon law prescribes, if death is imminent for any reason, that a fetus should be baptized even in its mother's womb; then if it is born alive, it should be baptized again conditionally. But if the water of baptism was poured on its head, then afterwards, when it is outside its mother, it should not be baptized again, not even conditionally. For other prescriptions on this point, see CIC 746 [1917].

87. In our time there has been a discussion about the fittingness or even the licitness of baptizing infants. The reason for this question comes from the fact that many children de facto, when they reach a more mature age, receive almost no religious instruction. If there is a question about licitness, the matter is not doubtful. If there is a question about its fittingness, then one should keep in mind what the Catholic Church requires, namely, that parents and guardians provide for the future religious formation of the child. But if in some places circumstances are such that Christian regions have become more like pagan areas, then one must abide by the judgment of prudent and competent ecclesiastical authority.

However, that is not the way things are in the real controversy among Protestants.[2] The non-Catholic theologian Karl Barth, relying on a new theory of baptism, denied infant baptism. According to Barth, baptism from its very institution supposes such a disposition of mind and command of the will that they cannot be given by infants. For, baptism is a "sacrament of faith," and therefore it presupposes faith.

According to Barth[3] (and this is a consequence of the sacramental doctrine of the Reformers) a sacrament is only a quasi continuation or prolongation of the preaching of the word of God; it is the visibility of the word. As such, a sacrament is destined to manifest the mission of the Word of God; this Word of God is not simple doctrine, but a true divine action;

2. There is a lively controversy between K. Barth and O. Cullmann, Protestant theologians. Concerning it, see J. Hamer, O.P., *Le Baptême et la foi:* Irenikon 23 (1951) 387-405; there is an ample bibliography in p. 405-407; O. Cullmann also offers a bibliography, *Le Baptême des enfants et la doctrine biblique du baptême* 21.
3. K. Barth, *Die kirchliche Lehre von der Taufe* (Theologische Studien, 14) (1943), especially p. 3-8.

this essential aspect is signified by a rite of some kind.

Therefore baptism is an element of Christian preaching, and consequently a human activity. The external rite is a quasi shadow of the real thing; but the internal reality in baptism is participation in the death and resurrection of Christ. But this efficacy depends on the free will of God; baptism, therefore, is the attestation of Christ, the covenant, grace and the Church. This testimony is presented by the external rite as its visible form, but only after preaching has made it clear as an audible sign. Consequently, according to Barth, baptism will not be the cause, but the manifestation of spiritual regeneration.

Oscar Cullmann[4] has a different view and thinks that infant baptism is licit. This learned man also requires faith in the one receiving the sacrament, but the faith of the community suffices, when the concern is with little children. He proceeds from the principle according to which baptism is the sacrament of incorporation in the Body of Christ, and he interprets the texts of Scripture in a sense that is more or less Catholic.

Against these errors there is the continual and universal practice of the Church,[5] and the constant doctrine of the Fathers[6] and the theologians.[7] This is founded on the necessity of baptism from the universal law of Christ also for children, since there is no other remedy available for them. Indeed, if baptism were not valid for them, because of a lack of faith, little children who die before obtaining the use of reason would not be able to be saved.[8]

88. Regarding the licitness and fittingness of administering baptism to little children, although there is no danger of death, the laws of the Church must be observed as found in CIC 745-754 [1917]. In general, if it is a matter of the children of non-Catholics or unbelievers, for whom perseverance in faith is difficult, they should not be baptized unless there is danger of death. But for the children of Catholics, baptism should not be delayed because of their age, because it is not right that they should be

4. O. Cullmann, *Die Tauflehre des Neuen Testaments. Erwachsenen-und Kindertaufe* (1948); *Le Baptême des enfants et la doctrine biblique du baptême* (Cahiers de l'actualité protestante, n. 19-20. Neuchâtel). See L. Leenhard, *Le Baptême chrétien, son origine, sa signification:* ibid. n. 14.
5. In the Councils of Carthage, Lateran IV, Vienne, Florence, Trent (D 223, 802, 903, 1348, 1625).
6. Tertullian had already mentioned this, *De Baptismo* 12: ML 1,1213. The doctrine of the Fathers is ancient: St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haeres.* 2,22,4: MG 7,784; see DTC 2,192-196. Origen appeals to the tradition of the Church: "The Church received from the Apostles the tradition to give baptism also to little children" (*In Epist. ad Rom.* 5,9: MG 14,1047).
7. Only Strabo (*De Eccles. Rebus* 26: ML 114,980) said that the baptism of little children was not in use in the first two centuries.
8. Some see an indication of the baptism of infants in Acts 16:15.33; 1 Cor. 1:16, where it is reported that whole families were baptized (of Lydia, of the guard in the prison at Phillipi, of Stephanas); among the members there were probably some infants.

deprived of the good effects of baptism; for thus it comes about that they increase gradually, even without sense perception, in faith, with the help of grace, with their own supernatural merits even from the first moment in which they can merit. Parents are obliged to have their children baptized as soon as possible, although it is not binding under grave sin, unless there is an imminent danger of death.

89. The obligation of baptizing the children of Catholic parents comes from the law of Christ, handed over to the Church, to whom all power in heaven and on earth has been given; and therefore he can demand that the children of Catholics become members of his own mystical body. Every human creature is under this power of Christ and in a remote way belongs to the Church of Christ. Moreover, it is not evil nor is it opposed to freedom that a child becomes a member of the Church before he attains the use of reason.

90. Whether the Apostles were baptized, or even needed baptism, is disputed, and clarity about this will never be able to be decided with certainty. For, it is a historical fact about which we know nothing. The Apostles themselves were directly subject to Christ, who could confer on them the effects of the sacraments without the sacrament. The same must be said about the Blessed Virgin; in her also the need for baptism was lacking because she did not inherit original sin. However she could have received it because of the character and the increase of grace.[9]

91. II. The *minister* of the sacrament of baptism, regarding its *validity,* can be any person, who has the use of reason and who uses the required matter and form and has the intention of doing what the Church does. This doctrine is a *matter of faith* (*de fide*) from Lateran Council IV (D 802). It is certain already from the ancient Fathers[10] and documents of the Church. For a time women[11] were forbidden to baptize and also bigamists.[12] But evidently the question was about licitness and not about validity. For, besides the universality, which is found in the Fathers concerning the administration of baptism, Urban II says expressly: "It is baptism if, in a case of emergency, a woman shall have baptized a child in the name of the Trinity."[13]

9. Suarez, *De Sacramentis* d.31 s.1 n.3.
10. Tertullian, *De Baptismo* 17: ML 1,1217; St. Jerome, *Dialog. Contra Lucifer.* 9: ML 151,529.
11. Council of Carthage IV, cn.100: Msi 3,959.
12. Council of Illiberitanum, cn.38: Msi 2,12; see D'Ales, *De Baptismo et Confirmatione* 70f.
13. *Epistola* 271: ML 151,529.

Theological reasoning takes its cue from the necessity of baptism: "It is due to the mercy of Him who wills all men to be saved that in those things that are necessary for salvation, man can easily find the remedy.... Consequently... it was ordained... that the minister of baptism should be anyone, even not in orders, lest from lack of being baptized, man should suffer loss of his salvation."[14]

Canon law distinguishes between the solemn and the private administration of baptism; therefore it established the following laws: Cn. 738.1: "The ordinary minister of solemn baptism is a priest; but its conferral is reserved to the pastor or to another priest of the same parish or to one approved by the local bishop; in a case of necessity this permission can be legitimately presumed." Cn. 741: "The extraordinary minister of solemn baptism is a deacon; but he may not use his authority without the permission of the local ordinary or the pastor, to be granted for a just reason which, in a case of necessity, may be legitimately presumed."

Other points that concern the minister and subject of baptism are determined by the Code of Canon Law and are treated in moral theology.

92. Scholium 1. *Whether angels can be ministers of baptism;* it does not seem possible to doubt it. For, "as God did not bind his power to the sacraments, so as to be unable to bestow the sacramental effect without conferring the sacrament; so neither did he bind his power to the ministers of the Church so as to be unable to give angels power to administer the sacraments. And since good angels are messengers of truth; if any sacramental rite were performed by good angels, it should be considered valid, because it ought to be evident that this is being done by the will of God... But if *demons* who are "lying spirits," were to perform a sacramental rite, it should be pronounced as invalid."[15] Therefore angels can be ministers of baptism, but extraordinary ones, because it has to do with the necessity of baptism.

93. Scholium 2. *On baptism for the dead.* In 1 Cor. 15:29, when Paul is speaking about the resurrection of the dead, he says to the Corinthians: *Otherwise, what do people mean by being baptized on behalf of the dead? If the dead are not raised at all, why are people baptized on their behalf?* Hence some wanted to conclude that the dead or cadavers could also receive baptism fruitfully and validly.[16]

But the Fathers interpreted the words of St. Paul in different ways; and the exegetes are not in full agreement. Some believed that there was a custom among the Corinthians that, if someone died, either a catechumen or a family member without baptism, another

14. III, q. 67, a. 3.
15. III, q. 64, a. 7.
16. On the different interpretations of this text and of this matter, see W. Henry: DACL 2,380-382, with an extensive bibliography; D'Ales, 83f.; L. Dursellen, *Die Taufe für die Toten:* Theol. Studien und Krit. (1903) 291-308; J.W. Horsley (Newbury House Magazine 1890) lists thirty-one interpretations, according to Iacono, *Il battesimo nella dottrina di S. Paulo* 88-91; DTC 2,361f.

Christian could receive baptism or the ceremonies of baptism for the deceased person, that is, in favor of the one who died. In this way the Corinthians thought that these dead persons would be worthy of the resurrection.

Tertullian[17] thought that Paul was dealing here with baptism by proxy, as happens in matrimony.

Others[18] give other interpretations: a) to baptize in this text signifies a Jewish rite in order to remove the impurity of the dead;

b) it is mortification for the dead (by way of a quasi indulgence);

c) *to baptize* in this place must be understood as baptism at the time of death (Epiphanius);

d) or also about baptism after the profession of faith in the resurrection of the dead (Chrysostom, Theodoret, Oecumenius, Theophylactus);

e) baptism inasmuch as it is efficacious from the death of Christ (Pseudo-Jerome, Iulianus, Sedulius);

f) the effect of baptism is being signified (Peter Lombard);

g) it refers to a practice among the Corinthians according to which, when a catechumen died without baptism, another was baptized for him, or he received the ceremonies of baptism in testimony of the faith which the deceased person professed.

Whatever may be said about these interpretations (some of them are not acceptable), all interpreters admit that St. Paul neither praises nor condemns this custom, but only mentions it to show faith in the resurrection.[19] Some heretics really thought that baptism for the dead is valid, but all the Fathers unanimously rejected this teaching. Moreover, it is certain that the Church has never admitted baptism for the dead, but with express words has condemned this practice, as often as this custom began to creep in because of the influence of heretics or from ignorance.

17. *Liber de Resurrectione carnis* 48: ML 2,912.
18. J. Corluy presents a brief summary of the different interpretations, *Spicilegium Dogmatico-Biblicum* (1884) 1,314-317 and in a note.
19. See also an article on baptism for the dead among pagans in DBS 1,907.

CHAPTER V

On the effects of baptism

94. In the treatise on the sacraments in general, many things that are said in general about the sacraments pertain directly to baptism; therefore here it will suffice to mention only the main points.

1. The first effect of baptism is *spiritual generation* to a wholly new life "and surely it is the first communication of this life. It is called *regeneration*, both because it is the second generation after the first natural generation, and, especially, because it is generation to that life which God at the beginning bestowed on the human race, which man had before sin, which ought to be transmitted by natural generation, but which man lost by sin, so that now this life is not communicated by natural generation, but each man is conceived with the privation of this life in the state of original sin."[1] For this reason, baptism is called the washing of regeneration (Tit. 3:5), the sacrament of regeneration, spiritual renascence, and it is given other similar names.[2]

95. 2. However this regeneration takes place through grace, for by justification a man is changed from a state of divine wrath to a state of friendship.[3] This involves the forgiveness of sins and the infusion of sanctifying grace. By baptism, therefore, all *sins* are remitted, not only original sin, but also all actual sins, if there are any, and the whole temporal punishment due to them.

This is shown from the Creeds in which we confess that there is one baptism for the forgiveness of sins (D 150); Celestine in the Indiculus says: "through the purification of the new birth [Christ] has washed away every past fault in his baptismal bath" (D 239). And the Council of Lyons II: "As for the souls of those who, after having received holy baptism, have incurred no stain of sin whatever..., are received immediately into heaven" (D 857). The Council of Trent condemns with an anathema anyone who denies that "the guilt of original sin is remitted by the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ given in baptism or asserts that all that is sin in the true and proper sense is not taken away... For, in those who are reborn God hates nothing, because there is no condemnation for those who were buried with Christ by baptism unto death...(Rom. 6:4) innocent, unstained, pure,

1 Lennerz, *De Sacramento Baptismi* 69. See Doronzo, 78-95.

2 Council of Carthage IV: D 223; Indiculus of Celestine: D 247; Council of Valence III: D 632; Council of Florence: D 1314; Council of Trent: D 1730.

3 Council of Trent, session VI, on justification.

and guiltless, have become the beloved sons of God... so that henceforth nothing holds them back from entering into heaven" (D 1515).

Likewise, Holy Scripture mentions this effect of baptism; when St. Paul exhorts Christians to lead a holy life, the reason he gives is that they have been baptized (Rom. 6:2; Eph. 5:26; 1 Cor. 6:9-11); and St. Peter, to those who asked him what they must do to be saved, said, *Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the forgiveness of your sins* (Acts 2:38).

However concupiscence remains, which in the reborn is present not for punishment but for merit. For, the reborn are not returned to the state of original justice (D 1515). This doctrine, which had already often been repeated in the controversy with the Pelagians, was finally declared with the quoted words by the Council of Trent in session 5.

96. 3. "In the very act of justification, together with the remission of sins, man receives through Jesus Christ, into whom he is inserted, the gifts of faith, hope and charity" (D 1530). Therefore by baptism man receives also *grace and the infused virtues, with the gifts of the Holy Spirit and the infused habits in order to be able to act supernaturally.* Grace is always joined together with the remission of sins. Therefore there has never been any doubt about baptismal grace. For a special reason it has customarily been called *sanctifying,* because it is the first grace that is conferred and it makes man holy and pleasing to God. It is also called *the grace of regeneration,* because that is its first effect.

Formerly it was disputed whether the virtues and habits were infused in infants along with the baptismal grace. On this point St. Thomas said: "Some of the early writers held that children do not receive grace and virtues in baptism, but that they receive the imprint of the character of Christ, by the power of which they receive grace and virtue when they arrive at the perfect age. But this is evidently false.... Now the source of this error was that they did not recognize the distinction between habit and act. And so, seeing children being incapable of acts of virtue, they thought that they had no virtues at all after baptism. But this inability of children to act is not due to the absence of habits, but to an impediment on the part of the body: thus also when a man is asleep, though he may have the habits of virtue, yet is he hindered from virtuous acts through being asleep."[4] The Council of Vienne thought that this opinion is more probable (D 904). But the Council of Trent (D 1530-1531) speaks in such a way that now it seems

4 III, q. 69, a. 6.

4* E. Sauras, O.P., treats this matter at length, *El Cuerpo Mistico de Cristo* (BAC, Madrid 1952) 592-596.

no dispute over this is possible.

97. 4. By this regeneration and sanctification another effect of baptism is produced, namely, *incorporation in the mystical Body of Christ.*[4*] For, *By one Spirit we were all baptized into one body—Jew or Greeks, slaves or free—and all were made to drink of one Spirit* (1 Cor. 12:13); and this is with all the rights pertaining to the community of the faithful, namely, participation in all the other sacraments. For, by the washing of the regeneration of baptism, those born to natural life are not only reborn to the life of grace, but they also receive the character and become capable of receiving the other sacraments.[5] Therefore, those who receive baptism, even if they are heretics or schismatics, by that fact are members of the Catholic Church.[6] By law they are also held to observe all the precepts of the Church, and they cannot be said to be freed from this obligation (Trent, D 1621). However the Catholic Church generally does not pass laws except for Catholics, therefore such precepts apply to them only. The Church does this because of her maternal compassion, but not because she abandons her right of imposing such precepts. But the rights that are common to all the faithful are not acquired by those who place an obstacle, who impede the bond of Church communion, such as defects of faith and other similar defects.[7]

98. Another effect of baptism is the *character,* whereby the baptized are dedicated to the service of Christ the King, and they are configured to Christ the Priest. For, the character incorporates a man in Christ.[8]

St. Thomas says: "It is clear that the sacramental character is specially the character of Christ, to whose character the faithful are likened by reason of the sacramental characters, which are nothing else than certain participations of Christ's priesthood, flowing from Christ himself."[9] Therefore the baptismal character is a consecration that makes a Christian a partaker in the priesthood of Christ. It is in the soul, being something like a passive potency, inasmuch as it makes a man capable of receiving the other sacraments; but this capability is not just passive,[10] for it makes a baptized man a true minister[11]; thus he is an active and not a lifeless instrument.[12] Therefore the sacraments do not help someone who does not have the sacramental character, even though he has

5 Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 204.
6 Ibid., p. 205.
7 Wernz-Vidal, Ius Canonicum (1928) 2 p.3.
8 III, q. 70, a. 4.
9 III, q. 63, a. 3.
10 Cajetan, *In 3* q.72 a.5.
11 Salmanticenses, *Cursus Theologicus* d.5 dub.2 n.49.
12 John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Theologicus. De Sacramentis in genere* q. 63 d. 25 a. 2 n.129.

received a baptism of desire or blood.[13] Thus the priesthood of all Christians begins with baptism[14] (see On the Eucharist, n. 188).

99. Scholium. *On the unrepeatability of baptism.* From the imprint of the character it follows that baptism cannot be repeated. This doctrine of faith has been declared often by the Church and it is defined. St. Stephen I in a question about rebaptism that came from the African bishops gave this precept to St. Cyprian and to the other bishops: "Let nothing be introduced except what is already handed down" (D 110). Again, the Synod of Arles confirmed St. Stephen's decision (D 123); St. Siricius responded to Bishop Himerius (D 183) that heretics, baptized by the Arians and returning to the Catholic faith, should not be baptized again. St. Innocent I distinguished between Novatianists and Paulianists: the latter should be baptized when they come to the Catholic Church, because their baptism in the name of Paul was invalid; but the Novatianists were properly baptized, and therefore must not be rebaptized (D 214). Lateran Council IV had to restrain the insolence of the Greeks towards the Latins, because "the Greeks even had the temerity to rebaptize those baptized by the Latins; and some, as we are told, still do not fear to do this" (D 810). Afterwards, in a letter to the Catholicos of the Armenians, Clement VI reminds him that those who become unfaithful and afterward return to the Church are not to be rebaptized (D 1081).

Eugene IV in his Decree for the Armenians (D 1314), based on the character which is given by baptism, says that baptism must not be repeated; the Council of Trent solemnly defined the same thing in canon 9 on the sacraments in general (D 1609; see also 1626), and Pius IV repeated this definition in the Tridentine Profession of faith (D 1864).

100. The Fathers with one voice say the same: St. Irenaeus,[15] Tertullian,[16] St. Epiphanius,[17] St. Optatus Milevitanus,[18] St. Jerome,[19] St. Augustine.[20]

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13 Id., q. 63 d.25 a.2 n.130.

14 On the baptismal character, in addition to what is said in the general treatises, see A. Groegaert, *Les cérémonies du Baptême et de la Confirmation* (1935) 170f.; E. Sauras, *Fundamento sacramental de la Acción Católica:* RevEspT 3 (1943) 129-158, especially 140f.; Id., *El Cuerpo Mistico de Cristo* 695-701; L. Audet, *Notre participation au sacerdoce du Christ: étude sur le caractère sacramental:* Laval théologique et philosophique (1944) 9-46; (1945) 110-130, in particular 119-125.

15 *Adversus Haeres.* 1,21,2: MG 7, 657.

16 *De Baptismo* 15: ML 1,1216; *De Pudicitia* 16: ML 2,1015.

17 *Haeres.* 42,3: MG 41,700.

18 *De Schism. Donatist.* 5,3: ML 11,1048-1051.

19 *Dialog. Contra Lucifer* 11: ML 23,166.

20 Very often; for, he taught the doctrine of the character brilliantly and he argued from it he argued to its indelibility. See R 1492, 1621, 1623,1625ff.

Likewise, St. Cyprian, who wanted baptism conferred by heretics to be invalid, rejected rebaptism: "For I do not know by what presumption certain of our colleagues are led, since they think that it is not necessary to baptize those who, after having been anointed among the heretics, came to us... But we say that those who come to us from the heretics are not rebaptized among us, but baptized."[21]

101. The theological reasoning is deduced 1) from the very words of Christ and the effect of Baptism. For, since it is a spiritual regeneration, as there can be only one generation, so also one regeneration.[22] 2) From the permanence of the character; for, since it is indelible, it does not permit baptism to be repeated.

The Code of Canon Law (cn. 732,2 [1917]), when treating sacraments that cannot be repeated, says: "But if there is a prudent doubt about whether they were conferred actually or validly, they should be conferred again conditionally." This means that a truly prudent doubt is required, not just any suspicion; however, this doubt does not have to be as serious for baptism as it is for confirmation. For, baptism is a sacrament of the greatest necessity, and therefore it suffices that such doubt has a sufficient foundation.[23]

As Innocent I (D 214) said, if it is a matter of heretics who have converted to the Catholic faith, the question must be raised above all, and in each individual case, whether they were de facto baptized, and with what formula, matter and intention. If in a concrete case there is no certainty regarding any abnormality, it suffices to know the liturgical uses of that heretical sect. According to the results of this inquiry, the new convert will not be baptized, or baptized absolutely or conditionally, according as it is determined that he was or was not baptized, or a prudent doubt exists about the validity about the previously received baptism.

102. *On converts from Protestantism.* 1. The Provincial Council I of Westminster decreed that all must be baptized conditionally, unless without doubt it appears that in their baptism certainly were observed everything that pertains to the matter and form and their application.[24] The reason for this decree was the indifference which Protestants commonly have in the

21 *Epist.* 71,1: ML 4,409; and he repeats the same idea in *Epist.* 73,1: ML 3,1110.

22 St. Augustine says: "You understand the birth of the Spirit in the same way as Nicodemus understood birth in the flesh: for, just as the fruit of the womb cannot be repeated, so neither can baptism" (*In Ioannem Tract.* 11,6: ML 35,1478; and tr. 12,2: ML 35,1484.

23 See the approved authors in Moral Theology and Canon Law.

24 Conc. Plen. Westminster, XVI, 7; quoted by J. Montánchez, *Les Sacramentos en general. Bautismo, Confirmación* (1944) 276.

administration of baptism. "Unitarians, Universalists and Congregationalists deny the necessity of baptism, and therefore they are not concerned about its administration. Methodists and Presbyterians baptize with aspersion, hence there can always be a prudent doubt whether in fact the body of the one being baptized was touched by the water or just his clothes; then also, even if the body was touched by the water, whether it can truly be called a washing so that water flowed over the body. The Baptists baptize with immersion; therefore by reason of the proximate matter the baptism is valid; but generally the words are uttered a considerable time before they enter into the water, and for this reason the baptism will be doubtful because of the defect of the necessary union of the matter and the form. The Episcopalians are negligent in the use of the elements essential for baptism. Finally, the Quakers do not baptize at all.[25] However, the Anglican ritualists are sufficiently careful about the matter, form and intention, so baptism must be assumed to be valid in their members, unless the contrary is proved positively.

103. *The revival of baptism.* The revival of baptism is deduced from its unrepeatability. But a sacrament is said to be revived, when the effect is not produced in the act whereby the sacrament is administered because of some obstacle (*obex*), but only after the obstacle has been removed. Therefore, if baptism were not revived, the one who accepted baptism with an obstacle would have no way of obtaining salvation. The reason for this, as the Council of Trent says, is because justification consists in the change from the state of sin to the state of grace, "After the promulgation of the gospel, this transition cannot take place without the bath of regeneration or the desire for it" (D 1524).

The "*obex*"[26] is the same thing as an impediment and it can be twofold: of the sacrament and of grace. The first is had when the subject is not properly disposed to receive the sacrament, for example, because of a defect in the intention (in an adult), and therefore the sacrament is *invalid.* An impediment (*obex*) of grace comes from a bad disposition in the one being baptized, because the sacrament itself is valid, but the subject can in no way receive the grace, for example, because he has an unforgiven mortal sin, or because of a defect of faith, or for some other similar reason.

As is clear, when there is an impediment to the sacrament, one cannot speak about a revival; therefore a case of revival is given only when the impediment is opposed to the grace.

25 J. Montánchez, *loc.cit.*, 276.

26 On the "obex" or impediment, see Otten, n. 139.

Therefore, when someone receives the sacrament of baptism under some kind of fiction or with some impediment, the sacrament is indeed valid and he receives the character, but he cannot receive the sanctifying grace. But when the impediment is removed, v.gr., by repentance and forgiveness of the sin, then the grace of the sacrament of baptism is poured into the soul. That is what is meant when one speaks about the revival of the sacrament.

In this case the effect is obtained *ex opere operato,* not *ex opere operantis.* That is, it is the sacrament itself that produces the effect; and therefore a complete remission of all sins committed before baptism, and the remission of all their punishments, is obtained. But the sins committed after the reception of baptism are forgiven only by the sacrament of Penance, and therefore the total punishment for those sins is not remitted in virtue of the revival or of the sacrament.

104. The doctrine about the revival of baptism is very common among theologians and they hold it as absolutely certain. Some, like Scotus,[27] Biel[28] and Vázquez,[29] seem to admit that the revival of grace is not conferred *ex opere operato*, but only *ex opere operantis.* However they do not present this as certain.

The *Fathers*[30] did not touch on this question explicitly, except when a difficulty was raised by the Donatists. For, on the one hand their baptism was said to be valid, but on the other hand they were attacked as heretics who did not give the Holy Spirit. Therefore Donatus strongly went after St. Augustine: "If our baptism is not valid, we must be rebaptized, if we return to you; but if we truly baptize, we give the Holy Spirit, and therefore we are in the true Church." The holy Doctor responded as follows: "Then the same baptism begins *to be able to forgive sins,* when they come to the peace of the Church; not so that they are already held not to be truly remitted, nor so that that baptism is rejected as foreign or something else or another is reported, but in order that the same baptism, which because of discord outside worked death, because of peace within works salvation."[31]

105. Finally, St. Cyprian recounts all the effects of baptism and its excellence: "I always had these things with me. For, having been engaged in very many errors in my previous life, I did not believe that I could be freed

27 *In 4* d.4 q.5.
28 *In 4* d.4 q.1.
29 *In 3* d.159,4.
30 Sasse presents this very well, 1,252f.
31 *De Baptismo* 3,13,18: ML 43,146.

from them; thus I was subject to many vices, and without hope of better things, I nursed and fostered my evils as already my own and part of myself. But after the generating waters, with the help of that generation from on high, and after my sins had been removed, the light from above poured itself out into a repentant and pure heart; after that, with the consuming Spirit from above, the second birth changed me into a new man; in a marvelous way I was freed from doubts, in order to reveal what was hidden, to shed light on what was dark, to make possible what previously seemed difficult, to be able to do what I thought was impossible, so that I could recognize as earthly that former carnal way of life involved in various crimes; then I began to belong to God, because now the Holy Spirit gave life to me."[32] And Clement of Alexandria is not less clear: "And this is what happened to us, for whom the Lord was a model. Having been washed, we are enlightened; having been enlightened, we are adopted as sons; having been adopted, we are made perfect; having been made perfect, we are rendered immortal. He said: 'You are gods, sons of the Most High' (Ps. 82:6). But this work is spoken of in many ways: grace, enlightenment, and a perfect washing. Certainly a washing, whereby our sins are taken away. But grace, whereby the punishments due to our sins are remitted. Enlightenment, whereby we behold that holy and salutary light, that is, whereby we see God. But we call perfect that in which nothing is lacking. Therefore only those of us who first attain the ends of life are already perfect. But those of us who are separated from death are now living."[33]

32 *Epist.* 1,4: ML 4,200f.; CSEL 3,5f.

33 *Paedagog.* 1,6: MG 8,220f. In a very beautiful way St. Hilary also similarly explains the effects of baptism through the effects that are evident in the baptism of Christ recorded in the Gospel: *Comm. in Matth.* 2,6: ML 9,927.

BOOK II

ON THE SACRAMENT OF CONFIRMATION

INTRODUCTION

106. St. Paul said: *It is God who **establishes** us with you in Christ, and has **commissioned** us; he has put his **seal** upon us and given us his Spirit in our hearts as a guarantee* (2 Cor. 1:21-22). With these words the holy Fathers and Church doctors found and designated that sacrament by which the Holy Spirit is communicated, and which therefore they especially determined with these names: *confirmation, sealing,* chrismation or *anointing.*

The name of *confirmation*[1] to designate this sacrament did not begin to be used universally until the fifth century. But the sacrament already much earlier, from the first centuries, was signified by many names:

From the *matter* it is called: anointing,[2] chrism,[3] imposition of hands,[4] χρίσμα,[5] anointing of chrism,[6] the sacrament of chrism,[7] μύρον.[8]

From the *effects:* σφαγίς,[9] sign,[10] seal[11]; the Lord's sign,[12] eternal life,[13] a spiritual thing,[14] chrism of spiritual anointing,[15] chrism of salvation,[16] άγίον χρίσμα,[17] μυστικόν χρίσμα,[18] sealing,[19] confirmation,[20] βεβαίωσις.[21]

From its *relation to baptism:* perfection,[22] complement,[23]

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1 G. Bareille, *Confirmation d'après* les Pères Grecs et Latins: DTC 3,1026f.; P. de Puniet, *Confirmation:* DACL 3,2515-2519.
2 *Const. Apost.* 7,44: MG 1,1045; St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 70,2: CSEL 3,2,768.
3 St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 70,2: CSEL 3,2,768.
4 St. Augustine, *De Baptismo contra donat.* 3,16,21: ML 43,149.
5 *Sacramentarium Serapionis. Oratio in oleum* 25: ed.Funk, 2,186.
6 St. Salvianus, *De Gubernat.* 3,2: ML 53,58.
7 St. Augustine, *Contra Litt. Petil.* 3104-239: ML 43,342.
8 *Const. Apost.* 7,22,2: MG 1,1012; ed.Funk, 1,406.
9 St. Cornelius, *Epist. ad Fabian* (in Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 6,43): MG 20,634.
10 Tertulliam, *Adversus Marcion.* 3,22: ML 2,358.
11 *Sacramentarium Serapionis* 25: ed.Funk 2,186; *Const. Apost.* 7,22,2: ed.Funk, 1,406.
12 St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 73,9: ML 4,1115.
13 St. Leo the Great, *Sermo ad Nativ. Dom.* 4,6: ML 54,207.
14 St. Ambrose, *De Myster.* 7,42: ML 16,403; Pseudo-Ambrose, *De Sacramentis* 3,2: ML 16,434.
15 St. Leo the Great, *De Nativ. Dom. Sermo* 4,6: ML 54,207.
16 *Pontificale Romanum* Part I. *De confirmandis.*
17 Conc. Laodic. Cn.7: Hrd 1,782.
18 St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* 21,4: MG 33,1902.
19 St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 73,6: CSEL 3,2,783.
20 Council of Orange, cn.2: Hrd 1,1783. St. Isidore of Spain, *De offic. eccles.* 2,26: ML 83, 823.
21 *Const. Apost.* 3,17: MG 1,800.
22 Conc. Illiber. Cn.38: Hrd 1,254; cn.77: Hrd 1,258.
23 Pseudo-Ambrose, *De Sacrament.* 3,2: ML 16,434.

consummation,[24] baptism of the Holy Spirit,[25] μυστήριον τελετής μύρον.[26]

107. The Catholic Church has always considered confirmation as a true sacrament and distinct from baptism, and in fact, as its complement. Customarily it is administered immediately after baptism. But since the administration of this sacrament is reserved to the bishops, if for just reasons baptism was conferred by someone other than the bishop, and so confirmation was separated from baptism, it was conferred later on a suitable occasion.

There are two elements that cause a special difficulty concerning this sacrament and its quasi history or evolution: a difference regarding the effect and a difference the rite.

If we look at the *effect,* we note that in the first century (or at least in the time of the Apostles) a conferral of charisms was often given solemnly in the very moment of confirmation; this granting of charisms later on is not apparent. But in what concerns the *rite* there is much variety, not only regarding the external rite, but also regarding the substance of the rite. Since, for example, in baptism, the use of water is evident from the very beginning, and only water with a definite formula and always substantially the same, in confirmation, in contrast, the matter of this sacrament is designated by the imposition of hands, or by anointing, or chrismation, etc. As a result, the disagreements among Catholics were about the matter of this sacrament and also about the minister, as we shall see in its proper place.

108. The *Reformers* rejected completely the whole doctrine of the sacrament of confirmation. Before them, only Wycliffe and Hus were in error about the minister of this sacrament, as is clear from the Council of Constance (D 1259). Also the Waldensians accepted the sacrament, but they rejected the anointing and retained only the imposition of hands.

Luther at first admitted the sacraments of baptism, confirmation, penance, extreme unction and the Eucharist[27]; but afterwards he recognized only three sacraments: "baptism, penance, bread."[28]

Melanchthon proposed: "Confirmation formerly was an exploration of doctrine in which individuals recited a summary of Christian doctrine, and they showed that they disagreed with the pagans and heretics...."[29]

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24 St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 73,9: CSEL 3,2,784.
25 St. Cyprian, *De Rebaptism.* 10: ML 3,1195.
26 *Const. Apost.* 7,22,2: MG 1,1012; ed.Funk, 1,406.
27 *Ein Sermon von dem Neuen Testament* (1520): *Opera Omnia* ed.Weimar, 6,367.
28 *De Captiv. Babyl.: Opera Omnia* 7,501.
29 *Loci communes* 48.

Thus gradually the use of confirmation among Protestants was abandoned. But in the eighteenth century Spencer wanted to renew the ceremony of imposition of hands in order to reanimate the spiritual life. He was able to obtain this in not a few places, but not without the strong opposition of many. The Lutheran church has always preserved the use commended by Luther, interpreted in the way in which Melanchthon explained it.[30]

Spanish Protestants in the nineteenth century accepted the sacrament of confirmation administered be a bishop before the first participation of children in the Lord's Supper. The rite consisted in certain prayers and exhortations which were followed by the imposition of hands, but without any anointing.[30*]

109. *The Council of Trent*[31] decided to examine four propositions of the Reformers concerning the sacrament of confirmation: 1) Confirmation is not a sacrament[32]; 2) The institution of the sacrament is due to the Roman Pontiffs, not to Christ, and it does not have the promise of the grace of God[33]; 3) It is a vain ceremony, and at another time it was only a catechesis whereby those approaching adolescence would explain the reason for their faith to the Church[34]; 4) The minister of confirmation is not the bishop alone, but any priest.[35]

The first three propositions were condemned as heretical; the fourth in the sense of the Reformers could be said to be condemned, but it was proposed with a certain addition. Therefore, with a solemn definition, on March 3, 1547, in the seventh session it was decreed:

Cn. 1. If anyone says that the confirmation of those baptized is a useless ceremony and not a true and proper sacrament; or that of old, it was nothing more than a sort of catechesis in which those nearing adolescence gave an account of their faith before the Church, let him be anathema.

Cn. 2. If anyone says that those who ascribe any power to the sacred chrism of confirmation are offending the Holy Spirit, let him be anathema.

Cn. 3. If anyone says that the ordinary minister of holy confirmation is not the bishop but any simple priest, let him be anathema (D 1628-1630).

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30 P. Bernard, *La Confirmation chez les Protestans:* DTC 3,1082-1088.

30* *Oficios divinos y administration de los sacramentos y otros ritos en la Iglesia española reformada* (Madrid 1889) 315-325.

31 CTr 5,838f.

32 Luther, *De Captiv. Babyl. loc.cit.*

33 *Confessio Augustana.*

34 Melanchthon, *Loci communes, loc.cit.*

35 *Libellus reformationis ad Colonienses.*

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CHAPTER I

Existence of the sacrament of confirmation

Thesis 1. The rite of confirmation, which is a true sacrament of the New Law, is conferred on the baptized.

S.Th. III, q. 72; Suarez, d.32 s.1; Pesch, 491-500; Puig de la B., 269-279; Lennerz, 56-72; Lercher-Umberg, 194-204; Doronzo, 264-276.

110. Connection. By baptism a man becomes a member of the Catholic Church and a subject of Christ the King, and he is a part of the Mystical Body of Christ; but he still must strive for perfection. Christ wills that men make progress in the spiritual life with the sacraments, just as they do in their material life. Therefore he instituted another sacrament, after baptism, in order to strengthen his spirit. That is the sacrament of confirmation. But the Reformers deny the reality of this sacrament, since they say it is not something distinct from baptism. Therefore our first task is to establish the sacramentality of confirmation.

111. Definition of terms. *The baptized.* With this word we are not only saying that confirmation cannot be received by the non-baptized (since we already know that baptism is necessary in order to receive the other sacraments), but we also wish to indicate that the rite of confirmation is distinct and separable from the rite of baptism, so that each one may obtain its own different effect.

The rite of confirmation we understand as it is now used by the Church, that is, by the imposition of hands and anointing the newly baptized, and by the invocation of the Holy Spirit. For now we prescind from clarifying the question about the matter and form of this sacrament.

Confirmation, as a sacrament of the New Law, can be defined in this way: "It is a rite whereby after baptism, and as its complement, the Holy Spirit is given to provide strength both to believe firmly and to boldly confess this faith."[1] Therefore it is a rite distinct from baptism, nor must it be understood as being essentially and necessarily connected with it. However, it is its complement, not indeed as if it were a part of it, nor in the way in which the episcopacy can be said to be a complement of the priesthood; but inasmuch as it is a new and distinct sacrament, which increases the powers received in baptism and brings them to a certain

1. Puig de la B., *De Sacramentis* 269. See Umberg, *Confirmatione baptismus "perficitur":* EphThLov (1924) 505-517.

fullness. Baptism is the sacrament of spiritual birth; confirmation is the sacrament of adolescence. In baptism faith, hope and charity are infused into the soul; in confirmation they are strengthened, and the soul acquires powers to defend that faith and to increase the other virtues. With these functions confirmation is the complement of baptism,

112. In order to understand this question completely, it is necessary to note the difficulty Protestants have against this sacrament: "The sacrament of confirmation is used either *to confer grace,* or *to confer strength*: the first is already had through baptism; the Eucharist confers the second. Therefore confirmation is useless." Besides the solution, which can be given immediately, namely, that we do not have to establish anything a priori, since positive arguments prove the existence of this sacrament, these points must be determined: When we say that confirmation was established by Christ as a true sacrament, we do not intend to signify by this sacrament that: a) *grace is uniquely conferred,* as if the other sacraments do not confer grace; nor, b) *necessary grace is conferred,* as if the other sacraments do not confer sufficient graces to produce the necessary effects; c) *we do not ask* whether there is another sacrament *by which exclusively* the Holy Spirit is given (since along with grace the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in the soul is always connected); but d) we are saying only that confirmation is a sacrament in which, for a special reason, the Holy Spirit is communicated in order to produce a special effect, namely, to make Christians *soldiers* of Christ.

113. *Novatianists* seem not to have admitted confirmation, for its leader did not accept it and, it seems, he did this out of contempt (Kch 256,15; R 547).

With explicit words the *Albigensians* denied this sacrament, and later they were joined by the *Waldensians* (D 793-794), by the *Wycliffites* (who however erred only concerning the minister: D 1259) and finally by the *Protestants*. According to Luther,[2] the Apostles did impose hands, but only to confer the *gifts* of the Holy Spirit, but not the Holy Spirit as a *gift;* Christians received, by the imposition of hands, many charisms, but not internal grace, which is infused by faith alone. In the course of time the Church forgot these charisms; but the bishops preserved this rite of confirmation in order to manifest their own authority; so the rite did not turn out to be useless. For, according to Luther, the rite of confirmation served to initiate officially a Christian into the external society of the

2. *De Captiv. Babyl., loc.cit.*

Church: a boy, when he reaches the age of 14, ought to stand before a priest and answer some questions before a tribunal about religion and about the Christian catechism, then he renews his profession of faith that was given in baptism by his parents, and he is solemnly accepted into the Church by the priest.

Calvin[3] holds that confirmation does not differ from baptism regarding its effects, and therefore it cannot be distinguished from baptism. In the early Church it was only a mere ceremony of profession of faith given by infants when they reached the age of discretion.

Melanchthon,[4] as we already said above (n. 108), taught what Luther later accepted, namely, that confirmation is an examination or a form of catechism.

Protestants, although they do not agree in explaining the nature of confirmation, with one voice reject it as a mere ecclesiastical rite (Luther),[5] a prematurely born ghost of a sacrament (Calvin).[6]

Modernists likewise deny this sacrament, which they say does not pertain to the history of Christianity (D 3444).

114. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Illiberitanus*[7] (ca. 300) already established the discipline concerning the administration of confirmation in canon 38: "In a case of necessity a lay person can baptize a catechumen, but so that, if he survives, he brings him to the bishop so that he may be perfected by the imposition of hands." In canon 77 the Council says that a deacon may baptize, but that the bishop must perfect the baptized by his blessing.

Innocent I teaches the same thing (D 215). Innocent III says: "The imposition of hands is designated by the anointing of the forehead that by another name is called confirmation, because through it the Holy Spirit is given for an increase (of grace) and strength" (D 785).

The Profession of Faith Prescribed for the Waldensians (D 794).

The Council of Lyons II: "The same Holy Roman Church also holds and teaches that there are seven sacraments of the Church: one is baptism.; another is the sacrament of confirmation, which bishops confer by the laying on of hands while they anoint the reborn" (D 860).

Benedict XII among the errors of the Armenians includes the fact that they say the sacrament of confirmation has no value (D 543). In the

3. *Institutio religionis christianae* 16; *Corpus Reformatorum* 29,1068f.
4. *Loci communes* 48; *Apologia confessionis* 8,6.
5. *De Captiv. Babyl.* Prelude.
6. *Institutio religionis christianae* 4,19; *Corpus Reformatorum* 29,1070.
7. Msi 2,12.

same way, Clement VI presented certain questions to the Catholicos of the Armenians about the minister of confirmation (D 1068-1071). *The Council of Florence* in its Decree for the Armenians lists confirmation among the sacraments of the New Law (D 1317-1319).

The Council of Trent, as was said above (n. 109), in session VII condemned the errors of the Reformers concerning this sacrament. Discussions about this matter were held at first by the theologians in eight particular congregations and afterwards in twelve general congregations by the Fathers. Finally, in session VII of the Council the doctrine on confirmation was defined in three canons, which are directed against the four main Protestant errors. In them it is asserted that confirmation is a true and proper sacrament, and it attributes real power to the sacred chrism (D 1628f.). And in the same session, in canon 1 on the sacraments in general, confirmation was listed among the seven true sacraments of the Church (D 1601).

St. Pius X, in the decree *Lamentabili,* condemned the errors of the Modernists (D 3444).

Pius XII in the Encyclical *Mystici Corporis*[8] determined the role of this sacrament in Christian life.

Theological note. The thesis is *defined divine and Catholic faith.*

115. Proof from Holy Scripture. Acts 8:16-20: After the deacon Philip baptized the converted Samaritans, Peter and John came to Samaria *and prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Spirit; for it had not yet fallen on any of them, but they had only been baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus. Then they laid their hands on them and they received the Holy Spirit.* Now when Simon the magician saw this, he wanted to buy with money from the Apostles this power of giving the Holy Spirit.

Acts 19:1-6: When Paul came to Ephesus he found some disciples who had received only the baptism of John; he explained to them the teaching about the Holy Spirit, baptized them and *when Paul had laid his hands upon them the Holy Spirit came on them; and they spoke with tongues and prophesied.*

116. *Explanation of the text.*[9] In these texts the way of proceeding of the Apostles is apparent: first, they teach the disciples the doctrine of Christ,

8. AAS 35 (1943) 201.
9. Besides the commentators on this text, it can be useful to consult Lennerz, *De Sacramento Confirmationis* nn.3-8, 65-721 R. Ruch, *Confirmation dans la Sainte Ecriture:* DTC 3,975-1026; I.B. Umberg, *De Sacramentis* 1 n. 754-764.

and they baptize the believers; if the one who baptizes is an Apostle, or a bishop, he proceeds to the imposition of hands in order to communicate the Holy Spirit to the one baptized. But if he is not an Apostle, the baptized person waits for the arrival of an Apostle or a bishop, who them imposes hands on him and so gives him the Holy Spirit.

With this rite the Holy Spirit is handed on. In these quoted texts he descends on the newly baptized in a charismatic form, as is stated expressly in 19:6 (*and they spoke with tongues and prophesied*), and implicitly in 8:19f., because Simon the magician wanted to have a similar power, that is, of performing those marvelous signs which he saw as effects of the Holy Spirit, and of also being able to communicate them to others.

For what special purpose the Apostles and St. Paul gave the Holy Spirit after the reception of baptism, in these texts is not stated expressly, but certainly the rite of imposition of hands to communicate the Holy Spirit appears to be something that the Apostles judged necessary after the reception of baptism; and therefore Peter and John go to Samaria, and St. Paul asks the Ephesians if they have received the Holy Spirit.

From other texts of the Gospels it is certain that Christ promised the Holy Spirit, and surely there cannot be any doubt that that promise had its effect in the rite which the Apostles performed in the cited texts. For, St. Peter said to Simon, who wanted to buy the power of handing on the Holy Spirit: *Your silver perish with you, because you thought you could obtain the gift of God* (τήν δωρεάν τοῦ θεοῦ) *with money.* Therefore the Holy Spirit is the *gift of God* and Simon wanted to buy the power of handing it on. About this gift of God Jesus had said to the Samaritan woman at the well: *If you knew* ***the gift of God*** (τήν δωρεάν τοῦ θεοῦ) *and who it is that is saying to you, 'Give me a drink,' you would have asked him and he would have given you living water* (John 4:10). But his "living water" is the "gift of God," or the Holy Spirit, as St. John declares when he reports the words of Jesus: *On the last day of the feast, the great day, Jesus stood up and proclaimed: "If anyone thirst, let him come to me and drink. He who believes in me, as the Scripture has said, 'Out of his heart shall flow rivers of living water.'" Now this he said about the Spirit, which those who believed in him were to receive; for as yet the Spirit had not been given, because Jesus was not yet glorified*[10] (John 7:37-39. Therefore the Holy

10. H. Rahner, *Flumina de ventre Christi: Die patristische Auslegung von Io 7,37-38:* Bibl (1941) 269-302, 367-403; he prefers to read the text like this: *Si quis sitit veniat ad me; et bibat qui credit in me. Sicut dicit Scriptura flumina de ventre eius fluent aquae vivae.* According to this punctuation, the „living water" is understood to flow from Christ, not from the Christian. Pius XII also uses this punctuation in the Encyclical *Haurietis Aquas* (AAS 48 [1956] 310).

Spirit is the gift of God and the living water satisfies the soul.[11] Also other effects, for the production of which the Holy Spirit is given, are mentioned by Jesus himself: *I send the promise of my Father upon you; but stay in the city, until you are clothed with* ***power*** *from on high* (Luke 24:49). *And while staying with them he charged them not to depart from Jerusalem, but to wait for the promise of the Father, which, he said, "you heard from me, for John baptized with water, but before many days you shall be baptized with the Holy Spirit. you shall receive* ***power*** *when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you shall be my witnesses in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria and to the end of the earth* (Acts 1:4-8). The Apostles give this testimony in synagogues and councils, because this divine **power** will teach them: *And when they bring you before the synagogues and rulers and the authorities, do not be anxious how or what you are to answer or what you are to say; for the Holy Spirit will teach you in that very hour what you ought to say* (Luke 12:11f.).

During the Last Supper Christ promised the Holy Spirit who will console the Apostles and *you know him, for he dwells with you, and will be in you* (John 14:17); *he will teach you* [ὑπομνήσει = he will suggest to you, he will recall to memory] *all things, and bring to your remembrance all that I have said to you; when the Spirit of truth comes, he will guide you into all the truth* [ὁδηγήσει ὑμας είς τήν ἀλήθειαν πάσαν = he will lead you by the way to all truth]. *He will glorify me, for he will take what is mine and declare it to you* (16:13f.)

Indeed, these things, as they had been promised, were granted. For, on the day of Pentecost the Apostles received the Holy Spirit, and immediately the "witnesses" manifested what they had received from Christ: St. Peter preaches with boldness (Acts 2:14-37); having been brought to the Sanhedrin with John, after the cure of the lame man, *then Peter filled with the Holy Spirit* professed Christ, and when this was known by his brother Apostles, *and when they had prayed, the place in which they were gathered together was shaken; and they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and spoke the word of God with boldness* (4:1-31); endowed with this **power** *the apostles gave their testimony to the resurrection of the Lord Jesus* (v. 33). Afterwards all the Apostles, bound with chains, with great boldness defended the cause of Christ before the Sanhedrin and the priests, to the point of shedding their blood, so that, having been beaten and released *they left the presence of the council, rejoicing that they were counted worthy to*

11. Under this same metaphor of water, the Holy Spirit was often promised in the Old Testament: *I will sprinkle clean water upon you.* Ezek. 36:25; see 47:1-22; Isa. 12:3: *With joy you will draw water from the wells of salvation.*

suffer dishonor of the name (5;26-42); and they did this, because *we are witnesses to these things, and so is the Holy Spirit whom God has given to those who obey him* (v. 32). Therefore the effect of the Holy Spirit in the Apostles was strength, boldness, power for the confession of their faith.

117. *Argument.* Given these facts, we argue: The imposition of hands, by which the Apostles communicated the Holy Spirit, is a sensible, symbolic and efficacious sign of grace instituted by Christ, and distinct from baptism. Therefore it is a sacrament.

Proof of the antecedent. a) *A sensible and symbolic sign* is shown in the imposition of hands, whereby power is handed on; for, such a rite among the ancients signified a certain transmission of both spiritual and ruling power.

b) *Effective of grace:* for the conferring of the Holy Spirit took place then really in a charismatic way, but it corresponded to the internal effects that appear later in the Apostles, as we have said: power, strength, boldness, etc. It is also given as "a gift of God," and the Holy Spirit dwells in the Apostles, etc.; all of these things correspond to the internal grace, which is given to the soul as a supernatural principle in order to perform supernatural acts.

And this kind of effect depends on the sacramental sign; for, if the rite is performed, grace is conferred, and in such a way that, as is apparent in the quoted texts, there is a connection between the rite and the effect—a connection of true causality. And the Apostles do not require any other disposition, in the one receiving confirmation, than what is always required for the reception of grace.

c) *Instituted by Christ:* for the Apostles, immediately after Pentecost, now appear performing this rite and indeed as something necessary, as a complement to baptism; this supposes that in this matter they had received instruction from Christ.

d) *Distinct from baptism:* as is evident, it is given as a complement to baptism and only after baptism; it is given by a bishop—or the Apostles—but not by the deacon Philip; it can be separated from baptism. Moreover, it is given in order to confess the faith with boldness, while baptism is for spiritual regeneration. This is clear from the promise of Christ, from the effects mentioned above, and from the preaching of Peter, who exhorts all to be baptized in order that they will be able to receive the Holy Spirit.

118. Proof from tradition. In the first centuries testimonies are rather obscure.[12] However, although the Apologists among the Fathers do not

12. P. Bareille, *Confirmation d'après les Pères Grecs et Latins:* DTC 3,1027f.

clearly and expressly speak about confirmation, still at times they do allude to is. Thus St. Clement of Rome recounts among the graces given to the Corinthians "the fullness of the Holy Spirit,"[13] by which Hermas was strengthened according to the testimony of the *Shepherd*,[14] and by this anointing we must be called *Christians* in the proper and correct sense, as Theophilus of Antioch says (R 174).

In the third century there are some excellent testimonies of Tertullian and St. Cyprian. Tertullian speaks at least seven times about confirmation,[15] and usually (but not always) enumerates it between baptism and the Eucharist (R 304, 333, 362); and he pays special attention to the spiritual effects that it produces. St. Cyprian[16] looks rather at the necessity and essential rites of this sacrament, and he also insists on the necessity of the bishop as the minister (R 592, 595). Both authors distinguish confirmation from baptism, and propose it as the complement of baptism: "In the next place (after baptism) the hand is laid on us, invoking and inviting the Holy Spirit (through the words of benediction)" (R 304). But the effect of the anointing is spiritual "like the act of carnal baptism itself by which we are immersed in water and its spiritual effect is that we are freed from our sins."[17] "For those who had received legitimate and ecclesiastical baptism, it was not necessary that they [Samaritans] be baptized again, but Peter and John gave them only what was lacking, so that, after praying for them and imposing the hand, the Holy Spirit should be invoked and poured out upon them. This is now also done among us, so that those who are baptized in the church may be presented to the authorities of the church and by our prayers and by imposing of the hand they may receive the Holy Spirit and be perfected with the Lord's seal."[18] Clearly, St. Cyprian is speaking about the rite used by the Apostles in Samaria and he says that it is still being repeated in the Church. However, it is not certain that at the time of St. Cyprian the Holy Spirit descended with his charisms as he did in the time of the Apostles. Moreover, it is a rite different from baptism, separable, and conferring a spiritual effect together with the imprint of the character.

In the fourth century all the Fathers agree with what was said by St. Jerome: that this is the custom of the churches "that on those who have

13. *2 Cor.* 2: ed.Funk, 187.
14. *Sim.* 9, 1,2: ed.Funk, 577. Some allusions are also found in St. Irenaeus, *Adv. Haer.* 1,21,3: MG 7,663; and also in Theophilus of Antioch, *Ad Autd.* 1,12: MG 6,1042.
15. In *De Bapt.* c.6 and 8 (twice): ML 1, 1206; *De Praescript.* C.36 and 40: ML 2,49 and 54; *De resur. Carn.* 8; ML 2,806; *De Pudicit.* 1: ML 2,980. See also *Adv. Marc.* 1,14: ML 2,262. The texts are given in D'Ales, 172.
16. *Epist.* 69,11; 70,3' 72,1; 73,6,9.21, etc.: ML 3,1045f.
17. Tertullian, *De Baptismo* 7: ML 1,1206.
18. St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 73,9: ML 4,1115.

been baptized by priests and deacons the Bishop hastens to impose his hand for the invocation of the Holy Spirit."[19]

St. Hippolytus says: "What is this oil except the power of the Holy Spirit by which, after the washing, the believers are anointed as with a chrism?"[20] And St. Cornelius, Pope, reprehends Novatian because, after a sickness, he omitted those things that are customarily given to the baptized: anointing by the bishop (R 547). *The author on the Sacraments:* "A spiritual sign follows [baptism] which you heard read today; because after the fountain, there is still perfection to be had, when, at the invocation of the priest the Holy Spirit is poured out—a spirit of wisdom and understanding, a spirit of counsel and power, a spirit of knowledge and piety, a spirit of holy fear: they are, as it were, the seven virtues of the Spirit" (R 1337).

119. Theological reasoning. "The sacraments of the New Law are ordained unto special effects of grace: and therefore where there is a special effect of grace, there we find a special sacrament ordained for the purpose. And thence it is that besides the movement of generation whereby man receives life of the body, there is the movement of growth, whereby man is brought to perfect age. So therefore does man receive spiritual life in Baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration: while in Confirmation man arrives at the perfect age."[21]

120. Objection. The Holy Spirit was given by the imposition of a hand. But after baptism a Christian already has the Holy Spirit. Therefore that tradition had to refer to charisms.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. Through baptism Christians already have the Holy Spirit as the first grace in which they can still grow more, *conceded;* they cannot grow any more in it, *denied. I distinguish the consequent.* The charisms must be understood in an exclusive way, *denied;* also charisms in addition to the internal grace, *conceded.* By baptism Christians certainly receive the Holy Spirit in the first sanctifying grace, but not in that perfection and quasi consummation that was promised by Christ. And surely Christ promised the Holy Spirit for the baptized; therefore this conferring of the Holy Spirit promised by Christ is distinct from that which is given in baptism. This should not be understood to be about the charisms alone as proposed in the argument.

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19. *Dialogus contra Lucifer.* 9: ML 23,163. More abundant texts are had in D'Ales, 174-178; Lennerz, n.15-55; Otten, n. 385.
20. *In Dan.* 1,16: MG 10,693.
21. III, q. 72, a. 1.

121. Scholium. *On the time of the institution of the sacrament of confirmation.* There were not lacking authors[22] who said that confirmation was not instituted by Christ, but by the Apostles. But this is easily refuted because only Christ can institute a sacrament.

A few early authors[23] thought that this sacrament was instituted by Christ when he embraced and blessed children (Matt. 19:13).

Others[24] placed its institution at the Last Supper, when Christ promised to send the Holy Spirit (John 14:16-17) etc. But in these texts he is speaking about the promise rather than the institution of the sacrament. The Catechism of the Council of Trent[25] embraces this opinion; in support of this the Council quotes the testimony of Fabian. This testimony, however, is not authentic.

St. Thomas, with many other theologians,[26] thinks that it was instituted by Christ "not by bestowing, but by promising it"[27]; in this way the place of John at the Last Supper can be adduced. The opinion is probable, inasmuch as it means that Christ told the Apostles what they must do afterwards.

Finally, the more common opinion[28] is that confirmation was instituted during the time in which Christ spoke with his Apostles about the kingdom of God for forty days (Acts 1:2f.). The other circumstances of time and place cannot be determined.[29]

22. Alex. of Hales (*Summ.* P.4 q.9 m.1) thought that confirmation was instituted at the prompting of the Holy Spirit at the Council of Melden in 845; Rolandus, *Sent.* ed.Gieti, 213; P. Aureolus, *In 4* d.7 q.1 a.1; according to St. Bonaventure Christ gave hints about it and the Holy Spirit instituted it (*In 4* d.23 a.1 q.2; but he says the contrary in *Breviloquio* p.6 c.4. St. Albert the Great: "I believe that Christ neither dispensed nor instituted that sacrament" (*In 4* d.7 a.1 q.1).
23. Robert Pullus, *Sententiae* p.5 c.22.
24. D. Soto, *In 4* d.7 q.unic. a.1.
25. P.2 c.3,6.
26. See Ed. Frutsaert, *Saint Thomas et l'institution de la Confirmation:* NouvRevTh 56 (1929) 23-34.
27. III, q. 72, a. 1 ad 1. But in *In 4* d.7 q.1 sol.1 ad 1, he had taught that Christ instituted and conferred confirmation according to Matt. 19:13. But in the *Summa* he rejected this opinion, namely, that Christ conferred confirmation, from John 16:7.
28. Scotus, *In 4* d.7 q.1 a.1; among the moderns, Otten, 388; Umberg, 778; Lercher-Umberg, 205.
29. Suarez, d.32 s.2 n.3f.

CHAPTER II

Essence of the sacrament of confirmation

Thesis 2. The remote matter of the sacrament of confirmation is the chrism blessed by a bishop; but the proximate matter is the imposition of the hand, which takes place in the act of anointing with chrism.

S.Th. III, q. 72, a. 2; Suarez, d.33 s.3f.; Pesch, 502-518; Otten, 390-401; Lercher-Umberg, 206-219; Lennerz, 73-150; Doronozo, 277-319.

122. Connection. As in the other sacraments, so also in confirmation it is necessary to seek and to determine its essence, since that is necessary for validity. The variations in the rite and name cause a special difficulty in order to complete and designate this sacrament. Therefore in this sacrament it is necessary first of all to distinguish the proximate matter from the remote matter. Since the whole question has to do with the matter, we will concentrate on that; we will speak about the form in the scholium.

123. Definition of terms. It is already abundantly clear what the proximate and remote matter is.

Chrism is olive oil mixed with balsam. Olive oil was always used, but it is not certain that it is necessary for validity, so that the use of some other oil would be a cause of invalidity. In the West there had never been a question about this. But among the Orientals there was a dispute between Nerses and Theorian in the twelfth century. Nerses defended the licitness of oil "from a small tree which they call sesame., because in the province of Armenia, because of the cold temperature, there are no olive trees; therefore it was necessary to use the oil that was found in that province for the matter of the chrism."[1] However, at least from the custom of the Church, there will be a doubt about chrism made from oil other than olive oil.

Balsam, which the Church uses, is a resin taken from the Commiphora opobalsamum. However, it does not seem to be necessary to use this particular balsam; balsam is sufficient from some other region which adds fragrance to the oil. And it does not seem to be required absolutely for the essence, although certainly it is necessary at least as a matter of precept.[2] Both with regard to the species of oil and with regard to the nature and necessity of the balsam, the debate over these points depends on the opinion

1. *Nersis opera* 1,183. On the controversy between Nerses and Theorian, see MG 133,191.
2. Scotus (*In 4* d.7 q.unic. a.2), and Cajetan (III, q. 72 a. 2) required the oil but not the balsam.

which each one has concerning the generic or specific determination of the sacraments that was made by Christ.

Imposition of the hand. In the rite of confirmation the bishop first extends his hands towards those to be confirmed while offering a prayer; afterwards, dipping his thumb in the chrism, he anoints the forehead of each person being confirmed while pronouncing the form, and as he pronounces it "while imposing his hand on the head of the one being confirmed with his thumb me makes the sign of the cross on his forehead."[3] Hence the question can be raised concerning which of the impositions of hand is essential, and whether any is essential. Whatever can be said about other times and customs,[4] now certainly the one essential imposition of hand is the second, that is, the one that takes place in the anointing with chrism.

The oil must be *blessed* by the bishop, on Thursday in Holy Week, but the Supreme Pontiff can grant this faculty to an ordinary priest. Such episcopal blessing also seems to be essential.

124. Opinions. Controversy about this exists only among Catholics, whose opinions can be reduced to the following:

a) The matter of confirmation is only the first imposition of hand. Thus Peter Aureolus[5]; however, he makes a distinction between the essence and the integrity of the sacrament: the imposition of hand is of the essence, anointing with chrism pertains to the integrity. Sirmond and Habert are usually cited as favoring this opinion; but the former does not wish to take up the question about the matter of confirmation[6]; and Habert only says that the Church imposed chrismation, but he does not say that the imposition of hand is the only matter.[7] *Many early canonists* were also in favor of this opinion. At the present time no one holds this opinion (neither theologians nor canonists).[8] The Holy Congregation for the Promotion of the Faith declared: "that confirmation must not be repeated conditionally"[9] in a case proposed by a missionary, who omitted the first imposition of hand." Others also point out against this opinion that the Greeks do not have this imposition of the hand; but "this reason should be used carefully."[10]

3. *Roman Ritual, Appendix on Confirmation.*
4. There was a big controversy about the rite of confirmation between P. de Puniet, O.S.B., and P. Galtier, S.J. The first in *Confirmation:* DACL: *Onction et Confirmation:* RevHistEccl 13 (1912) 450-466. P. Galtier, *La Consignation à Carthage et à Rome:* RechScRel 2 (1911) 355-383; *La Consignation dans les églises d'Occident:* RevHistEccl 13 (1912) 257
5. *In 4* dist.7 q.1.
6. *Antirrheticus* 2 c.8.
7. *Archieraticon* (Paris 1643) 701-704.
8. The promoters of this opinion seem to say this.
9. Decree 6, August 1840.
10. Lennerz, *De Sacramento Confirmationis* 120.

b) The matter consists in the anointing alone. Thus St. Thomas,[11] Scotus[12] and *many others.* They admit that the Apostles confirmed by the imposition of the hand, but they also say that the Church can change the matter of the sacraments. Today generally this opinion is not admitted.

c) Others, like Tapper,[13] Estius, Mayer require both chrismation and the first imposition of hand. This opinion is not easily admitted.

d) Finally, the greater part of theologians and canonists along with St. Robert Bellarmine,[14] Suarez,[15] Pesch,[16] Wirceburgenses,[17] Puig de la Bellacasa,[18] Lercher,[19] Lennerz,[20] and others, say that the imposition of hand (which is mentioned in the ancient rite of confirmation) is the same act of anointing with chrism, as we explained in the definition of terms and will be proved in the argument. Umberg[21] holds this same opinion, but with this difference, inasmuch as he says that the imposition of hand was established by Christ and the chrismation determined by the Church; both actions are necessary for validity, and indeed as two distinct actions. Greenstock maintains a similar opinion.[21*]

125. Doctrine of the Church. In addition to the documents already quoted in the previous thesis, it will help to recall these: Innocent III: "The imposition of the hands is designated by the anointing of the forehead that by another name is called confirmation, because through it the Holy Spirit is given for an increase (of grace) and strength" (D 785). Innocent IV indicates the same identity between chrismation and the imposition of hands when he says that the gift of the Holy Spirit is conferred by the anointing of chrism (D 831), and afterwards he says: "Another is the sacrament of confirmation, which bishops confer by the laying on of hands while they anoint the reborn" (D 860).

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11. III, q. 72, a. 2. But he is also placed among the advocates of the fourth opinion. See Doronzo, *loc.cit.*, 280.
12. Scotus, *In 4* d.7 q.1 n.2.
13. *Explicatio articulorum venerandae facultatis sacrae Theologiae generalis studii Lovaniensis* a.12.
14. *De Sacramento Confirmationis* c.9.
15. D.33 s.4. Many authors (like Pesch, 503; Puig de la B., 282, etc.) quote Suarez as being among the promoters of the second opinion; but he should rather be placed in fourth group, since he says that chrism is the remote matter (see Otten, 392).
16. *Praelectiones Dogmaticae* 6,510f.
17. *De Confirmatione* 149.
18. *De Sacramentis* 1,280f.
19. Ed.3, n.207.
20. *De Sacramento Confirmationis* 131f. He is inclined towards the second opinion, but he adds: "However, because of the authority of so many theologians perhaps it can be said that it is probable that an imposition of hand is now required, whether it is really identical with the anointing, or it is not identical but simultaneous with the anointing."
21. *Zum Gewalt der Kirche über die Sakramente:* Kath 95 (1915,II) 25-40.

21* D.-L. Greenstock, *El problema de la confirmación:* CiencTom 80 (1953) 175-228, 539-590; 81 (1954) 201-240.

Clement VI asks the Catholicos of the Armenians whether he believes that the chrism must be blessed by a bishop, that a bishop is the minister of confirmation and only the Roman Pontiff can delegate to priests the faculty of confirming (D 1068-1071).

Eugene IV in the Decree for the Armenians: "The second sacrament is confirmation. Its matter is chrism made form oil, signifying purity of conscience, and balsam, signifying the fragrance of a good reputation; it is blessed by the bishop. Confirmation given by the Church takes the place of that imposition of hand [which the apostles used]" (D 1317-1319).

According to Benedict XIV, Latin bishops must confirm absolutely infants or others in their dioceses who were baptized by Greek priests and signed on the forehead with chrism (D 2522). And in the Encyclical *Ex quo primum* (March 1, 1756, 52) he says: " What is beyond dispute should be stated: that in the Latin church, the sacrament of confirmation is conferred by the priest pronouncing the words of the sacramental form while he makes the sign of the cross on the forehead of the candidate with holy chrism."

Innocent III (D 793-794) and Innocent IV (D 831) appeal to the apostolic tradition.

CIC cn. 780 (1917) prescribes: "The sacrament of confirmation must be conferred by the imposition of hands while anointing with chrism on the forehead and with the words prescribed in the pontifical books approved by the Church."

126. Theological note. *It is very certain* that the remote matter is oil. It is a *common opinion* that is it chrism. It is also a *common opinion* that blessing by a bishop is necessary.

It is a certain and common opinion that the proximate matter is chrismation. It is also *a certain and common opinion* that the imposition of hands is necessary, but not one that is distinct from the chrismation itself.

127. The remote matter of the sacrament of confirmation is what is required for such a sacrament. But chrism is that matter. Therefore.

The minor is obvious from the documents cited above (n. 125) and from what will be presented in the second part from the Fathers.

That *the chrism must be blessed by a bishop* and not by a simple priest is certain from the church documents of Clement VI and Eugene IV quoted above (n. 1250. To these can be added: "Greek priests should not be obliged to receive holy oils, with the exception of chrism, from Latin diocesan bishops, since such oils, according to the ancient rite, are prepared

and blessed by them. But they should be obliged to receive the chrism, which, even according to their rite, can be blessed only by the bishop" (D 1992). Moreover, another Instruction from the Holy Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith on the administration of confirmation by a simple priest advises: "A priest must take care to have Chrism blessed by a Catholic bishop in communion with the Holy See, and he should know that he can never licitly administer confirmation without it, and also that he cannot receive it from heretical or schismatic bishops" (May 4, 1774). Likewise, all the ritual books agree on this matter; and it is the general consensus of theologians.

128. Proof of the second part. 1. The proximate matter of confirmation is what is proposed as such in Holy Scripture, in Tradition and in the Magisterium of the Church. But this is the imposition of the hand which takes place in chrismation. Therefore this is the proximate matter of this sacrament.

I prove the minor. On the one hand, Holy Scripture says that the Apostles confirmed by the imposition of hands (as we pointed out above in the texts quoted [n. 116] and is very evident); in fact, no other matter appears explicitly in the apostolic rite.[22] On the other hand, the documents of the Church and the Fathers, right from the beginning, teach that chrismation is the rite or the matter of confirmation, so that either they do not require specifically an imposition of the hand, or they speak indifferently about both rites, as if they are one and the same.[23] Therefore the way to reconcile both series of texts is to admit no other imposition of the hand than the one that is had in the chrismation itself. This position is supported also by other documents, as we shall see.

Regarding the Fathers, it suffices to read the texts so that it will appear how they take the anointing and the imposition of the hand as the same thing. Here are some examples: St. Hippolytus says: "And afterwards [after baptism] when he ascends let him be anointed by the priest with the oil that has been sanctified. And so each one, having wiped himself clean, is now clothed and then enters the church. But the bishop, imposing his hands on them, calls upon God saying. Afterwards, pouring holy oil on his hand and placing it on the head he says: I anoint you. and after signing him on

22. However a vestige of anointing appears in 2 Cor. 1:21f. and 1 John 2:20-27. Theodoret explains the text of St. Paul by confirmation (MG 82,384), and St. Cyril begins the catechism of confirmation with the words of St. John (*Myst.* 3: MG 33,1088). See G. Bareille, *Confirmation d'après les Pères Grecs et Latins:* DTC 3,1037.2.

23. See v.gr. St. Cyprian: R 595, 592.

the forehead he kisses him."[24] In this place then almost the ceremonies that we now use are apparent. St. Cyprian wrote: "For those who had received legitimate and ecclesiastical baptism, it was not necessary that they [Samaritans] be baptized again, but Peter and John gave them only what was lacking, so that, after praying for them and imposing the hand, the Holy Spirit should be invoked and poured out upon them. This is now also done among us, so that those who are baptized in the church may be presented to the authorities of the church and by our prayers and by imposing of the hand they may receive the Holy Spirit and be perfected with the Lord's seal."[25] And a little before he had also said: "It is also necessary to *anoint* one who has been baptized, so that, having accepted the *chrism*, that is, the anointing, he is the anointed of God and can have in himself the grace of Christ. But then the Eucharist is the source from which the baptized are anointed with the oil blessed on the altar.[26] But he could not sanctify a creature with oil who possessed neither altar nor church. Hence there cannot be spiritual anointing among the heretics, when it is certain that it is wholly impossible among them that the oil is sanctified and the Eucharist is celebrated."[27] Therefore St. Cyprian designates the sacrament of confirmation both by the imposition of the hand (without expressly mentioning chrismation) and by chrismation or anointing without any mention of the imposition of the hand. In both texts he is evidently dealing with the same sacrament, because he speaks about the invocation made by the bishop over the baptized that they may receive the Holy Spirit. This is the same gesture that the Apostles made over the Samaritans by the imposition of the hand, and which takes place "among us. by our prayer and the imposition of the hand"; and the same thing that was lacking to the Samaritans and then was given to them by the Apostles, is what he says is given to the baptized when they are anointed so that they can have the grace of Christ in themselves. In fact, St. Cyprian shows or supposes that this chrismation is a sacrament from the fact that, according to his well-known opinion, it is conferred invalidly by the heretics, because they cannot confect the Eucharist in which (that is, during the sacrifice of the Mass) the oil of confirmation is consecrated or blessed. Therefore for St. Cyprian the imposition of the hand is just as necessary as the chrismation.

Pointing in the same direction are the texts mentioned above in the

24. *Tradit. Apost.* Ed.Gregory Dix, 1,37-39.
25. *Epist.* 73,9: ML 3,1115.
26. Some read "unguntur oleo. sanctificato"; but on this reading, see M. de la Taille, *De Missa Sacerdotis ab Ecclesia praecissi aut exauctorati antiquarum sententiarum crisis:* Greg 1 (1920) 196; *"Unguntur oleum.":* Greg 1 (1920) 505; 2 (1921) 116f.
27. *Epist.* 70,2: ML 3,1040.

doctrine of the Church (n. 125) and in the previous thesis.

129. 2. It can also be shown from the Gospel that *to impose hands* and *to anoint* sometimes can be understood as synonymous words. *And some people brought to him* [Jesus] *a blind man, and begged him to* ***touch*** *him. And he took the blind man by the hand, and led him out of the village; and when he had spit on his eyes and* ***laid his hands*** *upon him, he asked him, "Do you see anything?". Then again* ***he laid his hands upon his eyes****, and he began to see* (Mark 8:22-25). The expression *he had spit on his eyes and laid his hands upon his eyes* means that Christ, having moistened his fingers with his saliva, touched his eyes or anointed them. Mark 7:32f. has a similar expression: *And they brought to him a man who was deaf and had an impediment in his speech; and they besought him* ***to lay his hand upon him.*** *And taking him aside from the multitude privately, he put his fingers into his ears,* ***and he spat and touched his tongue****.* In these two passages the Evangelist treats as the same thing *to touch, to impose his hand* and to anoint with saliva either a tongue or eyes. That is, the action of Christ of anointing eyes with his saliva is said to be the same as *to impose a hand on his eyes.*[28]

130. 3. Likewise, and if it can be even clearer, it is proved from the words of the *Roman Pontifical*, which prescribe the rite to be observed in confirmation: "Dipping the tip of his thumb in the holy Chrism. with his thumb he traces the sign of the cross on his brow [of the one being confirmed]."[29] This ceremony is explained in the *Roman Ritual:* ". and dipping the tip of his thumb in the holy Chrism, he confirms the person as he says: *N., I seal thee with the sign of the Cross,* and during these words he has his right hand resting on the head of the subject, while with his thumb he traces the sign of the Cross on his brow."[30] These words agree completely with those expressed by Innocent IV: "Another is the sacrament of confirmation, which bishops confer *by the laying on of hands while they anoint the reborn"* (D 860). This is the same as what Innocent III had said explicitly: "The imposition of the hands is designated by the anointing of the forehead that by another name is called confirmation" (D 785).

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28. See Knabenbauer, at this place, Maldonato and St. Bellarmine, *De Confirmatione* c.2.
29. *Roman Pontifical,* on Confirmation.
30. *Roman Ritual,* tit.III, c.II,6; c.III,6. In c.I,1 it says: "The sacrament of confirmation must be conferred *by imposition of hands and anointing the brow with Chrism";* and in n.3 is prescribes: "The anointing is not to be performed with some kind of instrument but *by the minister's hand, properly placed on the head of the subject who is being confirmed."* This is nothing other than what is expressed in the rubrics: *with the thumb of his right hand.* Hence it is clearly apparent to be the same, according to the Ritual, *to anoint with the thumb of the right hand,* and *to impose the hand on the head* of the one being confirmed.

131. Objections. 1. Holy Scripture speaks only about the imposition of hands. But the imposition of hands cannot signify anointing. Therefore.

I distinguish the major. It speaks only about the imposition of hands exclusively, *denied;* in a prescinding way, *conceded. I distinguish the minor.* The imposition of hands cannot signify anointing according to modern terminology, *I bypass the minor;* according to ancient terminology, *denied.* We have already said that in Holy Scripture statements are used that express separately what takes place all at once: to impose hands and to anoint, or to impose hands while anointing. The *Roman Pontifical,* in the text just quoted, speaks in the same way. For the same reason, in the Acts of the Apostles the Eucharist is often mentioned (which it calls the breaking of bread) and it never mentions the use of wine. Therefore Holy Scripture mentions only the imposition of hands without determining how the hands are imposed. But tradition immediately calls to mind these passages in the Acts of the Apostles and also while speaking about anointing.

2. In the Decree for the Armenians it says: "Confirmation given by the Church takes the place of that imposition of hand" (D 1317-1318); and it said that its matter is "chrism made from oil." Therefore, according to the Council of Florence, the matter of the sacrament of confirmation is in no way the imposition of hand.

I distinguish the antecedent. "Takes the place of that imposition of hand" means that now there is no need for the imposition of hand, not even the one used in the anointing itself, *denied;* it means that the imposition of hand *alone* is not necessary, or the first imposition of hand, *conceded.* In the Decree for the Armenians the Council of Florence followed the opinion of St. Thomas (his words are those of the Decree). He thought that the Apostles, because of a special privilege, confirmed with the imposition of hands only, and that the necessary matter is the chrism. However, from the same Decree it seems that in general the *matter* in each sacrament is understood to be the remote matter (bread and wine in the Eucharist, water in baptism, etc.) and therefore it is not excluded that the proximate matter, in this case the chrismation, can be reconciled with the imposition of hands, although it is not that imposition of hand which takes place separately from all the other remote matter.

132. Scholium. *On the form of confirmation.* In the already quoted Decree for the Armenians, the form of confirmation is expressed in these words: "I sign you with the sign of the cross, and I confirm you with the chrism of salvation, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (D 1317). This formula is preserved in the *Roman Pontifical.* It has been in use since the twelfth century, but it is found already in the seventh century. However there is a great variety in the form of confirmation according to the different rites, times and localities.

The Apostles administered confirmation not just by the imposition of hands, but also with the addition of prayer (Acts 8:15), which doubtless conveyed the meaning of the imposition of hands. The words of this prayer have not come down to us, but the early Church was wont also to confer the anointing with prayer and the imposition of hands. Tertullian is the first one to present the form of this prayer: "Then the hand is

imposed, with a blessing while calling upon and inviting the Holy Spirit."[31] The Canons of Hippolytus offer an explicit formula: "We bless you, Almighty Lord and God, because you made them worthy who are born again, and you pour out your Holy Spirit upon them so that now they have been united to the body of your Church and they can never be separated from it. Grant to those to whom you have given the remission of their sins, also the pledge of your kingdom through our Lord Jesus Christ."[32] In the first ritual books, in the so-called *Gregorian Sacramentary,* in the formula of confirmation the Holy Spirit is mentioned: "Almighty and eternal God, who have deigned to regenerate these servants with water and the Holy Spirit, and have given them the remission of all their sins, send forth into them the sevenfold Holy Spirit, the Paraclete from heaven—the Spirit of wisdom and understanding, the Spirit of counsel and fortitude, the Spirit of knowledge and piety: fill them with the Spirit of your fear."[33] The formula of the *Gelasian Sacramentary* is very brief: "The sign of Christ for eternal life."[34] What is proposed in another *Gregorian Sacramentary* is closer to the formula of Florence: "Sign them with the sign of the Cross of Christ, now that he has been appeased, for eternal life."[35]

133. The oriental churches customarily also manifested a great variety of forms for confirmation. Let it suffice to quote these: "The sign of the gift of the Holy Spirit" σφραγίς δωρεάς πνεύματος άγίου (the Greek form); "By anointing I anoint you in the omnipotent God, in Christ Jesus and in the Holy Spirit that you may be a worker having perfect faith and a vessel pleasing to him."[36] The Jacobite form: "May N. be signed with this holy Chrism, with the sweet odor of Christ, with the sign of true faith, with the complement and gift of the Holy Spirit in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit."[37]

This whole variety of formulas must always agree in some points, for example, in designating the purpose of chrismation or the effects of the sacrament of confirmation. In fact, the effects can also be expressed either explicitly or implicitly: "I sign you with the sign of Christ" can signify to make someone a soldier of Christ, and under this signification is included the strength or power which this sacrament confers. And something similar may be said about the other formulas.

Hence for the formulas, which are used for confirmation, per se and for validity, it is not required that they contain an invocation of the Holy Spirit (and this point *is certain*), but *more probably* it suffices that they express something from the effects of confirmation.[38]

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31. Tertullian, *De Baptismo,* 8: ML 1,1207.
32. *Canons* 137f.
33. *Sacramentarium Gregorianum:* ML 78,90.
34. *Sacramentarium Gelasianum* 1,44: ML 74,1112.
35. *Sacramentarium Gregorianum:* ML 78,90; this is the second part of the formula given above.
36. *Testamentum D.N. Jesu Christi.* Ed.Rahmanni, 131.
37. More formulas are to be found in DTC 3,1042-1046, and in Doronzo, *loc.cit.,* 319-324.
38. See Umberg, *De Sacramentis* 1,317-321.

CHAPTER III

On the minister, subject and necessity of confirmation

I. On the minister

Thesis 3. The ordinary minister of confirmation is the bishop alone, but by delegation of the Roman Pontiff any priest can be the extraordinary minister.

S.Th. III, Q. 72, a. 11; Suarez, d.36 s.1; Pesch, 543-553; Otten, 421-428; Puig de la B., 292-306; D'Ales, 211-218; Lercher-Umberg, 265-273; Lennerz, 158-204.

134. Connection. In all the sacraments the question about the minister is very important, but it is so for a special reason in the case of confirmation, as we shall see. For, simple priests, without a special faculty conceded by the Apostolic See, cannot confirm validly. But with that faculty the Supreme Pontiff does not exercise any power of orders; confirmation pertains to the power of orders. Moreover, this whole question is connected with that concerning the distinction between bishops and priests with regard to the nature of the power of orders; we will treat this matter in the treatise on Holy Orders (n. 39f.). In the meantime we will bypass this discussion and propose the thesis from the point of view of dogma.

135. Definition of terms. *An ordinary minister* is one who on his own right, because of either his office or his dignity, can administer the sacrament of confirmation.

An extraordinary minister is one who can do it only by delegation. Delegation for a simple priest is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff alone; some delegations are granted by common law (to Cardinals even if they are not bishops, to abbots or prelates of no diocese, to apostolic prefects). Recently this faculty has been granted also to pastors under certain conditions. A priest confirming without this special delegation would be acting invalidly.

136. Adversaries. Some *priests in Sardinia* (D 215), Photius[1] and his followers said that the power of confirming belongs to a simple priest. *Wycliffites* and *Hussites* (D 1178, 1251) attributed to the avarice of the Supreme Pontiff and of bishops that a simple priest was not permitted to

1. Deslandes, *Le Prêtre oriental ministre de la Confirmation* EchOr (1930) 5.

confirm. Among Catholics, Armachanus[2] with a few others thought that simple priests could confirm validly because of their own ordinary power, although they would do it illicitly.

A few Catholics held that a simple priest could in no way be an extraordinary minister of confirmation; among them were Hugo Victorinus,[3] Durandus,[4] Adrianus[5] and Estius.[6]

137. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Toledo* (400 A.D.) forbids priests to confirm without the consent of the bishop; and it decreed: "It is certain that the bishop can confect chrism at any time, but without the approval of the bishop nothing should be done; but it has been decreed that a deacon cannot confirm, but a priest can in the absence of the bishop; if the bishop is present, the priest can with the consent of the bishop."[7]

Innocent I: "But in regard to the signing of little children, it is evident that it may not be done by any other than a bishop. For the presbyters, although they are in the second order, nevertheless do not possess the crown of the pontificate" (D 215).

St. Gregory the Great: "It has come to our ears that some have been offended by our having forbidden presbyters to touch with chrism those who are to be baptized. And we indeed acted according to the ancient use of our Church: but if any are in fact hereby distressed, we allow that, where there is a lack of bishops, presbyters may touch with chrism, even on their foreheads, those who are to be baptized" (R 2294).

Then Innocent III says that only bishops can confirm (D 785), and he repeats this in the Profession of Faith Prescribed for the Waldensians (D 793-794). Innocent IV says the same concerning the errors of the Greeks (D 830) and also the *Council of Lyons II* (D 860). Clement VI to the Catholicos of the Armenians (D 1069-1071) and the *Council of Florence* in the Decree for the Armenians (D 1317-1319) expressly state that the ordinary minister of confirmation is a bishop, but that the Apostolic See can grant this faculty to a simple priest. And Martin V condemned this error of Wycliffe: "The confirmation of youths. is reserved to the pope and bishops through desire of temporal gain and honor" (D 1178).

138. At the *Council of Trent* the minister of confirmation was treated

2. *Quaest. Armen.* 11,14. See Dölger, *Das Sakrament der Firmung* 119f.
3. Hugo Victorinus, *De Sacramentis* 2,7,2.
4. *In 4* d.7 q.3 and 4.
5. *In 4* d.7 q.4 a.3.
6. *In 4* d.7 q.3 a.21,22.
7. Msi 3,997f.

in session VI (1547) and canon 4 was proposed under this simple form: "The minister of confirmation is only a bishop."[8] But some bishops were opposed to the Council of Toledo and St. Gregory the Great (in the places mentioned above). Likewise, they adduced the words of the Council of Florence, according to which a simple priest can also be an extraordinary minister; and with the Florentine synod they quoted Alexander of Hales, Nicolaus de Tudeschis (Bishop of Panormitanus), and also pope Melchiades (in the Pseudo-decretal). Wherefore these bishops wanted the Florentine formula to be defined, namely, that the bishop is the *ordinary* minister.

When this formula was handed over to the theologians, they retained the canons more or less as they were, but with regard to the minister they accepted the Florentine version. However this still did not please some of the Fathers; for, they wanted to define that the bishops are the *only* ministers of confirmation. Therefore some interpreted the concession of St. Gregory the Great in different ways. For, they said that the Supreme Pontiff in that case constituted those priests as bishops (the Bishop Bossae), or that he did not permit it but only pretended to do so in order to avoid a scandal (the Archbishop of Lancian), or he tolerated this practice in this particular case (the Bishop of Pacensis), or the Supreme Pontiff erred in making this concession (the Bishop of Acciensis. who submitted his opinion to the Council).

The Fathers proposed new formulas: the Bishop of Lancianensis proposed this one: "If anyone says that a simple priest is also a minister of confirmation and denies that this office pertains to a bishop alone, let him be anathema." This other form was pleasing to the Bishop of Saluzzo: "If anyone says that not only a bishop but any priest is the minister of confirmation, let him be anathema." Then the Fathers, weary after all these discussions, decided to return to the Florentine formula, and all agreed to that. Therefore, after such a long debate, they came to a definitive redaction in which the theologians, in order to comply with the wishes of the Fathers, added to the Florentine formula the word "alone": "If anyone says that the ordinary minister of holy confirmation is not the bishop alone but any simple priest, let him be anathema" (D 1630).

Later, in session XXIII, while considering the ecclesiastical hierarchy, again there were discussions about the faculty that simple priests have over the sacraments, and the Fathers rejected this first redaction of canon 5 (afterwards canon 7): "If anyone denies that there are degrees of Orders

8. See A. Mostaza, *El Minisro extraordinario de la Confirmación* en Trento: RevEspTeol 2 (1942) 471-519, especially 472.

in the Church, or says that all priests have the same or equal jurisdiction and authority, and that therefore any priest can absolve all Christians for all sins, or administer all the sacraments to any of the faithful., let him be anathema."[9] The proposed amendments concerned the sacraments of confirmation and orders, which the Fathers did not want to say pertain to a simple priest. After long discussions and different amendments, finally this formula was accepted: "If anyone says that bishops are not superior to priests; or that they do not have the power to confirm and ordain; or that the power they have is common both to them and to priests. let him be anathema" (D 1777. See 1767-1770).

Afterwards there are many declarations of Benedict XIV (D 2522), Pius X (D 3556), Pius XI,[10] and Pius XII granting, in different occasions, the faculty of confirming to simple priests. Pius XII made this a general power for pastors in cases of necessity in their own parishes and under certain conditions. However, he gives an express warning: "It is a defined doctrine that only a bishop is the ordinary minister of confirmation. Therefore the Apostolic See continually and zealously takes care that the conferring of this sacrament be reserved to bishops as a right and office belonging to them, to the extent that this is possible."[11]

Theological note. The first part is *defined divine and Catholic faith.* The second part is *at least very certain.*

139. Proof of the first part. *From Holy Scripture.* Acts 8:12-20 (see also 19:1-6). The deacon Philip, who had baptized in Samaria, was not able to confirm, so the Apostles Peter and Paul were sent to do this. In the same way, only the Apostle Paul appears confirming those who were thought to be baptized and therefore were expecting the arrival of an apostle or a bishop. Therefore, *de facto* only bishops appear as doing the confirming. Indeed, from this fact the holy Fathers and the ecclesiastical magisterium conclude that the power of confirming pertains only to bishops.[12] Thus, v.gr., Innocent III: "Although a simple priest or presbyter is able to give other anointings, this one, only the highest priest, that is the bishop, should confer, because only in reference to the apostles, whose vicars the bishops

9. CTr 6 (1950) 309.312-316.
10. April 30, 1929: AAS 21 (1929) 555.
11. AAS 38 (1946) 350f. Afterwards, on December 18, 1947, he gave the power to all local Ordinaries dependent on the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, so that, by an indult of the Apostolic See, they can grant to all priests subject to them who have the care of souls the faculty of validly administering holy confirmation to the faithful who are in danger of death. (AAS [1948] 41).
12. It is evident that the argument takes its *foundation* from Holy Scripture, but its whole value depends on the interpretation of the Magisterium of the Church and the Fathers.

are, do we read that they bestowed the Holy Spirit by the imposition of the hands" (D 785). The Council of Florence (D 1317-1319), Trent (D 1767-1770) and many other authors are based on this same reason, namely, while alluding to the Acts of the Apostles.

140. Proof from tradition. The constant tradition of the Church is also that confirmation can be conferred on his own authority by bishops alone. Indeed, the Fathers often refer to the text quoted from the Acts of the Apostles. Thus, St. Cyprian (R 595), Firmilianus,[13] St. Jerome (R 1359), St. John Chrysostom.[14] Sometimes it is simply said that a bishop confirms, as do St. Hippolytus[15] and St. Cornelius I (R 547). And dealing precisely with confirmation St. Jerome uses these words: "You want to know where it is written? In the Acts of the Apostles. Even if the authority of Holy Scripture did not exist in this part of the world, consent would be present after the fashion of a precept. For, many other things also, which are observed in the Church by way of tradition, have claimed for themselves the authority of a written law."[16]

141. Proof of the second part. *By delegation a simple priest can be the minister of confirmation.* 1. **The praxis of the Church** continuing through many centuries regarding the matter of the sacraments, especially concerning the validity of a sacrament, cannot be in error. But for many centuries the faculty of confirming has at times been conceded to simple priests. Therefore, priests can be the extraordinary ministers of confirmation.

Above, the documents have already been mentioned of St. Gregory the Great, the *Councils of Toledo, Florence,* etc. To these must be added the concessions made by Nicolaus IV, John XXII, Leo X, Adrian VI, Benedict XIV. Afterwards the concessions become more frequent,[17] until the CIC (1917) prescribed that priests are the extraordinary ministers and Pius XII conceded this faculty to all pastors; and in the Decree of the Sacred Congregation for the Discipline of the Faith it is announced: "Because of its necessity and for the good of the faithful, the Apostolic See more than once has been moved to grant that a bishop.can allow a simple priest, who has a certain church dignity, to be designated as *the extraordinary*

13. *Epist. 75 ad Cypr.* 7f.: CSEL 3,814f.
14. *In Act. Apost. Hom.* 18,3: MG 60,144. There are many texts listed in the Index of R 479.
15. *Tradit. Apost.* Ed. Gregory Dix 1,37-39.
16. *Dialog. contra Lucifer.* 8: ML 23,163.
17. For this question, see Dölger, *Das Sakrament der Firmung* 128; W. Onclin, *L'Administration du Sacrement de la Confirmation en cas de danger de mort:* EphThLov 25 (1949) 332-355.

minister of this sacrament. He may administer the sacrament with the proper ceremonies, but always after having told the faithful that *the bishop is the exclusive ordinary minister of this sacrament and that it is being conferred by a priest because of a special permission of the Apostolic See,* as very many pontifical indults clearly show."[18]

142. 2. Next, it is also demonstrated *from the praxis of the Greeks,* at least in the fourth century. This praxis seems to have been started at a time when, because of the large number of baptisms, a general faculty of baptizing was granted to simple priests. But although some theologians opposed this practice, nevertheless in conversations and councils concerning union, the validity of the confirmation conferred by Greek priests was never called into doubt.

But that the power of delegating is clearly within the power of the Supreme Pontiff is certain from almost all the documents quoted above; in particular, expressly from Benedict XII (D 543), Clement VI (D 1070), the *Council of Constance* (D 1178), *Florence* (D 1317-1319), Benedict XIV (D 2522), Pius XII. It is also proved from the discussion which the Latin theologians had with the Greeks concerning the origin of the faculty by which simple Greek priests were able to confirm. They appealed to the authority of Pope Martin,[19] but not to their own bishops. And de facto the Latin theologians admitted that at least a tacit permission existed, inasmuch as the Apostolic See, knowing about this, did not wish to trouble the Greeks about this matter.

143. Objections. 1. In the East simple priests are accustomed to confirm. Therefore, at least there the ordinary ministers are simple priests.

I distinguish the antecedent. They are accustomed to confirm from an at least tacit indult of the Apostolic See, *conceded;* in virtue of their priestly ordination alone, *denied.* As was said above, the easterners said that they had permission from Pope Martin (+ 655); but whatever the case may be about this permission, it is certain that Benedict XII wrote to the Catholicos of the Armenians, mentioning among their errors that some say "that the sacrament of confirmation. if it has any value, he himself [the Catholicos of the Armenians] has given permission to his priests that they confer the same sacrament" (D 543).

2. The Fathers, like St. John Chrysostom and St. Jerome, say that bishops do not differ from priests except in the power of ordaining. Therefore they do not differ in the administration of confirmation.

I bypass the antecedent and deny the consequent. We bypass the antecedent, be-

18. Decree of the Sacred Congregation of the Sacraments, September 14, 1946: AAS 38 (1946) 351.
19. D'Ales, *De Baptismo et Confirmatione* 214f.

cause it can also be *distinguished:* They do not differ except in the power of ordaining, because it is a unique power that simple priests cannot have, *bypassed;* inasmuch as no other power is proper to bishops, which could be communicated to priests, *denied.* What pertains to the difference between bishops and simple priests will be covered in the treatise on Orders; there the texts of St. Chrysostom and St. Jerome cited by the objector will be explained. Now it will suffice to point out as an answer to the difficulty that these Fathers are talking about the power that belongs to a bishop alone by reason of his ordination or ordinary power; therefore it is only deduced that priests cannot be the ordinary ministers of confirmation, but not that they cannot also be extraordinary ministers.

3. *Against the argument drawn from Scripture.* Philip, who is mentioned in the argument, was a deacon and not a priest. Therefore the argument proves nothing. For, the reason because of which an Apostle was required was not because of the need for a bishop, but perhaps because of the lack of a priest.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequence and the supposition, namely, that we are arguing only from the exegesis of the text. We deduce from Scripture the *fact*, namely, that always (not just in the case of Philip with the Samaritans), when the rite of confirmation is mentioned, a bishop is present to confer it, but never a simple priest. And from this *fact* the holy Fathers conclude that only a bishop can be the minister of confirmation.

144. Scholium. *What the Supreme Pontiff does when he grants to a simple priest the faculty of confirming.* A twofold question arises from the fact that bishops are the ordinary ministers of confirmation and priests are only extraordinary ministers: a) whether bishops are ordinary ministers by divine right or by church law; b) what is the nature of the power granted by the Supreme Pontiff to a simple priest when the faculty of confirming is granted to him: is it the power of jurisdiction, or the power of Orders?

The answer to the first question pertains to treatise on Orders, where we will treat the distinction between bishops and priests by reason of their ordination. We will now give a brief answer to the second question.

In what pertains to the Supreme Pontiff there is no difficulty: all concede that the Supreme Pontiff, in conferring the power of confirming, is exercising his power of jurisdiction, and therefore a newly elected Supreme Pontiff, who has not yet been ordained a priest or bishop, could grant this faculty. For, he would have in himself the power of jurisdiction, but not yet the power of Orders, until after he has been ordained. Therefore, the question is about the act of confirming on the part of the priest; that is: when a priest confirms by delegation, is he exercising an act of jurisdiction or an act of Orders, or in other words, is he using his power of jurisdiction or his power of Orders? The reason for the question comes from the fact that it seems to be difficult at first sight to see how the power of Orders cannot be exercised in an ordinary way (if priests in virtue of ordination can confirm); or what power of Orders is given from the decree alone or from an apostolic indult (if the power of

confirming is not given in ordination); or how the Supreme Pontiff, who is not yet a priest, could communicate the power of Orders, which he does not have, to a simple priest. Therefore, many answers have been given to this problem. The main ones are the following.

145. 1. A priest confirming exercises *the power of jurisdiction.* Thus regarding a case decided by the Congregation of the Council: "If indeed bishops confer the sacrament of confirmation because of their ordinary power, other simple priests do so from the power of jurisdiction delegated to them by the Supreme Pontiff."[20] And this agrees with the teaching of Cardinal D'Annibale,[21] whom the just-quoted response cites.[22] Today this opinion is hardly maintained; for, it is not apparent how only a priest and not someone else, v.gr., a deacon, could be the extraordinary minister of confirmation. Also it does not explain how a newly appointed bishop, who has not been consecrated, confirms invalidly without an apostolic indult.

146. 2. Some theologians, like Dölger[23] and Baisi,[24] think that in virtue of priestly ordination a priest has the power of confirming; but they say that this power is impeded as to its exercise by a prohibition of the Supreme Pontiff. Therefore, when the Supreme Pontiff grants the power of confirming to a priest, he does not give him a new power, but merely removes the prohibition or impediment which renders the exercise of the power invalid. This opinion perhaps can have in its favor the words of Benedict XIV: "But whatever there is about this difficult and very complex controversy, it is clear to all that confirmation conferred by a simple Latin priest through the sole delegation of the bishop would not be invalid, because the Apostolic See reserves this right to itself alone."[25] But, as Lennerz correctly says, "the way in which the power of confirming is customarily conferred by the Supreme Pontiff, does not seem to indicate so much the removal of an impediment (something negative), but rather the granting of a certain power (something positive)."[26] Moreover, in this opinion it must be supposed that the Supreme Pontiff has the faculty of rendering invalid, by removal of the power of Orders, an act performed in virtue of the power of Orders; otherwise it does not appear how he could render invalid a confirmation conferred by a simple priest, and not a Mass celebrated by the same apostate priest

20. Congreg. Concilii, Dec. 11, 1897.
21. Card. D'Hannibale, 3 n.282.
22. Analecta Ecclesiastica 6 (1898) 107.
23. *Das Sakrament der Firmung* 206-222.
24. Ca. Baisi, *In Ministro straordinario degli ordini sacramentali* p.136. This author defends the idea "that for the valid administration of Orders [the same holds true for Confirmation] it is necessary to have the power of jurisdiction" (p. 155). In this sense doubtless *the bound power* of confirming must be explained, for it supposes that priests have it in virtue of their priestly ordination (p. 136).
25. *De Synodo diocesana* 1,7 c. 8 n.7: D 1458, note.
26. *De Sacramento Confirmationis* n.203.

or the ordination conferred by a heretical or schismatic priest. Lercher[27] calls this opinion false. Nevertheless some recent authors seem to favor this opinion, like A. Mostaza.[27*]

147. 3. Suarez proposes a third opinion[28]: Christ could determine that the proximate power to confer confirmation is not given to a simple priest, but only the remote power, which by delegation from the Supreme Pontiff could be made proximate; however a bishop, because of his consecration, receives this proximate power. Suarez also explains this as a result of the priestly and episcopal character: namely, the priestly character, by the will of Christ, constitutes a man a minister of Christ so that he can exercise sacramental acts, but not all of them, but those that Christ has determined. Thus, episcopal consecration, as it were, extends the priestly character to the sacramental acts of ordaining and confirming; and since the character, extended in this way, is such that it cannot be lost, whenever a bishop confirms, he does it validly. Because of the faculty received from Christ, the Supreme Pontiff can increase the extent of the priestly character possessed by a simple priest, without a new consecration, and then the priest can validly confirm, but only within the extent or reach of the pontifical concession.

This opinion, inasmuch as it explains how the power of confirming is a power of Orders, how a priest without pontifical delegation confirms invalidly, and how delegation from the Supreme Pontiff is necessary for validity, is a doctrine admitted by almost all modern theologians, who consider this question in one way or another.[29]

148. 4. A new theory has been proposed by Straub,[30] which Lercher-Umberg follows.[31] According to this theory the Supreme Pontiff, when conferring to a simple priest the faculty of confirming, uses his power of jurisdiction, but he does not confer on the priest the power itself of confirming, but the right to it that God confer this power on him, which God decreed to give to a priest legitimately so designated. He tries to prove the value of this theory from a comparison with the primacy, which is due to a new Supreme Pontiff who has been legitimately elected. However, this opinion does not seem to solve the question, because a difficulty can still remain, namely, why this right cannot also be conferred on someone who is not a priest.

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27. Lercher, *Institutiones Theologiae dogmaticae* 4 (1920) 301. In the third edition of Lercher-Umberg he speaks somewhat more gently: "it is less pleasing". (n. 273).

27* A. Mostaza Rodríguez, *El problema del ministro estraordinario de la Confirmación* (Salamanca 1952) p. 374.

28. *De Sacramentis* d.36 s.2.

29. On this matter, see Dölger, *Das Sakrament der Firmung* 206-222; Lehmkuhl, *Zur Frage über den Priester als ausserordenliche Spender des Sakramentes der Firmung:* ZkathTh 6 (1882) 561-573; Gillmann, *Zur Lehre der Scholastiker vom Spender der Firmung und des Weihesakramentes;* I. Brinktrine, *Der einfache Priester als Spender der hl. Firmung:* DivTh (Fr) 7 (1929) 301-314. But especially Suarez, *De Sacramentis* 1 d.36; St. Bellarmine, *De Sacramento Confirmationis* c.12.

30. A Straub, *De Ecclesia Christi* (1912) 2,688.

31. N. 273.

II. On the subject and necessity of confirmation

149. These points are treated especially in Moral Theology. For now it will be sufficient to make the following observations.

1. *The subject*[32] of confirmation is every human person baptized and not yet confirmed. It is not required that he be an adult, for confirmation is given also to infants,[33] although the Church recommends that, unless there is an urgent necessity, the administration of confirmation be deferred to about the seventh year of age.[34] In the first centuries of the Church confirmation was conferred immediately after baptism, even in the case of infants.

If the one receiving confirmation is an adult, in addition to the at least implicit habitual intention, it is required that he be in the state of grace, because we are dealing here with a sacrament of the living. However, if the sacrament is received with an obstacle (= the state of mortal sin), then once the obstacle is removed, the sacrament revives.

150. 2. CIC (1917) in canon 787 says: "Although this sacrament is not necessary for salvation with a necessity of means, nevertheless it is not licit for anyone, if he can receive it, to neglect it." And the *Roman Catechism* says: "First it is necessary to teach that this sacrament is not so necessary as to be utterly essential to salvation. Although not essential, however, it ought to be omitted by no one, but rather, on the contrary, in a matter so full of holiness through which the divine gifts are so liberally bestowed, the greater care should be taken to avoid all neglect. What God has proposed in common unto all for their sanctification, all should likewise most earnestly desire."[35] A Decree of the Sacred Congregation of Discipline proposed: "Although from a legal point of view we know that confirmation is not required for the salvation of souls with a necessity of means, still because of its excellence and the precious gifts that it bestows, great effort should be given to convince pastors and other priests that no Christian, if the occasion presents itself, should neglect receiving this

32. Particular questions will be found in the approved authors of moral theology; for the theological question, see D'Ales, 218-225; there he cites many Fathers and documents of the Church.
33. Benedict XIV: D 2522; CIC 788 (1917); Pius XII, Decree of the Sacred Congregation for the Sacraments, September 16, 1946: AAS 39 (1946) 351. In Spain it was a custom for many centuries, until a few years ago, to confirm infants not long after their baptism. This custom can still be observed, but the Apostolic See desires that confirmation not be conferred until after a suitable catechesis given before first communion: AAS 24 (1932) 271-272.
34. CIC 788 (1917).
35. P.2 c.3 n.16.

excellent mystery of salvific Redemption."[36]

Therefore, the mind of the Church regarding the necessity of confirmation is sufficiently clear.

Lercher-Umberg[37] defends a necessity of the sacrament both of means and of precept, and he does this not only from ecclesiastical law, but also from divine law. However, the ecclesiastical law is not proposed precisely as a grave obligation, but this "obligation. is at least under venial sin."[38] Then *a necessity of means* in this place is understood in a special way, namely, "it is measured by a necessity of the end, which, with the help of the effects of the sacrament, and the free cooperation of the one confirmed, from the will of Christ it is necessary for obtaining the end, and it is an end that cannot be obtained without the help of confirmation."[39] The author proves this from the words of Councils, of the holy Fathers and Holy Scripture; he also argues from Canon Law, which requires confirmation in future religious, clerics, and sponsors of confirmation.[40] But this, at most, shows that the Church requires the reception of confirmation for certain offices or positions, in which the special graces of this sacrament are foreseen to be necessary, but it is not a precept in the strict sense for all the faithful. And the Constitution of Benedict XIV, *Etsi Pastoralis,* cannot be invoked as a Church precept: "they must be warned [the Italo-Greeks] by the local bishop that they are bound under pain of a grave sin, if, when they can receive confirmation, they reject or neglect it."[41] These words can be rightly understood to be about a grave sin that they would commit if, out of contempt for the sacrament, they pass up the opportunity to receive it.[42]

The First Synod of Arles (a. 314) canon 8: "With respect to the Africans, because they use their own law so as to rebaptize, it has been decided that, if anyone comes into the Church from heresy, he should be questioned on the profession of faith, and if it is determined that he has been baptized in (the name of) the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit, only hands should be imposed on him, so that he may receive the Holy Spirit; but if, upon being questioned, he does not respond with this Trinity, he is to be baptized" (D 123).

This is also clear from other words of Benedict XIV: "It is certain that adult persons either in reality or at least in desire must be confirmed

36. September 14, 1946: AAS 38 (1946) 350.
37. Lercher-Umberg, n. 256.
38. Id., n. 257.
39. Id., n. 256.
40. CIC 544,1; 974,1,1; 795,1. (1917).
41. May 26, 1742: *Magnum Bullarium Romanum* 16,96.
42. For an excellent treatment of this point, see Layman, *Opera Moralia* 1.5 t.3 c.5.

with a necessity of precept; this is also enumerated among the precepts of God, either when the faithful are threatened with war from a tyrant, or when we are gravely afflicted in our religion by the deceits of the devil, or finally when we reach the last moment of our life. But then the precept of the Church applies, when someone endowed with the use of reason, if a bishop is present who is the minister of the sacrament, is prevented from receiving it for no legitimate reason. Thus almost all theologians are in agreement about this."[43] Obviously the Supreme Pontiff is speaking about cases in which special graces are necessary in order to profess and defend the faith.

43. *Institutiones Ecclesiasticae*[2] (Rome 1750) 30.

CHAPTER IV

On the effects of confirmation

151. The Council of Florence with these words expressed the effects of confirmation: "The effect of this sacrament is that in it the Holy Spirit is given for strength, as he was given to the apostles on the day of Pentecost, in order that Christians may courageously confess the name of Christ" (D 1319). Christ promised the Holy Spirit to the Apostles so that they could remain faithful in confessing the faith: *And while staying with them he charged them not to depart from Jerusalem, but to wait for the promise of the Father, which, he said, you heard from me. you shall receive power* (δύναμιν) *when the Holy Spirit has come upon you; and you shall be my witnesses in Jerusalem and in all Judea and Samaria and to the end of the earth* (Acts 1:4.8).

I. It confers grace and the gifts of the Holy Spirit

152. The Apostles preach the necessity of baptism in order that believers can receive the Holy Spirit. *And Peter said to them, "Repent, and be baptized every one of you. and you shall receive the gift of the Holy Spirit"* (Acts. 2:38). Peter and John are sent to the Samaritans baptized by Philip, *who came down and prayed for them that they might receive the Holy Spirit; for it had not yet fallen on any of them, but they had only been baptized in the name of the Lord Jesus. Then they laid their hands on them and they received the Holy Spirit* (Acts 8:15-17). In the same way, at Ephesus, there were some baptized disciples who had received only the baptism of John: *And when Paul had laid his hands upon them, the Holy Spirit came on them; and they spoke with tongues and prophesied* (Acts 19:6).

From these texts of Holy Scripture, and from many others (v.gr., 1 Cor. 12:13; 2 Cor. 1:21-22; John 4:13; 7:37; Acts 2:17.33, etc.), and also from the testimonies of the holy Fathers, the rite of confirmation is presented as conferring the Holy Spirit, and indeed as a complement of baptism.[1] Therefore the Fathers expressly call this sacrament the complement of

1. It will be helpful to consult Lennerz, 9-56; Dölger, *Das Sakrament der Firmung;* C. Ruch, *Confirmation dans la sainte Ecriture:* DTC 3,980-999; G. Bareille, *Confirmation de 'après les Pères Grecs et Latins:* DTC 3,1051-1056.

baptism,[2] its perfection,[3] consummation[4]; these names have the purpose that "the effects of baptism may be brought to a greater perfection by the sacrament of confirmation and therefore they are said to be completed and finished."[5]

153. The grace, therefore, which confirmation confers, is perfective of baptism; because of this, theologians, while explaining the nature of this grace, say that it constitutes the confirmed person a soldier of Christ. By baptism a man enters into the people of Christ, and becomes a Christian; by confirmation he enters into the army or service of Christ the king. Therefore:

a) *It is a second grace,* or *an increase of grace* is given; for it supposes the first grace already received in baptism, which it now completes; and therefore it is a *sacrament of the living.*

b) *It is given to strengthen the soul,* and indeed so that he can boldly profess and defend the faith. With these words the nature of this grace is signified, which is conferred in order to defend the faith and profess it in both *ordinary* and *extraordinary* circumstances. And this is not only for the *passive* defense of the faith, as when, v.gr., a Christian is put on trial or subjected to torture; but also *active* defense, that is, when he must fight in ordinary or special circumstances, positively defending the faith or promoting the same faith.

c) *With special helps given at the proper time.* Faith is not put to the test always and everywhere, and therefore normally the general helps of grace to preserve the faith are sufficient and God never denies them. But when temptations or dangers are greater or extraordinary the sacrament of confirmation gives the right to obtain suitable helps.

d) *It conforms the soul to Christ.* "Those who receive confirmation, which is the sacrament of the fullness of grace, are conformed to Christ, inasmuch as from the first instant of his conception he was full of grace and truth."[6] "Man receives spiritual life in baptism, which is a spiritual regeneration: while in confirmation man arrives as the perfect age, as it were, of the spiritual life."[7] "This sacrament is given in order to confer a certain excellence, not indeed, like the sacrament of Orders, of one man over another, but of man in regard to himself: thus the same man,

2. Origen, *De Principiis:* MG 11,147; see Denzinger, *Rit. Orient.* 1,249f.
3. Conc. Illiberitanum, cn. 38, ed. Bruns, 1,7.12; Aphraates: R 695; *Auctor de Sacramentis:* R 1337; St. Cyril of Alex.: MG 74,49.
4. St. Cyprian: R 595; Ps.Dyonisius, *De Eccles. Hierarch.* 2,8: MG 3,404.
5. J.B. Umberg, *Confirmatione baptismus "perficitur":* EphThLov (1924) 505-517.
6. III q. 72, a. 1 ad 4.
7. III q. 72, a. 1 c.

when arrived at maturity, excels himself as he was when a boy."[8] And this perfection, or conformity with the perfect Christ, should be obtained by all; and therefore "this sacrament should be given to those on the point of death, that they may be seen to be perfect at the resurrection. And therefore even children dying after confirmation obtain greater glory, just as here below they receive more grace."[9]

e) With sanctifying grace it also confers *the gifts of the Holy Spirit.* For these pertain to the armor of a soldier of Christ. St. Ambrose says: "You have received a spiritual sign, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and virtue, the spirit of knowledge and piety, the spirit of holy fear; protect what you have received."[10] Likewise, St. Augustine,[11] the Book of Orders of the Visigoth and Mozarabic church,[12] which explain the meaning of the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit given to those confirmed. However, this conferring of gifts is only an amplification of the same gifts, which had been given already with charity in baptism.[13]

II. The character is imprinted

154. In the treatise on the sacraments in general it has already been proved that a character is imprinted on the soul in confirmation. Now we will just briefly consider the specific nature of this character.[14]

Just as the grace of confirmation increases and completes the grace received in baptism, so the character of confirmation perfects the character of baptism. Therefore:

a) The character in baptism is a sign distinguishing the faithful from unbelievers; but the character of confirmation distinguishes the spiritually mature from those of whom it is said that they are "like newborn babes" (1 Pet. 2:2). [15] For, confirmation is the sacrament of spiritual perfection. Therefore the modality of the character will be to sign this perfection and to protect it with this sign.

8. III q. 72, a. 8 ad 1.
9. III q. 72, a. 8 ad 4.
10. *De Myst.* 7,42: ML 16,402.
11. *Tract.* 15,2: ed. Morin, p. 58.
12. Ed. Férotin, 34,36f.
13. I. de Guibert, *Theologia Spiritualis ascetica et mystica*[2] (1939) 139, n. 145; but Umberg seems to want to prove that the gifts are conferred only in confirmation: *Confirmatione baptismus "perficitur":* EphThLov (1924) 505.
14. On the character of confirmation, besides the authors who treat the sacraments in general, see L. Audet, *Notre participation au sacerdoce du Christ: étude sur le caractère sacramental:* LavThPh (1944) 9-46; (1945) 110-135, especially p. 125-130; F. Brommer, *Die Lehre vom sakramentalem Charackter in der Scholastik bis Thomas von Aquin inklusive* (Forschungen zur christl. Litteratur-und-Dogmengeschichte, 8,2); A. Croegaert, *Baptême, Confirmation, Eucharistie, sacremants de "initiation chrétienne"*[4] p. 253-268.
15. III q.72, a. 5 ad 1.

b) In baptism the character opens the door of the Church and it is ordered to the reception of the sacraments, especially the Eucharist.[16] But this potency, which in the sacrament of baptism is active rather than passive, in confirmation, on the contrary, is active rather than passive, as we shall explain later. For by the character of confirmation the soul is perfected in its ability to receive the sacraments. Indeed, by reason of the character and in virtue of the sacrament of confirmation the soul must be disposed for many graces, which will be necessary in order to defend the faith; therefore its ability and receptive potency is increased, which is, as it were, requiring a response.[17]

c) The baptismal character makes a man a member of Christ; the character of confirmation constitutes him a soldier of Christ the king. "This sacrament, whereby spiritual strength is given to the regenerated, in a certain sense makes him an advocate for the faith of Christ. And because soldiers under a prince wear his emblem, those who receive the sacrament of confirmation are marked with the sign of Christ. Those who accept this sacrament in a certain way are enrolled into a spiritual army."[18] With this character the one confirmed is assimilated to Christ, the author and perfecter of faith (Heb. 12:2). Therefore, in virtue of this greater participation in the army of Christ, the character of confirmation increases the receptive power of the soul with regard to receiving all sacramental and extra-sacramental graces, for not only should confirmed Christians nourish their faith, but they have a new strength so that "they vigorously protect and defend their Mother the Church and the faith they have received from her."[19]

Therefore this potency is not merely passive, but rather active, and surely it is truly *active*, because "he who is confirmed receives the power of publicly confessing his faith by words, as it were *ex officio.*"[20] In fact, according to Sasse, "the baptismal character has a mode of a passive power; while the character of confirmation is like an active power."[21] For if, as it were *ex officio,* it pertains to someone confirmed to defend the faith of Christ, and not just to defend it passively, but actively, by fighting for it, confessing it and promoting it, then it is evident that the soul needs many graces, without which it would not have the necessary strength, constancy and fortitude.

16. See treatise *On Baptism* n. 97.
17. III q. 65, a. 3; q. 63, a. 6 c.
18. CG 4,60.
19. Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 201
20. III q. 72, a. 5 ad 2; likewise, *In 4* d.7 q.2 a.1 sol.1 ad 3.
21. 1,282.

d) By the character of confirmation the confirmed person becomes a participator in the priestly dignity, which is royal and prophetic and which belongs to a soldier of Christ. The holy Fathers often extol this, like Tertullian,[22] St. Ambrose,[23] Pseudo-Ambrose,[24] St. Augustine,[25] St. Leo the Great[26] and many others.[27]

e) Finally, by the character of confirmation a Christian participates in the apostolate, or, as it is called in our days, in Catholic Action. For, on the one hand, Catholic Action supposes and requires in its members active virtues of fighting in order to defend the faith and to promote it; on the other hand, the apostolate is the application or exercise of these virtues. Then also Catholic Action desires and supposes participation in the hierarchy by cooperating with it and the whole tradition in service to the Church. But this is what the character of confirmation confers: the fullness of this participation in a holy office, especially in defending the rights of the Church and spreading the faith. These activities can be had only through union with the hierarchy.[28]

155. Scholium. *On the distinction of the character of baptism and confirmation.* "It can be doubted whether the character of confirmation is a completely new quality really distinct from the baptismal character, or only a certain modification, or perfection of it, just as the grace of confirmation is compared to the baptismal grace. For it seems that this latter position is sufficient, for this is enough so that everything is true that the Councils and theologians teach about this, and is in conformity with the institution of this sacrament. For, it is said to be a certain perfection of baptism: therefore also its character will be only a perfection of the baptismal character; and this suffices for it to be said that it imprints a character, just as it is said to confer grace only because it perfects the baptismal grace.

"This way of speaking can be defended without making an error in faith. But the truth is that the character of confirmation is a real quality completely distinct from the character of baptism."[29] Not all theologians defend this distinction between the two characters so emphatically, but the common opinion is that both characters are

22. *De Baptismo* 7: ML 1,1206.
23. *De Myst.* 6,30: ML 16,398.
24. *Tract.* 3: ML 57,777.
25. *Ce Civitate Dei* 20,10: ML 41,725.
26. *De Nativ. Dom. Sermo* 4: ML 45,149.
27. They are mentioned by Lercher-Umberg, Otten, Pesch, etc.
28. S. Sauras, *Fundamaento sacramental de la Acción Católica:* RevEspT 3 (1943)129-158, especially p. 147-158; L. Audet, *Notre participation au sacerdoce du Christ: étude sur le caractère sacramental:* LavThPh 1 (1944-1945) 9-47. LavThPh 1 (1944-1945) 9-47.110-130, in a particular way 129-130; L. Civerdi, *Manual de Acción Católica* 1,3; Emm. Card. Villeneuve, *Fundament théologique du rôle des laïques dans l'apostolat:* Semaine religieuse de Quebec, 1944; H. Gasnier, *La Grâce de ma Confirmation* (1946) p. 113-127; A. Croegaert, *Baptême, Confirmation, Eucharistie* p. 268.
29. Suarez, *De Sacramentis* d.34 s.1 n.2.

really distinct, although the character of confirmation is said to be the perfection or even the extension of the baptismal character. However it is not said in that way, as if it were concerned with only one character terminating in many things because of confirmation.

TREATISE III

ON THE SACRAMENT OF CHRISTIAN UNITY

OR

ON THE MOST HOLY EUCHARIST

By

Joseph A. de Aldama, S.J.

INTRODUCTION

1. What the Church thinks about the venerable Mystery of the Altar was expressed very well by Leo XIII in his Encyclical *Mirae caritatis:* "But indeed a Sacrament so great and so rich in all manner of blessings can never be extolled as it deserves by human eloquence, nor adequately venerated by the worship of man. This Sacrament, whether as the theme of devout meditation, or as the object of public adoration, or best of all as a food to be received in the utmost purity of conscience, is to be regarded as the center towards which the spiritual life of a Christian in all of its ambit gravitates; for all other forms of devotion, whatsoever they may be, lead up to it, and in it find their point of rest. This Sacrament is, as it were, the very soul of the Church; and to it the grace of the priesthood is ordered and directed in all its fullness and in each of its successive grades. From the same source the Church draws and has all her strength, all her glory, her every supernatural endowment and adornment, every good thing that is here. Most abundant, assuredly, are the salutary benefits which are stored up in this most venerable mystery, regarded as a Sacrifice.; than which nothing can give greater honor, nothing be more pleasing, to God. For it is a divine Victim which is here immolated; and accordingly through this Victim we offer to the most blessed Trinity all that honor which the infinite dignity of the Godhead demands; infinite in value and infinitely acceptable is the gift which we present to the Father in his only-begotten Son; so that for his benefits to us we not only signify our gratitude, but actually make an adequate return."[1]

Therefore the mystery of the Eucharist is the soul of Christian life, the center of the entire liturgical worship of the Church.

2. But from that reality it is apparent that we have very many questions that must be investigated regarding this venerable mystery. For it contains within itself both the nature of a sacrifice and the nature of a sacrament. But this nature of a sacrament is had in the Eucharist in such a way that it differs from the other sacraments considerably, for it is a permanent sacrament. There is the additional fact that in this sacrament not only is grace produced, but also the author of grace is substantially contained and given in it. Indeed, what was accomplished once and for all by Christ the Lord either at the Last Supper or on the Cross is connected with the mystery of the Eucharist with a wonderful and very close bond. Therefore all of these points must be studied.

1 Encyclical "*Mirae caritatis*": ASS 34,650ff.

3. Therefore, in order to put some unity in this very complex treatise, first of all we will investigate the origin or institution of the Eucharist; this must be placed above all in the Last Supper of the Lord. Christ the Lord at that Supper transubstantiated bread and wine into his own Body and Blood; he gave his Body and Blood, under the appearances of bread and wine, to his Apostles to eat, and he offered them to his Father as a sacrifice. Christ the Lord did all these things in such a way that by one and the same action he transubstantiated the bread and wine into his own Body and Blood, and he gave them to his Apostles to eat, and he offered them to his Father as a sacrifice.

Moreover, he wanted this wonderful action, by which on one occasion he produced all these effects, to remain in the Church until the end of the world. Therefore there is present in the Church this wonderful action, whose effect is to transubstantiate into the Body and Blood of Christ, and to offer to God this Body and this Blood under the appearances of bread and wine. Therefore the consecrating action is at the same time sacrificial. But the effect of that action is ordained by Christ for the spiritual nourishment of the faithful. This eating is also at the same time a participation in the offered sacrifice and the application of a sensible sign that produces grace, that is, the reception of the sacrament. Thus all of these elements, in a wonderful manner, are brought together in the consecration.

Therefore we have this arrangement of our treatise:

Book I.	On the origin or institution of the Eucharistic mystery.
Book II.	On the reality of the Eucharistic mystery in the Church:
Chapter I.	On the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist.
Chapter II.	On the Eucharistic sacrifice.
Chapter III.	On the sacrament of the Eucharist.

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BOOK I

ON THE ORIGIN OR INSTITUTION OF THE EUCHARIST

CHAPTER I

On the institution of the Eucharist

4. The question about the origin of the Eucharist has been discussed very much by recent Rationalists and Modernists. For all of them the Eucharist, as it is now had in the Church, was not instituted directly by Christ. Once they have taken this position, then they have to explain two important points. The *first* one is—what was the true meaning of the Last Supper conducted by Christ the Lord. The *second* one is—how did that Supper, in its historical development, become the present-day Eucharist. In order to answer these questions, theories and systems have been multiplied *ad infinitum*, and they are still being added to. Here are the general outlines of these systems:

5. a) In the explanation *of the Supper conducted by Christ the Lord,* there is a threefold tendency of the authors:

The first tendency is *purely symbolic.* According to this view the Supper is a real comparison, or parable, signifying the love of Christ for his disciples, especially in the breaking of bread (Goetz, Haup, Goguel, Clemen), or also the violent death of Christ (Jülicher, Weizacker).

The second tendency is *symbolic-dynamic.* According to this view the Supper not only signifies, but in a certain sense also effects, either the food and drink among the disciples of Christ because of His promised presence (Harnack), or fraternal charity among the disciples of Christ (Hoffmann, Seville, Heitmüller, Brandt, Wellhausen), or a new covenant established between God and his people (Holzmann, Katenbusch), or the final salvific will of Christ (Dibelius).

Finally, the third tendency is *eschatological.* According to this view the Supper was a foreshadowing or quasi anticipation of the messianic or heavenly banquet, which is still to come (Spitta, Andersen, Loisy).

6. b) They explain the *transformation of this Supper* into our Eucharist in the following way. At the beginning, meals of Christians took place in

which the "breaking of bread" occurred in memory of the Last Supper of Christ and as a sign of Christian fraternity. At that time there was no commemoration of the passion or faith in the real presence of Christ. But already in the Pauline letters an evolution is apparent. Now that common meal has been changed (perhaps by Paul himself) into a sacramental meal; now its institution is attributed to the dying and rising Christ, who gives himself in the food. This evolution developed under the influence of the Hellenistic religions, especially the mystery religions. But here again the concrete explanations are diverse.

Some hold that Paul, because of his knowledge of the Greek mysteries, introduced the sacred meals to the Christian community, and he adapted to them the account of the Last Supper (Gadner, Loisy).

Some, after having admitted the universal fact of these religious meals in Hellenism, say that it cannot be further determined which sources Paul used (Heitmüller, Goguel).

7. However, other authors think that these explanations do not suffice; therefore they sought *new reasons for the answer.* Thus, Wetter thinks that the "mysterious" aspect of the Eucharist is well explained from Hellenistic syncretism; but that the sacrificial aspect comes from the evolution of some Jewish rite, that is, of the oblation of food for a meal. To this oblation, which at the beginning was done by rich Christians and afterwards by all Christians, prayers and sacred rites were added; when these things were mixed together with the mysterious character of the Christian meal, by a natural evolution they became a sacrificial oblation.

However, Lietzmann explains the matter like this. At the beginning there was a twofold form of Eucharistic celebration: Alexandrian and Roman. The Alexandrian form (which appears in the *Anaphora Serapionis* and before that in the *Didache),* comes from the Palestinian churches; in these the Christian meal has no historical connection with the Last Supper of Christ, but with the ordinary meals of Christ with his disciples, with the addition of an eschatological hope; it was a common meal, in which bread was broken with a blessing; but afterwards, from the influence of Hellenism, it was gradually considered to be a sacrificial meal, in which a holy bread was eaten. The Roman form (which appears in the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus and before that in 1 Cor.) comes from the Pauline churches; in these the Christian meal has a historical relation with the Last Supper of Christ (which was only a symbol of his future passion), and from there it draws its memorial character of the death of Christ; but afterwards, from the influence of Hellenism, it was thought to be a sacrificial banquet,

in which, through physical eating, it became a mystical participation with Christ. This Pauline form, gradually modified by Jewish elements, became general outside of Egypt.

8. c) According to the advocates of *form criticism,* the narration of the Last Supper of Christ was created by the Christian community because of the necessity of explaining the Eucharistic meal. The primitive narration contained only the words of Christ: "this is my body" (not yet "which is given for you," added later by Paul), "this chalice is the New Testament in my blood" (not yet "which is being poured out for you") and "as often as. he comes." Therefore the primitive Eucharistic meal was a symbol of the union of the faithful with Christ, so valid that Christ could say: "This is my Body." The other elements were added later under the influence of Hellenism (Dibelius). Loisy held that the passage in 1 Corinthians is not authentic, but pertains to a further evolution of the Christian mystery, surely prior to St. Justin and the redaction of the synoptic Gospels, but after Paul and the apostolic period. Thus the primitive meal, which was a popular symbol of union (because of the same food shared in common by all and because of a sense of the spiritual presence of Christ coming in the future), at first became a religious symbol (a "mystery") of hope and of Christian unity in Christ (thus in the Didache), and then a religious symbol commemorating and communicating an atoning death (thus in 1 Cor.).[1]

9. In opposition to all these theories of the rationalists and modernists, *the perpetual doctrine of the Church* is this: Christ the Lord at the Last Supper "offered his Body and Blood, under the species of bread and wine, to the Father, and under the symbols of the same things he offered them to the Apostles to consume; and he commanded them and their successors in the priesthood to offer them" (*Council of Trent,* sess. 22, chap.1: D 1739-1741). Three truths are contained in these words:

a) Christ at the Supper under the species of bread and wine gave his Body and Blood to the Apostles.
b) He offered his own Body and Blood to his Father under the same species.
c) He commanded that what he did should be done perpetually in the Church.

We will study this in the following three theses.

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1. See C. Ruch, *Eucharistie:* DTC 5,1024-1031; W. Goosens, *Les origines de l'Eucharistie, sacrement et sacrifice* (Louvain 1931); on this book, see F.M. Braun, *Les orgines de l'Eucharistie, sacrement et sacrifice:* EphThLov 8 (1931) 618-629. See also J. Coppens, *Eucharistie:* DBS 2,1146-1167; F. Carpino, *Evoluzione di sistemi sulle origini dell'Eucharistia:* ScuoCatt 63 (1935) 296-312.

Thesis 1. Jesus Christ at the Last Supper gave his Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine to his Apostles to partake of.

Filograssi, 18-36.

10. Definition of Terms. At the *Supper*, that is, when he said to the Apostles: "Take and eat, this is my Body; drink of it all of you, for this is my Blood."

He gave his Body and Blood. Really and truly he gave them his own Body and Blood. Therefore we say that those words must be understood in the proper and real sense, not in a symbolic or parabolic way.

However, in this thesis we are not saying anything about some further questions: whether the substance of the bread and wine is preserved together with the Body and Blood of Christ, or not; whether the real species of bread and wine remain. In this thesis "under the species of bread and wine" means only: giving to the Apostles what formerly was bread and wine.

11. Adversaries. 1) In general, all those who deny that in the Holy Eucharist the true Body and Blood of Christ are present; these points will be treated later.

2) In particular, recent *Rationalists* who admit nothing in the Last Supper except a normal meal with the promise of the spiritual presence of Christ among his own, or a symbolical allusion to the death of Christ or to the heavenly banquet.[2]

12. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* sess.13, ch. 1: "After he had blessed the bread and wine, he declared in plain, unmistakable words that he was giving to them his own body and his own blood" (D 1637): "For the apostles had not yet received the Eucharist from the hands of the Lord when he himself told them that it was truly his body that he was giving them" (D 1640): "Because Christ our Redeemer said that it was truly his body that he was offering under the species of bread." D 1642): "For, though Christ the Lord instituted the revered sacrament at the Last Supper and gave it to the apostles in the species of bread and wine." (D 1727). Similar statements are made in sess.21, ch. 3 (D 1729) and sess.22, ch. 1 (D 1740).

With these words the Church teaches:

a) that Christ at the Last Supper gave his own Body and Blood to the Apostles;

2. See above n. 5.

b) that it is contained in the very words of Christ himself as they have been preserved by the evangelists and by St. Paul;
c) that these words were always understood in this way by the Fathers and by the Church and that therefore they cannot be understood in any other way;

One should also recall proposition 45 of the Modernists, which was condemned by St. Pius X (D 3445).

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

13. Proof from Holy Scripture. Matt. 26:26f.; Mark 14:22f.; Luke 22:19f.; 1 Cor. 11:23-29.

Preliminary note. Concerning these four narrations, the chronological order of composition seems to be: 1 Cor., Matt., Mark, Luke. However, if they are compared with each other, they recount at least two different traditions: 1 Cor.-Luke and Matt.-Mark. We said "at least," because in spite of the similarities between 1 Cor. and Luke, the latter has some things proper to him, which seem to indicate an independent source.

In Luke's text the tradition of verses 17-20 is not the same in all the codices. The longer text, which is the received Alexandrian text, is present in all the Greek codices, except D, and in many Latin texts. But in codex D, in many Latin codices and in the Syrian versions there is a shorter text, which however is not rendered in the same way in each of the codices. For, in codex D and in some Latin versions verses 19b and 20 are omitted; but in the peshita version verses 17 and 18 are omitted; but in the versions of syrcur and syrsyn the order of verses (16-19-17-18) is changed, but so that in syrsyn the two verses of 18 and 20 become one verse. The longer text, unique and constant, should be retained, since in the shorter text there seem to be many attempts at simplification and adaptation.[3]

Moreover, for this thesis there are no differences in the four narrations regarding the bread (except the addition in Matt. of φάγετε); regarding the wine there are two ways of speaking:

τούτο έστιν τό αίμά μου τής διαθήκης (Matt-Mark).
τούτο τό ποτήριον, ή καινή διαθήκη, έν τώ αίματί μου (Luke).
τούτο τό ποτήριον, ή καινή διαθήκη, έστίν έν τώ έμώ αίματι (1 Cor.).

3. See C. Ruch: DTC 5,1063-1065, 1073-1077; M.I. Lagrange, O.P., *Evangile selon S. Luc* 22,19f.; J. Coppens, *Les origines de l'Eucharistie d'après les livres du Nouveau Testament:* EphThLov 11 (1934) 54f. From these studies it is apparent that there is no objective foundation for the hypothesis of some rationalists, according to whom Christ at the Last Supper gave the Apostles only bread and not wine (see DTC 5,1078f.).

In the second formula the meaning is: this chalice, in my blood (that is, containing my blood) is the New Testament; or, this chalice is the New Testament, because it contains my blood. The first formula expresses the same thing: this is my blood, the New Testament. Hence all the formulas contain the affirmation of the blood of Christ.

14. *Argument.* Christ, in saying that he is giving the Apostles his Body and Blood, was speaking about his true and proper Body and Blood. But those words would not be true if he had not truly given them his Body and Blood. Therefore Christ truly gave his Body and Blood to the Apostles.

The major. The Body, which he gives to the Apostles, is the same Body that is nailed to the Cross; the Blood, which he gives, is the same blood that is poured out on the Cross.

The minor. Those words of Christ cannot be understood in a metaphorical way. Therefore they must be understood in their literal meaning. But in their literal meaning they would not be true, if Christ had not truly given the Apostles his own Body and Blood. Therefore.

This antecedent: the words of Christ cannot be understood in a metaphorical sense from the nature of the matter (because bread is not a natural sign for the body, nor wine for the blood)), or from an accepted way of speaking (because there is no such accepted way), or from a previous warning (because there was none). Therefore in no way can they be understood metaphorically.

15. Proof from tradition. a) The conviction of the Church from Christian antiquity about the objective reality of these words of Christ is evident from many documents; many of them will be cited in the following theses. In order to give a few now, please note the following: in the second and third centuries, St. Irenaeus (R 240, 232), Tertullian (R 343),[4] St. Cyprian (R 581); see also 582ff. In the fourth and fifth centuries, in the Alexandrian Church St. Athanasius,[5] St. Cyril (R 2101); in the Palestinian Church St. Cyril of Jerusalem,[6] St. Epiphanius (R 1084); in the Church of Antioch St. Chrysostom (R 1179), Theodore of Mopsuestia (R 1035), Macarius Magnes (R 2166); in the Syrian Church Aphraates (R 689),

4. It is clear from the context that Tertullian does not deny the reality of the Body of Christ; his whole point is to prove that the figures in the O.T. are fulfilled in the N.T. Hence he says unsuitably that Christ instituted another figure of his Body. See also R 337, where, from the truth of the Body of Christ in communion, he demonstrates the truth of the Body of Christ on the Cross. See also R 362. Hence the cited text should be read: this, that is the figure of my Body, is my Body. This construction, although it seems perhaps difficult, occurs more than once in Tertullian. See A. D'Ales, *La théologie de Tertullien* 364, note.
5. *Epist.* 4 *paschalis:* MG 26,1379.
6. *Catechesis* 22,2: MG 33,1079. See R 844.

St. Ephraem (R 707f,), Iacobus Sarugenses[7]; in the Roman Church St. Jerome[8]; in the Church of Milan St. Ambrose[9]; in the Church of Brixen St. Gaudentius[10]; in the African Church St. Augustine (R 1464)[11]; in the French Church Ps.Eusebius Emissenus.[12] *In the seventh and eighth centuries,* St. Isidore of Spain,[13] Anastasius of Sinai,[14] Peter of Laodicaea,[15] St. John Damascene (R 2371). In these texts the necessity of believing Christ when he speaks is insisted on, and the truth of his words is taught expressly; also when the Fathers speak under the discipline of the secret mysteries (St. Epiphanius and St. Augustine), all ambiguity and all doubt is removed.

16. b) *The same truth is seen in the ninth century from the Eucharistic controversy.* This controversy, between Paschasius Radbertus on the one hand, and Rabanus Maurus and Ratramnus on the other, was especially about the relation between the Body of Christ in the Eucharist and the Body of Christ in heaven. But all agree in affirming the truth of Christ's words at the Last Supper. Thus Paschasius Radbertus: "He did not speak thus when he broke the bread and gave it to them: this is, or in this mystery, is the power or figure of my Body; but he said not falsely: this is my Body."[16] Ratramnus: "Therefore if nothing here has been changed, it is not different from what it was before. But it is different, because the bread has become the Body of Christ and the wine his Blood. For he himself said: Take...."[17] Rabanus Maurus: "But really just as then at the Last Supper he did not suffer in any way, when for the first time he deigned to create his true Body and his own Blood from bread and wine, he blessed it and gave it to his disciples...."[18]

Therefore: during the whole patristic age, whether in the East or in the West, also in different places; and again afterwards, even during the first Eucharistic controversy in the Middle Ages, the universal conviction in the Church was that the words of Christ at the Last Supper, while giving his

7. See Sasse, *De sacramentis* 1,355.
8. *Epist.* 120 *ad Hebidiam* 2: ML 22,986.
9. *De mysteriis* 9,54: ML 16,407. See also R 1340 (the complete text is in ML 16,444). The book, *De sacramentis,* was probably written by St. Ambrose; see BullThAncMéd 5,393-395; for a contrary view see F.A. Montgomery Kitchcok, *Venerius Bishop of Milan, Probable Author of the "De Sacramentis":* Hermathema 70 (1947) 22-38: 71 (1948) 19-35.
10. *Sermo 2 de Exodo:* ML 20,859.
11. See also *Enarrationes in Psalmos* in Ps.33 enarr.2 n.2: ML 36,308.
12. *Homilia 5 de Paschate:* ML 67,1052f.
13. *De ecclesiasticis officiis* 1,18,1: ML 83,754.
14. *Viae dux* 23: MG 89,298.
15. *In Mc* 14,22: MG 86,3326.
16. *Expositio in Mt 25:26:* ML 120,890.
17. *De Corpore et Sanguine Domini* 13: ML 121, 133.
18. *Epist. 2 ad Egilem* 6: ML 112,1516f.

Body and Blood to his Apostles, must be understood in the real sense. It is clear that the same must be said about the following centuries in the Middle Ages. Therefore the Council of Trent could say that the words of Christ have that real and clear meaning according to which they were understood by the Fathers, and which is according to the universal sense of the Church (D 1636-1637).

17. Objections. 1. In Scripture often the word "is" is used for "signifies" (Gen. 41:26; Dan. 4:17; Matt. 13:38f.; Gal. 4:24). Therefore it should also be understood in that way here.

I distinguish the antecedent. When the figure of speech can be recognized from the nature of the matter or from the explanation of the speaker, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.* In the cited examples the figure of speech is sufficiently clear from the nature of the matter. For the point is the explanation of a symbolic dream (Gen. and Dan.), or of a parable (Matt.), or of an allegory, which is stated expressly (Gal.). In these cases the word "is" from the very context can be understood only as "signifies."

2. In the quoted words of Christ in the proof of the thesis many occur, which must be taken necessarily in a figurative sense (chalice, testament, poured out). Therefore the whole narration must be understood in a similar way.

I distinguish the antecedent. They are sufficiently certain from the nature of the case and from the context of the narration, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.* The metaphors used in the consecration of the chalice are clear and intelligible; but in the consecration of the bread they would be totally unintelligible and very obscure.

3. Christ, since he was speaking in Aramaic, did not use the word "is," but more probably "behold." Therefore it is not licit to argue from that word.

I distinguish the antecedent. So that the one meaning of the used expression is rendered very well with word "is," *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.*

4. But the Apostles had already been advised beforehand by Christ, so that they would properly understand His words, in the Eucharistic sermon in John 6:52 (*the bread that I will give is my flesh for the life of the world*). Therefore the words must be understood in a figurative sense.

I distinguish the antecedent. The Apostles had been advised beforehand by Christ that he would give them his flesh for food, *conceded;* they had been advised beforehand that he would give them his flesh under the species of material bread, *denied.*

18. 5. The word "this" when it is used by Christ designates bread. But real bread is not the Body of Christ. Therefore either the proposition is false, or it must be understood figuratively from the nature of the matter.

Various answers have been given to this classical difficulty. Therefore we say that the pronoun "this" as used by Christ designates his body, which is now no more physically present, but is present in the mind and in the intention of the speaker, because it now appears to him as immediately future. Hence *the major is denied. The minor* doubtless must be *conceded.* It is clear also that thus the proposition is in no way false; this

happens in all practical propositions. But it is also not a tautology. For the body in the subject of the sentence is taken with reference to the species (the body that will be under the species), but in the predicate it is taken as it is in itself. Thus therefore the meaning is: This, that is, the body which will be immediately under the species, is no longer bread (as it generally is), but my Body.[19]

19. See Toledo, *In 3* q.78 a.5 concl.3,4.

Thesis 2. Christ at the Last Supper offered his Body and Blood to the Father under the species of bread and wine.

Filograssi, 218.

19. Definition of terms. *He offered.* He performed a strictly sacrificial action, or he made a true sacrifice.

A *sacrifice* is a special act of external worship, in which some sensible thing by some internal change is legitimately handed over to God in order to acknowledge his supreme majesty. Explanation:

a) *Worship* is testimony about the excellence of another with submission towards him. The virtue, which inclines a man to give due worship to God is called "religion." Sacrifice, therefore, is an external and public act of the virtue of religion; and in fact it is the main act of this virtue.

b) An act of worship is said to be *external,* whereby the internal acknowledgement of the excellence of another is made manifest by some external sign.

c) *A sensible thing.* External acts of worship are performed either by actions (v.gr., genuflection, vocal prayer), or by the use of some permanent thing which is offered to God or handed over to him.

d) *By some internal change.* Since the thing is not handed over to God in order that he might begin to exercise dominion over it, something must take place in the thing itself by which it is made known that the thing is consecrated to God and removed from profane use. Such a change can be the result either of consecrating action (a change to something better), or a destructive action (change to something worse). There is a dispute among theologians whether it pertains to the essence of a sacrifice that it be destructive. For now we will prescind from this question.

e) *In order to acknowledge his....* Sacrifice is in the genus of sign. However, a sign is composed of two things: from its matter and from its form. The matter is the thing itself that is offered and is looked at either as it precedes the sacrificial action (remote matter; v.gr., a living animal), or as already changed by it (proximate matter; v.gr., an animal already offered). The form is the changing action of the thing offered. But the *meaning* of this sign, which is a sacrifice, is the external manifestation of our internal acknowledgement of the divine excellence. This meaning does not agree with the sacrificial action from the nature of the case. Therefore an institution is required, which in the natural order could be done by man, but in the supernatural order it is done by God himself. Therefore in the definition it is said to be done "legitimately."

20. From the foregoing, it is apparent that a sacrifice *differs*:

a) from adoration, which is an internal act of worship;

b) from other external acts of worship, because it takes place by means of some permanent thing;

c) from mere offerings, because it takes place through some change in the thing.

Therefore we say that Christ at the Last Supper offered to the Father a true sacrifice; that is, the action, whereby Christ changed bread and wine into his own Body and Blood, was a strictly sacrificial oblation. However, because now there is no dispute about the internal nature of a sacrifice, it will suffice in this thesis for us to show that Christ at the Last Supper performed an action, which is not less sacrificial than the sacrifice of the Cross, or the sacrifices of the Old Testament; and finally to show that a true relation exists between all of these sacrifices.

21. Adversaries. In addition to the authors we cited above,[1] Wieland, a Catholic, denied the sacrificial character of the Last Supper. According to him, there is nothing in the N.T. that signifies that a sacrifice was made at the Last Supper. The words, which seem to require that meaning, must be understood to be about the sacrifice of the Cross. The Supper was only a banquet along with thanksgiving in the Body and Blood of Christ really present, with a reference to the future sacrifice of the Cross. St. Irenaeus was the first one to introduce the doctrine about the Eucharistic sacrifice.[2]

At the Council of Trent *some theologians* denied the sacrificial nature of the Last Supper or had doubts about it.

22. Doctrine of the Church. It is contained primarily in *Trent* sess.22, ch.1 (D 1739-1741). In order to get a good idea of the mind of the Council, we will give an outline concerning the history of this doctrine contained in the Tridentine decree.[3]

a) Already in 1552, in the discussion about the articles of the heretics, the Fathers disputed whether Christ offered a sacrifice at the Last Supper; the major part affirmed it against some who denied it. Hence *in the first version of the decree* (in 1552) the wording was: "then Christ the Lord

1. See the authors cited in n. 5.
2. See J. Coppens, *Eucharistie:* DBS 2,1151f. The Church condemned the works of Fr. Weiland: see AAS 3 (1911) 41f.
3. See J. Rivière, *Messe au Concile de Trente:* DTC 10,1113-1132; A. Michel, *Les décrets du Concile de Trente:* Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles* 10,1 (Paris 1938) 425-445; M. Alonso, S.J., *El sacrificio eucharistico de la ultima cena del Señor, según el Concilio Tridentino* (Madrid 1929) 83-244; J. Armijos, S.J., *La immolación desacrificio eucharístico, según el Concilio Tridentino y el decreto conciliar* (Quito 1942) 104-209.

performed the function of this priesthood, when he offered himself to his Father at the Last Supper under the sensible signs of bread and wine...."[4]

b) The matter of course was not completed in the second congregation of the Council. But finally in 1562 the articles of the heretics were assembled in order to be examined. When they had been discussed by the theologians, on August 6 a new version of the decree was proposed, in which nothing was said about the sacrificial character of the Supper: "It must be held that Christ the Lord instituted it [the sacrifice of the Mass], when at the Last Supper he changed bread and wine into his Body and Blood, and he gave Himself to the Apostles under the symbols of the same things to be consumed and offered, and he gave them a command, saying: do this in memory of me."[5] In the discussion of this text (August 11-27) the question was raised about the sacrificial value of the Supper; the vast majority of the Fathers were in favor of it and wanted this doctrine to be included in the final text; many of them held this view, while prescinding from a further declaration about the atoning value of the sacrifice of Christ. However, there were some who were opposed, and many who wanted this matter to be debated by the theologians.

c) On September 5 the *revised text*[6] was proposed in which the desire of the Fathers was satisfied in this way: "In order to manifest Himself as a priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek, and to leave to his beloved spouse, the Church, a visible sacrifice (which human nature requires), by which his bloody sacrifice accomplished once on the Cross might be represented and the memory of it might remain until the end of the world and the salvific power of it, for the remission of the sins which are daily committed by us, might be applied to us: at the Last Supper, on the night in which he was betrayed, he offered to God the Father his own Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine, and under the symbols of the same things he gave it to his Apostles (whom at that time he constituted priests of the New Testament) to eat...."[7] The new text was in general pleasing to the Fathers, with some objecting.[8] Hence no other changes were made, except for stylistic corrections.

23. *Therefore it is certain* that the will of the Council was to teach expressly the sacrificial character of the Last Supper, and in fact to define it dogmatically. This desire for a dogmatic definition is certain from the

4. Le Plat 4,386.
5. CTr 8,751.
6. On the various versions of the text at this time, see Armijos, *La immolación*... 119-185.
7. CTr 8,909f. In the reformed version it read: "He offered to the Father, *and indeed this is the opinion of the Fathers*" (see Armijos, *op.cit.*, 133.160). These words, which seem to have been added to soften the statement, were deleted by the papal legates before the text was presented to the Fathers (see CTr 8,915, note 2).
8. CTr 8,912-915.

Archbishop of Granada,[9] from Salmerón,[10] from Cardinal Hosius, the legate.[11] Hence by the theologians it was immediately stated as a matter of faith that Christ offered sacrifice at the Last Supper. This was the view of Toledo in 1565,[12] Cardinal Alanus in 1574,[13] Thomas de Chaves in 1575,[14] etc.

Theological note. Therefore the thesis seems to be *defined divine and Catholic faith.*[15]

24. Proof from Holy Scripture. Matt. 26:26ff.; Mark 14:22f.; Luke 22:19f.; 1 Cor. 11:23-29.

Note. The differences that concern us now, in these four narrations, are the following:

a) Concerning the bread:
τό ὑπερ ὑμων δεδόμενων (Luke)
τό ὑπερ ὑμων (1 Cor.)
Matthew and Mark omit this.

b) Concerning the chalice:
τοῦτο τό ποτήριον ἡ καινή διθήκη [έστιν] έν τώ αίματί μου (Luke-1 Cor.)
τό ὑπερ ὑμων έκχυννόμενον (Luke).
τοῦτο έστιν τό αίμα μου, τής διαθήκης, (Matt.-Mark)
τό περί πολλών έκχυννόμενον είς άφεσιν άμαρτιών (Matt.)
τό έκχυννόμενον ὑπερ πολλών (Mark).
There is no serious doubt about the authenticity of all these expressions.[16]

25. *Argument.* In many of these statements they are speaking about a true sacrifice. But not only about the sacrifice accomplished on the Cross, but about the sacrifice that is performed now. Therefore these narrations

9. CTr 8,954.
10. *Commentarii in evangelicam historiam* 9 tr.28 p.215; see tr.27 p.198.
11. See Braunsberger, *B. Petri Canisii, S.J., epistula et acta* 5,139.
12. *Tractatus de sacrificio tremendo Missae,* controv.3 (ed. Paris) 4,332. On the time when these lectures were held, see L. Gómez Hellín, S.J., *Toledo lector de filosofía y teología en el Colegio Romano:* ArchTG 3 (1940) 16.
13. *Opus Aureum de sacramentis in genere, de eucharistiae sacramento, de sacrificio eucharistiae* (Duaci 1603) 543.
14. *Summa sacramentorum Ecclesiae* (Salamanca 1575) 80.
15. P. Emmanuel Cuervo, O.P., (*Los teólogos de la escuela salmantina en las discusiones del Concilio de Trento sobre el sacrificio de la Cena* [Salamanca 1948] 45f.; or also CiencTom 74 [1948] 215f.) claims that the Council did not define the sacrificial character of the Supper and that therefore it is not an article of Catholic faith, but only proximate to faith. See also The Irish Eccl. Record 42,656; and EphThLov 32 (1946) 42, note 22.
16. See the difficulties raised by the critics in Coppens, *Eucharistie:* DBS 2,1178.

teach that Christ offered a true sacrifice at the Last Supper.

The major. a) His Body is given not only to the Apostles, but also *for* (ὑπερ) the Apostles; his Blood is poured out *for* (ὑπερ, περί) them, *for* many. But this way of speaking indicates a true sacrifice. Therefore. *This minor*: Rom. 8:32; Tit. 2:14; Gal. 2:20; which agree with Matt. 20:28; Mark 10:45; 1 Tim. 2:6; and with Rom. 5:8; 1 Thess. 5:10; Gal. 3:13; 2 Cor. 5:14-15.21.

b) The Blood of Christ is poured out "for the remission of sins," which also signifies a sacrificial action. See Rom. 3:25; Heb. 13:12; 9:11-14.

c) The joining together of this effusion of Blood with the new covenant also designates a sacrifice. This is especially clear from a comparison with Exod. 24:8; see Heb. 9:15-22.[17]

The minor. a) διδόμενον, ἐκχυννόμενον are present participles, which are not used to signify a future action, especially when the verb on which they depend is also in the present (ἐστίν).

b) If the word ἐκχυννόμενον (Luke), as many think, should be linked to ποτήριον, not with αἵματί, the argument for the sacrificial character of the Supper becomes even more valid; for thus the effusion of the Blood contained in the chalice is more clearly designated. However, the matter is doubtful, since the linkage could be different, even grammatically.[18]

N.B. From the words *alone* cited from Scripture it does not seem possible to make an absolutely cogent argument.[19]

26. Proof from tradition.[20] a) The Fathers say that Christ immolated Himself at the Last Supper: Hesychius of Jerusalem,[21] Eutyches of Constantinople.[22] b) that he offered Himself: St. Cyprian (R 581), Procopius.[23] c) that he taught us how we ought to sacrifice: St. Irenaeus (R 232), St. Leo the Great,[24] St. Isidore.[25] d) that a sacrifice was offered like that of Melchizedek: St. Cyprian (R 581), Eusebius of Caesarea (R 671), St. Jerome (R 1390), Theodoret of

17. Διαθήκη really means a covenant, not a testament, as some rationalists say. See C. Ruch, *Messe dans l'Ecriture:* DTC 10,810f.; L.G. da Fonseca, Διαθήκη *foedus an testamentum?:* Bibl 8 (1927) 31-50, 161-181, 290-319, 418-441; 9 (1928) 26-40, 143-160.
18. On this argument, see C. Ruch, *Messe:* DTC 10,806-818, where many other considerations are proposed.
19. See Suarez, *De Eucharistia* d.74 s.2 n.5. And in Trent it was not in any way defined. There the argument was made not only from tradition, but also from the example of Melchizedek (which otherwise would not have been fulfilled in Christ), from the command of doing what He Himself did, etc.
20. At the Council of Trent many ancient testimonies were quoted; on these see Alonso, *El sacrificio eucharistico...* 245-274.
21. *In Leviticum* 1,4: MG 93,821.
22. *Sermo de paschate et de sacrosancta Eucharistia* 2: MG 86,2391.
23. *In Exodum* 2: MG 86,2391.
24. *Sermo 7 de Passione* 3: ML 54,332.
25. *De ecclesiasticis officiis* 1,18: ML 83,754.

Cyrene,[26] Arnobius.[27] e) that the type of the sacrifice of the paschal lamb was fulfilled: St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1063), Theophilus of Alexandria.[28]

The antiphon reflects the mind of the *liturgy:* "A priest forever, Christ the Lord, according to the order of Melchizedek offered bread and wine."

27. Objections. 1. St. Paul says that Christ *offered himself once* (Heb. 7:27). But that took place on the Cross. Therefore at the Supper he did not offer himself.[29]

I distinguish the major. He offered himself once in a bloody and perfect oblation, *conceded;* also in an unbloody way, which has an essential relation to the bloody oblation, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* On the Cross there was just any kind of oblation, *denied;* there was an unbloody oblation that had an essential relation to the bloody oblation, *conceded.*[30]

2. St. Paul says that Christ *by a single offering* perfected those who are sanctified (Heb. 10:14). But this was the oblation of the Cross. Therefore at the Supper there was no oblation sanctifying men.[31]

I distinguish the major. He perfected those who are sanctified with a single bloody and perfect oblation, *conceded;* both bloody and unbloody, and perfect or having an essential relation to it, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* The oblation on the Cross was a bloody and perfect oblation, *conceded;* it was an unbloody oblation and it has an essential relation to the bloody one, *denied.*[32]

3. If Christ at the Supper made a sacrifice for us, therefore before the sacrifice of the Cross the redemption had already been accomplished. But this is false. Therefore at the Supper Christ did not make a sacrifice.[33]

I distinguish the major. If he had made a sacrifice fully independent of the sacrifice of the Cross, *conceded;* if he made a sacrifice having an essential relation to the sacrifice of the Cross, *I subdistinguish:* redemption had already been done in a beginning way, *conceded;* perfectly, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* It is false that before the sacrifice of the Cross the redemption had already been accomplished in a beginning way, *denied;* the redemption was done perfectly, *conceded. Likewise I distinguish the consequent.* At the Supper Christ did not make a sacrifice fully independent of the sacrifice of the Cross, *conceded;* he did not make a sacrifice having an essential relation to the sacrifice of the Cross, *denied.*[34]

28. Scholium 1. *On the paschal character of the Last Supper.* The question has been raised whether the Supper taken by Christ with his Apostles, in which he instituted the Eucharist, was really a paschal Supper. This has been denied by many rationalists, and even

26. *In Ps 109,* 4: MG 80,1771.
27. *Commentarium in Ps 109:* ML 53,496.
28. *Hom 10 in mysticam Coenam:* MG 77,1023.
29. See CTr 8,756.772.
30. See CTr 8,769.
31. See CTr 8,756.772.
32. See CTr 8,769.
33. See CTr 8,757.764.766f.
34. See CTr 8,762-769, 771-774.

by some Catholics. According to them, it was only a fraternal meal, which took place on the vigil of the feast with a special rite of sanctification (quiddosh), by blessing not only bread and wine, as always, but also a second cup with the addition of special prayers.

Here two things must be distinguished. The first is, whether the Supper of Christ was really a paschal meal; the second is, when it was celebrated. The second chronological question will not be treated here.[35] Regarding the first question, it must be affirmed absolutely that the Supper of the Lord was really a paschal meal. At the command of Christ the disciples prepared a paschal meal (Matt. 27:17ff.; Mark 14:12-16; Luke 22:7-13), which Jesus celebrated with them (Matt.26:20; Mark 14:17; Luke 22:14), while expressing his desire to celebrate it (Luke 22:15). St. Paul basically says the same thing, since on the one hand he says that the Supper took place on the night in which Christ was handed over (1 Cor. 11:23) and on the other hand he calls Christ "our paschal lamb" (1 Cor. 5:7). Trent also speaks in the same way in sess.22, ch.1: "after he celebrated the old Pasch..., Christ instituted a new Pasch" (D 1741).[36]

29. Scholium 2. *On the fullness of the sacrifice of the Last Supper.* The essential relation between the sacrifice of the Supper and the sacrifice of the Cross is clear. However, this relation has been explained by some theologians in such a way that both sacrifices form only a single complete sacrifice, that is, one coming together from both of them. Thus P. de la Taille,[37] and those who follow him in his opinion about the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass. According to them the sacrifice is really composed of two parts: oblation and immolation. Neither the oblation alone nor the immolation alone suffices to confer the status of a victim; but both are required. However the oblation that is required is not just any oblation, but it must be ritual; that is, it must be manifested sensibly and externally. Now on the Cross evidently there is the immolation of a victim; but there a ritual oblation does not appear in any way. This ritual oblation was performed at the Supper. Therefore the Supper by itself alone is not the sacrifice, but only insofar as its oblation is consumed by the immolation of the Cross. Therefore a numerical unity is present in the sacrifice of the Lord; it is offered liturgically at the Supper and then continued by the whole passion all the way to the death of the Cross.

This theory saves the sacrificial character of the Supper, and therefore it is Catholic. However it is less in accord with the doctrine of the Council of Trent in sess.22, ch. 1 (D 1739-1741): "once and for all he *offered* himself to God the Father by his death on the altar of the Cross... at the Last Supper... he *offered* his body and blood under the species of bread and wine to God the Father."[38]

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35. See J. Leal, S.J., *El dia de la última Cena del Señor en el Cardenal Toledo:* ArchTG 7 (1944) 135-186.
36. See T. Coppens, *Eucharistie:* DBS 2,1172-1174; Lagrange, *Evangile selon s. Marc* (Paris 1929) 354-363; W. Goossens, *Les origins de l'Eucharistie* part 2, ch.2, a.1. On the new argument proposed by Goossens, see Braun, *Les origins de l'Eucharistie:* EphThLov 8 (1939) 623f.
37. V.gr., *Mysterium fidei* 101f.
38. See Lepin, *L'Idée du sacrifice de la Messe* (Paris 1926) 688-697; I. Puig de la Bellacasa, *La esencia del sacrificio de la Misa:* EstEcl 8 (1929)363-380; 10 (1931) 65-96, 385-406,538-553; 11 (1932) 95-103, where there is an important bibliography. See also M. Alonso, S.J., *El sacrificio eucharistico de la última Cena del Señor, según los teologos:* EstEcl 11 (1932) 145-166, 323-368, 461-483; 12 (1933) 33-63, 177-198, 449-472; A. Zigrossi, *L'unità fra Cena e Passione alla luce della "Res et signum" del sacrificio eucharistico:* DivThom (Pi) 55 (1952) 358-374.

Thesis 3. At the Last Supper Christ gave a command and the power to his Apostles and their successors to consecrate, offer and administer his Body and Blood, as he had done.

Alastruey, 15-23.

30. Connection. In the preceding theses we proved that Christ at the Last Supper changed bread and wine into his Body and Blood, that he gave them to the Apostles as food and drink, and that at the same time with the same action he offered his Father a true and proper sacrifice of his own Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine. Now we add that Christ desired and commanded that these three things should be carried out permanently in the Church. Hence evidently the divine institution of the Eucharistic mystery in the Church is a consequence of that.

31. Definition of terms. *Command.* Immediately and directly he commanded his Apostles that they should always do what he himself did. Therefore, in this way he instituted a new sacrifice, whose proximate matter would be his own Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine, and which would have an essential relation to the sacrifice of the Cross.

Power. Because there cannot be a sacrifice without a priest, at the same time he instituted a new priesthood and he constituted his Apostles as priests. Their power would extend not only to the offering of a sacrifice, but also to transforming bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ. For, this was necessary so that the sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Christ under the species of bread and wine could be offered just as he had established it. Finally, the power of the Apostles and their successors would also be of such a nature that they can give the Body and Blood of the Lord to the faithful as food and drink, as a consequence of the sacrifice.

Hence it follows that Christ at the Last Supper instituted immediately the mystery of the Eucharist both as a sacrifice and as a sacrament.

32. Adversaries. All those mentioned above[1] deny our thesis, namely, that Christ willed that there be a perpetual repetition of the Last Supper in the Church; or, what comes to the same thing, Christ directly and immediately instituted the Eucharist.

33. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent* in sess.22, ch. 1 (D 1740-1741) said: "At the Last Supper... he offered his body and blood under the species of

1. See the author cited in n. 5-8.

bread and wine to God the Father, and, under the same signs, gave them to partake of to the disciples (whom he then established as priests of the New Covenant) and ordered them and their successors in the priesthood to offer, saying: 'Do this in remembrance of me.'" Then in the same sess.22, ch. 2 (D 1752): "If anyone says that by the words 'Do this in remembrance of me' Christ did not establish the Apostles as priests or that he did not order that they and other priests should offer his body and blood, let him be anathema." Likewise sess.23 ch. 1 (D 1764) and cn. 1 (D 1771); sess.13 ch.1 (D 1636-1637) and ch.2 (D 1638). In these words it is stated:

a) that Christ *instituted* the Eucharist at the Supper both as a sacrifice (sess.22 and 23), and as a sacrament (sess.13).

b) that *this is contained in the words:* Do this in remembrance of me (sess.22). However note that in the preparation of this sess.22 it was very clear to the Tridentine Fathers that Christ at the Last Supper instituted the Eucharist as a true sacrifice, which he truly sacrificed during the Supper.

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith*

34. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1 Cor. 11:24f.; Luke 22:19.

Note. The words which contain the command of repeating perpetually the Eucharistic mystery are found only in 1 Cor. and Luke:

a) For the bread: τοῦτο ποιείτε είς τή έμήν άναμνησιν (1 Cor.-Luke).

b) For the wine: τοῦτο ποιείτε όσάκις έαν πίνητε, είς τήν έμήν άναμνησιν (1 Cor.).

The authenticity of these words is denied by many rationalists; but there is no objective reason for this denial.[2]

35. *Argument.* Christ commands the Apostles to do in memory of him what he did at the Supper. But He consecrated bread and wine into his own Body and Blood; he offered the sacrifice of his own Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine, and he gave them under the same species to his Apostles to be consumed. Therefore Christ orders the Apostles to perpetually do these three things in his memory.

The major. a) τοῦτο means everything that precedes, whether words or facts. Άναμνησις means "a memorial," that is, that whereby someone renews his memory of some thing or person, with some affection.

b) That is the way St. Paul understands the words in verses 26-29. But when he says this he is not proposing his own theory, but he expressly affirms that this doctrine is commonly known in Christian preaching ("what

2. See Ruch, *Eucharistie:* DTC 5,1091-1094.

I also delivered to you," verse 23), and took its origin from Christ himself ("for I received from the Lord," verse 23), howsoever this last phrase may be understood.[3]

c) The Church has defined that this is the true meaning of these words (D 1752). Therefore a theologian is not free to deny it.

36. Proof from tradition. a) *Liturgical witnesses.* It is a solemn matter in the liturgies to establish a historical connection between the celebration of the Last Supper and the existence of the Eucharistic mystery in the Church. Here are a few examples:

The Roman Missal: "O Lord, holy Father, almighty and eternal God, may our sacrifice be acceptable to you through our Lord Jesus Christ your Son, who on this day commanded his disciples to perform this rite in memory of him."[4] "We beg you, O Lord, to accept this offering., which we make to you in memory of this day on which our Lord Jesus gave his disciples to celebrate the sacred rite of his Body and Blood."[5]

The Gelasian Sacramentary: it contains both of those prayers.[6]

The Gregorian Sacramentary: also has both prayers.[7]

The Old Mozarabic Liturgy: "May he grant that these sacraments, which he instituted today as he was about to suffer, by perceived by you not as a judgment but as a remedy."[8]

The Mozarabic Book of the Sacraments: "With ineffable compassion, by which of old at the time of your passion after having celebrated the Supper with your disciples, blessing and breaking the bread, you gave the sacrament of your Body to your disciples while commanding them to do this in memory of You for all time: look upon these loaves of proposition on your holy table with the same blessing as you did at that time...."[9]

The Old Gallican Missal: "Therefore this is the oblation, which we offer to You on the day of fasting of the Supper of the Lord, in which our Lord Jesus Christ, your Son, instituted the sacrificial rite of the New Testament, while he changed bread and wine (which the priest Melchizedek offered as a prefiguration of this future mystery) into the sacrament of his Body and

3. There are two ways of understanding the verb παρέλαβον. Some hold that Paul received this doctrine from an immediate revelation from the Lord. Others, perhaps a better view, from tradition. See Allo, *Première epître aux Corinthiens* exc. XII; Ruch: DTC 5,1084f.
4. Holy Thursday, Secrete Prayer.
5. Holy Thursday, Canon.
6. See Wilson, 67-69.
7. See Muratori, *Opere* (Arezzo 1`773) 13.II,576f.
8. *Holy Thursday,* blessing.
9. *Holy Thursday,* Qui pridie: ed.Férotin 239.

Blood...."[10]

Similar prayers are found in the oriental liturgies.

37. b) *Witness of the Fathers.* They are had from the beginning of the patristic age. Thus St. Justin finds the origin of our Eucharist in the fact that "the Apostles in their commentaries, which are called gospels, handed on that Jesus commanded them like this: namely, that after taking bread and having given thanks he said: do this in remembrance of me" (R 128; see also R 135). St. Irenaeus says that Christ at the Last Supper taught a new oblation "which the Church, receiving it from the Apostles, offers to God in the whole world" (R 232). According to Tertullian, the sacrament of the Eucharist is "commanded by the Lord" (R 367). St. Cyprian holds that Christ offered himself as a sacrifice to the Father and that he commanded that this be done in remembrance of Him (R 584); from this he deduces what the priest must do. Adamantius argues in this way from a doctrine known and admitted by all: "But if [Christ], as they say, lacked flesh and blood, then whose flesh or whose body or whose blood did he give as bread and drink, when he commanded his disciples to remember Him by these things?"[11]

From the fourth and fifth centuries many texts can be cited. Thus Eusebius of Caesarea teaches: "Therefore after all this, he offered a wonderful and outstanding sacrifice to his Father, intended for the salvation of all, and he instituted a memorial of this act, that we might offer a sacrifice to God."[12] St. Ephraem explains the words of Christ: "When you gather together in my name in the church anywhere on earth, do what I did in memory of me: eat my Body and drink my Blood, the new and the old testament" (R 708). St. Ambrose says that the sacrament that we receive is not a human but a divine reality; it was decreed by Him who blessed Abraham, the father of faith.[13] St. Jerome, after he says to Christ: "Just as Melchizedek, king of Salem, offered bread and wine, so also You offer your Body and Blood, the true bread and the true wine," he adds: "Melchizedek himself gave us these mysteries that we now have."[14] According to St. Chrysostom, the oblation "is the same one that Christ gave to his disciples and that the priests now offer" (R 1207). For St. Cyril of Alexandria, the action of Christ at the Last Supper gives us "an example of His prayer, which we must offer as often as we give thanks for the mystical and life-giving gift, which we are

10. See Muratori, *Opere* 13.III,541f.
11. *De recta in Deum fide* 5,6: MG 11,1839.
12. *Demonstratio evangelica* 1,10: MG 22,89.
13. *De mysteriis* 8,46: ML 16,404.
14. *In Ps 109:* ML 26,1165.

accustomed to perform."[15] Theodoret of Cyrene teaches "that we do not offer any other sacrifice, but we remember that one and salutary sacrifice; for this is what the Lord commanded."[16] According to Leo the Great, "while it was being discussed in the courtyard of Caiaphas how Christ might be killed, He, ordaining the sacrament of his Body and Blood, taught us what kind of victim should be offered to God."[17]

Therefore, both from the testimony of the old liturgies, and from the sayings of the ancient Fathers it is certain that there was a conviction in the Church that Christ at the Last Supper instituted the Eucharistic mystery. And that comes precisely from the words by which he ordered: *Do this in remembrance of me.*

38. Corollary. From the preceding mandate of Christ it is already certain that the Eucharist could never be lacking in the Church. For, this mandate, according to which both the sacrifice and the priesthood in the Church of Christ were instituted, doubtless pertains to the constitutive elements of the new religious society founded by Christ. But these constitutive elements must remain unchanged for all time. Hence for the theologian the divine origin of the Eucharist is now sufficiently certain against the arguments of the Rationalists and the Modernists. We will see next in the scholium that this can also be proved historically.

39. Scholium. *On the celebration of the Eucharist in the early Church.* Among the words of Christ commanding the Eucharistic mystery to be celebrated in memory of him, and the common conviction of the Fathers and the Liturgy that they really fulfill that divine mandate in the celebration of the Eucharist, there are also immediate testimonies, whereby it is historically certain that it was de facto already celebrated from the very beginning in the Christian communities. Now we will show how this is so.

a) *Facts.* The Eucharist is celebrated in Jerusalem: Acts 2:42-47. "Breaking of bread" (verse 42) seems to signify the Eucharist. The Christians are said to persevere (they devoted themselves) in this and it distinguished them from others; they learned the doctrine of the Apostles, to practice fraternal union, to participate in the Eucharist which maintained that union, and to say certain prayers. It is not clear whether the "breaking of the bread" in verse 46 also refers to the Eucharist; for, that expression alone is not sufficient.[18] But if also in v. 46 St. Luke means the Eucharist, it seems that it is done in connection with the "agape" or early Christian love-feast, as it took place continually after that time.[19]

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15. *In Lc 22,19:* MG 72,907.
16. *In Heb. 8,4:* MG 82,735.
17. *Sermo 7 de Passione:* ML 54,332.
18. Thus "breaking of bread" in Luke 24:35 and in Acts 27:35 does not seem to designate it. See Ruch, *Eucharistie:* DTC 5,1060.1065.
19. See Ruch, *Eucharistie:* DTC 5,1066ff.; *Messe dans l'Ecriture:* DTC 10,837.

It is celebrated also in *Troas* around the year 58: Acts 20:7-11. On the Lord's Day the disciples gather together (it is a σύναξις) in order to "break bread." The actions mentioned are: apostolic preaching, breaking of bread, fellowship.[20]

It is celebrated in *Corinth:* 1 Cor. 11:17-34; 10:16-22. St. Paul speaks about "the Lord's supper." This celebration, done rightly or unlawfully, among the Corinthians consisted of an agape and the Eucharist. That the Eucharist was celebrated there we saw in the preceding theses, where we examined the text of the letter to the Corinthians. Moreover, St. Paul expressly mentions the historical connection between the Last Supper and the institution of the Eucharist because of the command of the Lord.[21]

40. It is celebrated in *Syria* about the years 100-150: *Didache,* chapters 9.10.14f. (R 6-9). These chapters must be understood as being about the same thing, so that in ch. 14f. the author speaks about the obligation of celebrating the Eucharist, and in ch. 9f. about the liturgical way of performing it. In ch. 14 the σύναξις, the breaking of bread and the thanksgiving are mentioned; in these a pure sacrifice is offered, demanding therefore the internal preparation of the soul. These things are done by the liturgists. The same breaking of bread is mentioned in ch. 9. The totality of these rites is called "Eucharist." With this word also what is eaten and drunk there is designated (ch. 9), and it is holy. Evidently the concern is with the food and drink of a sacrifice. The formulas of chapters 9f. seem to be for the community, not for the liturgists; hence there is the omission of the consecration. In all of these aspects what is apparent is not only the permanence of the Eucharist in the Church, but also its sacrificial character.[22]

It is celebrated in *Asia Minor* about the year 110; St. Ignatius in his letters to the Ephesians 20,2 (R 43), to the Trallians 2,3 (R 48), to the Philadelphians 4 (R 56), to the Smyrnians 7,1 and 8,1f. (R 64f.). The Christians convene to celebrate the Eucharist, which is also said to be a celebration of the agape. In this Eucharist there is bread and a cup. The "breaking of bread" takes place with some prayers. And the Eucharist itself is the flesh and Blood of Christ. It is celebrated by special liturgists (among whom the deacons are called ministers of the mysteries); and it takes place on an altar, as a true sacrifice. The effect of the Eucharist is the sanctification of the soul.[23]

It is celebrated *commonly by the Christians in the middle of the second century:* St. Justin in his *First Apology* 65f. (R 128f.) and in his *Dialogue with Trypho* (R 135). The description of the Eucharistic meal is clear, also with the insertion of the words of institution and the command to repeat it. The sacrificial element appears in the *Dialogue with Trypho.*[24]

Therefore we have seen that these essential elements of the Eucharist were instituted by Christ and also that they are present historically from the very beginning.

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20. See Ruch, *Eucharistie:* DTC 5,1059f.
21. See Ruch, *Eucharistie:* DTC 5,1044-1059; *Messe:* DTC 10,829-834.
22. See Ruch, *Messe:* DTC 10,865-882. It seems more probable that chapters 9 and 10 are dealing also with the Eucharist; but this point is very much disputed. See for a contrary view, H. Leclercq, *Messe:* DACL 11,539-556.
23. See Ruch, *Eucharistie:* DTC 10,888-894.
24. See Ruch, *Messe:* DTC 10,895-907.

41. b) *Manner of celebration.* The rite, as is evident, was not just one from the beginning in all the churches. The question here to remember in particular concerns the agape.

The question is, namely, whether the Eucharist was celebrated while they were eating, either before or after the agape, as Christ himself did at the paschal Supper.

It seems that it should be affirmed concerning the early Jerusalem community (Acts 2:42-46), but it is better denied about the celebration of the Eucharist by the Apostles in Troas (Acts 20:7-11). But it is surely to be affirmed with regard to the Corinthian church (1 Cor. 11). However in Corinth there is still a question whether it took place in that church in the proper way, or with some abuse that St. Paul condemns in his letter. Both of these theories are defended by Catholics. The first explanation seems to be more probable; according to this view, the abuse condemned by the Apostle was the not celebration of the Eucharist at an agape, but the improper way of doing it that was gradually introduced by the Corinthians.[25]

25. See Ruch, *Messe:* DTC 10,848-852; Allo, *Première Epître aux Corinthiens* exc.X.

CHAPTER II

On the promise of the Eucharist

42. The promise of the Eucharist made by God is intimately connected with the question of its origin. We can consider this both in the Old and in the New Testament; and of course both in express words, and in symbols and types. But since this material is very abundant, we will present only those elements that are more important.

Thesis 4. Christ in his sermon on the bread of life promised what he fulfilled at the Last Supper, by giving the Apostles his own Body and Blood.

Filograssi, 5-18; Puig, 196-205; C. Ruch, *Eucharistie d'après la sainte Ecriture:* DTC 5,989-1024; Th. Philips, *Die Verheissung der hl. Eucharistie nach Joannes. Eine exegetische Studie* (Paderborn 1822); Corluy, *Specilegium dogmaticum* 2,361-364.

43. Definition of terms. *Sermon on the bread of life,* that is, John 6:22-71.

He promised what he fulfilled at the Last Supper, that is, that he would give his own Body for food and his own Blood for drink; however, we are not saying that Christ in that promise said expressly everything that he actually did at the Supper. Thus, not only did he say nothing about a sacrifice, but also nothing about the way in which he would give his Flesh for food, under the species, etc.

We are saying, therefore, only that the words of Christ in John 6, in which he speaks about his Flesh to be eaten and his Blood to be drunk in the future, must be understood in their proper sense, not in a metaphorical way. The meaning would be metaphorical, if this eating were understood about Christ dwelling in us through our faith in Him; this is usually called a spiritual eating.

44. Adversaries. *Protestants,* according to whom Christ calls Himself the living bread only metaphorically, and in the whole sermon he is speaking only about a spiritual eating.

Many Tridentine Fathers said similar things for polemical reasons. They took this position in order to be able to respond more easily to the Hussite heretics, who wanted to prove from this sermon the necessity of communion under both species.[1]

1. On Cajetan and other Fathers with this view, see J. Tapia, *El sentido eucarístico del cap.6 del Evangelio de San Juan en los teólogos postridentinos:* ArchTG 6 (1943) 12-20.

Also, *some theologians* after the Council of Trent; but in time this explanation gradually disappeared more and more among Catholics.[2]

45. Doctrine of the Church. 1. *The Council of Trent* sess.21 ch. 1 (D 1726-1727). Concerning the history of this text, please note that at the Council there was great diversity in explaining chapter 6 in St. John. But actually the greater part of the theologians understood that chapter either to be about sacramental eating only, or about spiritual and sacramental eating at the same time. *In the first version of the decree* it said: "But neither those words of the Lord: Unless you eat. should be accepted in such a way that both species are prescribed for the laity. For although, following many Greek and Latin Fathers, it must be admitted that those words of the chapter pertain to the sacrament of the Eucharist, still from the said words it cannot be concluded that the Lord commanded that the bread should be eaten and the chalice drunk."[3] To many of the Fathers it seemed that these words were said too emphatically. Hence, *in the second version* it was said: "But from the sermon of the Lord in John 6 it is not rightly concluded that communion under both species was commanded by the Lord. For he also said."[4] Therefore *in the definitive form* this addition was made: "Whatever according to various views." Therefore the Council says nothing about the meaning of the words of John 6; it only declares, in whatever hypothesis, even if the Eucharistic and real sense is admitted, that the divine institution of communion under both species cannot be deduced from those words.[5]

2. Leo XIII in the Encyclical "*Mirae caritatis*" openly taught the Eucharistic meaning of John 6.[6]

Theological note. *Common and certain.*

46. Proof from the words themselves. *Note.*[7] There are two principal interpretations of Catholics. According to some, the whole sermon is divided into two parts; the first (35-47) treats spiritual eating by faith, and the second (48-60) deals with real and Eucharistic eating, or sacramental

2. See Tapia, *El Sentido eucharístico.* 26-33.
3. CTr 8,653f.
4. CTr 8,688.
5. For the history of the words of Trent, see F. Cavallera, *L'Interprétation du chapitre 6 de Saint Jean. Une controverse exégetique au Concile de Trente:* RevHistEccl 10 (1909) 687-709; S. Frankl, *Interpretatio Io 6,54 in primo temporis spatio Concilii Tridentini:* CollTheol 17 (1936) 424-431; J. Tapia, *El sentido eucharístico.* 11-25.
6. ASS 34,642-647.
7. On the external literary form, see P. Gaechter, *Die Form der eucharistischen Rede Jesu:* ZkathTh (1933) 419-441. On the authenticity of some verses, see C. Ruch, *Eucharistie d'après la sainte Ecriture:* DTC 5,993f. On its historicity, see Ruch: DTC 5,1011-1024.

eating. According to others, the whole sermon treats the Eucharist in the proper sense. This question is not about the Eucharistic meaning of chapter 6 (which is admitted by all), but about its literary unity. For our argumentation this unity is indifferent, since it suffices for us that the Eucharistic meaning in the second part is retained. But the literary unity of the whole sermon is absolutely to be recommended. This is shown in the following way:

a) Christ desires to give a bread which is much more excellent than the bread he multiplied; great faith is required for the understanding of this exalted bread (v. 26-29).

b) Having heard about this wonderful bread, the Jews think about another wonderful bread given to them by Moses, a great prophet. Jesus makes use of this allusion to the manna in order to lead the Jews to the knowledge of this new bread. For, it will be like the manna given by Moses; but it is much more excellent. The manna was a heavenly food and it was a life-giving food; his bread will contain both in a more excellent way (v. 30-34).

c) In the first place, it will be *truly* heavenly, or coming down from heaven, not like the manna. Thus the divine origin of Christ is designated (since the promised bread is Himself); this must be believed completely, although it seems difficult to the Jews (v. 35-347).

d) In the second place, it will be *truly* life-giving, not like the manna. Thus the effect from the eating of this bread is designated; this bread is nothing else but the flesh of Christ himself; this must absolutely be eaten, although it seems impossible to the Jews (v. 48-60).[8]

47. *Argument.* Christ promises that He will give a certain food (v. 27), a certain bread (v. 52), which is Himself (v. 33.35.48.52), his Flesh (v. 52); indeed it is food and drink, that is, his Flesh to be eaten and his Blood to be drunk (v. 54-59). But these words must be understood in the real and physical sense. Therefore, Christ promises that He will give his own Body to be eaten really and truly and his own Blood to be drunk really and truly. But also at the Last Supper he gave his Body to be truly eaten and his Blood to be truly drunk. Therefore, Christ in the sermon of life promises what he fulfilled at the Supper.

The minor. a) Not in a *metaphorical* sense. The expression "to eat

8. See E. Janot, *Le pain de vie. A propos des interprétations du chapître 6 de l'Evangile de St.Jean:* Greg 11 (1930) 161-170; J. Leal, *La unidad eucharistica del cap.6 del Evangelio de San Juan, según el Cardenal Toledo:* ArchTG 6 (1943) 155-190; J. Tapia, *El sentido eucharistico.:* ArchTG 6 (1943) 69-105; G.X. Müller, *Revelaturne Eucharistia Io 6,26-47 ipsis verbis, an typis?:* Greg 3 (1922) 161-177; J.M. Bover, *De sermonis unitate Io 6,26-29:* VerDom 3 (1922) 48-50; J.A. Oñate, *El discurso del "Pan de vida":* CongrInternEuc 2 (1952) 48-50; V. Larrañaga, *El discurso sobre el Pan de vida en San Juan 6,22-71:* ib. 413-423.

someone's flesh" or "to eat someone" has sometimes in Scripture the meaning of destroying or oppressing someone (Job 31:31); but this singular and figurative meaning in the context is simply impossible.

b) Not in a *spiritual and symbolic* sense. The faith, which is demanded by the context (v. 35-47), is different from the eating of flesh and the drinking of blood; the former must be given now (v. 29.36.64), the latter will be had later (v, 27,52); God gives the former (v. 37f.44.45.65), Christ himself will give the latter (v. 27.51). Moreover, if he were dealing with faith, what he had already explained previously in clear terms, he would now be saying in more obscure words.

c) *The real and physical* sense is demanded by the words themselves (v. 55), in comparison with the manna; thus it is understood by the listening Jews, who therefore disputed among themselves (v. 52.60); Jesus does not correct them, but confirms this meaning with emphatic words (v. 61f.); elsewhere he had corrected the false understanding of his words (see John 3:3-13; 4:32ff.; 8:32-36).

48. Proof from tradition. a) *From the holy Fathers.*[9] The Fathers, while speaking about the Eucharist, use words and expressions taken from John 6 and they are evidently alluding to that text by their words. Thus, St. Ignatius (R 64, 43), St. Irenaeus (R 234), Clement of Alexandria (R 408) among the ancients. The Fathers also expressly understand John 6 to be about the Eucharist. Thus, Origen (R 491), St. Athanasius,[10] St. Cyril of Jerusalem,[11] St. Basil (R 916), St. Gregory of Nyssa,[12] St. John Chrysostom,[13] St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2131), Anastasius Sinaita,[14] Petrus Laodicaenus,[15] St. John Damascene[16] among the Greeks; Tertullian,[17] St. Cyprian (R 559), St. Hilary (R 870), St. Ambrose (R 1270), St. Gaudentius Brixiensis,[18] St. Jerome,[19] St. Leo the Great (R 2214), St. Maximus Taurinensis,[20] St. Isidore Hispalensis[21]

9. See Schmitt, *Die Verheissung der Eucharistie (Jn 6) bei den Vätern* (Würzburg 1900); Schmitt, *Die Verheissung der Eucharistie bei Cyril von Jerusalem und Johannes Chrysostomus* (Würzburg 1930); P. de Puniet, *La promesse de l'Eucharistie (Ioann.6), interprétée par saint Jean Chrysostome*:RevThom 15 (1907) 548-612.
10. *De Incarnatione adversus Arianos* 16: MG 26,1012.
11. *Catecheses* 22,4: MG 33,1100.
12. *In Ecclesiastem* hom.8: MG 44,739.
13. *In Ioannem* hom.46,2: MG 59,260f.
14. *Viae Dux* 23: MG 89,298.
15. *In Markum* 14,22: MG 86,3326.
16. *De fide orthodoxa* 4,13,49: MG 94,1148f.
17. *De oratione* 6: CSEL 20.
18. *In Exodum* serm.2: ML 20,859.
19. *Epist. 120 ad Hebidiam* 2: ML 22,987.
20. *Homilia* 45: ML 57,330.
21. *De ecclesiasticis officiis* 1,18: ML 83,755.

among the Latins.[22]

b) *From the use of the Councils.* In the Council of Nicea II, in order to prove the reality of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist, the words of John 6:54f. are quoted together with the words of institution.[23] A similar usage is found in Lateran IV,[24] in Constance sess.13,[25] and in Trent itself in sess.13 ch. 2 and 8 (D 1638, 1649).

c) *In the Eucharistic controversy of the ninth century* John 6 is cited in the Eucharistic sense without any opposition.

d) *In early Scholasticism.* Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, St. Albert the Great, Scotus and others make us of the same meaning.[26]

e) *In later Scholasticism.* In the fourteenth century, because of the objections of the Hussites, some begin to have doubts. At the Council of Trent a very small group (ten) defended the exclusively spiritual meaning; all the others defended either the real meaning alone or both together. After the Council of Trent the same spiritual sense was defended by Cornelius Jansen, Michael Palacios, Arias Monus (so it seems) and Gulielmus Estius; others took the real position. Afterwards the Eucharistic meaning has been defended by all with a perfect consensus, while setting aside the further question about the literary unity of the sermon.[27]

f) *From the liturgical use.* In the *Roman Breviary* for the feast of Corpus Christi, in addition to the Gospel, the responses of the third nocturne are taken from John 6; the same holds for the antiphon for the Benedictus. In the Missal for the same feast, both the Gospel and the verse after the Gradual are taken from the same chapter of St. John.

49. Objections. 1. Christ *de facto* corrected a false understanding of his hearers in v. 62: *Do you take offense at this? Then what if you were to see the Son of man ascending where he was before? It is the spirit that gives life, the flesh is of no avail.* Therefore he wanted to be understood in a spiritual sense.

I respond that those words cannot be understood in that way. For, the Jews hearing that, not only did not put faith in Christ by accepting this explanation, but they positively walked away from Him (v. 66). Hence they understood the words of Christ not in some mitigation of the obvious meaning, which doubtless was the real sense, but rather as a confirmation of the real meaning. But for an understanding of those words that are

22. Because some Fathers at times make use of the spiritual sense does not prevent them from speaking about the real and Eucharistic sense in other places.
23. Hrd 4,370.
24. Msi 22,972.
25. Msi 27,727.
26. On these authors, some of whom are quoted as adversaries to the Eucharistic sense, see briefly J. Tapia, *El sentido eucaristico.:* ArchTG 6 (1943) 12-20.
27. See J. Tapia, *El sentido eucaristico.:* ArchTg 6 (1943) 26-69, 105-117.

objected to, please note the following.

The words: *If you were to see the Son of man ascending.* are explained in different ways. St. Chrysostom understands them to be an allusion of Christ to his divine origin, in order to conclude from there that the proposed matter is supernatural and therefore to be believed with faith, not just to be understood by reason. This is almost the same as he dealt with Nicodemus (John 3:12-13). It is as if he were to say: If you were to see me ascending where I was before, you would believe that I came down from heaven and have a divine nature; therefore I can do these things and other miracles.

Others think that he is making an allusion to his own ascension (which is clear in those words), in order to withdraw their carnal thoughts from mortal flesh. As if he were to say: if he can make this flesh heavenly, can he not also change it into the food of men?

Others present a different view.[28]

The words: *It is the spirit that gives life, the flesh is of no avail,* should be understood in this way: in man that which gives life is not the flesh, but the spirit; flesh without spirit is dead flesh—it is good for nothing. Therefore, since Christ had said that the eating of his flesh gives life, and in fact eternal life (v. 54), the flesh, which He says must be eaten, cannot be dead flesh, flesh without spirit, but living flesh, flesh united to the Word himself. With these words he corrects the false conception of his hearers, whereby they think that the flesh of Christ, promised by Him, must be eaten in small pieces.

50. 2. Christ did not always correct the false understanding of his hearers (see John 2:19). Therefore perhaps he did not correct them here, although they understood him badly.

I deny the parity. In the cited text the event itself proved that he was talking about his body. Here, on the contrary, if he had not corrected them, the event would have proved nothing about the true meaning of the words. Moreover, in our case Christ absolutely would have to correct a false interpretation, which would have led the whole Church into error and into an idolatrous worship.

3. Christ speaks about a present eating (v. 54: he who eats). Therefore he is not speaking about a future Eucharist, but about faith in himself.

I deny the antecedent. Christ is obviously speaking about a future eating: *the bread which I shall give* (v. 51). Hence the cited words do not designate any definite time, but say in an indefinite way: he who eats my flesh then when it is given.

51. Scholium. In the proof of this thesis we supposed the institution of the Eucharist as already proved in the preceding theses. If someone does not wish to suppose that this has been proved (as those authors seem to do who place the thesis about the promise before the thesis about the institution), then he proceeds in such a way that he proves immediately that Christ really promised that He would give his Body as food and his Blood as drink. Then, because this divine promise is absolute, it must absolutely be fulfilled in the Church. But because in the Church no other way is present of eating the Body of Christ and drinking His Blood except in the Eucharist, therefore it must be deduced that Christ in those words really promised the institution of the Eucharist.

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28. See I. Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in Ioannem* 252-255.

Thesis 5. The sacrifice made by Melchizedek was a type of the Eucharistic mystery.

Filograssi, 236-241; A. Vaccari, *Melchisedec, rex Salem, proferens panem et vinum (Gen 14,18):* VerDom 18 (1938) 208-214, 235-243.

52. Definition of terms. *The sacrifice made by Melchizedek,* namely, the one narrated in Gen. 14:18ff.

Type. Not just a likeness. But God willed both that that sacrifice be made by Melchizedek and that it be recorded in Genesis, so that we might have a true prefiguration of the Eucharist. We cannot be certain about this from the text alone of Genesis, but from other sources.

The Eucharistic mystery. Because the Eucharistic mystery, as we have seen, has many aspects, this prefiguration certainly can be understood in many different ways. *In the first way,* in such a way that Melchizedek actually did not offer a sacrifice to God, but only handed over to Abraham and his companions bread and wine; and thus he was a type of Christ giving to his Apostles his own Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine. In this way Franciscus Ferrerius argued at the Council of Trent that the figure of Melchizedek was fulfilled in Christ.[1] *In the second way,* in such a way that Melchizedek truly sacrificed bread and wine to God; and thus he was a type of Christ sacrificing Himself at the Last Supper under the species of bread and wine. *The third way* joins both of these views together, inasmuch as Melchizedek first sacrificed bread and wine to God, and having already offered them to God he then gave them to Abraham for food; just as Christ at the Supper both sacrificed Himself under the species of bread and wine, and having offered to God his Body and Blood under these species he then gave them to the Apostles to eat. We understand the thesis in this third sense, which seems to render more fully the prefiguration of the Eucharist in Melchizedek.

53. Adversaries. *Protestants,* who, in order to deny the sacrifice of the Mass, contended that Melchizedek did not offer a sacrifice to God, but only offered bread and wine to Abraham as food, or to celebrate his victory. Hence his offering was not a mystical prefiguration of the Eucharist.

54. Doctrine of the Church. It is presented in the *Council of Trent* in sess.22 ch.1 (D 1739-1741). Regarding this text, the following points should be noted.[2]

1. CTr 8,732.
2. See F. Asensio, *El recuerdo de Melquisedec en el Concilio de Trento:* EstBibl 6 (1947) 265-285.

In the first draft of the decree it was said: "In these species it seems that Christ instituted thus sacrifice [of the Mass] for this reason--that (according to the opinion of the holy Fathers) he might demonstrate that he, confirmed by an oath of the Father, is an eternal priest according to the order of Melchizedek."[3]

In the second draft it was said: "Since under the former Covenant. there was no perfection, it was necessary (according to the merciful ordination of God the Father) that another priest arise according to the order of Melchizedek, who. He, then, our Lord and God. because his priesthood was not to end with his death, in order to show himself to be a priest constituted forever according to the order of Melchizedek and in order to leave to his beloved spouse the Church a visible sacrifice (as the nature of man demands)., at the Last Supper, on the night when he was betrayed, offered his Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine to God the Father, and."[4] Two expressions were deleted: "it seems" and "according to the opinion of the holy Fathers." Both were too restrictive. Hence the second draft is more affirmative. *In the definitive form* "in order to show," which suggested the intention, was changed to the words "declaring himself constituted," which designates just the fact.

Therefore the Council directly teaches two things: that Christ is a priest according to the order of Melchizedek, and that Christ declared Himself to be a priest according to the order of Melchizedek by offering his Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine and by instituting the Eucharistic sacrifice. The Council does not teach directly and immediately that Melchizedek actually offered a sacrifice; however this point (which was generally supposed by the theologians and Fathers at the Council, but certainly not by all of them), is contained indirectly in its declaration. However the Council does teach directly that there is really a relation between Melchizedek and Christ in the Eucharistic sacrifice, whether it was present on the Cross, or not; on this point there was not a common opinion at Trent. But the intention of the Council is to teach the truth of the sacrifice of the Mass. The relation to Melchizedek seems to be added as an explanation or argument in order to confirm that truth. This is sufficiently clear not only from the words of the definition, but also from the history of the decree.

Theological note. This thesis seems to be *Catholic doctrine.*

3. CTr 8,751.
4. CTr 8,909f.

55. Proof from Scripture. Gen. 14:18f.[5] Many things must be considered here by parts.

1) *Melchizedek sacrificed bread and wine.*

a) In the text Melchizedek is said to be *a priest of God Most High.* But it pertains to a priest to offer sacrifice. Hence it follows that sometimes he offered sacrifice.

b) But in the text itself it does not say that *he offered a sacrifice.* The verb "bringing out" (or rather, "he brought out") of itself does not have a sacrificial meaning, but it signifies only "he set it out," "he produced." The words which are added (*and he is a priest of God Most High*) are a circumstantial and explanatory proposition, which are better united with what preceded, as it is given in the Vulgate and in the Masoretic punctuation; in fact, the Septuagint version is not far removed from this meaning.[6] Therefore the meaning will be: he brought out bread and wine because he was a priest of God Most High.[7] Or perhaps it can be said that the proposition is the explanation for both actions.

c) But the text *supposes a sacrifice* of Melchizedek, even if one accepts the connection of the words *and he is a priest of God Most High* with what follows. For the ancients frequently joined a banquet together with offerings and sacrifices. This is true also for the people of Israel (see Gen. 31:54; 1 Sam. 9:13). Moreover, in our case it has to do with celebrating the extraordinary victory, because of which thanks was to be given to God; this is what Melchizedek did with the priestly rite. Finally, Melchizedek enters into a treaty with Abraham; but such a treaty was always made secure by a religious solemnity. Hence the banquet offered by Melchizedek to Abraham and to his companions was truly a holy banquet, whose food was first offered to God and then distributed among the guests. Therefore the text supposes the sacrifice of Melchizedek from the whole nature of the action that he narrates. Hence not only the Christian exegetic tradition, but also the Jewish, which explain the text as a sacrifice, has a true foundation in it.

Therefore we hold that the priest Melchizedek offered bread and wine to God as a sacrifice.

56. 2) *Melchizedek was a type of the Eucharistic mystery.*

a) First of all, *in the sacrifice itself.* From the revelation itself we know

5. J.E. Coleran, *The Sacrifice of Melchizedek:* ThSt 1 (1940) 27-36; P. Heinisch, *Das Buch Genesis* (Bonn 1930) 222 excursus; R. Galdos, *Jesucristo, sacerdote eterno según el orden de Melquisedec:* MiscCom 2 (1942) 35-53; G.M. Perrella, *Il "sacrificio di Melchisedec":* PalCl 16 (1937 II) 265 268; Id., *Ancora sul sacrificio di Melchisedec:* PalCl 17 (1938) 230f.
6. St. Chrysostom (MG 53,336) and Theodoret (MG 80,172) use this reading, but they join it with the preceding; they also see in the Greek particle δε a causal meaning.
7. But Vaccari thinks (VerDom 18 (1938) 210f.) a union with what follows is to be preferred in this case.

that Melchizedek was a type of Christ in priesthood. This is clear from Ps. 110:4 (which is certainly messianic, from Matt. 22:43f.) and from Heb. 5:6-10; 7:1-22.[8] But the type was of the priesthood of Christ in the sacrifice itself. For, Christ is said to be a priest "according to the order of Melchizedek" in opposition to the priesthood according to the order of Aaron (Heb. 7:1). But diverse orders of priesthood differ in the sacrifice they offer, as what is specific to that priesthood. Therefore Melchizedek is a type of Christ also in the fact that he sacrificed bread and wine. But it is clear that Christ did not offer bread and wine except in the Eucharistic mystery, in which under the species of bread and wine he offered his Body and Blood.

b) Next, *in the banquet itself* offered to Abraham, it is said expressly in some Greek codices that Melchizedek gave bread and wine to Abraham and his companions. And although some theologians did not want to admit it (thinking thus that the sacrifice offered to God is excluded, which indeed, as we have seen, is not the case), nevertheless it must be said that this is sufficiently confirmed by the documents of Christian antiquity.[9] But because the bread and wine offered by Melchizedek to Abraham had previously already been offered as a sacrifice, the sacred character of this bread and wine and its consumption must be admitted. Hence an intrinsic connection between the offering made to God and the giving of the bread and wine to Abraham must be affirmed. Therefore, if Melchizedek is a type of Christ in the offering of bread and wine, he is also a type of Him in offering sanctified bread and wine to those exhausted and returning from their victory; that is, in offering his Body and Blood to the Apostles for them to eat. All of these points become even more clear from the tradition.

57. Proof from tradition.[10] **a)** *The Fathers say that Melchizedek offered a true sacrifice of bread and wine, and therefore that he was a type of Christ.* St. Cyprian, explaining that Christ is a priest after Melchizedek because "he offered a sacrifice to God the Father, and offered that very same thing which Melchizedek had offered, that is, bread and wine, His

8. See G. Piazzi, *La figura di Melchisedec nell'Epistola agli Ebrei:* ScuoCatt 63 (1935) 417-432; F. J. Jérome, *Das geschichtliche Melchisedec-Bild und seine Bedeutung im Hebräerbriefe* (Strassburg 1917).

9. See Vaccari: VerDom 18 (1938) 211-214, who thinks that this is certain. Previously Toledo had written: "No Catholic doubts that the bread and wine offered by Melchizedek was given for the refreshment of Abraham and those who were with him" (*Tractatus de Melchisedec* 10,30: ArchTG 3 [1940] 131). Similarly St. Robert Bellarmine: "We do not deny that they were given as refreshment to Abraham and his companions, but we say that they were first offered to God and consecrated and then given to men so that they might partake of the sacrifice" (*Controversiae de sacramento Eucharistiae* 5,6).

10. See G. Bardy, *Melchisedec dans la tradition patristique:* RevBibl 35 (1926) 496-509; 36 (1927) 25-45; R. Galdos, *Melchisedec en la patristica:* EstEcl 19 (1943) 221-246; F. Asensio, *El recuerdo de Melquisedec en Suarez:* EstEcl 22 (1948) 407-417. Toledo presents the patristic tradition excellently, *Tractatus de Melchisedec:* ArchTG 3 (1940) 118-149.

Body and Blood" (R 581). Similarly Eusebius of Caesarea (R 671), and St. Ambrose ("we knew that the figure of those sacraments already took place in the time of Abraham, when holy Melchizedek offered that sacrifice").[11] St. Jerome also explains "the order of Melchizedek" in this way: "Our mystery is signified in the word of order: in no way by the immolation of irrational animals through Aaron, but by the offering of bread and wine, that is, by the Body and Blood of the Lord Jesus."[12] According to St. Augustine, in Melchizedek "the first sacrifice appeared, which is now offered to God by Christians throughout the whole world"[13]; in fact, Christ himself offered it, for "He is our priest forever according to the order of Melchizedek; he offered Himself as a holocaust for our sins, and he commanded that a similar sacrifice be celebrated in memory of his passion, and what Melchizedek offered we now see is offered in the Church of Christ throughout the whole world."[14] Isidorus Pelusiota says: "Melchizedek, performing his office of priest with bread and wine, with these foreshadowed the type of the divine mysteries."[15] St. Cyril of Alexandria, while explaining how Melchizedek was a figure of Christ, says: "He places the manner of his priesthood as an example clearly before our eyes, because Melchizedek offered bread and wine."[16] Primasius agrees with this: "In this order of priesthood Christ was made a priest, not a temporal but an eternal one, and he did not offer legal victims but in place of them bread and wine, namely, his own Flesh and Blood."[17] St. Jerome, alluding to previous authors whom he had read (Origen, Hippolytus, Irenaeus, Eusebius of Caesarea, Eusebius Emissenus, Apollinares, Eusthatius Antiochenus), says: "They interpret his order in many ways.Because. he did not immolate victims of bread and blood nor did he examine the entrails of brute animals, but with bread and wine, the simple and pure sacrifice of Christ, he dedicated a sacrament."[18]

58. b) *The Fathers say that Melchizedek gave Abraham and his*

11. *De sacramentis* 5,1: ML 16,465. See *ibid.* 4,3,12: ML 16,458): "Therefore Melchizedek offered bread and wine. Who is Melchizedek? He is without mother, with father. The Son of God was born without a mother.; and again he was born without a father." The same idea recurs in his book, *De mysteriis* 8,45f.: ML 16,421.
12. *Liber hebraicarum quaestionum in Genesim* 14,18: ML 23,1011. See *Epist. 46 ad Marcellam* (ML 22,484): "He [Melchizedek] at that time offered bread and wine as a type of Christ, and he proclaimed the Christian mystery in the Blood and Body of the Savior."
13. *De Civitate Dei* 16,22: ML 41,500.
14. *De diversis quaestionibus* 83 q.61: ML 40,49.
15. *Epist.* 931: MG 78,422.
16. *Glaphyra in Genesim 2,* on Abraham and Melchizedek 9: MG 41,106.
17. *In epist. ad Hebraeos* 5,5f.: ML 68,716.
18. *Epist. 73 ad Evangelum* 3: ML 16,458. See also Isidorus Hispalensis, *Allegoriae V. Testamenti* 19: ML 83,104. Moreover, the matter is so clear that a Protestant author could write recently: G. Wuttke (*Melchisedec der Priesterkönig von Salem. Eine Studie zur Geschichte der Exegese* [Giesen 1921[58): "It was a common opinion of exegetes that Gen. 14:18 is speaking about a sacrifice of Melchizedek."

companions bread and wine, and therefore that he was a type of Christ giving the Apostles his Body and Blood. Thus St. Epiphanius: "Melchizedek meets him and he offers him bread and wine, thus signifying a prefiguration of the sacraments, figures of the Body of the Lord—the same Lord who says: I am the living bread."[19] St. Chrysostom: "See how by the honor shown to the patriarch a mystery is made known to us. For, he brought forth bread and wine. When you see the type, think of the truth; and admire the power of the divine Scripture—how in previous centuries and from the beginning it signified the future in advance."[20] Likewise, Pseudo-Chrysostom: "And why did he say according to the order of Melchizedek? Because of the sacraments; because he also offered bread and wine to Abraham, and because this priesthood has been freed from the Law."[21] St. Jerome: "He is the one who said, he who eats my flesh and drinks my blood, and according to the order of Melchizedek he gives us his sacrament."[22] Cassiodorus: "For to whom can it truly and clearly be applied [that is, the words "You are a priest forever] unless it is to the Lord our Savior, who in a salvific way consecrated his Body and Blood in a payment of bread and wine?"[23]

59. c) *Sometimes they join both together in one formula.* Thus Clement of Alexandria: "Melchizedek, a priest of the Most High from Salem, who gave sanctified bread and wine for food, as a type of the Eucharist."[24] St. Augustine: "Hence Melchizedek, having brought forth what was blessed from the Lord's table, was able to foreshadow His eternal priesthood."[25] Theodoret: "We find that Melchizedek is a priest and king (therefore he was the figure both of a true priest and king), not bringing forth sacrifices lacking reason, but bread and wine; for, he offered them to Abraham when he foresaw according to the spirit the image of his own priesthood in the loins of Abraham."[26] 'He [Melchizedek] was a type of the Lord's priesthood; and therefore he also gave bread and wine to Abraham, since he was perhaps accustomed to offer such gifts to the God of all things; for it was also necessary that it be brought to light in this type."[27] St. John Damascene: "Melchizedek received. Abraham. That table designated this mystical table; just as that priest was the figure and image of Christ the true

19. *Panarion* haer.55: MG 41,982.
20. *In Genesim* hom. 35,5: MG 53,328.
21. *In Ps 109,8:* MG 55,276f.
22. *Tractatus in Psalmos* 109: Anecdota Maredsolana 3,2,201.
23. *Expositio in Psalterium* 109,5: ML 70,797.
24. *Stromata* 4,25: MG 8,1371.
25. *Epist.* 177,12: ML 33,769.
26. *Interpretatio in Psalmos* 109,4: MG 80,1771.
27. *Quaestiones in Genesim* ch.14 interr.64: MG 80,171.

priest."[28]

60. d) *The Liturgy agrees.* Thus in the Canon of the Mass the text says: "Accept them as Thou didst accept the offerings of Thy just servant Abel, and the sacrifice of our Patriarch Abraham, and that which Thy high priest Melchizedek offered up to Thee, a holy Sacrifice, an immaculate Victim."[29] And in Vespers for the feast of Corpus Christi: "Christ the Lord, the eternal priest according to the order of Melchizedek offered bread and wine." Similar words are used in the Ambrosian Liturgy for Holy Thursday: "Accept this oblation which we offer to Thee on the day of fasting of the Lord's Supper, on which our Lord Jesus Christ, Thy Son, instituted the sacrificial rite of the New Testament, when he changed into the sacrament of his Body and Blood the bread and wine, which the priest Melchizedek offered as a prefiguration of the future mystery."[30] The mention of Melchizedek recurs also in the Mozarabic Book of Sacraments,[31] in the Leonine Sacramentary,[32] etc.

61. Objection. The reason why Melchizedek was a type of Christ is explained expressly in the letter to the Hebrews, chapter 7. But there nothing is said about the Eucharistic mystery. Therefore the offering of Melchizedek has nothing in common with the Eucharistic mystery.

I distinguish the major. It is explained expressly and according to all its aspects, *denied;* it is explained expressly according to those aspects that contributed to the purpose of the Apostle, *conceded. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* It would have nothing in common with the Eucharistic mystery, if the typology of Melchizedek in the letter to the Hebrews were explained according to all its aspects, *conceded;* if it is explained only according to some, which pertain to the purpose of the author, *denied.*

That is, as Toledo says, the purpose of St. Paul was "to show against the Jews that the priesthood of the Law would cease at the arrival of the Christ, and consequently the Law itself. And he proves this, because Christ would be a priest according to the order of Melchizedek forever. Therefore the priesthood of Aaron must cease and be changed into the priesthood according to Melchizedek, which was different from the Aaronic, because the former was not according to a command of the Law, but the latter is. For Paul this was enough for his purpose, nor was it necessary for him to explain the differ-

28. *De fide orthodoxa* 4,13: MG 94,1150. See also the text of St. Jerome (*Breviarium in Psalmos 110:* ML 26, 1235): "For as Melchizedek, the king of Salem, offered bread and wine, so also You offer your Body and Blood, the true bread and true wine. This Melchizedek gave us the mysteries we have. He is the one who said: he who eats my Flesh and drinks my Blood. According to the order of Melchizedek he gave us his sacrament."
29. On the hypothesis proposed by Baumstark, according to which originally in this text of the Canon the word "summus" was absent, see J.A. Jungmann, *Missarum sollemnia* 1,66 note 6 (Vienna 1948).
30. Assemani, *Codices liturgici* 4,1.
31. Férotin, 262.
32. Muratori, 1,470.

ence of the offering, since the priesthood itself taught and proved that it was different.[33]

62. Scholium 1. *A priest according to the order of Melchizedek.* Toledo[34] correctly says that they are not the same: that Melchizedek is a type or figure of Christ, and that Christ is a priest according to the order of Melchizedek.

a) Melchizedek surely was a *type or figure of Christ* in many ways. St. Paul explained many of them in the quoted citation from the letter to the Hebrews. Then the holy Fathers explained these and some others. All are briefly gathered together by Toledo.[35] Melchizedek is said to be a type or figure of Christ:

1) In his person: because he is without father, without mother, without a genealogy (Heb. 7:3).

2) In his name: because he is called the king of righteousness (Heb. 7:2).

3) In his royal dignity: because he is a king, indeed a king of peace (Heb. 7:2).

4) In his priesthood: because he is a priest of God Most High (Heb. 7:3).

5) In the nature of his priesthood: because he was not anointed with sensible oil, nor a priest according to carnal generation, nor possessing a temporal priesthood (Eusebius, St. Epiphanius.).

6) In his offering: because he offered bread and wine.

b) However, Christ is said to be *a priest according to the order of Melchizedek,* speaking more accurately, not for all these reasons, but primarily "because His priesthood was not mandated according to the institution of the Old Law, but according to the power of God, or from his divinity itself united with his flesh, through which he obtained the eternity and perpetuity of his priesthood. In this way Melchizedek represents a certain figure or likeness to the One who was made a priest before the Law existed; he was not instituted by the rites of the Law, nor by carnal succession, but by the institution of God."[36] Then the priesthood of Christ was also according to the order of Melchizedek with regard to the oblation itself, because he offered his Flesh and Blood in the species of bread and wine. Finally, also because he gives under the same species the same things for food, which previously had been offered to God, to those who were exhausted and returning from war.

c) Another question is connected with this one; it was much disputed at the Council of Trent on the occasion of the cited decree. Namely, whether the sacrifice that Christ offered *on the Cross* was also according to the order of Melchizedek or not. And it seems necessary to say that Christ offered Himself on the Cross with the priesthood that he had; but his priesthood was that according to the order of Melchizedek. Therefore he could not act as a priest except according to that order. It is another matter that sometimes he acted according to the order of Melchizedek under all the aspects previously explained, and at other times not under every aspect. However, from that it does not

33. *Tractatus de Melchisedec* 14,56: ArchTG 3 (1940) 146.
34. *Tractatus de Melchisedec* 13,47: ArchTG 3 (1940) 141f.
35. *Tractatus de Melchisedec* 12: ArchTG 3 (1940) 136-140.
36. *Tractatus de Melchisedec* 13,50: ArchTG 3 (1940) 142f.

follow that Christ really and fully can be said to be a priest according to the order of Melchizedek, even if he did not offer a sacrifice at the Last Supper under the species of bread and wine. For the complete and perfect idea of that order contained the oblation of bread and wine.

63. Scholium 2. *The paschal lamb and Melchizedek.* Because the paschal lamb is also a figure of Christ in the Eucharist, St. Thomas reflects on whether the lamb or Melchizedek is the stronger figure of the Eucharistic mystery: "I answer that, We can consider three things in this sacrament: namely, that which is sacrament only, and this is the bread and wine; that which is both reality and sacrament, to wit, Christ's true body; and lastly that which is reality only, namely, the effect of this sacrament. Consequently, in relation to what is sacrament only, the chief figure of this sacrament was the oblation of Melchizedek, who offered up bread and wine. – In relation to Christ crucified, Who is contained in this sacrament, its figures were all the sacrifices of the Old Testament, especially the sacrifice of expiation, which was the most solemn of all. While with regard to its effect, the chief figure was the Manna, having in it the sweetness of every taste, just as the grace of this sacrament refreshes the soul in all respects.

"The Paschal Lamb foreshadowed this sacrament in these three ways. First of all, because it was eaten with unleavened loaves (according to Exod. 12:8: they shall eat flesh. and unleavened bread). As to the second, because it was immolated by the entire multitude of the children of Israel on the fourteenth day of the moon; and this was a figure of the passion of Christ, Who is called the Lamb on account of his innocence. As to the effect, because by the blood of the Paschal Lamb the children of Israel were preserved from the destroying Angel, and brought from the Egyptian captivity; and in this respect the Paschal Lamb is the chief figure of this sacrament, because it represents it in every respect" (III, q. 73, a. 6).

Thesis 6. The Eucharist is that oblation, which the Lord through Malachi foretold would be a pure offering to his name and which would be among the nations in every place.

Puig, 480-487; St. Bellarmine, *De sacramento Eucharistiae* 5,10; E. Tobac, *Malachie:* DTC 9,1749-1753; B. Mariani, *De sacrificio a Malachia praedicto:* Ant 9 (1934) 193-242, 361-382, 451-474.

64. Definition of terms. *The oblation foretold by Malachi* is had in Mal. 1:10f.

The Eucharist is that oblation, that is, through that oblation the Eucharist is prefigured by the divine intention; and indeed it is made under the idea of a sacrifice, as we saw that it was celebrated by Christ at the Last Supper and instituted by Him for the Church.

65. Adversaries. *The Rabbis* generally and also the *Rationalists* held that in this text the concern is with the true worship of God among the Jews who were in the diaspora.

Contemporary *Rationalists* generally hold in various ways, following Theodore of Mopsuestia[1] and Arias Montanus, that in the text the concern is with the worship of the true God, although remaining unknown, offered by the Gentiles, while they are intending to worship some supreme god.

Protestants held that the concern in the text is with the worship of the true God among Christians, but only with a spiritual sacrifice in an improper sense, that is, it has to do with praise, prayers and good works.

66. Doctrine of the Church. It is presented in *Trent* in sess.22 ch. 1 (D 1742). The Council theologians, among the traditional arguments advanced to prove that the Mass is a true sacrifice against the Protestants, from the beginning used the text of Malachi. Hence *in the first draft* of the decree it was said: "And since in this sacrifice he is contained who is the immaculate Lamb, and is offered by the Church whose prayers are pure, therefore the holy Synod along with the holy Fathers says that this is that oblation, which the Lord through Malachi foretold would be a pure offering, to his name which would be great among the nations in every place."[2] *The revised draft*[3] in this part almost coincides with the defined doctrine. There it should be noted that the oblation is not said to be pure by reason of the victim or by reason of the praying Church, but rather by reason of the oblation itself which cannot be defiled by the ones doing the offering.

1. *In Malachiam* 1,11: MG 66,606.
2. CTr 8,751.
3. CTr 8,910.

Theological note. The thesis must be said to be *Catholic doctrine.* For, it does not seem to be a matter of faith (*de fide*), because it is presented by the Council among the arguments to prove the truth of the sacrifice of the Mass, to which it is essentially referred.

67. Proof from Holy Scripture. Mal. 1:10f.[4] *Note.* After the introduction (1:1), the first part of the prophecy (1:6—2:9) reprehends the priests; because, having forgotten the honor due to God, they offer polluted and unclean sacrifices (1:6-9). Those sacrifices cannot please God. In place of them a pure sacrifice is offered during the time of the Messiah in the whole world (1:10f.). In the meantime the wickedness of the priests will be punished by a divine malediction (1:12—2:4), since the priests have really abandoned the true nature of their priesthood (2:5-9).

In this context in verse 10, God is introduced as eagerly desiring in his indignation that someone close the doors of the temple and not set fire on the altar in vain, that is, uselessly because God is angry and so can no longer be placated. Surely this would be better than to offer to God polluted victims. Therefore God is no longer pleased with them and he does not wish to receive any of their sacrifices. Therefore those sacrifices ceased, that is, during the messianic time (verse 11), in order that in the whole world the majesty of God may be fully recognized and a pure sacrifice be offered to Him.[5]

68. *Argument.* In this text a true sacrifice is predicted for the messianic time, and it is an unbloody one. But such a sacrifice cannot be anything else but the Eucharist. Therefore Malachi predicted the Eucharistic sacrifice.

The major. a) *The text deals with the messianic time.* For, the majesty of God is said to be universally acknowledged by the nations in the whole world. By the prophets this is constantly attributed to the messianic time (Isa. 49:6; 60:9; Amos 9:12; Mic. 4:2; Ps. 22:28.).

Then, because this sacrifice is offered in every place, it appears that the Mosaic Law has already ceased, according to which it was not allowed to offer sacrifice except in the place designated by God.

Moreover, it is said that a pure sacrifice is offered by the nations; this supposes that holiness has been extended also to the Gentiles, as had been

4. See Knabenbauer-Hagen, *Commentarius in Prophetas minores* 2 (Paris 1923) 519-534; J. Zingerle, *Beiträge zur Erklärung der Prophetie des Malachias (1,11) über das neutestamentliche Opfer:* ZkathTh 50 (1881) 499-526; A. Herbranz, *El profeta Malaquías y el sacrificio de nuestros altares:* EstBibl 2 (1930) 67-73; 3 (1931) 94-122.
5. On the critical evaluation of the text, see A. Van Hoonakeer, *Les douze petits prophètes* (Paris 1908) 711f., and Knabenbauer, 522f.

predicted for the messianic time.

Finally, the prophecy cannot be understood to be about the Jews living in the diaspora, since even at that time they were not everywhere in the world; also, the words of the prophecy are not explained as if they said that the name of God is acknowledged by these nations (but not by other nations); likewise, it cannot be about the worship of the true God, although remaining unknown, whom the nations, while they are adoring some supreme god, de facto worship, since such worship really cannot be said to be pure, nor would such worship really be given by it to the true God in a way that is due to Him.

69. b) *The text is dealing with a true sacrifice.* Words are used which Scripture employs in order to signify sacrifices. "It is offered" is said in the same way and with the same word in verse 7 about the sacrifice of bread; in verse 8 about bloody sacrifices; likewise in 2:12 and 3:3 in a strictly sacrificial sense.

The same thing must be said about the word "oblation" (Minhah), which is never used in Scripture, when it speaks about the divinity, in a metaphorical or analogical sense; but much less it is ever used without some determination, as when it is called "a sacrifice of praise".

Moreover, from the context it is clear that the pure sacrifice is opposed to the visible and external, but polluted, sacrifices of the Jews—one that is in the same way visible and external in the messianic time; in contrast to the sacrifices that were polluted from defect in the offered matter and from the ones doing the offering, the new sacrifice will be pure because of the excellence of the matter, which can never be corrupted by the priests.

c) *The text is dealing with an unbloody sacrifice.* "Minhah," according to all, is the proper word used to designate an unbloody sacrifice (see Lev. 2:1ff.; 6:13; 7:9; Num. 15:4.), that is, a cereal offering. But note that incense is almost always associated with Minhah (Lev. 2:1.15; 6:15; 24:7.).

70. *The minor.* a) The Eucharist, as celebrated and instituted by Christ at the Last Supper, is really the sacrifice of the messianic time; this is offered to the true God throughout the whole world among the Gentiles and by the Gentiles. And it is not in a determined place, but everywhere on earth.

By it infinite honor is given to God and the great name of God is acknowledged.

It is a pure oblation, containing a most holy victim, which cannot be corrupted by any indignity of the offerers.

It is an unbloody sacrifice; and inasmuch as it is offered under the species

of bread and wine it is similar to the cereal offerings of the Old Testament which, made from flour, barley or a cake with oil, salt and incense, were offered on the altar.

b) Obviously nothing else is a sacrifice like that.

71. Proof from tradition. a) Already in the *Didache* there was an allusion to Mal. 1:11, when the author spoke about the Eucharist (R 8).

b) In the *Apologies* directed against the Jews the classical argument is taken from this prophecy: thus St. Justin (R 135). Similarly St. Chrysostom.[6] It is treated more at length by St. Augustine: "This sacrifice is by the priesthood of Christ according to the order of Melchizedek, since in every place from the rising of the sun to its setting we see that it is now being offered, but they cannot deny that the sacrifice of the Jews has ceased; for, to them it was said. "I take no pleasure in you nor do I accept gifts from your hands." So why are they still waiting for another Christ?"[7] In a previous time there was St. Cyprian.[8]

c) The Fathers say that *the Eucharistic sacrifice was predicted* by the sacrifice of Malachi. St. Irenaeus, speaking about the sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Christ, which the Church, having received it from the Apostles, offers to God in the whole world, says that it was foretold by Malachi (R 232). Eusebius, after citing the text of Malachi, says further: "Therefore we offer a sacrifice of praise to God Most High; we sacrifice to God while bringing to him our filial fear and a holy sacrifice; we sacrifice in a new way, according to the New Testament, a pure victim. Therefore we both sacrifice and burn incense, at one time celebrating that great sacrifice, according to the mysteries which were handed on by Him and giving thanks to God for our salvation., at another time consecrating all of us to Him and dedicating ourselves to His High Priest with our words, body and mind."[9] St. Chrysostom: "See how well and how clearly he has interpreted the mystical table, the unbloody sacrifice."[10] St. Jerome, commenting on Malachi, says that a pure sacrifice is being offered in every place "as in the ceremonies of the Christians."[11] Theodoretus Cyrensis: "And divine Malachi openly taught us piety with these words, which now are observed everywhere. By reason of the lacking victims the killing has ceased: only

6. *Adversus Iudaeos* 5,12: MG 48,902.
7. *De Civitate Dei* 18,34,3: ML 41,594. See *Adversus Iudaeos* 9,13 (R 1977); *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 106,13: ML 37,1427.
8. *Testimonia adversus Iudaeos* 1,16: ML 4,714f.
9. *Demonstratio evangelica* 1,10: MG 22,91-94. See 1,6: MG 22,59f.
10. *In Ps 95,2:* MG 55,622f.
11. *In Malachiam* 1,11: ML 25,1551. See *In Ezechielem* 7,21,25: ML 25,207.

the immaculate Lamb is sacrificed."[12] St. Damascene: "This is the pure and unbloody sacrifice, which from the rising of the sun to its setting the Lord through the prophet said would be offered to Him."[13]

d) In a beautiful way St. Augustine *joins this prophecy together with the prophecy of Melchizedek,* not only in the places just cited, but also here: "This one [Israel according to the spirit] immolates to God a sacrifice of praise, not according to the order of Aaron, but according to the order of Melchizedek. Those who read know what Melchizedek brought forth when he blessed Abraham; and if they are now partakers of him, they see that such a sacrifice is being offered to God in the whole world. Certainly he changed the priesthood according to the order of Aaron. Hence another prophet says to the carnal Israel: I take no pleasure in you. Behold what is according to the order of Aaron. But why he does not accept this, he adds and says: because from the rising of the sun. Behold what is according to the order of Melchizedek."[14]

72. Objections. 1. Tertullian understands the pure sacrifice of Malachi as "simple prayer of a pure conscience."[15] Therefore it is not about the Eucharist.

Tertullian writes in the same book: "In every place a sacrifice is offered to my name and it is a pure sacrifice, that is, a relation of glory and a blessing and a hymn of praise; all of these things when they are observed also in you are a sign on foreheads, and the sacraments of the churches, and the purity of the sacrifices; you must now come out and say that the Spirit of the Creator with your Christ has prophesied."[16] In these words the allusion to the Eucharist seems clear.

2. St. Cyril of Alexandria, commenting on Malachi, writes: "He predicts. that a pure and unbloody sacrifice will be offered to his name, while the priests are busy offering with diligence, and goodness and chastity the sweet-smelling fragrance of a spiritual incense, that is, faith, hope and charity and the integrity of good works."[17] Therefore, according to St. Cyril, the text is concerned with a sacrifice taken metaphorically, and not about a sacrifice in the proper and strict sense.

St. Cyril continues in the same place: "Thus when the heavenly and life-giving sacrifice of Christ had been constituted, through which death and the earthly flesh subject to corruption was destroyed, it is clothed with incorruption." That is, St. Cyril teaches that the text is concerned with the spiritual worship of the virtues and good works; but in addition the sacrifice of Christ is added to this, which is spiritual and heavenly and also gives life to the world. It should be noted that the Greek Fathers read in the Septuagint version (LXX) "fragrance" (*suffimentum*, θυμίαμα) for "it perfumes" (*suffitur*);

12. *In Malachiam* 1,11: MG 81,1967.
13. *De fide orthodoxa* 4,13: MG 94,1150f.
14. *Contra adversarium legis et prophetarum* 1,20,39: ML 42,626f.
15. *Adversus Marcionem* 4,1: ML 2,391. See also *Adversus Iudaeos* 5: ML 2,646f.
16. *Adversus Marcionem* 3,22: ML 2,381f.
17. *In Malachiam* 1,12: MG 72,298. See also *De adoratione in spiritu et veritate* 2: MG 68,223-226.

and therefore that they often spoke in this text about prayers and petitions, or about a sacrifice taken analogically. But they did this in order to understand from the following words a true sacrifice in the strict sense. Eusebius covers the whole matter excellently in the text cited above: "Therefore we both sacrifice (θύομεν) and burn incense (θυμιώμεν)." Similarly Theodoretus in the text already cited: "Only the immaculate Lamb is sacrificed, who takes away the sin of the world; and, as a sign of power, it is a sweet-smelling incense."

BOOK II

ON THE REALITY OF THE EUCHARISTIC MYSTERY IN THE CHURCH

73. We have seen that Christ at the Last Supper performed a sacred action, which was at the same time both the change of bread and wine into his own Body and Blood, and the oblation of the same Body and Blood to God in a true sacrifice. But also, as we saw, Christ wills that this same sacred action continue in the Church until the end of time. In this way he fulfilled both his own prior promise and the ancient prophecies about a new worship to be instituted in the time of the Messiah.

Hence it follows immediately that such a sacred action exists in the Church by the institution of Christ (with the necessary ministerial power in order to bring it about); and therefore that the Body and Blood of Christ exist under the species of bread and wine, which is offered in sacrifice to God and which is consumed by the faithful as spiritual nourishment. Now we have to study these points and see how they are realized in the Church.

The foundation, however, of the whole treatise is the real presence of Christ under the species of bread and wine. For the sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Christ could not be offered, if that Body and Blood were not really present under the species; and the same Body of Christ and his Blood could not be eaten, unless Christ is really present in those species.

This gives us the outline of our treatise.

CHAPTER I

On the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist

74. *The doctrine of the Church* on the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist is well set forth by the Council of Trent, especially in sess. 13, chapters 1-4. Here are the main points of this doctrine:

a) Christ is contained in the Eucharist truly, really and substantially (cn. 1).

b) Christ is present in the Eucharist under the species only of bread and wine, for the substance of bread and wine does not remain (cn. 2).

c) Hence Christ becomes present in the Eucharist under both species and under each single part of both species (cn. 3).

d) This presence of Christ in the Eucharist is permanent (cn. 4).

In these points three things mainly are taught about the Eucharistic

presence of Christ: *the first* is the fact of the real presence; *the second* is the action by which the real presence takes place (that is, transubstantiation), whose effect is also that the substance of bread and wine cease to exist, while only the species remain; *the third* is the special manner of this real presence, in which namely Christ is whole in both species and all their parts, and he is there permanently.

Now we will treat each of these points.

ARTICLE I

ON THE FACT OF THE REAL PRESENCE

Thesis 7. In the Eucharist is contained truly, really and substantially the Body and Blood together with the soul and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ, and therefore the whole Christ.

S.Th. III, q. 75, a. 1; Suarez, *In 3* q.75 disp.46; Puig, 320-346; Alastruey, 78-110; Filograssi, 36-84; Lercher-Dander, 279-293.

75. Definition of terms. *In the Eucharist,* that is, under the species of bread and wine, after the bread and wine have been consecrated. Here we are prescinding from the question whether also the substance of bread and wine is still there, and whether the species, which are sensibly apparent, are really present.

Is contained, that is, is present; but in whatever way it may be present; in this thesis we say nothing about this.

Truly, or not only in a sign; *really,* or not in a figure; *substantially*, or not only virtually or dynamically.

The whole Christ: all the elements that now constitute Christ after rising from the dead.

76. Adversaries. 1. In the eleventh century Berengarius. According to him, Christ is present in the Eucharist truly, but spiritually or intelligibly, inasmuch as the visible sacrament is understood to be a likeness of the true Body of Christ. In Communion Christ is received in thought, not with the mouth. But Christ can be said to be present also corporally, inasmuch as the divine nature dwells corporally in the human nature of Christ spiritually present.[1]

2. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the later *Berengarians,*

1. L.C. Ramírez, *La controversia eucaristica del s.XI. Berengario de Tours a la luz de sus contemporáneos* (Bogotá 1940) 99-124.

according to whom Christ is present in the Eucharist not essentially or truly, but only sacramentally and in signification. He can be said to be truly present, inasmuch as he is truly signfied, as a vine is said to be true.[2] The *Cathars* and *Albigensians* also denied the real presence.

3. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, *some Armenians,* who admitted the presence only in a likeness or in a figure: see D 1018.[3]

Wycliffe, according to whom Christ in the Eucharist is not truly there in his corporal presence—identically, really, essentially, substantially or corporally; but he is there only figuratively and tropically, sacramentally and virtually. That is, just as John was Elijah figuratively and not personally, so bread is the Body of Christ figuratively. Therefore one says "this is my Body," as one says "John is Elijah." This way of thinking simply follows the doctrine of Berengarius.[4]

Huss has the same idea as Wycliffe.

77. 4. In the sixteenth century, *Protestants,* except Luther (who always admitted the real presence, although not permanently) and the Lutherans. *Sacramentarists* (Carlostadius, Zwingli, Oecolampadius) held that Christ is in the Eucharist only in figure, or metaphorically. For, the Eucharist is only a sacrament, a sign, a symbol or memorial of Christ. Communion takes place through faith in Christ. Buccerus said that same things, only somewhat attenuated. Calvin held that Christ is present in the Eucharist not only in sign or in figure, but by a special power, which flows down to earth from the Body of Christ existing in heaven; in virtue of this one who eats the Eucharist is made a partaker of the Body of Christ by faith. *Anglicans* also held the error of Calvin, with the exception of the Ritualists.[5]

5. In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, all *Rationalists* and *Modernists* deny the real presence, as is obvious.

78. Doctrine of the Church. 1. *Before the Council of Trent.*

a) Against Berengarius the *Council of Rome* in 1079 (D 700). This formula, whose origin is found in another Roman formula in 1059 (which Berengarius signed and afterwards retracted) and in the formula of the year 1063, teaches these points: the *true* Body and the *true* Blood of Christ are

2. See. Ramírez, 125-135.
3. This document is nothing but a catalogue of the errors of the Armenians which was sent to the Roman Pontiff by two bishops; therefore it has not other value. The Armenian church in a Council convened in 1345 responded to these accusations (see Msi 25,1185-1270). After this response, the Roman Pontiff wanted certain points to be explained more clearly (D 1068-1071); but he said that some of the responses were insufficient (D 1072-1085). See X. le Bachelet, *Benoit XII:* DTC 2,696-704.
4. See E. Mangenot, *Eucharistie du XIII^e siècle au XV^e siècle:* DTC 5,1320-1324.
5. See L. Godefroy, *Eucharistie d'après le Concile de Trente:* DTC 5,1340-1343.

present in the Eucharist; the *same* Body offered on the Cross and the *same* Blood that flowed from his side; and this is meant *properly* and *truly,* that is, not only spiritually on intelligibly.[6]

b) Innocent III (D 782) condemns the later Berengarians.[7]

c) Innocent III against the errors of the Cathars, Albigensians and some Waldensians (D 793-794).[8] Similarly *Lateran Council IV* (D 802).

d) Clement VI against the errors of the Armenians (D 1072-1085). Prescinding from the disputed question about this document being a possible definition *ex cathedra,*[9] at least it contains the faith of the Roman Church, which was imposed on the Armenians as what must be believed.

e) *The Council of Constance* against Wycliffe and Huss (D 1153, 1256). The condemnation of Wycliffe was repeated many times. In the Synod of London (1382) the proposition "that Christ is not in the sacrament of the altar identically, truly and really in his own bodily presence" was condemned as heretical. In another Synod of London (1397) the proposition "just as John figuratively was Elijah." was also condemned as heretical. The 45 propositions (D 1151-1195) were condemned first by the University of Prague (1403). They are taken from the books of Wycliffe; the first 24 had already been condemned in the first Synod of London. Later they were condemned by the Council of Constance (1415) in sess.8; this condemnation was confirmed by Martin V in the Bull "*Inter cunctae*" in the year 1418. Although the Council did not pass a particular judgment on each individual proposition (see D 1251), nevertheless the third proposition (D 1153) was held as heretical by all the qualified theologians at the Council and before it.[10]

79. 2. *In the Council of Trent* sess.13. The real presence is defined expressly in cn.1 and in the corresponding ch.1; it is supposed in the whole session (cn.2,3,4; chs. 3,4,8).

a) *The meaning of the first canon* (D 1651). The first error of the heretics proposed to the theologians was: "the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ is not really in the Eucharist, but only as in a sign as wine is said to

6. On the many condemnations of Berengarius, see Ramírez, *La controversia eucaristica* 57-98.
7. See Ramírez, 132-135. The distinction of D 783 is taken from the *Summa Sententiarum* (ML 176,140): see Master of the Sentences 4, d.8). But already previously, it seems, it is present in the treatise of Gregory Bergomensis, *De Corporis et Sanguinis Domini veritate* (see Ramírez, 133f.).
8. The profession of faith prescribed for Durandus de Osca and the Waldensians contains the main chapters of the doctrine against the errors of that time, although these errors were not defended by Durandus and his associates. For, their doctrine was considered orthodox by the same Innocent III (ML 215,1510).
9. See EstEcl 6 (1927) 97f.
10. See E. Mangenot, *Eucharistie du XIII^e siècle au XV^e siècle:* DTC 5,1320-1324; F. Jansen, *Eucharistiques (Accidents):* DTC 5,1399-1413; A. Baudrillart, *Constance (concile de):* DTC 3,1213-1217. For a complement of the doctrine, see D 1375f.).

be in the air outside of a tavern,[11] which was said to be the error of Zwingli, Oecolampadius and the Sacramentarians. The same formula remains in the first and second drafts of the decree presented to the Fathers for examination. In their debates the words "actually, really, truly, truly and really" seem to mean the same thing. After the debates the canon was rewritten in this way: "If anyone denies that in the sacrament of the most Holy Eucharist the body and blood, together with the soul and the divinity, of our Lord Jesus Christ and, therefore, the whole Christ is truly, really and substantially contained, but says that he is in it only as in a sign or figure or by his power, let him be anathema."[12] The word "power" was added "in order that the positions of the heretics may be more clearly condemned." Hence it seems necessary to say that the Council wanted first of all to extol the reality of the presence of Christ; that is, that Christ is present according to his substance (not according to power only), and that he is present truly and really (not only as in a sign or figure). By these determinations and formulas the Sacramentarians (truly and really, that is, not in a sign or figure) and the Calvinists (substantially, that is, not just in power) are more clearly condemned.

b) *The meaning of the first chapter* (D 1636-1637). The chapters in this session were composed after the redaction and discussion of the canons in order to complete the explanation of the Catholic faith. The first chapter teaches the real presence "truly, really and substantially," as the first canon does; then it calls this presence sacramental. But the Council also teaches in this chapter the origin of the Eucharist and the meaning of the words of institution. We have already treated this matter above.[13]

80. 3. *After the Council of Trent.* a) *In Trent's profession of faith* (D 1866) the same words of the first canon are repeated; the same holds for the profession of faith prescribed for the Maronites (D 2535).

b) Pius XII in our time condemned the recent doctrine according to which "the real presence of Christ in the most Blessed Eucharist is reduced to a certain symbolism, inasmuch as the consecrated species are only efficacious signs of the spiritual presence of Christ and of his intimate union with the faithful, who are members of his Mystical Body."[14]

Theological note. *Divine and Catholic faith.*

81. Proof from Holy Scripture. The thesis can be proved in two ways.

11. CTr 5,869; see 6,124.155.166.
12. Theiner, 1,520.
13. See L. Godefroy, *Eucharistie d'après le Concile de Trente:* DTC 5,1326-1336, 1340-1346.
14. Encyclical "*Humanae generis*": D 3891.

The first is indirect, that is, from what has already been proved. For, Christ at the Last Supper was present under the species of bread and wine after He uttered the words of consecration. But then Christ desired and commanded, as we have seen, that what he did should be done perpetually in the Church. This desire and command of Christ necessarily was efficacious, since it concerns something that pertains to the constitution of the Church. Therefore Christ exists in the Church really present under the species of bread and wine. However, since he could be present nowhere in this way except in the Eucharist, therefore Christ is really present in the Eucharist.

The second way is direct and it is based on 1 Cor. 10 and 11.[15]

82. 1 Cor. 10:14-22. a) *Note.* He is talking about idol worship and about eating the meat that had been sacrificed to idols. In this part of the epistle, in order to solve a problem of conscience, the Apostle first presents the principles of the solution (8:1-13); then he supplies the motives why they should accept the practical solution that he gives them (9:14—10:13); finally, he prescribes the proper way of acting (10:14—11:1). In this last part he prescribes three things: first, it is not permitted to use the sacrificial foods of the Gentiles (10:14-22); second, it is permitted to eat whatever is sold in the meat market (10:23-26); third, it is permitted to eat whatever is placed by unbelievers before invited guests, unless it would involve some scandal (10:27-30). Our text is found in the first of these prescriptions.

There the Apostle gives a strict command that they abstain from all idol worship, that is, from taking part in the sacrificial foods of unbelievers (10:14-22). And he states the fundamental reason for this: Christians have another food and another drink. That food and that drink are nothing other than the Body and Blood of Christ. Therefore, those who have communion with the Body and Blood of the Lord (for communion is had with victims and through them with God from the eating of the victims), how can they also have communion with demons? Moreover, the union would be destroyed, which exists among Christians because they have the same bread. This unity, mentioned in verse 17, is explained in two ways by the exegetes. Some: for in our multitude we are one bread, one body, because we all participate in one and the same bread. Others: because there is one bread, therefore we, though many, are only one body, for we all participate in one and the same bread. The second explanation seems to be more suitable.

b) *Argument.* Christians, because they consume a definite bread and wine, participate in the Body and Blood of Christ in the proper sense. But

15. See Allo, *Première épître aux Corinthiens* in the commentary on these passages and in exc.XII; C. Ruch, *Eucharistie d'après la sainte Ecriture:* DTC 5,1044-1059.

this cannot be unless Christ is really present in the Eucharist. Therefore Christ is really present in the Eucharist.

The major. That participation brings about the unity of the Church because the bread is numerically one and the same (τού ένός άρτου). But such numerical unity cannot be had except from the identity of the indivisible Body of Christ. Therefore.

83. 1 Cor. 11:27-32. A) *Note.* The Apostle is talking about the defects that the Corinthians are committing at the meals of Christians in which they are taking part (11:17-34). He describes and reprehends these defects of unity and harmony. But he offers the supreme motive of the Eucharist, whose institution he narrates, so that he can deduce from it how it should be handled in a holy way (11:27-32).

Note this *regarding the text itself:* "this" (*hunc*) in verse 27 is absent in the Greek, but obviously supposed; for it is the bread mentioned in v. 26 and 23f. (see also 10:20). "Will be guilty" (ένοχος), that is, he will be accused of violating the Body and Blood of the Lord. "Let a man examine himself" (δοκιμαζέτω), that is, let him examine his own internal disposition (see 2 Cor. 13:5). "And so" (ούτως), that is, after he sees that he has the proper disposition. "In an unworthy manner" does not seem to be in the original, but it renders the meaning very well: one who does not distinguish between the Body of Christ and the other common bread ("non diiudicans"), and therefore does not give the due honor to that Body, when he eats and drinks receives the sentence of his own judgment.

b) *Argument.* The bread, which Christians consume, is the bread consecrated by Christ at the Last Supper, and the wine they drink is the wine consecrated at the same event; hence (ώστε) those who unworthily consume this bread and this wine are accused of violating the Body and Blood of the Lord; because to consume them unworthily is nothing other than not to attend to the reality of the Body of the Lord. But all these points suppose that Christ is really present in the Eucharist. Therefore.

84. Proof from tradition. In this argument it is also possible to proceed in an indirect way, from what has already been proved, as was done with the argument from Scripture. But there is also an excellent direct argument, as the seriousness of the subject matter requires. For, the following points are evident witnesses to the faith of the Church in the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist: 1) the consensus of the Fathers during the whole patristic age; 2) all of the very ancient liturgies; 3) other ancient documents; 4) the Eucharistic controversies in the Middle Ages. Now we will say a few

things about each of these points.

85. 1. *The holy Fathers.*[16]

a) Among the *Apostolic Fathers* we have: the *Didache* (R 6f.); where the cup and the broken bread, which are called "eucharist," cannot be understood without a historical connection with the Gospel and the Pauline narration. The Eucharist demands a good moral disposition (see 1 Cor.); it is said to be "spiritual food and drink," giving eternal life (see John 6).[17] St. Ignatius to the Smyrnaeans (R 64); there the truth of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist is apparent from opposition to the teaching of the Docetists. And also to the Philadelphians (R56); where unless it is dealing with the true flesh of Christ there is no argument for union.

b) Among the *Apologists* we have St. Justin (R 128), arguing from the truth of the Incarnation to the truth of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist.

86. c) Among the other *Pre-Nicene Fathers* we have St. Irenaeus, a witness for the Church of Asia Minor, Gaul and Rome (R 249), who argues from the truth of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist (as from something well known) to the truth of the Incarnation (see also R 234).

For the Roman Church St. Hippolytus should be cited, who wrote: "We receive his Body; and his Blood is a pledge of eternal life for anyone who humbly approaches him."[18]

For the Church of Alexandria there is Clement who said: "From a different point of view therefore listen to the Savior. I am your nourishment; I give myself as bread, which no one who has tasted it still accepts the danger of death; daily I give the drink of immortality."[19] Origen in the same Church mentions the care that Christians have also regarding even small pieces of the consecrated bread (R 590); and he teaches the truth of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist in opposition to its figure (R 491). In the same Church St. Dionysius agrees: "For he hears the Eucharist and answers with the others "Amen"; he assists at the table and extends his hand to receive the sacred food; in receiving it for a long time he has been participating in the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ—thus I did

16. See G. Bareille, *Eucharistie d'après les Pères:* DTC 5,1121-1183.
17. See J. Quasten, *Monumenta Eucharistica et liturgica vetustissima* (Florilegium Patristicum, fasc.7 part 1 p.8-13), where there is a bibliography. See however a contrary view in H. Leclercq, *Messe:* DACL 11,539-552.
18. *Fragmenta in Genesim* 38,19 (ed. Berlin 1936). See *In Proverbia* 9,1-5 (ed. Lagarde, 199). On this whole question, see A. D'Ales, *La théologie de saint Hippolyte* (Paris 1906) 147-150.
19. *Quis dives salvetur* 23: MG 9,627.

not dare to renew him again."[20]

For the African Church it is necessary first of all to cite Tertullian, who teaches openly the real presence in the Eucharist. For he says: "The flesh feeds on the Body and Blood of Christ, that the soul likewise may fatten on [its] God" (R 362); he speaks often about receiving and even reserving "the Body of the Lord" (R 310, 368), "and we are very upset if some of it falls on the ground" (R 367). The texts that seem to say the opposite, as if they were dealing with a "figure" of the Body of Christ (R 343), or as if bread "represents" or "is thought to be" the Body of Christ (R 333), really do not mean that at all. For, one must pay special attention to the way in which Tertullian speaks about this matter just as he does about other questions. He says "figure" as an ancient symbol of the Body of Christ (namely the bread), now truly containing it. But "to represent" is to make something present, to show it. But "to be thought to be" is nothing else but "to be."[21] In the same African Church St. Cyprian speaks about the violence that is done to the Body of Christ by those who communicate badly (R 551), and in a clear way he cites John 6 (R 559).

87. d) *From the Fathers of the fourth century* the following should be cited: for the Roman Church, Ambrosiaster writes: "Because by the death of the Lord we are liberated, while remembering this in eating his Body and drinking his Blood which were offered for us, following the New Testament in these things we signify that this is the New Law."[22] St. Jerome, while praising Bishop Exuperius who gave everything to the poor, then adds: "No one is richer than the one who carries the Body of the Lord in a basket and his Blood in a glass container."[23] We also have testimony in other Italian Churches. Thus St. Ambrose: "Christ for me is food; Christ for me is drink; the Flesh of God is my food, and the Blood of God is my drink. Christ ministers to me daily."[24] And St. Gaudentius: "Therefore the Creator and Lord of natures who produces bread from the earth, and again from that bread, because he both can do it and promised it, makes his own Body; and he who made wine from water, also makes his own Blood from the wine."[25]

In the Church of Gaul there is St. Hilary of Poitiers (R 870). In the Spanish Church Gregory Illiberitanus, almost copying the words of Tertullian:

20. That is, he did not want to re-baptize someone baptized by heretics. *Epistola ad Sixtum* (in Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 7,9: MG 20,656.
21. See DTC 5,1131f.; A. D'Ales, *La théologie de Tertullien* (Paris 1905) 356-359.
22. *In 1 Cor 11,26:* ML 17,256.
23. *Epistola* 125,20: ML 22,1085.
24. *In Ps 118* sermo 18,26: ML 15,1461. See *De Sacramentis* 4,419: ML 18,482 and 4,4,14 (R 1339); 4,4,23 (R 1340). See also Theodoretus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 5,18: MG 22,1231.
25. *In Exodum* serm.2: ML 20,855.

"Flesh feeds on the Body and drinks the Blood of Christ, that the soul may fatten on [its] God."[26] In the African Church St. Optatus Milevitanus: "For what is the altar but the seat of Body and Blood of Christ."[27]

The Alexandrian Church offers us many testimonies. St. Athanasius (R 802). Macarius: "In the Church bread and wine must be offered—the type or figure of his Flesh and Blood."[28] Didymus: "We celebrate the Eucharist every year, every day, or rather every hour, taking part in his Body and Blood. Those who have been found worthy of this supreme and eternal mystery know whereof I speak."[29] Theophilus: "What built for itself a temple of God the Father, not made by human hands, that subsisting Wisdom distributed his own Body as bread, and he gave his vivifying Blood as wine to drink."[30] This whole homily of Theophilus is worth reading.

The Church in Palestine offers us the testimony of Eusebius: "But we men of the new covenant every Sunday while celebrating our Pasch are always satiated with the Body of the Servant, we always participate in the Blood of the Lamb."[31] St. Cyril of Jerusalem has much to say (R 840, 842, 844, 845, 846, 848, 850).

In the Church of Antioch St. Chrysostom stands out (R 1192, 1194, 1195). Macarius Magnes should also be mentioned (2166).[32]

In the Church in Cappadocia there are St. Basil (R 916), St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1062) and St. Gregory Nazianzen: "But, O holy worshipper of God, do not hesitate both to pray and to perform a service for us, when you have drawn down the Word by speaking a word, when you have divided the Body and Blood of the Lord in an unbloody operation, using your voice instead of a sword."[33]

The Church of Syria is represented by Aphraates (R 689), St. Ephraem (R 707f.) and Cyrillonas: "He [Christ] is a cluster of grapes who treaded Himself in the Upper Room, and then gave Himself to his disciples in the cup as a witness of truth."[34]

88. e) *From the Fathers of the fifth century* those to be cited are: for the Roman Church St. Leo the Great (R 2214). For the other Churches of Italy, St. Peter Chrysologus: "A woman touched his garment and was cured from

26. *Tractatus Origenis* 17 (ed. Battifol-Wilmart, 187f.).
27. *De schismate donatistarum* 6,1: ML 11,1065.
28. *Homilia* 27,17: MG 34,706.
29. *De Spiritu Sancto* 3,21: MG 39,905. *De Trinitate* 2,14: MG 39,715.
30. *In mysticam Coenam:* MG 77,1018. On this homily, see RevHistEccl 33 (1937) 46-56.
31. *De solemnitate paschali* 7: MG 24,702.
32. On the ambiguous formulas, to which Macarius alludes, see the scholium.
33. *Epistola* 171: MG 37,279-282.
34. *Homilia 2 de Paschate.*

a long-term disease. How miserable we are, for daily we handle the Body of the Lord and consume it, and we are not cured of our diseases."[35] For the Churches of the Gauls, Faustus Reiensis: "For just as without bodily sense, having put away the former worthlessness, suddenly your are clothed with a new dignity, and just as what was injured in you God cured, what was infected he washed away, what was stained he cleansed and these things are not entrusted to your eyes or senses: so when you approach the sacred altar and have been satiated with the heavenly food, look upon the holy Body of your God and his Blood—honor it, admire it, grasp it with your mind, take it with the hand of your heart and especially receive it with interior delight."[36]

In the African Church, St. Augustine stands out; his testimonies, often allegorical, do not take away his faith in the truth of the real presence. These texts should be consulted: R 1519, 1524, 1815.[37]

In the Alexandrian Church we have first Isidorus Pelusiotas: "When our God and Savior, having become a man, revealed the Holy Spirit to complete the divine Trinity and in the invocation of holy baptism named him together with the Father and the Son as freeing us from sins, and in the mystical Supper when he changed common bread into the Body of his own incarnation, what did you."[38] Then St. Cyril (R 2100).

In the Church of Antioch there is Theodore of Mopsuestia (R 113c)[39]; Theodoretus Cyrensis: "How can it happen that we communicate with the Lord through his precious Body and Blood, and again through food sacrificed to demonic idols?"[40] Likewise, the *Epistola ad Caesarium* (attributed to the false Chrysostom): "For just as before the bread has been sanctified we call it bread; but when it has been sanctified by divine grace, by the power of the priest, it is now freed from being called bread, and can now be called the Body of the Lord., and we do not preach two bodies but one Body of the Son, so."[41]

In the Church of Syria there is Balaeus: "He [the priest] takes bread and gives the Body; he takes wine and gives the Blood."[42] In the Church of Armenia John Mandakuni: "You pay no attention to the holiness of the Body and Blood of Christ, which you received from the awe-inspiring altar."[43]

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35. *Sermo* 33: ML 52,295.
36. *Homilia de Corpore et Sanguine Christi* 3: ML 30,272.
37. See G. Bareille, *Eucharistie d'après les Pères:* DTC 5,1173-1177.
38. *Epistola* 109: MG 78,255.
39. See however W. de Vries, *Der "Nestorianismus" Theodorus von Mopsuestia in seiner Sakramentenlehre:* OrChrPer 7 (1941) 135-141.
40. *In 1 Cor 10:21:* MG 82,306.
41. MG 52,578.
42. *In consecratione Ecclesiae.*
43. *De spectaculis* 2.

89. f) *From the Fathers of the sixth century* first of all in Rome we cite St. Gregory the Great: "The Good Shepherd gave his life for his sheep, that in our sacrament he might change it into his Body and Blood, so that the sheep, which he had redeemed, he might satiate with the nourishment of his own flesh."[44] In Gaul St. Caesar of Arles (R 2231). In Africa St. Fulgentius (R 2237). In the Church of Antioch, Eutychius: "Therefore each one takes the whole holy Body and precious Blood of the Lord, even if he consumes only a part of these species; for it is divided indivisibly to all, because within He has united himself with all."[45]

90. g) *From the Fathers of the seventh and eighth centuries* the Spanish Church has St. Isidore: "The sacrifice, which is offered by Christians, Christ our Lord and Teacher first instituted, when he commended his Body and Blood to his Apostles."[46] In the Church of Antioch, Maximus the Confessor: "But Christ, coming as the Pontiff of future goods and offering Himself as a silent victim, gave them his Blood along with his Flesh; because of their good minds they have excellent senses when it comes to the evaluation of good and evil."[47] In the Church of Palestine, St. Sophronius: "For then in response we say this to the priests [that is, Amen], when they distribute the vivifying and salutary Body and Blood of Christ, offering a testimony with our own voice, and professing that it is true and truly is called what is distributed to us by them for spiritual food and for the forgiveness of sins."[48] St. John Damascene (R 2371).

91. 2. *Liturgies.* All of the very old liturgies contain a narration of the institution of the Eucharist in the canon. Often they have an invocation of the Holy Spirit to change the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ. Commonly they use words that designate the presence of Christ.[49]

3. *Other ancient documents.* There are many symbolic representations (v.gr., breaking bread) and some epigraphic documents (see R 187) that bear witness to the Eucharistic faith.[50]

92. 4. *Eucharistic controversies of the Middle Ages.* At that time there were two controversies about the Eucharist. *In the first one* (ninth to tenth centuries), the question had to do with the identity between the Eucharistic

44. *In Evangelia* hom.14,1: ML 76,1127.
45. *De Paschate et de sanctissima Eucharistia* 2: MG 86,2394.
46. *De ecclesiasticis officiis* 1,18,1: ML 83,754.
47. *Quaestiones ad Thalasium* 36: MG 90,382.
48. *SS.Cyri et Ioannis miracula* 38: MG 87,3567.
49. See H. Leclercq, *Messe:* DACL 11,513-774; especially 730-750.
50. See R.S. Bour, *Eucharistie d'après les monuments de l'antiquité chrétienne:* DTC 5,1183-1210.

Body of Christ and the Body of Christ in heaven. Both those who affirmed identity (Paschasius Radbertus), and those who denied it (Rabanus Maurus, Ratramnus) admitted the real presence. The dispute was about the manner of that presence.

In the second controversy (eleventh to twelfth centuries), because of a false notion of conversion Berengarius and his disciples denied the real presence. Therefore there was a violent reaction both in the many conciliar condemnations and in many Catholic writings (Adelmanus, Hugo, Ascellinus, Durandus, Lanfrancus, Guitmondus, Bernoldus, etc.).[51]

93. Theological reasoning. It is obvious that the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist cannot be proved by reason. However, St. Thomas explains its fittingness (III, q. 75, a. 1) from the perfection of the new law, which brought truth to figures [of the old law]; from the love of Christ for us, since friendship wishes to enjoy the presence of friends; from the perfection of faith, which concerns things that are not seen, and which must be exercised both regarding the divinity of Christ (in the Incarnation), and regarding His humanity (in the Eucharist). Suarez explains this beautifully and at length, gathering together many arguments of this manifold and excellent fittingness.[52]

94. Scholium. *Figure, image, similitude.* In the holy Fathers some difficult texts are found, which seem to deny the real presence, while admitting nothing in the Eucharist except a figure or similitude of the Body of Christ. A few comments will now be given on those texts.

a) St. Cyril of Jerusalem uses such a way of speaking: "For in the figure (τύπω) of bread, the Body is given to you; and in the figure of wine the Blood is given to you."[53] And Gelasius: "And certainly the image and similitude of the Body and Blood of Christ are celebrated in the action of the mysteries."[54] Eusebius, Macarius, St. Gregory Nazianzen, Eutychius speak in a similar way.[55]

b) This manner of speaking is taken from the Liturgy. Thus in the Apostolic Tradition of St. Hippolytus it was said: "And then the oblation is offered to the bishop by the deacons, and he gives thanks—the bread as an example (which the Greeks call an antitype) of the Body, but the mixed chalice because it is an antitype (which the Greeks call

51. See F. Vernet, *Eucharistie du IX^e à la fin du XI^e siècle:* DTC 5,1207-1233.
52. *In 3* q.75 a.1 disp.46 s.7.
53. *Catecheses mystagogicae* 4,3 (R 845).
54. *De duabus naturis in Christo adversus Eutychen et Nestorium* 14 (ed. Thiel, 541f.).
55. Eusebius, *Demonstratio evangelica* 8 (MG 22,595); Macarius, *Homilia* 27,17 (MG 34,706); St. Gregory Nazianzen, *In laudem sororis* 18 (MG 35,810f.); Eutychius, *De paschate et de SS. Eucharistia* 2 (MG 26,2394). Among the Latins, besides Tertullian mentioned earlier, see St. Jerome, *Adversus Iovinianum* 2,5 (ML 23,304); St. Augustine, *Enarrationes in Psalmos* 3,1 (ML 36,73).

a similitude) of the Blood."[56] The Euchologium Serapionis: "We offer you this bread, a similitude of the Body of the Only-begotten. This bread is a similitude of the holy Body; because our God Jesus Christ in the night in which."[57] Similar words are found in the Apostolic Constitutions, in the Ambrosian Liturgy, in the Anaphora of St. Basil, in the Mozarabic Liturgy.[58]

c) It is certain that in these texts the real presence is not being denied, because these same authors have other clear texts, some of which have already been quoted in the thesis; this pertains also to the liturgies. Indeed, in other passages preceding or following these texts often the real presence is openly affirmed.

d) St. Damascene offers an explanation of these formulas (R 2371). And actually the bread and wine in those texts is called a figure (τύπος), image (εἰκών), similitudo (ὁμοίωμα) of the Body of Christ before the consecration; also they are called after the consecration ἀντίτυπα of the Body of Christ, inasmuch as they respond to the preceding figure (plain bread), and therefore now contain his Body and Blood. Hence the cited texts, in no way deny, but rather positively support the real presence.

e) However, these formulas, especially in a culture less inclined to use allegories, could easily be understood in the wrong way. Actually it seems that this did happen at times, as Macarius Magnes says (R 2166).[59] Therefore the Second Council of Nicaea in act.6[60] forbade their use.

95. Objections The main ones have already been covered in the thesis and in the scholium. But note in general that many Fathers made use of allegories, but that does not mean that they denied the real presence, as we have seen. For, the Eucharist, containing Christ really present but invisibly under the species, really is a symbol and sign of the Body of Christ long ago offered for us on the Cross; it is also a sign of the Body of Christ existing in heaven (it is also for us a pledge of glory), but also a sign of Christ invisibly uniting Himself with his own Mystical Body. Therefore it cannot be surprising that the Fathers sometimes allude to all these truths.[61]

56. *Traditio Apostolica* 73f. (Florilegium Patristicum, 7 part 1,32).
57. *Euchologium Serapionis* 13,3 (Florilegium Patristicum, 7 part 1,61).
58. St. Ambrose, *De sacramentis* 4,5 (ML 16,444); *Anaphora S, Basilii* (MG 18,686); *Liber Ordinum* (ed. Férotin, 322); *Liber mozarabicus sacramentorum* (ed. Férotin, n. 1440).
59. The danger of a false understanding appears clearly in Facundus Hermianensis, *Pro defensione trium Capitulorum* 9,5 (MG 67,7625): "The sacrament of His Body and Blood, which is in the consecrated bread and wine, we say is His Body and Blood; this does not really mean that His body is bread and the wine his Blood, but that they contain in themselves the mystery of His Body and Blood."
60. See Hrd 4,370.
61. On this whole question, see A. Wilmart, *Transfigurare:* BullAncLittArchChr 1 (1911) 280; J. Brinktrine, *Die transformatio (transfiguration) Corporis et Sanguinis Christi in den alten abendländischen Liturgien:* ThGl 8 (1916) 311-318.

ARTICLE II

ON THE ACTION BY WHICH THE REAL PRESENCE TAKES PLACE OR ON TRANSUBSTANTIATION

96. Having established the truth of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, we are now going to treat the action by which this presence is brought about. This action is a definite kind of conversion, which is called "transubstantiation." In order to establish this there is *first of all* the dogmatic fact, that is, its existence and truth. But since from that there follows de facto (whatever the case may be with its metaphysical necessity) the remainder of the accidents of the bread and wine after transubstantiation has taken place; this is the *second* question that must be dealt with. *Finally,* we will seek a more intimate explanation of this mystery.

I. THE FACT OF TRANSUBSTANTIATION

Thesis 8. In the Eucharist the substance of bread and wine does not remain with the Body and Blood of Christ, but what takes place is the wonderful and singular conversion of the whole substance of bread into the Body and the whole substance of wine into the Blood; the Catholic Church most fittingly calls this conversion "transubstantiation."

S.Th. III, q. 75, a. 2-4; Suarez, *In 3* q.75 disp.40 and 50; Alastruey, 114-134; Puig, 348-365; Filograssi, 84-114; Lercher-Dander, 294-306.

97. Definition of terms. *Conversion* is the change of one thing into another. Conversion is a species of change. *Change is* the transition of a thing from one state or way of being to another.

Change is divided into generation (transition of something from a negative to a positive state), corruption (from a positive to a negative state) and conversion (from a positive to a positive state). Hence conversion requires a positive terminus from which (*a quo*) and a positive terminus to which (*ad quem*).

The *terminus* in a conversion is distinguished as *total* (the whole thing which ceases or begins to exist) and as *formal* (that aspect according to which the thing ceases or begins to exist).

Conversion also requires a *connection* between the termination of one thing and the positing of the other. The termination of the one is because of the positing of the other; or in such a way that one thing ceases to exist

because the other begins to exist.

It is a disputed point whether for the notion of conversion it is also required that something of the whole "terminus from which" remains in the new reality.[1]

98. *The whole substance of bread and wine.* That is, *the total terminus a quo* is the substance and accidents of bread and wine, or the bread and wine as they exist in nature. *The formal terminus a quo* is the total (and only) substance of bread and wine. *The total terminus ad quem* is the Body and Blood of Christ under the species of bread and wine. *The formal terminus ad quem* is the Body and Blood of Christ.

The wonderful and singular conversion. It is designated in this way because the formal terminus ad quem does not begin to exist simply, but it only begins to exist in a new way. And also because the conversion is of the total substance into a total substance; therefore it is more substantial than other substantial conversions. Hence it is called transubstantiation.

99. Adversaries. Berengarius arrives at a negation of the real presence from his difficulty in understanding the Eucharistic conversion. According to him, such a real conversion is impossible, both on the part of the terminus a quo and on the part of the terminus ad quem. However, there is in the Eucharist a certain "true conversion," but by consecration; that is, the substance of the bread is not destroyed, but it remains as elevated to something better. This conversion is "intelligible," not "sensual" (or real); inasmuch as the bread is said to be converted into the Body of Christ spiritually, because the human nature of Christ *is thought to be* in the bread.[2]

Wycliffe, according to his conception of the presence of Christ as not real but figurative, tended to defend also that the substance of bread and wine remain after the consecration, as he de facto taught.[3]

Those *Protestants,* who admitted the real presence, denied not only the word, but also the truth of transubstantiation. For, they defended that the substance of bread is present together with the Body of Christ in the Eucharist, although all of them did not always clearly explain in the same way the relation existing between the two substances. Luther proposed his theory of ubiquity; according to this view the human nature of Christ, as being united to the divinity, is everywhere, and therefore also in the

1. See Suarez, *In 3* q.75 disp.50 s.2 n.16; Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.7 n.8. On conversion, see Urráburu, *Ontologia* 246f.; *Cosmologia* 358.
2. See Ramírez, *La controversia eucaristica* 99-124.
3. See E. Mangenot, *Eucharistie du XIII^e siècle.*: DTC 5,1320-1324. On Huss, see P. De Vooght, *Huss a-t-il enseigné la "remanentia substantiae panis post consecrationem"?:* RevScRel 27 (1953) 257-273.

substance of the bread. Osiander defended "impanation," or a hypostatic union between the humanity of Christ and the substance of bread; almost as the divinity is united with the humanity in the Incarnation.[4]

In our days some theologians contend that "the doctrine of transubstantiation, since it involves the antiquated notion of substance" should be changed.[5]

100. Doctrine of the Church. 1. *Before the Council of Trent.*

a) Gregory VII (D 700) *against Berengarius.* Already previously in the Synod of Rotomagensis (1063) it was said: "In the consecration by the ineffable power of the divinity that the nature and substance of bread *is converted* into the nature and substance of the Flesh [of Christ].; similarly that the wine. *truly and essentially* is converted into his Blood, which by the lance of the soldier. poured forth." But afterwards in the Synod of Placentina 1095) it was said: "that the bread and wine, when consecrated on the altar, *are converted not only figuratively but also truly and essentially* into the Body and Blood of the Lord." Berengarius understood the words of the Roman formula "to be substantially converted" to signify in the mind of the Church the termination of the substance of the bread and wine and the positing of the Body and Blood of Christ, although he deliberately distorted those words into another meaning in order to save his heresy.[6]

b) Innocent III (D 782 and 784). There for the first time is read in a pontifical document the word "transubstantiated," which together with the word "transubstantiation" was already frequently used in theology from the middle of the twelfth century.[7]

c) *Lateran Council IV* (D 802) uses the word "transubstantiated."

d) *Council of Lyons II* in the profession of faith for Michael Paleologus (D 860) it is said that the bread is "truly transubstantiated." This profession of faith, which is almost the same formula sent by Clement IV to Constantinople, is composed of two parts. The first part (from the beginning

4. The theory of impanation is undeservedly attributed to Berengarius (see Ramírez, 44). It is also falsely imputed to some unnamed authors in the eleventh and twelfth centuries (see DTC 5,1286). Certain texts of Rupertus Tuitiensis reflect this theory, not only in his early but also in his later works (see *In Ex* 2.10: ML 167,617; *In Io* 6,52: ML 169,481; but there cannot be any doubt about his orthodox mentality (see DTC 5,1286; 14,196-203). John Quidort in 1304 taught a similar doctrine, holding that this is one of the possible explanations of the Eucharistic conversion, since according to him the doctrine of transubstantiation is not a matter of faith (*de fide*) (see H. Weisweiler, *Die Impanationslehre des Ioannes Quidort:* Schol 8 (1931) 161-195.

5. See Encyclical "*Humani generis*": D 3891).

6. See Ramírez, *La controversia eucaristica* 78-98.

7. Up to this time the first one to use these words seems to have been Stephanus Augustodunensis, *Tractatus de Sacramento altaris* 14 (ML 172, 1293); or Rolandus Bandinellus around the years 1140-1142 (Gielt, *Die Sentensen Rolands Bandinelli* 231); or perhaps Hildebertus-Laverdensis, *Sermo* 93: ML 171,776. See J. de Ghellinck, *Eucharistie au XII^e siècle en Occident:* DTC 5,1287-1293.

to "Such is the true Catholic faith.") coincides with the symbol of faith of Leo IX (D 680-685). The second part is added because of new errors. The dogmatic value of this definition of faith, although attacked by some at the First Vatican Council, most certainly was recognized by the Fathers of the same Council.[8]

e) *The Council of Constance* (D 1151) against Wycliffe.[9] This first proposition even before this time was condemned by qualified theologians as heretical.

f) *The Council of Florence* presents the doctrine of the Roman Church in the Decree for the Armenians (D 1320) and in the Decree for the Jacobites (D 1352).

101. 2. *The Council of Trent* sess.13 cn.2 and chap.4 (D 1652, 1642). The third error, proposed for examination by some of the theologians, was: "In the Eucharist there is indeed the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, but they are together with the substance of bread and wine, so that it is not a transubstantiation,"[10] cited expressly from Luther. This was the occasion for the canon.

a) *In the canon* (D 1652) three things are taught: the substance of bread and wine disappears, and only the species remain; this takes place by the conversion of a substance to another substance; this conversion is very fittingly called transubstantiation. That it is not sufficient to admit the ceasing of the substance of the bread and wine, but also the truth of the conversion must absolutely be retained and also the very word "transubstantiation"—this is taught by Pius VI against the Synod of Pistoia (D 2629). Hence the verb "and denies" (*negaveritque*) should be understood as "or denies" (*negaveritve*). Nevertheless, for dogma the popular notion of conversion suffices, nor should all the conditions of a further scientific explanation be required, since it is certain that the Council in this matter did not wish to answer all the scholastic questions.[11]

b) *In the fourth chapter,* besides the things contained in the canon, the source of this doctrine is taught; it is found in the words of institution of the Eucharist.

See also the Profession of Faith of Trent (D 1866).

3. *After the Council of Trent,* it is necessary to remember the condemnation by Pius XII of the recent error concerning the necessity of

8. See V. Grumel, *Lyon (II^e Concile de):* DTC 9,1384-1388.
9. On this Council see above N. 78 e).
10. CTr 5,69.
11. CTr 5,844.

amending the doctrine of transubstantiation.[12]

102. *Therefore the doctrine of the Church is this:*

a) The Body and Blood of Christ are so present in the Eucharist that the substance of the bread and wine does not remain there.

b) The substance of bread and wine does not remain because it is converted into the Body and Blood of Christ.

c) Hence the Body and Blood of Christ begin to be present in the Eucharist by reason of a true conversion, whose two extremes are the bread and wine on the one hand, and the Body and Blood of Christ on the other.

d) This conversion is very fittingly named transubstantiation; doubtless because it comes about from the whole substance of bread and wine changing into the whole substance of the Body and Blood of Christ.

e) This doctrine is deduced from the truth of the words of institution.

Theological note. The fact of transubstantiation, that is, the ceasing of the whole substance of the bread and wine and its conversion into the Body and Blood of Christ, is *defined divine and Catholic faith.*[13] It is *Catholic doctrine* that the word itself of transubstantiation must very fittingly be retained.

103. Proof from Holy Scripture. It is proved from the words "This is my Body"; "This is the chalice of my Blood."

a) After the consecration, *there is no longer the substance of bread and wine.* The pronoun "this" (at least when the predicate is expressed) must designate only the Body of Christ. But if the substance of bread were present together with it, it would not designate only the Body of Christ. Therefore, after the words of consecration have been spoken the substance of bread is not present.

The major. 1) The pronoun "this" must designate *the Body of Christ;* otherwise there would not be identity between the subject and the predicate, and so the proposition would not be true. 2) The pronoun "this" must designate *only* the Body of Christ: For, that pronoun designates only the substance contained under the visible accidents, except when it is dealing with some substance ordained to another that can contain it. But this must be certain from the nature of the matter, or from common use, or from a special forewarning. But the substance of bread in no way at all is ordered

12. Suarez, (*In 3* q.75 disp.4 s.1 n.5) had already said that not only the absence of the substance of the bread but also the conversion itself pertains to Catholic faith.

13. Encyclical "*Humani generis*": D 3891. See E.-J. Vandenbussche, *La transsubstantiation, verité pacifiante:* CongrInternEuc (1952) 1,217-221.

to contain the Body of Christ.

The minor. If the substance of bread were present together with the Body of Christ, the pronoun "this" would designate only the substance of bread; for it alone is what corresponds to those sensible accidents.

Thus we can truly say "this is wine," by showing a full glass; but we cannot truly say "this is gold," by showing an apple in which is hidden a golden coin; in this final case one would have to say "here is gold."

104. b) All of this is done *in virtue of some conversion.* From the way in which what Christ did and said at the Last Supper is described, it is clear that Christ in some true sense gave the Apostles what he had in his hands. But this is not true, unless there is a connection between the bread and wine as they cease to be and the Body and Blood of Christ as they begin to be. Therefore there is such a connection. But this is nothing other than that one was changed into the other (that one ceases so that the other may begin to be). Therefore there is here a true conversion.

c) All the aspects *of a conversion, even taken scientifically,* are verified. There are two positive terms (bread and the Body of Christ); the terminus *a quo* ceases to exist as a whole substance (the whole substance of bread disappears) and another whole substance takes its place (the whole substance of the Body of Christ); there is an intimate connection between the cessation of one and the positing of the other (given the truth of the words, *therefore* the substance of bread ceases to be *because* the Body of Christ is now present under the species; since from the truth of the words, as we have seen, the Body of Christ must be under the visible accidents as a unique substance); something common remains of the whole terminus *a quo* and of the whole terminus *ad quem* (namely, the species of bread and wine).

105. *Note* that the whole argumentation is based *on the truth* of the words "This is my Body," and "This is the chalice of my Blood"; that is, if transubstantiation is not admitted, then the truth of Christ's words cannot be saved. In this sense Trent says: "Because Christ. said that it was truly his body that he was offering under the species of bread, it has always been the conviction of the Church of God." (D 1642). On the worth of this argument from the words of institution, it seems necessary to say this: Trent declared that the Church has always seen the doctrine of transubstantiation in the words of Christ, just as they were uttered by Him at the Supper. Therefore the argument based on them is certain, at least with this interpretation of the Church. Indeed, as it seems, even prescinding from her interpretation.

Hence, after the Council of Trent the contrary opinion, which is attributed to Scotus, Durandus and the Nominalists, cannot be defended.[14]

106. Proof from tradition. a) The holy Fathers teach: 1) That the substance of bread and wine is no longer present in the Eucharist after the consecration. Thus St. Ambrose (R 1333, 1339f.), St. Caesarius (R 2231), St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 848). 2) That the bread and wine become the Body and Blood of Christ. Thus St. Irenaeus (R 249), Tertullian (R 343), St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1062), St. Augustine (R 1520). 3) That the bread and wine are changed, transformed into the Body and Blood. Thus St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 844), St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1035), St. Chrysostom (R 1157), Theodore of Mopsuestia (R 1113f.), St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2101), St. Caesarius (R 2231). 4) They hand on the same doctrine under various comparisons. Thus St. Damascene (R 2371). Note also that many of these things are said in Christian catechism as something pertaining to the faith and doctrine of the Church about the Eucharist.

However there were some authors in the school of Antioch in the fifth century who, for polemic reasons, at times seem to have spoken less correctly about transubstantiation. Thus Theodoretus (R 2151). Pseudo-Chrysostom in the letter to Caesarius (R 1227); and those who were influenced by them—Gelasius[15] and Ephraem of Antioch.[16] All of these defend against the Monophysites the truth of the human nature of Christ and the persistence of the two natures in Him. They take an analogy from the Eucharist, in which after the consecration there is not only the Body of Christ, but also another visible element. Hence it came about that some of these authors (Theodoretus, Pseudo-Chrysostom), in order to strengthen their argument, called this last element the substance or nature of bread. But the texts of Ephraem and Gelasius, although obscure, seem to be removed from this exaggeration.[17]

107. b) *From the Liturgy.* In all the oriental liturgies from the fifth century there is an *epiclesis* in the strict sense; in it there is an invocation of the Holy Spirit that he change the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ. The same thing can be said about the Mozarabic liturgy and also the Gallican in many of its Masses. Finally, in the Roman Liturgy itself, the

14. See DTC 5,1305f. On the true opinion of Scotus in this matter, see O'Neill, *La preuve scripturaire de la transsubstantiation d'après la B.Duns Scot:* EtFranc 44 (1932) 401-406.
15. *De duabus naturis in Christo adversus Eutychen et Nestorium* 14 (ed. Thiel, 541f.).
16. MG 103,980.
17. See J. Lebreton, *Le dogme de la transsubstantiation et la christologie antiochenne du V^e siècle:* Et 117 (1908) 477-497.

prayer "Quam oblationem" (whether it is an epiclesis or not) contains the same idea.[18]

108. Theological reasoning is taken from S.Th. III, q. 75, a. 2. The Body of Christ is really present in the Eucharist. But it cannot be present unless it is because the bread is changed into it. Therefore there must be such a conversion. But also if there is such conversion, then the bread does not remain. Therefore.

The minor. That which already exists, does not begin to exist elsewhere unless it is either by local motion or by a conversion. But the Body of Christ, already existing in heaven, cannot be present in the Eucharist by local motion. Therefore it is by conversion.

The second minor. What is converted into another, when the conversion has been made, no longer remains; for, this is to be converted into another.

There is a dispute about the value of this argument and about its meaning in St. Thomas.[19]

109. Objections. 1. The pronoun "this" can designate only the Body of Christ, even if the substance of bread is present with it, because it can prescind from the latter. Therefore because the pronoun "this" designates only the Body of Christ it does not follow that the substance of bread is absent.

I deny the antecedent, because the pronoun "this" designates whatever is under the visible species.

2. The pronoun "this" does not designate the accidents of bread, even if they are present with the Body of Christ. Therefore in a similar way it does not designate the substance of bread, even though it is together with the Body of Christ.

I deny the parity, because the accidents are not what is designated by the pronoun, but the substance is designated which is under them. On the contrary, the substance of bread, if it were there, would be absolutely designable by the pronoun, because it is the substance. Thus when we say "this is sweet," the pronoun does not designate the color or quantity of the thing that is sweet, but only the substance which is said to be sweet and exists under a definite color and a definite quantity.

3. The Fathers say "bread becomes the Body of Christ." Therefore in the same way we would be able to say truly "bread is the Body of Christ." Therefore the identity between the subject and the predicate is preserved, even though the substance of bread remains.

I concede the antecedent and I deny the first consequent. For, a thing that becomes

18. See F. Cabrol, *Epiclèse:* DACL 5,176.

19. That is, theologians ask whether it is metaphysically repugnant, prescinding from the words of institution, that Christ is present in the Eucharist in some way other than conversion, as the words of St. Thomas seem to indicate. See Suarez, *In 3* q.75 disp.49 s.1; Alastruey, 144-147; B. Baur, *Non potest aliter Corpus Christi incipere esse de novo in hoc sacramento (Eucharistiae) nisi per conversionem substantiae panis in Ipsum:* DivThom (Pi) 37 (19340 120-128.

something else, at the terminus of the motion ceases to be what it was before the same motion. Thus, when I say "cold water becomes hot" in the terminus of that heating process the water ceases to be cold. Hence, if bread becomes the Body of Christ, it ceases to be bread. However, it must be admitted that a better way of saying it is not "bread becomes the body," but "the Body is made out of the bread," as St. Thomas teaches in III, q. 75, a. 8 ad 1. And this is the true meaning of that statement of the Fathers.

4. It is the essence of conversion that a common subject remains at both ends. But in transubstantiation this common subject does not remain. Therefore transubstantiation is not a true conversion.

I distinguish the major. It is the essence of a formal conversion (transformation), *conceded;* it is the essence of every conversion, *I subdistinguish:* what remains is something common, *I bypass the minor;* what remains is a subject in the proper sense, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* A common subject in the proper sense does not remain, *conceded;* nothing common remains, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* It is not a true formal conversion, *conceded;* it is not a true conversion simply, *denied.*

110. Scholium. *On some false explanations of transubstantiation.* Before we offer a more intimate explanation of transubstantiation, some explanations must be noted that cannot be held by Catholics, because they do not preserve the elements of the dogma already proved.

a) *The explanation of Durandus.* The Eucharistic conversion, according to him, is explained because, the matter remaining the same, the form of bread and wine is corrupted, and the form of the Body and Blood of Christ takes its place. This theory does not save the truth of transubstantiation, because according to it really something of the substance of the bread and wine does not disappear, namely, the matter. Hence it must be said to be at least an error in faith.[20]

b) *The explanation of Rosmini.* Since food is truly transubstantiated into our flesh and blood because it is the terminus of our sentient principle, so bread and wine are likewise transubstantiated because they become the terminus of the sentient principle of Christ and are sanctified by His life (D 3229f.). This theory, condemned by Leo XIII, does not preserve the conversion of the whole substance of bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ.

c) *The Cartesian explanation.* Just as in the transubstantiation of food the same particles remain and are informed by the soul, so in the Eucharist the bread and wine are said to be transubstantiated because the particles of bread and wine, remaining the same, in a miraculous way begin to be informed by the soul of Christ. In this theory it is clear that the substance of bread and wine remain, contrary to Catholic dogma.[21]

All of these explanation, retaining something of the bread, do not seem to be able to be reconciled with the Tridentine doctrine: "while *only* the species remain." The old

20. See Suarez, *In 3* q.75 disp.49 s.3 n.6.
21. See A. Chollet, *Descartes:* DTC 4,555-560.

opinion,[22] recently proposed again (although from a different perspective),[23] according to which, when the substance of bread is converted into the Body of Christ, the existence of the bread remains, also seems to be less in agreement with the same Tridentine definition.

111. d) *The explanation of P. Bayma.* Because the formal idea of a substance is "to exist in itself" and actually not to be sustained in another, if this formal idea is taken away from some substance, by that very fact it ceases to be a substance. In the Eucharist, therefore, Christ being substantially present sustains the nature of the bread and wine, which by the very fact that they are sustained in another cease to be a substance, although in the matter itself it suffers no change. Therefore the whole nature of the bread and wine remains, that is, the matter and the form; but now it is not a substance. It must rather be said that the nature of the bread and wine in the Eucharist now takes on the nature of a supernatural accident. This theory wishes to save the Tridentine definition, "the substance of the bread ceases to exist and only the accidents remain"; however, this theory saves that only verbally, not in reality, since the bread and wine truly remain. Hence according to Catholic doctrine this theory cannot be tolerated (D 3121ff.).

e) *The explanation of P. Sanders.* The Tridentine doctrine must be retained which says that "only the species remain." But after the consecration the prime matter of the bread and wine remains with the accidents, and this composite is called by the Council the "species." The matter, so determined by the accidents, needs to be informed by the substantial form of Christ. But because this cannot be, this information is supplied because the "species" (that is, the matter of the bread and wine together with the accidents) already exist through the existence of the Body of Christ. This theory also, which has many other problems with it, does not really save the Tridentine doctrine, because according to that doctrine nothing of the bread remains except only the accidents; therefore the matter also does not remain.[24]

22. See Suarez, *In 3* q.75 disp.49 s.4.
23. See B. Augier, *La transsubstantiation d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin:* RevScPhTh 17 (1928) 438f.
24. See EphThLov 8 (1931) 514f.

II. ON THE EUCHARISTIC SPECIES

112. The Council of Trent, since it teaches the whole conversion of the substance of bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ, nevertheless affirms that the species of the bread and wine remain. In this question that we now have to treat there are three elements that pertain to the doctrine of the Church (in one way or another): the objective reality of the species, the remaining of the same species, the absence of any subject of inhesion. That being the case, there are now various attempts to explain it that can be examined.

Thesis 9. In the Eucharist the really objective species of the bread and wine remain—the same ones that were in the substance of the bread and wine before the consecration; but now they remain without any subject.

S.Th. III, q. 77, a. 1-2; Suarez, *In 3* q.77 disp.56; Alastruey, 148-161, 232-241; Puig, 366-377; Filograssi, 114-133; Lercher-Dander, 312-315.

113. Definition of terms. *The species of bread and wine* are the properties which our senses perceive and with which bread and wine are customarily referred to (color, smell, taste, size).

Really objective, that is, they really exist independently; they are not just appearances or something merely subjective produced in our senses by God or by the Body of Christ by a subjective modification of them alone.

They remain the same, that is, not only is identity maintained in the effects they produce, but also in their very being, which is exactly the same as it was before the consecration.

Without any subject is said for the reason that these species, or accidents, do not inhere in any substance. Therefore we deny for them not only the substance of the bread and wine, but any subject whatever of inhesion. This holds true for the whole complex of accidents; for quantity alone remains absolutely without *any* subject; the other species inhere in the quantity.

Therefore we are saying three things: a) The species of bread and wine really exist independently after the consecration; b) and they are not newly produced, but are the same ones which before were in the bread and wine; c) however they now remain without a subject of inhesion. But in the thesis we will give just one proof for the three points.

114. Adversaries. Historically the adversaries first attacked the existence of accidents without a subject, then their objective reality, and

thirdly their identical permanence.

In the twelfth century *in the school of Abelard* some held that the accidents of bread and wine after the consecration remain in the air.[1]

Wycliffe held that the accidents do not remain without a subject after the consecration. This was a consequence of his denial of transubstantiation and of the real presence. Indeed for him such existence of accidents without a subject of inhesion is impossible, even for the absolute power of God.

Some Cartesians. At the end of the seventeenth century and in the eighteenth century many theologians, wishing to explain the Eucharist according to the tenets of Cartesianism, and because of that having a great difficulty from the Cartesian identity between the essence of a body and its actual extension, fell into the following two tendencies, which Descartes himself had already mentioned. Namely, *some* held that the species are merely intentional, that is, subjective sensations produced in us by God or by the Body of Christ in such a way that they seem to us to remain just the same as they were before the consecration. Thus Maignan, Saguens, Nájera among the Friars Minor. *Others,* however, held that the pieces of bread through the consecration are informed by the soul of Christ, and so become the Body of Christ, in which therefore they are the species. Thus, Desgabbets, Fouquet, Le Gallois among the Benedictines; Cally, Varigno, and *others.*[2]

According to Tongiorgi, S.J., and Palmieri, S.J., the species are phenomena, not indeed purely subjective, but objective; however they are not the same in their being as they were before, but only according to their effects. Once the substance of the bread has been removed, God brings it about that in the place where it was before and within the same limits, resistance is had in the same way in which it functioned from the substance of the bread when it was present. Thus the same objective phenomena remain (as from a cause existing independently and apart from the senses). But it is obvious that this identity is not entitative, but merely sensible.[3]

Sanders proposed a new conception of the species. The species, according to him, are a certain composite from the matter of the bread (or wine) and the accidents. The accidents determine the matter which is of itself indeterminate. But matter so determined by the accidents truly demands to be informed by the substantial form of Christ. But this exigency is actually not fulfilled (since it cannot be fulfilled because of the actual glorious state of the Body of Christ); but it is the reason why the matter of the bread exists through the

1. See F. Jansen, *Eucharistiques (Accidents):* DTC 5,1377-1382.
2. See F. Jansen: DTC 5,1422-1444.
3. See Filograssi, 124.

existence of Christ and why it conserves its accidents.[4]

115. Doctrine of the Church. Innocent III, proposing the doctrine of the Roman Church, speaks about the species (D 782), which are visible (D 783), and in the same way about the accidents (D 784).

Lateran Council IV says that the Body and Blood of Christ are truly contained under the species of bread and wine (D 802); this way of speaking evidently supposes that the species are something objective.

The Council of Constance condemns the error of Wycliffe (D 1152). This proposition is condemned as diverse from proposition 1; historically this can be proved for certain from the teaching of Wycliffe himself and from the two censures of the theologians at the Council. Therefore Catholics must hold the permanence of the accidents of bread and wine without a subject. However it is not certain from the Council itself with what censure that proposition is condemned (see D 1251). Although from the preceding condemnations of Wycliffe and from the cited censures of the theologians, it is necessary to say that it is condemned at least as erroneous. Many early theologians held that it was condemned as heretical.[5]

The Council of Trent in sess.13 ch.2 (D 1652) says that transubstantiation takes place "while only the species remain." These species, which alone remain, are nothing else but the accidents without a subject; this was the unanimous doctrine of the Church from the thirteenth century. From a historical point of view it does not seem possible to have a doubt about this. The permanence of the species is also taught in that canon. However it is not certain that this point is defined there, even though reasons are not lacking which would seem to say that it is.

The objective reality of the species is always supposed in the manner of speaking of the Council. Thus, the Body of Christ exists under the species of bread (D 1639); the species have parts which can be separated (D 1653); the species are visible signs (D 1741).

Leo XIII writes: "Here [in the Eucharist] all the laws of nature are interrupted: the whole substance of bread and wine is converted into the Body and Blood of Christ; the species of the bread and wine, existing in no subject, are conserved by the divine power."[6]

116. *Hence* these three points are certainly contained in the doctrine of the Church:

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4. See StCath (1924-25) 15-24 (1930-1931) 149-168.
5. See F. Jansen: DTC 5,1410-1413.
6. Encyclical "*Mirae caritatis*": ASS 34,645.

a) Something of the bread and wine objectively is present after the transubstantiation: it is called the species, or accidents.

b) This certainly is the same that previously pertained to the bread and wine, but not to their substance, which has been changed *totally* into the Body and Blood of Christ.

c) But it remains without a subject, not inhering in any subject.

What else those species might be, or the accidents, and how they can exist without a subject, does not pertain to the doctrine of the Church.

Theological note. Since it is not certain that Trent wanted to define the permanence of the species, the thesis cannot be said to be a matter of faith (*de fide*). Therefore it can be said to be *at least Catholic doctrine.* Inasmuch as it seems certain that the proposition of Wycliffe was condemned as erroneous, the existence of the accidents without a subject can be said to be *theologically certain.* However it is clear that "accidents" here is not to be taken in the technical sense.

117. Proof from the consensus of theologians. This consensus, which is apparent in the whole history of theology, has as its root and foundation the doctrine of the Church, first about transubstantiation and then about the accidents.

a) The great doctors of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, following the *Master of the Sentences,*[7] expressly teach with one voice that the accidents of the bread and wine remain without a subject in the Eucharist; and they do this by refuting the hypothesis of the Abelardian school. Thus in their commentaries on the Master: St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus.

b) *The Nominalists,* having a great difficulty in admitting a real distinction of quantity from the substance, propose a theory of intentional species (Holcot, Petrus de Alliaco); however they do not dare to defend it because of the clear teaching of the Church.

c) When the *teaching of Wycliffe* first appears, the theologians see it as repugnant to the decisions of the Church. But this teaching, often reproved by the magisterium of the Church, was condemned definitively by the Council of Constance.

d) From that time *until Descartes* the doctrine of accidents remaining without a subject is not only defended by theologians of all schools as connected with dogma, but generally it was also held to be a matter of faith (*de fide*) (Toletus, Valentia, Suarez, Becanus, Lugo, Vázquez, *others*).

7. *Sententiae* 4 dist.12.

e) Concerning various attempts at an explanation proposed *by the Cartesians,* some were rejected immediately by other theologians because they did not save the truth of transubstantiation, but others because they did not save the objectivity of the species. One result was that in order to protect this objectivity some new systems were proposed (Tongiorgi, Palmieri) based on recent discoveries in physics.

f) But these *last systems* were also commonly rejected by theologians, because they did not sufficiently protect the doctrine of the Councils of Constance and Trent, as far as this can be determined from the historical circumstances.

But all these facts, through so many centuries, after so many difficulties, even in changed philosophical perspectives, clearly prove that the objective permanence of those species without a subject is connected with Catholic dogma. For such a strong theological tradition cannot be explained in any other way. Therefore it is certain not only that there is a consensus of theologians, but also that it is truly a dogmatic consensus.[8]

118. Objections. 1. If the thesis is accepted, then one would have to admit accidents existing without a subject of inhesion. But this cannot be admitted. Therefore the thesis is false.

I distinguish the major. Existence without the exigency of a subject of inhesion, *denied;* existence without an actual subject of inhesion, *I subdistinguish:* supernaturally, *conceded;* naturally, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* Accidents without an exigency of a subject of inhesion cannot be admitted, *conceded;* accidents without an actual subject of inhesion cannot be admitted, *I subdistinguish:* naturally, *conceded;* supernaturally, *denied.*

2. But an accident without an actual subject of inhesion is repugnant. For, that accident would have to be sustained by God. But it cannot be sustained by God. Therefore such an accident is repugnant.

I distinguish the major. It would have to be sustained by God in the genus of a material cause, *denied;* in the genus of an efficient cause, *conceded. I also distinguish the minor.* It is repugnant for an accident to be sustained by God in the genus of a material cause, *conceded;* in the genus of an efficient cause, *denied.* That is, God cannot be the subject of inhesion for those accidents, because such a subject is modified by the inhering accidents, which is impossible for God who is immutable. But God in another genus of cause, namely as efficient cause, supplies for that which the substance would do by sustaining it as a true subject of inhesion.

8. Hence the contrary opinion of Palmieri cannot be admitted, *Institutiones Philosophicae* 2 (Rome 1875) 186.

3. But the thesis supposes that quantity is really distinct from substance. But there is no proof for this in modern physics. Therefore the thesis now cannot be admitted.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. That is, modern physics does not prove positively and evidently the distinction of quantity from substance, *conceded or I bypass the minor;* that is, modern physics proves positively that such a real distinction is repugnant, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* The thesis must not be admitted, if modern physics cannot prove that real distinction, *denied;* if modern physics were to prove positively that they are not really distinguished, *conceded, but I deny the supposition.* Whatever may be the case with physics, either recent or ancient, from our thesis it follows that the certain doctrine of the Church requires a real distinction of quantity from the substance. Therefore this having been established, it is impossible that it will ever be proved truly by physical science that it is repugnant or that there is not such a real distinction.

119. Scholium 1. *On the scholastic explanation.* We saw in the thesis what must be held based on the teaching of the Church in the question concerning the Eucharistic species. A more profound explanation of this fact can be freely investigated, provided that the elements mentioned above are all maintained.

An excellent explanation is found in the scholastic theory of absolute accidents. According to this theory, the species are both the quantity and the qualities. The qualities are immediately founded on the quantity and are in it as in the subject of inhesion. But the quantity, really distinct from the corporeal substance, can be separated from it and by the divine power exist separated without any subject of inhesion. Therefore in transubstantiation, when the substance of bread ceases to exist, the very same quantity of bread continues to exist, while God supplies the material causality of the substance (the subject of inhesion) by his efficient causality. The quantity, conserved in this way, is the quasi subject of inhesion for the other accidents or qualities.[9] But the condemned proposition of Wycliffe must not be understood in any other way, since it is certain that the theologians at the Council of Constance understood it in this sense: "this is false and erroneous and smacking of heresy as understood *universally,*"[10] that is, if it is understood of all the accidents, among which is certainly the quantity remaining without a subject of inhesion.

9. See S.Th. III, q. 77, a. 2; Suarez, *In 3* q.77 disp.56 s.2 and 3.
10. See Von der Hardt, *Rerum Concilii Constantiensis* 3,168.

However, this scholastic explanation, although it is excellent and certainly to be retained, is not required by the doctrine of the Church. For, there can be other explanations, which in other ways save those three dogmatic elements. Thus, for example there is the dynamic theory of Cardinal Franzelin; according to him, after the transubstantiation the resistance remains and the same attraction which was present before in the bread, as a transient act divinely conserved. This theory labors under the philosophical difficulty in explaining the permanence of the transient action without a subject; but theologically it saved what must be saved.[11]

120. Scholium 2. *On the activity of the species.* The consecrated species have the same activity which they possessed before the consecration; they are subject to the same alteration and corruption and they nourish in the same way. But in order to nourish, they have to be corrupted; but when they are corrupted and no longer contain the Body of Christ, the same substance is produced naturally , which would have been produced by them if there had not been a transubstantiation.[12]

121. Scholium 3. *On the relation between the species and the Body of Christ.* According to the way of speaking of the Church, as we have seen, the Body of Christ exists under the species—it is contained under the species. Therefore there is a relation of presence and of containing. It is clear that any formal physical union must be denied, whether substantial (which is repugnant between substance and accidents), or accidental (which would suppose, contrary to the doctrine of the Church, that the accidents are in the Body of Christ as being in a subject of inhesion). Therefore the Body of Christ is not broken, is not torn by the teeth, is not chewed. This last way of speaking seems to be affirmed in the profession of faith prescribed for Berengarius in 1059 at the Roman Council.[13] But there the issue has to do only with affirming the real presence of Christ without any ambiguity. Hence some expressions are perhaps too realistic, but they do have a true

11. See G. Filograssi, *La realtà oggetiva delle specie eucharistiche secondo il Cardinal Franzelin:* Greg 18 (1937) 395-409. On the relation between the dogmatic elements and the philosophical explanation, see J. Ternus, *"Dogmatische Physik" in der Lehre vom Altarsakrament?:* Stimm (1937) 220230; F. Unterkirche, *Zu einigen Problemen in der Eucharistielehre* (Innsbruck 1938), and on this book see, DivTh(Fr) 17 (1939) 238-250; P. Sedlmayer, *Die Lehre des hl. Thomas von den accidentia sine subiecto remanentia, untersucht auf ihren Einklang mit der aristotelischen Philosophie:* DivTh(fr) 12 (1934) 315-326; M. Oromi, *El Concilio de Trento y la teoria substancia-accidentes en la Eucaristía:* VerVid 3 (1945) 3-45; *Substancia y especies ebn la Eucaristia:* ibid., 11 (1953) 97-107; F. Selvaggi, *Il concetto di sostanza nel dogma eucaristico in relazione alla fisica moderna:* Greg 30 (1949) 7-45.

12. See S.Th. III, q. 77, a. 3-8; Suarez, *In 3* q.77 disp.57; Alastruey, 241-252.

13. ML 148,1425.

meaning. His contemporaries understood the formula in that way.[14]

Therefore that presence and containing of Christ under the species seems to be explained in the best way from a certain action of the Body of Christ, by which it conserves the accidents of the bread and wine by supplying their existence in the genus of an efficient cause. There are those who think that that alone is not sufficient, but that also a certain binding of the Body of Christ to the species is required, or the insolubility of the intimate presence. This comes from the power divinely given to the species to hold intimately in themselves the Body of Christ. To others, however, this does not seem to be necessary.[15]

On how and to what extent changes in the species can be predicated about the Body of Christ, consult Suarez.[16]

14. See, for example, Guitmundus Aversanus, *De Corporis et Sanguinis Christi veritate* 1: ML 149,1432ff. Ramírez also bears witness to this, *La controversia eucarística* 69-78.
15. See Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.6 s.2; F. De Lanversin, *Le concept de présence et quelques-unes de ses applications:* RechScRel 23 (1933) 58-80; *La présence eucharistique:* RechScRel 23 (1933) 176-196; E. Gutwenger, *Die sakramentale Einheit zwischen Christus und den eucharistischen Gestalten:* ZkathTh 74 (1952) 318-338.
16. *In 3* q.75 disp.6 s.2.

ON THE NATURE OF TRANSUBSTANTIATION

122. From the doctrine of the Church it is certain that transubstantiation involves not only the presence of the Body of Christ and the cessation of the substance of bread, but in addition a conversion. But this conversion cannot be explained like other natural conversions, which are formal conversions; in these the subject remains and the forms are changed. But in this singular conversion there is this difference—that the subject does not remain since the conversion is substantial, that is, of the whole substance into a whole substance. Therefore a special difficulty in order to explain transubstantiation seems to reside especially in the necessary connection between the beginning terminus (*terminus a quo*) and the final terminus (*terminus ad quem*). There is also another difficulty from the fact that in transubstantiation the *terminus ad quem* preexists the conversion and does not simply come into being through it.

Many solutions have been proposed. It seems that the fundamental ones can be reduced to those that we will now present.

123. I. Theories. 1. *The theory of annihilation.* The substance of bread is annihilated, and the Body of Christ takes its place under the same accidents. This theory, which is falsely attributed to Scotus,[1] does not save the concept of conversion. For, the suspension alone of the conserving action (in which annihilation in the proper sense consists) is not ordained to the production of the Body of Christ; without this ordination there cannot be a conversion.

2. *The theory of reproduction.* It is explained in this way by Suarez[2]: a) In transubstantiation there is *a real action,* which has to do with the Body of Christ, inasmuch as through that action the Body of Christ is constituted under the species. This action really influences the substantial being in the Body of Christ, and therefore it is a substantial action. This is now said to be by way of conservation, because from another source it is supposed that the Body of Christ is already existing elsewhere. And in this way that action could be said to be the sufficient production of the terminus, if this is not elsewhere; but now it only has the nature of conservation. Finally, this action is not a mutation in the proper sense, but only an action or a real dependence.

1. On Scotus and his true opinion, see W. Lampen, *La dottrina della transsubstanziazione secondo il B. Duns Scoto:* StFranc 10 (1924) 127-132; A. Vellico, *De transsubstantiatione iuxta I. Duns Scotum:* Ant 5 (1930) 301-332; U. Storff, *De natura transsubstantiationis iuxta I. Duns Scotum* (Quaracche 1936).
2. *In 3* q.75 disp.50.

b) Moreover, there is *another distinct action,* positive and real, by which the accidents of bread are separated from the substance and are established essentially. This action per se at first produces in the accidents a new way of existing per se, which is formally repugnant to actual inhering and to the union of the accidents in the subject. And therefore in virtue of this action, these accidents are separated from their subject. But when the accidents have been separated from the substance, the latter by its very nature ceases to exist, because in this way the dispositions necessary to conserve the union of the form with the matter are taken away. Therefore, that union is absolved immediately and consequently it ceases to be the substantial form that depends on the matter; and since a new form is not introduced the result is that the matter ceases to be, because it cannot exist without the form. But this cessation of the substance of the bread is in no way an annihilation, because it happens in virtue of a positive and physical action, not by the mere removal of the cooperation of God.

c) *Between both actions there is a connection* which is not physical, but only from the divine institution. That is, one is ordained to the other, and because of the other it takes place from the intention of the agent, because the words do not have the power to posit one terminus, unless it is by expelling the other; and because the other terminus cannot be expelled unless it is by another action, therefore the one cannot be effective except by omitting the other or in order to the other. And so it has to do with a true conversion.[3] Thus Lessius, Arriaga, Piccirelli, Franzelin, Puig.

124. 3. *The theory of adduction.* It is explained by St. Bellarmine in this way[4]: a) The bread in the Eucharist *is not annihilated* because annihilation terminates in nothing; but the action by which the bread ceases to be does not terminate in nothing but in the Body of Christ.

b) But for a true conversion *it is not required that the terminus ad quem be newly produced;* it is sufficient that one term succeeds another, whether the former is now produced, or is adduced from elsewhere, or happens in some other way. Hence in the Eucharist, because the Body of Christ preexists before the conversion, but not under the species, the conversion only brings it about that it begins to exist under the species.

c) *This action is called adductive* because it brings it about that, without any local motion, the Body of Christ, which before was only in heaven, is now existing under the species; and this is not only by a simple presence

3. M. Ouera accurately explains the Suarezian theory, *Suarez y la doctrina de la transubstanciación eucarística:* RazFe 138 (1948,II) 409-441.

4. *De sacramento Eucharistiae* lib.3 ch.18.

or coexistence, but also by a certain union, such as there is between the substance of bread and the accidents, but with no inherence.

d) This action, since it is converse, *is received in the bread;* since it is adductive, *it is in the Body itself of Christ.* Therefore Christ is not changed inasmuch as he loses nothing; but certainly he is changed because he acquires something that he did not have, that is, a sacramental existence.

Thus also now Scotus, Toletus, Vázquez, Pesch, Lercher.

125. 4. *The theory of the constitution of Christ under the species.* This theory is only a further declaration of the preceding one, while avoiding the name of "adduction." It is explained by Cardinal Lugo in this way[5]: a) In transubstantiation there is *one action*, which is well said to be constitutive of Christ under the species, while connoting the cessation of the substance of bread.

b) This action (which, as it is a conversion, has for its formal terminus the Body of Christ; but since it is a production, it has for its terminus to bring about the union of the Body of Christ with the accidents)[6] *brings about the union of the Body of Christ with the accidents.* This union involves two things. The first is the substantial task of sustaining the accidents in the genus of an efficient cause, not a material cause; and this means that the Body of Christ subsists under the accidents. The second is a certain binding of the Body of Christ to the accidents; this is a certain power, by which the accidents are divinely enabled to take with themselves the Body of Christ wherever they are brought.

c) Once that substantial function is realized of supporting the accidents, *by that fact and naturally the substance of bread ceases to exist,* since it is deprived of its substantial function; otherwise there would be a twofold adequate causality concerning the same effect, although it would be in a twofold genus of cause.

d) Hence *a conversion is truly given*; because the substance of the bread ceases because of the placing of the Body of Christ under the same accidents and in reference to the same substantial function, which previously the substance of bread performed.

e) *Therefore there is no annihilation,* because the cessation of the substance of bread does not tend towards nothing, but to something, that is, to the Body of Christ into which it is converted.

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5. *De sacramento Eucharistiae* disp.7.
6. Note that that singular action, which is a conversion, is substantial because its formal terminus is the substance of the Body of Christ; but since it is a production, there is no reason why it is called substantial. Therefore it is a substantial conversion, but it is not a substantial action; in fact, in its entity it is completely accidental. See disp.7 s.8 n.129.

Thus recently Manyá.[7]

126. 5. *The theory of simple conversion.* It is explained by Billot[8] in this way: a) Transubstantiation is not the destruction of one substance and the substitution of another by way of reproduction or adduction; but it is a *simple action,* whereby God (who, as the author of being, has power over all being) *immediately changes* whatever of being there is in the substance of bread into that which is being in the substance of the Body of Christ.

b) *The subject of this action is only the bread,* and not Christ in any way, who remains without any change. Christ experiences nothing, receives nothing, is not replicated; he becomes present where before he was not, by this fact alone that, in virtue of the conversion, the accidents of bread acquire the real relation of containing the Body of Christ.

c) *Nothing ceases to exist by way of annihilation,* but by way of the properly said conversion of one individual substance into the individual substance of the Body of Christ.

This theory is explained as a true return to the genuine mind of St. Thomas and of the great scholastics of the thirteenth century.[9] Many recent authors follow this view, like De la Taille, D'Ales, Lebreton, Lepicier, Van Hove, Van Noort, Alastruey, Filograssi, Garrigou-Lagrange, Piolanti.[10]

127. II. Our opinion. In this very difficult matter, we will present briefly what seems to be better.

a) *The theory of conversion* seems to express the dogma of transubstantiation whose explanation we are seeking; but it does not give the further scholastic search for an explanation. They respond that by this theory much more is said than what is expressed in the dogma, because that theory explicitly excludes annihilation, adduction and reproduction.[11] Doubtless this is true; but the question is precisely about the nature of that converting action, which all admit is converting, and which is said not to be

7. *La transubstanciación:* RevEspT 7 (1947) 245-264.
8. *De SS Eucharistiae sacramento* q.75 par.2.
9. On the mind of St. Thomas, see A Bassani, *De transsubstantiatione ad mentem S. Thomae Aquinatis* (Florence 1913); A. Zychlinski, *Sincera doctrina de conceptu transsubstantionis iuxta principia S. Thomae Aquinatis:* CiencTom 30 (1924) 28-65, 222-224; I. Puig de la Bellacasa, *De transsubstantiatione secundum S. Thomam* (Barcelona 1926); B. Augier, *La transsubstantiation d'après saint Thomas d'Aquin:* RevScPhTh 17 (1928) 227-259; V. Cachia, *De natura transsubstantiationis iuxta S. Thomam et Scotum* (Rome 1929). On other scholastics, see Puig de la Bellacasa in EstEcl 9 (1930) 566f.
10. M. de la Taille, *Mysterium fidei* eluc.50; A. D'Ales, *De Sanctissima Eucharistia* 78ff.; A.M. Lepicier, *Tractatus de SS. Eucharistia* 172f.; J. Lebreton, *Eucharistie:* DAFC 1,1581f.; A. van Hove, *Tractatus de SS. Eucharistia* 85-88; G. van Noort, *De Eucharistia* 344f.; G. Alastruey, 138-147; Filograssi, 133-152; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Eucharistia* 83ff.; A. Piolanti, *De Sacramentis* 65ff.
11. See Filograssi, 157.

reproductive or adductive or constitutive under the species. So the question comes to this: what is the nature of the intrinsic connection, because of which, when the substance of bread ceases, the Body of Christ is made present?

Moreover, it is not sufficiently understood how the Body of Christ, in virtue of this action, begins to be now where it was not, if such action does not in any way terminate in Him. This Body of Christ would begin to have a new relation without any new foundation.

Finally, this action would do nothing, would produce nothing; this seems to be repugnant. But if it is said that this action does nothing other than convert, that is precisely what is being questioned—namely, what it means to convert one thing into another according to the whole substance.

128. b) It seems that *the uniqueness of the action* must be retained. For in the case of a double action, the conversion properly speaking is less explained. This is so especially if the connection between both actions is only extrinsic from the divine intention alone.

c) Without doubt the action *terminates in the Body of Christ.* Surely not because Christ loses something, but because he acquires a new mode of existence, namely, under the species. It must certainly not be said that this is contrary to the view of St. Thomas. For the holy Doctor says: "It is necessary that this conversion terminate in the Body of Christ," and therefore it is not annihilation (4 d.11 a.2); "the substance of Christ's body which is the term of this conversion, does not receive more or less" (III, q. 75, a. 7); "since the conversion of the substance of the bread is terminated at the substance of the Body of Christ" (III, q. 76, a. 3 ad 2); "the conversion that takes place in this sacrament is terminated directly at the substance of Christ's Body" (III. Q. 76, a. 4).

129. d) Such a new way of existing of Christ in the Eucharist involves *a new relation to the species;* this is not a mere presence in them, but a quasi containing under them. This relation not unsuitably seems to be explained by the substantial function of sustaining the species in the genus of efficient cause. Therefore Christ becomes present by having, without any local motion, whatever he would have by local motion; and moreover *an effective influx on the accidents* of the bread is given to his Body. By this influx, with regard to the being of the accidents, is supplied that which before was done by the substance of the bread in the area of a true sustaining and inherence. These effects are produced by the transubstantiating action.

e) But because, when this has taken place, the substance of bread cannot

exist under the same accidents, *the substance of the bread disappears in virtue of one and the same transubstantiating action.* Therefore this is a true conversion, because under the same accidents it changes the substances; not by a mere succession of substances, but by their mutual incompatibility, caused by one action alone.

f) This wonderful and singular action, whose intimate nature we cannot penetrate, is such in itself that it effects all of this *by its own interior power,* not by a mere divine extrinsic intention. But the words of consecration make known to us that the intrinsic nature of this action is of such a kind. These words, according to all, express the true incompatibility of the substance of bread with the Body of Christ under the same accidents. However, since those words are not only true, but also are active, they really cause such incompatibility. There is no reason to deny that those words do cause this by their own power, since they are instrumentally elevated by God.[12]

130. *It is said* against the foundation of this explanation: thus the substance of the bread is not that which is changed into the Body, but that which is expelled by the Body; therefore there is no true conversion of bread into the Body of Christ.[13] But I deny the antecedent. The substance of bread is what is changed into the Body of Christ because, when the Body is present, the substance of the bread necessarily ceases to exist.

But you say again: thus there is an annihilation of the substance of the bread. I respond that the substance of the bread is not annihilated with an annihilation in the proper sense, because it does not cease to be through an action that tends towards nothing, but through an action that tends to constitute the Body of Christ under the same accidents, under which the substance of the bread was. Moreover, it can be admitted that the substance of the bread is annihilated with an annihilation in the improper sense, inasmuch as in virtue of that action is caused such a manner of existing under the accidents, which is incompatible with the permanence of the substance of the bread, *and therefore* God withdraws his conserving influx from it.

12. Perhaps Suarez intends nothing else. For he says expressly: "This whole necessity is founded on the necessity of the words [of institution], to which their efficacy is accommodated; for they are practical words, which have power in order to realize themselves in their own simple signification; and for this a substantial conversion was necessary" (*In 3* q.50 s.8 n.5). Hence the connection is not merely external, but it comes from the power which the practical words themselves have. Therefore, if he says that for the nature of a conversion it is not required that the connection be intrinsic, he is referring to the absolute power of God.

13. See Filograssi, 154.

ARTICLE III

ON THE MANNER OF THE REAL PRESENCE

131. After we have treated the fact of the real presence and investigated the action whereby Christ becomes present in the Eucharist (which is the action making Christ present under the species remaining from the substance of the bread and wine which cease to exist), we now ask what is the nature of this special manner of the singular presence.

Thesis 10. The whole Christ is present in the Eucharist under both species and the whole Christ is under each of their parts, whether after the separation has been made or before the separation.

S.Th. III, q. 76, a. 1-3; Suarez, *In 3* q.76 disp.51 and 52; Puig, 393-414; Alastruey, 173-193; Filograssi, 167-172; Lercher-Dander, 316-319.

132. Definition of terms. *The whole Christ,* that is, his Body and Blood, together with his soul and divinity. The whole Christ is understood with essential and integral totality, in the way that he exists at the moment of the consecration.

Present under the species can be understood in two ways: a) *in virtue of the words* there is present everything that is signified directly and immediately by the words of consecration and without which the words would not be true; b) *in virtue of concomitance* is present whatever is not signified directly and immediately by the words, but is really united with that which is posited in virtue of the words. Therefore the connection is found in the matter itself.

We are saying that the whole Christ is really present, whether in virtue of the words or in virtue of concomitance.

The species are said to be that complex of the sensible accidents, by which naturally bread and wine are designated.

The parts result from the breaking of the bread or from the distribution of the Blood contained in the chalice. *Before the separation,* when the parts are not yet formally existing, they are understood as designable in the host or in the chalice.

133. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Constance* (D 1199) teaches as a matter of faith that "whole Body and Blood of Christ are under both species."

The Council of Florence in the Decree for the Armenians teaches

the doctrine of the Roman Church, namely, that "the whole Christ" is contained under both species, and indeed under each part separated from the consecrated bread and wine (D 1321).

The Council of Trent in sess.13 cn.1 (D 1636-1637) explains what is understood by "the whole Christ." This is explained further in ch.3 (D 1639-1641). That is, in virtue of the words—Body and Blood; in virtue of the natural connection and concomitance (namely, from the substantial union of the living Christ), the Body and Soul are under the species of wine, the Blood and Soul under the species of bread; in virtue of the hypostatic union, the divinity under both species. Therefore, "the whole and integral Christ" signifies this.

In the same session, in cn. 3 (D 1653), it is defined that "the whole Christ" is contained first under each species; and then also under each part of either species when separated. This is also explained further in ch.3 (D 1639-1641), inasmuch as the presence of Christ is taught in each part of the species in general, without saying anything expressly about after a separation has been made. This was also said at the beginning in the canon cited; but a restriction was added, "when separated," a few days before the definition, lest what Florence had said should proceed further, or perhaps lest a certain Catholic theologian be condemned.[1]

That the whole and integral Christ is contained under both species is taught also by the Council of Trent in sess.21 ch.3 and cn.3 (D 1729, 1733).

134. Theological note. That the whole Christ (Body, Blood, Soul, Divinity) is contained under both species is *defined divine and Catholic faith.* This also holds for the thesis "that the whole Christ is contained under each part of either species when separated," that is, when parts are actually made. That they are contained in the parts even before the separation (that is, when the parts are only designable) is *Catholic doctrine so certain that the contrary is temerarious.* The doctrine about the containing in virtue of the words and in virtue of concomitance, although to some theologians it seems to be a matter of faith (*de fide*), it must be said rather to be *a certain explanation of the dogma,* which pertains to Catholic doctrine and which cannot be denied without temerity.

135. Proof. a) *The whole Christ under each species.* The words of consecration of the bread are not true, unless by them the Body of Christ

1. See DTC 5,1352.

is made present as it de facto exists when the words are pronounced. But at that time the Body of Christ is united to the Blood, the Soul and the Divinity. Therefore under the species of bread all of these become present, or the whole Christ becomes present. *The major.* Otherwise the exact same Body of Christ would not be made present, but something else. The same, as is evident, holds true for the consecration of the chalice. Hence St. Paul (1 Cor. 11:27) says: *whoever eats the bread* or *drinks the cup of the Lord in an unworthy manner will be guilty of profaning the Body* and *Blood of the Lord.*

b) *The whole Christ is under each part when separated:* At the Last Supper Christ gave the Apostles the one consecrated chalice; from Christian antiquity the Fathers urge the faithful to exercise great care lest any part of the bread or wine should fall on the floor (R 367, 490.); likewise the Fathers say that the bread is broken without dividing Christ (R 707, 806, 2230)); both of these points are found in the liturgies, especially in the Roman liturgy, in which the following is sung: "Nor a single doubt retain, / When they break the host in twain, / But that in each part remain, / what was in the whole before." But these words prove the conviction of the Church—that Christ is present in the same way in the separated parts just as he was in the whole species of the bread and wine.

c) *The whole Christ is under each part when not separated.* The whole Christ is there where the substance of the bread was. But this was in each of the parts before the separation. Therefore also the whole Christ. Moreover, if the whole Christ, not yet present in each of the parts before the separation, were then present in each of the parts after the separation, the reason for this presence would be something other than the words of consecration. But the words of consecration are the only reason for the real presence. Therefore the whole Christ is present under each of the parts when they are not separated.

136. Objections. 1. If the whole Christ is present under both species, then one of the two consecrations is useless. Therefore the whole is not present.

I distinguish the antecedent. It is useless, that is, it is not required to receive the whole Christ, *conceded;* it is not required simply, *denied.* That Christ becomes present not under just one species, but under two, was not necessary in order that the faithful communicant might receive the whole Christ; and therefore the Church defined the validity of communion under one species (D 1198-1200, 1726-1734). But this separation of the species in the consecration has another meaning; when we treat the sacrifice of the Mass and its essence this will be explained.

2. Because the whole is within, nothing of it is outside. But the whole Christ

is within the species of bread. Therefore nothing of Him is outside of that species. Therefore Christ is not under the species of wine.

I distinguish the major. Nothing of him is outside negatively (nothing of him is what is not within), *conceded;* nothing of him is outside positively, *denied. I concede the minor and distinguish the first consequent.* Nothing of Him is outside the species of bread negatively (that is, so that it is not within it), *conceded;* nothing of him is outside the species of bread positively (that is, so that it is not under the species of wine), *denied.*

3. If the whole Christ were present under each separated part, He would be separated from Himself. But this is absurd. Therefore he is not present.

I distinguish the major. He would be separated from Himself, that is, one presence of Him would be separated from another presence, *conceded;* that is, His being would be separated from itself, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* It is absurd that the being of Christ is separated from itself, *conceded;* it is absurd that His diverse presences are separated from each other, *denied.*

Other difficulties that are often raised against this teaching will be handled in the following scholiums.

137. Scholium 1. *On the formula "in virtue of the words and in virtue of concomitance."*

a) Theologians ask how the soul of Christ is made present in virtue of concomitance, and not in virtue of the words. For, the Body of Christ, which is made present in virtue of the words, is a human body; but a human body is not such except by the soul, which is the only form of the body. There are many answers to this which can be seen in Lugo.[2] It can be said that "body" is understood in a common way, as man is said to be composed of soul and body. Indeed, even in scholastic rigidity "body" formally *signifies* only the matter with a form of corporeality, without being further determined, although in our case it is used for the matter with a rational form. Thus in the three days of Christ's death, if a consecration had been made, in virtue of the words the body would have been made present in the same way, although in virtue of concomitance the soul would not have been made presence, since at that time it was separated from the body,

b) They also ask how the divinity of Christ is made present in the Eucharist only in virtue of concomitance. For, in the formula of consecration the Body is called "my"; but since in Christ there is only one divine person, that word "my" seems to signify this person; and therefore in virtue of the words the divinity will be there. But it is necessary to consider that the word "my" does not include the divinity as an essential or integral constitutive, but only as the designation of the possessor. This difficulty will seem greater perhaps in the opinion of those who say that the humanity of Christ exists by the existence of the Word. But even in this opinion it can be said that, in virtue of the words, nothing is signified except the Body of Christ existing by some existence, which is not further determined as to what it is.

2. *De sacramento Eucharistiae* dispt.8 s.4.

c) Finally, it is necessary to add that, in virtue of circuminsession, not only the Word but also the Father and the Holy Spirit in their own way are present under both species, since the three divine Persons are really identified with one and the same nature.[3]

138. Scholium 2. *On sacramental presence.* a) All theologians, except Durandus and the Nominalists, hold that Christ in the Eucharist *has his own quantity.* Suarez calls this teaching certain.[4] The reason for this is that the Body of Christ in the Eucharist is the same as it is in heaven; and it cannot lack those things that belong to it intrinsically. Hence it is clear that his quantity is also present in the Eucharist by concomitance.

b) But this leads to a further question about *what the quantity contributes* to the Body of Christ in the Eucharist, since it is certain that it does not contribute everything that naturally is found in other bodies; for, in the Eucharist the whole body of Christ is in the whole and the whole is in each part. In this matter there is not just one opinion of theologians, because of the different way of conceiving quantity itself.

Concerning this question, since there are different ways not only of thinking but also of speaking, in order to avoid confusion, it is necessary to make the following observations.

139. *In the first place: Extension* means in general the outside-positioning of the integral parts. This outside-positioning seems to imply two things especially: the first one is that they are distinct parts, and also united among themselves; the second one is that these parts mutually exclude each other in the same space, and they are impenetrable and offering resistance to another body, as long as the body is not divided. Now the body has the first one (which they call *entitative extension*) by its entity, not by quantity. But still this latter one can be thought of in two ways: in the first way by aptitude alone and by a proximate potency, but in the second way in act. They call the first type *aptitudinal extension in reference to place;* this indeed is the primary effect of quantity, and therefore it is metaphysically inseparable from a quantified body. They call the second type *actual extension in reference to place;* this type, as the secondary effect of quantity, follows naturally from the first, but can be suspended by divine power.

Therefore that being the case, the Body of Christ in the Eucharist does not have its integral parts (entitative extension) from quantity, but from its intrinsic substantial entity. But it does have from quantity aptitudinal extension, since it is absolutely inseparable from it. But it lacks actual extension in virtue of the divine power.

But if the question is raised about whether the Body of Christ in the Eucharist has his own figure, then a distinction must be made. For the *organic figure* is one

3. See Suarez, *In 3* q.76 disp.5 s.3-6; Lugo, *De sacramento Eucharistiae* disp.8 s.4-6; Alastruey, 182-189; Filograssi, 154-166.

4. *In 3* q.76 disp.51 s.2 n.5. On Durandus, see R. Mast, *De quantitate Corporis Christi in SS. Eucharistia apud Durandum a S. Porciano:* Edoc 4 (1951) 289-310.

thing, which comes from the intrinsic composition of quantity; the *situated or local figure* is something else, which comes from actual extension. In the Eucharist, therefore, Christ has an organic figure, but not a situated figure.[5]

140. *In the second place:* But there is another way of conceiving this whole matter and according to it entitative extension is attributed to a corporeal substance from the quantity; for, the corporeal substance before the quantity is conceived outside of every genus of what is continuous or extended. Essentially and primarily actual extension in reference to place is attributed to quantity. But they do not admit any aptitudinal extension, in addition to the aptitude of having quantity, and this aptitude is in the material substance.

Therefore the Body of Christ in the Eucharist has from quantity both its integral parts and dimension in length, breadth and depth, and its own natural figure, which we said is situated. But it lacks any commensuration to the species, because these are not the superficies surrounding the superficies of the Body of Christ, for the latter is whole in the whole and whole in each part; hence it cannot be said to be located.[6]

The first way of conceiving this matter seems preferable to us.

141. c) This special presence of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist is said by St. Thomas (III, q. 76, a. 3) to be *by way of substance.* A substance in itself has its own way of existing, distinct from the way in which it is under quantity and from quantity; that is, whole in the whole, and whole in each part. Accordingly, *in the first opinion* mentioned above one should note that the corporeal substance, even if it has of itself integral parts, nevertheless does not yet have them extended, not even with an aptitudinal extension. Therefore it can be said to be like a spirit, although obviously not in all respects. But *in the second opinion* this is explained from the fact that a substance of itself does not have integral parts; hence it cannot be except as a whole wherever it may be. Therefore presence by way of substance is had in the Eucharist, because in virtue of the words of consecration only the substance of Christ is made present, that is, without its quantity; the latter is posited only from concomitance. Hence the substance of the Body of Christ, either because it does not yet have integral parts, or because it now has them without any extension, saves its own proper way of being; but the quantity of the Body of Christ has in the Eucharist the same manner of presence, which is proper to a substance, because it is not made present by reason of itself, but by reason of the substance.[7]

5. See Suarez, *In 3* q.75 disp.48 s.1 n.21 and 25. On the true opinion of Suarez there is a dispute; see J. Caballeria, ¿Admite Suarez cantidad sin extensión actual?: EstEcl 13 (1934) 447-458. For the philosophical question, see Urráburu, *Cosmologia* 207f.
6. See Billot, *De SS. Eucharistiae sacramento* q.76 par.1; Filograssi, 172-184. For the philosophical question, see P. Hoenen, *Cosmologia* lib.1 ch.1 a.2 par.2.
7. See Suarez, *In 3* q.76 disp.52 s.2 n.8; Filograssi, 184-187.

142. d) From this it follows that Christ in the Eucharist *exercises the same acts* of intellect and will that he exercises in heaven; but that he cannot exercise naturally the acts of the senses, because these acts suppose actual extension. But whether Christ in the Eucharist exercises acts of the senses supernaturally is a point disputed by theologians. Some say that he does, as can be seen in Franzelin[8]; to him it seems to be a pious and probable opinion, as being connected with the dignity of the sacred humanity and with the purpose of the sacrament, whereby Christ desires to enter into even bodily contact with his faithful followers. But regarding the immanent acts of Christ formally as existing in the Eucharist, inasmuch as they suppose a certain bodily mutation, these cannot be exercised by Christ naturally, but without doubt they are exercised supernaturally.

Christ in the Eucharist cannot suffer anything from physical agents, since he exists by way of a spirit.

Finally, he cannot be seen naturally with the bodily eye; and more probably not even supernaturally, but some theologians say that he can.[9]

143. e) The Body of Christ, although it is whole in the whole and whole in each part, even before the separation, nevertheless it is not multiple in the host, as the soul is not multiple in the body that it informs, although it is in the whole and in each of its parts.[10]

144. f) Because the Body of Christ in the Eucharist is exactly the same as it is in heaven, it is necessary to say that the Body is *replicated.* Note, however, no matter what is in the different opinions of the Scholastics regarding the possibility of circumscriptive replication, this diversity of opinion in our case is not a difficulty. For, here a mixed replication is given, since the Body of Christ is in heaven circumscriptively and in the Eucharist it is by way of spirit or by way of a substance. This can in no way be shown to be repugnant. [11]

145. Scholium 3. *On the permanent presence of Christ in the Eucharist.* It can be asked what the temporal limits are of this presence of Christ in the Eucharist. The Church defined at the Council of Trent in sess.13 cn.4 and ch.3 (D 1654, 1639-1641) that Christ is present in the Eucharist not only in the use, while it is taken (as some Protestants say), but immediately after the consecration. This is the foundation of the special adoration that is given in the Church to the Blessed Sacrament (D 1656f.,

8. *De Eucharistia* th. 11.
9. See Suarez, *In 3* q.76 disp.53; Alastruey, 217-231.
10. On another way in which it can be said that Christ is multiple in the Eucharist, from a completely different perspective, see L. Baudiment, *Notre Seigneur n'est il présent qu'une fois dans l'hostie?:* RevApol (1937) 546-562. A.H. Maltha, *Cosmologica circa transsubstantiationem:* Ang 16 (1939) 305-334.
11. On the philosophical question, see Urráburu, *Cosmologia* p. 979-1001; Hoenen, *Cosmologia* lib.1 ch.2 a.2 par.3. On the whole question of sacramental presence, see R. Masi, *La teoria suareziana della presenza eucaristica* (Rome 1952); on this book see J. Hellín, *Sobre la ubicación en Suarez y sobre su sistema metafísico:* RevEspT 7 (1947) 275-288.

1643f.).[12] It is the common and certain opinion of theologians that Christ is present until the corruption of the species.[13] Concerning the apparitions of Christ in the Eucharist and the miracles that sometimes occur in the consecrated species, note that in general Christ in himself is not seen, nor his Flesh and Blood, but only the figure and color of flesh and blood, inhering in the sacramental species themselves.[14]

12. See also some of the propositions condemned by Gregory XI (D 1101ff.).
13. See Suarez, *In 3* q.76 disp.54.
14. See Suarez, *In 3* q. 76 disp.55.

CHAPTER II

On the Eucharistic sacrifice

146. Having established the necessary foundation of the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist, which takes place in the Church like the action performed by Christ at the Last Supper and according to His command, now we must investigate the sacrificial nature of our Eucharist. This of course is had from the same institution of Christ, who did it at the Supper and commanded that it be done in memory of Him. Now we have to study more at length its reality, essence and purpose, while always having before our eyes what the Church teaches us about it.

Namely:

a) Our Eucharist is a true and proper sacrifice.

b) But it is a special kind of sacrifice, the essence of which is a representation and a perpetuation of the sacrifice of the Cross. Hence, the result is a close connection and in a certain way a unity of the Eucharistic sacrifice with the sacrifice of the Cross.

c) Also, the victim in both is the same and the one making the offering is the same.

d) The only difference is the manner of offering, or the sacrificial action.

e) Finally, the purpose of both sacrifices is the same.[1]

Therefore these are the parts that we will now have to examine.

ARTICLE I

ON THE TRUTH OF THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE

Thesis 11. In the Mass a true and proper sacrifice is offered to God.

S.Th. III, q. 83, a. 1; Lercher-Dander, 334-345; Filograssi, 218-243; Alastruey, 337-349; Puig, 480-505.

147. Definition of terms. *The Mass* is a sacred action in which, with many preceding and following prayers and ceremonies, the Eucharist is confected by transubstantiation. We describe the Mass in this way with Bellarmine.[2] For at this time its essential definition cannot be given.

Therefore we are saying that in the Mass *a sacrifice is offered,* that is,

1. See Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 548ff.
2. *De Eucharistia* 5,1.

in that liturgical complex some elements are present (which we are not determining just now) in which the idea of a sacrifice is verified.

The Mass (*Missa*), the word used for Eucharistic ceremonies, at first designated the dismissal of the faithful after the ceremonies were over and with the addition of a benediction. Then the word "Mass" designated the rite itself of the Eucharist. Many other names have been used to signify the same thing, such as the breaking of bread, the collect, the Lord's Day, the action.[3]

148. Here we understand *sacrifice* to be an act of external worship which must be said to be a "sacrifice" with the same truth and propriety as we designate the sacrifices of the Old Testament and the sacrifice of the Cross.

True and proper, that is, not just in a metaphorical way.

149. Adversaries. *Petrobusians,* so called from Peter of Bruys, in the last decades of the twelfth century, who denied that a sacrifice of the Body and Blood of the Lord is truly offered in the Church. They said that this sacrifice is absolutely nothing and ought not to be offered to God.[4]

Wycliffe is said to have held: "It is not founded on the Gospel that Christ ordained the Mass" (D 1155).[5]

Protestants, for whom the Mass is not a sacrifice offered to God, but only a benefit received from God (a testament). This was Luther's view. According to them there is no propitiatory sacrifice except the death of Christ. When the Fathers speak about sacrifice in the Eucharist, they must be understood to be speaking about a sacrifice of praise, that is, about thanksgiving. Thus Melanchthon. In general, the Reformers were strongly opposed to the Mass.[6]

Also all the *Rationalists* we mentioned in n. 5-8 deny the sacrificial character of the Mass.

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3. See J. Jungmann, *Missarum sollemnia* (Vienna 1948) 1,232ff.
4. See Petrus Venerabilis, *Adversus Petrobrusianos haereticos:* ML 189,722. On this, see F. Vernet, *Bruys (Pierre de):* DTC 2,1151-1156. In this sense is to be understood canon 23 of Lateran Council II (D 718).
5. Concerning the proposition, see L. Cristiani (*Wycliff:* DTC 15,3604), according to whom the text does not appear in which Wycliffe denied the sacrificial character of the Mass or its institution by Christ. Hence he concludes that the meaning of the proposition was perhaps that Christ did not institute the Mass with all the prayers and ceremonies that are now in it.
6. See J. Rivière, *La Messe durante le période de la Réforme et du Concile de Trente:* DTC 10,1085-1099; N.M. Halmer, *Der literarische Kampf Luthers und Melanchtons gegen das Opfer der heiligen Messe:* DivTh(Fr) 21 (1943) 63-78.

150. F. Wieland[7] proposed more or less these stages in the evolution of the sacrificial character of our Eucharist:

a) Before the middle of the second century the celebration of the Eucharist was only a eucharistic banquet. But it was called a sacrifice in the broad sense, inasmuch as by giving thanks Christ became present with a relation to the sacrifice of the Cross, for it was done in remembrance of Him. Therefore nothing really was offered to God, but a gift from God was received.

b) About the middle of the second century gradually the Eucharist began to be considered as an oblation made to God by Christians, whereby some gift was presented to God, that is, the Body and Blood of Christ. This happened because of the influence of the pagan Mysteries and of the Old Testament.

c) St. Irenaeus was the first one to speak expressly about the Eucharist as a gift that is offered by us to God as a sacrifice.[8]

151. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent*[9]*: In the first convocation of the Council* the theologians, after the discussion of the articles proposed to them, wanted to add, among other points, also the condemnation of this proposition: "that the Eucharist is not a true sacrifice."[10] But this question was tabled by the Legates so that it could be treated later with greater care. But then there was a debate in July 1547 on this proposed article of the heretics: "that the Eucharist in the Mass is not a sacrifice or oblation for sins, but only a commemoration of the sacrifice offered on the Cross; and it is not offered, but it is a good and meritorious work."[11]

Until the end of 1551 *in the second convocation of the Council* there was still no treatment of the sacrifice of the Mass. Then in the beginning of 1552 the first draft of the decree was drawn up, but the Fathers were not able to debate it because the Council was suspended.[12] Finally, *in the third convocation* in the year 1562 there was a lengthy debate on the sacrifice of the Mass by the theologians and Fathers, during which many versions of the decree were composed.[13] Finally, the definitive decree was promulgated

7. *Der Vorirenäische Opferbegriff* (Munich 1909); *Mensa und confessio* (Munich 1906). Against him, see J. Brinktrine, *Der Messopferbegriff in der ersten zwei Jahrhunderten* (Freiburg 1918).
8. See J. Coppens, *Eucharistie:* DBS 2,1151f; Ruch, *La Messe dans la sainte Ecriture:* DTC 10,864f.
9. See J. Rivière, *La Messe durant le période de la Réforme et du Concile de Trente:* DTC 10,1112-1142.
10. CTr 5,1008.
11. CTr 6,322; see ibid. 324.
12. Le Plat, 4,385-397.
13. These drafts can be seen in J. Armijos, *La immolación del sacrificio eucaristico según el Concilio Tridentino y el decreto conciliar* (Quito 1942) 119-185.

in session 22, which with regard to our question teaches the following:

In the preamble, it affirms that the Eucharist is a true and unique sacrifice, and that it pertains to the deposit of Christian faith (D 1738; see D 1750).

In chapter 1 (D 1739f.) it teaches: a) Christ a priest according to the order of Melchizedek consummated (made perfect) the old levitical sacrifice. b) Christ offered a sacrifice on the Cross. c) But his priesthood was to be perpetual. d) Hence Christ himself instituted a visible sacrifice, by which that first one could be re-presented and perpetuated. e) This institution was established when Christ at the Last Supper offered his Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine, and commanded that it should be done perpetually in the Church. f) Thus there is complete harmony between the old priesthood and the new priesthood, just as Christ first celebrated the old Pasch and then instituted the new Pasch. g) This doctrine is contained in the prophecy of Malachi, in 1 Cor. 10:21 and in the ancient sacrifices that prefigured this sacrifice. In this chapter note the description of the Mass given by the Council: "the offering of Christ by the Church through her priests under visible signs in memory of his passion and death."

In canon 1 (D 1751) it teaches "that a true and proper sacrifice is offered"; in canon 2 (D 1752) its institution by Christ at the Supper; in canon 3 (D 1753), against the Protestants, that the sacrifice of the Mass is merely a sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving. Finally, what is taught in the remaining chapters and canons of this and the following session certainly suppose the truth of the sacrifice of the Mass. Then this is stated solemnly in the Tridentine profession of faith (D 1866).

On the truth of the sacrifice of the Mass see also proposition 45 of de Bay (D 1945). The works of F. Wieland were put on the Index of forbidden books.[14]

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

152. Proof from Holy Scripture. This thesis also can be proved in two ways as in n. 81 above. *The first way is indirect* or from what has already been proved, and indeed in two ways. *Firstly,* from theses 2 and 3 in this way: Christ at the Supper offered his Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine in a sacrifice and he commanded that this be done perpetually in the Church. Therefore in the Church the sacrifice of the Body and Blood of Christ is offered under the species of bread and wine (for this will of Christ cannot fail to be efficacious, since it concerns an essential

14. AAS (1941) 41.

matter in the constitution of the Church, namely, a visible sacrifice). But such a sacrifice is offered nowhere if it is really not offered in the Mass. Therefore in the Mass a true and proper sacrifice is offered. *Secondly*, it can be proved also indirectly from thesis 6 in this way: In Malachi a true, pure sacrifice is promised efficaciously, for all time and for every place; this sacrifice, according to the explanation of the Fathers, is a sacrifice joined with the Eucharist. But such a sacrifice is not offered except in the Mass. Therefore in the Mass a true and proper sacrifice is offered.

153. *The second way is direct* and is based on 1 Cor. 10:14-22.

Note. See especially what we said above in n. 82.

Argument. In this text a comparison is made between the eucharistic banquet and sacrificial meals. But this supposes that the eucharistic banquet has a sacrificial character. Therefore in the celebration of the Eucharist, or in the Mass, there is a true sacrifice.

The minor. Otherwise the whole argumentation of the Apostle is destroyed.

The major. a) Eucharistic eating is compared with the eating of victims in Jewish sacrifices (θυσία) and with the eating of food offered to idols in pagan sacrifices. b) Participation in the Body and Blood of Christ is assimilated to the participation in the altar among the Jews and being partners with demons among the pagans. But this participation takes place immediately in the victim, and in the mediating altar, and the mediating God, to whom the victim on the altar is sacrificed. c) A comparison is made between the altar of the Jews (θυσιαστήριον), the altar of the pagans (τράπεζα δαιμονίων) and the altar of Christians (τράπεζα κυρίου).[15]

154. Proof from tradition. a) *Before St. Irenaeus:* In the *Didache* (R 8) the Eucharist is called a sacrifice (θυσία), which had been predicted by Malachi. St. Clement of Rome (R 19ff.) speaks about the sacrifices of Christians, which take the place of the Jewish sacrifices. St. Justin (R 135) teaches that the Eucharist is foretold by Malachi; moreover, he knows "the sacrifices which Jesus commanded to take place, that is, in the Eucharist of the bread and chalice, which is a custom among Christians everywhere."[16]

b) St. Irenaeus (R 232) teaches in the same way and with the same meaning that the Eucharist is an oblation, foretold by Malachi, that is to replace the ancient sacrifices.

c) *Other pre-Nicene authors:* Origen holds that we offer to God the

15. See Ruch, *La Messe dans la sainte Ecriture:* DTC 10,864-964.

16. *Dialogus cum Thryphone* 117: MG 6,745.

Eucharist as the Gentiles offer sacrifices to demons in thanksgiving[17] and that the Eucharistic mystery is truly propitiatory just as in the old Law there were propitiatory sacrifices.[18] According to Tertullian communion is a participation in the sacrifice (R 301); the Eucharist is an oblation which the devil taught the followers of Mithra to imitate in their sacrifices (R 299).[19] St. Hippolytus in the *Apostolic Tradition* describes the manner of the eucharistic oblation at the beginning of the third century.[20] St. Cyprian (R 581-584) teaches that Christ made an offering in bread and wine like Melchizedek and that we sacrifice in the same way.

d) *Other Fathers:* They describe the Eucharistic liturgy with sacrificial terms. Thus St. Caesarius Nazianzen (R 806), St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 851), St. Gregory Nazianzen (R 1019), St. John Chrysostom (R 1118, 183, 1192, 1222), St. Ambrose (R 1260), St. Augustine (R 1424), St. Fulgentius (R 2270), St. Gregory the Great (R 2323). They say that the Eucharist is a new Pasch and the immolation of a new lamb: St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1063), St. Jerome (R 1390), St. Leo the Great.[21] They say that the Eucharist has replaced the sacrifices of the Old Law: St. Chrysostom (R 1193), St. Augustine (R 1866), St. Leo the Great,[22] St. Fulgentius (R 2270). They say that the figure of Melchizedek is fulfilled in them: see above n. 57ff. and 71. They say that in it the sacrifice of the Cross is re-presented and renewed: St. Ambrose (R 1270), St. Augustine (R 1604), St. Fulgentius (R 2270).

e) This perpetual tradition appears in all the *Liturgies,* which always use sacrificial words like offer, sacrifice, oblation, immolation.[23]

155. Theological reasoning. No religion lacks a visible sacrifice. Therefore also in the Christian religion it is necessary that there be such a sacrifice. But in the Christian religion any sacrifice necessarily is the oblation of one victim, Christ, as the only one who could please God. Therefore in the Christian religion there has to be a visible and repeatable sacrifice whereby Christ is offered to God: this is the Eucharistic sacrifice.

156. Objections. 1. In the N.T. worship in spirit and in truth (John 4:21-24) replaced the sacrificial worship of Jerusalem. But in this way a visible sacrifice is excluded. Therefore in the N.T there is no visible sacrifice.

17. *Contra Celsum* 8,88: MG 11,1565.
18. *In Leviticum* hom.9,10 and hom.13,3: MG 12,523-547.
19. See the same idea in St. Justin (R 128).
20. See *Florilegium Patristicum* 7,1,26ff.
21. *Sermo* 58,3: ML 54,353.
22. *Sermo* 59,7: ML 54,341.
23. See for the ancient liturgies *Florilegium Patristicum* 7,1,30.44ff.61f.; for the Gallican liturgy, Muratori, *Liturgia romana vetus* 2,652.691f.; for the Roman liturgy see the Canon of the Mass.

I distinguish the major. Worship in spirit, that is, merely internal worship, *denied;* worship in the spirit, that is, sincere worship, which will also be in truth inasmuch as it will no longer be the figure of future things, but in a present reality, *conceded. I also distinguish the minor.* A visible sacrifice is excluded, if the worship of the N.T. is only internal worship, *conceded:* if it is a sincere worship and done in truth, *denied.*

2. The ancient authors, especially the Apologists, do not admit any sacrifices in the Church. Therefore the Mass is not a sacrifice.

I distinguish the antecedent. They admit no sacrifices, which are offered to a needy God and in a bloody rite, *conceded;* absolutely no sacrifices, *denied.*

3. If the Mass is a sacrifice, the sacrifice of the Cross was not sufficient. But it was totally sufficient. Therefore the Mass is not a sacrifice.

I distinguish the major. If the Mass were a sacrifice in which a new victim is offered in addition to the prior one, the sacrifice of the Cross would not be sufficient, *conceded;* if it is a sacrifice in which the same victim is offered with a new oblation in order to apply the fruits of the Cross, *denied. I concede the minor. I also distinguish the consequent.* The Mass is not the sacrifice of a new victim, *conceded;* it is not a sacrifice offering the same victim with a new oblation, *denied.*

Other objections are presented above in n. 61 and 72.

ARTICLE II

ON THE SPECIAL NATURE OF THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE

157. The Council of Trent says that Christ left to the Church a visible sacrifice, namely, the Eucharistic sacrifice, "by which the bloody (sacrifice) that he was once for all to accomplish on the cross would be re-presented, its memory perpetuated until the end of the world"; namely the memory "of his passage from this world to the Father when by the shedding of his blood he redeemed us and delivered us from the dominion of darkness, and transferred us to his kingdom" (D 1739-1741). By these words the Eucharistic sacrifice is designated as having an essential relation to the sacrifice of the Cross. Therefore when we ask about the nature of this sacrifice, it is necessary to begin from this relation so that we can then make further progress in order to define it more clearly according to its various aspects.

Thesis 12. The sacrifice of the Mass essentially is the re-presentation and renewal of the sacrifice of the Cross.

Alastruey, 350-355; Filograssi, 257f.

158. Definition of terms. *Re-presentation,* that is, objective and real, not a mere subjective recollection.

Renewal, that is, not an empty and plain commemoration, but a true and wondrous, although unbloody and mystical, repetition of the sacrifice of the Cross.[1]

Essentially, that is, the essence of the Mass, as a sacrifice, is not had without this objective re-presentation and mystical renewal of the sacrifice of the Cross. For Christ wills to institute his sacrifice in this way.

Hence, in the sacrifice of the Mass two aspects must be considered. For, it is in itself a sacrifice, and it is at the same time the objective re-presentation of the other sacrifice. From the first consideration it is an absolute sacrifice; but from the second it is a relative sacrifice. But essentially is contains both of these; and indeed in such a way that these are not two things, but two formalities. But what kind of relation exists between these two formalities cannot be determined here, but pertains to other problems.

159. Adversaries. *Protestants* must be mentioned here not because they deny that the Mass is a re-presentation of the sacrifice of the Cross,

1. See Leo XIII, Encyclical "*Mirae caritatis*": ASS 34 (1901-1902) 653.

but because they understand this re-presentation in such a way that they simply destroy the character of a true sacrifice in the Mass.

160. Doctrine of the Church. It is contained in the *Council of Trent* in sess.22 ch.1 (D 1739-1741); there it teaches that the sacrifice of the Cross is re-presented by the Mass, and that it takes place because of the will of Christ who instituted it. That this re-presentation is not a bare commemoration of the sacrifice accomplished on the Cross, but is one that in itself is a true and proper sacrifice, is taught expressly in canon 3 (D 1753), as a consequence of the doctrine contained in canon 1 (D 1751).[2]

Leo XIII: In the sacrifice of the Mass "the supreme sacrifice on Calvary is renewed in a wondrous manner."[3] The sacrifice of the Mass "is not an empty and bare commemoration of His death, but a true and wondrous, although unbloody and mystical, renewal."[4] "That sacrifice [of the Cross] is continued in the Eucharistic sacrifice. For since it is necessary that the sacrificial rite be associated at all times with religion, it was the divine counsel of the Redeemer that, once the sacrifice of the Cross was consummated, it should become perpetual and perennial. The reason for this perpetuity resides in the most holy Eucharist, which does not bring about an empty likeness or a mere recollection of the matter, but the truth itself, although under a different form."[5]

Pius XI: The bloody sacrifice of the Cross "is renewed constantly on our altars in an unbloody manner."[6]

Pius XII: "Therefore the august sacrifice of the altar is not just an empty commemoration of the suffering and death of Jesus Christ, but a true and proper sacrifice, by which indeed the High Priest by an unbloody immolation does what he had already done on the Cross when he offered Himself to the eternal Father as a most acceptable victim." "Since the Eucharistic sacrifice daily re-presents and renews the sacrifice [of the Cross]."[7]

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic doctrine.*

161. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) Christ in instituting the sacrifice of the Eucharist commands that it be done in memory of him (ἀνάμνησις). But this memory is not some kind of recollection, but objective and real.

2. See E. Jamoulle, *Le sacrifice eucharistique au Concile de Trente:* NouvRevTh 67 (1945) 1121-1139.
3. Encyclical "*Mirae caritatis*": ASS 34 (1901-1902) 645.
4. Ibid. 653.
5. *Epist. encycl. Ad Episcopos Scotiae:* ASS 31 (1898-1899) 12.
6. Encyclical "*Miserentissimus Redemptor*": AAS 20 (1928) 170.
7. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 548-580.

Therefore the sacrifice of the Mass essentially is a re-presentation and renewal of the sacrifice of the Cross.

The minor. It is explained in this way by St. Paul in 1 Cor. 11:26. Namely, as often as you participate in the victim of this sacrifice you announce the death of the Lord; doubtless because the sacrifice of the participated victim is objectively and in itself a re-presentation of that death.

b) Christ instituted the Eucharistic sacrifice, which would reproduce the sacrifice offered by himself at the Last Supper. But the sacrifice of the Supper had an essential relation in itself to the sacrifice of the Cross. Therefore also the Eucharistic sacrifice has the same relation. But it could not have it unless it is an unbloody renewal of it. Therefore the sacrifice of the Mass is a re-presentation of the sacrifice of the Cross.

The first minor. The sacrifice at the Supper is given to the extent that there is a mystical effusion of blood (see above n. 25). But such a mystical effusion cannot be understood without an essential relation to the real effusion accomplished on the Cross. Therefore the sacrifice of the Supper had an essential relation to the Cross.

This minor. The essential relation at the Supper in the Eucharistic sacrifice must be a mystical immolation of such a nature as the real immolation of the Cross; for it must be a relation of such a kind that it preserves the nature of a true sacrifice. Therefore it will be an unbloody renewal of it.[8]

162. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers say that the Eucharistic sacrifice must respond to the passion of the Lord: St. Cyprian (R 582); that it must be a true remembrance of the death of Christ because of the identity of the immolated victim: St. Chrysostom (R 1222); that it must be a remembrance of the sacrifice of the Cross, as the sacrifices of the old Law were figures of it: St. Augustine (R 1604); that through it is announced that Christ died for us: St. Fulgentius (R 2270); because we immolate Him again: St. Gregory the Great (R 2323). More will be added to this in the following theses.

163. Theological reasoning. In the Eucharistic sacrifice, as we shall see later, it is exactly the same victim, the same principal offerer as in the sacrifice of the Cross, only the way of offering is different. But in this way the Eucharistic sacrifice essentially re-presents and renews the sacrifice of the Cross. Therefore the sacrifice of the Mass is a renewal of the Sacrifice of the Cross.

8. See J.A. Jungmann, *Das Gedächnis* des Herrn in der Eucharistie: ThAschr 133 (1953) 387-399.

164. Scholium 1. *On the unity of the Eucharistic sacrifice and the sacrifice of the Cross.* From the proved objective re-presentation of the sacrifice of the Cross, which essentially is in the Eucharistic sacrifice and which is a renewal and repetition of it, it follows that there is an essential unity between both of them.

In fact, this unity is taught by the Council of Trent (D 1743) as being in the victim and in the principal offerer. There it is treating, clearly, its essential nature. For even here some accidental differences can be found. But the same Council teaches that there is an essential difference between both sacrifices, namely, in the nature of the offering; this is located in the fact that in the Mass "the same Christ *who offered himself once in a bloody manner* on the altar of the Cross is contained and offered *in an unbloody manner.*"

From this it follows that this unity cannot be conceived as numerical, according to the thinking of theologians who defend "the presence of the mysteries" (Mysteriengegenwart).[9] All of these points become clearer from the teaching contained in the Encyclical "*Mediator Dei.*"

Theologians ask whether the essential difference in the nature of the offering is such that it can be called truly a specific difference. The better response is in the affirmative with Suarez,[10] because sacrifices are specifically different from each other when they differ essentially in the external sacrificial action. However, other theologians disagree with this.[11]

165. Scholium 2. *On the unity of the sacrifice of the Mass and the sacrifice of the Last Supper.* Between the sacrifice of the Supper and the sacrifice of the Mass there is a minor difference, since the external and visible sacrificial action is the same, and since the victim and the principal offerer remain the same. However, it is clear that between both sacrifices there are many accidental differences, and that both are distinguished precisely.[12]

9. See E. Jamoulle, *L'unité sacrificielle de la Cène*, la Croix et l'Autel au Concile de Trente: EphThLov 22 (1946) 34-69.
10. *In 3* q.83 disp.76 s.1 n.4ff.
11. See Alastruey, 358ff. On other accidental differences, see ibid. 560f.
12. See Suarez, *In 3* q. 83 disp.76 s.1 n.2f.

ARTICLE III

ON THE VICTIM AND OFFERER OF THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE

166. Three elements can be considered in the Eucharistic sacrifice, as in any other sacrifice: the offered victim, the offering priest and the oblation itself. Of these of course the main element is the oblation or the sacrificial action. However this will have to be treated later, because in it is the essential difference between this sacrifice and the sacrifice of the Cross. Therefore we will now treat the two other elements, in which there is identity between the two sacrifices.

Thesis 13. Christ himself is the victim of the sacrifice of the Mass.

Lercher-Dander, 354-361; Alastruey, 363-376.

167. *A victim* is that which is offered in a sacrifice, or that which is immolated in it.

Christ himself, that is, the victim of the Mass is the same victim of the Cross. It is clear that the difference lies in the fact that on the Cross a passible Christ was offered and in his own proper species; but in the Mass Christ himself, who is already impassible and in a foreign species, is offered, that is, under the species of bread and wine.

168. Doctrine of the Church. *Lateran Council IV* (D 802): "the priest himself, Jesus Christ, is also the sacrifice."

The Council of Trent in sess.22 teaches this: a) "Christ offered his Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine to God the Father, and, under the same signs, gave them to the Apostles., and ordered them and their successors in the priesthood to offer." (ch.1: D 1740); b) Christ "instituted a new Pasch, namely, himself, to be offered by the Church through her priests under visible signs." (ibid.); c) "The same Christ who offered himself once in a bloody manner on the altar of the Cross is contained and is offered in an unbloody manner" (ch.2: 1743); d) "The victim is one and the same" in the Mass and on the Cross" (ibid.); e) Priests offer "the Body and Blood" of Christ (cn.2: D 1752).

According to sess.23 ch.1 (D 1764) the Body and Blood of Christ are offered. The same idea is had in cn.1 (D 1771).

Therefore it is the same thing to say that in the Mass the victim is Christ himself, or Christ himself under the species of bread and wine, or the Body

and Blood of Christ (of course, under the species).

Pius XII said: "As priest he offered himself and continues to offer himself as a victim for our sins."[1]

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

169. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) The victim of the sacrifice of Christ at the Last Supper was His Body and Blood, or Christ himself under the species bread and wine. But in the Mass the same victim is offered as at the Supper. Therefore the victim of the sacrifice of the Mass is Christ himself.

The minor. Because Christ commanded to be done what he had done.

b) 1 Cor. 10:14-22: Those who participate in the Eucharistic sacrifice are partakers of the Body and Blood of Christ. But this supposes that the victim of the Eucharistic sacrifice is Christ himself. Therefore Christ is the victim of the Eucharistic sacrifice.

170. Proof from tradition. a) St. Cyprian teaches expressly that in the Mass we offer what Christ offered at the Supper, namely, his own Body and Blood (R 581, 584).

b) The Fathers say that Christ is offered in the Eucharist: Origen,[2] St. Chrysostom (R 1193, 1222), St. Ambrose (R 1260), St. Maximus[3]; that Christ is immolated: St. Chrysostom (R 1118), St. Jerome,[4] St. Augustine (R 1424), St. Gregory the Great (R 2323); that Christ is sacrificed: St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 853), St. Chrysostom (R 1183); that the Body and Blood of Christ are the victim of this sacrifice: St. Leo the Great[5]; that he is cut into pieces with a bloodless cutting, while using the voice for a sword: St. Gregory Nazianzen (R 1019).

c) Throughout the Liturgy this idea is present, not only in the Canon of the Mass, but also in other prayers, v.gr.: "Graciously look down, we beseech Thee, O Lord, upon the gifts of Thy Church: by which gold, frankincense, and myrrh are no longer laid before Thee; but He is sacrificed and received who by those very gifts was signified, Jesus Christ Thy Son."[6]

171. Theological reasoning. In the N.T. the only sacrificial victim is Christ (which is taught often in the letter to the Hebrews, v.gr., 10:12; see

1. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 548. See also Pius XI in the Encyclical "*Quas primas*": "Christ the priest offered himself as a victim for sins and he continues to offer himself perpetually" (D 3678).
2. *In Numeros* hom.24,1: MG 12,757.
3. *Sermo* 78: ML 57,689f.
4. *Epistola* 21,26: ML 22,388.
5. *Sermo 7 de passione:* ML 34,332.
6. Secret for the feast of the Epiphany.

7:27; 9:12ff.; 25-28; 10:19f.). But the Eucharist is the true sacrifice of the N.T. Therefore in it the victim is Christ himself.

172. Objections. 1. The victim of a sensible sacrifice must also be sensible. But Christ in the Eucharist is not sensible. Therefore he cannot be the victim of this sacrifice.

I distinguish the major. He must be sensible either mediately or immediately, *conceded;* only and necessarily immediately, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* He is not sensible even mediately, *denied.* For, he is sensible by reason of the words efficaciously practical and by reason of the species demonstrating His real presence.

2. The victim, which is offered in a sacrifice, is presupposed to be present before the sacrificial action. But before the sacrificial action Christ is not present in the Eucharist (for the sacrificial action is the transubstantiation). Therefore Christ is not the victim of the Eucharistic sacrifice.

I distinguish the major. The victim is presupposed to be present beforehand naturally, *conceded;* beforehand also temporally, *I subdistinguish:* if the sacrificial action were only oblate and immolated, *conceded;* if it is at the same time constitutive of the victim as being present, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* Christ is not present beforehand in the Eucharist temporally, *conceded;* beforehand naturally, *I subdistinguish:* he is not present before the sacrificial action which constitutes Christ's presence, *conceded;* before the sacrificial action as oblate and immolated, *denied.*

3. That is the victim of a sacrifice, which is changed by the sacrificial action. But in the Eucharist by the sacrificial action the bread and wine are changed, not Christ. Therefore the victim of the Eucharistic sacrifice is the bread and wine, not Christ.

I distinguish the major. That is the victim of a sacrifice which is changed by the sacrificial action taken in a material sense, *denied;* which is changed by the sacrificial action taken in a formal sense, *I subdistinguish:* which is changed either physically or mystically, *conceded;* necessarily physically, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* The bread and wine are changed by the sacrificial action taken in a material sense, *conceded;* by a sacrificial action taken in a formal sense, *denied.* Again, Christ is not changed physically by the sacrificial action taken in a formal sense, *conceded;* he is not changed mystically, *denied.*

173. Scholium 1. *On the offering of bread and wine.* It seems certain from the various liturgical statements that the bread and wine are offered in some way. However, this should not be understood in such a way that the substance of bread and wine is offered as the transient material of the sacrifice, inasmuch as it is destroyed in the effecting of the sacrifice[7]; but because the sacramental species of the bread and wine pertain intrinsically to the matter offered in the sacrifice. Hence the victim in an adequate way is not just Christ taken simply, but as he constitutes one sacramental composite together with

7. See Suarez, *In 3* q.83 disp.75 s.1 n.11.

the species.[8] This way of speaking seems to be more in agreement with the recent teaching of the Church in the Encyclical "*Mediator Dei.*"[9]

174. Scholium 2. *On the offering of the Church and of the faithful.* Because Christ is offered in the Mass as the Head of the Church, the Church herself, or the mystical Body of Christ, morally participates in the victimal nature of its Head. It is not as if the faithful are a victim in the proper sense in the Mass just like Christ, or even together with Christ physically on the altar; but that "the *sensible* sacrifice of the Eucharistic Body of Christ is the liturgical expression primarily of the *interior* sacrifice of Christ, and secondarily of the *interior sacrifice of the faithful,*"[10] that is, from the identity of the affections of devotion and religion with Christ the Head since he is the physical and real victim of this sacrifice.

This teaching is handed on especially *by the recent Supreme Pontiffs.* Pius XI: "With this august Eucharistic sacrifice, the immolation of both the ministers and the other faithful should be joined, so that they may show themselves as living victims, holy and pleasing to God."[11] Pius XII: "And just as our divine Redeemer dying on the Cross offered Himself to the eternal Father as the Head of the whole human race, so the same [in the Eucharistic sacrifice] not only offers Himself as the Head of the Church to the heavenly Father, but also in himself he lovingly includes also all of his mystical members, especially those who are more weak and infirm."[12] "But in order that the oblation by which the faithful offer the divine victim in this sacrifice to the divine Father may have its full effect, it is necessary that the people add something else, namely the offering of themselves as a victim.; it is then with the High Priest and through him that they offer themselves as a spiritual sacrifice, that each one's faith ought to become more ready to work through charity, his piety more real and fervent, and each one should consecrate himself to the furthering of the divine glory, desiring to become as like as possible to Christ in his most grievous sufferings."[13] "All the elements of the liturgy, then, would have us reproduce in our hearts the likeness of the divine Redeemer through the mystery of the Cross, according to the words of the Apostle of the Gentiles, 'With Christ I am nailed to the Cross. I live, now not I, but Christ lives in me.' Thus we become a victim, as it were, along with Christ to increase the glory of the eternal Father."[14]

175. The same teaching is contained in the *Liturgy:* "Sanctify, we beseech Thee, O Lord our God, by the invocation of Thy holy name, the host we offer Thee, and by its means make us an eternal oblation to Thee."[15] "O Lord, may Jesus Christ, our Mediator, render these offerings acceptable to Thee, and my He present us with Himself as victims agreeable to Thee."[16]

8. See Suarez, *ib.* n.9.
9. AAS 39 (1947) 563.
10. Lercher-Dander, 354.
11. Encyclical "Miserentissimus Redemptor": AAS 20 (1928) 171.
12. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 233.
13. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 557.
14. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 559.
15. *In the feast of the Holy Trinity.*
16. *In the Votive Mass of our Lord Jesus Christ, the Eternal High Priest.*

It is also taught by the holy Fathers, who urge the symbolism of the mixing of water with the wine in order to signify the union of the faithful in Christ and under Christ the Head (see R 562; D 1320, 1748). Eusebius Caesariensis: "We sacrifice in a new way according to the N.T. a pure victim. on the one hand celebrating the memory of that great sacrifice, according to the mysteries handed on to us by Him.; but on the other hand consecrating ourselves to him and to his Pontiff, who is the Word, as being immolated in body and soul and prostrate before him."[17] St. Cyril of Alexandria: "For, in our sacrifices we immolate our souls as in a certain kind of image, and we offer them to God; when we die to the world and to the wisdom of the flesh, we endure the mortification of our vices, and almost with Christ we are fixed to the cross, so that, by changing ourselves into a holy and pure way of living, we may live according to his will."[18] St. Gregory the Great: "It is necessary that, when we do this, we offer ourselves to God with contrition of heart; for, we who celebrate the mysteries of the Lord's passion must imitate what we do."[19] And especially St. Augustine, who urges the Church to be the mystical Body of Christ, which responds invisibly to the visible sacrifice (R 1745, 1519, 1524).

That his oblation of the faithful may obtain its full effect, in a beautiful way Pius XII reminds them that it is necessary that they offer themselves as victims, not only by assisting at the sacrifice, but also in their whole Christian life. The holy liturgy appropriately brings them to this attitude with all of its various elements. Therefore the faithful must stir up these thoughts and ponder them often.[20]

17. *Demonstratio evangelica* 1,10: MG 22,94.
18. *De adoratione in spiritu et veritate* 11: MG 68,770.
19. *Dialogi* 4,59: ML 77,428.
20. See Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 557-562.

Thesis 14. Christ is the principal offerer in the sacrifice of the Mass.

Lercher-Dander, 346-353; Alastruey, 401-404.

176. Definition of terms. *Christ* is understood as Christ the man, or as man in a specifying way.[1]

The offerer, or priest; that is, the one legitimately constituted to offer to God this public sacrifice of the New Law, just as Christ offered a sacrifice at the Last Supper (see above n. 19-29) and on the Cross.[2]

He is called *principal* because he is not the only one. For, it is certain that, in the Church, there is a true and proper priesthood, whose main task, among others, is to offer this sacrifice (D 1764, 1771). Therefore we say that Christ is offering as the principal cause, while other priests offer as ministerial causes.

We affirm the fact, namely, that Christ truly offered the sacrifice of the Mass, but He is not the only one who offers it. How this principality of Christ in offering is to be explained in more detail we will discuss later in the scholium.

177. Doctrine of the Church. *Lateran Council IV* (D 802) teaches: In the Church "the priest himself, Jesus Christ, is also the sacrifice. His Body and Blood are truly contained in the sacrament of the altar under the appearances of bread and wine."

The Council of Trent in sess.22 ch. 2 (D 1743): "the same now offers himself through the ministry of priests who then offered himself on the Cross." In these words it is affirmed both that Christ offers and that priests offer ministerially. Hence Christ offers principally. Therefore also, when Christ is said to have commanded that the successors of the Apostles should offer it, and that the same ones are said to immolate Christ (D 1740), it must be understood to be in a ministerial sense.

Pius XI said: The priest "in the name of the divine Redeemer offers a most pleasing victim to the eternal majesty of God."[3]

Pius XII said: "The august sacrifice of the altar, then, is not mere empty commemoration of the passion and death of Jesus Christ, but a true and proper act of sacrifice, whereby the High Priest by an unbloody immolation offers Himself a most acceptable victim to the Eternal Father, as He did upon the Cross. The priest is the same, Jesus Christ, whose sacred Person His minister represents. Now the minister, by reason of the

1. See SThS 3, I, 492ff.
2. See SThS 3,I, 664-694.
3. Encyclical *"Ad catholici sacerdotii"*: AAS 28 (1936) 12.

sacerdotal consecration which he has received, is made like to the High Priest and possesses the power of performing actions in virtue of Christ's very person. Wherefore in his priestly activity he in a certain manner lends his tongue and gives his hand to Christ (St. Chrysostom)."[4]

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

178. Proof from Holy Scripture. Heb. 7:23-27. According to St. Paul, the essential difference between the Old and the New Law is the fact that in the Old Law many priests were necessary, while in the New Law the one priest Christ is sufficient. Therefore in the New Law either there is no sacrifice except the sacrifice of Christ, or if there is another one, it must be offered by Christ himself. But according to Scripture, there is another sacrifice in the New Law, namely the sacrifice of the Mass. Therefore in the Mass the offering priest is Christ himself.

179. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers say that Christ himself sanctifies the Eucharistic oblation: St. Chrysostom (R 1207; see R 1157); that He is offered in us: St. Ambrose (R 1260); that he is the priest and offerer: St. Augustine (R 1745).

180. Theological reasoning. The sacrifice, which is a renewal of the sacrifice of the Cross, cannot be offered except by Christ himself. But the sacrifice of the Mass is that. Therefore the sacrifice, which is a true renewal of the sacrifice of the Cross, cannot be offered except by Christ himself.

181. Objection. The sacrificial action in the Eucharist is the transubstantiation. But Christ the man does not perform the transubstantiation principally. Therefore he does not principally perform the sacrificial action. Therefore he is not the principal offerer.

I distinguish the major. The sacrificial action is the transubstantiation, according as it is a converting action, *denied;* according as it is oblative and unchanged, *conceded. I also distinguish the minor.* Christ the man does not perform principally the transubstantiation as converting, *conceded;* as oblative and unchanged, *denied.* That is, Christ the man effects the transubstantiation as such through his power of excellence; but he offers the sacrifice (and therefore performs the sacrificial action, and consequently the transubstantiation as it is formally a sacrificial action) as the principal cause.

4. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 548.

182. Scholium 1. *In what sense Christ is the principal offerer in the Mass.*[5] At the very least it must be held that Christ is the principal offerer in the Eucharistic sacrifice because he efficaciously instituted it, because such a sacrifice can be offered in the Church only in the name of Christ, because the institution of Christ continues perpetually in its influence. If these points are admitted, the doctrine of Trent is sufficiently maintained. But theologians ask further whether a greater influx of Christ in each Mass must be admitted, and therefore whether Christ is the principal offerer in our sacrifice in a more extensive and true sense.

The first opinion on this is negative, which does not admit any other influx of Christ on the oblation of the Mass except a virtual one that we just described. Thus Scotus, Vázquez, D'Ales, and others.[6] De la Taille strongly defends this opinion, and according to him Christ is truly offering in us and through us; we belong to Him and we do not make an offering except in a way dependent on His priestly power. But this oblation is ours, not his; whatever sacrificial power a partaker has comes from His oblation offered once and for all at the Last supper.[7]

The second opinion on this is affirmative, holding that Christ in the Mass actually offers, inasmuch as he actually wills and offers each and every Mass that is celebrated on earth. Thus Suarez, Salmanticenses, and among recent authors, Lepin, Garrigou-Lagrange, Filograssi, Lercher-Dander, Alastruey, and others.[8]

Lugo says that the question is not about the reality, but only about the name. For, he says that both opinions concede that it is not required that Christ physically concur with each oblation or that he has an actual will, really existing, by which he is now making an offering. Therefore that Christ is the principal offerer he thinks should be explain in this way: "Christ is truly offering now, because the priest by the institution of Christ is offering in the name of Christ; this suffices that this action morally speaking is said to be the action of Christ, just as the reverence that the ambassador of the king shows to the Pontiff is morally the reverence of the king for the Pontiff."[9] This explanation would be admitted by many authors supporting the first opinion, but not by

5. See Lercher-Dander, 358; Alastruey, 450-460.
6. See Scotus in Suarez, *In 3* q.83 disp.77 s.1; Vázquez, *In 3* disp.225 ch.3; A. D'Ales, *De Sanctissima Eucharistia* thes.5. See W. Lampen, *De Christo non actualiter sed virtualiter offerente in Missa:* Ant 17 (1942) 253-268.
7. *Mysterium fidei* eluc.23; *Esquisse de Mystère de la foi* 67-78.
8. Suarez, *In 3* q.83 disp.77 s.1 n.4-7; Salmanticenses, *De Eucharistia* disp.13 dub.3 par.1; M. Lepin, *L'idée du sacrifice de la Messe d'après le théologiens depuis l'origine jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris 1926) p.2 ch.6 a.2 par.4; Garrigou-Lagrange, *An Christus non solum virtualiter sed actualiter offerat Missas, quae quotidie celebrantur?:* Ang 19 (1942) 105-118; *La valeur infinie du sacrifice de la Messe et la célebration quotidienne des messes pour la pacification du monde:* CongInternEucar (1952) 1,37-44; Filograssi, 302-306; Lercher-Dander, 353; Alastruey, 406. In connection with this question there has been some debate recently which can be seen in K. Rahner, *Die vielen Messen und das eine Opfer* (Freiburg 1951); *Die vielen Messen als die vielen Opfer Christi:* ZkathTh 77 (1955) 94-101. J.M. Granero, *Novum Pascha:* EstEcl (1954) 211-237.
9. *De Eucharisti* disp.19 s.7 n.93.

the authors of the second opinion, who de facto require much more.[10]

183. Therefore this *second opinion seems more probable.* With Suarez it can be explained in the following way. Christ is the principal offerer in the sacrifice of the Mass, not only because he instituted it or because it has its efficacy from Him, or because the sacrifice is offered in His name as if through an ambassador representing Christ; but also because Christ the man concurs physically in the action whereby this sacrifice takes place, that is, with the transubstantiation, not just in general, but as it is a sacrificial action, since He is acting as the supreme worshipper of God and intercessor for men and ordaining the whole action for the worship of God and representing it to the Father in remembrance of his passion, so that the Father may be propitious to men.

Hence it is clear that Christ can now do all of this, because he is a true priest and intercedes for us and beholds all the actions of his ministers and desires in all and through all to worship God. We should not suppose that there is a multiplication of acts of the will in Christ corresponding to the multiplication of Masses. But with one oblation continuing without interruption he wills and offers all Eucharistic sacrifices, which are well known to Him because of his beatific and also infused knowledge.

If these points are admitted, not only is the Tridentine doctrine on the identity of the principal offerer in the Mass and on the Cross maintained better, but also the dignity and the value of the Eucharistic sacrifice is more fitly explained not only on the part of the victim, but also actually and proximately of the offerer.[11]

184. Scholium 2. *On the Church offering the sacrifice of the Mass.*[12] a) *The Fact. The Council of Trent* teaches that Christ instituted a new Pasch. "Namely, Himself, to be offered by the Church through her priests under visible signs" (D 1741); Masses, also private, "should be considered truly communal., because they are celebrated by a public minister of the Church, not for his own good alone, but for the faithful who belong to the Body of Christ" (D 1747).

Pius XI teaches: "Nor do those only enjoy a participation in this mystic priesthood and in the office of satisfying and sacrificing, whom our Pontiff Christ Jesus uses as His ministers to offer up the clean oblation to God's Name in every place from the rising of the sun to the going down, but the whole Christian people rightly called by the Prince of the Apostles a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, ought to offer for sins

10. Thus Suarez, on the same example used by Lugo, says: "although the honor shown by a king through his ambassador has a certain special dignity because of the person of the king, as being from the principal honorer through his minister, still according to normal moral estimation much more would be added, if the king personally through himself (as he could) concurred" (*loc.cit.* 6). Now he holds this about Christ offering through Himself, so that a better and more perfect equality may be had between the sacrifice of the Mass and the sacrifice of the Cross on the part of the offerer.

11. On this question, see W. Lampen, *Doctrina S. Ioanis Crysostomi de Christo se offerente in Missa:* Ant 18 (1943) 3-16.

12. See Lercher-Dander, 348-352; Alastruey, 413-429; Filograssi, 259-266; Suarez, *In 3* q.83 disp.77 s.3.

both for itself and for all mankind, in much the same manner as every priest and pontiff taken from among men, is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God."[13]

Pius XII teaches: In the Eucharistic sacrifice "the sacred minister acts as the vicegerent not only of our Savior but of the whole Mystical Body and of each one of the faithful. In this act of sacrifice through the hands of the priest, by whose word alone the Immaculate Lamb is present on the altar, the faithful themselves, united with him in prayer and desire, offer to the Eternal Father a most acceptable victim of praise and propitiation for the needs of the whole Church."[14] According to the same Pontiff, "Christ's faithful must also be said to offer the divine victim"; "all Christians, especially those present at the altar, are offering"; "they are offering the sacrifice not only through the hands of the priest, but also in a certain sense with him"; "the minister at the altar takes the place of Christ as Head, offering in the name of all the members"; the whole Church is rightly said "through Christ to make the oblation of the victim"; "The supreme sacrifice of the New Law signifies that obedience [of internal worship], whereby the principal offerer, who is Christ and, together with Him and through Him all his mystical members obey and venerate God with due honor."[15] Therefore the teaching of the Church is certain that the sacrifice of the Mass is offered not only by priests, but also by the Church and by all the faithful.

185. This teaching is clearly supported by the *Liturgy.* "So may our sacrifice be in your sight. That my sacrifice and yours may be acceptable. For whom we offer, or who offer up to Thee this sacrifice. We beseech thee graciously to accept this oblation of our service [that is, of the priest] and that of Thy whole household. And now, O Lord, we, Thy servants, and with us all Thy holy people., do offer unto Thy most sovereign Majesty." It is for this reason that the Eucharistic victim is called "the gifts of Thy Church," "the offerings of Thy suppliant Church," "the gifts of Thy rejoicing Church."[16]

The *holy Fathers* speak in the same way[17]; according to them "we all offer this victim" (R 851); the Church as the Body of Christ "learns to offer herself through Him" (R 1745); Christians are called a true priestly race because they offer the Eucharistic sacrifice to God (St. Justin[18]); the Eucharistic sacrifice is "the oblation of the Church," which "the Church offers with simplicity" (St. Irenaeus[19]). For, as St. Peter Damian says, "the sacrifice of praise is offered by all the faithful, not only by men but also by women, although it is seen to be offered in a special way by one priest, because what he does by offering with his hands, this is affirmed by the multitude of the faithful with intense mental devotion."[20] The *theologians* agree. Thus Innocent III before he became Pope: "Not only do the priests offer it, but also all the faithful. For, what is done in a

13. Encyclical "*Miserentissimus Redemptor*": AAS 20 (1928) 172.
14. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 232f.
15. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 554ff.
16. *Masses for the feast of Epiphany, the Third Sunday after Pentecost, Low Sunday.* See Pius XII, Encyclical "Mediator Dei": AAS 39 (1947) 554.
17. See M. de la Taille, *Mysterium fidei* 327-342.
18. *Diologus cum Tryphone* 116f: MG 6,746f.
19. *Adversus haereses* 4,18: MG 7,1026.
20. *Liber qui appellatur Dominus vobiscum* 8: ML 145,237.

special way through the ministry of priests, this is done universally by the devotion of the faithful."[21] Hence Suarez writes: "Among the Catholic faithful there is harmonious agreement that they can be offerers of this sacrifice."[22]

The reason for this is that a public sacrifice is offered by the community to whom the sacrifice belongs; but the Mass is the public sacrifice of the Church. Therefore it must be offered by the Church.

186. *Explanation of the fact.*[23] In the explanation of this teaching the essential difference must by all means be retained between priests, who by the sacrament of Orders have been deputed officially to offer sacrifice, and the other faithful (D 1764, 1767f.). The latter in no way can be made equal to priests in offering sacrifice or in performing the oblation of a true sacrifice.[24]

Hence it is that the sacrificial action itself is performed by one priest. "The unbloody immolation at the words of consecration, when Christ is made present on the altar in the state of a victim, is performed by the priest and by him alone, as the representative of Christ and not as the representative of the people."[25] Hence the *oblation in the strict sense*, that is, as it is a strictly sacrificial action, is not offered by the faithful; and therefore it is necessary to say that they do not offer the sacrifice of the Mass, because in making the oblation, strictly speaking, they do not participate.

However, *oblation in the broad sense* can be said to be the action by which a victim that is already present is offered to God for praise and propitiation; or the act whereby "the priest places the divine victim upon the altar that he offers to God the Father as an oblation for the glory of the Blessed Trinity and for the good of the whole Church."[26] The quotes above taken from the Canon of the Mass must be understood as being about the oblation taken in the broad sense.

Therefore the faithful participate in the oblation in their own way for two reasons. *The first is,* because they offer the sacrifice through the hands of the priest, since the priest "acts in the person of Christ, the Head, who makes the offering in the name of all his members"; hence "the whole Church is rightly said to offer the oblation of the victim through Christ." *The second is,* because the people together with the priest in a certain sense offer the sacrifice; therefore "it is based on the fact that the people unite their hearts in praise, impetration, expiation and thanksgiving with the prayers or intention of the priest, even of the High Priest himself, so that in the one and same offering of the victim and according to a visible sacerdotal rite, they may be presented to God the Father."[27]

187. *Therefore the following points must be stated:*

21. *De S. Altaris Mysterio* 3,6: ML 217,845.
22. *In 3* q.83 disp.77 s.3.
23. See S. Tromp, *Quo sensu in sacrificio Missae offerat Ecclesia, offerant fideles:* Per 30 (1947) 265-273.
24. On the errors flowing from a false view of this, see Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 553f.556f.
25. Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 555.
26. Pius XII, ibid. The following explanations are taken mostly from this encyclical.
27. Pius XII, Ibid. 555f.

1) The Church, as a social organism and as the Mystical Body of Christ, truly offers the sacrifice of the Mass, because her sacrifice in the strict sense is made principally by Christ as the Head of the Church, and ministerially by priests who are special members of his Body ordained for this purpose.

2) The Church, likewise as a social organism, also offers the sacrifice of the Mass, because she offers her oblation in the broad sense to God through the hands of a priest, inasmuch as he takes her place, and inasmuch as through the priest, her public minister, she officially honors and venerates God with due honor.

3) Individual members of the faithful are said in no way to offer sacrifice, because they participate proximately and directly in the oblation itself in the strict sense (for in this the priests do not act on their behalf); but only because they offer to God the oblation of the victim in the broad sense through the hands of the priest, who in this case acts on their behalf; and because they communicate with an internal affection in the prayers of praise, impetration and thanksgiving, whose external sign is the visible rite of the sacrifice.

4) This communication can be more or less. For, it is had as it were habitually in all those who belong to the mystical Body of Christ, because they are rightly thought to want to participate in the official and highest worship, which this mystical Body and religious society offers to God. It is greater in those who are present at the sacrifice, as it is in those who are its ministers or who ask for the celebration. It is greatest in those who are present to the sacrifice in such a way that they foster internal sentiments of self-oblation, or recite the same liturgical prayers or assist in some other way.[28]

188. c) *A further question is*[29] whether from the participation of the faithful in the oblation in the broad sense of the Eucharistic sacrifice the "royal priesthood" is explained, which belongs to all the baptized from the fact of their baptism according to 1 Pet. 2:9 (see 2:5). The affirmative opinion, which is now that of many recent theologians, received strong confirmation from the words of Pius XII: "Nor is it to be wondered at, that the faithful should be raised to this dignity. By the waters of Baptism, as by common right, Christians are made members of the Mystical Body of Christ the Priest, and by the 'character' which in imprinted on their souls, they are appointed to give worship to God. Thus they participate, according to their condition, in the priesthood of Christ."[30] On the same point Pius XI wrote: "But the whole Christian people rightly called by the Prince of the Apostles a chosen generation, a kingly priesthood, ought to offer for sins both for itself and for all mankind, in much the same manner as every priest and pontiff taken from among men, is ordained for men in the things that appertain to God."[31]

However Christians do not enjoy the priestly power, nor do the ordained priests

28. See also on this questions, S. Tromp, *Ven. Ludovicus de Ponte, S.J., et co-oblatio fidelium in sacrificio Missae:* Per 31 (1942) 345-351; I. Congar, *La participation des fidèles à l'offrende d'Eucharistie d'après la Tradition et le Magistère catholique:* LumV 7 (1952) 54-72.

29. See Lercher-Dander, 352; Alastruey, 425-429; Filograssi, 263f.

30. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 555.

31. Encyclical "*Miserentissimus Redemptor*": AAS 20 (1928) 171f.

in the act of sacrificing acts as delegates of the community; but the priests can be said to act in the name of the people only because they represent the person of Christ, inasmuch as he is the Head of all the members and offers Himself for them. The people, on the other hand, since they in no way represent the divine Redeemer and are not mediator between themselves and God, can in no way possess the sacerdotal power.[32]

Therefore the faithful can truly be said to be priests, not metaphorically, because they really "offer," that is, actively participate in the oblation of the Eucharistic sacrifice. But between them and the ordained priests there is no univocity in the priesthood; for, they are not equal in making the oblation, which is univocally one and the same. However, between them there is a certain analogy, such as exists between a strict oblation and an oblation in the broad sense. Therefore the faithful are said to be priests only in an analogical sense.

32. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 553.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE SACRIFICIAL ACTION OF THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE

189. Having considered the elements in which the Eucharistic sacrifice is in agreement with the sacrifice of the Cross (the victim and the offerer), the element in which the two differ essentially must now be examined. This is the nature of the offering, or the sacrificial action. In this regard, in the first place it must be established in what part of the Mass this essential sacrificial action is to be found; that is, it is to be placed in the consecration alone. Then it will be necessary to inquire further about what the formal reason is because of which the consecration is the sacrificial action. When this has been established, we will have the essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice.

Thesis 15. The re-presentation of the sacrifice of the Cross in the Mass is located formally in the consecration of both species; therefore the sacrificial action of this sacrifice is to be placed essentially in it alone.

Lercher-Dander, 362-367; Alastruey, 376-389; Filograssi, 269-275; Puig, 506-522.

190. Definition of terms. *The re-presentation of the sacrifice of the Cross,* which we said is essential in the Eucharistic sacrifice as it was instituted by Christ.

Is located in the consecration: the action manifesting in itself the objective re-presentation is the consecration.

Of both species, that is, the objective re-presentation of the sacrifice of the Cross is not had in the consecration as such, but in the two consecrations taken together.

Formally, that is, the twofold consecration, as such, has the objective representative power of the sacrifice of the Cross.

In it alone, having excluded all the other elements that are in the Mass: that is, the verbal oblation, the breaking and mixing the species, and especially the communion.

Essentially, that is, the whole essence of the sacrificial action is contained in the double consecration, although some other actions can be added that are required for an *integral* sacrifice, namely, the communion of the offering priest.

The sacrificial action is the action by which the priest formally

sacrifices, or performs the sacrifice.

191. Adversaries. Many theologians require for the essence of the sacrificial action in addition to the consecration, also *communion,* at least that of the offering priest. The earlier theologians take this view so that the immolation of the Cross may be re-presented, for they think it is not sufficiently re-presented by the consecration alone. Thus D. Soto, M. Cano, Valentia, Henríquez.[1] But others hold this position so that there will be a destruction of the immolated victim,[2] which they think pertains to the essence of a sacrifice. Thus Bellarmine, Ysambert, Mastrius, Salmanticenses, Lugo, St. Alphonsus Liguori, and others.[3]

Some theologian require besides, either *the verbal oblation* (Soto, Cano, Valentia, Henríquez), or also *the breaking and mixing* (Cano, Valentia Estius).[4]

All of these authors defend the position that the *consecration* pertains essentially, although inadequately, to the sacrificial action. However that is said to be denied by Scotus, Gabriel, *and some Thomists.* But certainly *some recent theologians* have held that position; for them the nature of the Eucharistic sacrifice consists rather in a meal of the fraternal community, and therefore its adequate essence is to be placed in the communion both of the priest and of the faithful together as a community.[5]

192. Doctrine of the Church. Pius XII teaches: "Now it cannot be over-emphasized that the Eucharistic sacrifice of its very nature is the unbloody immolation of the divine Victim, which is made manifest in a mystical manner by the separation of the sacred species and by their oblation to the eternal Father. Holy Communion pertains to the integrity of the Mass and to the partaking of the august sacrament; but while it is obligatory for the priest who says the Mass, it is only something earnestly recommended to the faithful."[6] With these words the following points are taught: a) The essence of the sacrifice of the Mass, which consists in the unbloody immolation of the victim, is to be placed in the separation of

1. D. Soto, *In 4* d.8 q.2 a.2; M. Cano, *De logis theologicis* 12,12. See M. Halmer, *Der Opfercharakter der heiligen Messe nach Dominikus Soto und Melchior Cano:* DivTh(Fr) 22 (1944) 31-50; Valentia, *De rebus fidei hoc saeculo controversis, De SS.Missae sacrificio* 1,2; Henríquez, *Summa theologiae moralis* 9,9.
2. Therefore it is not by reason of a sacrificial banquet, as if the whole nature of a sacrifice consisted in the communion alone, as such, as some theologians have maintained.
3. St. R. Bellarmine, *De Missa* 1,27; Ysambert, *In 3* q.83 disp.1ff.; Mastrius, *In 4* lib.4 disp.4 q.4; Salmanticenses, *De Eucharistia* disp.13; Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.19 s.5; St. Alphonsus, *Theologia Moralis* lib.6 tr.3 ch.3 dub.1 n.110; in Moral Theology he is followed by Marc, Aertnys, Hermann.
4. *In 4* d.22.
5. See Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 563.
6. *Ibid.,* 563.

the sacred species, which is a mystical immolation, and which is attained formally by the double consecration. b) The oblation of the separated species pertains to the essence of the same immolation; it is a non-verbal oblation, but one that is given in the consecration itself. c) The communion of the offering priest pertains to the integrity, not to the essence, of the sacrifice. d) The communion of the faithful does not pertain to the integrity. Therefore it is clear that, if the communion is excluded from the essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice, a fortiori all the other actions that compose the Mass are also excluded from it.

The same Supreme Pontiff explains: "By the transubstantiation of bread into the Body of Christ and of wine into his Blood, his Body and Blood are both really present: now the eucharistic species under which he is present symbolize the actual separation of his Body and Blood. Thus the commemorative representation of his death, which actually took place on Calvary, is repeated in every sacrifice of the altar, seeing that Jesus Christ is symbolically shown by separate symbols to be in a state of victimhood."[7] In these words it is taught that the objective representation of the sacrifice of the Cross, which is essential in the Eucharistic sacrifice, is therefore had in the double consecration, because, through distinct species, on the one hand the Body of Christ and on the other hand his Blood are indicated, as mystically separated, just as by his passion and death on the Cross they were really separated.

Theological note. The thesis, which was already held by theologians to be common and certain, must now be said to be *Catholic doctrine* because of the quoted words, by which Pius XII explains the whole matter.

193. Proof. a) *The consecration of both species well represents in an objective way the immolation of the sacrifice of the Cross.* Another action is required in order to have that representation, which in itself signifies the pouring out of his blood on the Cross, or its separation from the Body. But this is had through the two consecrations taken together. Therefore the two consecrations well represent in an objective way the immolation of the sacrifice of the Cross.

The minor. A consecration signifies what is expressed by the words. Therefore the consecration of the bread signifies only the Body of Christ being present, and the consecration of the chalice only the Blood of Christ being present. Therefore the double consecration, because it is double and not one, signifies the Blood as separated from the Body, or the Blood

7. *Ibid.*, 548f.

poured out on the Cross.

b) *Communion is not required for that objective representation.* The liturgical significance of communion is known from the words by which it is introduced into the liturgy. But these words deal always with the advantage for the recipient, not with the oblation made to God. Therefore communion is not required for the representation of the Cross. Thus St. Thomas says: "Receiving is of the very nature of the sacrament, but offering belongs to the nature of sacrifice" (III, q. 79, a. 7 ad 3).

c) *Communion is not required essentially for the necessary destruction of the victim.* Communion liturgically has the character of a convivial participation in the victim already sacrificed (1 Cor. 10:16-21); this idea is often expressed in the liturgical prayers after communion. But this participation does not come from the part of man placating God, but from the part of God already placated; now He sanctifies man sacramentally by making him His own table companion. Therefore it cannot pertain to the essence of sacrifice, since it supposes that it is already done. But the sacrificial meal in the Eucharistic sacrifice is the natural complement of the sacrifice, since it was instituted according to the nature of food and drink, and therefore with an intrinsic ordination to a sacrificial meal. Therefore the communion of the priest is required by divine law for the integrity of this sacrifice.

d) *The other actions do not pertain to the essence.* All the other liturgical actions in some cases may be omitted, but the sacrifice still remains. Therefore they do not pertain to its essence.

194. Objections. 1. The communion of the priest is like the burning in holocausts. But the burning was of the essence of those sacrifices. Therefore the communion of the priest belongs to the essence.

I deny the major. Communion is like the convivial participation in the victim of the sacrifice.

2. St. Paul (1 Cor. 11:26) places in communion, and surely that of the faithful, the objective representation of the sacrifice of the Cross. Therefore communion pertains to the essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice

I deny the antecedent. St. Paul in those words only explains in what sense in the Eucharistic sacrifice there is a remembrance of Christ. But what the true meaning of communion is he explains in the same epistle in 10:16-21.

3. Sacrificial action presupposes the presence of the victim. But in the Eucharistic sacrifice the victim is not present except through the consecration. Therefore the sacrificial action of the Eucharistic sacrifice cannot be the consecration.

I distinguish the major. Sacrificial action presupposes the presence of the victim at least first in nature, *conceded;* first also in time, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.*

The victim is not present except through the consecration as this is a transubstantiating action, *conceded;* as it is an action of oblation and immolation, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* The sacrificial action cannot be the consecration as it is a transubstantiating action, *conceded;* as it is an action of oblation and immolation, *denied.*

4. But the consecration is in no way an action of oblation and immolation. For the consecration effects only what is signified by the words and the species. But by the words and the species only transubstantiation is signified. Therefore the consecration is only a transubstantiating action, but in no way oblative and immolative.

I deny the second minor. For proof I bypass the major and distinguish the minor. By each consecration taken separately only transubstantiation is signified, *I concede the minor or bypass it;* by both consecrations taken together, *I deny the minor. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* The consecration of one of the two taken separately is only a transubstantiating action, *conceded;* both consecrations taken together, *denied.*

195. 5. If the sacrificial action is the consecration, then it is necessary to say that God is principally the one sacrificing. However not God, but Christ the man is principally the one sacrificing. Therefore the consecration is not the sacrificial action.

I distinguish the major. If the sacrificial action were the consecration as transubstantiating, it would be necessary to say that God is the one principally sacrificing, *conceded;* if the sacrificial action is the consecration as oblative and immolative, *denied. I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* The sacrificial action is not the consecration as transubstantiating, *conceded;* as oblative and immolative, *denied.*

6. After the consecration there is still the oblation made by the Church. But oblation pertains to the essence of any sacrifice. Therefore by the consecration alone the whole essence of the sacrifice is still not present. *The major.* The Church prays: "And now calling to mind. we offer to thy most sovereign Majesty. a pure victim."

I distinguish the minor. After the consecration there is still an oblation in the broad sense, *conceded;* there is still a sacrificial oblation in the strict sense, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* Oblation in the strict sense pertains to the essence of a sacrifice, *conceded;* oblation in the broad sense, *denied.* See what we said about the oblation of the faithful above in n. 187.

7. In every sacrifice some destruction of the victim is required. But by the consecration alone there is no destruction of the victim. Therefore the consecration alone is not the whole essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice.

The solution of this difficulty is different for the various opinions, which are proposed by the theologians to explain the essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice. Therefore according to those diverse systems some respond in one way and others respond in a different way. Some *simply deny the major.* Others, *after conceding the major, deny the minor* and try in many ways to explain it. We can say this much: *I distinguish the major.* In every sacrifice some destruction of the victim is required which is either real or symbolic or representative, *conceded or bypassed;* necessarily real and physical, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* By the consecration there is no real or physical destruction

of the victim, *conceded;* there is no symbolic or representative destruction, *I subdistinguish:* by one of the consecrations taken separately, *conceded;* by both consecrations taken together, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* The consecration alone of only one of the species is not the whole essence of Eucharistic sacrifice, *conceded;* the consecration alone of both species taken together is not the whole essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice, *denied.*

Thesis 16. The sacrificial action of the sacrifice of the Mass is had formally in this, that by the twofold consecration the bloody separation of the Body and Blood is presented in an unbloody way, and so the same victim of the Cross is offered and immolated by the same principal offerer through distinct signs of that death.

Lercher-Dander, 368-378; Filograssi, 275-320; Alastruey, 389-400; Puig, 523-534.

196. Connection. We have seen that the consecration alone, but being double, manifests the objective representation of the sacrifice of the Cross, which is essential in the Eucharistic sacrifice. However the question about the essence of this sacrifice has not yet been fully answered. For, a priori we do not know whether the essence of the Mass, inasmuch as it is a true and proper sacrifice, includes some other element beside that objective representation of the Cross. Of course we do know this one thing, namely, that that element, if it exists, must be found in the consecration. For, we have said that the whole essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice is contained in the consecration alone. Therefore we now ask in what sense, under what formal reason, is the consecration the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass.

197. Definition of terms. Although many things, which are said in the wording of the thesis, must be explained later in more detail, still now some things must be briefly explained.

The sacrificial action is the action by which the priest essentially offers and immolates the victim to God. Therefore it is the action by which the sacrifice itself takes place.

To offer and to immolate can be said either in a popular sense, or in a technical sense. *In the popular sense* they signify one and the same thing, namely, to make a sacrifice or to sacrifice. *In the technical sense* they are distinguished, at least formally, although materially they can be one and the same external action.

To offer is said from oblation. *Oblation* in the technical sense is an act of the will directing to another (to God in our case) the presentation of some gift. But that act of the will, if it has to do with a visible sacrifice, must be manifested exteriorly.

To immolate is said from immolation. *Immolation* in the technical sense is some external action, which is done concerning the victim of a sacrifice. This action is not necessarily the killing of the victim. Thus, on the Cross, the killing of the victim was done by the Jews and Romans, while the sacrificial immolation was made only by Christ. Therefore St. Thomas

says: "The slaying of the Man Christ may be referred to a twofold will. First, to the will of those who slew Him: and in this respect He was not a victim: for the slayers of Christ are not accounted as offering a sacrifice to God, but as guilty of a great crime. Secondly, the slaying of Christ may be considered in reference to the will of the Sufferer, who freely offered Himself to suffering. In this respect He is a victim." (III, q. 22, a. 2 ad 2). Also in the Old Testament the slaying of the victim could be done by anyone, while only the priests performed the sacrificial immolation; for the sacrifices of animals this consisted in pouring the blood on the corner of the altar. Therefore an immolation is in some way an action changing the victim. I said "in some way" so that for now we may prescind from the disputed questions about a real or moral or mystical or sacramental immolation.

We say *formally* in the wording of the thesis, because, since we know that the consecration coincides with the sacrificial action, we want to determine the essential aspect or the formal reason because of which the consecration verifies the concept of a sacrificial action.

198. Opinions. Many have been proposed in this most difficult matter.[1] Of these, we now intend to present the main tendencies.

The first tendency: for a sacrifice *the oblation and immolation* of the victim is required essentially. This tendency insists especially on explaining the Eucharistic immolation, in which the true difficulty is found.

a) Some understand immolation as the real *destruction* of the victim. In order for them to find it in the Mass, either they require for the essence in addition to the consecration also the communion of the priest,[2] or they explain the consecration as constitution of Christ under the idea of food with an intrinsic reference to communion,[3] or in the exterior state of being dead so that it can be eaten.[4] Usually this theory is said to be that of Bellarmine.

b) Others explain immolation in the consecration itself, inasmuch as this constitutes Christ *in a more declined state*, in which he cannot connaturally exercise his bodily life. In this way therefore Christ is destroyed not simply, but certainly morally, or according to human estimation. But by

1. In addition to the authors cited at the beginning of the thesis, an explanation of these views can be seen in A. Michel, *La Messe chez les théologiens postérieurs au Concile de Trente:* DTC 10,1143-1316; M. Lepin, *L'idée du sacrifice de la Messe d'après les théologiens depuis l'origine jusq'à nos jours;* M. Bauele, 3 Neukirch, *Doctrina speculativa theologorum de sacrosancto Missae sacrificio:* EstFranc 44 (1932) 321-338. From the different views of the authors it is sufficiently clear how difficult it is in this matter to give an objective and exact classification.
2. Of this mind are the authors cited above in n. 191, except Lugo.
3. Thus Viva, *De sacramentis* p.5 a.1; Wirceburgenses, *De Eucharistia* 391.
4. Thus Lamiroy, *De essentia SS. Missae sacrificii* (Louvain 1919) p.3 s.1 a.2

communion he is destroyed even more and the victim is consumed. Thus especially Lugo,[5] after whom this theory is named.

c) Others see in the consecration not an actual, but a *virtual* immolation. That is, the words of consecration accomplish nothing except what they signify. Therefore by the power invested in them they tend to produce a real separation, which de facto they would do unless they were impeded accidentally from concomitance. This is the opinion of Lessius,[6] which was also held by many Thomists.

d) A few others proposed a *merely representative* immolation, according to which in the Eucharist, since it is a relative sacrifice, no other real immolation is required except, having supposed the same victim of the Cross as really present, the objective commemoration or representation of the real immolation accomplished on the Cross. Thus Vázquez and *a few others.*[7]

e) Others defend an immolation that is not physical, but *mystical.* Namely, the twofold consecration constitutes the sacramental and mystical separation of the Blood of Christ from His Body; through it Christ is made present on the altar and is offered to God in the very same habit of suffering and death which he once endured on the Cross. This theory, whose main elements were already found in some of the ancient theologians, especially in Salmerón, was recently revived mainly by Billot and *many others* have followed him.[8]

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5. *De Eucharistia* disp.17 s.5 n.64-68; he was preceded by O. Casel, *De sacrificio Missae* ch.19 (on this see S. Resende, *O sacrificio da Missa em D. Frei Gaspar do Casel* [Porto 1941]) and Malderus, *De virtutibus theologicis et iustitia* tr.10 ch.3 dub.1 s.1 n.7. De Rhodes, *Disputationes theologicae scholasticae* ch.2 tr.10 disp.2; Tournely, *De Eucharistiae sacramento* q.8 concl.5. Recently one who firmly adopted this theory is Franzelin, *De SS. Eucharistiae sacramento et sacrificio* thl16; he is followed by Stentrup, *De Verbo Incarnato* 2,2 tr.75; Hurter, *Theologiae Dogmaticae compendium* 3,419; Lahousse, *De Eucharistia* 765-769; and many others. Card. Cienfuegos (*Vita abscondita sub speciebus eucharistics* disp.5 s.5 s.3 n.37), through a certain deformation of this theory, held that Christ, when he becomes present in the Eucharist, enjoys the exercise of his sensitive faculties and continues to place some acts of these faculties: but that immediately he freely and of his own will sacrifices this sensitive life, and so is reduced to a more declined state.
6. L. Lessius, *De perfectionibus moribusque divinis* 12.13.95ff. The same theory of virtual immolation was held by Sylvius, *In 3* q.83 a.1 q.2 concl.3; Gonet, *Clypeus theologiae thomisticae,* tr. de sacramento Eucharistiae disp.11 a.2 par.4; Billuart, *Tractatus de Eucharistia* diss.8 a.2; H. Hugon, *De Eucharistia* q.9 a.2; Frassen, *Scotus Academicus* t.4 app. de sacrificio Missae; and many others.
7. Vázquez, *In 3* disp.222 ch.8; J. Perrone, *Praelectiones theologicae* 8,246-250; J. Souben, *Nouvelle Théologie Dogmatique* (1905) 7,134ff. On other authors with similar views, see Lepin, *L'idée du sacrifice de la Messe.* 604ff.
8. Salmerón, *Commentarii in evangelicam historiam* t.9 tr.29; Z. Pascualigo, *De sacrificio Novae Legis* tr.1; Gotti, *Tractatus de Eucharistia ut sacrificium est* q.1 dub.2 n.11-14; L. Billot, *De Ecclesiae sacramentis* 1,635-640; N. Gihr, *Das heilige Messopfer* 100ff; Van Noort, *De sacramentis* s.4 q.3 a.3; A. Tanquerey, *Brevior Synopsis theologiae dogmaticae* 641; P. Minges, *Compendium theologiae dogmaticae specialis* 2,211ff.; A. Michael, LTC 10,1264-1277; R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Eucharistia* p.2 ch.2 a.2; Lercher, *Institutiones theologiae dogmaticae* th.48; Puig, *523-534;* Filograssi, 292-313; Alastruey, 394ff. It is clear that these and many other authors hold the substance of this theory, however they explain it in many different ways, even often by borrowing some elements from the other theories.

f) Tanner[9] defended *the mystical and at the same time destructive* immolation of the substance of the bread and wine. Suarez proposed the *destructive* immolation of the bread that is also *effective* or presentative of Christ on the altar. In modern times Scheeben defended this theory of consecration.[10]

199. *The second tendency: the oblation alone* is required essentially for the sacrifice. This tendency removes the greatest difficulty of the problem by suppressing the essential necessity of an immolation. However, it does not totally omit the immolation, but thinks that the immolation made once formerly is sufficient, provided that the victim immolated then is now offered again.

a) This theory, *gradually developed since Maldonatus and the theologians of the French school,* was proposed in the nineteenth century by Thalhofer. According to him, in the consecration Christ makes an oblation of Himself, which is essentially the same that he made on the Cross and continues to make in heaven.[11]

b) This tendency is found in some theologians so that *a new oblation* is made by Christ the Priest of the victim immolated formerly. That is, the ritual sacrifice is not constituted by an immolation, but by an oblation. This is the act whereby man gives to God the victim representing the same man. Christ on the Cross made a complete oblation of his suffering and death, or the complete gift of his love. This oblation embraces the whole life of Christ; before his passion he offered Himself in a daily immolation of humility, poverty, work and simply his human life; in the passion he offered Himself in a special way as suffering and slain on the Cross; in heaven he offers Himself continually as the one formerly immolated, and the sensible signs of that immolation remain in his glorious Body. Christ present in the Eucharist is constituted along with his act of perpetual heavenly oblation; and in this way the heavenly sacrifice of Christ becomes present on the

9. *Theologia scholastica* t.4 disp.5 q.9 dub.2 n.39.

10. Suarez, *In 3* q.83 disp.75 s.6. See P. Schepens, *Sententia Suareziana de essentia sacrificii Missae:* Greg 5 (1924) 94-102. It is said that this theory was preceded by Galenus, *De SS. Missae sacrificio* 6. The same things seems to be found in de Bay, *De sacrificio* 10; Toleto, *In 3* q.83 controv. 1ff.; Beccano, *De sacramentis* p.3 tr.2 ch.5 q.2; Duhamel, *Theologiae. summarium* diss.ult. ch.1; Wigger, *In 3* q.83 dub.1; De Coninck, *De sacramentis et censuris* 1 q.83 a.1; M. J. Scheeben, *Handbuch der katholischen Dogmatik* 3.1.400ff; P. Schanz, *Die Lehre von den heiligen Sakramenten der katholischen Kirche* 479-483; J. Kramp, *Die Opferanschauungen der römischen Messliturgie* (120). On this theory, see the review of the work of Kramp written by P. Umberg in ZkathTh 46(1922) 433-445.

11. Maldonatus, *De sacramentis disputationes. De Eucharistia* p.3. On the theologians of the French school who are said to have prepared for this theory, see Michel: DTC 10,1195-1208. V. Thalhofer, *Das Opfer des Alten und Neuen Bundes* (Ratisbon 1870); T.H. Simar, *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik* (1893) 155. See however J. Galy, *Le sacrifice dans l'école française* (Paris 1951).

altar in a definite place and time, or in conditions that are not heavenly, but earthly. Therefore in the Mass a twofold consecration is required, representative of the sacrifice of the Cross, as a mystical immolation; not however as something entering into the essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice, but only as the necessary condition of the present oblation of Christ on the altar, as he willed it to be. Therefore the Eucharistic sacrifice consists essentially in the oblation alone of Christ (to which as its complement and extension the oblation of the Church is joined). Christ makes this oblation his own (and the Church of Christ does it) under signs that represent the former immolation of Christ on the Cross. Thus especially Lepin.[12]

200. c) This tendency appears in other theologians in such a way that a new *oblation by the Church* of the previously immolated victim is made, but not by Christ. That is, they make a distinction between the sacrifice of Christ and the sacrifice of the Church. *The sacrifice of Christ* was unique, coalescing from two essential elements: the oblation of the Last Supper and the oblation of the Cross. The oblation of the Supper was not just internal, but external and liturgical, under the representative image of the future bloody immolation. This sacrifice of Christ was consummated by the divine acceptance, whereby the victim becomes glorious (through the resurrection), heavenly (through the Ascension), and perennial (through his immortality). Hence Christ remains perpetually in his true being as an accepted victim.

The Eucharistic sacrifice is *the sacrifice of the Church*, consisting in the oblation that the Church makes of the victim immolated on the Cross. By this oblation, Christ does not become the victim, but Christ, who in himself is and remains a victim, becomes our victim. Therefore the consecration is formally a sacrificial action since it is the oblation of the divine heavenly victim really immolated on the Cross; and this oblation is made by the Church by the power of Christ. Hence the Mass is a repetition of the Lord's Supper, since in both there is only the external and liturgical oblation, under the same visible signs, of the same victim, which is actually immolated elsewhere. But there are two differences: in the Supper Christ offers, in the Mass the Church offers (Christ only virtually); in the Supper the victim about to be immolated is offered, in the Mass a victim already immolated

12. M. Lepin, *L'idée du sacrifice de la Messe d'après les théologiens depuis l'origine jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris 1926) 737ff; *Autour de l'idée du sacrifice:* RevAp 46 (1928) 257-287. Similar ideas are proposed by P. Batiffol, *Leçons sur la Messe 175-181; B. Bartmann, Lehrbuch der Dogmatik* 2,353-360; J. Rivière, *Un nouveau système sur l'essence du sacrifice de la Messe:* RevScRel 11 (1921) 69-92; A.A. Paquet, *De sacramentis* disp.8 s.4; A.M. Lepicier, *De sacramento sacrificio eucharistico* 82-123. See on this theory, F. de Lanversin, *Esquisse d'une synthèse du sacrifice:* RevScRel 17 (1927) 193-209; M. de la Taille, *De sacrificio vero et proprio, quaestiones disputatae V:* Greg 9 (1928) 3-64.

is offered. This is the position of P. De la Taille.[13]

201. *The third tendency:* the sacrifice of the Mass is the real and present renewal *by way of a mystery* of the very same sacrifice of the Cross. This tendency supposed the whole theory of "the presence of the mysteries" (Mysteriengegenwart), developed especially by some German Benedictines. According to this theory, the sacrifice of the Cross, accomplished once in history on the Cross, becomes really present to us under the veil of symbols. However, this presence is not just an objective remembrance, nor is it a mere virtual presence in its influence and causality, nor is it only the presence of the same victim. On the other hand, this presence is not a historical repetition of the same sacrifice, since it took place once in history and cannot be repeated. But it is a certain intermediate presence—spiritual, mystical, sacramental, metahistorical (that is, transcending space and time), by way of a mystery. Thus especially Casel, and *others* after him.[14]

202. A historical synthesis.[15] These tendencies considered from a distance proceed from different concepts of a sacrifice. For, the elements which are thought to be essential to a sacrifice they try to find in the consecration itself. This is especially the case with the first two tendencies. But if they are looked at more closely, they are found to think differently about the relation of the Mass to the Cross, which is absolutely essential.

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13. M. de la Taille, *Mysterium fidei*[3] (Paris 1931); *Esquisse du Mystère de la foi* (Paris 1924). In a similar way, though perhaps with more difficult terminology, McDonald spoke about this, *The Sacrifice of the Mass in the Light of Scripture and Tradition.* The system of P. De la Taille stirred up great controversies among theologians, and in these he had to defend his ideas more than once. Here are a few: Swaby, *The Last Supper and Calvary;* M.C. D'Arcy, *The Mass and the Redemption* (London 1926); M. Alonso, *El sacrificio de la última Cena del Señor, según el Concilio Tridentino* (Madrid 1929); J. Puig de la Bellacasa, *La essencia del sacrificio de la Misa:* EstEcl 8 (1929) 363-380; 10 (1931) 65-96, 385-406, 538-553; 11 (1932) 95-103; M. Alonso, *El sacrificio eucaristico de la última Cena del Señor, según los teólogos:* EstEcl 11 (1932) 145-166, 323-368, 461-483; 12 (1933) 33-63, 177-198, 377-472; M. De la Taille, *Distinctio oblationis et immolationis in traditione theologica:* EphThLov 4 (1927) 384-405; *Coena et Passio in theologia apologetica contra pseudo-reformatores:* Greg 7 (1928) 177-241.

14. O. Casel, *Die Messe als heilige Mysterienhandlung* (edited in *Mysterium. Gesammelte Arbeiten Laacher Münche,* 1926) 29-52; *Das Mysteriengedächnis der Messliturgie im Lichte der Tradition:* JahrbLitWiss (1926) 113-204; *Die Messopferlehre der Tradition:* ThGl 23 (1931) 351-367. Similar ideas are proposed by M. Schmaus, *Katholische Dogmatik* 3.2 (1941) 208-214; A. Arnold, *Der Ursprung des christliche Abendmahls* (1937) 141-149; J. Pinsk, *Die sakramentale Welt* (1938) 169-181; G. Söhngen, *Symbol und Wirklichkeit im Kultmysterium* (1940) 151; A. Vonier, *A Key to the Doctrine of the Eucharist* (London 1925) ch.12. On the differences in explaining „mystery" and its immediate subject, see Lercher-Dander, 375f. On this whole tendency, see also P. Le Vooght, *A propos d'une conception symboliste de la Messe:* DivTh(pi) 35 (1932) 310-317; J. Bütler, *Die Mysterienthese der Laacher Schule im Zusammenhang scholastiker Theologie:* ZkathTh 57 (1935) 546-571; A.M. Hoffmann, *Passionis representatio:* ThPrakQschr (1936) 505-531; A. Piolanti, *La teoria sacrificale di ode Casel:* EDoc 7 (1954) 157-167.

15. See J. A. de Aldama, *Conclusiones de una sintesis histórica sobre la esencia del sacrificio de la Misa:* CongrInternEuc (1952) 1,117-126.

For, according to Trent a certain identity between the two sacrifices must be preserved. Therefore this identity, whatever the situation may be with the previous tradition, from the sixteenth century evolved in such a way that, with the passage of time, it was investigated and asserted up to the last tendency mentioned. For, at first the exact identity predominated only in the victim, multiplied both by the oblation and by the immolation. Later the exact identity predominated in the victim and in the immolation, multiplied only by the oblation; more recently the exact identity in the victim, in the immolation and in the oblation is being sought. Hence it is that the elements of the diverse theories are often mingled together, since the individual theories are subject to a more profound theological evolution. In what follows these points should be kept in mind.

203. The way of proceeding. From what we have just said, it appears that there can be a twofold way of proceeding in the solution of this problem.

The first is quasi a priori, that is, having supposed the truth of the sacrifice of the Mass, we can proceed from the essential notion of a sacrifice to the explanation of the essence of this one concrete sacrifice. In this way of proceeding, first a notion is established, in which the essential elements of a sacrifice as such are found. Then, if the Mass is a true sacrifice (which is known from the doctrine of the Church), each and every one of those essential elements must be found in it, as is obvious. But because the consecration alone fulfills the whole essence of the Mass, all of those elements will be found in it. Therefore the whole attempt of this investigation depends on this—that it explains under what formal reason the consecration contains those elements. Surely this way is not on that account to be rejected because the Church, teaching that the Mass is a true and proper sacrifice, did not wish in effect to determine in these words the identity between the abstract notion of a sacrifice and the essence, at least in general terms, of the Mass. Indeed this way would be the best, if from some other source it were established for certain what the essential elements are in the abstract notion of a sacrifice. For, this notion then could not not be verified in the Mass, which is a true and proper sacrifice. But that is not the case. We do not have such an essential notion of a sacrifice as such, which certainly and necessarily must be verified in every sacrifice. The disputes among theologians for so many centuries are proof enough for this.

The second way of proceeding is quasi a posteriori, by investigating positively all the elements that essentially constitute this concrete, singular and wondrous sacrifice. For if these points are well defined, from them afterwards by comparison with other sacrifices the true and abstract notion

of a sacrifice as such will be able to be deduced with more certainty. And this way seems to be more theological; that is especially the case, because whatever we know about this Eucharistic sacrifice and its intimate nature, we know from revelation; moreover, its essence is unique and very different from all other sacrifices.[16] Therefore we will follow this second way.

204. Doctrine of the Church. The Magisterium of the Church nowhere teaches us the essence of the sacrifice of the Mass as such. However, it has proposed many of its essential elements; it is necessary to put these all together as the theological foundation of the whole solution.

a) *The Council of Trent* in sess.22 ch.1 (D 1739-1741) teaches that Christ left to the Church a visible sacrifice, "by which the bloody (sacrifice) that he was once for all to accomplish on the Cross would be re-presented"; by which the priests *offer* "his Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine"; by which Christ Himself *is offered* "by the Church through her priests under visible signs." In chapter 2 (D 1743) the Council teaches that this sacrifice is *therefore* truly propitiatory because in it "the same Christ who offered himself once in a bloody manner on the altar of the Cross *is contained and is offered in an unbloody manner*": "for, the victim is one and the same: the same one now offers himself through the ministry of priests who then offered himself on the Cross; *only the manner of offering is different*"; so the difference of the oblation consists in this, that one is bloody, the other is unbloody. In canon 3 (D 1753) the Council teaches that this is not "a simple commemoration of the sacrifice accomplished on the Cross," but it is "propitiatory." In the Decree on what is to be observed and what is to be avoided in the celebration of the Mass, the Council speaks about the Eucharistic sacrifice, "by which the life-giving victim, by which we have been reconciled to God, *is immolated* daily by priests on the altar."[17]

In order for us to gather together these Tridentine elements, first it must be noted that the Council use the words "offering" and "immolation" not in their technical meaning but in the popular meaning, according as they signify simply "to sacrifice," as is apparent from a careful comparison of the quoted texts. Therefore, that being the case, the Council teaches: 1) That the Mass is essentially the re-presentation of the Cross, which however is not a simple commemoration, but it has the nature of a true propitiatory sacrifice. 2) That the Mass and the Cross are simply two sacrifices, not one and the same. 3) That the essential difference between both is not in the victim nor

16. This way is followed or suggested by Filograssi, 292-295; Lercher-dander, 378.
17. CTr 8,962.

in the principal offerer, but only in the manner of offering. I say essential, which is greater than what is found accidentally in the victim or the offerer. 4) That the nature of the offering (namely, the sacrificial action) is different, because one is bloody and the other is unbloody. 5) That the Mass is thus a propitiatory sacrifice, because it re-presents objectively the sacrifice of the Cross. But because in fallen nature the aspect of propitiation (the other aspects are necessarily connected with it) is essential to every sacrifice, from the doctrine of the Council it seems to be deduced that the Mass is a true sacrifice from the same objective and unbloody re-presentation of the sacrifice of the Cross, so that, in order to save the truth of the sacrifice of the Mass as absolute, it is not necessary that any new element be added to its essence as a relative sacrifice.

205. b) Leo XIII teaches (above n. 160) that the sacrifice of the Mass is a true, although unbloody and mystical *renewal* of the sacrifice of the Cross; that through it the sacrifice of the Cross is *perpetuated* not only by a similar or empty memory, but by bringing the truth itself, although under *a different species.* There again the unbloody and mystical oblation or immolation is designated as the unique difference. The words of Pius XI cited in the same place have the same meaning.

c) Pius XII teaches: "The august sacrifice of the altar, then, is not mere empty commemoration of the passion and death of Jesus Christ, but a true and proper act of *sacrifice*, whereby the High Priest by an unbloody immolation offers Himself a most acceptable victim to the Eternal Father. The manner, however, in which Christ *is offered* is different. On the Cross He completely offered Himself and all His sufferings to God, and the *immolation* of the victim was brought about by the bloody death, which He underwent of His free will. But on the altar, by reason of the glorified state of His human nature, death shall have no more dominion over Him, and so the shedding of His Blood is impossible; still according to the plan of divine wisdom, the *sacrifice* of our Redeemer is shown forth in an admirable manner by external signs which are the symbols of His death. For by the transubstantiation of bread into the Body of Christ and of wine into His Blood, His body and blood are both really present: now the Eucharistic species under which He is present symbolize the actual separation of His body and blood. Thus the commemorative representation of His death, which actually took place on Calvary, is repeated in every sacrifice of the altar, seeing that Jesus is symbolically shown by separate symbols to be in a state of victimhood."[18]

18. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 548f.

206. In these words these points seem to be taught: 1) The Mass is not only a relative sacrifice, but also an absolute one. 2) It is an absolute sacrifice, because Christ in it does what he did on the Cross. This identity is had in the victim and in the Priest. But the diversity is in the manner of the offering. 3) On the Cross there is an oblation and an immolation. In the Mass also there is an oblation and an immolation. These words *here* seem to be used in their technical sense. 4) The immolation of the Cross is by a bloody death (certainly inasmuch as it was freely accepted by Christ); the immolation of the Mass is by external signs (therefore unbloody). 5) The consecration accomplishes this unbloody immolation, because it makes Christ present in a state of victimhood, inasmuch as by the separation of the species the bloody separation of death is symbolized and signified. 6) This unbloody immolation is not only a re-presentation of the bloody immolation of the Cross, but it is a true immolation, because through it the death of Christ is demonstrated, shown and indicated by the distinct species, which therefore are symbols of his death. All of these points seem to be said not only about an objective re-presentation or commemoration alone, but about a present sacrifice. In this way we understand the verb "is shown," that is, not as a synonym for the verb "is signified." For, the expression "sacrifice by external signs" is wholly opposed to the expression "immolation by a bloody death." Indeed through these two expressions he intends to give an explanation of the different reason by which Christ offers Himself on the Cross and in the Mass. But this must be of such a nature that not only the nature of the re-presentation is maintained, but also that of the sacrifice; that is, not only the nature of a relative sacrifice, but also the nature of an absolute sacrifice. However, this would not be true, if the verb "is shown" has no more than a relative significance.

207. d) *From all of this,* the exact identity between the Cross and the Mass by both the oblation and immolation is certainly excluded (the third tendency).[19] An exact identity in the immolation alone also seems to be excluded. That is, a new immolation is required, although an unbloody one; for, from the doctrine of the Church it is not apparent how this does not pertain to the very essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice; therefore it is in itself more than a mere condition. Thus it seems that the second tendency cannot be admitted, since it speaks about a new oblation of the victim previously immolated, as such, having supposed the unbloody immolation

19. See B. Klopenburg, *A controversia sobre a teoria do Mistero:* RevEclBras 11 (1951) 241-256.

only as a condition.[20] A mere representation is excluded, even an objective one, of the sacrifice of the Cross; or, which is the same thing, that the Eucharistic sacrifice is only relative (the opinion of P. Vázquez). Also of great importance is the absolute silence, whereby the real destruction of the victim in recent documents is not even hinted at, its causality and consecration, declined status, virtual immolation and such like things. It is not that the Church intends to condemn these opinions; but that her Magisterium is proceeding de facto by other ways. These ways are a new oblation together with a mystical immolation (this is not as a condition, but as an essential part) closely connected with the real and physical presence of the same victim, previously immolated, and of the same principal priest, formerly and also now immolating and offering.

208. Our explanation. a) First of all, we place the *unbloody representation* of the bloody death of Christ in the twofold consecration. The essence of the sacrifice of the Mass consists in this, inasmuch as it is a relative sacrifice, as we have already demonstrated.

b) Next we consider the *identity* of the principal *offerer* and of the *victim* in the Mass and on the Cross. This also has been explained in the previous theses.

c) Thirdly, we say that *an external and ritual oblation* is had through the same twofold consecration by the same Christ as Priest, just as the external ritual oblation in the shedding of his Blood was present on the Cross. Both are necessarily connected with the internal act of oblation: the latter, because no one could pour out the Blood of Christ unless He Himself freely willed that it should be poured out in sacrifice; but the former, because no one could produce an unbloody immolation, unless He freely instituted this rite as a perpetual sacrificial rite. But this real will of Christ continues and is operative in every Mass.

d) Fourthly, we say that the twofold consecration, according as it is the unbloody immolation through distinct species as through symbols of his death, is a true and real, although *mystical*, *immolation* (not just an objective representation of the immolation made long ago), because through it, by the same Priest and concerning the same physically present victim, the bloody immolation of the Cross becomes morally present.

This more probable explanation, which is based totally on the doctrine of the Church, explains the complete essence of the Eucharistic sacrifice

20. For arguments against this tendency, see M. Cordovani, *Animadversiones in sacrificium Missae:* Ang 8 (1931) 543-548; J. Brinktrine, *Zum Wesen des Opfers und besonders des Messopfers. Oblation oder Immolation?:* Ang 15 (1937) 102-113.

from its relation to the sacrifice of the Cross. Indeed it seems to be suggested by the Council of Trent (when it explains why the Mass is a propitiatory sacrifice) and to be expressly affirmed by Pius XII. On the other hand, the theological tradition before the Council of Trent cannot be expressed in a different way. Finally, after the Council of Trent theological progress, which is subject to all kinds of theories, tends in the same direction, although at times somewhat obscurely, and at other times in an exaggerated way. Therefore, for these reasons this theory seems preferable, although in it some things still remain under a certain religious ambiguity, whereby the *Mystery of Faith* necessarily must remain covered with a shroud.

209. Corollary. Therefore the Mass is: the act whereby Christ, through the ministry of priests, sensibly offers to God by an unbloody immolation, through sacred signs of separated species that signify a bloody death, the same victim immolated long ago on the Cross and now physically present on the altar.

210. Objections. 1. Mystical immolation is not a real immolation, but only the representation of a real immolation. But in a sacrifice a real immolation is required. Therefore mystical immolation does not suffice

I distinguish the major. Mystical immolation is not a real immolation, if it does not take place regarding the same physically present victim and by the same priest, *I bypass the major; if it is so, I deny the major. I bypass the minor and distinguish the consequent.* Just any kind of mystical immolation does not suffice, *conceded;* a mystical immolation performed on the same physically present victim and by the same priest is not sufficient, *denied.*

2. A mystical immolation has only the reality of a sign. Therefore it only signifies a sacrifice, but it does not make a sacrifice.

I distinguish the antecedent. A mystical immolation, which does not connote the same physically present victim and the same priest really making the offering, has only the reality of a sign, *conceded;* a mystical immolation, which connotes both of these, has only the reality of a sign, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* A mystical immolation, which does not have that twofold connotation, only signifies a sacrifice, but does not make it, *conceded;* a mystical immolation, which has both of those connotations, *denied.*

211. Scholium. *On the teaching of St. Thomas.*[21] According to St. Thomas, in the

21. On the opinion of St. Thomas, see P. Rupprecht, *Sacrificium Mediatoris: Die Opferanschauungen des Aquinaten:* DivTh(Fr) 9 (1931) 293-308, 398-428; 10 (1932) 59-78, 514-530; 11 (1933) 411-426; *Der hl. Thomas und das Leidensgedächnis in der Eucharistie:* ThPraktQschr 118 (1937) 403-436; A.M. Hoffmann, *De sacrificio Missae iuxta St. Thomam:* Ang 15 (1938) 262-285. On the opinion of other old doctors, see R. Garrigou-Lagrange, *De sacrificio Missae secundum S. Albertum Magnum:* Ang 9 (1932) 213-224; S. Frankl, *Doctrina Hosii de sacrificio Missae, cum decreto Tridentino comparata* (Lwów 1935).

Church Christ is said to be immolated, because the representative and memorial image of the sacrifice of Christ is in it, and because through it the fruits of the Passion are applied to us (III, q. 83, a. 1). The Eucharistic sacrifice is not other than the sacrifice that Christ offered, but it is its commemoration (III, q. 22, a. 3 ad 2), or re-presentation, containing the same victim of the Passion, who is Christ (III, q. 73, a. 4 ad 3), the same Christ who suffered (III, q. 75, a. 1). This re-presentation is had especially in the twofold consecration (III, a. 74, a. 7 ad 2).

ARTICLE V

ON THE PURPOSE OF THE EUCHARISTIC SACRIFICE

212. The identity between the Eucharistic sacrifice and the sacrifice of the Cross, which we saw in the victim and the principal offerer but not in the sacrificial action, must be asserted also about the aims of both sacrifices. Hence the Council of Trent teaches that Christ instituted the Eucharistic sacrifice, by which not only the sacrifice of the Cross is re-presented and its memory perpetuated, but also "its salutary power is applied for the forgiveness of sins that we daily commit" D 1740). The purpose or aim of the sacrifice is the same as its efficacy. Therefore we will now treat this subject.

Thesis 17. The Mass is a sacrifice of adoration, thanksgiving, propitiation and impetration.

Lercher-Dander, 379-383; Filograssi, 244-257; Alastruey, 430-439.

213. Definition of terms. *A sacrifice* is said to be *adoration* inasmuch as it is an act of *latria*, or the worship due to God alone because of His infinite excellence. This worship of God (*latria*) is exercised by the virtue of religion, to which it pertains to show reverence to God because he is the Creator and Ruler of all things (II-II, q. 81, a. 3). *Latria* is the essential and primary end of every sacrifice, and therefore the primary effect that follows from it. Therefore to sacrifice is an act of the virtue of religion (II-II, q. 85, a. 3).[1]

A sacrifice is said to be *thanksgiving* inasmuch as it is an act of giving thanks to God for the benefits received. This act is exercised by the virtue of gratitude whose function is to render thanks to benefactors (II-II, q. 106, a. 1); it is a potential part of justice (II-II, q. 80). Giving thanks is closely connected with *latria*, for just as a special worship must be given to God as Creator, so also a special gratitude must be given to him from men who have received everything from him. This also seems to pertain to the essential end of a sacrifice.

214. A sacrifice is said to be *propitiation* inasmuch as it is an act placating the offense given to God by the sinner. This placation takes place through the satisfaction which is a recompense for the inflicted injury according to the proportion of equality; therefore it pertains to the virtue of justice (*Suppl.*

1. See D. Klein, *De fine sacrificii:* Ant 13 (1938) 3-18.

q.12). This satisfaction is ordained first to remove the hatred of abomination existing in God because of sin (and in this sense it is properly said to be propitiation); then to remove the hatred of vindictiveness, a result in God because of his hatred of abomination (and in this sense especially it is called satisfaction). A sacrifice is said to be fully satisfactory regarding both aspects. Because propitiation supposes sin in man, it cannot be said to be the essential end of every sacrifice. But on the other hand, in the state of fallen nature it is necessarily joined together with sacrifice. For what can man the sinner offer to God, unless he first makes Him favorably inclined to himself?

A sacrifice is said to be *impetration* inasmuch as it is an act of seeking from God new benefits. This act is also exercised by the virtue of religion, because a man by his prayer, by subjecting himself to God and admitting that he needs Him as the source of his good things, shows reverence to Him (II-II, q. 83, a. 3). If this impetration is directed to some special benefit, not to all good things in general, then it does not pertain to the essential end of sacrifice, but is closely associated with it.

215. Adversaries. *Protestants,* who denied that the Mass is a true and proper sacrifice, because they did not want to admit its propitiatory character (D 1753).

216. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* in sess.22 ch.2 (D 1743) teaches: a) The sacrifice of the Mass is truly propitiatory. b) By its offering God is placated. c) The Mass has this propitiatory power from its intimate relation with the sacrifice of the Cross. d) The propitiatory power of the Mass is fully extended to the living and the dead. e) The sacrifice of the Mass is also impetrative. The Council includes this formal reason under the same name of propitiation, since it says that through the Mass God grants grace and the gift of repentance, and that it is also offered "for other necessities."

In canon 3 (D 1753) many of these points are taught under threat of an anathema. Moreover the aspect of adoration and thanksgiving of the Mass is supposed, for example, in chapter 3 (D 1744).

217. Leo XIII teaches: "For it is a divine victim who is here immolated. And accordingly through this victim we offer to the most blessed Trinity all that honor which the infinite dignity of the Godhead demands; infinite in value and infinitely acceptable is the gift which we present to the Father in his only-begotten Son; so that for his benefits to us we not only signify our gratitude, but actually make an adequate return. Here then is a motive

whereby the faithful may be stirred to a devout and earnest endeavor to appease God the avenger of sin, and to win from Him the help which is so needful in these calamitous times. And they should see that such blessings are to be sought principally by means of this sacrifice. For it is only in virtue of the death which Christ suffered that men can satisfy, and most abundantly, the demands of God's justice, and can obtain the plenteous gifts of His clemency. And Christ has willed that the whole virtue of His death, alike for expiation and impetration, should abide in the Eucharist, which is no mere empty commemoration thereof, but a true and wonderful though bloodless and mystical renewal of it."[2] In this text all the effects of the sacrifice of the Mass are taught: adoration (we give worthy honor to God), thanksgiving (we give Him thanks), propitiation (we placate, we satisfy), impetration (we ask for help, we seek gifts).

Elsewhere he teaches: "That expiation [of the Cross] of human faults was absolutely perfect; and there is no other way but that which is present in the Eucharistic sacrifice."[3]

Pius XI teaches in our satisfactions "the whole virtue of the expiation depends on the one bloody sacrifice of Christ, which without the intermission of time is renewed on our altars in an unbloody manner."[4] And elsewhere: the Mass "has efficacious power in order to reconcile the human race, wounded by sin, with the eternal majesty of God," because it is "a true sacrifice of the divine victim."[5]

218. Pius XII copiously teaches all the ends or effects of the Eucharistic sacrifice, positively insisting that they are the same as the ends of the sacrifice of the Cross: "Moreover the appointed ends are the same. The *first* of these is to give glory to the heavenly Father. From His birth to His death Jesus Christ burned with zeal for the divine glory; and the offering of His blood upon the Cross rose to heaven in an odor of sweetness. To perpetuate this praise, the members of the Mystical Body are united with their divine Head in the Eucharistic sacrifice, and with Him, together with the angels and archangels, they sing immortal praise to God and give all honor and glory to the Father Almighty.

"The *second* end is duly to give thanks to God. Only the divine Redeemer, as the eternal Father's most beloved Son whose immense love he knew, could offer Him a worthy return of gratitude. This was His intention and desire at the Last Supper when He gave thanks. He did not cease to do

2. Encyclical "*Mirae caritatis*": ASS 34 (1901-1902) 652f.
3. *Epist. encycl. Ad Episcopos Scotiae:* ASS 31(1898-1899) 12.
4. Encyclical "*Miserentissimus Redemptor*": AAS 20 (1928) 171.
5. Encyclical "*Ad catholici sacerdotii*": AAS 28 (1936) 11.

so when hanging upon the Cross, nor does He fail to do so in the august sacrifice of the altar, which is an act of thanksgiving or a "eucharistic" act; since this is truly meet and just, right and availing unto salvation.

"The *third* end proposed is that of expiation, propitiation and reconciliation. Certainly, no one was better fitted to make satisfaction to Almighty God for all the sins of man than was Christ. Therefore, he desired to be immolated upon the Cross "as a propitiation for our sins, not for ours only but for those of the whole world and likewise He daily offers Himself upon our altars for out redemption, that we may be rescued from eternal damnation and admitted into the company of the elect. This He does, not for us only who are in this mortal life but also for all who rest in Christ, who have gone before us with the sign of faith and repose in the sleep of peace; for whether we live or whether we die still we are not separated from the one and only Christ.

"The *fourth* end, finally, is that of impetration. Man, being the prodigal son, has made bad use of and dissipated the goods which he received from his heavenly Father. Accordingly, he has been reduced to the utmost poverty and to extreme degradation. However, Christ on the Cross offering prayers and supplications with a loud cry and tears, has been heard for His reverence. Likewise upon the altar He is our mediator with God in the same efficacious manner, so that we may be filled with every blessing and grace.

"It is easy, therefore, to understand why the holy Council of Trent lays down that by means of the Eucharistic sacrifice the saving virtue of the Cross is imparted to us for the remission of the sins we daily commit."[6]

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

219. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) The sacrifice, which is predicted in Malachi 1:11, is a sacrifice replacing all the sacrifices of the Old Law. But the sacrifices in the Old Law were not only of adoration and thanksgiving, but also propitiation and impetration. Therefore the sacrifice predicted by Malachi will be of such a kind. But this is nothing but the sacrifice of the Mass. Therefore the sacrifice of the Mass is not only one of adoration and thanksgiving, but also of propitiation and impetration. *The major.* Because the ancient sacrifices no longer please God, and therefore they no longer are able to attain their end; therefore a new sacrifice is predicted that replaces all of them (see D 1742).

b) The words of institution, from which we have proved above (n. 24f.) that Christ offered a sacrifice at the Last Supper, prove that He offered a

6. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 549f.

propitiatory sacrifice. But the sacrifice of the Mass is like the sacrifice of the Supper. Therefore it is also propitiatory.

220. Proof from tradition. a) The holy Fathers teach that the Mass is the unbloody *worship of latria:* St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 851); whereby our invisible adherence to God is expressed visibly: St. Augustine (R 1744).

b) From the beginning the Mass is called the *Eucharist* (thanksgiving): *Didache* (R 6ff.), St. Ignatius,[7] St. Justin (R 135), Tertullian; see St. Chrysostom (R 1173). The Mass is said to be offered to God lest we be ungrateful to Him: St. Irenaeus (R 232); because it is the commemoration of many benefits: St. Chrysostom (R 1173); in which what God has given to us is manifested: St. Fulgentius (2270).

c) The Mass is called a sacrifice of *propitiation:* St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 851); in which Christ is offered for sins in order to render God propitious: St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 853); whereby God is placated for the dead: St. Chrysostom (R 1206); so that God may be merciful to them: St. Augustine (R 1516); in which there is a true remission of sins: St. Augustine (R 1866); which takes place for our absolution: St. Gregory the Great (R 2323).

d) The Mass is offered for all who need the *divine assistance:* St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 851).

221. e) The *Liturgy* from ancient times embraces all of these points very well. In the *Traditio Apostolica* (third century) it says after the consecration: "Therefore mindful of His death and resurrection, we offer You bread and give thanks to You. and we beseech You to send your Holy Spirit on the oblation of your holy Church; it is a gathering together of all the saints who are being filled with the Holy spirit in confirmation of faith in truth, in order that we may praise and glorify You through your Son Jesus Christ, through whom there is glory and honor to You—Father and Son with the Holy Spirit in your holy Church now and forever."[8] In the *Anaphora of St. Mark* (fourth century) we find this prayer: "To you, who made heaven and earth., who made man according to your image and likeness., we give thanks and offer this sacrifice., because your name is great among the nations. We ask and beseech You, be mindful of your holy, one, catholic Church. Grant peace, which comes from heaven, to all our hearts, but also grant us peace in this life. [Grant us] a good harvest. Grant to those who have died the rest of their souls. Grant that we may have part and inheritance with the beautiful assembly of your Prophets,

7. *Ad Ephesios* 13: MG 5,655.
8. See *Florilegium Patristicum* 7,1,27.

Apostles and Martyrs."[9] The *Euchologium Serapionis* (fourth century) has this: "Wherefore we also, celebrating the likeness of your death, have offered bread, and we beseech you: through this sacrifice be reconciled with all of us and appeased, O God of truth."[10] Praises are added and many prayers for the living and the dead. In a liturgy which is called *Clementina* (fourth century) we find the following: "Therefore mindful of the passion and death and resurrection from the dead and his return to heaven and his future second coming. we offer You this bread and this chalice, giving thanks to You for Him. And we beseech You, that you look kindly on these gifts presented in your sight. Next we beseech You, O Lord, for your holy Church. Also we beseech You on behalf of my (who make this offering to you) worthlessness and for all the presbytery, for the deacons and all the clerics. We also beseech You, O Lord, for the King. Next we make this offering to You for all the saints, who have always pleased You, for the Patriarchs, Prophets, the just. Next we make our offering to You for this people. Also we beseech You on behalf of this city. We also beseech You on behalf of those who hate us and persecute us. We also beseech You on behalf of the catechumens of the Church and for those who are tormented by the adversary, and for our brothers who are doing penance. Also we make this offering to You for good weather and for an abundance of fruits. We also beseech You on behalf of those who for a good reason are absent."[11] In the daily *Roman Liturgy* there is an impetration for all kinds of benefits in the Collects and Postcommunion prayers; this is especially true in the prayers of the Offertory and the Canon.

222. Theological reasoning. a) Every true sacrifice must be one of *adoration* from its inner nature, because it is offered to God in recognition of his supreme power. Therefore also the sacrifice of the Mass.

b) Every sacrifice must also be one of *thanksgiving* (eucharistic) from its own nature regarding all the benefits received from God in general; this is recognition of God as our Creator and Lord, who has given us everything we have. The sacrifice of the Mass is especially a thanksgiving, so that by antonomasia it is called the "Eucharist," because the gift which is given to God (the man Christ) and the love with which it is shown (by Christ Himself and by us inasmuch as we are joined with Him) have infinite value and worth in the sight of God.

c) The sacrifice of the Mass completes and perfects all the sacrifices of the Old Law (D 1742). But among those sacrifices there were many

9. See *Florilegium Patristicum* 7,1,44ff.
10. See *Florilegium Patristicum* 7,1,48f.
11. See *Florilegium Patristicum* 7,1,22ff.

propitiatory and expiatory. Therefore the sacrifice of the Mass is also propitiatory and expiatory.

d) In the sacrifice of the Mass, God offended by the sins of men is placated in a most perfect way and becomes propitious towards men. Therefore he will give them *new benefits.*

223. Objections. 1. If the Mass is said to be a propitiatory sacrifice, then the propitiatory power of the sacrifice of the Cross is assumed to be insufficient. But this is to derogate from the sacrifice of the Cross. Therefore the Mass is not a propitiatory sacrifice.

I distinguish the major. If the Mass is said to be a propitiatory sacrifice through a new power independent of the propitiatory power of the Cross and added to it, then the propitiatory power of the Cross is assumed to be insufficient, *conceded;* if through the same propitiatory power of the Cross, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* It would derogate from the Cross to affirm in the Mass a new propitiatory power independent of the Cross and added to it, *conceded;* to affirm its propitiatory character from the same propitiatory power of the Cross, *denied.*

We have seen from Leo XIII that he expressly says that the expiation of the sacrifice of the Cross is not different, but absolutely the same as the expiation of the Cross (n. 217). For the only thing that can condignly placate the offended God is the sacrifice of his Only-begotten Son offered by Him with infinite charity. Of this offering the Mass is nothing else but the objective re-presentation and commemorative repetition. Through it, therefore, the same Victim again by the same Priest is made manifest before God through a mystical and unbloody immolation (see D 1743). But because the sacrifice of the Cross was perfect and complete on the part of Christ, this new manifestation of the Victim in the sight of God does not have in itself, on the part of Christ himself, the character of some new merit or new satisfaction (for now Christ cannot do this), but the character of a new application of the merits and satisfaction of Christ on the Cross. Therefore the Mass not only does not derogate from the sacrifice of the Cross, but it makes its efficacy actual and perpetual.[12]

2. The application of the merits and satisfaction of Christ cannot happen through the Mass. For that application must take place through some act, which directly tends to the sanctification of men. But the Mass, as a sacrifice, directly does not tend to the sanctification of men, but to the worship of God. Therefore such application cannot take place through the Mass.

I distinguish the major. Such application efficiently and instrumentally must take place through an act that tends directly to the sanctification of men, *conceded;* such an application in an impetrative way must take place through an act that directly tends to sanctification, *denied. I concede the minor. I also distinguish the consequent.* Such application cannot take place through the Mass efficiently and instrumentally, *conceded;* not in an impetrative way, *denied.*

It is necessary to note that there is a different nature of a sacrifice and a sacrament.

12. See the explanation of this dogmatic truth, which Pius XII gave, in his Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 550ff.

A sacrament sanctifies efficiently and instrumentally; a sacrifice sanctifies through the power of impetration that it has in the sight of God.

224. Scholium 1. *On the extension of the fruits of the Mass.* a) For whom the sacrifice of the Mass is offered, the Council of Trent teaches in sess.22 ch.1 (D 1743) and ch.3 (D 1753): "for the sins, punishments, satisfaction, and other necessities of the faithful who are alive, but also for those who have died in Christ but are not wholly purified" (See D 3378, 3394); or "for all the faithful who belong to the Body of Christ" (D 1748).

b) The Mass is offered "for the sins" not directly for their remission, but in remission of the punishment still remaining for them. But it is offered for them indirectly, inasmuch as by the sacrifice of the Mass God, having been appeased, grants grace and the gift of repentance to the sinner, and so forgives his sins (D 1743), that is, by giving the actual grace whereby the sinner disposes himself for justification to be obtained by the ordinary means. The Mass is offered "for the punishments and satisfaction" so that the infinite satisfaction of Christ may be applied to us. It is offered "for the other necessities" so that in these we may be helped by the merits of Christ and by means of impetration. It is "for those who have died" by way of suffrage.

The Mass is not offered for the Saints, because they have nothing to expiate or to request. On the other hand, the Mass is not offered to them, since the sacrifice is an act of *latria* that must be given to God alone. But the Mass is offered "in honor of the Saints" (D 1744, 1755), not only so that God "who crowned them" might be honored in his Saints (the purpose of *latria*) nor only so that we may give thanks to God "for their victory" (the purpose of thanksgiving), but also so that we may ask for their help and obtain their intercession before God. That is, inasmuch as God because of their prayers may graciously receive our prayers, and "may they whom we are here commemorating on earth deign to plead for us in heaven."[13]

225. Scholium. 2. *On the manner and reason of efficacy in the sacrifice of the Mass.* a) The sacrifice of the Mass produces its effects by the performance of the rite itself (*ex opere operato*), that is, by the sacrifice alone done validly.[14] It has this way of acting from the fact that the victim and the principal offerer are independent of merely human conditions. Such an effect follows immediately for the whole Church (the general fruit of the Mass) and for the celebrating priest (a very special fruit that is personal and cannot be transferred to another), and in its own way also for the others actively participating in the Mass. But for those persons, whom the Mass is intended to benefit in particular (the special fruit), the effect follows from the rite itself by reason of the free determination of the celebrant, which is required as a condition.[15]

b) But the Mass also has its effects *from the agent's action* (*ex opere operantis*), according as it is a good work performed by just men. For that work is meritorious, satisfactory and impetrative, according to the measure of the grace and charity and other virtues which the celebrant exercises in it.

13. See Alastruey, 459-474, 444-451; Lercher-Dander, 383f.; Suarez, *In 3* q.83 disp.78.
14. See Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 532f.
15. On the existence of this special fruit see the teaching of the Church against the Synod of Pistoia, Prop. 30 (D 2630).

c) Also, there is still a third way in which the Mass produces its effects that is quasi *ex opere operato,* or *ex opere operantis* of the Church. For the Mass is the official work of the Church. But the official work of the Church, as being that of the immaculate spouse of Jesus Christ (holy therefore and closely united with its Head), cannot not be most pleasing to God and full of powerful impetration.[16] But this impetration increases because of the habitual devotion of the Church, and it increases because of the number of holy people living among the Church militant.[17]

226. Scholium. 3. *On the infinite value of the Mass.* The value of the Mass, or the extent of its efficacy, according as it is the action of the agent, or also the action of the Church as the agent, is without doubt finite, as is clear. Therefore the whole question concerns the value of the Mass according as it is *the action of the rite itself* (*ex opere operato*). Also, even from such a point of view, still a twofold value can be distinguished. One concerns the first reality and the other the second reality.

b) The value of the Mass *in the first reality* is considered according to the power, which pertains to the sacrifice from its own nature in order to produce its effects. It is also called the value of the Mass *regarding it sufficiency.* Therefore, looked at in this way, the Mass has infinite value, not only in the nature of *latria*, thanksgiving, propitiation and impetration, but also in the nature of the men for whose use these fruits can be given. This infinity comes from the Person who is the principal offerer (especially if he actually makes the offering, as we think he does), and from the offered Victim. However, from the act of oblation itself, considered physically, there is no infinite value (since it is an act of the human will of Christ), but it is certainly if it is considered morally (since it is the human act of a divine Person, who morally dignifies that act).

c) The value of the Mass *in the second reality* is considered according to the power or efficacy, which is actually communicated in a definite Mass. It is also called the value of the Mass *regarding its efficacy.* Therefore, looked at in this way, the Mass has an infinite value in the nature of *latria* and thanksgiving, since in this way the Mass, being infinite in the first reality, is not limited by any subject. But in the nature of propitiation and impetration several distinctions must be made. For, intensively, or regarding the level of the communicated efficacy, it must be said to be finite. Accordingly, the praxis of the Church is to celebrate many Masses for one and the same intention. But extensively, or regarding the number of persons who are actually helped by the Mass, the general and very special fruit is infinite, that is, the same benefit accrues to each one, even though their number is increased. But concerning the special fruit (after having affirmed generally the infinity of the impetrative fruit), there is a dispute among theologians about the value of the propitiatory fruit. However, it seems to be more probable to say that this value also is finite, not so much from the finite priest celebrant (whose application is only a condition), as from the will of Christ who instituted it.[18]

16. See Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 38 (1947).
17. See Lercher-Dander, 385f.; Alastruey, 439-444, 452-459; Suarez, *In 3* q.83 disp.79 s.1-10.
18. See Lercher-Dander, 387ff.; Alastruey, 471-481; Suarez, *In 3* q.83 disp.79 s.11f.; Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.19 s.12.

CHAPTER III

On the Sacrament of the Eucharist

227. Christ the Lord at the Last Supper not only offered a sacrifice, but the victim of that sacrifice, namely his own Body and Blood under the species of bread and wine, he gave to his Apostles to eat. Then he commanded that this be done perpetually in the Church. Hence our Eucharist not only has the character of a sacrificial oblation, as we have seen, but also that of a sacrificial meal. But this participation in the holy victim must contribute to the sanctification of souls. Hence the Eucharist is also a sacrament, but one that is absolutely special. We will now take up the task of explaining it, investigating its truth, essence, effects and necessity.

ARTICLE I

ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST

Thesis 18. The Eucharist is a true and permanent sacrament of the New Law.

S.Th. III, q. 73, a. 1; Lercher-Dander, 391-396; Filograssi, 321-326; Alastruey, 11-15, 167-170; Puig, 425-431.

228. Definition of terms. *The Eucharist,* that is, the complex of the Body and Blood of Christ present under the species of bread and wine after the consecration and coming from the consecration. Now we are considering this complex in a general way, for the time being not determining the elements that are essential in this sacrament.

Sacrament: an efficacious sign of grace.

A permanent sacrament can be understood inasmuch as, having been instituted by Christ as perennial, it continues perpetually in the Church. In this sense all the sacraments of the New Law are permanent. Therefore this one is understood otherwise, that is, inasmuch as both in its physical and sacramental reality it is not something transient, but perennial. In this sense only the Eucharist is a permanent sacrament; for the other sacraments formally consist in some transient action. Therefore the Eucharist is a sacrament not only in its use, but also outside of its use. This includes two things: a) That Christ is present under the species not only at the moment of consumption, but he is present from the consecration until the corruption of the species. b) That the sacramental sign is had not only in the moment of consumption, but permanently.

229. Adversaries. Luther and the *Lutherans* did not admit the real presence of Christ in the Eucharist except at the moment of consumption; as a result they denied that it is a permanent sacrament.

Rationalists and *Modernists* deny this sacrament and all the others.

230. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* in sess.7 cn.1 (D 1601) lists the Eucharist among the seven sacraments of the New Law. This is also the case in all the documents of the Church that deal with the sevenfold number of sacraments (see above I, n. 45). In all of sess.13 this was often supposed and there its institution under the form of food and drink is taught (ch.2: D 1638), and it is compared with the other sacraments (ch.3: D 1639).

In sess.13 ch.3 (D 1639-1641) and cn.4 (D 1654) this is taught: a) Christ is present before the use and after the communion; b) this is the difference of the Eucharist compared to the other sacraments, not only because they have "the power of sanctifying" but because in this one there is "the author himself of holiness"; c) but also because they have the power of sanctifying "when someone makes use of them," but in the Eucharist the author of holiness is present "before the use."

231. Theological note. That the Eucharist is a sacrament is *defined divine and Catholic faith.* That Christ is present in the Eucharist permanently is also *an article of defined faith.* That the Eucharist is a permanent sacrament is usually said to be *common doctrine.*[1] However I do not see how it is not contained *equivalently* in the words of the Council of Trent. For, having admitted the identity of the Eucharist with the other sacraments in signifying grace, the difference is placed in the act of causing grace, which is proper to a sacrament.

232. Proof. a) The Eucharist is *something sensible:* species and words.

b) It was *instituted by Christ to be perpetual* (Luke 22:19; 1 Cor. 11:24ff. This is also apparent from the institution of the New Testament in place of the Old and from the new Pasch constituted in place of the old one.

c) *It signifies grace:* the Eucharist is given under the species of food and drink, surely spiritual in nature; therefore it directly contributes to sustaining and fostering the life of the soul, which is grace. Then the Eucharist is given as a sacrificial meal; however participation in the victim signifies in every sacrificial meal the union of the soul with God, to whom

1. See however Alastruey, 167, who holds that it is an article of faith. But he reduces the whole question to the permanent presence of Christ, inasmuch as Christ is present in order to sanctify.

the sacrifice was made. This union in the supernatural order takes place again through grace.

d) *It causes grace:* Christ promised that He would give bread whose effect would be to give a life of union with Him (John 6:57f.). Likewise, participation in this sacrificial victim is a true union with Christ in order to participate in the effects of the redemption.

e) *In it Christ is present permanently:* Christ begins to be present through the transubstantiating action. Therefore before the consumption. On the other hand, that presence is directed not only to the sacrificial oblation, but also to participation in the victim, and therefore it is under the species of food and drink. Therefore it continues as long as the possibility of consumption remains.

f) *The sensible sign itself, as efficacious of grace, remains:* the same sensible sign remains, containing the same power of producing grace, since it really contains Christ.

g) St. Thomas (III, q. 73, a. 1 ad 3) proves the permanence of the sacrament from the fact that this sacrament is called such because it contains something sacred. But the Eucharist does not contain only "the sacred in relation to something else," that is, a transient power of sanctifying (like the other sacraments), but "it contains something absolutely sacred, namely Christ Himself."[2]

233. Objections. 1. The Eucharist is not only the species and words, but also the presence of Christ. But the presence of Christ is not sensible. Therefore the Eucharist is not a sensible sign, at least not an adequate one.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. The presence of Christ is not sensible through himself, *conceded;* it is not sensible through the species under the words of the consecration morally permanent, *denied. I also distinguish the consequent.* The Eucharist would not be an adequately sensible sign, if the presence of Christ were not sensible in any way, *conceded;* if the presence of Christ is not sensible through himself, but it is certainly through the species under the words morally permanent, *denied.*

2. Sacraments are sacraments only to the extent that they cause grace. But the Eucharist causes grace only in communion. Therefore the sacrament is only in communion, and therefore it is not a permanent sacrament.

I distinguish the major. The sacraments are sacraments only to the extent that they cause, that is, inasmuch as they have the power to cause grace, *conceded;* inasmuch as they actually cause grace, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* The Eucharist causes grace only in communion, that is, only then does it actually cause it, *I bypass the minor;* that is, only then does it actually have the same power of causing, *denied.*

2. See Suarez, *In 3* disp.39 s.2.

234. Scholium *On adoration of Christ in the Eucharist.* a) The worship of the Eucharist supposes the real permanent presence of Christ. Therefore the worship given to the sacrament of the Eucharist is the same worship that is owed to Christ, namely, the worship of *latria*. On this matter there are special documents of the Church in Trent in sess.13 ch.5 (D 1643-1644) and cn.6 (D 1656). But Pius XII expressly condemned the opinions of those who say that through this worship of the Eucharist the historical Christ, the Eucharistic Christ and the triumphant Christ in heaven are mixed up together in a false way.[3] The Council of Trent in sess.13 ch.6 (D 1645) and cn.7 (D 1657) defined that the reservation of the Blessed Sacrament in the tabernacle is legitimate.

b) Not only Christ existing under the species, but also the whole visible sacrament, since it consists from the presence of Christ and from the species, must be adored with the one worship of *latria*. With that singular act primarily and per se the Person of Christ is adored, to whom the adoration is per se directed. Secondarily, however, and accidentally the species is also adored as joined together with Christ and composing with it one reality.[4]

c) This adoration of Christ in the Eucharist doubtless is absolute, according as this word is opposed to relative worship,[5] because its object is Christ himself because of his excellence. However, absolute adoration can be understood in a different way, that is, as it is opposed to conditioned worship. And of course in this sense, some condition is always supposed, namely, that the species really are consecrated. But this condition is had implicitly because the one adoring has in his mind and heart the intention of adoring the true Christ and the true sacrament. Therefore nothing prevents adoration even in this sense from being absolute in general and per se, unless there is a case in which accidentally there is a prudent reason of doubting the truth of the sacrament.[6]

3. Encyclical *"Mediator Dei":* AAS 39 (1947) 570. Concerning this worship, the same encyclical (568-572) brilliantly defends the true doctrine against some recent and false tendencies. See also Pius XI, Encyclical *"Miserentissimus Redemptor":* AAS 20 (1928) 173.
4. See Suarez, *In 3* q.79 disp.65 s.1 n.3; Lugo, *De Mysterio Incarnationis* disp.34 s.2 n.35; disp.36 s.5 n.72; Alastruey, 485f.
5. See SThS 3,I,231.
6. See Suarez, *In 3* q.79 disp.65 s.2; Lugo, *De Mysterio Incarnationis* disp.37 s.4.

ARTICLE II

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST

235. Because we said that the Eucharist is a true sacrament, and also a permanent one, since in it on the one hand the consecrated species and on the other the Body and Blood of Christ coalesce, there is a question about which of these elements pertains to the intrinsic constitution of this sacrament. Our response is that both of them are required.

Thesis 19. The sacrament of the Eucharist essentially and intrinsically consists in the species of bread and wine along with the words of consecration morally remaining, and in the Body and Blood of Christ really present.

Filograssi, 326-329; Alastruey, 161-166; Puig, 432-445.

236. Definition of terms. *Essentially consists,* that is, they are the essential parts of this sacrament; or none of those elements is required only as a necessary condition. There are three elements: the species of bread and wine, the words of consecration, and the Body and Blood of Christ.

Intrinsically, that is, not something essentially connoted, but extrinsic, and therefore not entering into the constitution of the sacramental sign.

The species are required as consecrated, that is, inasmuch as they exist after the consecration.

The words of consecration are required as determining the species in their sacramental being. However, since words once spoken now no longer are present physically, we say that they are an essential and intrinsic part of the sacrament inasmuch as they remain morally in their continuing effect.

The Body and Blood of Christ are required as being present through the words of consecration, which are morally permanent, really and physically present under the species.

Hence the species of bread and wine together with the Body and Blood of Christ constitute the quasi material part, determined by the words of consecration as the formal part. Therefore we are talking about the physical composition, or quasi physical, not about the metaphysical composition, such as would be a composition out of the signifying thing and the signification, by which a metaphysical sign coalesces.

237. Adversaries. Soto[1] and others held that the Body and Blood of Christ pertain essentially to the sacrament of the Eucharist, but not intrinsically, but as something connoted by the consecrated species.

Scotus,[2] Vázquez[3] and others held that the words of consecration are not the form of a permanent sacrament, but only of a sacrament in the process of becoming; therefore that they do not pertain to it intrinsically and essentially.

238. Theological note. *More common and more probable.*

239. Proof. a) *The Body and Blood of Christ pertain to the essential and intrinsic constitution of the sacrament of the Eucharist. Trent* in sess.13 ch.5 (D 1643) says that the worship of *latria* must be shown to the sacrament of the Eucharist. But this would be false, if the Body and Blood of Christ did not pertain intrinsically and essentially to that sacrament. Therefore they do so pertain. Again, the sacramental sign in this sacrament would not be efficacious of grace, if in its intrinsic and essential constitution the author of grace were not found, namely, the Body and Blood of Christ. Therefore they are so found.

b) *The species of bread and wine pertain to the essential and intrinsic constitution of the sacrament of the Eucharist.* The Body and Blood of Christ alone would not be a sensible sign of the grace to be communicated, and much less of the grace to be communicated under the species of bread and wine. But they have both of these from the species. Therefore the species enter essentially into the constitution of the sacrament.

c) *The words of consecration pertain to the essential and intrinsic constitution of the sacrament of the Eucharist.* The sacrament of the Eucharist, from what we have said, is not constituted in the nature of a sensible sign and in the nature of an efficacious sign of grace except by the words of consecration, by which the real presence under these definite species is produced. Therefore the words are required for the intrinsic and essential constitution of the sacrament. But they are not required as uttered physically continually. Therefore they are morally permanent.

239. Corollary. 1. Therefore communion is not the sacrament, but the application of the sacrament so that it may produce grace.

2. Hence the sacrament of the Eucharist is the sacrament, in which under the species of bread and wine the Body and Blood of Christ are

1. *In 4* d.8 q.1 a.1.
2. *In 4* d.8 q.1 ad 3.
3. *In 3* disp.167 ch.3.

contained for the spiritual nourishment of souls.

240. Objections. 1. The Body and Blood of Christ are said to be in the sacrament. But if they pertained to the intrinsic constitution of the sacrament, this could not be said. Therefore they do not pertain to it.

I distinguish the major. The Body and Blood of Christ are said to be in the sacrament as a part in a whole, *conceded;* as one thing in another adequately distinct thing, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* They could not be said to be in the sacrament as in a thing adequately distinct, *conceded;* as a part in whole, *denied.* In this way the soul is said to be in the body. Note that the word "sacrament" in the Eucharist sometimes is taken for the whole sacramental composite (as when the sacrament is said to be adored, to be reserved, to be carried); but sometimes it is taken for the consecrated species alone (as when the sacrament is said to be broken and other such like things). And in the cited statement it is taken in this second sense.

2. The words of consecration are the efficient cause of the sacrament of the Eucharist. Therefore they do not pertain to its intrinsic constitution.

I distinguish the antecedent. The words of consecration, as physically spoken are the efficient cause of the Eucharist, *conceded;* as morally permanent, *denied. I also distinguish the consequent.* The words of consecration do not pertain to the intrinsic constitution of the sacrament, as spoken physically, *conceded;* as morally permanent, *denied.*[4]

241. Scholium 1. *On the sacrament alone, on the sacrament and the reality, on the reality and not the sacrament, in the Eucharist.* Innocent III (D 783) writes that three elements must be distinguished in the Eucharist: a) "the visible form," that is, the sensible sign; this is "the sacrament and not the reality," or "the sacrament alone," and it is the consecrated species. b) "the truth," that is, the Body of Christ truly present; this is "the reality and the sacrament." c) "the spiritual power," that is, the effect in the recipient; this is "the reality and not the sacrament," or "the reality alone."

He says that two things are signified by *the first element,* namely, both the presence of Christ and the sanctification of the soul. *By the second element* only one thing is signified, namely, the sanctification of the soul, but something else is also had, that is, the truth of Christ present, which is signified by the sacrament alone. Finally, *by the third element* nothing is signified, but the two things that had been signified are really had, namely, both the presence of the Body of Christ and the sanctification of the soul.

In this document, about whose dogmatic character there is no certainty, the teaching of the scholastics of that time is contained; it seems to have been taken from the *Summa Sententiarum.*[5]

242. Scholium 2. *On the unity of the sacrament of the Eucharist.* Although there are two species physically diverse, nevertheless the sacrament of the Eucharist must be

4. See Suarez, *In 3* q.74 disp.42, and Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.1; there many other more subtle questions are explained and difficulties solved.

5. *Summa Sententiarum* tr.6 ch.3: ML 176,140; see Magister Sententiarum 4 d.8; S.Th. III, q. 73, a. 6.

said to be specifically one. The reason is because both species constitute only one sign, since they signify a sacramental refreshment, whereby, as sacrificial, it cannot be signified except by the twofold nature of the species.[6] Regarding the numerical unity, some identity should be retained, because of the identity of Christ present in each consecrated particle; also a certain diversity can be seen in the multiplicity of particles. But among theologians the way of speaking about this varies. S.Th. III, q. 73, a. 2.[7]

243. Scholium 3. *On the matter of the sacrament of the Eucharist.* S.Th. III, q. 74. a) The matter out of which the sacrament of the Eucharist is made must be wheat bread and grape wine. *This faith of the Roman Church,* decreed for the Armenians at the Council of Florence (D 1320), was always observed, as is testified to by the words of Innocent III (D 782f.), the Profession of Faith for the Waldensians (D 793-794), Lateran Council IV (D 802), the Council of Florence (D 1303, 1352), and the Council of Trent (D 1642). Some of these documents expressly add that a small amount of water must be mixed with the wine, and they also explain the mystery of this (D 784f., 822, 1320, 1748, 1759). But that either leavened or unleavened bread can be used validly is taught by Leo IX (D 350, Lyons Council II (D 860), and the Council of Florence (D 1303).

b) In this whole matter the following are in error: the Artotyrites (using bread and cheese[8]), the Aquarians connected with the Ebionites, the Marcionites and the Manicheans (using only water); at times their error was adopted by some Christians because of their simplicity.[9] The separated Orientals, especially in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, defended the use of leavened bread; they still hold that this is necessary, although generally they do not defend the absolute invalidity of unleavened bread.[10]

c) *The tradition of the holy Fathers* teaches openly that the Eucharist must be confected out of bread and wine.[11] Thus in the *Didache* (R 6), St. Justin (R 128), the epitaph of Abercius (R 187), St. Irenaeus (R 249), Origen (R 507), St. Cyprian (R 581-584), St. Eusebius (R 671), St. Ephraem (R 707), St. Athanasius (R 802), St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 840), St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1062), St. Ambrose (R 1340), St. Augustine (R 1519), St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2100), St. Caesar of Arles (R 2231), St. Damascene (R 2371). Express mention of the mixing in of water is made by St. Justin (R 128), St. Irenaeus (R 240, 249), Clement of Alexandria (R 410), St. Cyprian (R 583), St. Ambrose (R 1340), and St. Damascene (R 2371).

All of this is derived completely from what Christ did at the Last Supper. For it is

6. However it does not follow from this that communion must be received under two species in order to participate in the victim. For, in order to constitute the victim the two species are required; but once they have been constituted, participation in one species suffices; for it is truly a participation in the victim. On communion under both species, see the *Council of Constance* sess.13 (D 1198-1200), the *Council of Trent* sess.21 ch.2 (D 1728) and cn.2 (D 1732), with the condemnations of the Followers of Wycliffe and Hus (D 1258) and of Luther (D 1466).
7. See Suarez, *In 3* q.73 disp.39 s.3f.; Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.2.
8. See Epiphanius, *Adversus haereses* 49,2: MG 41,811.
9. See St. Cyprian, *Epistola* 63,15: ML 4,385.
10. See Th. Spácil, *Doctrina Theologiae Orientis separati de S.S. Eucharistia* 2,114-125.
11. Harnack, *Brot und Wasser: die eucharistischen Elemente bei Iustin:* TU 7,2, 113-144.

certain that He used bread and wine (probably mixed with water).[12]

244. Scholium 4. *On the form of the Eucharist.* S.Th. III, q. 78. a) The words by which the Eucharist takes place are "the words of the Savior with which he effected this sacrament" (Council of Florence for the Armenians: D 1320); these words are cited expressly by the same Council in the Decree for the Jacobites (D 1352): "the words that the holy Roman Church, confirmed by the teaching and the authority of the Apostles Peter and Paul, has always been wont to use" (D 1352). Note, however, that it is more certain that those words are the form of the sacrament than that by them Christ performed the consecration. For, on this question there was a lengthy dispute among theologians. For, essentially Christ could have performed the consecration without words, with an act of his will alone, and then afterwards given the Eucharist to the Apostles. Thus, since the twelfth century there has been a dispute about this: some defending that Christ consecrated without words, others that he did it with some words uttered secretly, others by those words but said silently, and still others with those words pronounced out loud. Since the thirteenth century this last opinion daily has become more common so that today it is common and certain, although the Council of Trent did not wish to define anything about this.[13] But even the theologians who did not defend this opinion certainly held that these are the words of our consecration. This opinion is proved chiefly by this agreement of the theologians, and it is also wondrously confirmed from the place, the manner and the solemnity with which in all the liturgies from ancient times those words are used.[14] It is not necessary here to determine those words in more concrete detail.[15]

245. b) But the most important question here concerns the *epiclesis.* The word "epiclesis" means the liturgical prayer whereby the Holy Spirit (and sometimes the Word) is invoked in order that he may convert the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ. This prayer in one way or another is in all the oriental liturgies.[16] Two forms of the epiclesis should be distinguished.

In the *first one* God is only asked to bless or accept the eucharistic gifts, or to make them assist the recipients to attain salvation. This epiclesis in the broad sense is found in the most ancient liturgical documents, as in the *Traditio Apostolica,*[17] in the *Testament of*

12. On this whole question, see Suarez, *In 3* q.74 disp.44f.; Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.4. More briefly Lercher-Dander, 397ff.; Alastruey, 24-52,
13. On this dispute of the theologians, see Suarez, *In 3* q.78 disp.58 s.1f.; Alastruey, 53-56.
14. See H. Leclercq, *Messe:* DACL 10,729-750.
15. See Alastruey, 65-71, who mentions the main controversies in this matter. The biggest dispute is about the words *of the New and eternal Testament, the mystery of faith, which shall be shed for you and for many for the forgiveness of sins;* St. Thomas says that these words are of the substance (III, q. 78, a. 3). Some interpret these words of the Angelic Doctor as meaning "of the essence," while others say they are only "about integrity." See also J.B. Umberg, *Die wesentlichen Messopferwörte:* ZkathTh 20 (1926) 73-88; J. Brinktrine, *Die sakramentale Form der Eucharistie nach der Lehre der abend-und-morgenländischen Väter:* ThGl 43 (1953) 411-425; *Die ersten Spuren der katholischen Lehre von der sakramentalen Form der Eucharistie:* ibid., 44 (1954) 338-351.
16. It is disputed whether or not there is a true epiclesis in the Roman liturgy. See S. Salaville, *Epiclèse eucharistique:* DTC 5,218ff.
17. "Being mindful. we ask that you send the Holy Spirit on the oblation of the holy Church; gathered in one place among all the saints who seek the fullness of the Holy Spirit to confirm their faith in the truth so that." (*Florilegium Patristicum* 7,1,30).

the Lord[18]; it is also found in many Mozarabic Masses.[19] The epiclesis in the broad sense seems to be nothing more than a verbal expression of the sacrificial oblation (generally already made), whereby the liturgical meaning is better fostered; it is also a preparation for communion so that the sacrificial meal may be participated in with greater fruit.

The second epiclesis, in the strict sense, is a prayer by which the transubstantiation is besought according to the obvious meaning of the words. This epiclesis is more frequent in the oriental liturgies, and also generally (although not always) it occurs after the words of consecration.[20] Therefore, concerning this epiclesis in the strict sense a question presents itself: by it the Holy Spirit is invoked that he bring about the transubstantiation; therefore it seems to be supposed that it has not yet been done. But because the words of consecration have already been pronounced, either by these words the transubstantiation simply has not yet taken place, or certainly not by them alone but only as joined together with the epiclesis. Actually the separated eastern theologians since the fourteenth century hold that the consecration does not take place by the words of the Lord unless the epiclesis is joined to them.

The Catholic doctrine is certain that the epiclesis is not required in order to effect the consecration. St. Pius X taught this expressly (D 3556), and it had already been handed on by Clement VI,[21] by Benedict XIII,[22] by Benedict XIV,[23] and by Pius VII.[24] This may also be proved from the fact that the epiclesis in the strict sense is not found in all the liturgies, not even in all the oriental ones.

Therefore a question remains about what the epiclesis finally means, when, as we have seen, it is not used in order to effect the eucharistic conversion. Indeed, according to the known propriety of liturgical style, when the mystery is accomplished objectively in an instant, and then is explained subsequently by the words and human actions, the epiclesis sets forth and explains the great mystery of the transubstantiation that has already taken place, inasmuch as it first is attributed to the operative words of Christ, now it is attributed to the Holy Spirit as sanctifying it. However, other authors explain it in a different way.[25]

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18. See *Florilegium Patristicum* 7,5,255.
19. See A. Colunga, *La epíclesis en la liturgia mozárabe:* CiencTom 47 (1933,I) 145-161, 289-306.
20. On the origin of the epiclesis in the strict sense many theories have been proposed, which can be seen in Th. Spácil, *Doctrina.* 2,193-200.
21. Msi 25,1245f.
22. CL 2,439f.
23. CL 2,197.
24. CL 2,551. On all of these declarations of the Apostolic See, see Th. Spácil, *Doctrina.* 2,108-112. Note that this matter is not just dogmatic, but also historical.
25. See Lercher-Dander, 400-403 and Th. Spácil, *Doctrina.* 2,148-217. On the epiclesis the following can be consulted: J. Brinktrine, *Zur Entstehung der morgenländischen Epiklesis:* ZkathTh 42 (1918) 307-326, 483-518; *De epiclesis eucharisticae origine et explicatione:* EphLit 37 (1923) 9-18, 49-57, 111-116, 155-164; *Neue Beiträge zur Epiklesenfrage:* ThGl 21 (1929) 434-452; H. Connolly, *The Meaning of Epiclesis. A reply:* JThSt (1924) 337-364; S. Salaville, *Spiritus liturgiae orientalis et doctrina de epiclesi in theologia orientali:* Acta V Congr. Velehrad 131-139; P.A. Hoh, *De epiclesi apud Syrochaldeos:* ibid., 139-144; B. Botte, *L'ange du sacrifice et l'epiclèse de la Messe au Moyen Age:* RechtheAncMéd 1 (1929) 285-308; M. Jugie, *Considérations générales sur la question de l'epiclèse:* EchOr 39 (1936) 324-330; A. Colunga, *La cuestión de la epiclesis a la luz de la liturgia mozárabe:* CiencTom 55 (1936,II) 57-62, 145-168; M. Jugie, *De forma Eucharistiae. De epiclesibus eucharisticis* (Rome 1943); M. Schultze, *Zum Problem der Epiklese anlässlich der Veroffentlichung eines russischen Theologen:* OrChrPer 15 (1949) 368-404; F. Nötscher, *Epiklese in biblischer Beleuchtung:* Bibl 30 (1949) 401-404; M. Gordillo, *Compendium theologiae orientalis* (Rome 1950) 174-184.

ARTICLE III

ON THE EFFECTS OF THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST

246. The effects of the sacrament of the Eucharist are considered first and essentially when it is received in sacramental communion. For then the application and the use of the sacrament takes place. The Council of Trent in sess.13 ch.2 teaches these effects (D 1638).

a) Because the sacrament of the Eucharist is the soul's spiritual *food*, it nourishes and strengthens the spiritual life in union with Christ, by whose life we live.

b) But the sacrament of the Eucharist is also an *antidote* for sins, and therefore frees us from venial sins and preserves us from mortal sin.

c) It is also a pledge of our future glory, and hence it brings about not only the beatitude of the soul but also the resurrection of the body.

d) Finally, it is a symbol, doubtless an efficacious one, of the mystical Body of Christ; hence it causes the mutual union of the members among themselves, as it perfects the union of the members with Christ the Head.

Therefore Holy Communion principally has all these effects, because it is a *sacrificial meal* in which the victim of the Cross and the altar is participated in. For, the proper effect of any sacrificial meal is to perfect union between the faithful and God by means of the victim. But because this victim is not just some sacred thing coming from the oblation and immolation of the sacrifice, but the God-man himself, Christ Jesus, the union of the soul with God in this sacrament is altogether special through the physical increase of grace and charity. However, by this very fact the soul is protected against sin, as something that mainly separates the soul from God. Again, because in this sacrificial meal we participate in the victim, which was immolated for our perfect redemption, there follows in us from this participation a pledge of eternal life for the soul and for the body. Finally, since it is the proper effect of the sacrificial meal to produce union between all the faithful partakers who participate in the one bread, the mutual union among all Christians is caused by that communion (1 Cor. 10:17).[1] Now we will explain these points one by one.

1. Communion is always and essentially a participation in the sacrificial victim, at whatever time it is done. Therefore, although communion within the Mass and with hosts consecrated in the same Mass should be commended, still it should not be urged as absolutely necessary; indeed there will be circumstances in which the contrary is advised according to the mind of the Church. See Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 564ff.

Thesis 20. Sacramental communion effects union with Christ inasmuch as it increases grace and fosters charity by which that union is perfected.

S.Th. III, q. 79, a. 1; Lercher-Dander, 407-411; Alastruey, 266-276; Puig, 255-265.

247. Definition of terms. *Communion* is said to be the reception of the sacrament of the Eucharist in at least one species; this is nothing other than to participate in the Eucharistic sacrifice of the victim who has been offered and immolated.

Sacramental, that is, formally sacramental. For, according to the Council of Trent in sess.13 ch.3 (D 1648) and cn.8 (1658), communion can be received in three ways:

a) *Sacramentally only,* whereby the sacrament of the Eucharist is taken without the necessary disposition, that is, in the state of mortal sin. This communion can be said to be sacramental only materially, since what it really received is the sacrament, but it is not received as the sacrament and its proper effects are not obtained.[2]

b) *Spiritually only,* whereby the sacrament of the Eucharist is not taken really, but only as a wish or desire. This communion produces excellent effects in the soul, but it cannot in any way be said to be sacramental. It is described by Pius XII in this way: the Church desires that Christians "should receive holy communion at least by desire, so that with renewed faith, reverence, humility and complete trust in the goodness of the divine Redeemer, they may be united to Him in the spirit of the most ardent charity."[3]

c) *Both sacramentally and spiritually,* by which the sacrament is really received by a person in the state of grace; therefore he receives its effects by the performance of the rite itself (*ex opere operato*). This communion is formally sacramental, and therefore it alone must be said to be sacramental. We are treating this matter.

248. *Union with Christ* is understood as a spiritual uniting of man with Christ the Head. This uniting does not take place first through the Eucharist, but through the sanctifying grace which is already present in the soul; but by the Eucharist it is increased, perfected and "in this mortal life it is brought as it were to its summit."[4]

2. The Council of Trent defines in sess.13 ch.7 (D 1646-1647) and cn.11 (D 1661), based on 1 Cor. 11:28f., that the state of grace is required for the fruitful reception of this sacrament. Moreover, it declared that, for someone in the state of mortal sin, the state of grace obtained by an act of perfect contrition is not sufficient, but that sacramental confession is required.
3. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 563.
4. Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 202.

It increases grace, that is sanctifying grace, and together with it the infused virtues, especially charity.

It fosters charity, that is, the fervor of charity which consists especially in acts of charity. Hence a certain spiritual delight follows from the reception of this sacrament, or sweetness and pleasantness of the mind. Therefore this bread from heaven is said to have in itself all delights.

249. Adversaries. The *Armenians* are said to have denied all spiritual effect of the Eucharist (D 1020).[5]

250. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Florence,* explaining the faith of the Roman Church to the Armenians (D 1322) says: The effect of this sacrament is "is to unite men with Christ. For, since it is by grace that persons are incorporated into Christ and united to his members, it follows that those who receive this sacrament worthily receive an increase of grace. And all the effects that material food and drink have on the life of the body—maintaining and increasing life, restoring health, and giving joy—all these effects this sacrament produces for the spiritual life."

The Council of Trent in sess.13 ch.2 (D 1638) teaches that the sacrament is taken "as the soul's spiritual food, which would nourish and strengthen those who live by the life of him who said: 'He who eats me will live because of me.'" According to ch.8 (D 1649-1650) for those who receive it worthily it is "the life of their souls and continual health for their minds; strengthened by its power, may they, after journeying through this sorrowful pilgrimage, reach their home in heaven."

251. Leo XIII: the Eucharist "not only nourishes and sustains that life the desire whereof demands our most strenuous efforts, but also enhances beyond measure that dignity of man of which in these days we hear so much. For what can be more honorable or a more worthy object of desire than to be made, as far as possible, sharers and partakers in the divine nature? Now this is precisely what Christ does for us in the Eucharist, wherein, after having raised man by the operation of His grace to a supernatural state, he yet more closely associates and unites him with Himself. For there is this difference between the food of the body and that of the soul, that whereas the former is changed into our substance, the latter changes us into its own. Moreover, in this most admirable Sacrament, which is the chief means whereby men are engrafted on the divine nature, men also find

5. See what we said in thesis 7, note 3.

the most efficacious help toward progress in every kind of virtue."[6] On this increase of virtue there is extensive development in the same encyclical: the Eucharist increases faith, restrains sensual desire, strengthens hope, stirs up a sense of repentance and fosters love for God. Therefore this sacrament "is to be regarded as the center towards which the spiritual life of a Christian in all its ambit gravitates; for all other forms of devotion, whatsoever they may be, lead up to it, and in it find their point of rest."[7]

Pius XII: "By the sacrament of the Eucharist the faithful. are united with the divine Head of the whole Body by an ineffable and divine bond."[8]

252. Note. As is apparent from the quoted documents, the effects of the Eucharist are explained from an analogy with bodily food, whose purpose is to sustain and increase the bodily life from the union with and transformation of the food into the being of the one eating it. But in this divine food the opposite occurs, namely, that the consumers are spiritually united with it and somehow transformed into it, and so their spiritual life is sustained and increased, together with a certain delight and sweetness. But it is clear that the spiritual life is had through grace, and agreeably exercised through the fervor of charity.

Theological note. *It is divine and Catholic faith* that the effect of communion is the increase of grace, since it is certain on the one hand that the Eucharist produces grace (D 1606) and on the other that grace is presupposed before its reception (D 1648). It is necessary to say the same thing about the effect of union with Christ, which according to the Tridentine doctrine takes place through the bonding together of grace and the infused virtues (D 1530-1531). It is *Catholic doctrine* that through communion actual charity is also increased.

253. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1 Cor. 10:16-21: Sacramental communion is a sacrificial meal. But in a sacrificial meal, by means of the victim, a faithful person is united with God. Therefore through sacramental communion union with God takes place.

John 6:54-59: He who eats the Flesh of Christ and drinks His Blood has eternal life, because His Flesh is food and His Blood is drink. And just as food and drink remain in the consumer who unites them with himself, in a similar but contrary way, he who eats the Flesh of Christ and drinks

6. Encyclical "*Mirae caritatis*": ASS 34 (1901-1902) 644f.
7. *Ibid.*, 645-651.
8. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 202.

His Blood remains in Him, who unites the consumer to Himself and through this union also lives in the consumer. This union is the same as that given between the members of the body and the head, or between the branches and the vine (see John 15:4-7). Therefore it is the union because of which the members of the body participate in the life of the head and the branches participate in the sap of the vine. Therefore it brings it about that from our union with Christ we participate in His life more abundantly.

254. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers teach that union with Christ is produced by sacramental communion*: by it a believer becomes a member of Christ: St. Irenaeus (R 249), St. Augustine (R 1524); he becomes one with His Body and Blood: St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 843, 845); he becomes mingled with the Flesh of Christ: St. Chrysostom (R 1166, 1180); he is transformed into Him: St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1035), St. Augustine (R 1953); Christ is in him and he is in Christ: St. Hilary (R 870); he walks with Him from union with Him: St. Leo the Great (R 2206); he becomes a partaker in the divine nature: St. Damascene (R 2371); he has union with Him, like liquid wax with other wax: St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2116). St. Augustine expresses the idea beautifully: "O mystery of piety! O sign of unity! O bond of charity! He that would live has where to live, has whence to live. Let him draw near, let him believe, let him be embodied, that he may be made to live" (R 1824).

b) *The holy Fathers teach that through communion the life of the soul is increased*: through it the soul is nourished: Tertullian (R 362), St. Gregory Illiberitanus[9]; it is sanctified: Clement of Alexandria (R 410); it becomes a partaker in the vivifying and sanctifying power of Christ: St. Cyril of Alexandria (R 2101); it has spiritual health: St. Augustine (R 1652); it has life: St. Ephraem (R 707); it lives: St. Augustine (R 1824); it lives for many reasons: St. Basil (R 916).

c) *The holy Fathers speak about the increase of actual charity and of fervor through it*: St. Cyprian teaches that through communion the memory of the old man is taken away, there is forgetfulness of one's former secular way of life and the experience of divine forgiveness rejoices the heart.[10] St. Ambrose explains: through it "the affection of the faithful is nourished, so that they rejoice over the remission of their sins, and they put away the cares of this world, the fear of death and all anxieties."[11]

9. *Tractatus Origenis* 17 (ed, Batiffol-Wilmart, 187f.).
10. *Epistola* 63,11: ML 4,394.
11. *In Ps 118* serm.15,28: ML 15,1494.

255. d) "*The Liturgy* bears witness of the increase of supernatural life or of *sanctifying grace,* as often as the Eucharist is celebrated as the living and vital bread, truly the bread of the children, as the food of immortality, whose eternal fruition of the divinity is prefigured by its temporal perception; as the gift of heavenly life, help for eternity and by its reception we contribute to the increase of our eternal redemption. The Eucharist is for us a pledge of eternal salvation, and when we have received it we must live in such a way that we can arrive at it."[12]

e) Regarding *actual charity*, which is apparent in the fervor of Christian life, "*the liturgy* celebrates the Eucharist as the food of wayfarers and the bread of children, whereby the good Shepherd feeds and protects us mortals: as viaticum whereby he protects the afflicted soul from the evil enemy and leads him to eternal life; as a sacrament whereby, being refreshed, we can serve God with pleasing morals; as a help for everlasting salvation, by which faith progresses in truth, by which we are purified and strengthened, by which whatever in our mind is evil will be cured; as the mystery, in whose participation we are taught to despise earthly things and to love the heavenly; as most holy mysteries, conferred for the protection of our restoration, which are for us both a present and a future remedy; as bread from heaven having in itself all delight: O how delightful, Lord, is your spirit, through whom, in order that you may demonstrate your sweetness towards your children, having given the pleasant bread from heaven, you fill the hungry with good things, sending away empty the fastidious rich. Embracing almost everything, the Church asks that the operation of your heavenly gift may take possession of our minds and bodies, that we may not be sufficient for ourselves, but that its effect may always go before us."[13]

256. Theological reasoning. a) The sacrament of the Eucharist is given by way of food and drink. But the proper nature of food and drink is that it confers nourishment and increase of life. Therefore the sacrament of the Eucharist is given for the nourishment and increase of the spiritual life. But his is had by grace and charity. Therefore through it grace and charity are increased.[14]

b) But food by an intimate union with and assimilation with the one eating it produces this increase of life. Therefore the Eucharist also causes the increase of grace and charity through an intimate union with

12. Lercher-Dander, 408,II.
13. Lercher-Dander, 409,II.
14. See Suarez, *In 3* q.70 disp.63 s.1 n.2.

and assimilation with the communicant. But such a union cannot be a transformation of the food into the communicant. Therefore it will be the transformation of the communicant into Christ, that is, by love.

c) Food also delights the eater. Therefore the Eucharist must produce a similar spiritual delight. But such delight in the spiritual order is had from the fact that the acts of this life are exercised with sweetness and facility through the fervor of actual charity. Therefore this fervor of charity is the effect of this sacrament.[15]

257. Scholium 1. *On the time when these effects are produced.*

a) The increase of habitual grace and charity is produced at the moment of consumption; that is, when it can be truly said that a man has eaten the Body of the Lord.[16]

b) However, these effects are not greater, all things being equal, because many hosts are consumed, or one communicates under both species.[17]

c) If during the sacramental presence in the communicant, he disposes himself more, it is very probable that this effect is also increased in him.[18]

d) The increase of actual charity is given through special motions of grace, which can be impeded by attachment to venial sins (since they are very opposed to the fervor of charity), or by the dispositions of the recipient less in conformity with attention and devotion. "It has been said that the effect of this sacrament is not only the obtaining of habitual grace or charity, but also a certain actual refreshment of spiritual sweetness; which is indeed hindered if anyone approach to this sacrament with mind distracted through venial sins; but the increase of habitual grace or of charity is not taken away" (III, q. 79, a. 8).

258. Scholium 2. *On the union of our body with Christ in communion.* From the real presence of Christ there results (not as an effect, but as the use of the sacrament) a certain contact or nearness of the Body of Christ with our body, brought about by the species. However, this is not really a true physical or material union, nor does it add something beyond the effects of the spiritual union. But for this reason Christ can be said to be more closely united with us, because truly and properly he is constituted within the communicant and he is seized by a certain bodily embrace. Hence during his sacramental presence, Christ moves the communicant to love Him and to be joined to Him with affection. When that presence ceases, a certain moral relation remains between Christ and the communicant; because of this contact, with a special title there is thought to be as it were something of Christ because of which Christ has special care for him even regarding his body. This union, so understood, cannot be called physical,

15. See Suarez, *In 3* q.79 disp.63 s.9 n.2; M. Ezcurdia, *Conclusiones de la teología católica sobre la Eucaristia como sacramento de unión:* CongrInternEuc (1952) 228-231.
16. See Suarez, *In 3* q.79 disp.63 s.4.
17. See Suarez, *In 3* q.79 disp.63 s.5f.
18. See Suarez, *In 3* q.79 disp.63 s.7. Hence the importance of thanksgiving after communion is very clear. See Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 566ff.

but mystical, although it is based in some way on the bodily bond. It can be explained to a certain extent by an affinity whereby Christ the Spouse considers the flesh of a worthy communicant under a special title as his own flesh. Hence it happens that He conforms it to His own incorruptible and glorious flesh, as we shall see later, now by the weakening of concupiscence, and then through the final resurrection.[19]

19. See Suarez, *In 3* q.79 disp.64 s.3; Vázquez, *In 3* disp.204; Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.12 s.5 n.9; Toletus, *In Ioannis Evangelium* ch.6 ann.29 and ch. 17 ann.23; Franzelin, *De Eucharistia* 337f,; Alastruey, 295-299.

Thesis 21. By sacramental communion we are freed from venial sins and preserved from mortal sins; our concupiscence is also diminished.

S.Th. III, q. 79, a. 4 and 6; Lercher-Dander, 411; Alastruey, 279-291.

259. Definition of terms. *We are freed,* that is, sacramental communion gives remission of venial sins.

We are preserved, that is, sacramental communion does not give remission of mortal sins (per se), but it has the effect that the soul more easily resists temptations, and therefore it is more removed from committing a mortal sin.

Concupiscence is understood as every inordinate desire of the sensitive appetite; it refers especially to lust.

Is diminished, that is, it is mitigated, pacified. But it is never totally removed.

260. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* in sess.13 ch.2 (D 1638): the Eucharist is taken as "a remedy to free us from our daily faults and to preserve us from mortal sin." In cn.5 (D 1655) indirectly it is taught that the Eucharist remits some sins.

Leo XIII: the Eucharist is a remedy for the desire of sexual pleasures: "For in the first place it puts a check on lust by increasing charity, according to the words of St. Augustine, who says, speaking of charity, 'As it grows, lust diminishes; when it reaches perfection, lust is no more.' Moreover the most chaste flesh of Jesus keeps down the rebellion of our flesh, as St. Cyril of Alexandria taught, 'For Christ abiding in us lulls to sleep the law of the flesh which rages in our members.' Then too the special and most pleasant fruit of the Eucharist is that which is signified in the words of the prophet: 'What is the good thing of Him,' that is, of Christ, 'and what is His beautiful thing, but the corn of the elect and the wine that engenders virgins,' producing, in other words, that flower and fruitage of a strong and constant purpose of virginity which, even in an age enervated by luxury, is daily multiplied and spread abroad in the Catholic Church, with those advantages to religion and to human society, wherever it is found, which are plain to see."[1]

St. Pius X: Christ desired that "the faithful of Christ being joined with Christ through the sacrament may receive from it the strength to restrain passion, to wash away the little faults that occur daily, and to guard against more grievous sins to which human frailty is subject" (D 3375).

1. Encyclical "*Mirae caritatis*": ASS 34 (1901-1902) 646.

261. Theological note. It is *defined divine and Catholic faith* in Trent that the effect of the sacrament of the Eucharist is freedom from venial sins and preservation from mortal sins. It is *Catholic doctrine* that there is also a lessening of concupiscence.

262. Proof from tradition. St. Ephraem expressly says: "Whoever with faith eats this bread sanctified in my name, if he is holy, will remain holy; if he is a sinner, he will be condoned" (R 707). St. Chrysostom: "This blood worthily received drives devils far away, summons angels to us, and the very Lord of the angels. By this the soul is cleansed, by this it is adorned, by this it is inflamed; this makes our mind brighter than fire; this shed blood makes heaven accessible."[2] And he says elsewhere: "Then how will we be able to be freed from this plague [of anger]? If we drink that potion, which can extinguish within us the worms and serpents. And what, you ask, is the nature of that cup which has this power? The precious Blood of Christ, if it is taken with faith."[3] St. Ambrose: "One who has a wound requires medicine; it is a wound because we are under sin; the medicine is the heavenly and venerable sacrament."[4] St. Gregory of Nyssa: the Eucharist is a medicine to expel the poison in the soul.[5] St. Jerome: "This is the food of the elect and of youths; it is both the wine that rejoices the heart of man and is drunk by these virgins, who are holy both in body and in spirit, so that inebriated and rejoicing they may follow the Church."[6]

We find similar statements in the *Liturgy.* The Church prays that the sacrament of the Eucharist "may ever cleanse us from our own faults,"[7] that it may "purify us from sin,"[8] that it may "grant us both the expiation of our sins and the strengthening of our souls"[9]; "grant that no stain of sin may remain in me, whom these pure and holy sacraments have refreshed."[10]

263. Theological reasoning. a) *Venial sins:* By the nourishment of food is restored what is continually being lost in the body through the vital process. Therefore something similar happens in the spiritual life through communion. But in this life venial sins continually diminish the

2. *In Ioannem* hom.46,3: MG 59,261.
3. *In Matthaeum* hom4,9: MG 57,50.
4. *De sacramentis* 5,4,25: ML 16,471.
5. *Oratio catechetica* 37: MG 45,94.
6. *In Zachariam* 9,15f.: ML 25,1489.
7. *Mass on Friday of the Fourth Week of Lent.*
8. *Mass on the Ninth Sunday after Pentecost.*
9. *Mass on the Twelfth Sunday after Pentecost.*
10. *Prayer after the Communion of the Celebrant.*

fervor of charity, in which the spiritual life consists. Therefore through communion venial sins are remitted.

This effect *is produced* by the action of the agent (*ex opere operato*) through the infusion of sacramental grace. Therefore it does not require any other special disposition in the recipient, except the state of grace and the absence of actual attachment to the venial sin that is remitted. Hence this effect is produced not only indirectly, by arousing the fervor of charity, but also directly and immediately by destroying the stain of sin.[11]

b) *Mortal sins:* Mortal sin is the death of the spiritual life. Therefore preservation from it is like preservation from bodily death, which takes place through nourishing food and healing medicine and through arms to defend oneself against exterior adversaries. Therefore, in a similar way we are preserved from mortal sin. But the Eucharist is a food that strengthens us through the increase of grace and charity; it is a healing medicine through the removal of venial sins, and finally it is a sign of the passion of Christ by which the devils have been conquered. Therefore through the Eucharist we are preserved from mortal sin. See S.Th. III, q. 79, a. 6.

This preservation *takes place first of all* inasmuch as the sacrament of the Eucharist confers an abundance of sanctifying grace; *secondly,* inasmuch as through the increase of habitual charity the soul is more pleased with spiritual things and it is less attracted to temporal and carnal things; *thirdly,* inasmuch as the presence of Christ the Victim drives away demons, just as he drove them away on the Cross by his death; *fourthly,* inasmuch as concupiscence itself is diminished, as we will see immediately.[12]

264. c) *Concupiscence*: *First,* as St. Augustine says, "the nourishment of it [charity] is the lessening of cupidity; its perfection is not cupidity."[13] But the sacrament of the Eucharist increases charity. Therefore it diminishes cupidity or concupiscence. See S.Th. III, q. 79, a. 6 ad 2. Lugo describes the bodily results of the fervor of the charity of the soul in this way: "what follows it is a certain quasi palpitation of the heart shouting for joy, a smile on the face, vivacity of color, modesty of the eyes, control of the tongue, maturity of gait, reformation of the whole body and a modest and graceful ordering of every external movement."[14] It is clear

11. Thus with many others Suarez, *In 3* q.79 disp.63 s.10 n.2. But Lugo, with others, denies it, *De Eucharistia* disp.12 s.4 n.83f.; *De paenitentia* disp.12 s.4 n.83f. See Alastruey, 284. On this effect of the Eucharist, see also G. Rambaldi, *Santa Communione e peccati veniali:* ScuoCatt 76 (1948) 145-155.
12. See Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.12 s.4 n.85ff.+
13. *De diversis quaestionibus 83* q.36,1: ML 40,25.
14. *De Eucharistia* disp.12 s.5 n.99.

that all of this is very far removed from the image of a person indulging in his concupiscence.

Secondly, a certain friendly familiarity between a faith-filled person and Christ is a result of the Eucharistic meal. Therefore also a greater knowledge in him of spiritual things and greater insight in judging these things (for a greater knowledge of friends among themselves results from this friendship: see John 15:15). But through this insight base desires and the temptations of concupiscence are diminished and lulled to sleep. Therefore concupiscence is diminished.[15]

Thirdly, pious and good affections in the will of the communicant flow from the same friendship. But by those pious affections the base attractions of concupiscence and of the will are put to rest. Therefore also in this way concupiscence is lessened. But this redundance is intended by Christ from the institution of this sacrament, whose purpose is to produce a union of love with Him.

Fourthly, piously and probably it can be added that the sacrament of the Eucharist has an influence on the very body of the communicant—not indeed by conferring on it a supernatural quality, but by moderating the bodily element of concupiscence and by extinguishing gradually the ardor of lust.[16]

Therefore it is necessary to say that "by reason of this sacrament the moderation of this evil inclination is conferred by special helps from God and by his external providence and governance. Through these helps it happens first of all that thoughts and affections well accommodated to his final end are aroused in man; then, that external occasions are taken away, which can cause evil attractions in a man, and those rather are presented that produce temperance and moderation; finally, that devils are held at bay lest they increase the power of evil inclinations.[17]

265. Scholium 1. *Whether the sacrament of the Eucharist sometimes produces the first grace.* That the sacrament of the Eucharist does not produce *per se* the first grace is evident from the fact that it is a sacrament of the living, supposing in the recipient the state of grace who receives it "both sacramentally and spiritually." But there is a question about whether it may produce it *per accidens* in some particular case. A case is that of a man in the state of mortal sin who received communion, but who communicates in good faith because he thinks he is in the state of grace and has the necessary disposition. Therefore there is a question whether in this case the communicant receives the first grace, that is, the grace that is poured into him together with the forgiveness of the sin that he has.

15. See Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.12 s.14 n.86.
16. See Suarez, *In 3* q.79 disp.64 s.1 n.5; Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.12 s.4 n.87.
17. Suarez, *ibid.*

Suarez along with others replies affirmatively. He says that both because the sacraments are said to produce grace in all those who place no obstacle to it, and because this sacrament in particular contains Christ the fount and author of grace and the spiritual life; and it is probable that he wills to confer that grace on a man who is not indisposed.[18] This is a probable opinion and can be defended, provided that one supposes in the communicant together with his good faith also a true and supernatural attrition, without which it is impossible for the sin to be remitted. However, Vázquez and Lugo give a negative response to this case.[19]

Scholium 2. *On the remission of punishments as an effect of the sacrament of the Eucharist.* According to the teaching of St. Thomas (III, q. 79, a. 7) remission of the temporal punishments is an effect of the sacrament of the Eucharist, not directly from the power of the sacrament, but indirectly from a certain concomitance, when it produces an increase of charity from whose fervor remission not only of the guilt but also of the punishment follows; of course this takes place according to the degree of the devotion and fervor.

Hence the sacrament of the Eucharist does not have its effect from the performance of the rite itself (*ex opere operato*) except only in those who receive it; see S.Th. III, q. 79, a. 7. For, if it should have some effect, it would be especially the remission of the temporal punishment. Therefore when the pious faithful offer their communion for others, either living or dead, they are not offering them some fruit derived from the sacrament from the performance of the rite itself, but the merit and satisfaction that the communion has from the action of the agent (*ex opere operantis*). For, it is a good act of the virtue of religion, done in the state of grace, in a special way satisfactory and meritorious because of the fervor of charity which it arouses and because of the union with Christ whom it contains as really present.[20]

18. Suarez, *In 3* q.79 disp.63 s.1 n.10.
19. Vázquez, *In 3* q.79 disp.205 ch.4f.; Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.12 s.2.
20. See Suarez, *In 3* q.79 disp.63 s.10 n.3f.

Thesis 22. The sacrament of the Eucharist is sacramentally the pledge of eternal life for those who receive it.

S.Th. III, q. 79, a. 2; Lercher-Dander, 412; Alastruey, 276ff.292ff.; Filograssi, 338f.

266. Definition of terms. *A pledge* is that which is given as an objective sign of a reward to be given later. We say that the Eucharist is this for communicants with respect to eternal life.

Eternal life is the heavenly glory which, as the perfect redemption merited for us by Christ, includes the glorification of the soul and body, and therefore also the resurrection of the body. We are saying that both are had as a pledge in Holy Communion.

267. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* in sess.13 ch.2 (D 1638): "Christ willed, moreover, that this sacrament be a pledge or our future glory and our everlasting happiness ." In ch.8 (D 1649-1650) it is taught that the Eucharist is spiritual bread "strengthened by its power, may they [the faithful], after journeying through this sorrowful pilgrimage, reach their home in heaven."

Leo XIII: "Now the venerable Sacrament of the Eucharist is both the source and the pledge of blessedness and of glory, and this, not for the soul alone, but for the body also. For it enriches the soul with an abundance of heavenly blessings, and fills it with a sweet joy which far surpasses man's hope and expectations; it sustains him in adversity, strengthens him in the spiritual combat, preserves him for life everlasting, and as a special provision for the journey accompanies him thither. And in the frail and perishable body that divine Host, which is the immortal Body of Christ, implants a principle of resurrection, a seed of immortality, which one day must germinate. That to this source man's soul and body will be indebted for both these boons has been the constant teaching of the Church, which has dutifully reaffirmed the affirmation of Christ, 'He that eats.'"[1]

Innocent XI condemned the error of those who say by excess that frequent communion is a mark of predestination in those who live like pagans (D 2156_

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

268. Proof from Holy Scripture. John 6:48-59. By making a comparison with the manna, Christ promises that he will give living bread,

1 Encyclical "*Mirae caritatis*": ASS 34 (1901-1902) 647.

that is, his own Flesh and his own Blood under the species of bread and wine in the Eucharist. Indeed, the manna was not *truly* the bread of life, because those who ate it died. But the Eucharist will be the *true* bread of life, living and life-giving bread, and those who taste it will not die, that is, they will live forever. But he explains further this eternal life, which the Eucharist produces in those who eat it. For, it contains both the life *that is forever,* which never ceases through death, and the life *that will again be given* after death, through the resurrection. The first is spiritual life; the second is bodily life. Therefore the sacrament of the Eucharist produces both, but in a different way. It produces the *first* type of life so that it conserves, fosters and increases the life already existing in the soul; but it conserves it not just in some way, but for eternity. But it produces the *second* type of life, in order to restore it after it has been lost through death; but it restores it so that it will live perpetually in eternity. Therefore the communicant receives in the sacrament an objective sign of eternal life concerning the soul, and of perpetual resurrection concerning the body. This is a true sign, since it is founded on the promise of Christ which cannot fail to be realized.

269. Proof from tradition. a) The holy Fathers say that Christ, by giving the food and drink of the Eucharist, gave us eternal life: *Didache* (R 7); so that one who does not communicate has reason to fear for his eternal salvation: St. Cyprian (R 559). Therefore they call the Eucharist "the medicine of immortality, the remedy lest we die": St. Ignatius (R 43).

b) The holy Fathers teach that through union with Christ man is a partaker of incorruption: St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1035); because the Eucharist confers on us "as it were the seed of immortality," warding off all corruption: St. Cyril of Alexandria.[2] They say that the flesh from the Eucharist becomes capable of eternal life: St. Irenaeus (R 234); our bodies when they receive the Eucharist "are no longer corruptible, having the hope of the resurrection to eternity": St. Irenaeus; for they will rise up again, just as the grain of wheat rises after being buried in the earth: St. Irenaeus (R 249).

c) Therefore in general the Fathers say that in the Eucharist a firm hope for the future is given to us: St. Chrysostom.[3]

d) The Church prays in the *Liturgy:* "Grant us, we beseech Thee, O Lord, to be filled with the everlasting enjoyment of Thy divinity, which is prefigured by the temporal reception of Thy precious Body and Blood"[4]; and it petitions through this communion "that in both the present and the

2 *In Ioannem* 4,2 (^,55): MG 73,582.
3 *In Ioannem* hom.46,3: MG 59,261.
4 *Votive Mass of the Blessed Sacrament.*

future, even our bodies therein may find relief"[5]; and the Church says to the communicant: "May the Body of our Lord Jesus Christ preserve your soul unto life everlasting." Therefore the Church sings: "O sacred banquet, in which. a pledge of future glory is given to us."[6]

270. Theological reasoning. a) Bodily food is ordained intrinsically to bring a man to a perfect state. Therefore, similarly, that is what the Eucharist does in the spiritual life. But the perfect state of the spiritual life is eternal life. Therefore the Eucharist is ordained to bestow eternal life.[7]

b) By reason of communion a special joining of our flesh with the Flesh of Christ takes place, and also a quasi affinity between both of them, because of which Christ considers that flesh as his own (see above n. 258). Therefore Christ will conform that flesh to the example of his own Flesh. Therefore he will resurrect it in glory.[8]

5 *Mass for the Sixteenth Sunday after Pentecost.*

6 *Antiphon at Second Vespers for the feast of Corpus Christi.*

7 See Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.12 s.4 n.89.

8 See J.B. Franzelin, *De Eucharistia* (Rome 1932) 338. Thus the resurrection of the body as an effect of the Eucharist is proved, not only from a general reason (because the resurrection of the body is a redundance from the sanctifying grace beatifying the soul), but from a reason that is totally special to this sacrament. Suarez (*In 3* q.79 disp.64 s.2) explains it through the new title alone to the resurrection, for which the right is already had from grace. But Lugo (*De Eucharistia* disp.12 s.5 n.107f.) wants to explain the same thing not only through a new title, but by a special increase of grace and through special helps which are given precisely from the intention of the bodily resurrection and in reference to it.

Thesis 23. By sacramental communion the mutual union of the members of the Church is increased.

Lercher-Dander, 414f.; Alastruey, 270ff.; Filograssi, 336s.

271. Definition of terms. *Mutual union,* that is, what takes place between the members of the mystical Body of Christ, as such, under Christ the Head. *Is increased,* that is, it does not for the first time begin to be, since it is already had in some degree because they are members of the same Body; but it is strengthened and made more firm, and it is more free so that it can be exercised better in acts of charity.

272. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Lateran IV* (D 802) teaches that the sacrament of the Eucharist is given "in order that the mystery of unity may be accomplished."

The Council of Florence in the Decree for the Armenians (D 1322) explains how in this sacrament the result is "to unite souls with Christ," through the increase of grace, "whereby man is incorporated into Christ and united to His members."

The Council of Trent in sess.13 ch.2 (D 1638) places among the effects of the sacrament of the Eucharist that it is "a symbol of that one 'body' of which he himself is the 'Head' and to which he willed that we, as members, should be linked by the closest bonds of faith, hope, and love, so that we might all say the same thing and that there might be no dissensions among us." With these words, although directly he is speaking about union with Christ the Head, a mutual union between the members of the mystical Body is also designated. In ch.8 (D 1649-1650) the Council explains this union more distinctly, calling the Eucharist a "sign of unity," a "bond of charity," "a symbol of concord, in which all Christians must agree and be of one mind." Because "our Savior left [the Eucharist]in his Church precisely as a symbol of the unity and charity with which he wished all Christians to be joined together and united with each other," as is stated in the Foreword of the Decree (D 1635).

273. Leo XIII: "This then is what Christ intended when he instituted this venerable Sacrament, namely, by awakening charity towards God to promote mutual charity among men. For the latter, as is plain, is by its very nature rooted in the former, and springs from it by a kind of spontaneous growth. Nor is it possible that there should be any lack of charity among men, or rather it must needs be enkindled and flourish, if men would but

ponder well the charity which Christ has shown in this Sacrament. For in it he has not only given a splendid manifestation of his power and wisdom, but has in a manner poured out the riches of his divine love towards men. Add to this that the outward and visible elements of this Sacrament supply a singularly appropriate stimulus to union."[1]

St. Pius X: "Since we desire the communication of this table, which is the symbol, root and principle of Catholic unity, to be common for all the faithful, the result should be that mutual agreement of hearts will increase; because there is one bread, as the Apostle says, we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread."[2]

Pius XII: "The Sacrament of the Eucharist is itself a striking and wonderful figure of the unity of the Church, if we consider how in the bread to be consecrated many grains go to form one whole, and that in it the very Author of supernatural grace is given to us, so that through Him we may receive the spirit of charity in which we are bidden to live now no longer our own life but the life of Christ, and to love the Redeemer Himself in all the members of His social body."[3]

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

274. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1 Cor. 10:17: *Because there is one bread, we who are many are one body, for we all partake of the one bread.* We said above in n. 82 that there are two explanations of this text. The first one is: because we in our multitude are one bread, we are one Body, because we all partake of one and the same bread. The second is: because there is one bread, therefore we, though many, are only one body, because we all partake of one and the same bread. This second explanation seems to be better. But our argument proceeds from both of them in the same way. For, the cause of union among Christians is always communion of one and the same Eucharistic bread.[4]

275. Proof from tradition. a) *The holy Fathers* say that the Eucharist is the mystery of the union of Christians in one body: St. Augustine (R 1524); that the mystery is commended to us from the unity of the bread: St. Augustine (R 1519).[5]

1. Encyclical "*Mirae caritatis*": ASS 34 (1901-1902) 648f.
2. *Const. Apost.* "*Tradita ab antiquis,*" de SS. Eucharistia promiscuo ritu sumenda: AAS 4 (1912) 615.
3. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 233.
4. See F. Puzo, *La unidad de la Iglesia en función de la Eucaristia:* CongrInternEuc (1952) 1,458-471.
5. See P. Bertocchi, *Il simbolismo ecclesiologico dell'eucaristia in Sant'Agostino* (Bergamo 1938); see H. Bouesse, *Le symbolisme eucharistique:* AnnTh 12 (1952) 191-203.

The holy Fathers find a symbol of unity in the bread itself, made out of many grains, and in the wine, pressed out of many grapes. Thus already in the *Didache* (R 6f.), St. Cyprian,[6] *Euchologium Serapionis,*[7] St. Chrysostom (R 1194), St. Augustine (R 1824).

c) The Fathers give one bread as the reason for Christian unity: St. Ignatius (R 43, 56); therefore the Eucharist is the "sign of unity" and the "bond of charity": St. Augustine (R 1824).[8]

d) Christ himself is united with us in the Eucharist in order that we may be mutually united: St. Chrysostom (R 1166); because the communicants become concorporal not only with Christ, but also with each other: St. Cyril of Alexandria.[9]

e) The Church prays in the *Liturgy:* "that by Thy loving kindness Thou mayest make to be of one mind, those whom Thou hast fed with these Paschal sacraments."[10] In the Eucharist she sees "the gifts of unity and peace mystically designated."[11] Communion itself is for the Church an efficacious sign of unity: "We beseech Thee, O Lord, that this Thy holy communion which we have received, as it represents the union of the faithful in Thee, so may it bring about unity in Thy Church."[12]

276. Theological reasoning. The person who communicates is united in a special way with Christ the Head as His member. Therefore he is united in his Body with the other members of the same.

It is clear that this union takes place through an increase of charity, not just in any way, but because this sacrament was instituted to obtain that end. However, this is especially apparent both from the symbolism of the bread and wine, and from the nature of food and drink. For the former become one out of many; but the latter are transformed into the one who eats them, while

6. *Epistola* 69,5: ML 4,1141.
7. See *Florilegium Patristicum* 7,1,62.
8. St. Thomas mentions this symbolism in III, q. 74, a. 1.
9. *In Ioannem* 11 (17,11): MG 74,515-518.
10. *Mass on Easter Sunday.*
11. *Mass of Wednesday after Easter.*
12. *Mass for the Unity of the Church.*

in the sacrament the transformation occurs of the communicant into Christ.[13]

Finally, the nature of a sacrificial banquet can also be considered. For in it there is a profession of one religion, of one faith, of one spiritual life among all who participate in it.

277. Scholium. *On the effects of the sacrament of the Eucharist as it is a permanent sacrament.* The real permanent presence of Christ in the Church cannot not be the fount and source of many good things for her and for the faithful. Therefore the Eucharist is said to be "the center of the whole Christian life."[14] For from that center flow forth both the special devotion and religion among the faithful, and the singular actual graces whereby our virtues are increased and fostered, and a special divine providence towards Christians defending them against dangers and temptations.

Another question is whether the Eucharist is the universal cause of all graces, which are given by God to me. This certainly seems to be very difficult to admit, if the question has to do with a type of causality that is efficient in the strict sense.[15]

13. The symbolism of the species at least signifies union according as it is immediately produced by Christ really present because of the increased bond of charity. Whether he also produces it immediately depends on the disputed question whether the species, as they constitute one sacramental sign with the Body of Christ, have a true instrumental causality. This is thought to be probable by Suarez, *In 3* q.74 disp.42 s.1 n.5, and Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.1 s.2 n.22. Concerning the teaching of this thesis, see A. Lang, *Zur Eucharistielehre des hl. Albertus Magnus. Das Corpus Christi verum im Dienste des Corpus Christi mysticum:* DivTh(Fr) 10 (1932) 124-142; St. Simonis, *De causalitate Eucharistiae in Corpus Christi mysticum doctrina S. Bonaventurae:* Ant 8 (1933) 193-228; M. Gordillo, *L'Eucharistia, sorgente dell'unità cristiana:* CivCatt 85 (1934) 16-27; J. Salaverri, *La Eucaristía, sacramento de unión:* EstEcl 26 (1952) 453-465; A. Hoffmann, *Eucharistia ut sacramentum pacis secundum S. Thomam:* DivTh(Fr) 58 (1955) 111-117. These points and many others on this theme can be found in Vol. 1, CongrInternEuc (1952).
14. See Leo XIII: ASS (1901-1902) 651; St. Pius X: ASS 19 (1907) 275-343; Pius XI: AAS (1927) 451.
15. See E. Springer, *Die Taufgnade als Kraftwirkung der Eucharistie:* DivTh(Fr) 8 (1930) 421-446; *Zur Frage: Wirkungskreis und Notwendigkeit der Eucharistie:* DivTh(Fr) 9 (1931) 203-222; O. Lutz, *Ist die hl. Eucharistie die Wirkursache aller Gnaden?:* ZkathTh 55 (1931) 438-466; E.S., *Zur Frage: ist die hl. Eucharistie die Wirkursache aller Gnaden?*: DivTh(Fr) 9 (1931) 452-458; E. Sauras, ¿En que sentido depende de la Eucaristia la eficacia de los demás sacramentos?: RevEspT 7 (1947) 303-336.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE NECESSITY OF THE SACRAMENT OF THE EUCHARIST

278. Having studied the existence, essence and effects of the sacrament of the Eucharist, we will not examine its necessity. It is clear that this question has to do with the necessity of receiving the sacrament. For, it is sufficiently clear that the Eucharist both as a sacrifice and as a sacrament must necessarily and always exist in the Church. But the necessity of receiving the sacrament of the Eucharist can be thought to have many aspects, according as it is dealing with a necessity of means or a necessity of a precept and also with the necessity for salvation in general or with the necessity of perseverance. Now these points will be developed further.

Thesis 24. The sacrament of the Eucharist is not necessary with a necessity of means, neither actually nor in desire, in order to obtain salvation; but it is necessary with a moral necessity in the broad sense in order to persevere for a long time in the state of grace.

S.Th. III, q. 73, a. 3; Lercher-Dander, 427-443; Alastruey, 304-320.

279. Definition of terms. *Necessary* is said to be that without which something cannot be obtained. *Necessary with a necessity of means*, if it is required as a means, without whose influx the end cannot be obtained; *with a necessity of precept,* if it is required as a condition lest a new positive impediment of the end be added.

Necessary with a necessity of means can be *either physically or morally necessary.* This is according as the means by its influx removes the physical and absolute incapability of obtaining the end, or only a moral incapability, consisting in a great difficulty, which without that means is not overcome, either simply and without any exception (*moral necessity in the strict sense*), or only very rarely (*moral necessity in the broad sense*).

Actually or in desire: a means is said to be necessary, according as the means itself must be added so that it can exercise its proper influx, or that the means can be substituted for by some other thing, which supplies for its influx.

Salvation here is understood as the beatific vision. But because in this order of providence in order to obtain the beatific vision the one thing, which is required in man absolutely, is the state of grace at the moment of death, the sacrament of the Eucharist can be thought to be necessary for salvation in three ways; that is, because it is the means without whose influx

it would be impossible actually or in desire: a) to obtain the first grace; b) to obtain the ability to persevere in grace; c) to obtain passive perseverance, or the possession of the state of grace at the moment of death.

We are saying that the sacrament of the Eucharist neither actually nor in desire is the physically necessary means for salvation in any of those ways. But we are saying that the Eucharist is morally necessary actually or in desire in order to obtain the capability of persevering for a long time, with moral necessity in the broad sense.

280. Adversaries. *Armenians* in the fourteenth century are said to have held the absolute necessity of the sacrament of the Eucharist even for children (D 1016).

That the sacrament of the Eucharist is physically necessary for salvation actually or in desire was held by *many theologians* in the Middle Ages[1]; some even in the Modern age have held that, like Toletus,[2] John of St. Thomas,[3] and others. The same opinion was renewed *by some recent authors*: among them those who stand out are:

a) J. Nicolussi,[4] who held that the sacrament of the Eucharist is physically necessary in order to obtain the first grace. Hence in the reception of Baptism an adult must elicit the desire for the Eucharist, without which the Baptism does not confer grace, since the baptismal grace is given in reference to the Eucharist. In the Baptism of infants that desire is supplied by the Church.[5]

b) E. Springer[6] held that the sacrament of the Eucharist is necessary actually or in desire in order to obtain incorporation with Christ, without which there is no salvation in this order of providence. This incorporation is not had really except through the Eucharist, which is the fount of all graces. But any habitual grace in man, any incorporation with Christ, if it is not really obtained from the Eucharist, will necessarily be obtained from it by desire or in a spiritual way. Hence Baptism, Penance, prayer, keeping the commandments connaturally tend to the real reception of the Eucharist so that they can have their effect. Therefore the whole spiritual life is a Eucharistic life and the Church is nothing other than a society of

1. See A. Landgraf, *Zwei Probleme der frühscholastischen Sakramentlehre. I. Die Lehre von der Heilsnotwendigkeit der Eucharistie und die Schulen Abaelards und Gilberts de la Porrée:* ZkathTh 66 (1942) 119-131.
2. *In 3* q.73 a.3.
3. *De Eucharistia* disp.26 a.4.
4. *Die Notwendigkeit der Eucharistie* (Bozen 1917); *Die Wirkungen der hl. Eucharistie* (Bozen 1918).
5. See O. Lutz, *Die Notwendigkeit der hl. Eucharistie:* ZkathTh 43 (1919) 235-268; Über Wirkungen und Notwendigkeit der hl. Eucharistie: ZkathTh 44 (1920) 398-420, 505-537; G. Klodnicki, *De necessitate Eucharistiae ad salutem:* DivTh(Pi) 7 (1920) 57-70.
6. Über das in der Taufe eingeschlossene Votum der Eucharistie: ThPraktQschr 74 (1921) 525-540.

communicants either actually or in desire.[7]

c) De la Taille[8] held that the sacrament of the Eucharist is necessary with a necessity of means for the first grace, at least with an implicit desire. This desire is had in a valid Baptism, which is the sacrament of spiritual communion—a sacramental movement to the Eucharist. Through it there is already present in the adult (having that desire, at least in his intention of receiving true Baptism) a spiritual eating of the Eucharist. In the Baptism of infants that desire is not had actually, but certainly habitually, inasmuch as it is contained objectively and according to the faith of the Church in the sacramental sign itself of Baptism.[9] Filograssi, Alastruey, Garrigou-Lagrange and others take a similar position.[10]

Lercher and Dander affirm the moral necessity in the strict sense of the Eucharist in order to persevere for a long time.[11]

281. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* in sess.21 ch.4 (D 1730) and cn.4 (D 1734) teaches that little children "are not bound by an obligation to sacramental holy communion." And it gives this reason for its position: "seeing that after rebirth by the water of baptism and incorporation in Christ, they are not at that age able to lose the grace they have received of being children of God." With these words it seems to be implicitly affirmed that the one reason because of which communion would be necessary is not to lose grace, or in order to persevere. Consequently it is supposed that it is in no way necessary in order to have the first grace. This surely is essentially true regarding the actual reception of the Eucharist, which is the only thing the Council is talking about. But it should be carefully noted that the silence about any desire of the Eucharist in this context really proves a lot; especially since the Council was well aware of the desire for Baptism (D 1524) and the desire for Penance (D 1661).

Theological note. a) That the sacrament of the Eucharist actually received is not necessary for salvation for little children is *defined divine*

7. See O. Lutz, *Die Lehre des hl. Thomas über die Notwendigkeit der hl. Eucharistie:* ZkathTh 46 (1922) 20-59.
8. *Mysterium fidei* 587-617.
9. See O. Lutz, *Die Notwendigkeit der hl. Eucharistie nach M. de la Taille:* ZkathTh 49 (1925) 42-61.
10. Filograssi, 352; Alastruey, 311; Garrigou-Lagrange, *De Eucharistia* q.83 a.3. Note however that these authors do not always explain their position clearly. For if they understand the desire of the Eucharist in Baptism only as an objective ordination, inasmuch as there is in Baptism the beginning of that incorporation which is consummated by the Eucharist, and therefore the baptized person is connaturally drawn to participate in the Eucharist, then this can be admitted. But these aspects can hardly be called a desire for the Eucharist. See Lercher-Dander, 437, A, 3.
11. Lercher, *Die heilige Eucharistie als notwendiges Mittel zur Bewahrung des Gnadenstandes:* ZkathTh 55 (1931) 287-293; Lercher-Dander, 427.

and Catholic faith. That it also holds true for a desire in the strict sense is *certain theologically.* That it is not necessary for adults with a necessity of means is also a *matter of faith*, since Trent teaches that the justification of an adult is had by the reception of Baptism alone (D 1515, 1528). *It seems to be certain* that the Sacrament of the Eucharist in desire is not necessary for adults, in the sense that without it the Baptism would not obtain its effect.[12] The moral necessity to persevere for a long time is a *certain opinion.* It is a *probable opinion* that this necessity is moral in the broad sense.

282. Proof. a) *The sacrament of the Eucharist is not physically necessary with a real necessity of means*: It would be necessary either for the first grace, or in order to obtain the power of persevering for a long time, or to have passive perseverance. But for none of these is it a physically necessary means. Therefore it is not necessary physically.

The minor. Not for the first grace, because this per se is already presupposed; and the grace of the Eucharist, which is a grace of refreshment, supposes someone already living. *Not for the power of persevering*, because the physical power of persevering is already present in the justified person from his free choice alone along with the state of grace. *Not for passive perseverance,* because all children dying before the use of reason and all adults dying after an act of contrition or after receiving the sacrament of Penance de facto have this without the actual reception of the Eucharist.

b) *The sacrament of the Eucharist is not physically necessary with the necessity of means in desire:* It would be concerned either with a desire in the strict sense or with a desire that is objectively contained in the Baptism itself. But it is neither. Therefore it is not necessary in desire.

The minor. Not about a desire in the strict sense, for its necessity for adults would have to be proved expressly; but Trent says nothing about this when it explains the necessary disposition for justification. *Not about a desire that is objectively contained in Baptism,* so that the sanctifying influx of Baptism is had from this desire, because on the one hand such a desire is taught nowhere by the Church; and on the other hand, just as each sacrament has its own proper grace, so it has its own power of causing it; but there is no reason that argues for diminishing the sanctifying power of Baptism in favor of other sacraments, or even of conditioning it in Baptism and in the other sacraments in their reference to the Eucharist.

c) *The sacrament of the Eucharist is morally necessary in order to*

12. This opinion is defended by Cajetan, *In 3* q.73 a.3; Suarez, *In 3* q.73 disp.40 s.1; Lugo, *De Eucharistia* disp.3 a.2; Salmanticenses, *De Eucharistia* disp.3 dub.1; Billuart, *De Eucharistia* disp.6 a.1 p.1; Pesch, *Praelectiones theologicae* 4 prod.79; Billot, *De Ecclesiae sacramentis* 1,327f.; Umberg, *Systema sacramentarium* 48f.; O. Lutz, in the cited places, and many others.

persevere for a long time in grace. Christ in his Eucharistic sermon (John 6:54) speaks about a necessity of the Eucharist, which is not just a necessity of precept, but also of means. But that necessity is to be understood as moral and in order to persevere for a long time in grace. Therefore the Eucharist is required morally in order to persevere.

The major. The necessity is asserted not because he commands us to take the Eucharist, but because the Eucharist is the bread of life, without which therefore no one can live.

The minor. That necessity is in order to persevere for a long time, because it is to preserve life, like the necessity of bodily food. But in order to persevere for a long time it is not just a physical impotence that must be taken away, but only a moral impotence.

d) *That this moral necessity is taken in the broad sense* is proved from the fact that there is no objective reason to affirm a greater necessity, that is, that no help is given to the just man by God in order to persevere, not even one that is external and remote, that does not have a necessary connection with the Eucharist. That seems to be affirmed gratuitously.[13]

283. Objections. 1. Innocent I (R 2016) offers a reason why without Baptism infants cannot have eternal life, because otherwise they would not eat the flesh of the Son of man, which is necessary in order to have life according to John 6:54. Therefore he supposes that a desire for the Eucharist is contained in Baptism.

Response. Innocent I only says that Baptism is necessary so that infants may have eternal life, which is joined together with the cited text only because in it the Lord has spoken about "eternal life," not just about "the kingdom of heaven." The connection of this with Baptism is had from the necessary incorporation in Christ, which in the text is expressly stated.

2. Christ in John 6:53 in the same way says "unless you eat" as he said in John 3:5 "unless one is born of water." But in this last text is contained the necessity of means for the Eucharist.

I distinguish the major. Christ says in the same way, that is, in both cases he is teaching a necessity of means, *conceded;* the same necessity of means, *denied. I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* In that text a certain necessity of means for the Eucharist is contained, *conceded;* the same necessity of means is contained, *denied.* That is, the necessity of means to persevere for a long time is contained in it; however, not a physical necessity, but a moral one.

3. St. Augustine often joins Baptism together the Eucharist, v.gr., in R 1716f. Therefore he thinks that a desire for the Eucharist is contained in Baptism.

Response. St. Augustine also often says in the same book, which is mentioned in the objection, that Baptism suffices for salvation. Therefore in those texts cited as objec-

13. See Suarez, *In 3* q.73 disp.40 s.2 n.16.

tions he does not wish to say anything else but that through Baptism incorporation in the Church takes place, that is, into the body of Christ and his members, without which incorporation eternal life is impossible. In this sense he says that eternal life cannot be had without participation in the body of Christ, that is, without incorporation in the Church which takes place through Baptism.[14]

284. 4. St. Thomas teaches that no one has grace before reception of the Eucharist, except from a desire for it (III, q. 79, a. 1 ad 1; q. 73, a. 3). Therefore he asserts the necessity of means of the Eucharist actually or in desire.

Response. St. Thomas, when he treats the necessity of the sacraments, says that only two sacraments are necessary with a necessity of means, namely, Baptism for all, and Penance for some (III, q. 65, a. 4). On the other hand, he teaches that Baptism by its own power incorporates into Christ (III, q. 70, a. 4); then the Eucharist perfects this incorporation (4 d.4 q.2 a.2 sol.5 ad 2). He says that spiritual eating is also necessary in order to achieve this incorporation (III, q. 65, a. 4 ad 2). But this incorporation is said by him to be a desire for the Eucharist inasmuch as Baptism is ordained as its end to the reception of the Eucharist (III, Q. 65, a. 3). But it is clear that it can be said to be a desire for the Eucharist only in an improper sense.

5. All spiritual life takes its beginning from the passion of Christ in conjunction with the life-giving Flesh of Christ. But the Flesh of Christ is found only in the Eucharist. Therefore the Eucharist is required simply for salvation.

I distinguish the major. In conjunction with the Flesh of Christ, that is, from some true influx of it, *conceded;* from conjunction with the Flesh of Christ, that is, from eating it, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* The Flesh of Christ is to be eaten only in the Eucharist, *conceded;* the Flesh of Christ simply so that it can have its effect on us is found only in the Eucharist, *denied.*

6. The Author of grace is in the Eucharist. Therefore from it comes the universal causality of all graces.

I distinguish the antecedent. The Author of grace is in the Eucharist, that is, He who is the Author of grace, *conceded;* it is the Author of grace, that is, as He is the Author of grace, *denied. I distinguish the consequent in the same way.* The universal causality of grace would be from it, if the Author of grace were in it precisely as the Author of grace, *conceded;* if it is only He who is the Author of grace, *denied.* For it would have to be proved that Christ has so arranged things that he grants no grace unless it is in connection with his sacramental presence.

7. Incorporation in Christ is absolutely necessary for salvation. But this takes place through the Eucharist. Therefore the Eucharist is absolutely required for salvation.

I distinguish the major. Incorporation in Christ is absolutely necessary for salvation when it is begun by Baptism, *conceded;* perfect and consummated, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* Initial incorporation takes place through the Eucharist, *denied;* perfect and consummated incorporation, *conceded.*

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14. See *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* 3,4,7f.: ML 44,189. See Lercher-Dander, 440.

EPILOGUE

285. The Eucharistic mystery, which we have explained, "is the culmination and center, as it were, of the Christian religion."[1] For it also supposes the Trinity, in which the Word is eternally in the bosom of the Father, and the Incarnation, in which Christ is temporarily in the womb of his Mother, and the Redemption, whose sacrifice in it is perpetually renewed and its fruits are abundantly shared in, and eternal life, of which it is the pledge that is more secure than all security. Through it by a new and singular presence the Lord remains with us, a victim perpetually as it were in the bosom of the Church, being for us before the Father; by our continual participation in Him we are sanctified and strengthened in the long journey to the mountain of God. It is necessary for us to remain always in adoration and praise of them, because they are greater than all praise, nor can we praise them sufficiently.

1. Pius XII, Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 547. See also what we cited above in n. 277, note 13.

TREATISE IV

ON THE SACRAMENTS OF REPARATION AFTER A FALL

ON PENANCE

By
Severino González Rivas, S.J.

ON EXTREME UNCTION

By
Francisco A P. Sola, S.J.

INTRODUCTION

1. *If in all those who are regenerated there were such gratitude towards God that through his bounty and grace they constantly preserved the justice they had received in baptism, there would have been no need to institute another sacrament for the forgiveness of sins besides baptism itself. But since God, who is rich in mercy, knows our frame, he has given a remedy of life also to those who after baptism have delivered themselves up to the bondage of sin and the devil's power, namely, the sacrament of penance, whereby the benefit of Christ's death is applied to those who have fallen after baptism.*[1]

Therefore the divine life, with which God adorned the human race in paradise, having been completely lost by the sin of Adam, was restored again as a result of Christ's death through the power of the sacrament of Baptism.

However, this supernatural life, given to us through baptismal regeneration, and strengthened by Confirmation and the Eucharist, is continually threatened by the world, the flesh and the devil (D 1541), so that those who have been reborn of water and the Holy Spirit often succumb and lose the life of grace.

But God, who is rich in mercy, above all aware of our weakness, wished to institute a new remedy, namely, the sacrament of Penance whereby the merits of the death of Christ the Lord may be applied to those who fall after Baptism.

Therefore it is necessary to speak about this remedy in the treatise on the sacrament of Penance. The sacrament of Extreme Unction will be joined to it as its completion.

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1. *The Council of Trent* s.14 ch.1 (D 1668).

BOOK I

ON THE SACRAMENT OF PENANCE

INTRODUCTION

2. The virtue of penance is one thing and the sacrament of Penance is something else. For, *of its very nature* the virtue of penance is not part of the sacrament; therefore Trent says in sess.14 ch.1, that "before the coming of Christ, penance was not a sacrament; nor is it one after his coming for anyone who has not been baptized" (D 1670). For this reason, therefore, the custom developed among theologians of treating separately the virtue and the sacrament of penance.[1] However, since *by divine institution* acts of the virtue of penance were raised to the dignity of being a part of the sacrament of Penance, we will here omit a special treatment of the virtue of penance and immediately begin to explain the doctrine concerning the sacrament of Penance. But we will do this in such a way that in the proper places we will also consider at least the main principles that pertain to the virtue of penance.

In arranging the material we will follow the way marked out by the Council of Trent in sess.14, where it more fully teaches what it had said previously in a summary fashion in the Decree on Justification in ch.14 (D 1542-1543).

Therefore in the first place we will treat *the institution and necessity of the sacrament of Penance* (Trent in sess.14 ch.1f.); next, *its essence or parts* both in general and in particular (ch.3-5; 8f.); in the third place *the minister of this sacrament* (ch.6f.); finally, *its fruit or effects* (ch.3). To these points will be added, by way of an appendix, a brief treatment *on indulgences* (Trent sess.25).

1. See v.gr. S.Th. III, qq. 84 and 85; Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.2-15 and disp. 16-38; Galtier, *De paenitentia* n.8-114 and n. 115-629; Lercher-Lakner, *De paenitentia* (1949) n. 450-488 and n. 489-625.

CHAPTER I

On the institution of the sacrament of Penance

3. The importance of this chapter rests in the fact that the truth about the institution of the sacrament of Penance is both the foundation of everything that will be said in the whole treatise and at the same time is subject to serious difficulties both historical and dogmatic, which are very strongly presented by the adversaries of the Catholic doctrine. However, the true doctrine is explained by the Council of Trent in sess.14 ch.1-2 and cn.1-3. In these places the following points are especially stated:

1) That Christ the Lord instituted the sacrament of Penance when he committed to the Apostles and their successors the power of forgiving and retaining sins, or of reconciling with God members of the faithful who fall after Baptism (D 1668-1670, 1703).

2) That this power embraces absolutely all sins, that is, that sins can be forgiven as often as the faithful fall into them after Baptism (D 1668-1670, 1701).

3) That reconciliation of this kind is different from that which takes place through Baptism, because it is exercised in a judicial way (D 1671-1672, 1702, 1709).

4) The existence of the sacrament of Penance, which is distinct from the sacrament of Baptism, flows from all of this as a corollary.

Therefore the matter will have to be treated in four articles: *on granting the power of forgiving and retaining sins, on the breadth of this power, on its judicial nature, on the existence of the sacrament of penance.*

ARTICLE I

ON CONFERRING THE POWER OF FORGIVING SINS

4. In order to be able to demonstrate the divine institution of the sacrament of Penance, it is necessary first to ask whether Christ the Lord gave to the Church the power of forgiving those sins that are committed by the faithful after their Baptism. Therefore, we establish the following thesis:

Thesis 1. Christ the Lord communicated to the Apostles and their successors the power of truly forgiving sins committed after Baptism.

S.Th. *Suppl.* q.17, a.1; q. 18; Galtier, 117-141; Lercher-Lakner, 490-500; Puig, 536-560.

5. Definition of terms. *He communicated.* For this power is truly divine. Therefore if it is given among men, it will be only by a communication made by God. See Luke 5:17-26. But we contend that it was given immediately by Christ to the Church, and therefore that it is not in the Church by some kind of historical evolution, but by a donation of Christ the Lord.

The power of truly forgiving sins. The object of this power is not a declaration of forgiveness given by God, but it is the very forgiving of sin. That is, this forgiveness of sins is not a purely juridical reconciliation in the face of the Church, but it is a true reconciliation of the soul with God, which does not take place except by the conferring of sanctifying grace (D 1701).

But it is clear that this can happen only *by the power of authority* coming from the Holy Trinity, *by the power of excellence* from Christ the Lord, but by the Church *in an instrumental way,* that is, *by a vicarious power.*

However, this power is called metaphorically by Trent in sess.14 ch.5 and 8, and also in cn.15 (D 1679, 1692) *the power of the keys.* Florence and Constance had already used this name much earlier. But Suarez[1] rightly points out that with this name the supreme power of ruling the Church given to Peter was signified in Matt. 16:16. It also means that part of this power is the power of forgiving sins, in virtue of which the doors of the kingdom of heaven are opened or closed for the sinner.

6. Adversaries. 1. The *Montanists* held that this power, and a restricted one as will be explained in the following article, was not given to the hierarchical Church, but to the spiritual Montanistic Church. Consider these words of Tertullian: "for according to the person of Peter this power will be fitting for spiritual persons. And therefore the Church surely will forgive sins; but the Church of the Spirit through a spiritual man, not the Church with a number of bishops."[2]

2. The *Reformers* taught that this power is not a true power of forgiving sins, but is a power of proclaiming the Gospel; through this preaching faith is aroused whereby a man is justified. Therefore, a priest can do nothing other than declare that God forgives the sins through fiducial faith (D 1670, 1703). Among recent Protestants there is much confusion about this matter.[3]

3. *Modernists,* and also contemporary non-Catholics writing about the history of dogmas, deny that that power was given to the Church by Christ; rather, they say that the Church usurped it to itself by an evolving process. Therefore, for them, this power is an ecclesiastical invention. Thus, the

1. *De paenitentia* disp.16 s.4 n.8.
2. Tertullian, *De pudicitia* 21: ML 2,1077-1080; D'Ales, *L'édit de Colliste* (Paris 1914) 190-196.
3. See Galtier, 117; A. Vacant, *Absolution:* LTC 1,222ff.; Caspari, *Beichte:* REPT 2,533ff.

words in John 20:21ff. cannot be understood to be about the sacrament of Penance (D 3446f.).

These adversaries regard the process of penitential evolution as a particular case of a general evolution of the pneumatic Church into the hierarchical Church; this matter is covered extensively in the treatise on the Church. Therefore in this historical evolution they distinguish three stages:

The first stage of the evolution signifies the predominance of the pneumatic or charismatic Church. In this stage, since according to them the hierarchy did not yet exist, the pneumatics enjoyed the greatest authority; but then the persuasion grew that they could forgive sins. The occasion was the assertion in the gospels that sins are forgiven through the Holy Spirit. Hence the first Christians concluded that those who possessed the Holy Spirit could forgive sins.

The second stage occurred when the charisms disappeared. In this stage, the power of forgiving sins is thought to be possessed by the martyrs, who had a singular relationship with the Holy Spirit (Matt. 10:19).

The third stage is had through the prevalence of the influence of the hierarchy. In this stage, the hierarchy usurps to itself exclusively the power of forgiving sins.

This conception of the primitive Church without a hierarchy is refuted historically in the treatise on the Church. Here we will demonstrate theologically that the power of forgiving sins was given to the hierarchy of the Church by Christ Himself and that this was always the conviction of the Church from the beginning.[4]

7. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent*, in sess.14 ch.1 (D 1668-1670), teaches that Christ communicated to the Apostles and to their legitimate successors the power of forgiving and retaining sins committed after Baptism; at the same time it says about this power, but not about the power of preaching the Gospel, that the consensus of all the Fathers always understood the words of John; ch. 3 (D 1674) "the reality and the effect of this sacrament. consists in reconciliation with God" (see D 1542-1543); in cn.1 (D 1701) it is defined that this remission or reconciliation takes place with God Himself, that is, that it is a true remission of the guilt; in cn.3 (D 1703) it is defined that the words of John must be understood to be about the power of forgiving sins, "as the Catholic Church has always understood them." See sess.6 ch.14 (D 1542-1543).

8. Theological note. This truth is *defined divine and Catholic faith* that

4. See Lercher-Lakner, 491.

Christ the Lord communicated to the hierarchical Church the true power of forgiving and retaining sins committed after Baptism.[5] It is also *defined* in Trent that the words of John 20:21ff. are to be understood as referring to this power.

9. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1. From John 20:21-23, where Christ explicitly gave to the hierarchical Church the power of forgiving and retaining sins.

Text: *Peace be with you. As the Father has sent me, even so I send you. And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and said to them, 'Receive the Holy Spirit. If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained.'*

Here therefore, a) after the *salutation* ("peace be with you"), b) *their mission is announced* (as the Father has sent me to accomplish the work of redemption, so I send you to apply this work to every human being by the sanctification of souls); c) then *the mission is conferred,* both by facts ("he breathed on them"), and by words which explain the fact to them ("receive the Holy Spirit," for the sanctification of souls is appropriated to Him; "if you forgive the sins of any," that is, if, how often soever, whatever sins you forgive, they are forgiven, that is, by that fact they remain forgiven; "and if you retain the sins of any," that is, if, how often soever, whatever sins you retain for any men, they are retained, or, by that fact they remain retained for them).

10. Argument. Therefore, with these words, Christ the Lord confers 1) a true power of forgiving and retaining sins, 2) sins committed after Baptism, 3) on the Apostles and their successors, that is, on the hierarchical Church. Therefore Christ communicated to the Apostles and their successors the power of truly forgiving and retaining sins committed after Baptism.

11. *The antecedent* is demonstrated part by part:

1) *A true power of forgiving sins:* a) *From the very words by which Christ confers this power.* For as often as this formula *to forgive sins* (ἀφίημι τας ἁμαρτίας) is used by Christ, it signifies, not a declaration of sin already forgiven by God, but a true forgiveness, and indeed of the guilt itself. See Matt. 9:2-5 (a paralytic), Luke 7:47 (Magdalene), Matt. 6:12-15 (the Lord's Prayer). This very formula is used by the Apostles in the exact

5. According to some authors the thesis, according as it says that there is in the Church the power of *truly* forgiving sins, is only theologically certain (see Galtier, 123); Lercher-Lakner, 490). This is said because of some older theologians whom we will treat in the scholium. But those authors did not deny that sin is truly forgiven in the sacrament of Penance.

same sense. See Acts 2:38 (Peter), 1 John 1:9 and 2:12 (John). Therefore from the words themselves, by which this power is conferred, it is certain that Christ communicated a true power of forgiving and retaining sins, and it surely refers to the guilt itself.

b) *From the context.* For it is certain that an important power is being conferred. For the Holy Spirit is given and all justification comes from him; the mission of Christ is communicated, who was sent adorned with true power of forgiving sins. See Matt. 9:1-8; Mark 2:1-12; Luke 5:17-26. Therefore from the context it is clear that Christ conferred the power of forgiving sins, and it surely refers to the guilt itself.

c) *From the other rejected interpretations of the adversaries:* For, 1) the passage in John cannot be understood to be about the power of preaching repentance, as the Protestants claim. For, as the Reformers themselves admit, preaching the Gospel does not forgive sins, but arouses faith in the hearers that they be forgiven by God; here however it is said that the ministry of Christ forgives sins. And the comparison with Luke 24:36-49 does not help; for, in Luke two apparitions are mentioned; one on the day of the resurrection (v. 36-43), and the other on the day of the ascension (v.44-49), as is proved by the word εἶπεν which is used by Luke to separate two sections (see Luke 16:1; 18:1; 20:41), and from parallel sites of other sections (see Matt. 28:16; Mark 16:14). Indeed, even if we should concede that one and the same apparition is being narrated, there still remains this solution: that Luke undoubtedly omitted what John afterwards completed, as was the custom of this evangelist. Therefore Luke in no way denied the power of forgiving sins, but only refrained from narrating it. 2) *The passage in John cannot be understood to be about the power of declaring forgiveness made by God,* as is sufficiently clear from the meaning of the words and from the context. But let us look carefully at the words themselves. For, in the hypothesis of the Reformers, the meaning of the words would be absurd: "Whose sins you declare to be forgiven, they are declared to be forgiven." But the adversaries themselves, when they recognize the absurdity, admit a metaphor in the protasis, but then deny it in the apodosis. But they do this by what right? For they change the meaning of the same word, within the same statement, without any foundation. 3) *An escape of having the power of forgiving sins as to their temporal punishment, but not as to their guilt, cannot be admitted.* For this conflicts with the ἀφίημι, as is clear from the parallel passages, which was mentioned before. Moreover, the power is given to forgive what can be retained; now the temporal punishment cannot be retained, but it can be expiated in many ways. Finally, in the second part (*they are forgiven; remittuntur eis*) it must be understood that

God truly forgives sins also regarding their guilt; therefore according to the same reason the first part must be understood, namely *whose sins you shall forgive; quorum remiseritis;* for otherwise the same words would have a different meaning in the same sentence without any foundation.

12. 2) *Sins committed after Baptism:* a) *From the universality of this power:* If you forgive the sins of any. Therefore it necessarily includes the baptized. And indeed to the baptized alone for the two following reasons that flow from the nature of this power:

b) Because not just the power of forgiving is given, but also that of *retaining sins;* this is not present in Baptism.

c) Because, as will be proved from this very text of John, this power must be exercised *judicially;* but judgment can be exercised only with regard to subjects, that is, on the baptized.

It is objected that some Fathers, like St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine, St. Cyril of Alexandria,[6] understood these words of John to be about the power of baptizing.

I respond, that these Fathers did not say that they understand this passage to be about the forgiveness of sins by Baptism; for, it will be clear from our presentation of the argument from tradition that they understood these words to be about sins committed after Baptism. But while speaking about the worth of Baptism, they quote these words in order to prove that the forgiveness of sins takes place by the real power, not of man, but of the Holy Spirit.

13. 3) *This power is given to the Apostles and to their successors.* First of all, *it is given to the Apostles.* The reason for this is not sought from the fact that Christ was speaking only to the Apostles; for it seems that other disciples were also present, when Christ uttered these words. But this power is given, not to all the faithful, but to the Apostles, that is, to the hierarchical Church, because the mission, about which he is speaking there, is conferred on the hierarchical Church alone, as is proved in the treatise on the Church; for it is part of the power of teaching, ruling and sanctifying. It is also given *to the successors of the Apostles,* both because that power is perennial in the Church, and also because the reason for

6. St. Cyprian, *Epistola* 73,7 (R 594); St. Ambrose, *De penitentia* 1,8,36 (R 1295); St. Augustine, *De baptismo* 3,18,23: ML 43,150; St. Cyril of Alexandria, *In Ioannem* 12,1 (R 2121). In order to properly understand the mind of these Fathers, see for St. Cyprian B. Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 368-424; for the others, G.Odoardi, *La dottrina della penitentza in S. Ambrogio* (Rome 1944); K. Adam, *Die kirchliche Sündenvergebung nach dem hl. Augustin* (Paderborn 1917); B. Poschmann, *Kirchenbusse und correptio secreta bei Augustinus* (Braunsberg 1923).

giving that power of forgiving sins will remain as long as there are sinners in the Church. Therefore, rightly was the proposition of Abelard rejected: "The power of binding and loosing was given only to the apostles and not to their successors" (D 732). Moreover, Trent in sess.14 cn.10 (D 1710, 1684) defined that the words of John must be understood to be about priests or bishops, not about the faithful.

14. 2. From Matt. 16:19 and 18:18, where the power of binding and loosing is promised and conferred on Peter and the other Apostles; included in it is power of forgiving and retaining sins: *I will give you the keys of the kingdom of heaven, and whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven. Truly, I say to you, whatever you bind on earth shall be bound in heaven, and whatever you loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven.*

a) **Text.** It is assumed to be well known from Fundamental Theology, both regarding its historicity and regarding its meaning. But with regard to its meaning, it should be noted that the words *to bind and to loose,* of themselves directly do not signify only to forgive and to retain sins; for this formula of binding and loosing is much broader than that. Indeed, we would not know for certain that the power of forgiving and retaining sins is really included in this formula, unless for other reasons we knew that this power was de facto given to the Church by Christ. The Lord in a special way conferred this power, according to the teaching of Trent (D 1668-1670), not at that time, but later and after the resurrection. However, because de facto this power is really a part of the power of binding and loosing, therefore according to the ancient tradition this power is also said to be *the power of binding and loosing,* or also *the power of the keys.*[7]

15. b) **Argument.** 1) From the fullness of the power of binding and loosing (Matt. 16:19) promised to Peter, it is manifest that he can also make decisions about sinners. Actually, he can *bind,* that is, retain sins, or *loose,* that is, forgive sins. Namely, the power of loosing any bond preventing someone from entering heaven is promised to Peter. But such a bond is sin. Therefore he can loose or forgive it.

2) In Matt. 18:18 this same power of binding and loosing is conferred on the Apostles, on the occasion of passing judgment whether concerning sinners in general, or in particular about someone who sinned against his brother. Now this power of binding and loosing, which constitutes the reason why someone is subject to the judgment of the Church: a) also includes the

7. For a more detailed explanation of these texts, see Lercher-Lakner, 495.

power of forgiving sins, since it is a very broad power of loosing any bond that prevents one from entering heaven; but sin is such a bond; therefore the Apostles can loose it; b) it pertains to the hierarchical Church only, not to each one of the faithful, as is clear from the context (v. 17f.).

But that this is the true meaning of these texts is confirmed by the tradition of the Fathers, who interpret the matter in this way. For, Firmilian wrote: "But what is the greatness of his error, and what the depth of his blindness, who says that remission of sins can be granted in the synagogues of heretics, and does not abide on the foundation of the one Church which was once based by Christ upon the rock, may be perceived from this, that the power of remitting sins was given to the apostles, and to the churches which they, sent by Christ, established, and to the bishops who succeeded them by vicarious ordination" (R 602). Similar views were expressed by St. Chrysostom (R 1119), St. Pacianus (R 1244-5), St. Ambrose (R 1293), etc.[8]

Moreover, Trent taught that these words must be understood to be about the power conferred on the hierarchical Church (D 1710, 1684).

16. Proof from tradition.[9] The ecclesiastical magisterium, as it defined that the words of John must be understood about the granting of this power of forgiving sins, so also it declared that this same truth was asserted by the tradition: "The universal consensus of the Fathers has always acknowledged," that, by those words, the power of forgiving sins committed after Baptism was conferred on the Church (D 1670); "as the Catholic Church has always understood," that those words must be understood to be about the forgiveness of sins committed after Baptism (D 1703). That this is truly the case is certain for the following two reasons:

a) *From the controversy with the Montanists towards the end of the second century, and with the Novatians in the middle of the third century.* For 1) these heretics acknowledge in the Church the power of forgiving sins; but they restricted it to certain venial sins. 2) But the Church, even with regard to this restriction, as is evident, opposed Montanism by the decree which is said to be that of Calixtus,[10] which Tertullian mentions with great indignation, and she also opposed the Novatians through the attacks of St. Ambrose, St. Pacian, St. Cyprian and other Fathers. To be sure, the controversy was about the true forgiveness of sins in the eyes of God. For,

8. See V. Brander, *Ist Binden und Lösen bei Matth.16,19 und18:18 ein rabbinischer Schulausdruck?:* Kath 94 (1914) 116-132;
9. See Lercher-Lakner, 501-506; Galtier, 147-196.
10. Who the author of this decree was, we will see later. But whatever opinion one has about this, the strength of the argument is the same, since Tertullian attacks the decree as being Catholic.

what the heretics denied to the Church, and attributed to God alone, the Catholic teachers contended applied also to the power of the Church. Now the Montanists and the Novatians acknowledged that God truly forgives those grave sins. Therefore the Church held that it truly forgives sins.

b) *From the explicit testimony of the holy Fathers* whose mind is revealed in these few quotes:

1. The Fathers *compare Penance with Baptism*, so that the effect of both is the true remission of sins. Thus Hermas: "After that great and holy calling [Baptism], if someone after being tempted by the devil sins, he still has one penance." (R 87). Tertullian: "These poisons of his [the devil's], therefore, God foreseeing, although the gate of forgiveness has been shut and fastened up with the bar of Baptism, has permitted [it] still to stand somewhat open. In the vestibule he has stationed a second repentance." (R 314). St. Augustine: "If it was done by a catechumen [homicide], it is washed away by Baptism and, if by a baptized person, he is healed by penance and reconciliation" (R 1864). St. Ambrose and St. Pacian have similar statements.[11]

2. This power is given by Christ the Lord, and it is to the *hierarchical Church.* Here are the words of St. Cyprian: "But if we find that none ought to be restrained from doing penance, and that peace may be granted by His priests to those who entreat and beseech the Lord's mercy, inasmuch as He is merciful and loving." (R 578). Firmilian, as above in n. 15 (R 602). St. Chrysostom: "What priests do here below God ratifies above, and the Master confirms the sentence of his servants. For indeed what is it but all manner of heavenly authority which he has given them?." (R 1119). St. Pacian: "What he does through his priests, is his own power. For what does he says to his Apostles. Is this permitted to the Apostles alone? Therefore to baptize is permitted to them alone, and to confer the Holy Spirit to them alone, and to forgive the sins of the people to them alone; because all of this was commanded to none other than to the Apostles." (R 1244). St. Ambrose: "For this right [of binding and loosing] was given only to priests" (R 1293).

3. Through Penance the Holy Spirit is restored, when he has been lost because of *post-baptismal sins.* Therefore, post-baptismal sins are remitted through Penance just as truly as pre-baptismal sins are remitted through Baptism. The *Didascalia Apostolorum* bears witness to this: "For him in place of Baptism there will be the imposition of hands; for, either by the imposition of hands or by Baptism they receive participation in the Holy Spirit." And St. Cyprian: "How can someone be found ready and suitable

11. St. Ambrose, *De paenitentia* 1,2: ML 16,467f.; St. Pacian, *Epistula* 3,7: ML 13,1068.

for confession who has not previously peacefully received the Spirit of the Father?" And St. Jerome: "A priest. imposes his hand on the subject, and he prays for the return of the Holy Spirit."[12]

17. Theological reasoning. 1. Christ conferred on the Church the power of giving and preserving supernatural life through Baptism and the other sacraments. Therefore it was fitting that this life, at some time having been lost by sin, should be able to be restored by the Church by the activity of the power of remitting sins.

2. Power of this kind commends the dignity of the Church, and fosters the reverence and obedience of men towards her.

18. Objections. 1. From 2 Cor. 5:18-20, where according to St. Paul God *gave us the ministry of reconciliation. and entrusted to us the message of reconciliation.* Therefore the apostolic mission of reconciling men consists in preaching alone.

I respond that the instruction there has to do with the general ministry of apostolic preaching, without however excluding a special way, whether baptismal or non-baptismal, of reconciling men through the direct remission of sins. The Reformers also acknowledge that the cited words do not deny the remission of sins through Baptism; therefore by what right do they exclude another form of remission that is non-baptismal?

2. St. Cyprian writes: "Only the Lord can exercise mercy. Only He can grant forgiveness" (R 552). Therefore, according to St. Cyprian, the Church does not have the power of truly remitting sins, since this power belongs exclusively to God alone.

I respond that St. Cyprian, in the quoted words, is speaking in favor of satisfaction, which those who fell during the persecution of Decius must perform. Therefore, he warns those clerics, who granted reconciliation too easily, that the proper authority of showing mercy belongs to God alone; and therefore that the condonation of a priest would be worthless, who proceeded without the proper satisfaction, and as it were on his own authority. Therefore, St. Cyprian taught that only God can remit sins *on his own authority,* so that the Church then can do it with *vicarious or instrumental power, conceded;* otherwise, *denied.* Consider the context. For there he immediately adds: "Man cannot be greater than God, nor can the servant by *his own indulgence* remit or forego what has been committed against the Lord" (R 552). And a little below St. Cyprian testifies that the priests take the place of an instrument in reference to the remission of sins: "Each one confesses. his own sin. while the satisfaction and remission is made pleasing to God *through the priests"* (R 553).[13]

3. Firmilian, bishop of Caesarea, writing about the synods that "every year" were

12. *Didascalia Apostolorum* 2,41,4 (ed. Funk, 1,130); St. Cyprian, *Epistula* 67,4: ML 3,1030ff.; St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Luciferianos* 5: ML 23,159f.

13. There is more about the mind of St. Cyprian in B. Poschmann: ZkathTh 37 (1913) 246-262; *Paenitentia secunda* 370-424; D'Ales, *La théologie de saint Cyprien* 273-281. But we deny that there is a contradiction in St. Cyprian, as B. Capelle contends, *L'absolution sacerdotal chez saint Cyprien:* RechThAncMéd 7 (1935) 221-234.

held by the bishops in order to take care of the things committed to their care, says, "for our fallen brothers, and when after the salutary washing they are wounded by the devil, a remedy is sought through penance, not as if they obtain remission of their sins from us [bishops], but that through us they may be converted to an understanding of their sins, and are forced to give greater satisfaction to the Lord."[14] Therefore Firmilian thought that the bishops did not have the power to remit sins.

I respond that Firmilian says only this: that the bishops, *assembled together in a council*, establish laws about accomplishing a fitting satisfaction, but that they do not grant a collective remission of sins; for, that takes place by the bishops, acting *individually* with each single sinner, after they have undergone the necessary penance. This was the source of the *penitential canons* of the councils.

4. St. Ambrose says: "Men make use of their ministry for the forgiveness of sins, but they do not exercise the right of any power of their own" (R 1287). Therefore men, on the testimony of St. Ambrose, cannot truly remit sins.

I respond that what clearly follows from this is that men do not remit sins by their own power, but in the name of the Hoy Trinity; and indeed that they forgive sins with an intercessory formula, such as has been used in the Church for a long time. For, St. Ambrose also speaks in this way: "For they forgive sins not in their own name but in that of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. They ask, the Godhead gives." (R 1287). Moreover, St. Ambrose was a vigorous foe of Novatianism (R 1295); therefore he held that the Church truly remits sins.

19. 5. St. Jerome: "Each person is bound by the ropes of his own sins; and the Apostles can loosen those ropes and chains by imitating their Master who said to them: *whatever you loose on earth will also be loosed in heaven.* But the Apostles set them loose by the word of God and the testimonies of the Scriptures and the exhortation to virtue.[15] Therefore the power of remitting sins is nothing other than the power of preaching the word of God.

I respond that it is possible *to bypass* what St. Jerome teaches here that sins can be forgiven by the Apostles through preaching the word of God, but without excluding the direct power of remitting sins. Indeed, his very words seem to point in this direction: "The Apostles, imitating their Master." Moreover, he asserted plainly elsewhere the direct power of forgiving sins when he was interpreting the same words of Matthew: "*He gave power to the Apostles* so that they could know who are condemned by such sins, that the human sentence would be strengthened by the divine sentence, and so that whatever was bound on earth, would be also bound in heaven."[16] And in another place: "Far be it from me to censure the successors of the Apostles, who with holy words consecrate the body of Christ, and who make us Christians. *Having the keys of the kingdom of heaven, they judge men to some extent before the day of judgment"* (R 1345).

6. The penitential power was not given by Christ to the hierarchical Church, but

14. Among the epistles of St. Cyprian, epist. 75,4: ML 3,1205f.
15. St. Jerome, *In Isaiam* 6,14,17: ML 24,222.
16. St. Jerome, *In Matthaeum* 3,18,18: ML 26,131.

the latter usurped it exclusively for itself by a certain evolution of the Church from the pneumatic state to the hierarchical state. Surely some words of Holy Scripture affirm this (1 Cor. 5:3-13; 2 Cor. 2:5-11), and also certain facts and later statements (the martyrs of Lyons, Clement of Alexandria, Origen, etc.).[17]

I respond that this theory of evolution was refuted historically in the treatise on the Church, when that conception of the primitive Church was proved to be false, in which, supposedly, there was no hierarchy. But we also excluded it above theologically, when we demonstrated that the power of forgiving sins was given by Christ the Lord Himself to the hierarchical Church.

To this can be added that very ancient traces, which still exist of the remission of sins, suggest that this remission was given by the bishops of the Church. Thus *Timothy* is commanded to rebuke sinners and to impose his hands (1 Tim. 5:20-22); sins are forgiven by the prayers of the elders (Jas. 5:14-16); sinners must be brought to the *bishop,* so that they may be forgiven by God (St. Ignatius of Antioch: R 59); through the *leaders* of the Churches precepts are given concerning penance (Hermas: R 82).

But the foundations on which the theory of evolution rests are very weak. For the *confessors* were not thought to forgive sins, but only to intercede for sinners whose situation was judged only by the bishop. This is certain in the case of the martyrs of Lyons[18]; it is certain also from St. Cyprian.[19] But the facts that are presented, supposedly as a revival of the primitive sense of the Church contrary to the prevailing influence of the hierarchy, prove nothing of this. Concerning the Montanists, the confession of Tertullian is sufficient; he admits that he rejected the ancient sense of the Church.[20] That Clement of Alexandria gives advice to a youth in need of penance that he should choose for himself a man who could offer prayers to God for him, does not rule out the fact that that man was a priest; in fact, there he offers the example of St. John the Evangelist.[21] Finally, Origen recounts many things concerning the necessity of approaching a priest in order to obtain remission of sins.[22]

20. Scholium 1. *On the mind of St. Augustine.* St. Augustine describes the process of the resurrection of a sinner under the image of the resurrection of Lazarus, so that Christ by himself arouses and vivifies the sinner, but he forgives them through the ministers of the Church. Here are his own words: "He [Lazarus from the tomb] comes forth bound; not therefore by his own feet, but in virtue of his Savior. This takes place in the heart of the penitent. When you hear that a man has repented of his sins, now he has come back to life; when you hear that a man by confessing has manifested his conscience, now he has exited the tomb, but he is not yet absolved. When is he absolved? By whom is he absolved? What you loose on earth, he said, shall be loosed in heaven.

17. See Galtier, *De paenitentia* 164-186.
18. Eusebius, *Hist. Eccl.* 5,2: MG 20,436. See Tertullian, *De pudicitia* 22: ML 2,1080-1084.
19. St. Cyprian, *Epistola* 15,1; 17,1; 22,2: ML 4,271f.276f.291. See B. Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 395-411.
20. Tertullian, *De pudicitia* 1: ML 2,1033. See D'Ales, *L'édit de Calliste* 190f.
21. Clement of Alexandria, *Quis dives salvetur* 41: MG 9,645-648.
22. Origen, *In Num.* hom.10,1: MG 12,635-638; *In Lev.* hom.2,4: MG 12,418. On these matters see Galtier, 177-183; B. Poschmann, *Die Sündenvergebung bei Origenes* 51f.; *Paenitentia secunda* 440-471.

Rightly the absolving of a sinner can be given through the Church; but for the dead person to be raised, can happen only by the Lord appealing from within; for this is the way God works interiorly."[23] Therefore there is a question here whether the power of the Church, according to the mind of St. Augustine, includes the guilty state of sin, or only the guilty state of divine or ecclesiastical punishment. For it happens that formerly some scholastics and recently Karl Adam[24] held that, according to St. Augustine, only the guilty state of punishment is truly and directly absolved by the Church.

However, this interpretation is completely false. For, according to St. Augustine the bonds, which are loosed by the Church, are the bonds of sins: "Each person is confined by the chains of his own sins, and outside of this Church nothing is set loose."[25] Moreover, the remission of sins, according to St. Augustine, takes place by the infusion of the Holy Spirit and this infusion is had through the Church: "Sins, because they are not forgiven outside the Church, must be forgiven in the same Spirit by which the Church is gathered together into one. The remission of sins, since it is not given except in the Holy Spirit, can be given only in the Church that has the Holy Spirit."[26]

Therefore, the arousing and vivification, which St. Augustine attributes to God alone, is not justification or the remission of sins; but it is that first supernatural motion whereby the sinner begins to dispose himself for justification. But Pelagianism, which taught that the work of salvation is in our own hands, gave St. Augustine the occasion of making this assertion,

21. Scholium 2. *On the mind of the old scholastics.* Some of the older scholastics, both from the writings of the Fathers, which we treated in the preceding scholium,[27] and from the nature of contrition which was not yet fully understood, used such a manner of speaking that they seem to suppose that absolution does not touch the sin itself or the guilt, which they held was remitted by contrition, which was demanded by them as the necessary disposition for the sacrament. Therefore, the purpose of the absolution, according to these scholastics, was said to be only the authentic manifestation of forgiveness,[28] or the forgiveness of the eternal punishment,[29] or of other temporal

23. St. Augustine, *In Ps.* 101,2,3: ML 37,1306f. See also *Sermones* 67,2: 98,6; 295,2: ML 38,434.594f.1349; *In Ioannem* 22,7: ML 35,1578. This way of speaking is also common in Origen, *In Ioannem* 28,5: MG 14,694; St. Ambrose, *De paenitentia* 2,7,56: ML 16,511; St. Jerome, *In Matthaeum* 16,19 (R 1386); St. Cyprian, *De lapsis* 17: ML 4,494f; and others. To understand St. Cyprian correctly these works will help: C.M. Chartier, *La discipline pénitentielle d'après les écrits de saint Cyprien:* Ant 14 (1939) 18-42, 135-156; B. Capelle, *L'absolution sacerdotale chez saint Cyprien:* RechThAncMéd 7 (1935) 221-234. But on the use that the older authors made of the words of Matt. 16:19 and 18:18 and John 20:23 consult H. Bruders in ZkathTh 34 (1910) 659; 35 (1911) 79.292.466.690.

24. K. Adam, *Die kirchliche Sündenvergebung nach dem hl. Augustin* (Paderborn 1917) 46-48. The opinion of the scholastics will be treated in the following scholium.

25. St. Augustine, *Serm.* 295,3: ML 38,1349.

26. St. Augustine, *Serm.* 17,28: ML 38,461. See B. Poschmann, *Die kirchliche Vermittlung der Sündenvergebung nach Augustinus:* ZkathTh 45 (1921) 208-228, 405-432, 497-526.

27. See A. Debil, S.J., *La première distinction du De Paenitentia de Gratien:* RevHistEccl 15 (1914-20) 251-273, 442-455.

28. St. Anselm, hom.13: ML 158,662.

29. Hugo of St. Victor, *De sacramentis christianae fidei* 2,14,8: ML 176,564f.; *Summa Sententiarum* 6,11: ML 176,147ff.

punishment together with authentic manifestation of the remission of the guilt.[30] St. Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure agree with this opinion of St. Anselm, Hugo and the Master of the Sentences.[31]

First of all, it should be noted that this opinion is very different from the errors of the Reformers, both because they do not say that justification comes from fiducial faith, but from true contrition that necessarily is joined together with sacramental confession, and also because they hold explicitly that penance is a true sacrament, and therefore a cause of grace. Therefore, these scholastics were only ignorant of the manner of causality of grace in the sacrament of Penance.

Moreover, St. Thomas[32] and Scotus[33] perceptively proposed this manner, while explaining the proper efficacy of the absolution. This will be treated more extensively later.

30. P. Lombard, *Sententiae* 4,18.
31. Albert the Great, *In 4* dist.18 a.1f.; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* 4 q.20-21; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* dist.17-18. On these see A Trombetta, *Il valore della assoluzione sacramentale nei teologi scolastici* (Rome 1942); F. Carpino, *Un tentativo al sec. XIII per valorizzare l'assoluzione sacramentale:* ScuoCatt 66 (1938) 281-289; *Consensi e critiche ad una teoria sull'assoluzione sacramentale nel sec. XII:* ScuoCatt 67 (1939) 308-325; A. Landgraf, *Grundlagen für ein Verständnis der Busslehre der früh-und Hochscholastik:* ZkathTh 51 (1927) 161-194; F. Pangerl, *Die Reuelehre Alberts des Grossen:* ZkathTh 46 (1922) 64f.; F. Mitzka, *Die Lehre des hl. Bonaventura von der Vorbereitung auf die heiligmachende Gnade:* ZkathTh 50 (1926) 250f.
32. S.Th. III, q. 84 and 86. On the mind of St. Thomas, see J. Göttler, *Der heilige Thomas von Aquin und die vortridentinischen Thomisten über die Wirkungen des Bussacramentes* (Freiburg 1904); M. Buchberger, *Die Wirkungen des Bussacramentes nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin* (Freiburg 1904); B. Schultes, O.P., *Reue und Bussacrament* (Paderborn 1907); P. De Voogt, O.S.B., *La justification dans le sacrement de la pénitence d'après S. Thomas d'Aquin:* EphThLov 5 (1928) 225-256; 7 (1930) 663-675; B. Schultes, O.P., *Circa doctrinam S. Thomae de iustificatione:* Ang 3 (1926) 166-175, 345-354; M. Flich, S.J., *L'attimo della giustificazione secundo S. Tommaso* (Rome 1947).
33. Scotus, *In 4* d.14 q.4 n.6-11. See S. Minges, O.F.M., *Ioannis Duns Scoti doctrina philosophica et theologica* (1930); P. Raymond, O.F.M.Cap., *Duns Scot:* DTC 4,1865-1947, especially 1920f.; R.Ch. Dhont, O.F.M., *Le problème de la préparation à la grâce. Débuts de l'Ecole franciscaine* (Paris 1946); N. Krautwig, O.F.M., *Die Grundlagen der Busslehre des J. Duns Scotus* (Freiburg 1938).

ARTICLE II

ON THE EXTENT OF THE POWER OF FORGIVING SINS

22. It is conceivable that Christ the Lord could have granted to the hierarchical Church this power of forgiving sins, a) for only some sins, b) or just once in the life of each sinner, c) or on the other hand, for absolutely all sins, and for every sinner. But what did he actually decide? De facto, he willed this power to be of such a nature that it would be absolutely universal, both with respect to any kind of sin, and with respect to every sinner.

But this question about the extent of the power of forgiving sins can have two meanings: 1) Whether the Church really always had this universal power, and held at least implicitly this teaching about the universal extent of this power, or whether on the contrary at some time denied that she had such power. Here you have *the dogmatic question.* 2) Whether the Church, although she well knew that she could forgive all sins of any sinner, still for disciplinary reasons denied de facto forgiveness for certain sins (v.gr., murder, unchastity, apostasy). Theologians dispute whether this second question is dogmatic or historical. But since its dogmatic character is not established for certain, we will treat is as a historical question.[1] Therefore, here is the historical question.

To be sure, if the response to the first question is negative, the *teaching* of the Church at some time would have been changed; and if the response to the second question is also negative, her *discipline* at some time would also have been changed. But if the response to both questions is affirmative, then neither the doctrine nor the discipline of the Church in this matter was ever changed.

However it should be well noted that both questions were raised about the first and second centuries; for, non-Catholic historians of dogma hold that this innovation was introduced in the third century—for *adulterers* by the edict of Callistus around the year 217, but for *apostates* and *murderers* by St. Cornelius and St. Cyprian around the year 251.

We will treat both questions separately in three theses.

Thesis 2. The power of forgiving sins, given by Christ to the hierarchical Church, is extended to absolutely all sins.

S.Th. III, q. 86, a. 1; Galtier, 205-221; Lercher-Lakner, 507-510; Puig, 561-580.

1. See J.B. Umberg, *Absolutionspflicht und altchristliche Bussdisziplin*: Schol 2 (1927) 321-341.

23. Adversaries. 1. *The Montanists,* at the end of the second century, denied to the Church the power of forgiving grave sins. Tertullian explained this teaching in his book, *De pudicitia,* published around the years 217-222. Therefore, the Montanists distinguished between *forgivable* sins, which could be forgiven by the bishop, and *unforgivable sins*, which, after penance has been done on earth, are forgiven by God alone.[2] Many forgivable sins are mentioned.[3] The unforgivable sins were, not only those three capital sins, namely, idolatry, fornication and murder, but also others, such as blasphemy, fraud, etc.[4]

2. *The Novatians*, from the middle of the third century, at first held that the Church could not forgive the sin of apostasy for the lapsed; but then they said the same thing for any kind of grave sin, so that the Church could forgive only a few light sins. They taught this doctrine so that the Church would be preserved as pure and holy.[5]

3. *Many contemporary non-Catholic historians of dogma* teach that the Montanists and the Novatians reflect the legitimate sense of the Church. For, they hold that the Church *for a long time thought* that it was not licit for her to forgive these grave sins, and therefore *de facto* she did not forgive them (D 3446).

24. Doctrine of the Church. St. Gelasius I towards the end of the fifth century (D 349) taught: "For there is no sin for whose remission the Church does not pray." *Lateran IV* (D 802): "After receiving baptism, anyone who shall have lapsed into sin can always be restored through true penance." *Trent* in sess.14 cn.1 (D 1701) defined that in the Church there is the sacrament of Penance "to reconcile the faithful with God as often as they fall into sin after baptism." The same universal power is mentioned several times or implied by Trent in the same sess.14 and also in sess.6 (see D 1668-1681, 1686-1688, 1707, 1542-1543, 1579).

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

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2. Tertullian, *De pudicitia* 2,18.19: ML 2,1037.1070ff. See G. Bardy, *Montanisme:* DTC 10,2335-2370.
3. Tertullian, *De pudicitia* 19 (ML 2,1073f.) lists these forgivable sins: "Certain daily faults, which we all commit. are anger, waving one's hands, easily cursing, casually swearing, breaking a promise, lying out of embarrassment or necessity.; in business, in performing duties, to gain something, in food, in looks, in hearing—how greatly we are tempted!, so that if there is no forgiveness for them, no one could be saved. Therefore there will be forgiveness for these things." See also in the same book, *De pudicitia* 7: ML 2,1043-1046. There is more on this in D'Ales, *La théologie de Tertullien.*
4. Tertullian, *De pudicitia* 19: ML 2,1070-1074. There is more on this in D'Ales, *L'édit de Calliste* ch.6; B. Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 321-325.
5. See D'Ales, *Novatien* ch.4; Galtier, *La rémission des péchés moindres:* RechScRel 13 (1923) 116; E. Amann, *Novatien et Novatianisme:* DTC 11,816-849.

25. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1. *Positively,* from John 20:21-3 and Matt. 16:19 and 18:18, where the words *whose sins you shall forgive. and whatever you loose.* are so universal that they do not allow for any exception. For, Gelasius interpreted them very well: "In whatever all are (included), however great they may be, and of whatever kind they may be" (D 349). Therefore the power of forgiving sins, given by Christ to the hierarchical Church, is truly universal.

This is confirmed by the context in St. John. For, the mission conferred there on the Apostles is the same mission of Christ. But Christ forgave absolutely all sins (remember the *parables* of the lost sheep, the drachma, the prodigal son, and the *facts* of the woman sinner and the adulteress, the paralytic, the good thief). Therefore the Apostles have the same universal power.

26. 2. *Negatively,* inasmuch as this power is not shown to be limited by any words of Holy Scripture, either directly or indirectly. Not *directly,* because no text can be quoted in which it is said explicitly that this power of the Church would be limited. And not *indirectly,* inasmuch as de facto some sin is removed from this universal power of the Church. For the main texts, to which the Montanists and Novatians appeal, are more or less these:

27. 1) *Concerning the sin against the Holy Spirit,* which is said not to be forgiven either in this world or in the age to come (Matt. 12:31; Mark 3:28; Luke 12:10). Before we respond to this, two points should be noted: 1) what sin is being considered; 2) in what sense is it said to be unforgivable.

a) The sin against the Holy Spirit is *understood* to be the sin of the Pharisees, who were of such a mind that the miracles, whereby Christ obviously proved his divine mission, they attributed obstinately to the devil, and therefore refused to accept the kingdom of God. Therefore, because the Pharisees attributed to an unclean spirit what Christ did in the power of the Holy Spirit, their sin is called blasphemy against the Holy Spirit. For, the words of Christ are the conclusion of the argumentation, whereby he proved to the Pharisees that he had bound the strong one [the devil] and so had now instituted the kingdom of God. Therefore, those who are not with Him, are against Him. Because the argument is clear, since the Pharisees, by attributing Christ's miracles to the devil, are against Christ. Their sin, to which they cling pertinaciously, is blasphemy against the Holy Spirit in whose power Christ works the miracles.[6]

6. See Knabenbauer and Lagrange in their commentaries on this place in the Gospels; St. Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 2,16.

b) The sin against the Holy Spirit is said to be *unforgivable*, not because the Pharisees could not abandon, with the help of God's grace, this perverse will and so obtain forgiveness for their sin, but because, as long as this bad will remained, they could not obtain pardon for their sin, because with this subjective disposition they shut themselves off from the only way of salvation. For, Christ is the only way for the forgiveness of sins, since he is truly the one who takes away the sin of the world (John 1:29). Therefore whoever rejects Christ, as long as he rejects Him by that very fact places himself outside of the means of forgiveness, and hence his sin, as such, can be said to be unforgivable. St. Gelasius (D 349) said well: "with respect to such men, if they continue to be thus, the judgment remains never to be relaxed. Although the judgment of them nevertheless remains true, by which he is denounced (as) never to be loosed who continues in the course of them, but not after he withdraws from this same course."[7]

Therefore, the sin against the Holy Spirit must not be said to be unforgivable in itself and absolutely, by reason of its gravity, but by reason of the subjective disposition of the will and hypothetically.

28. 2) *On the impossibility of restoring to penance those who have once been enlightened and have fallen into sin* (Heb. 6:4-6). The sin referred to here is the sin of apostasy from the faith, or the return to Judaism. But this sin is said to be unforgivable, according to many of the Fathers, because these apostates now cannot be baptized again; therefore they cannot come to the Church again by a repetition of Baptism (see S.Th. III, q. 84, a. 10 ad 1). But since this interpretation seems to be contrary to the text and the context, with some recent exegetes (Huyghe, Prat, A.B. Davidson, Ceulemans), with good reason we embrace this other solution: it is impossible that these apostates be converted again to the faith through the elementary catechetical doctrine, which they learned before their Baptism; but they should be summoned back to repentance by a more lofty doctrine, namely, by the teaching about the priesthood of Christ which is explained in Heb. 7. Therefore, this impossibility concerns the preaching apostle rather than the apostate to be renewed.[8] However, several theologians have understood the text to be about a moral impossibility, or about the great difficulty of conversion.

7. See St. Athanasius, *Fragm. In Mt:* MG 27,1385; Gregorius Illiberitanus, *De diversis generibus leprarum* 6: ML 30,255; St. Pacian, *Epist.* 3,15 and 22: ML 13,1075f.; S.Th. II-II, q. 14, a. 3. A sin similar to this sin against the Holy Spirit is mentioned in the *Didache* 11,7. For there also the sin is said to be unforgivable whereby one resists God's prophets. But the same solution must be given to it.
8. Huyghe, *Commentarius in epistolam ad Hebraeos* 6,4ff.; Fr. Prat, *La théologie de saint Paul* 1,466.597; A.B. Davidson, *The Epistle to the Hebrews* 6,4ff.; F.C. Ceulmans, *Commentarius in epistolas S. Pauli,* Heb. 6,4ff.

Therefore it is not impossible for these lapsed faithful to be restored simply and absolutely, but it is only said that it is impossible for them to be restored by the elementary doctrine; but there is another way by which they can be restored.

29. 3) *Concerning the rejected sacrifice for sins* (Heb. 10:26). The text is speaking about the sin of apostasy from the faith of Christ (Heb. 10:25.29). It is stated that those who have sinned after the knowledge of the truth now no longer have a sacrifice for sins, or a way of salvation, or a way of rendering God merciful, because they have rejected Christ. But the Apostle does not deny that such lapsed persons can be converted from their apostasy and so, if they adhere again to Christ, have in Him the only sacrifice for sins. Therefore, the Apostle is not teaching that apostasy is unforgivable, but that no sin can be remitted unless it is by the one Victim, Christ the Lord. See the *Council of Valence* cn.5 (D 632).

30. 4) *Concerning sin which is mortal* (1 John 5:16). Sin which is mortal is the sin of apostasy from the faith. But in this place John is not speaking about the power of forgiving sins, but about prayer for the apostate. This prayer is not forbidden by the Evangelist, nor is it said to be useless, but only that it is not commanded, since from the subjective disposition of the sinner it seems to be morally certain that he does not wish to be converted.[9]

31. Conclusion. Therefore in all of these places the meaning is almost the same. For there the possibility of conversion is not excluded, nor is the power of the Church to forgive these sins denied, but only the condition of those who reject Christ the Lord is denounced as being a state of damnation. This is, for example, the perspective of the whole letter to the Hebrews, from which also many difficulties are sought: "For the person who abandons Christ, there is hope of salvation nowhere else."

32. Proof from tradition. 1. *Some of the Fathers,* even before the third century, acknowledge at least implicitly that this power of the Church is truly universal, without any exception. St. Clement of Rome says: "[The blood of Christ] was poured out for our salvation and brought the grace of conversion to the whole world. Let us look back over all the generations, and learn that from generation to generation the Lord has given an opportunity of

9. See St. Gelasius I (D 349) and St. Thomas, *De malo* q.13 a.15. Also, much is said about penance in the N.T. by B. Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 1084. See J. Bujanda, *El "peccatum ad mortem" interpretado por el Cardinal Toledo:* ArchTG 3 (1940) 69-84.

repentance to all who would return to him" (R 12). St. Ignatius of Antioch: "Now God forgives all who repent, so long as their repentance turns to union with God and to communion with the bishop" (R 59). St. Polycarp: "Priests are dedicated to compassion, merciful towards all. not too severe in judgment, know that we are all sinners" (R 73). Hermas: "Those who repent with their whole heart and cleanse themselves of all the wickedness just described, without ever adding to their former sins, will receive from the Lord a remedy for their former sins." (R 90). St. Justin: "For the one who does penance for his sins, the goodness and the kindness of God and the immensity of his riches, will embrace him as just and free from sin, just as he says through the prophet Ezekiel."[10] St. Dionysius of Corinth wrote a letter, according to Eusebius, in which "he commands it to be received by all who have converted from any lapse or crime, or even from a heretical error."[11]

33. 2. *From Montanism.* For Tertullian: a) Acknowledged this universal power in his book, *De paenitentia,* while he was still a Catholic: "In the vestibule he has stationed repentance the second to open to such as knock. However, if any do incur the debt of a second repentance, his spirit is not to be forthwith cut down and undermined by despair. let not to repent again be irksome. You have offended, but can still be reconciled." (R 314). b) Indeed, having become a Montanist, when he retracts his former position in his book, *De pudicitia,* in that way he testifies to the fact that this is the teaching of the Church (R 383 n.1, 387). c) Tertullian himself admits that the Church spoke out strongly against any limitation of this power through "the edict of Callistus" (R 383).

3. *From Novatianism.* For, with the rise of this heresy, St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose and St. Pacian opposed it. Moreover, the Roman Pontiffs and the councils consider this position as heretical (D 183, 212, 1668-1670).

Hence it is certain that the Fathers, before the third century, acknowledged no restriction on the power of forgiving sins. Tertullian himself testifies in various ways that this was the teaching of the Catholic Church. When Novatianism appeared it was attacked by the Fathers and condemned by the Roman Pontiffs. Therefore the Church from the beginning acknowledged that the power of forgiving sins, conferred on her by Christ, is absolutely universal.

34. Theological reasoning. St. Thomas (III q.86, a. 1) proves that any sin in this life can be blotted out by penance, by appealing to the twofold

10. St. Justin, *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 47: MG 6,577-580.
11. Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 4,23: MG 20,386.

repugnance which would arise from its denial. For:

1) *It would be opposed to the divine mercy,* which is great: "for, in a manner, God would be overcome by man, if man wished a sin to be blotted out, which God were unwilling to blot out." Therefore it is fitting for divine mercy that it gave to the Church the universal power of forgiving sins.

2) *It would derogate from the power of the passion of Christ,* through which penance works, as it does in the other sacraments. Therefore it is fitting that the penitential power, supported by the blood of Christ, should be truly universal.

35. Objections. 1. Origen seems to hold that some sins cannot be forgiven by the Church. For he complains in this way: "There are some who in a way unknown to me arrogate to themselves what surpasses the priestly power; perhaps they are also ignorant of priestly discipline and take glory in the fact that they can condone idolatry and forgive adulterers and fornicators; they act as if, merely by praying for those who have committed such crimes, they can even absolve mortal sins."[12]

I respond that here he is talking about sins that at that time had to be expiated by public penance. Therefore, Origen rightly complains about those who claimed that by prayer alone or by a priestly absolution they could forgive idolatry, adultery and fornication without requiring those sinners to undergo the public penance. Therefore, both from other texts of the same Origen, and from the words of other authors of that time, it is certain that Origen in the quoted text does not mean that the Church lacks the power of remitting such sins, but that they should not be forgiven by the Church except through public penance.[13]

Therefore, Origen teaches that the Church cannot forgive certain sins without the proper satisfaction, to be performed by public penance, *conceded;* he teaches that theses sins cannot be forgiven by the Church in any way, *denied.*

2. St. Cyprian says that "one who sins against God cannot be forgiven in the Church."[14] Therefore he seems to deny to the Church all power of remitting sins.

I respond that the meaning of these words must be gathered from other texts of the same St. Cyprian. Now, if these quoted words are compared with his *Epist.* 16 and with his book, *De lapsis,* it is clear that he holds that the Church can remit absolutely all sins, provided that "the sinners do penance for the allotted time and according to the rule of discipline come to public confession" (R 569). Therefore, St. Cyprian does not deny that the Church can remit sins, but he says that they must not be remitted by her unless the required satisfaction has been made by public penance.[15]

12. Origen, *De oratione* 28: MG 11,530. See Cavallera: BullLittEccl 24 (1923) 172.

13. See B. Poschmann, *Die Sündenvergebung bei Origenes;* Galtier, *Les péchés incurables d'Origène:* Greg 10 (1929) 177-209. Moreover, that Origen clearly taught that all sins are forgivable is well proved by D'Ales, *L'édit de Calliste* c.9. Bardy shows the same thing, *Origène:* DTC 11,1556-1558. Consult *Contra Celsum* 3,50 and 71: MG 11,986 and 1014; GChS 1,246 and 263. See B. Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 427-471.

14. St. Cyprian, *Testimonia* 3,28: ML 4,782.

15. See D'Ales, *La théologie de saint Cyprien* 282-288; Galtier, *Les péchés incurables d'Origène:* Greg 10 (1929) 203-206; B. Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 370-424.

Thesis 3. The Church has never denied forgiveness for any crime because of its gravity.

Galtier, 228-265; Lercher-Lakner, 511-515; Puig, 910-928.

36. Connection. From the preceding dogmatic thesis it is sufficiently certain that the Church always had the universal power of forgiving sins, and she also knew she had it, at least implicitly. Now the question is asked whether the Church de facto always made use of this universal power; or whether, on the contrary, for disciplinary reasons, sometimes she refused to give pardon for some sins, or for some sinners. In this thesis we are treating forgiveness given always to all sins; in the next thesis we will deal with pardon as never denied to any sinner.

Definition of terms. *The Church* is understood here as universal, not a particular church; or also as the Roman Church. For, in some particular churches it is certain that a rigorous praxis at times was in effect, according to the testimony of St. Cyprian[1] about the African church: "Among our predecessors, some of the bishops in this same province of ours did not consider giving peace to adulterers, and completely closed the door of repentance to adultery."

We say "*never*" as a general statement. But because historically the whole question is raised about the first three centuries, we will restrict our consideration to that time. Moreover, the mind of the Church from the fourth century on is certain from the Council of Nicaea I (D 129), Innocent I (D 212), Caelestine I (D 236), and others.

Not for any crime is also said in a general way. But the question is limited, because of the adversaries, to the three sins of apostasy, fornication and homicide.

37. Adversaries. *Some recent non-Catholics,* influenced by Harnack and Loisy,[2] deny that the Church imparted forgiveness for those sins. It is clear that these authors suppose that the Church did not acknowledge its own power over these sins.

Some Catholics, defending that the Church always was aware of her universal power, hold that she did not wish to use that power at times for disciplinary reasons. Thus, in the seventeenth century: Morin, Sirmond;

1. *Epistola* 55,21: CSEL 3,2,638.
2. Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* 1,439-444; Loisy, *L'Evangile et l'Eglise* 238f. However among non-Catholics there are some historians of dogma, like Loofs and Seeberg, who are opposed to this thesis.

and more recently Funck, Batiffol, Vacandard, Rauschen, Amann.[3]

The historical reason mainly quoted for this view is the testimony, which they say is converging, of three illustrious authors of the third century: *Tertullian,* who opposed the edict of Callistus who said: "When they have performed their penance, I forgive the crimes of adultery and fornication" (R 312); *St. Hippolytus*, who accuses the same Roman Pontiff because "he was the first one who dared to grant to men what they do for their own pleasure, saying to all that their sins are forgiven by him"[4]; and *Origen* who wrote: "There are some who in a way unknown to me arrogate to themselves what surpasses the priestly power; perhaps they are also ignorant of priestly discipline and take glory in the fact that they can condone idolatry and forgive adulterers and fornicators; they act as if, merely by praying for those who have committed such crimes, they can even absolve mortal sins."[5] Therefore, from these three testimonies, to which can be added some statements of St. Cyprian, they say it is certain that the ancient rigorism of the Church was changed in the third century.

Theological note. The thesis from the historical point of view is *more probable.*

38. Argument. *It should be noted* that this question can be solved in two ways: in one way a priori, that is, by arguing from dogma recently defined (at the Lateran Council or at Trent), to the doctrine and practice of the early Church; for otherwise there would be a loss of infallibility, or at least of the holiness of the Church. Thus, among others, Palmieri, D'Ales, Stufler, Kopler.[6] In another way the question can be solved a posteriori, by arguing from historical and positive documents. Thus Galtier, Umberg, Lercher-Lakner, and others; they think that the aprioristic way is not completely certain.[7] We will proceed according to this second way, so that the historical difficulty may be explained and solved in a historical way to the extent that it is possible. We will do this in two ways: *positively* (by presenting ancient historical testimonies for the pardon granted to all crimes), and *negatively* (by explaining what is adduced by the adversaries in opposition to our position).

3. See Amann, *Pénitence:* DTC 12,780-783.
4. *Philosophumona* 9,12. Among the works of Origen also in MG 16,3385.
5. Origen, *De oratione* 28: MG 11,530. See Cavallera: BullLittEccl 24 (1923) 172.
6. D. Palmieri, *Tractatus de paenitentia* 106f.; D'Ales, *L'édit de Calliste;* J. Stufler, *Die Bussdisziplin der abendländischen Kirche bis Kallistus:* ZkathTh 31 (1907) 433-473; L. Kopler, *Bussakrament und Ablass* 45-57.
7. Galtier, 224ff,; J. Umberg, *Absolutionspflicht und altchristliche Bussdisziplin:* Schol 2 (1927) 321-341; Lercher-Lakner, 512.

39. 1. *It is proved in a positive way.* **First Century.** The teaching and practice of the apostolic age shows that from the beginning there were not lacking sinners, and that repentance was preached to them to return to the way of salvation. These are the main facts that should be recalled to mind:

St. Paul granted pardon to the incestuous Corinthian. Also among the brothers in Corinth there were not a few fornicators, whom the Apostle "in his absence" urged to repent, and when he was "present," he is not required to act more severely with them (1 Cor. 5:9-13; 2 Cor. 1—2; 6—7:13).[8]

St. Peter: he urges repentance to Simon the Magician (Acts 8:22-24). Moreover, he tells the faithful: God *is forbearing towards you, not wishing that any should perish, but that all should reach repentance* (2 Pet. 3:9).

St. John the Evangelist in Asia brought a profligate young man back to the Church by repentance.[9]

St. James the Apostle (5:14-20) assumes that there are sinners among the faithful, who can be converted from their errors and saved.

St. Luke narrates that many faithful, since after their conversion were still practicing magic arts, *came confessing and divulging their practices* (Acts 19:18).

Didache 4,14: "You shall confess your offences in church, and shall not come forward to your prayer with a bad conscience" (R 3). And again in 14,1: "And on the Lord's Day, after you have come together, break bread and offer the Eucharist, having first confessed your offences, so that your sacrifice may be pure" (R 8).

St. Clement of Rome: "Therefore whatever sins we have, having been seduced by one of the servants of our adversary, we beg for their forgiveness. For it is better for a man to confess his sins than to harden his heart. You, therefore, who laid the foundation of rebellion, submit to the presbyters, and accept chastisement for repentance, bending the knees of your heart" (R 27).

The Letter to Barnabas 19,12: "Confess your sins. Do not go to prayer with an evil conscience" (R 37).

Therefore, these remarks, selected at random, prove sufficiently both that the non-Catholic thesis about the primitive Church, as a society of saints from whom sinners are excluded, is false, and that the Church urged all sinners without exception to receive penance.

40. Second century. The doctrine and praxis of this age also demonstrate that the mind of the Church was that forgiveness should be granted to any

8. See Galtier, 229f. where much information is provided.
9. See Clement of Alexandria, *Quis dives salvetur* 42: MG 9,648f.

sin and to any sinner. The following should be kept in mind:

St. Ignatius of Antioch (+ 107): "Those, too, will belong to God who have returned, repentant, to the unity of the Church" (R 56). "Now God forgives all who repent, so long as their repentance turns to union with God and to communion with the bishop" (R 59).

St. Polycarp, writing shortly after the year 107 to the Philippians, exhorts them: "Priests should be dedicated to compassion, merciful towards all, bringing back those who have fallen away. and they should not be too severe in judgment" (R 73).

Hermas, in the middle of the second century, in his *Shepherd*, is totally dedicated in exhorting penance by which men find salvation. The adversaries claim that under his influence the Church began to forgive sins.[10]

St. Dionysius of Corinth (ca. 150), as Eusebius[11] reports, "commands that those who are converted from any lapse or crime, even if it is from heretical errors, should be taken back."

St. Justin (+ 167) teaches that the faithful, if they have fallen back into Judaism and denied Christ, cannot be saved; however, he makes an exception for those who have repented before their death. Therefore, according to St. Justin, the sin of apostasy is also forgiven.[12]

St. Irenaeus (+ 202) says that those just persons will be rewarded with eternal life "who have persevered in the love of God, either from the beginning or after penance."[13] It is certain that he is talking about ecclesiastical penance because elsewhere he says that some women, who had been deluded by the Gnostics, "made a public confession of their sins" (R 193).

From the fact about St. Polycarp, who is said by St. Irenaeus to have converted many heretics to the Church in Rome under Anicetus.[14]

From the fact about Cerdonis, who, according to St. Irenaeus, again and again made a public confession.[15]

From the fact of Marcion: Tertullian says that he was repeatedly ejected from the Church, before he departed permanently.[16]

Therefore, this abundance of testimonies demonstrates that it was not an exception, but the general practice of the Church in the second century of not denying absolution for any sin whatsoever.

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10. On the mind of Hermas, see Galtier, 238-245; B. Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 134-205.
11. *Historia Ecclesiastica* 4,23: MG 20,386.
12. *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 47.
13. *Adversus haereses* 1,10,1: MG 7,551. See B. Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 206f.
14. See St. Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* 3,3: MG 7,851.
15. See St. Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* 3,3: MG 7,857.
16. See Tertullian, *De praescriptione haereticorum* 30: ML 2,49.

41. Third century. It will suffice to mention a few cases:

A certain man named Natalius, according to Eusebius,[17] who, being corrupted by money, allowed himself to be consecrated a bishop by heretics, was received back into communion with the Church by St. Zepherinus (198-217).

Clement of Alexandria (+ 215), when he recounts the reconciliation of the young man made by St. John the Evangelist, shows that this praxis should be praised, and that it is not in conflict with the customs of the Church at that time.[18] See above n. 39.

St. Cyprian (+ 258) explicitly defends the view that no one should be excluded from penance: "We certainly think that no one is to be restrained from the fruit of satisfaction, and the hope of peace. pardon and mercy must not be denied to penitents." (R 577).

Finally, the *Didascalia* (about the middle of the third century) gives these general prescriptions: "Let the bishop take care. that those who have sinned do penance. and let him give forgiveness of their sins. For anyone who drives him from the Church, when he has repented, kills him wickedly."[19]

42. 2. *It is proved in a negative way.* After having given the positive arguments by which it is established that the Church, in the first three centuries, did not deny pardon for any sin, we come now to consider the foundations on which the adversaries rely in order to construct their opposite theory.

1. *On the sins of unchastity.* As we have seen, a threefold "converging" testimony is proposed; we will examine each one separately.

The testimony of Tertullian is quoted, since he wrote against "the edict of Callistus." About this testimony it is necessary to say: a) That edict *does not come from St. Callistus,* nor from any Roman Pontiff. For the bishop, whom it concerns, presumes, according to Tertullian, to do that because he arrogated to himself the power of loosing and binding, as if he were a bishop of some church "near Peter"; this does not hold true for the Roman Church but for those who, because of a similarity of doctrine with that church, are said to be near to Peter (R 387).[20] Moreover, the titles that Tertullian gives to that bishop ("bishop of bishops," "supreme pontiff," "holy father"), at that time did not belong exclusively to the bishop of Rome, and they are

17. *Historia Ecclesiastica* 5,28: MG 20,514.
18. *Quis dives salvetur* 42: MG 9,648f.
19. *Didascalia* 2,18 (ed. Funk 1,64).
20. See Galtier, *Le véritable édit de Calliste:* RevHistEccl 23 (1927) 469-475; *Ecclesia Petri propinqua:* RevHistEccl 24 (1928) 41-51.

used by Tertullian in an ironic sense. The edict seems rather to be that of an African bishop, more probably Agrippinus.[21]

But also *by that edict an ancient practice of the Church* was not revived. This is certain from Tertullian himself, both as a Catholic and later as a Montanist. For, as a Catholic he wrote the book *De paenitentia,* in which he assumes the praxis of the Church of giving pardon to all crimes, even to apostasy and unchastity (R 312f)[22]; as a Montanist in his book *De pudicitia* he confesses that he, not the Catholics, has changed his mind; and he did that not because of some ancient tradition (in whose praise he wrote so much in his book *De praescriptione haereticorum*), but because of the new prophets Montanus and Priscilla (R 383f., 387).[23]

43. The testimony of St. Hippolytus is quoted, who accuses St. Callistus. But in the words of St. Hippolytus there is nothing to prove that Callistus was the first one to grant pardon to fornicators. The only thing Hippolytus says is that Callistus granted pardon much too easily; this was because he promised pardon to those coming back from the sects, if they would come to him, and he said that he did this; to Hippolytus this seemed to be illicit.[24]

Origen speaks about incurable sins; according to his way of thinking they are not to be considered truly unforgivable,[25] but rather forgivable after a long and real penance in the proper sense. The priests about whom he complains in the cited text neglect to enforce this type of remission.[26]

Therefore the threefold testimony of the third century is not at all "converging" and offers no positive proof that the universal Church, or the Roman Church, during the two previous centuries refused to grant pardon to those three serious sins.

44. 2. *On the sin of apostasy.* The adversaries hold that before the persecution of Decius (249-251) there was a praxis of not forgiving the sin of apostasy, but that after the persecution St. Cornelius and St. Cyprian

21. See Galtier, *L'Eglise et la rémission des péchés aux premiers siècles* (Paris 1932) 141-183; B. Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 348; G. Bardy, *L'édit d'Agrippinus:* RevScRel 4 (1924) 1-25. Today it seems certain that the edict did not come from the bishop of Rome; see B. Altaner in ThRev 38(1939) 133f. Actually St. Cyprian (*Epistola* 55,21) says that there were predecessors of him in Africa, who thought that peace should not be given to adulterers; these certainly were not subject to the Montanists, doubtless because of some bishop who prevented it. Therefore he seems to have been the author of that "edict," which moreover is not an edict in the proper sense.
22. See Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 261-367.
23. See Galtier, 247-253; Lercher-Lakner, 515.
24. See D'Ales, *L'édit de Calliste* 217-227; K. Preysing, *Existenz und Inhalt des Bussediktes Kallists:* ZkathTh 43 (1919) 358-362; Galtier, 254f.
25. See J. Stufler, *Die Sündenvergebung bei Origenes:* ZkathTh 31 (1907) 203-228.
26. See Galtier, *Les péchés incurables d'Origène:* Greg 10 (1929) 177-209. More on this can be found in Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 427-433.

introduced this new discipline. The fundamental reasons for asserting this are approximately the following: St. Cyprian was convinced that the sin of someone in the Church who "denied God" could not be forgiven.[27] Then St. Cyprian and the Roman clergy at the beginning of the persecution did not dare to grant pardon to the lapsed before this practice was approved by a council[28]; St. Cyprian says that it was done only after that because of the necessity of the times and the large number of apostates.[29] Finally, they say that the schism of Novatian obtained such a large and easy diffusion, because it restored the ancient practice of rigorism.

But to these claims *this response can be made*: that the conviction of St. Cyprian about the impossibility of pardon of apostasy was not so absolute that de facto he thought that the sin could not be forgiven, since pardon was given later to those who had obtained "a certificate of peace." Actually St. Cyprian himself, alluding to the "sin against God" by apostasy and to the same texts of the Gospel (Mark 3:28ff.; Matt. 12:32), strongly exhorted the lapsed to hope that they would obtain forgiveness.[30]

That St. Cyprian and the Roman clergy, when the See of Peter was vacant, did not wish to give pardon to the lapsed, is true enough, inasmuch as it seemed to them these sinners at the time were not properly disposed, and not because they thought that pardon could not be given to them. This was a question of discipline: namely, whether by making the obtaining of penance more difficult men would be more effectively restrained from committing apostasy. But after the persecution a distinction was made between those having the "certificate" (that is, those who, although they had not sacrificed to idols, still had a document saying that they had sacrificed) and the sacrificers (that is, those who actually offered sacrifice); the former were reconciled immediately, but the latter only after a lengthy penance. Finally the Synod of Carthage in 252, because of the imminent new persecution, said that the sacrificers should also be received back. As is obvious, these are differences not in denying or conceding pardon to the apostates, but in demanding of them more or less penance.[31]

The spreading of the Novatian schism is sufficiently explained from the repugnance of the faithful in receiving back those who, in such great numbers, sacrificed to idols during the persecution, and who afterwards in time of peace returned so easily to the Church. This explanation, in preference to some others that have been advanced, seems preferable

27. *Testimonia* 3,28: ML 4,751
28. *Epistola* 17,1ff,:; 30,5-8.
29. *Epistola* 14,1; 55,7.
30. *Epistola* 16,2: 17,2.
31. See Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 391-397; Galtier, 261f.

because the Novatians never appealed to some ancient practice of the Church in their own defense, and because Novatianism had its beginning not from doctrinal reasons, but from a dispute about the episcopacy.[32]

45. 3. *On the sin of homicide.* They adduce hardly any other argument except cn.21 of the Council of Ancyra in the year 341: "those who have committed homicide should submit themselves immediately to penance; and they will obtain perfection concerning the end of life."[33] They understand this text in such a way that it signifies a certain mitigation of a previous severity. Hence they conclude that previously forgiveness for the sin of homicide was not given.

But it is certain that this forgiveness was given previously. We mentioned earlier (n. 39) the fact about St. John the Evangelist. Hermas promised forgiveness to children who had betrayed their parents during the persecution.[34] St. Callistus granted pardon to women who had killed their own fetus.[35] Other examples are given by St. Gregory Thaumaturgus.[36] Origen does not list homicide among the incurable sins. Therefore such an interpretation of the canon of Ancyra is imagined gratuitously. In fact that canon is dealing with prostitutes who suffocated their children: a mitigation is offered to them—not one that simply grants a pardon that formerly was not granted to them, but one that grants them pardon after ten years of penance; before that time it was granted to them only at the moment of death.[37]

46. Scholium 1. *On public and private penance.*[38] In the ancient Church there was a penitential practice called "the order of penitents." The penance, which took place by being added to that order, is now usually called *public penance.*[39] The faithful placed in that order were separated from communion with the others, and they performed their own liturgical rites for a certain time, until they were finally reconciled. But the way of conducting all of this was not always the same in all the churches. Still, it was always an official penance, which could not be undertaken by a sinner by his own choice with-

32. See St. Pacian, *Epistola 3 ad Simpronianum* 1.19.22.26: ML 13,1063-1082; Galtier, 263.
33. Msi 2,526.
34. *Pastor* Vis 2,2,2ff.
35. At least if we believe Hippolytus: *Philosophumena* 9,12,6: MG 16,3388.
36. *Epistola canonica* 7: MG 10,1040.
37. See Galtier, 265.
38. See Galtier, 267-310; Lercher-Lakner, 519f.; I. Zeiger, *De statu disputationis in historia sacramenti paenitentiae:* Greg 14 (1933) 432-441.
39. It certainly existed from the beginning of the third century, and probably before that. See Tertullian, *De paenitentia* 9 (R 315); St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, *Epistola canonica* 2: MG 10,1020-1048; St. Pacian, *Paraenesis ad paenitentiam:* ML 13,1081f.; St. Ambrose, *De paenitentia:* ML 16,485-546; St. Jerome, *Epistola* 774: ML22,392f.; Sozomenum, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 7,16: MG 67,1460.

out the intervention of the Church.[40] In this public penance these distinctions should be made:

a) *The imposition of penance,* which was done by the bishop after judging the guilt and circumstances. The bishop imposed the penance, either because the sinner was publicly known as such, or he was denounced by someone who knew of his crime, or because he spontaneously presented himself.

b) *The penitential action,* which is the completion of those acts and rites that are proper to "penitents." These acts included confession, liturgical separation from the body of the faithful, special prayers, fasting and works of expiation. In the East (at least in Asia Minor) various grades of penitents were distinguished: the weepers (*flentes*) (who remained at the entrance of the church asking for the prayers of the faithful), the hearers (*audientes*) (who were admitted to listen to the explanation of Christian doctrine), the prostrate (*substrati*) (who, being prostrate, received the blessing of the bishop), the standers (consistentes) (those present at the whole Mass, but not allowed to receive holy communion).[41]

c) *Absolution of the penitent,* which took place through the imposition of hands and the resulting reconciliation.[42] Today it seems to be certain that the sacramental forgiveness of sins was given by this absolution, but not before, according to the law and necessity.[43]

d) *A consequence* of this public penance was the person who went through it once could not do it again, and he could not be admitted to the clergy.

47. Scholium 2. *Private penance,* in contrast to the public penance, is one that takes place without being joined to the order of penitents.[44] There has been much debate about the existence of this private penance and there still is. However, it is certain that private penance did not exist as a penitential practice independent of the public penance, nor in the sense that always and rightly, before the absolution of public penance, the sin was already forgiven privately and in secret.[45] Therefore the only question is whether in the ancient Church there was another way to obtain forgiveness of sins without having to join the order of penitents. The existence of private penance in this sense is affirmed,

40. See Tertullian, *De paenitentia* 7: ML 1,1351f.; *De pudicitia* 5: ML 2,1039ff.; St. Cyprian, *De lapsis* 30: *Epistola* 57,1.
41. A description of the penitential action has been given among others by Tertullian (R 315); St. Jerome, *Epistola* 779f.: ML 223,92ff,; Sozomenus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 7,16: MG 67,1460f.; S. González Rivas, *La penitencia en la primitiva Iglesia española* (Madrid 1950) 90-104. See also V. Monachino, *La cura pastorale a Milano, Cartagine e Roma nel secolo IV* (Rome 1947) 111-132, 246-275, 393-407.
42. In Rome this absolution took place on Holy Thursday; in Milan on Holy Saturday; in Spain both days were used. See González, 109f.
43. See Galtier, 269-278; Lercher-Lakner, 519,4. For reconciliation in the Spanish Church, see S. González, *op.cit.*, 104-112.
44. See Galtier, 279ff.
45. See Galtier, 269-278.

among others, by Galtier and K. Adam,[46] but it is denied by Poschmann.[47]

The affirmative opinion seems to us to be more probable for the reasons that Galtier has proposed: a) The power of mitigating the manner and duration of penance was recognized to be present in priests. This is testified to by St. Cyprian, St. Chrysostom, St. Leo the Great, St. Augustine, and others.[48]

b) There were some sins (not capital),[49] which were forgiven without being joined to the order of penitents. Thus Tertullian speaks about "lighter sins," which are truly grave sins, but not "capital."[50] For the capital sins he demands "condemnation," for which there is a "punishment" and then "forgiveness"; for the lighter sins he demands "chastisement," for which immediately (without the "punishment") there follows "forgiveness."[51] Actually, the "punishment" means public penance. Therefore, "lighter" sins were forgiven by the bishop without public penance.[52]

c) In the reconciliation of heretics, those who were previously Catholic are received back only by public penance; but those who were baptized in a heretical sect were received into the Church by the imposition of hands and they did not have to do the public penance.[53]

d) After the persecution of Decius the "sacrificers" were reconciled by public penance, but those having the "certificates of peace" were admitted immediately without public penance (R 576); and a fortiori those who had not received the certificates (R 553).

e) The Council of Illiberitanus in cn.20 decreed: "If anyone, even a lay person, is proved to have accepted interest on money lent and, having been rebuked, then promised that he would stop that practice and would exact nothing further, it is proper to

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46. Galtier, 283-310; *L'Eglise et la rémission des péchés aux premièrs siècles: A propos de la pénitence primitive:* RevHistEccl 30 (1934) 797-846; *Comme on écarte la pénitence privée:* Greg 21 (1940) 183-202; K. Adam, *Die kirchlichen Sündenvergebung nach dem h. Augustin* (Paderborn 1917); *Die geheime Kirchenbusse nach dem hl. Augustin* (Kempten 1921); *Die abendländische Kirchenbusse im Ausgang des christlichen Altertums:* ThQschr 110 (1929) 1-66.
47. *Kirchenbusse und correption secreta bei Augustinus* (Braunsberg 1923); *Die abendländische Kirchenbusse im Ausgang des christlichen Altertums* (Munich 1928); *Die abendländische Kirchenbusse im frühen Mittelalter* (Breslau 1930); *Die kirchliche Altertum und die kirchliche Privatbusse:* ZkathTh 54 (1930) 214-252. See also ThRev 32 (1933) 257-272. Lercher-Lakner agrees with Poschmann.
48. St. Cyprian, *Epistola* 55,13ff.; 59,15f.; St. Chrysostom, *In 2 Cor.* hom.159,6: MG 61,422; *De sacerdotio* 2,4: MG 48,635; St. Leo the Great, *Epistola* 159,6: ML 54,1138; At. Augustine, *Enchiridion* 65: ML 40,262f.
49. The three sins mentioned in the previous thesis—fornication, idolatry and homicide—in the ancient way of thinking are called *capital sins.*
50. Tertullian, *De pudicitia* 19 (ML 2,1070-1074) distinguishes these sins both from the capital sins and from venial sins.
51. "Some sins are forgivable, others unforgivable according as there is no doubt that the one deserves chastisement and the other punishment. Every crime is settled with forgiveness or with punishment: forgiveness after chastisement, punishment after condemnation" (Tertullian, *De pudicitia* 2: ML 2,1036).
52. Tertullian in *De pudicitia* 2 (ML 2,1036f) expressly says that there is no question or problem between Montanists and Catholics concerning the lighter sins and their forgiveness.
53. On the similarity in the rite of this reconciliation with the rite of the public penitents St. Innocent I says this: "Under the sign of penance we receive them by the imposition of hands. With the sign of penance we receive them" (ML 20,550f.). See Galtier, *Absolution ou confirmation? La reconciliation des hérétiques:* RechScRel 5 (1914) 339-394, 507-544.

grant him forgiveness."[54]

f) St. Gregory Illiberitanus speaks about "minor" sins, which can be forgiven by a priest, but without the public penance.[55]

g) St. Augustine speaks about the adultery of a husband, secretly denounced by his wife, which was also forgiven secretly by the Church.[56] In a similar way he mentions thieves whom the bishop rebuked—some secretly, some openly and others by depriving them of Holy Communion (if it was necessary).[57]

Therefore, for these and similar reasons it seems necessary to admit the existence of a way of forgiveness without being assigned to the order of penitents. Hence, this can very well be called a type of private penance.

54. See González, *La penitencia en la primitiva Iglesia española* 55: where he notes that in this case not only is nothing said about penance, but also nothing about the denial of communion, as seems to be assumed in the other canons of that Council, v.gr., in cn.14 about fallen virgins.
55. *De diversis generibus leprarum* 2: ML 30,245f.; see González, *La penitencia.* 71f. On St. Pacian, see ibid. 79. On the confession of monks and nuns, see Galtier, 218.
56. *Sermo* 82,8: ML 38,511.
57. *Epistola* 153,21: ML 33,663.

Thesis 4. The Church never denied forgiveness to any sinners whom she considered disposed.

Galtier, 311-371; Lercher-Lakner, 516ff.; Puig, 940-950.

48. Definition of terms. *The Church* is understood as in the preceding thesis: the universal Church, or the Roman Church.

Denied forgiveness, that is, some way for the forgiveness of their sins was always open to sinners, even though they were kept away from the public penance and from communion of the faithful.

Any sinners. The question here in particular concerns the dying, the relapsed and major clerics.

Dying sinners are said to be those at the moment of death who had not done penance, that is, the public penance. This could happen either because they had not yet completed the penance already started, or because they had postponed it until the time of death.

The relapsed are called those who, after having performed the public penance once, committed the same sins again, which were punishable by public penance.

Major clerics are understood to be the bishops, priests and deacons who had committed the capital sins, and who were not admitted to the public penance.

Whom she considered disposed. For the question here is, whether forgiveness of sins would be denied to these sinners precisely because of certain circumstances (that is, because they had not been purified by public penance, because they were relapsed, because they were clerics).

Theological note. The thesis is *more probable.*

49. Argument. 1. *On the dying.*

a) From time at least of the *Council of Nicaea I absolution was given to all dying persons.* This is certain from cn.13 of that Council (D 129), from the testimony of St. Innocent I (D 212) and St. Celestine I (D 236). Moreover, from St. Leo the Great, who reprobates the bad custom of postponing penance until the moment of death (D 310).

b) *For the preceding times* this question is very much disputed. However, it seems to be more probable that the praxis of denying absolution to the dying was never common in the Church. This is proved by the following reasons: *The Council of Nicaea* in that canon 13 not only did not say it was innovating something, but expressly confirms the ancient and regular law;

St. Celestine I in the cited letter is horrified at the denial of absolution for the dying by some clerics; this horror could hardly be explained if there was at one time such a custom in the Church. According to the *Council of Trent,* it was always a very holy custom in the Church that there should be no reservation of absolution for those in immediate danger of death (D 1688). Pius VI condemned the opinion of the Synod of Pistoia, which approved of the praxis of the ancient Church of denying communion even at the moment of death, as being contrary to the Council of Nicaea, St. Innocent, St. Celestine and redolent of the perversity that, in that decretal, horrified the holy pontiff (D 2638).

c) But *in contrast to the above* there are certain facts. *First of all,* St. Innocent in the same letter speaks about a prior observance, which was harsher, and according to which "penance should be granted but communion should be denied"; this denial of communion implied a denial of absolution. *But* observe that St. Innocent says that "remission" was given to them also at that time, although it was more difficult. Then he says that there is now a "more favorable" rule, lest it seem that in the denial of communion a denial also of forgiveness is contained, as the Novatianists want it to be. Hence "communion" in that text is not connected with absolution.

In the second place, they cite cn.22 of the Council of Arles I,[1] decreeing that communion be denied to apostates who, overcome by illness, seek communion, unless they become well again and do penance. *However,* in that canon it does not seem that the case of someone dying is being considered, but only of someone who is sick and has a good chance of recovering.

In the third place, they quote cn.64 of the Council of Illiberitanus,[2] in which communion is denied to a woman living in adultery until the time of death. In fact, this perpetual denial of communion appears in several other canons of that same Council.[3] *However,* if the context of those canons is attended to and if there is an analysis and comparison of formulas, it becomes sufficiently clear that in the Council of Illiberitanus "communion" means nothing more than "reconciliation."[4] Therefore there was a denial, even in perpetuity, of reconciliation with the Church, which doubtless brought with it the negation also of Holy Communion, but the forgiveness of sins was in no way denied. There is no positive reason for affirming the contrary and on the other hand it is difficult to admit the exclusion from absolution and the ecclesiastical remission of sin, which neither before nor

1. Msi 2,473.
2. Msi 2,16.
3. See González, *La penitencia.* 44ff.
4. González makes this analysis and comparison, *La penitencia.* 46-51.

afterwards made an appearance in Spain.[5]

Moreover, it can be conceded that, in Spain and in France, such a custom of denying absolution to the dying sometimes was observed; Innocent I and Caelstine I spoke out strongly against this practice. But it would still have to be proved that the same practice was observed either in the universal Church, or in the Roman Church.

50. 2. *On the relapsed.*

a) It is certain that a new public penance, which could be done only once, was not granted to the relapsed.[6] Therefore many penitents postponed penance to the end of their life.

b) Perhaps it can be bypassed that before St. Siricius it is not positively certain about the sacramental absolution given to these relapsed persons, since the examples of it brought forward really are not absolutely clear.[7]

c) St. Siricius, while denying Eucharistic communion to these lapsed persons, granted them at least in the time of death reconciliation with the Church and absolution.[8] It is not certain that there he is dealing only with those who, having completed their penance, did the things that were prohibited to penitents. Moreover, St. Siricius does not say that he is initiating a new discipline.

d) The Church always exhorted the relapsed to do penance, while promising forgiveness to all who had a conversion of heart.[9] This remission of sins, given the existence of a private penance as already explained, surely may be supposed to have taken place by some exercise of the power of the keys, whose nature and way of operating is not known to us. For the doctrine about the remission of those sins is nowhere apparent as being outside the power of the keys.[10]

51. 3. *On major clerics.*

a) It is true that the major clerics, who committed capital sins, in some churches were not admitted to the rite of public penance. Thus, St. Basil says, according to the ancient rules of the Church, that they must be deposed from their rank and reduced to the lay state, but that they must not be admitted to the group of penitents.[11] This was the rule also for the Roman Church, according to the testimony of St. Leo the Great, St. Siricius

5. See Gonzñlez, *La penitencia.* 52ff.
6. See Poschmann, *Die kirchliche Busse im Ausgang des christlichen Altertums* 57-68, 97-104.
7. See Galtier, 319.
8. *Ad Himerium Tarraco nensem:* ML 13,1137.
9. See St. Augustine, *Epistola* 153,3,7f.: ML 33,656.
10. See Galtier, 325.
11. *Epistola canonica* cn.3.32.51: MG 32,672.728.796.

and St. Optatus Milevitano.[12]

b) However this was not the universal practice in the Church, as is certain from the *Council Illiberitanum* cn.76, *Neo-Caesarea* cn.1, *Orange I* cn.4, and from other testimonies.[13]

c) For them also there was at hand a remission of sins by a private penance. For, an imposition of hands was not denied to them, but only that which was given to lay people or as to penitents.[14] There are positive examples of the granting of this type of forgiveness even in the Roman Church.[15] In particular, those who were converted from schism or heresy were not admitted without a rite of reconciliation, although it was done without public penance.[16] About all of this St. Leo the Great writes: "It is foreign to ecclesiastical custom. that those who for a serious crime of theirs by the imposition of hands receive the remedy of penance. Therefore for these fallen clerics a private handling is desired in order to merit the mercy of God, where the satisfaction by them, if it was worthy, is also fruitful"[17]; this fruitful satisfaction seems to suppose communion at least of the laity.

d) Finally, by way of an exception, also in Rome, some of these clerics were reinstated in their previous office and dignity. [18]

12. St. Leo the Great., *Epistola 167:* ML 54,1203; St. Siricius, *Ad HimericumTarraconensem:* ML 13,1145; St. Optatus M., *De schismate Donatistorum* 1,24: ML 11,923-933, where he narrates that St. Miltiades in the Roman Synod in 313 condemned Donatus, "because he confessed that. he imposed hands on lapsed bishops, which is foreign to Church practice."
13. *Conc. Illiberitanum* cn.76: Msi 2,18; *Conc. Neocaesariense* cn.1: Msi 2,540; *Conc. Arausicanum* cn.4: Msi 6,437. For other testimonies see Galtier, 364. On the legislation of the Council Illiberitanum concerning fallen clerics, see González, *La penitencia.* 56f.; on the Spanish church, see *ibid.*, 27-37.
14. See Galtier, 367.
15. See Galtier, 368.
16. See Galtier, 369.
17. *Epistola* 167,2: ML 54,1203.
18. Galtier collects some examples, 364.

ARTICLE III

ON THE JUDICIAL NATURE OF THE POWER OF FORGIVING SINS

52. Having proved the existence and universality of the power of forgiving sins, our next task is to determine the nature of this power. To express this in one word, it must not be said to be *gratuitous* but *judicial.* That is: there is also another way to obtain the forgiveness of sins, namely, the sacrament of Baptism. Therefore, the question is asked whether this forgiveness of sins, about which we are now speaking, takes place for the same reason as the baptismal forgiveness, or is it something different. Namely, the baptismal power is exercised by way of a gratuitous gift, since no investigation precedes it, nor does judgment take place, nor is any satisfaction imposed. Is power of this kind also penitential? Not at all. For the baptismal power is gratuitous; but the penitential power is exercised by way of a judgment. For this reason, therefore, the radical different between Baptism and Penance is brought out. And so this judicial character is the fundamental characteristic of the sacrament of Penance.

Thesis 5. This power, granted by Christ, is exercised by a judicial act.

S.Th. III, *Suppl.* q. 17, a.2f.; Galtier, 327ff.; Lercher-Lakner, 527-533; Puig, 581-589.

53. Definition of terms. Judicial power, from the popular concept which Trent had in mind, is said to be "the faculty coming down from the supreme authority, in order to pass a judgment that is really efficacious of a law that is asserted or denied, according to the rule of law and according to the merit of the offenders." I will explain each part;

The faculty coming down from the supreme authority. For according to all, a judge is a public magistrate, or someone invested with public authority. Therefore, he is not a mere arbitrator who is chosen by the will of the parties involved.

In order to pass a judgment that is really efficacious, that is, not merely theoretically directing or declaring; for, otherwise he would be a mere consulter, giving his own opinion, but not a true judge passing sentence authoritatively.

Of a law that is asserted or denied. That is, judicial power is concerned with two contrary acts (to absolve—to condemn), but not with contradictories (to use this power or not to use it).

According to the rule of law. For a judge is a public magistrate; for

otherwise he would be a mere arbitrator who resolves the matter on a basis of equity.

According to the merit of the offenders. For otherwise it would not be a judgment, which is concerned with justice, but a mere benefit which proceeds from benevolence.

54. *Therefore,* all Catholics hold that penance, from the institution of Christ, is to be exercised in a judicial manner. According to the mind of Trent, it is to be understood in this way: *The Penitent* is one who is truly guilty and accuses himself before the minister. *The minister* is a true judge, who passes sentence in an authoritative manner, not just as an arbiter who resolves the matter amicably. *The forgiveness itself* is a judicial act, since it is a judgment, proclaimed with authority, and not according to the will of the offenders or of the judge, but according to the merits of the case and the rule of law.

If we compare this internal penitential judgment before God with the external criminal judgment of a civil court, we see that they differ in the following ways: regarding the *end,* which in the former case is the justification or absolution of the sinner, while in the latter it is vindictive or condemnatory; regarding the *manner,* because there are no witnesses or accusers in a penitential judgment, since the penitent himself gives testimony about his sin and his present disposition of soul; regarding the *sentence,* for the punishment given is not vindictive, but medicinal and satisfactory; regarding the *minister,* who is indeed a judge, but at the same time a doctor, a teacher and a father.[1]

55. Adversaries. The Reformers deny this judicial characteristic, holding that penance is a power either of proclaiming the Gospel or declaring that the sins have already been forgiven (D 1684-1685, 1709).

56. Doctrine of the Church. Trent in sess.14 ch.2 and 5 (D 1671-1672, 1679-1681) teaches that the minister of penance is a judge, but the penitent is the accused, and that this comes from the institution of Christ, and for this reason the baptismal power differs greatly from the penitential power; ch.6 (D 1684-1685) says that the exercise of this power takes place through a judicial act, whereby the sentence is passed by the minister as a judge; cn.9 (D 1709) defines that the sacramental absolution of the priest is a judicial act.

1. On all of this see I. Umberg, *Die richterliche Bussgewalt nach Io 20,23:* ZkathTh 50 (1926) 337-370.

Theological note. It must be held that sacramental absolution is a judicial act as *explicitly defined divine and Catholic faith;* therefore, it must be held *as implicitly defined* that the power, by which such absolution is exercised, is also judicial.[2]

57. Proof from Holy Scripture. John 20:23: *If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained.* Therefore thus: Judicial power is the faculty coming down from the supreme authority, in order to pass a judgment that is really efficacious of a law that is asserted or denied, according to the rule of law and according to the merit of the offenders. But such is the power conferred by those words. Therefore, the power of forgiving sins is a judicial power.

The major contains the juridical notion that is generally admitted by all.

The minor is to be proved with regard to each part of the definition:

a) *Power coming down from the supreme authority, or authoritative power.* For it is conferred by the Originator of this ecclesiastical power: *As the Father has sent me, even so I send you. If you forgiven the sins of any.*

b) *In order to pass a judgment that is really efficacious.* For, we proved above that the Church not only declares that the sins have been forgiven by God, but that she truly forgives the sins; therefore her judgment is ratified also in heaven.

c) *Of a law that is asserted or denied.* That is, this power of forgiving sins is twofold or has two parts, while referring to two opposed acts (forgiving—retaining), so that these acts are opposed in a contrary way, not in contradiction. Hence these two acts are positive acts. This is not the case in the power of baptizing. For, this is not a twofold power; so baptism is either administered or it is not administered, and therefore it is a power that has only one positive terminus (the conferring of Baptism).

Therefore, the penitential power is a twofold power so that both acts are positive. No one doubts about *forgiveness.* But the same things must be said about *retention.* For the word κρατέω expresses a true act still more vividly than the Latin word *retineo*—not merely the non-use of the power, since it signifies *to hinder, to restrain.* And this is confirmed because the effect of forgiving and retaining is positive. For, by forgiveness man is freed from guilt and eternal punishment; but by retaining, the obligation of returning to the penitential tribunal is imposed on the sinner, or ratified, so that he may be able to obtain forgiveness for his sin. This is the juridical effect of denied absolution; it is surely something positive in the juridical order, even though nothing is produced in the physical order, as happens in

2. See J. Ternus, *Die sakramentale Lossprechung als richterlicher Akt:* ZkathTh 71 (1949) 214-230.

absolution by the infusion of sanctifying grace.

d) *According to the rule of law and according to the merit of the offenders.* For, it is a vicarious power, and therefore it must be exercised according to the laws of the one granting it. But it is a fundamental law, as we will demonstrate next, that the forgiveness of sins is not given except to those properly disposed by contrition. Therefore the minister can absolve only the contrite, that is, according to their merits.[3]

58. Proof from tradition. 1. *In general,* from the history of penance it is certain that from the first centuries there was in the Church a true penitential tribunal with judges, laws, punishments, absolution or retention of sins. Indeed, by the activity of this tribunal, the power granted by Christ of forgiving sins was exercised. Therefore, the nature of this power is truly judicial.

2. *In particular,* the holy Fathers a) clearly call priests judges, b) and they call the exercise of this penitential power a judgment, c) and they deduce this from the words of John 20:23 and Matt. 16:19 and 18:18. Listen to Tertullian: "We come together in assembly. we pray. In the same place we also hear exhortations, castigations and divine censures; for *it is judged with great seriousness,* as among certain men in the sight of God, and there is the important preliminary examination of a future judgment that, if someone committed a crime that he should be banished from sharing in the prayers and the community and all holy association."[4] And the *Didascalia Apostolorum* admonished the bishop about his dignity: "*you have power to pass judgment for God on those who have sinned;* for it was said to you bishops by the Gospel: whatever you bind on earth will be bound in heaven. *Judge,* therefore, O bishop, *with power, as God does,* but receive the penitents with love, as God does, because the Lord God with an oath promised sinners that he would give them pardon."[5] ST. Chrysostom: "If you wish to see how great a difference there is between a king and a priest, consider the type of power given to both of them, and you will see that a priest is much more sublime than a king. The king is entrusted with the administration of earthly things.; but the seat of the priest is located in heaven, and he has the authority to administer heavenly things. Who says this? The very king of heaven: for whatever you bind on earth.From the earth the principle of his judgment is confirmed in heaven; for, *the judge sits on the earth,* the Lord follows his servant, and *whatever he shall have*

3. See J. Umberg, *Die richterliche Bussgewalt nach Io 20,23:* ZkathTh 50 (1926) 337-370.
4. *Apologeticum* 39: ML 1,532.
5. *Didascalia Apostolorum* 11f. (ed. Funk, 1,46ff.).

judged here below, the Lord approves in heaven."[6] St. Jerome: "Far be it from me to censure the successors of the Apostles, who with holy words consecrate the body of Christ. Having the keys of the kingdom of heaven, *they judge* men to some extent *before the day of judgment"* (R 1345).

59. Theological reasoning. Suarez states it with these words: "It was fitting that sins committed before Baptism should be forgiven in a very different way than sins committed after it. For. those sins were committed before the enlightenment of faith, and therefore in some way they have an excuse, and for this reason pardon for them is granted more easily. But the sins committed after Baptism. are more grave, and so they require a stronger medicine. and therefore the remedy for these sins had to be instituted by way of a just judgment. Also, this was necessary lest an occasion of sinning might seem to be given to Christian men because of the ready access to forgiveness. Therefore the power for remitting these sins is a judicial power."[7]

60. Objections. 1. Judicial power is that which is ordained to absolve the innocent and condemn the guilty. But the power of forgiving sins is ordained to absolve the guilty, but not to condemn them. Therefore the power of forgiving sins cannot be judicial.

I distinguish the major. Civil judicial power in criminal cases is ordained to absolve the innocent and condemn the guilty, *conceded;* any and all judicial power, even civil judicial power, or also the power of forgiving sins, so that this is of the essence of judicial power, *denied.*

I explain. As we already said above, the power of forgiving sins, since it involves the essential qualities of judicial power, must be said to be truly judicial; however, it differs in many way from civil judgments in criminal cases, namely, in its *purpose, manner, minister,* etc. Therefore, the power of forgiving sins differs above all from civil criminal power as to its *purpose;* for, the latter is given really in order to condemn the guilty and absolve the innocent, whereas the former is given in order to absolve and justify sinners.

2. It is of the essence of judicial power that it be twofold, that is, that it have two positive outcomes (to absolve—to condemn). But the power of forgiving sins has only one positive outcome, namely, to absolve. Therefore the power of forgiving sins is not a judiciary power.

I deny the minor. For this power is to forgive or to retain sins. But, according to what has been said, not only to forgive but also to retain are positive acts.

3. A positive act has a positive effect. But in the retention of sins is not a positive effect. Therefore the retention of sins is not a positive act.

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6. *In Isaiam* hom.5,1: MG 56,130f.
7. *De paenitentia* disp.16 s.1 n.11. See J. Ternus, *Die sakramentale Lossprechung als richterlicher Akt:* ZkathTh 71 (1949) 214-230.

I distinguish the major. A positive act has a positive effect, either *physical* or *juridical, conceded;* precisely *physical, I subdistinguish:* if it is dealing with juridical things, *denied;* but if with other things, *I bypass the major. I also distinguish the minor.* In the retention of sins there is no positive physical effect, as there is in forgiveness by the infusion of sanctifying grace, *conceded;* there is no positive juridical effect, *denied.*

4. The positive juridical effect of the retaining of sins would be the obligation of submitting the sins to the keys. But this obligation is already present, before the sinner approaches the tribunal of penance. Therefore the retention of sins does not produce any new positive juridical effect.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. It was present, but the obligation of submitting the sins to the keys is confirmed anew, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.*

I explain. In virtue of the sentence of retention, the penitent remains guilty of his sin and of undergoing its punishment, with the obligation of again submitting the sins to the keys; that is the case, even if the penitent being properly disposed goes to confession, and the priest denied him absolution our of malice or ignorance. But this sentence is considered valid in heaven, so that the sinner continues to be held in the eyes of God as an enemy, unless perhaps an act of perfect contrition preceded his confession. Moreover, note that the penitential tribunal is a tribunal at the same time both of *appellation* and of *reconciliation.* Therefore, it is not required that in each and every act some new punishment is imposed, but it suffices that what God inflicted because of the sin be retained in an authoritative way. Even in civil cases, when someone approaches a higher court in order to be freed from a punishment imposed by a lower court, if he is rejected, a true judgment is really present, even though nothing new is imposed, but the decision of the lower court is upheld.

61. 5. Also the one to whom Baptism is denied has an obligation to once again ask for the sacrament of regeneration. But from this it does not follow that Baptism is a judicial act. Therefore, neither is the power of forgiving sins, or of retaining them, a judicial act.

I deny the parity. For that obligation of receiving Baptism is not to the Church, to which the one seeking Baptism does not yet belong, but only to God. Moreover, he can be freed from this obligation by anyone, even though he is not a subject of the Church; for, the minister of Baptism, at least in a case of necessity, is any man or woman. But with respect to the power of forgiving and retaining sins, the situation is much different. For, that obligation concerns the Church, and it can be resolved only by a legitimate minister.

6. Also in order to confer Baptism, a judgment about the necessary disposition of the candidate must be made, but Baptism is not a judicial act. Therefore likewise the same thing must be said about the power of forgiving and retaining sins.

I deny the parity. For, that judgment is a judgment or previous deliberation either to exercise or not to exercise the gracious power of Baptism; but no jurisdiction is exercised there, since the one to be baptized is not yet a subject of the Church. The situation is very different regarding the power of forgiving and retaining sins, which is truly an

act of jurisdiction.

7. The absolution of sins, which the priest imparts, is the dispensation of a benefit, not his own but God's. But the dispensation of the benefit of another cannot be a judicial act. Therefore, the absolution of sins is not a judicial act.

I distinguish the major. The absolution of sins is a pure dispensation of the benefit of another, *denied;* it is a dispensation whereby a priest, as a judge, gives a true decision, *conceded. I also distinguish the minor.* A pure dispensation, *conceded;* a judicial dispensation, *denied.* Trent expresses this idea beautifully: "It is true that priestly absolution is the dispensation of another's bounty; yet, it does not consist in the mere ministry of proclaiming the Gospel or of declaring that the sins have been forgiven, but it has the pattern of a judicial act in which the priest pronounces sentence as a judge" (D 1685).

8. In the Old Law the remission of sins did not happen judiciously. Therefore not in the New Law. For, otherwise the forgiveness of sins in the New Law would be more difficult than in the Old Law, since the New Law is the law of grace.

I concede the antecedent; I deny the consequent and its proof. For, in the Old Law there was no forgiveness of sins without being preceded by perfect contrition. Actually, in the New Law attrition suffices as the necessary disposition for sacramental absolution. Moreover, Trent said rightly: "The difficulty of this kind of confession and the shame at uncovering sins could seem to be burdensome were it not lightened by so many advantages and consolations" (D 1682).

ARTICLE IV

ON THE EXISTENCE OF SACRAMENTAL CONFESSION

62. After we have acknowledged in the preceding articles that Christ the Lord conferred on the hierarchical Church the power of forgiving sins, and that it is universal, and to be exercised in a judicial way, from that is deduced, by way of a corollary, the sacramental character of penance. For the existence of the sacrament of Penance is nothing other than that the power was so granted by Christ that it should be dispensed by a sensible rite, to continue perpetually, which would be at the same time both signifying and conferring sanctifying grace. But by that very fact it turns out to be a new sacrament distinct from Baptism.

Thesis 6. Therefore the sacrament of Penance exists and it is distinct from Baptism.

S.Th. III, q. 84. A. 1; Galtier, 330-333; Lercher-Lakner, 536-539; Puig, 590-599.

63. Adversaries. 1. *The early Protestants* deny that penance is a special sacrament, distinct from Baptism. Thus Luther: "The sacrament of penance, which is listed with these two, lacks a visible sign and divine institution, and I said it is nothing other than the way and return to baptism."[1]

2. Among *recent Protestants* there is a great deal of confusion whether penance is a divine institution or a human one.

3. *Modernists* say that penance is a human institution; therefore they deny its sacramental reality (D 3446f.).

4. Also certain *canonists* (like Rufinus, Ioannes Faventius and Ioannes Teutonicus) and *some theologians* (like Abelard and Robertus de Flamesbury) held that private penance is not a sacrament.[2]

64. Doctrine of the Church. Against the Reformers Trent defined in sess.7 cn.1 (D 1584): "If anyone says.that penance. is not truly and properly a sacrament, let him be anathema." And sess.14 cn.1 (D 1701): "If anyone says that in the Catholic Church penance is not truly and properly a sacrament for the faithful. let him be anathema." And we find the same thing in sess.14 cn.2 (D 1702): "If anyone confuses the sacraments and says that baptism itself is the sacrament of penance, as though these two

1. *De Captivitate Babylonica: Opera* (ed. Weimar) 6,501. See A. Michel, *Pénitence:* DTC 12,1053-1066.
2. P. Schmoll has proved this, *Die Busslehre der Frühscholastik* (Munich 1909).

sacraments were not distinct. let him be anathema."

Against other heretics or errors, very often the very same truth was taught by the Church. *The Council of Verona,* against the Albigensians (D 761), said: "All those who. concerning the confession of sins. or the other sacrament of the Church have no fear of thinking or teaching otherwise than the holy Roman Church preaches and observes., we bind by the same bond of perpetual anathema." Innocent III against the Waldensians, enumerating the various sacraments (D 793-794): "To sinners truly repentant, we believe that forgiveness is granted by God, and with them we communicate most gladly." *Lyons II* in the profession of faith of Michael Paleologus (D 860): "The same holy Roman Church also holds and teaches that there are seven sacraments. Another is penance." *Florence in its decree for the Armenians* (D 1323): "The fourth sacrament is penance."

Theological note. That penance is both a sacrament and different from baptism is a truth that is *defined divine and Catholic faith.*

65. Argument. 1. *Penance is a sacrament.* From what we have proved, Christ conferred on the hierarchical Church the power of forgiving all sins committed after Baptism, and it is done in a judicial way. But the exercise of this judicial power is a sensible rite, signifying and conferring grace, and it continues perennially. Therefore Penance is a true sacrament.

The major is certain from the previous theses.

The minor. a) *A sensible rite,* because a true judgment cannot stand without some external sign of a penitent and a minister. b) *Signifying grace,* for the sentence is expressed by a true absolution; however, the absolution or remission of sins does not take place except by the infusion of grace; therefore this rite signifies grace. c) *Conferring grace,* for it confers a true remission of sins, which is had only by the infusion of grace. d) *Continuing perennially,* for it must continue as long as there are sinners, and they will always be there as long as the Church lasts.

66. 2. *Penance is a sacrament distinct from Baptism:* For these two in many ways differ from each other—in their *matter* and *form, in their fruits and by reason of a judgment.* Thus Trent said in sess.14 ch.2 (D 1671-1672): "Besides, it is clear that this sacrament differs in many ways from baptism. Apart from the fact that it differs widely in matter and form, which constitute the essence of a sacrament, it is beyond question that the minister of baptism need not be a judge since the Church does not exercise judgment on anyone who has not first entered her through the gate

of baptism. It is otherwise with those who are of the household of the faith, whom Christ the Lord has once made members of his body. Moreover, the effect of baptism is different from that of penance. For by baptism we "put on Christ" and are made an entirely new creature in him, receiving full and integral remission of all sins. To this newness and integrity, however, we are by no means able to arrive by the sacrament of penance without many tears and labors on our part, as divine justice demands."[3]

67. Objections. 1. From John 20:21: *As the Father has sent me, even so I send you.* Hence it follows that the Apostles must forgive sins in the same way as Christ did. But Christ forgave sins without a sacramental rite. Therefore the Apostles too must forgive sins without a sacramental rite.

I distinguish the major. The Apostles must forgive sins in the same way as Christ, unless a difference is proved, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied. I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* For two reasons it is certain that there is a difference. *First,* because Christ enjoyed a power of excellence, which the Apostles lacked. *Next,* because we have positively demonstrated that Christ willed that the forgiveness of sins should be conferred by the Church through a sacramental rite.

2. From St. Augustine: "By this laver of regeneration and word of sanctification all the evils of regenerate men of whatever kind are cleansed and healed—not the sins only which are now all remitted in baptism, but those also which after baptism are committed by human ignorance and frailty; not, indeed, that baptism is to be repeated as often as sin is repeated, but that by its one only ministration it comes to pass that pardon is secured to the faithful of all their sins both before and after their regeneration" (R 1874). Therefore, according to St. Augustine, sins committed after baptism are also forgiven by the sacrament of baptism.

I respond that St. Augustine with those words intended to say this one thing—that penance is not effective without baptism. For, he goes on further to say: "For what benefit would there be either in penance before baptism, unless baptism followed, or afterwards unless penance preceded it?" Moreover, St. Augustine clearly distinguished penance from baptism when he wrote: "If it was done by a catechumen [homicide], it is washed away by baptism; and if by a baptized person, he is healed by penance and reconciliation" (R 1864). "As baptism cannot be repeated, that is not the case with the imposition of hands" (R 1627).

3. From Calvin: Baptism is not destroyed by sins committed after baptism. Therefore, the sacrament of penance is superfluous in order to forgive sins committed after

3. An argument from tradition, paying attention to the special nature and history of public penance, was made by Lercher-Lakner, 538f, Much about the difference between baptism and penance among the Fathers and the early Church authors has been written: K. Rahner, *Sünde als Gnadenverlust in der frühchristlichen Litteratur:* ZkathTh 60 (1936) 439-501; J. Stufler, *Die verschiedenen Wirkungen der Taufe und Busse nach Tertullian:* ZkathTh 31 (1937) 372-6; B. Poschmann, *Paenitentia secunda* 159.239.247.285.398.427. F. Créteur wrote about the same difference according to the mind of St. Thomas, *Nature du sacrement de pénitence selon Saint Thomas:* AnTh 7 (1946) 454-460.

baptism, since these can be removed by baptism itself.[4]

I distinguish the antecedent. Baptism in itself is not destroyed, *I deny the supposition,* as if baptism were a permanently functioning sacrament; it is not destroyed in its effects, *I subdistinguish:* regarding grace, *denied;* regarding the character, which however the Reformers deny, *conceded.*

68. Scholium. *The word "sacrament"—at what time it is used for penance.* When St. Pacian is dealing with the power of forgiving sins, he says that "both the loosing of chains and the power of a sacrament" were given to priests (R 1244). In St. Augustine "sacrament" occurs concerning reconciliation and the action of penance[5]; and concerning the imposition of hands by a prelate, as a sign of our contrition.[6] The sinner is also said by him "to accept the manner of his satisfaction from the overseer of the sacraments."[7]

The *Liber Ordinum* of the Spanish church twice says that penance is "the sacrament of reconciliation,"[8] which it then opposes to baptism.[9] St. Peter Damian speaks about "the sacrament of confession"[10]; Nicolaus Claraevallensis also repeats this.[11]

In a meaning that is still not clearly defined, it is called by Lanfranc[12] the forgiveness of sins among "the four ecclesiastical sacraments," which are in addition to it faith, baptism, and the consecration of the Lord's Body and Blood. Algerus Laodiensis,[13] now in a much more proper sense, speaks about penance as being among the sacraments, that is, baptism, confirmation, eucharist and orders. From this time, namely at the beginning of the twelfth century, this designation became common.

But from this time the sacrament of penance frequently was also referred to by other names. Thus, it is simply called penance, or confession; just as in the age of the Fathers it was called reconciliation, the imposition of hands, the action of penitence, satisfaction; and other similar names were also used.

4. *Institution Chrétien* 4,19. See St. Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 1,14.
5. *Epistola* 228.8: ML 33,1016.
6. *Ennarationes in Psalmos* 156.8: ML 37,1903f.
7. *Sermo* 351,9: ML 39,1545.
8. *Liber Ordinum* (ed. Férotin) 92,104.
9. *Liber Ordinum* (ed. Férotin) 94,357. See S. González, *La penitencia en la primitiva Iglesia española* 157-160.
10. *Sermo* 58: ML 144,824.
11. *Sermo* 99 (among the sermons of St. Peter Damian): ML 144,901.
12. *.De celanda confessione:* ML 150,625f.
13. *De misericordia er iustitia* p.3 ch.65: ML 180,886. See *ibid.,* 879-887

CHAPTER II

On the necessity of the sacrament of penance

69. Trent in sess.14 ch.2 (D 1671-1672), immediately after stating the existence of the sacrament of penance, and its distinction from the sacrament of baptism, goes on to say: "This sacrament of penance is necessary for salvation for those who have fallen after baptism, just as baptism itself is for those who have not yet been regenerated."

Therefore, before the Council begins to explain the essence and fruits of the sacrament of penance, it established its necessity. Therefore, it is necessary for us now to speak about the necessity of the sacrament of penance. But we are speaking about the sacrament of penance in general. For, we are not yet treating the necessity of the confession of sinners, or of any other act of the penitent.

Therefore, there is a question whether this penitential way, instituted by Christ the Lord to obtain the remission of sins, *is optional or necessary.* But if it is necessary, again it is asked whether this necessity comes *from the will of Christ, or from a precept of the Church.*

We assert both claims: Both that the sacrament of penance is necessary for the forgiveness of sins committed after baptism, and that this comes from the will of Christ.

Therefore, the necessity of the sacrament of penance was imposed by Christ himself. But we grant that the Church can make this necessity more known, and determine it by the annual confession, although at the same time we defend the view that this necessity, imposed by Christ himself, was always sufficiently known in the Church.

Thesis 7. By the institution of Christ the sacrament of penance, received actually or in desire, is the absolutely necessary means to obtain the forgiveness of mortal sins committed after baptism.

S.Th. III, q. 84, a. 5f.; Galtier, 334-362; Lercher-Lakner, 521-526; Puig, 613-624.

70. Definition of terms. *Necessary with a necessity of means* says two things: A positive *movement* to the end, and its *necessity*, so that without it the end cannot be obtained. This is easy to understand if it is compared with the binding necessity of a precept.

For, *to be necessary with the necessity of a precept* is said to be that which is necessary for salvation only because it is commanded, but not because it

is the only way of salvation. Therefore what is it? This kind of necessity is necessary in such wise that, if someone does not carry out such a precept, he will sin mortally, and this sin will be an obstacle to his salvation.

However, to be necessary with a necessity of means can be either *actually necessary,* or *necessary actually or in desire.*

To be necessary actually is present when it cannot be supplied for by something else. Such is sanctifying grace in relation to salvation.

To be necessary actually or in desire, that is, what can be supplied for by another, in which is contained, at least implicitly, the desire of that which is said to be necessary. Thus the sacrament of penance can be supplied for by an act of perfect charity; but that charity, if it is true, always includes the will to do everything that God established as necessary. Therefore, even before the reception of the sacrament of penance, perfect charity always justifies, but the obligation remains of submitting the sins to the keys. But if afterwards the sinner refuses to go to confession, this will signify, either that his desire was not serious, or that it has been retracted. Therefore in the hypothesis of a serious desire, the sins were truly forgiven through charity; but if the penitent refuses to receive the sacrament, he would sin again, because he did not want to fulfill a grave obligation.[1]

Concerning this necessity of means, one is conceived as flowing *from the nature of things and the other from the positive will of Christ.* Indeed, the necessity we are considering now does not come from the nature of things, but form the will of Christ who determined it to be such: *from the institution of Christ.*[2]

71. Adversaries. 1. *Protestants,* both old and contemporary, inasmuch as by denying the existence of the sacrament thereby they also reject its necessity.

2. *Many contemporary non-Catholic historians of dogma* hold that the necessity of this sacrament a) was unknown to the Church for many centuries;

1. In theology many things are said to be necessary, as a means of salvation; this seems to be opposed to a necessary means, namely, that there is only one way of salvation. For this reason *entrance into the Church, baptism, the act of faith in adults not yet justified, the sacrament of penance* are said to be necessary. However, it should be observed that these are not said to be necessary means in the same order, but some are subordinated to others. Therefore, there is only one thing that is absolutely and simply necessary for salvation: *The state of sanctifying grace at the moment of death.* The other things are means to obtain this sanctifying grace, different depending on the different circumstances in which a man finds himself.

   A. *For those not yet justified:* 1) If they are adults, an act of faith is required, as the disposition for baptism. 2) For all, whether adults or infants, baptism is demanded, whereby a man is justified by the infusion of sanctifying grace, and incorporated into Christ in the Church.

   B. *For those already justified by baptism,* if they again fall into sin, the sacrament of penance is available as the only way to recuperate sanctifying grace.

2. There is more about this concept in A. Landgraf, *Das sacramentum in voto in der Frühscholastik:* Mélanges Mandonnet (Paris 1930) 2,97-143; J.A. Aldama, S.J., *La necessidad de medio en la escolástica postridentina:* ArchTG 8 (1945) 57-84.

b) but that modern Catholic doctrine began under the influence of monks who introduced frequent confession; c) that the Church approved this praxis in the thirteenth century, when Lateran IV decreed a new law of annual confession (D 812).

3. *Modernists* embraced this same doctrine (D 3446).

The arguments on which the adversaries rely are mainly these: a) in antiquity only the capital sins were submitted to the keys, and it was done publicly; b) there is silence about the use and frequency of this sacrament in the ancient Church; c) crimes were forgiven to major clerics without any ecclesiastical penance; d) the disagreement among the Scholastics in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, both about the necessity of confession and about the law of this necessity.[3]

Now it is necessary for us to respond to all of these points; we will do it by explaining *the argument from tradition,* and in the scholium.

72. Doctrine of the Church. A. *The necessity of the sacrament of penance:*

Trent in sess.14 ch.2 (D 1671-1672) compares the necessity of the sacrament of penance with the necessity of the sacrament of baptism (see D 1618, 1524); sess.6 cn.29 (D 1579) defined that lost justice cannot be recovered without the sacrament of penance; sess.6 ch.14 (D 1543) declares that this necessity consists in the reception or the desire of the sacrament.

B. *From the institution of Christ:*

Trent itself in sess.14 cn.6 (D 1706) defines that the necessity of sacramental confession, and therefore of the sacrament itself, comes from the divine law.

C. *From the words of institution:* The same *Council of Trent* in sess.14 ch.5 (D 1679-1681) teaches that it is certain from the words themselves of institution that confession is necessary by divine law; and therefore accordingly the necessity of the sacrament of penance is also certain. Hence, the necessity of the sacrament of penance by divine law is proved either from the words alone of John 20:23, or at least with the added explanatory tradition of the Church. However, it must be admitted that this necessity is not contained there as explicitly as the necessity of baptism in John 3:5 is contained there.[4]

73. Theological note. 1. The necessity of the sacrament of penance for sinners after baptism, by divine law or by the institution of Christ, is a truth that is *defined divine and Catholic faith* according to Trent in sess.14 cn.6 (D1706).

2. That this necessity is a necessity of means, is *at least theologically*

3. See Galtier, *De paenitentia* 334.

4. The opinion of the theologians who said that the necessity of the sacrament of penance is not proved by John 20:23 unless new elements are added from tradition (see Scotus, *In 4* d.17 q.un; Cajetan, *In Io* 20; G. Biel, *In 4* d.17 q.1 a.1) cannot be maintained after Trent. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.17 s.2 n.5f.

certain. Trent did not teach that explicitly, but it is easily deduced, both from the positive influence of penance with respect to justification and from the necessity of the same (D 1701 and 1706).

3. But that there is a necessity of means to receive the sacrament or to desire it, is clearly supposed by Trent in sess.6 ch.14 (D 1542-1543). Therefore *it is theologically certain.*

74. Proof from Holy Scripture. *Note:* 1) according to Trent in sess.14 ch.5 (D 1679-1681) the argument is drawn from the words of institution in John 20:23.

2. But we develop our argument so that *first* we prove in general the necessity of the sacrament of penance from the divine law; *next*, we show that this necessity is a necessity of means, not only of precept; and *finally,* we say that this necessity is replaceable, or it is a necessity of means by either actually receiving or desiring the sacrament (*in re or in voto*).

Argument: 1. *The necessity of the sacrament of penance is proved from the institution of Christ,* from the power of retaining sins committed after baptism, which Christ conferred on the Church in John 20:23f.: *whose sins you shall retain, they are retained.* From the words of Christ, the hierarchical Church can retain all sins so that they are also retained by God. But this power of retaining argues in favor of the necessity of submitting all post-baptismal sins to this sacrament. Therefore the sacrament of penance is necessary to obtain the remission of sins committed after baptism because of its institution by Christ.

The major is clear from the words of Christ.

The minor. a) *For sins once submitted to this sacrament,* there must be only one way of remission; for otherwise the power of retaining, given to the Church by Christ, would become scornful.

b) *But also there must be for all sins* only one way of remission, and therefore *even before the sins are submitted to the keys.* For otherwise Christ would have acted unwisely by conferring in such a solemn way the power of retaining sins, which no one would make use of, unless it were the only way of remission. For, this way is both more difficult than other ways (v.gr., perfect contrition), and sins once submitted to it cannot be remitted in any other way. Therefore Christ, if he seriously conferred the power of retaining sins, necessarily had to establish this way as the only way of remission of post-baptismal sins.[5]

2. *The necessity of means is proved* from the twofold constitutive element of a necessity of means: For, 1) the sacrament of penance is the *cause of justification,* for in a causal way it pours grace into those who have fallen into sin after baptism (theses 1-4); 2) in fact for them it is *the only cause of*

5. You will find a more detailed explanation of this argument in Galtier, 341-345.

justification, as we just proved in 1 above.

3. *The necessity of receiving the sacrament actually or by desire is proved* because it is certain from another direction that contrition with perfect charity remits sins, even before the reception of the sacrament. Therefore this sacrament of penance cannot be said to be necessary always in its actual reception. But the *question* here is whether charity and the sacrament are two independent ways for the remission of sins, or whether one has a relation to the other. The *response* to this is clear from our proof. For, if the sacrament of penance is the necessary means for sinners after baptism for the same reason that baptism is necessary for all, it is evident that in the New Law charity includes some relation to the sacrament itself, without which the sin cannot be forgiven. But this relation is called *an implicit desire* for the sacrament, for an *explicit* desire is not required. Therefore, the desire is charity itself, as it were something vicarious of the sacrament, inasmuch as it includes an intrinsic relation to it, and contains the will or desire of receiving the sacrament, when it becomes possible.[6]

75. Proof from tradition. For many reasons it is certain that the Church held both theoretically and practically the doctrine about the necessity of the sacrament of penance. Here are the main points:

1. *The holy Fathers* introduce the sacrament of penance as the unique remedy after baptism. This is clear, both because they call the sacrament of penance "the second plank after shipwreck,"[7] and from their clear statements without using any metaphors. Thus, St. Leo the Great, writing about forgiveness obtained through the sacrament of Penance, says: "The forgiveness of God cannot be obtained except through the supplications of priests" (D 308).

2. The faithful are exhorted to overcome their feeling of shame in confessing their sins, lest otherwise they perish. Listen to Tertullian: "I presume that most men shun this work from day to day, as it is a public exposure of themselves, being more concerned for their shame than for their salvation. That is, if we do hide something from the knowledge of man, shall we equally conceal it from God?. Is it better to be damned in secret than absolved in public?. If you shrink back from confession, consider in your heart hell." (R 316f.). And Aphraates: "But if someone is ashamed, he cannot be healed, since he does not wish to show his wounds to the doctor." (R 685). And St. Ambrose: "If you wish to be justified, confess your sins. For a shamefaced confession of sins looses the bands of transgression." (R 1299). And St. Jerome: "For if a sick man is

6. See J.A. de Aldama, *La necesidad de medio.*: ArchTG 8 (1945) 57-84.
7. This metaphor is used by Tertullian, *De paenitentia* 7,9,12 (R 314f.); St. Jerome, *Epistola* 130,9: *In Isaiam* 2,3,56; St. Pacian, *Epistola* 1,5. See *Trent* sess.6 ch.14 (D 1542); S.Th. III, q. 84, a. 6.

ashamed to show his wounds to the doctor, what the doctor does not know he cannot cure" (R 1375). St. Pacian speaks in a similar way.[8]

3. Under the image of the resurrected Lazarus they urge the necessary approach to the ministers of the Church. We quoted in n.20 the words of St. Augustine and some other Fathers on this point.

4. They say that the Montanists and Novatians are cruel, hard-hearted and merciless. Therefore, they suppose that this way is necessary; for otherwise, if there were another way of forgiveness, there is no reason why they should be thought to be so cruel. See v.gr., St. Innocent I: "It was decided that communion be given to the departing. that we may not seem to follow the harshness and the rigor of the Novatianist heretic who refused mercy" (D 212).

5. *The solicitude of the Church* about giving absolution to those in danger of death is an argument for its necessity; for, this would not make sense, if there were another way of salvation. See the *Council of Nicaea I* (D 129), St. Innocent I (D 212), St. Celestine I (D 236).

76. Therefore, from the earliest times the Church acknowledged that the sacrament of penance is a necessary means for the forgiveness of post-baptismal sins. Hence it is false:

a) *That only the capital sins, and in fact the public ones, were submitted to the keys.* For, the Fathers openly speak about manifesting also secret thoughts and desires (St. Pacian); about overcoming the sense of shame, which is not present in the sinners and sins that are already known by everyone (Tertullian, Aphraates, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Pacian), etc.

b) *That there was a great silence about the use of this sacrament in the primitive Church.* For, what has been presented in this and in the previous theses shows that such a silence did not exist.[9]

c) *That penance was not given to major clerics.* For, elsewhere we have said (n. 51) that public penance was denied to them, but not private penance.

d) We will consider *the disagreement among the Scholastics* in the scholium.

77. Objections. Origen says: "Listen, now, how many remissions of sins are to be found in the Gospels. The first one is that by which we are baptized for the remission of sins. The second remission is in the passion of the martyrs. The third is for giving alms. The fourth remission of sins for us comes from this, that we forgive the sins of our brothers. The fifth remission of sin is when someone converts a sinner from the errors of his way. There is also a sixth remission through an abundance of charity. And there is still a seventh, although it is difficult and painful, namely, the remission of sins through

8. *Paraenesis ad paenitentiam* 8: ML 13,1086.
9. For more on this see Galtier, *De paenitentia* 346-357.

penance." (R 493). Therefore, Origen thinks there are many ways to obtain the forgiveness of sins; among them, in the seventh place, penance is mentioned. Therefore, the sacrament of penance cannot be said to be the only way of salvation for those who have sinned gravely after baptism, and therefore it is not necessary.

I respond that Origen is speaking about the remission of all kinds of sin, grave or venial. Moreover, the purpose of Origen was to show that there are not fewer remissions in the New Law than in the Old; therefore he mentions all the ways by which in one way or another sins are remitted.[10] However, just as, by including baptism among these kinds of remissions, he does not intend to deny its necessity, so also he does not reject the necessity of penance. Moreover, he hints at this necessity in the following homily in the same book of Leviticus: "If we accuse ourselves, it helps us attain salvation; but if we expect that we will be accused by the devil, that accusation will be for us a punishment; for he will have companions in hell, whom he will have convicted as companions in crime" (R 494).

2. Nectarius, the bishop of Constantinople (381-397), abrogated every penitential institute.[11] Therefore he did not know about the necessity of penance.

I respond that Nectarius did not abrogate every penitential institute, but only the office of the penitential priest. Of course, by this abrogation the reason for the relaxation of penitential discipline is made sufficiently clear, and that is what Socrates and Sozomenus were complaining about. For, given the absence of the penitential priest, the one who hears spontaneous confessions was no longer available, and it was to him that public sinners were sent. Moreover, since at that time there was no precept concerning an annual confession and about the forgiveness of mortal sins by sacramental absolution before receiving holy Communion, each person approached penance when he wanted to, or just simply omitted it. Therefore, the abrogation of the office of the penitential priest is not a valid argument for ignorance of the necessity of penance. For, since this necessity was recognized, that particular office was abrogated for other reasons, which those historians refer to and explain.

3. St. John Chrysostom, in his homilies *on penance,* mentions five ways of doing penance, namely, confession of sin in the assembly like David, tears like Ahab, humility like the publican in the temple, alms and prayer.[12] Therefore he did not think that ecclesiastical penance was necessary.

I respond that Chrysostom was not preaching about grave sins, but about all types of sin, even the smallest, which can be atoned for in all of these ways. Therefore, he says that these sins can be atoned for in all these ways, but he does not deny the necessity of sacramental penance for grave sins. In addition, when we consider the necessity of confession we will come back to the mind of Chrysostom on this matter.

78. 4. Sins can be remitted by perfect contrition. Therefore the sacrament of penance is not necessary.

10. Cassian speaks in a similar way, *Collationes* 20,8: ML 49,1154-1165.
11. See Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 5,19: MG 67,615; Sozomenus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 7,16: ML 67,1458; St. Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 3,14; Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.17 s.2 n.30; Galtier, *De paenitentia* 360-362; L. Roy, *Note sur l'incident de Nectaire et de son prêtre pénitencier:* ScEccl 1 (1948) 217-221.
12. *De paenitentia* hom.3: MG 49,285-297.

I distinguish the antecedent. Sins can be remitted by a perfect contrition which includes the desire for sacramental penance, *conceded;* which does not include this desire, *denied. I distinguish the consequent.* Therefore the sacrament is not necessary actually (*in re*), *conceded;* actually or in desire (*in re vel in voto*), *denied.*

5. Venial sins are also remitted by the sacrament of penance. But with respect to venial sins it is not necessary. Therefore it is not necessary with respect to mortal sins.

I concede the major and minor. But I deny the parity, since venial sins do not constitute the necessary matter of the sacrament of penance. For, this power was given primarily to forgive or to retain mortal sins; but it is also extended to venial sins, which, however, as we heard Origen and St. Chrysostom say, can be forgiven in many other ways.

6. Venial sins, when absolution is denied, can be retained. But then it does not follow that it is necessary to submit them again to the keys. Therefore, from the power of retaining the necessity of the sacrament of penance does not follow.

I distinguish the major. Venial sins can be retained improperly, *conceded;* they can be retained properly, *denied. I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* From the power of retaining, taken improperly, the necessity of the sacrament of penance does not follow, *conceded;* from the power of retaining, taken properly, *denied.*

Therefore, venial sins cannot properly be retained, because they are not the necessary matter of the sacrament of penance. However, they can be said to be retained in an improper sense, inasmuch as the great fruit of sacramental absolution is denied to them. Hence the power granted by Christ is surely in order to forgive and to retain; but it is exercised according to the nature of the sins that are submitted to that power.

7. The asserted necessity of the sacrament of penance makes the forgiveness of sins in the New Law more difficult than it was in the O.T. Therefore it must be rejected, since the Law under which we now live is a Law of grace.

I deny the antecedent. For, in the New Law attrition is sufficient for the remission of sins by the sacrament of penance, since in the Old Law contrition was always demanded, which is more difficult to have than attrition. Moreover, this difficulty of confession often is made lighter by its many advantages and consolations (D 1682).

79. Scholium. *On the disagreement of the early Scholastics.* The disagreement among the early Scholastics too three forms: a) About the act in which properly the forgiveness of sins takes place; b) on the proper effect of the priestly absolution; c) about the law according to which one must approach the sacrament of penance. The first two are closely related, and assail the necessity of the sacrament of penance; but the third one supposes the necessity of the sacrament of penance, but only disagrees concerning the law on which the necessity is based.

a) *About the act in which the forgiveness of sins takes place,* theologians have had different opinions. For some, like St. Anselm, Abelard and his disciples, and also Peter Lombard, held that sins are forgiven by God alone in the contrition[13]; but others, espe-

13. St. Anselm, *Hom.*13: ML 158,662; Abelard, *Serm.*8: ML 178,440-443; Roland, *Sententiae* (ed. Gietl) 248; Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 4 d.17.

cially St. Thomas (III, q. 84, a. 1-7) and Scotus[14] taught that *the priestly absolution* is ordained to the remission of sins, so that, if sometimes they have already been forgiven by contrition, that does not happen per se and necessarily. Gratian mentions this controversy in his *Decretum* q.2 cause 33. We already spoke about this in n. 21.

b) *On the proper effect of absolution* there were different opinions; this came both from a defect of knowledge of the true causality of the sacraments, and from the difficulty of properly understanding some statements of the Fathers. Thus 1) St. Anselm[15] said that the priestly absolution manifests authentically the forgiveness of sins; Hugo of St. Victor[16] argued that the absolution remits eternal damnation; 3) Peter Lombard and Roland[17] taught that the absolution manifests authentically the forgiveness of the guilt, and remits part of the temporal punishment. St. Albert the Great, Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure[18] agree with this last two-sided opinion with regard to the remission of punishment; 4) Richard of St. Victor[19] thought that the absolution definitively remits the eternal punishment, which God before that did not remit because of the contrition, unless it were under the condition of receiving absolution, and also part of the temporal punishment; 5) St. Thomas and Scotus, as we said above, transmit the true doctrine about the proper efficacy of absolution, since they say that it is ordained for the remission of sins with regard to the guilt.

c) *About the law according to which one must approach the sacrament of penance* there were two opinions, one claiming it is a divine law, the other that it is ecclesiastical. However, they differ from each other more in the way of speaking than in the reality. For, even those who support an ecclesiastical law, defend it from the power given to the Apostles of forgiving sins, or from the apostolic precept. Therefore, Abelard, R. Pullus, Hugo of St. Victor, Alexander of Hales and St. Bonaventure say it is an *ecclesiastical law*[20]; while on the contrary St. Thomas and Scotus[21] admitted a *divine law,* without however conceding that this necessity can be demonstrated from the words themselves of the institution. However, Trent openly taught this in sess.14 ch.5 (D 1679-1681), after having added to it the interpretation of the Fathers: "From the institution of the sacrament of penance as already explained, the whole Church has always understood that the complete confession of sins was also instituted by the Lord and is by divine law necessary for all who have fallen after baptism."

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14. Scotus, *In 4* d.14 q.4 n.6-11.
15. *Homilia* 13: ML 158,662.
16. *De sacramentis* 1.2 p.14 c.8: ML 176,565. Similarly in the *Summa Sententiarum* tr.6 c.11: ML 176,147ff.
17. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 4 d.18; Roland, *Sententiae* (ed. Gietl) 247f.
18. St. Albert the Great, *In 4* d.18 a.1-10; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.4 q.20-21; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.17-18.
19. Richard of St. Victor, *De potestate ligandi et solvendi* c.8 and 12: ML 196,1165 and 1168. There is more on these opinions of the theologians in A. Vacant, *Absolution:* DTC 1,175-191; A. Debil: RevHistEccl 15 (1914) 442-455.
20. Abelard, *Epitome Theologiae* 36: ML 178,1756f.; R. Pullus, *Sententiae* 6,59: ML 186,908; Hugo of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* 1,2 p.14 c.1: ML 176,552; Alexander of Hales, *Summa* p.4 q.18 m.3 a.2; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.17 p.11 a.2 q.1
21. S.Th., *In 4* d.17 q.3 a.1; *Suppl.* q.6 a.1-2; Scotus, *In 4* d.17 q.un. On this pointr useful material will be found in J. Gartmeier, *Die Beichtpflicht* (1905); P. Browe, *Die Pflichtbeichte im Mittelalter:* ZkathTh 57 (1933) 335f.

CHAPTER III

On the parts of the sacrament of penance

80. An investigation of the nature or essence follows the proved existence and necessity of the sacrament of penance, by inquiring into what the nature is of the sensible rite whereby this singular judgment has its effect. Trent covers this matter in sess.14, first *in a general way* in ch. 3, by designating the quasi matter and form of this sacrament; but then in ch. 4-5 and 8-9, by explaining *in particular* the individual acts out of which that quasi matter coalesces, namely, contrition, confession and satisfaction. Therefore, it is necessary for us to speak first of all in *article 1* about the parts of the sacrament of penance in general; and afterwards, *in the following articles*, about the individual acts of the penitent in particular.

ARTICLE I

ON THE PARTS OF PENANCE IN GENERAL

81. Like the other sacraments, so also the sacrament of penance is composed of two elements, matter and form. The words of absolution are the form; but the acts of the penitent are the matter, that is, contrition, confession and satisfaction. Now since the matter of this sacrament is not some material thing, like, v.gr., water in baptism or chrism in confirmation, but the acts of the penitent, it is customarily called the *quasi matter.* Two points therefore must be treated singly: the *quasi matter* of the sacrament of penance, and its *form.*

Therefore, concerning the matter, or the quasi matter of the sacrament of penance, two things must first be distinguished: one dogmatic, the other scholastic. Here is the dogmatic element: whether those three acts of the penitent, at least as understood internally, are required necessarily in order to obtain a full and perfect remission of sins in the sacrament. But the scholastic element or what was disputed in the schools is: whether those acts, as manifested externally, are really necessary and come together in order to constitute the sacramental rite itself. We cover both points in the following thesis.

Thesis 8. Three acts of the penitent, namely, contrition, confession and satisfaction, are required for the sacramental remission of sins; they must be sensible and come together as the material part in

order to constitute intrinsically the sacramental sign.

S.Th. III, q. 90, a. 1ff.; Galtier, 386-393; Lercher-Lakner, 541-546; Puig, 600-612.

82. Definition of terms. *They are required* or they are necessary, so that without them the sacrament of penance cannot take place. But they are required not only collectively, but also distributively: hence none of them can be lacking.[1]

Contrition is understood here in general as sorrow for sins committed; *confession* is understood as a manifestation of sins in order to receive absolution; *satisfaction* not as already actually fulfilled, but as the subjective disposition of the penitent accepting it in order to fulfill it later.

Sensible per se or through another, according to the nature of each act and according to different circumstances.

The material part which, of itself being undetermined, is made determined by the sacramental form.

Intrinsically, by an analogy with a composite in a physical being.

The sacramental sign is made up of two parts: absolution as the form, and the acts of the penitent as the matter. Therefore the acts of the penitent are not required as the necessary condition for remission of sins, but they are required as the constitutive part of the sacramental rite itself. Hence those acts are not considered as they are in themselves good, salutary and perhaps even meritorious, but as they are the objective element of the sacramental sign which causes grace.[2]

83. Adversaries. 1. Luther denied that the three acts of the penitent are required for the remission of sins (D 1455), since for him nothing else is required except the terrors of conscience and fiducial faith (D 1673-1675, 1704). Therefore in this sense he speaks about "the parts of penance."[3]

2. *Some theologians,* especially moralists, hold that the acts of the penitent are indeed required, but not as sensible. Therefore those acts are internal subjective dispositions which, although in no way externally manifested, still are present internally, and suffice for the remission of sins by receiving sacramental absolution. Their main argument for this is the praxis of validly absolving a dying person who is totally unconscious and who has given no sign of contrition and confession. This is the view of

1. Differently in Lercher-Lakner, 524 and 545.
2. See Lugo, *De paenitentia* disp.12 s.2; Palmieri, *De paenitentia* th.14.
3. See St. Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 1,18.

Ballerini and there are many who agree with him.[4]

3. *The Scotists* generally hold that the acts of the penitent are necessary, and also as sensible, but not as the element intrinsically composing the sacramental sign. Therefore they are required as integrating parts of the sacrament, whose whole essence consists in the absolution.[5]

84. Doctrine of the Church. Leo X rejected the doctrine of Luther (D 1455). *The Council of Trent* in sess.14 ch.3 (D 1673-1675) and cn.4 (D 1704) once again condemned the same teaching.

However, positively the *Council of Trent* teaches: the acts of the penitent are the "quasi matter" of the sacrament, in opposition to the "form," in which mainly its power is located; these acts are the "parts" of penance, inasmuch as they are required in the penitent for the integrity of the sacrament; but they are required as "the quasi matter of the sacrament" (D 1673, 1704). It is also defined by the Council in cn.9 (D 1709) that confession is required so that the priests can absolve. The expression "quasi matter" is taken immediately from the Council of Florence in its Decree for the Armenians (D 1323). Finally, it is clear that the Council of Trent did not wish to condemn those doctrines that at the time were defended by theologians; from another angle this is surely certain.[6]

85. Theological note. That the acts of the penitent are required, at least as internal dispositions, is *defined divine and Catholic faith.* That they are required as sensible, preserving the extrinsic probability because of the authors holding the contrary view, *is certain.* That they are required as the part intrinsically constituting the sacramental sign is *more probable.*

86. Argument. a) *Three acts of the penitent are required:* The sacrament of penance essentially aims at restoring the friendship with God, which has been lost by sin. Therefore it is necessary that the offender make a compensation according to the will of the offended one. But this takes place well if the offender has the will to compensate for the offense (by contrition) and takes the means established by the one offended in order to signify that compensation (by confession and satisfaction). Therefore, those three acts of the penitent are required. This is what St. Thomas says in

4. Ballerini, *Opus theologicum morale* 5 n.3fff.; 8 n.394-419; Noldin, *De sacramentis* 222f.; Berardi, *Praxis confessarii* 4,2; Tanquerey, *De paenitentia* 165; E.F. Regatillo, *Ius sacramentarium* 1,477.
5. Frassen, *Scotus Academicus* t.4 tr.1 disp.2 a.2 q.2 n.5ff.; Herincx, *De paenitentia* disp.1 n.15; Minges, *Compendium Theologiae* p.2,234; F.X. Abárzuza, *Manuale Theologiae Dogmaticae* t.3 n.503-506. But there are some Scotists who defend the opinion very common outside of their own school. Thus Mastrius, *In 4* disp.5 q.11f.; Brancatus de Laurea, *De paenitentia* disp.17 a.1.
6. See Pallavicini, *Historia Concilii Tridentini* 12,66.

S.Th. III, q. 90, a. 2. For now we offer no more proof for the thesis, because these individual acts will be treated at length in the following theses.

b) *The acts of the penitent are required to be sensible:* According to the Council of Trent a priest cannot absolve unless the penitent makes his confession. But this confession, which also includes contrition, must be sensible. Therefore according to the Council the acts of the penitent are required to be sensible.

The major is certain from sess. 14 cn. 9: "If anyone says. that the confession of the penitent is not required in order that the priest may be able to absolve him, let him be anathema" (D 1709). Note from the connection of the whole canon that the confession is required there because of the judicial nature of the absolution, which is also the doctrine of the Council in the chapter, as we shall soon see.

The minor is certain from ch.5 of the same session (D 1679-1681), in which the Council speaks about the necessity of confession by reason of the judicial nature of the sacrament. For, without knowledge of the case, priests cannot exercise judgment over it. Therefore, the confession, which is required, is necessarily sensible. It must also be sorrowful, since this also pertains to the case, which must be known by priests before they can absolve.

c) *The acts of the penitent are required as the element intrinsically constituting the sacramental sign:* This view is taught by the Council of Florence in the Decree for the Armenians, in which they say that the acts of the penitent are the "quasi matter" (D 1323), but they understand by that formula something that is opposed to the "form" (therefore intrinsically composing with the form), and saying expressly that all sacraments are perfected by the things as the matter and by the words as the form (D 1312). Indeed, it is also certain historically that the Council understood that formula about the true matter which constitutes the sacramental sign together with the form; for, it took the formula from St. Thomas,[7] who doubtless understood it in this way.[8]

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7. These words are taken from the small work of St. Thomas, *De articulis fidei et sacramentis Ecclesiae* (ed. Mandonnet) 16f.
8. How St. Thomas understood this formula of "quasi matter" is certain from III, q. 84, a. 1 ad 1; q. 86, a. 6. Note that from the Council of Trent it cannot be argued properly, since it is certain that the Council did not wish to resolve this dispute. Therefore, it uses the formulas which were used by the Scotists at that time. But the argument which is proposed from theological reasoning, namely the one taken from the nature of judgment, proves that the acts of the penitent are essentially required, and also as sensible, but against the Scotists it does not seem to be valid. For, it is not completely certain, if we prescind from this thesis, that the sacramental sign instituted by Christ is the whole process of judgment or only the judicial sentence: nor is it said in Trent, except that the power is judicial and that it must be exercised through a judicial act by a judge. See Lercher-Lakner, 544 for 3 p.

87. Objections. 1. Trent teaches that the acts of the penitent pertain to the integrity of the sacrament of penance. But if they pertain to the integrity they do not pertain to the essence. Therefore the acts of the penitent according to the Council do not constitute intrinsically the sacramental sign.

I distinguish the major. Trent teaches that the acts of the penitent pertain to the integrity of the sacrament, that is, that there cannot be a sacrament without them, *conceded;* that is, that they are the integrating parts, as these are opposed to the essential parts, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* The Council, not wishing to resolve the disputed question between the Scotists and the Thomists, used such words as are sufficient to condemn the Protestants.

2. Trent said that contrition is a disposition (D 1676), but that confession is a condition (D 1679-1681). Therefore acts of this kind do not pertain to the essence of the sacrament.

I concede the antecedent, but deny the consequent and the consequence. For the Council decreed that in an assertive way, not exclusively, by teaching what all theologians agree on in opposition to the errors of the Reformers.

3. If the acts of the penitent were the matter of the sacrament, then the penitent would turn out to be the minister. However not the penitent, but the priest is the minister. Therefore the acts of the penitent are not the matter of the sacrament.

I deny the major. For, the minister of the sacrament is the one who applies the form to the matter, not the one who supplies the matter in any way whatsoever. Surely the penitent supplies the matter to be taken away by absolution, that is, the sins; and he does that by a sorrowful confession in virtue of which the judicial decision takes its beginning. But only the priest applies the form to this matter. See III, q. 24, a. 1 and 2.

4. If the acts of the penitent pertain to the matter of the sacrament, they will be the cause of grace. But this is repugnant. Therefore they do not pertain to the matter of the sacrament.

I distinguish the major. The acts of the penitent, if they are considered as good and meritorious acts, by which he is disposed to receive grace, are the cause of grace, *denied;* if they are considered as parts of the sacramental sign, *conceded.* Thus, for this reason, as elevated by the minister of absolution, they are a true instrumental cause of grace. *I also distinguish the minor.* It is repugnant that the acts of the penitent, as his dispositions, are the cause of grace, *conceded;* as an essential part of the sacrament, *denied.*

5. Whatever constitutes a sacrament must be sensible. But contrition is not sensible. Therefore it cannot constitute a sacrament.

I distinguish the major. It must be sensible per se or through something else, *conceded;* necessarily per se, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* Contrition is not sensible per se, *conceded;* it does not become sensible through a sorrowful confession, *denied.*

88. 6. An unconscious dying person, giving no sign of sorrow or of a desire to confess his sins, can be absolved. But in this case there is no confession or sensible contrition. Therefore it is not required that the acts of the penitent be sensible.

I distinguish the minor. An unconscious dying person can be absolved, if it is sup-

posed that he has given absolutely no sign of sorrow, *denied;* if it is supposed that his desire to confess is signified in the way in which he can do it, *I subdistinguish:* then he can be absolved conditionally, *conceded;* he can be absolved absolutely, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* In this case there is no sensible contrition or confession, if really no sign of this is supposed to have been given by the moribund person, *conceded;* if he is supposed to have manifested his desire in the way in which he could do it, *denied.*

The *Roman Ritual* says that the moribund should be absolved "if he has shown a desire of confessing either by himself or through another."[9] This praxis was extended later to one who does not manifest such a desire. But already St. Alphonsus, on whose authority this praxis seems to have been based, warned that it could be done only because such a dying persons "is presumed to desire and to seek absolution with sensible signs," with his sighs, halting respiration and bodily movements."[10] If therefore from that praxis, so introduced, it is further concluded that a valid absolution is given even at the exclusion of any manifestation of interior contrition and of the desire to confess, this deduction strays beyond of the limits of the premises. Moreover, the reason because of which that praxis, which however until now is not sanctioned by any ecclesiastical document, can be maintained seems to be that, since the sacraments are for men, in a case of extreme necessity everything should be attempted that seems, with some probability, to save the essential elements of the sacrament. For, anyone who lived in a Christian way, or at least remained united to the body of the Church, rightly is thought at the moment of death both to desire the sacrament that is so essential and to express this will in any way possible. But if in the objective order that is not the case, then the absolution will not be valid and the sacrament is not really conferred.

7. The Sacred Apostolic Penitentiary recently allowed to give absolution not only when there is a danger of death, but also whenever without it, there is a large assembly of the faithful, which otherwise necessarily would lack for a long time sacramental grace and holy communion. But in that case, there is no sensible contrition or confession.[11] Therefore sensible acts of the penitent are not required.

I concede the major and deny the minor. In that case a sorrowful confession takes place in the way that it can, as in the case of someone ignorant of the language of the confessor, by his presence alone manifests to the confessor his contrition and desire of confessing. They also, by presenting themselves before the confessor, whom they know is a confessor and as such is present, in groups but seriously and attentively, are thought to make known their contrition and desire of confessing. Therefore, according to the same instruction, they must be ncouraged not only to foster internal sorrow, but also to

9. Tit.3 ch.1 n.25.

10. *De paenitentia* 482. See Lehmkuhl, *Theologia Moralis* 2,646-650. Some authors ridicule this explanation, which seeks in those natural signs the manifestation of interior contrition and a desire to go to confession. But it should be noted that this explanation is about an exceptional case and it seems to be necessary in order to save a doctrine solidly based for other reasons. Moreover, psychologically it is easily explained that a man familiar with Catholic teaching, at the moment of his death, signifies in any way he can his desire of not dying without going to confession. It is also certain from a historical point of view that some have actually done this, which they revealed later when they had recovered from the illness. Therefore, it is very reasonable, in this difficult question, that this solution should be accepted.

11. See AAS 36 (1944) 155f.

manifest it by the external signs that are possible in the situation; and finally, when they can receive the sacrament of penance in the normal way, they must submit each mortal sin, forgiven by that general absolution, to the keys in a private confession.

8. But in that instruction a distinction is made between what is absolutely required, and what is required only inasmuch as it is possible; among the former internal contrition is mentioned, among the latter a sensible contrition. Therefore the latter is not thought to be demanded by the sacrament.

I respond that indeed such a distinction is made, but only so that in praxis the absolution can be given; for, the latter would certainly be invalid without internal contrition and without its external manifestation in the way possible in the given situation. However, in a speculative way, it is not said that those who *in no way* have manifested externally their contrition (because this manifestation was impossible for them) have obtained the grace of that absolution.

9. At least satisfaction already supposes that the sacrament has been conferred. Therefore it cannot be an essential intrinsic part of it.

I distinguish the antecedent. Satisfaction, according as it designates the desire of making satisfaction included in the contrition, supposes that the sacrament has already been conferred, *denied;* satisfaction, according as it has been actually performed, *I subdistinguish:* supposes that the sacrament has already been conferred in its essential elements, *conceded;* also in its integral elements, *denied. I also distinguish the consequent.* Satisfaction, according as it is a desire of making satisfaction, is not an essential intrinsic part of the sacrament, *denied*; satisfaction, according as it is the work performed, *I subdistinguish*: is not an intrinsic part of the sacrament, *conceded;* is not an integral part, *denied.*

89. Scholium. *On the imposition of hands.*[12] In the ancient administration of the sacrament of penance there was a special imposition of hands; perhaps a vestige of that remains even now in the rite of the confessor saying some prayers while his right hand is raised towards the penitent.[13] A question can be raised whether that imposition of hands pertains to the matter of the sacrament of penance. There is a common opinion among theologians,[14] contrary to a few previous ones,[15] that it does not pertain to the matter of the sacrament and is in no way required for validity; in fact it never was required for validity. St. Thomas mentions the same thing in III, q. 94, a. 4. Moreover that question, whether at one time the imposition of hands was of the essence of the sacrament of penance, which now certainly is not of the essence, is difficult to answer historically. But speculatively and a priori it can receive different answers, according to the opinion each one has about the specific or generic institution of all the sacraments by Christ.[16]

12. See Galtier, *Imposition des mains:* DTC 7,1393-1397; J.A. Jungmann, *Die lateinischen Bussriten in ihrer geschichtliche Entwicklung;* J. Coppens, *L'imposition des mains et les rites connexes dans le N.T et dans l'Eglise ancienne.*

13. Tit. 3 c.2 n.3.

14. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.18 s.6; Salmanticenses, *De paenitentia* disp.3 a.4.

15. Usually cited are Thomas Waldensis, *De sacramento paenitentiae* c.147 n.1 and the unknown author against whom St. Thomas wrote his small book, *De forma absolutionis;* see ch. 4 in that book.

16. This can be seen above in *Theoria generalis sacramentorum* n. 147-152.

Thesis 9. The form of the sacrament of penance is to be placed in the words of absolution.

S.Th, III, q. 84, a.3; Galtier, 512; Lercher-Lakner, 594f.

90. Definition of terms. *The form* is understood as that essential part together with the acts of the penitent composing intrinsically the sacramental sign; but in that composite it is the part determining the acts of the penitent in order to signify and cause grace.

In the words of absolution, that is, in the absolution which in a normal way is usually given with words. Therefore we are not saying in the thesis precisely that words are required, or that a nod does not suffice, even though this is true. Much less are we determining what the words are that are required for validity.

We are saying, therefore, that the words of absolution are not only required, which no one ever denied and it is expressly taught in the Church, but we say that they are required formally by reason of the form intrinsically constituting the sacramental sign by analogy with a physical composite.

91. Adversaries. *Scotists,* denying that the acts of the penitent are the essential material of the sacrament of penance, because they deny that absolution is really the form in the way it was explained. In the same way this also holds for those authors who, as we saw in the previous thesis, do not require the acts of the penitent to be sensible.

Theological note. The thesis is *more probable.*[1]

92. Argument. a) *The Council of Florence* speaks about absolution (D 1323) as the form of the sacrament of penance. But it understands this about the form in the strict sense as the part intrinsically constituting the sacramental sign. Therefore the form of the sacrament of penance is the words of absolution.[2]

b) The sacramental sign of the sacrament of penance is a judicial act. Therefore in it a decision cannot be lacking. But the decision in this sacramental judgment is absolution. Therefore absolution cannot be absent from the sacramental sign. But from other sources it is certain that in that

1. The thesis cannot be said to be *de fide* or theologically certain or simply certain, because it is not treating the necessity of absolution, but the formal reason of the absolution intrinsically constituting the sacramental sign together with the acts of the penitent. If therefore it is only more probable that the acts of the penitent are the true essential matter, then that the absolution in the strict sense is the form cannot be more than probable.
2. An argument cannot be made from the Council of Trent, speaking about "the form of the sacrament of penance" (D 1673). For the "form" mentioned there is used in the sense in which it was also used at that time by the Scotists and still is; so it is not used there in the strict sense in which it is used in our thesis.

sacramental sign the acts of the penitent are present as the matter. Therefore absolution in the sacramental sign must necessarily be said to be the form.

93. Scholium 1. *On the words required for the form of absolution.* Both in the Council of Florence (D 1323) and in the Council of Trent (D 1673) the words of the form are said to be: "I absolve you" (*Ego te absolvo*), etc. Thus the words are designated, which according to the *Roman Ritual* and the custom of the Church, de facto are used. But it can be asked which words are absolutely essential. The common answer of theologians to this question is that the essential words are only two (*te absolvo* in Latin; three in English, *I absolve you*). But these two (or three) are required, because otherwise the effect of the sacrament would not be signified or its subject would not be determined.[3] But those words alone suffice, because from the action itself it is clear that absolution is given from sins, and that it takes place in the name of God. Therefore the other words are added for the sake of its licitness. But it is also clear that these words are required in such a way that they can be supplied for by equivalent words, provided that the judicial meaning is correctly expressed.

Scholium 2. *On the meaning of the form of absolution.* Those older theologians, who thought that a previous perfect contrition is necessary for the sacrament, held that the meaning of the absolution is only an authentic declaration of forgiveness made by God alone. This interpretation is false, since forgiveness is really accomplished by the sacramental sign, and it does not follow absolutely from that presupposition.

But a particular question is raised here because it can often happen that the sacrament of penance is conferred validly on someone who is already in the state of grace, or actually of a person who accuses himself of sins only of sins already forgiven. Therefore, since the form must always have its own true meaning, there is a question about what the true meaning of the form is, which is suitable in all cases.

St. Thomas rightly explained the meaning of the form when he wrote: "I absolve you, that is, I confer on you the sacrament of absolution" (III, q.84, a. 3 ad 5). Other theologians further developing this explanation defined it in this way: "Sacramentally I absolve you," or "I confer on you the grace of forgiveness as it is in itself," or "I confer on you the sacrament that of itself forgives sins."[4]

3. However Lercher-Lakner thinks, 599, that more probably the word "absolvo" is sufficient; because the person of the penitent has been sufficiently determined by the concrete circumstances in which that word is pronounced.

4. See Cajetan, *in 4* q.8 a.3; Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.18 s.1 n.10; J.M. Dalmau explains it, *Significación de la forma del sacramento de la penitencia:* EstEcl 2 (1923) 386-401. Against the common opinion of theologians B.F.M. Xiberta contends, *Clavis Ecclesiae* (Rome 1922): that absolution brings with itself not only the infusion of grace, but also reconciliation with the Church. For these authors, who defend the intentional or juridical causality of the sacraments, the form signifies: "I as a judge give you in the name of Christ a right or a new title to a right, according to which it is due to you that God cease from or cease again from his just hatred of and hostility for the sin here and now subjected to the keys, and that he restore the friendship lost because of this sin; and thus at the same time I give you the right to the sanctifying grace that will forgive the sins here and now handled juridically." See Lercher-Lakner, 602.

Thesis 10. The form of absolution must be formally indicative, although materially it can be deprecative.

S.Th., *De forma absolutionis sacramentalis* (Opusc. 19); Galtier, 418-523; Lercher-Lakner, 600.

94. Definition of terms. *The indicative form* is understood as that which in virtue of the words expresses the actual exercise of power. It is said to be *formally indicative*, if the meaning of the words manifests the actual exercise of power, even if the words grammatically are not indicative; it is said to be *materially indicative*, if even the words themselves grammatically are taken as such.

Deprecative is understood as the form that expresses some desire, like the prayer of a priest beseeching God to absolve the penitent. It is called *formally deprecative,* if the meaning and intention of the form is nothing other than the expression of that desire; it is called *materially deprecative,* if the words grammatically taken are in the optative or subjunctive mood giving expression to that desire, even if the meaning and intention of the speaker is also to use his power.[1]

95. Adversaries. In the thirteenth century an unknown theologian seems to defend the validity of the formally deprecative form.[2]

In the seventeenth century there was a big controversy over the validity of the deprecative form.[3]

Theological note. That the form must be formally indicative is *theologically certain,* as we shall see in the argument. That is could be materially deprecative is *certain.*

96. Argument. a) Sacramental absolution is a judicial sentence, according to *Trent* (D 1685). But a judicial sentence pronounced with authority by a judge necessarily is formally indicative. Therefore, the absolution must be formally indicative.

b) Sacramental absolution was formerly and still is in some places materially deprecative. Therefore it can be such.

The antecedent. In the first place, absolution was formerly materially deprecative: In the West at the beginning of the thirteenth century,[4] in the

1. Lercher-Lakner, 600, expresses this somewhat differently, but in reality is in perfect agreement with us.
2. He is the one whom St. Thomas seems to attack in his little work, *De forma absolutionis sacramentalis ad Magistrum Ordinis* (ed. Mandonnet, opusc. 19).
3. On this controversy, see A. Vacant, *Absolution sous forme déprecatoire:* DTC 1,244-252.
4. That is asserted by the author of the book refuted by St. Thomas and Thomas does not contradict him. And Gulielmus Parisiensis seems to speak really in the same vein, *De sacramentis paenitentiae* ch. 19.

Mozarabic liturgy,[5] in the patristic age according to the testimonies of St. Leo the Great, St. Jerome, St. Ambrose, St. Augustine[6]; they are speaking only about a prayer or invocation; in the Orient the older forms of the Greeks are deprecative.[7]

In the second place, absolution even now is materially deprecative: the form of absolution which the Uniate Greeks outside of Europe use contains this among other prayers: "may he deign to forgive you through me a sinner."[8] The Roman Church not only considers this form valid, but orders them to use it also in the confessions of the Latin faithful.[9]

97. Scholium. *On the way in which the form must be pronounced.* The absolution must be given with words spoken by the mouth, wherever both the priest and the penitent are present. This is the common and certain opinion of theologians; it is supposed in all the Rituals.[10] The objection opposed to this is not valid, namely, that it is not of the essence of a judicial decision that it be pronounced by the mouth; for, it would have to be proved that in this judgment nothing else is required except what is required in every judicial decision.

Moreover, the absolution must be given to a penitent who is present; this is clearly contained in the Decree of Clement VIII (D 1988). But this must be understood to be not about the licitness, but about the validity; otherwise the absolution of an absent person in a case of necessity would be permitted, which is forbidden in that decree; for that was the question being treated.

Hence absolution by telephone could only be valid, respecting a possible determination of the Church which up until now has not willed to define anything on this point, to the extent that both speakers on the telephone are thought to be truly present to each other; now this is not thought to be the case.[11]

5. See *Liber Ordinum* (ed. Férotin) 19-100.
6. St. Leo The Great, *Epistola* 108,2f.: ML 54,1011f.; St. Jerome, *Dialogus contra Luciferianos* 5: ML 23, 159; St. Ambrose, *De Spiritu Sancto* 3,18,137: ML 16,809; St. Augustine, *De baptsmo* 3,16,21; 5,20,28: ML 43,149.190.
7. See *Paenitentiale Ioannis Ieiunatoris:* MG 88,1896ff.; Goar, *Rituale Graecorum* (Paris 1647) 673-676.
8. See Goar, 676.
9. See Benedict XIV, Bull *"Etsi pastoralis":* CL 2,511; *Collectanea de Propaganda fide* 1,702 n.1275.
10. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.19 s.1 n.3.
11. See Galtier, 524-527.

ARTICLE II

ON CONTRITION

98. After we have treated the matter and form of the sacrament of penance in general, now we will deal in particular with the individual acts of the penitent which constitute that matter. We will do this by following the way and the order of the Council of Trent.

First of all, we must consider contrition, which is the first act of the penitent. On this, five points are taught by the Council which we will explain in as many theses: 1) The notion of contrition; 2) its necessity; 3) the efficacy of perfect contrition; 4) the goodness of imperfect contrition, or attrition; 5) its efficacy.

Thesis 11. Contrition is sorrow of the soul and detestation of the sin committed, together with the resolve not to sin any more.

S.Th. III, q. 85, a. 1ff.; Galtier, 1-19, 52-55; Lercher-Lakner, 417.451ff.

99. Definition of terms. *Contrition* is the primary act of the virtue of repentance. *Repentance* in virtue of the word can be described thus:

a) The Latin word "*paenitentia*,"[1] which comes from "*paene*" (almost) or "*paenitus*,"[1] says directly the intimate sorrow of the soul for some prior action, but so that it connotes implicitly a change of mind. Tertullian, from the use of the pagans, defined it as "a certain passion of the soul, which comes from the offense of a former action."[2]

b) The Greek word μετάνοια from the verb μετανοεῖν, corresponding to the Latin word *paenitentia,* signifies directly a change of mind, but it connotes indirectly the sorrow of soul for some previous action. Rightly therefore profane authors use the Greek word in the same sense as the Latin word. On this matter Lactantius says: "One who regrets what he has done, understands his previous error, and therefore the Greeks say in a better way and more meaningfully μετάνοιαν, which we can say with the word repentance. For he regains his senses and he recovers his mind as it were from insanity which irks him because of his fault, and he blames himself for his folly and he resolves in his mind to live more virtuously; then he takes great care lest he again fall into the same traps."[3]

c) The Hebrew word נחם , corresponding to the previous Greek and

1. Therefore recent authors write "paenitentia" and not "poenitentia," as customarily it was written before, because they derived the word from "poena."
2. *De paenitentia* 1: ML 1,1336f.
3. *Divinae institutiones* 6,24: ML 6,722f.

Latin words, denotes displeasure or sorrow concerning former faults with the resolve and desire for a better life. See Job 42:6; Judges 21:6.15. But this is often translated in the LXX with the words μετανοεῖν *and* μεταμέλειν. In the wisdom books and in the New Testament they are often used in the same sense as the Hebrew word.

Hence Luther and Erasmus falsely adhere to the etymological meaning alone, since the Jews of that time intended to signify the same thing with the Greek word which was signified by the equivalent Hebrew words, namely, sorrow for past faults and with the resolve to amend for the future.[4]

What repentance signifies really is explained in this thesis.

Sorrow is sadness or affliction of soul because of a present evil.

Detestation is hatred of the committed sin with the desire of totally removing, if it were possible, the past sin ("I wish I had not sinned"). *Hate* is a movement of the soul opposed to some object; in this case shunning sin.

A resolve is the deliberate will to do something in the future.

100. Adversaries. *Protestants* hold that contrition must be distinguished into both active and passive. Passive contrition means the terrors of conscience when sin is acknowledged; these terrors are totally necessary, not free. Fiducial faith is the response to this passive contrition and its effect is justification. From this there follow a change of heart and a new life with active contrition. A similar notion of repentance, which in the various sects continues up to the present time, is common to all the philosophers and theologians who profess a secular and autonomous ethics.[5]

101. Doctrine of the Church. a) *Negatively,* the Church condemned the Protestant notion: Leo X (D 1457), *the Council of Trent* in sess.14 cn.4 and 13 (D 1704, 1713).

b) *Positively,* the Church taught the Catholic notion: *the Council of Trent* in sess.6 ch.6 (D 1526): "they are moved by a certain hatred and detestation of sin"; sess.14 ch.1 (D 1669): "they detest so great an offense of God with hatred of sin and a sincere and heartfelt sorrow"; sess.14 ch.4 (D 1676): "contrition is the sorrow of the soul and detestation of the sin committed, together with the resolve not to sin any more."

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic doctrine.*

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4. See St. Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 1,7. On contemporary Protestants, see Köstlin, *Busse:* REPT 3,590f.
5. See Lercher-Lakner, 452; Galtier, 10-13.

102. Proof from Holy Scripture. The elements of contrition are contained passim in the holy books: v.gr. : *No one repents of wickedness, saying, "What have I done!"* (Jer. 8:6); *for I know my transgressions, and my sin is ever before me* (Ps. 51:3); *return to me with all your heart, with fasting, with weeping, and with mourning; rend your hearts and not your clothing* (Joel 2:12); Tyre and Sidon *would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes* (Matt. 11:21). With these and similar words repentance is explained as a certain free movement of the heart of sadness and affliction because of the committed sin.

103. Proof from tradition. Tertullian describes repentance: "Thus confession is a discipline for man's prostration and humiliation, enjoining a demeanor calculated to move mercy. With regard also to the very dress and food, it commands [the penitent] to lie in sackcloth and ashes, to cover his body in mourning, to lay his spirit low in sorrows, to exchange for severe treatment the sins which he has committed..., to groan, to weep and call day and night unto the Lord your God" (R 315). St. Augustine insists on true detestation: "Because sin must not remain unpunished, let it be punished by you, lest you be punished for it" (R 1494). But he teaches expressly: "It is not sufficient to change one's habits for the better and to cease doing evil, unless he also makes satisfaction to God for what he has done by the sorrows of repentance, by groans of humility, by the sacrifice of a contrite heart, together with giving alms" (R 1531). St. Gregory defines repentance: "Certainly to do penance is both to lament for evils done and not to do them again" (R 2336). Many similar quotes could be given.

104. Proof from the consensus of theologians. The theologians always have agreed on the notion of repentance. Therefore, having accepted those elements, they raised further questions to attain a better explanation of repentance. Thus, they studied the formal motive of repentance, and taught that contrition can also be made based on the motive of any virtue; but that a special virtue of penance must also be admitted, whose motive is the reparation of the divine law, and which therefore is referred to justice as its potential part.[6]

6. Some of the older authors denied that a special virtue of penance, which detests every sin from a formal particular motive, different from the motives of the other virtues, is to be admitted, but this is now commonly affirmed along with St. Thomas, III, q. 85, a. 2. There are different opinions among theologians concerning the formal motive of that special virtue. Thus, Lugo, *De paenitentia* disp.2 a.4 holds that the motive is not compensation for the sin, but the moral goodness that is reflected in reconciliation with God. However, much more commonly the motive is said to be the goodness which is reflected in the reparation of the divine law injured by sin. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.2 s.3 n.4. On this whole question, see Galtier, 20-36.

105. Objections. 1. Such penance depresses a man and prevents him from acting. Therefore it must not be admitted.

I distinguish the antecedent. Such penance depresses a man if it is immoderate, *conceded;* if it is moderate, *denied.* See III, q. 84, a. 9 ad 2 and 3.

2. This penance is foolish, because uselessly it wants to undo something that has already been done. Therefore it cannot be admitted.

I deny the antecedent. I distinguish the proof. With an absolute will it desires to undo what has already been done, *denied;* with a conditioned will it desires to undo past sin to the extent it were possible, by removing its result as much as possible, *conceded.* See III, q. 85, a. 1 ad 3.

3. That motion of penance is nothing but a mere passion of the soul and something like a feeling of shame. But this cannot be a virtue. Therefore, this notion of penance cannot be admitted.

I deny the major. Penance is a free motion of the soul against sin, apart from that passion. See III, q. 85, a. 1 ad 2.

Thesis 12. In order to obtain by request the forgiveness of sins an act of contrition was necessary at all times.

S.Th. III, q. 86, a. 2; Galtier, 37-51; Lercher-Lakner, 461-466; Puig, 693-704.

106. Definition of terms. *To obtain by request the forgiveness of sins.* Understand sins here as mortal and personal. Therefore we are not considering venial sins and original sin. We are speaking here only about adults.

At all times. Therefore both before Christ and after Christ. But within the Christian law the proposition is valid not only for the fallen after baptism, but also for those who fell into grave personal sin before receiving baptism.

Contrition, or the act of penance that we described in the preceding thesis.

Necessary. Necessary contrition can be thought of in two ways. In the first way, so that, *considering his absolute power*, even God himself cannot forgive sins without the contrition of the sinner; in the second way, so that *de facto* and historically God does not forgive sins, unless the sinner repents for them. In the thesis we affirm the historical necessity of contrition, prescinding from the absolute necessity, about which theologians disagree. On this point, it seems to be held more commonly and more probably that God could condone sins without the contrition of the sinner, provided that his will is not actively attached to his sin.[1]

107. Adversaries. The *Reformers* denied the necessity of contrition, which is a true and free motion of the soul against sins, as we saw in the preceding thesis.

108. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* in sess.14 ch.1 (D 1669) teaches in general: "Penance was indeed at all times necessary for all men who had stained themselves by any mortal sin in or to obtain grace and justice—not excepting those who desired to be cleansed by the sacrament of baptism." Similarly ch.4 (D 1676) teaches: "This disposition of contrition was necessary at all times for the attainment of the remission of sins." Finally, cn.4 (D 1704): "If anyone denies that for the full and perfect remission of sins three acts are required... contrition... let him be anathema."

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

1. See Cajetan, *In 3* q.86 a.2; Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.9 s.3.

109. Proof from Holy Scripture. From the notion commonly admitted, contrition will be necessary with the necessity of a means, if it is the means without which remission cannot be obtained. But contrition is shown to be such in sacred Scripture. Therefore, in order to obtain remission of sins it is necessary to say that contrition is necessary with the necessity of means.

The minor. a) From the prophets of the O.T. listen to Ezek. 18:21-30: *But if the wicked turn away from all their sins that they have committed... they shall surely live, they shall not die. None of the transgressions that they have committed shall be remembered against them... When the wicked turn away from the wickedness they have committed and do what is lawful and right, they shall save their life....* And Joel 2:12-17: *Return to me with all your heart... rend your hearts... Return to the Lord, your God, for he is gracious and merciful....* See Jer. 31:18-20.

b) In the *New Law* Christ teaches the same thing, Matt. 4:17: *Repent.* Peter says the same in Acts 2:38 and 3:19: *Repent... Repent therefore, and turn to God so that your sins may be wiped out.* Paul says the same thing in Acts 26:20: *I declared... that they should repent and turn to God and do deeds consistent with repentance.*

110. Proof from tradition. 1. *The holy Fathers* often exhorted the faithful to contrition, as the means without which the forgiveness of sins could not be obtained. Thus Hermas, in his *Shepherd;* Tertullian, *De paenitentia;* St. Pacian, *Paraenesis ad paenitentiam;* St. Ambrose, *De paenitentia;* St. Ephraem, *Hortationes ad paenitentiam;* St. Chrysostom, *Novem homiliae de paenitentia....* Here, v.gr., are the words of Tertullian: "That repentance, O sinner... do you so hasten to so embrace, as a shipwrecked man some plank. This will draw you forth when sunk in the waves of sin, and will bear you forward into the port of the divine clemency... Then how foolish it is not to perform the penance and so obtain the pardon of sins; this is not to pay the price, to extend the hand for the merchandise! It is for this price that the Lord instituted the granting of pardon; with this compensation of repentance he proposed that impunity be restored" (R 312f.). St. Chrysostom: "Have you sinned? Go to church and wipe out your sin. As often as you fall in the forum you also get up again; thus, as often as you sin, regret your sin and do not despair... Although you may have sinned in extreme old age, go to church and do penance; this is the place for medicine, not for judgment, not for demanding punishment, but for granting the remission of sins" (R 1136). And St. Ambrose: "Peter was sorrowful and wept, because he erred as a man. I do not find what he said, but I discover that he wept; I read about his tears, I do not read about

his satisfaction; but what cannot be defended, can be washed away. Tears wash away the sin which he is ashamed to confess with words" (R 1310). And St. Augustine: "But even crimes themselves, however great, may be remitted in the Holy Church; and the mercy of God is never to be despaired of by men who truly repent, each according to the measure of his sin" (R 1919).

2. *The praxis of the Church* is that she absolves only those who are contrite.

111. Theological reasoning. St. Thomas presents it in III, q. 86, a. 2: "It is impossible for a mortal actual sin to be pardoned without penance, if we speak of penance as a virtue. For, as sin is an offense against God, he pardons sin in the same way as he pardons an offense committed against him. Now an offense is directly opposed to grace, since one man is said to be offended with another, because he excludes him from his grace. Now as stated in the Second Part (I-II, q. 110, a. 1) the difference between the grace of God and the grace of man, is that the latter does not cause, but presupposes true or apparent goodness in him who is graced, whereas the grace of God causes goodness in the man who is graced, because the good will of God, which is denoted by the word 'grace,' is the cause of all created good. Hence it is possible for a man to pardon an offense, for which he is offended with someone, without any change in the latter's will; but it is impossible that God pardon a man for an offense, without his being changed. Now the offense of mortal sin is due to man's will being turned from God, through being turned to some mutable good. Consequently, for the pardon of this offense against God, it is necessary for man's will to be so changed as to turn to God and to renounce having turned to something else...."

112. Objections. 1. Both Scripture (Matt. 6:14) and the Fathers (R 493) attribute the power of remission not only to contrition, but also to other works of devotion. Therefore contrition is not the necessary means.

I distinguish the antecedent. According to Scripture and the Fathers other works of devotion confer the remission of sins, *conceded;* they confer it in such a way that they also remit sins, even if someone does not detest them, *denied.*

2. Christ said, *Give alms... and everything will be clean for you* (Luke 11:41). Therefore alms so contribute to the cleanness of soul that it alone justifies.

I concede the antecedent but deny the consequent. That is, Christ warns the Pharisees about too much solicitude for external cleanliness (Luke 11:38-9), while urging alms, in opposition to their greed, as a means to obtain true cleanliness. But in no way

does he exclude other works, which are necessary for salvation.[2]

3. From Ezek. 18:21: *But if the wicked turn away from all their sins that they have committed... and keep all my statutes... they shall surely live.* Hence the keeping of the commandments is just as necessary as contrition for salvation. But the keeping of the commandments is not necessary with the necessity of means. Therefore neither is contrition.

I distinguish the major. Keeping the commandments as a resolve is just as necessary as contrition, *conceded;* actual observance, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* Keeping the commandments as a resolve, *denied;* actual keeping the commandments, *conceded.*

I explain. The resolve to keep the commandments is included necessarily in contrition, since no one truly detests sins, if he does not have the intention to avoid them in the future. Therefore, an intention like this is just as necessary as contrition itself, that is, with a necessity of means. It is necessary to say something else about keeping the commandments when the resolve is actual. For, if this were as necessary as contrition with a necessity of means, no one would be justified except at the moment of death, that is, when he had actually already kept all the commandments; this certainly is false.

4. The mercy of God surpasses the mercy of man. But man sometimes forgives his enemies, even when they have not repented; indeed Christ commands us to do this (Matt. 5:44). Therefore God must remit sins even for those who do not repent.

St. Thomas *responds* to this in III, q. 86, a. 2 ad 3: "God's mercy is more powerful than man's, in that it moves man's will to repent, which man's mercy cannot do."

5. God remits the sin in infants without penance. Therefore also in adults.

St. Thomas also *responds* to this: "In children there is none but original sin, which consists, not in an actual disorder of the will, but in a habitual disorder of nature... and so in them the forgiveness of sin is accompanied by a habitual change resulting from the infusion of grace and virtues, but not by an actual change. On the other hand, in the case of an adult, in whom there are actual sins, which consist in an actual disorder of the will, there is no remission of sins, even in Baptism, without an actual change of the will, which is the effect of Penance" (*ibid.* ad 1).

113. Scholium 1. *On the necessity of means in contrition.* The necessity of contrition for the remission of sins is not only a necessity of precept, but also of means. For, contrition is positively leading to salvation, and on the other hand it is so demanded in the founts of revelation that its necessity cannot be thought to be from the circumstances of the sinner, or from a mere divine precept (which would be dispensable), but absolute if at the same time the order of justification freely established by God is supposed.

Scholium 2. *What kind of contrition is necessary with a necessity of means.* Contrition can be formal and virtual. Formal contrition is explicit detestation of sin. Virtual is an act in which a man does not detest sin explicitly, but its tendency is of such a nature that, if a man actually thought about his sin, he would detest it. Thus, v.gr., someone

2. See Knabenbauer, *In Lucam* 377-380.

who makes an act of love of God, while not thinking about a sin committed previously, does not have formal contrition; but he does have it virtually, because the tendency of that love of God is of such a nature that it cannot be reconciled with sin. The contrition, therefore, that is necessary for the remission of sins, per se must be formal, as the argument given proves sufficiently. But theologians ask whether *per accidens* in some case virtual might be sufficient. And indeed many Thomists, like Cano, Peter Soto and Dominicus Soto,[3] require always a formal act of contrition. However, Scotus along with many others[4] contends that virtual contrition always suffices, namely an act of charity, in which contrition is contained implicitly and virtually. Finally, Suarez, and with him now many theologians, make a distinction: per se formal contrition is required whose "first and fundamental reason is the divine ordination, which is made known to us sufficiently from Scripture and the sense of the Church"; but *per accidens,* in a case where the sinner, having forgotten about his sins, elicits an act of perfect charity or suffers martyrdom, then that virtual contrition suffices. For, on the one hand forgetfulness excuses from formal contrition, and on the other hand perfect charity always justifies.[5] This second opinion is more probable.[6]

3. M. Cano, *Relectio de paenitentia* p.3; P. Soto, *De paenitentia* lect.4f.; D. Soto, *In 4* d.15 q.1 a.2.
4. Scotus, *In 4* d.14 q.1 a.3; Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.9 s.1 n.1 and 6 mentions many other theologians who follow Scotus.
5. Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.9 s.1 n.1-11.
6. The contrition required in the sacrament as its part is always formal contrition; see Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.20 s.6 n.2. Regarding venial sins, the common doctrine of theologians holds that also for their remission some contrition is necessary with a necessity of means, either formal or virtual. And they prove this both from Holy Scripture (Rev. 2:1-5), and from the fact that the Fathers require some kind of daily repentance, whereby lesser sins are taken away. But this agrees with the reason that the remission even of lesser sins is not given without some detestation and retraction of them. See S.Th. III, 87, a. 1; Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.12 s.1 n.4-13.

Thesis 13. Contrition, with perfect charity, always justifies, even outside of the actual reception of the sacrament.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q.5, a. 1ff.; Galtier, 58-77; Lercher-Lakner, 467-475; Puig, 706-720.

114. Definition of terms. *Contrition* is divided by Trent (D 1677-1678) into perfect and imperfect. This naming is taken both from the different *effect* and from the different *motive* or formal object.[1]

a) *By reason of its effect,* perfect contrition (contrition in the strict sense) is that which justifies even outside of the actual reception of the sacrament; therefore it alone in nature of a disposition suffices for justification, although it must include a desire for the sacrament. But imperfect contrition (attrition) is that which alone does not suffice for the justification of a sinner outside of the sacrament.

a) *By reason of the motive,* from which comes the efficacy or inefficacy of the effect, perfect contrition is that which is perfected by charity, that is, by the appreciative love of God above all things, because of his absolute goodness; while imperfect contrition will be that which "commonly arises either from the consideration of the heinousness of sin or from the fear of hell and of punishment." We will see later whether contrition can be perfected equivalently by other motives.

Contrition is perfected by charity in two ways: *By a command,* if the act of charity commands the placing of an act of contrition, even if it is made from any kind of motive; or *by a personal choice,* if the act of contrition is elicited from the motive itself of charity. Both turn out to be acts of contrition, perfected by charity. But the latter kind can be had in various ways. For, the mind can tend directly towards the love of God: "I love you, my God, because you are infinitely lovable, and therefore I wish that I had never sinned"; or, on the contrary, it can be ordered directly to detestation of sin: "I am sorry for my sins, because I have offended God, who is infinitely lovable."

But it should be noted that Trent did not teach explicitly how charity

1. The first one who seems to have distinguished perfect and imperfect contrition from its different formal motives is Durandus; but for contrition he does not require perfect charity: similarly Paludanus (see A. Landgraf, *Reue:* LTK 8,850f.). Cajetan distinguished between the two contritions because perfect contrition is the greatest appreciation of God, but imperfect is a lesser appreciation (see J. Göttler, *Der heilige Thomas von Aquin und die vortridentinischen Thomisten,* 242-247. Also at that time the motive of attrition was commonly held to be fear; but there was a dispute about the motive of perfect contrition: Biel and Cano required a motive of perfect charity; Vitoria, D. Soto and Vega thought that a love of God lesser than perfect charity is sufficient (see V. Heynck, *Untersuchungen über die Reuelehre der tridentinischen Zeit:* FranzStud 29 [1942] 25-44). In this historical moment the Tridentine doctrine is proclaimed, in which the distinction between the two contritions from different motives is made clear. See Lercher-Lakner, 469; Galtier, 57; A. Landgraf: ThRev (1933) 393.

perfects contrition. For, it asserted in general only this: that charity perfects contrition; but it described it only negatively, since it excluded from perfect contrition that which arises from the consideration of the heinousness of sin or from the fear of hell and punishment. In the scholium we will consider the other motives in addition to charity.

Even outside of the actual reception of the sacrament, that is, before the sacrament is received actually, although a desire for the sacrament is required, as is clear from what we said in thesis 7.

Always justifies, that is, not only in a case of necessity or of martyrdom, but whenever a sinner elicits an act of perfect contrition sanctifying grace is infused into him.

115. Adversaries. 1. *Protestants* hold that contrition never reconciles with God; for, it does not justify, but only fiducial faith does.

2. De Bay taught that the act of charity does not exclude the state of sin; and that contrition perfected by charity, outside of the actual reception of the sacrament, does not always justify, but only in a case of necessity, as at the moment of death or when it is not possible to receive the sacrament, or in the case of martyrdom (D 1931ff., 1970f.)

116. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent* in sess.14 ch.4 (D 1677-1678) supposes as known to all that "it sometimes[2] happens that this contrition is perfect through charity and reconciles man to God before this sacrament is actually received"; therefore it intends to teach directly even then that "this reconciliation, nevertheless, is not to be ascribed to contrition itself without the desire of the sacrament, a desire that is included in it." See sess.6 ch.14 (D 1542-1543). In fact, Trent itself prepared a definition, to be inserted between canons 5 and 6 of sess.14, in which it said: "If anyone denies that sins are forgiven, through contrition by which a penitent, with the aid of divine grace through Jesus Christ, is sorry for his sins because of God, with the intention of confessing and doing satisfaction, let him be anathema."[3] But the definition was dropped lest some Catholic theologians be tarnished with a note of heresy, for example, Cajetan, who is said to have thought otherwise. St. Pius V taught that perfect contrition always justifies (D 1971).

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2. Contrary to the false interpretation of de Bay, the meaning is this: as often as contrition is perfected by charity, so often is there reconciliation with God. Hence the adverb "sometimes," which de Bay misused, affects in the same way and together the two propositions—"contrition perfected by charity" and "to reconcile man with God."
3. See Theiner, *Acta Concilii Tridentini* 1,592; F. Cavallera: BullLittEccl (1932) 136f.

Theological note. It is at least *Catholic doctrine,* and perhaps even *proximate to a definition.*

117. Proof from Holy Scripture. From John 14:21ff.: *They who have my commandments and keep them are those who love me; and those who love me will be loved by my Father, and I will love them and reveal myself to them... Those who love me will keep my word, and my Father will love them, and we will come to them and make our home with them.* Here he is speaking about love between God and man. And surely *on the part of man* the matter has to do with actual and efficacious *charity,* since it implies the observance of the commandments. *But on the part of God,* the love of friendship is understood, for because of it the Father and the Son come and make their home, which can take place only through grace; therefore it is a love superior to that which God has for sinners. Therefore, from this we argue thus:

Charity always justifies. But perfect contrition necessarily is joined together with charity. Therefore, perfect contrition always justifies.

The major is certain from the quoted words.

The minor. For perfect contrition either is elicited by charity, or is commanded by it, as is clear from our definition of terms.

Note 1. The charity, about which John is speaking, is joined together with the keeping of the commandments only in desire or as a resolve, not necessarily in actuality; for otherwise justification would not be obtained until the end of life, which is false. Therefore a charity is understood that by its very nature is practical or efficacious.

Note 2. God also loves sinners with a love of beneficence, as is clear from Christ's redemption and other benefits. See Rom. 5:8; 1 John 4:10. Of course he loves them with this love of beneficence, but not yet with paternal friendship, in order to lead them to this paternal friendship. St. Thomas (II-II, q. 27, a. 2) beautifully explains the distinction between these two loves.

Note 3. Holy Scripture attributes the forgiveness of sins also to other virtues, v.gr., faith (Rom. 5:1), fear of the Lord (Sir. 1:27), alms (Tob. 12:9)...; however these justify only in the sacrament. Therefore, likewise it is opposed to the argument given by us that charity itself justifies only in the sacrament, but not before its actual reception. I respond to this objection by denying the parity. For, *charity is a proximate and final disposition* for justification, as we just proved, supposing as more remote dispositions of faith, hope, etc.; but it merits justification *with infallible congruity* (*de congruo*). But the other virtues are *mediated and remote dispositions,*

as is certainly true of fear, because it justifies only in the sacrament (D 1677-1678); however, concerning faith and alms and any other virtues, as we proved in thesis 12, for those who have fallen into personal mortal sin contrition is the necessary means for justification, and those virtues, without contrition, cannot justify. But the way in which contrition justifies with perfect charity will be discussed in the scholium.

118. Proof from tradition. 1. The Fathers urged the actual reception of baptism, as the ordinary and certain way of salvation. However, at the same time they think, although there are not many such statements, that the catechumens who die without baptism and without their own fault, in virtue of their charity can be saved. Well known are the words of St. Ambrose regarding the death of Valentinian: "I hear that you are sorry that he did not receive the sacrament of baptism. Tell me, what else is there in us except petition? But a short time ago he had this desire, that, and it was before he came to Italy, he should be instructed, and he said that he wanted soon to be baptized by me, and therefore he thought he would come to me. Therefore did he not have the grace that he desired? Did he not have what he begged for? Certainly, because he begged for it. He received it" (R 1328). Some other statements that have a trace of the same teaching are in Tertullian, St. Cyprian and St. Hippolytus.[4]

And an objection should not be raised from St. Augustine where he says: "For however much a catechumen progresses, he still bears the burden of his iniquity; it is not forgiven unless he comes to baptism."[5] For, as is clear from what St. Augustine had just said a little before, the words of the objection are true for the one who out of arrogance does not wish to be baptized, and therefore he does not possess true contrition.

Nor should a difficulty be pressed from some other words of the same St. Augustine: "The sanctification of a catechumen, if he has not been baptized, is not sufficient for him to enter the kingdom of heaven, or for the remission of his sins."[6] For, as is certain from what precedes these quoted words, the sanctification there is not understood as subjective through the internal dispositions of the catechumen, but that which was conferred through the proper means for the sanctification of a catechumen, which was the imposition of hands. Therefore he is talking about a certain imperfect sanctification, but not about the perfect sanctification obtained by charity.

Moreover, St. Augustine openly taught that an adult can obtain salvation

4. They are gathered together by Galtier, 67.
5. *In Io* 13,7: ML 35,1496.
6. *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* 2,26: ML 44,175.

through conversion alone of the heart, provided that the sacrament of baptism is not contemned, but its desire is also present; and he proves it by the example both of Cornelius the centurion and of the good thief: "I find that not only suffering for the name of Christ can supply for that which was lacking from baptism, but also faith and a conversion of heart, if perhaps because of the dangers of the times he could not be helped."[7]

2. The Fathers eloquently describe the power of charity to drive out sins. Thus St. Clement of Rome: "Who can describe the bond of the love of God?. The height to which charity raises a person is ineffable. Charity glues us to God..." (R 26). Origen: "The sixth also is the forgiveness of sins through the abundance of charity" (R 493). St. Ephraem: "O power of tears, how in the blink of an eye, when your wings have been removed, do you ascend to heaven and obtain your requests from God, who meets you propitiously, bringing with him indulgence and the forgiveness of your sins..." (R 743). St. Chrysostom: "He [St. Paul] knew that nothing is greater than charity, that nothing is equal to it, not even martyrdom which is the chief of all goods... For charity, even without martyrdom, makes disciples of Christ; but martyrdom without charity cannot do that."[8] St. Chrysologus: "See, O man, that you do not despair, for there remains a way in which you can give satisfaction to your most holy creditor. Do you wish to be absolved? Love. Charity covers a multitude of sins. What is worse than the crime of denial? Yet Peter by his love alone was able to blot it out..." (R 2176).

119. Theological reasoning. Contrition with perfect charity is the most perfect conversion of man to God. Therefore it is fitting that God convert himself likewise to man, by the forgiveness of his sins. *It is fitting,* I said. For, God is not held from justice to restore his friendship because of the act of charity, because an act of this kind per se is not sufficient compensation for the injury. But since it is certain from revelation that God wishes to restore his friendship because of such an act of charity, we can easily understand how great the fittingness is in this matter. For, just as by sin the divine friendship is lost, because man turns himself totally away from God, so it is fitting that he should recover by charity the friendship of God, because charity involves the total amount of conversion of man to God that he is capable of offering.

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7. *De baptismo* 4,22.29 (see R 1629f.); *De anima et eius origine* 1,9,11: ML 44,480; *Retractationes* 2,18: ML 32,637.
8. *In S. Romanum martyrem* 1,1: MG 50,607.

120. Scholium 1. *On the way in which both perfect contrition and the desire of the sacrament justify.* It is certain from what we have proved that contrition perfected by charity always justifies, even before the sacrament is actually received. Hence we also know from thesis 7 that the sacrament is necessary with the necessity of means for justification actually or in desire. Therefore, as Trent teaches (D 1677-1678), perfect contrition includes the desire for the sacrament; and so, justification must be attributed to contrition together with a desire of the sacrament. Therefore, how do both extra-sacramental contrition and the desire for the sacrament influence justification?

Contrition does not influence it as the *instrumental cause,* since it is not a part of the sacrament; nor as the *formal cause,* at least as an adequate one, for according to Trent (D 1529) "the single formal cause [of justification] is the justice of God...."[9] But contrition contributes to justification as *the proximate and final disposition* of grace, with which it is immediately connected; therefore it differs from the other preparatory acts of justification because they are only remote dispositions, and therefore only mediately connected with grace. Moreover, contrition contributes to justification also by way of *merit,* not condign, but *infallible congruous merit.* But this contrition is brought about, not by habitual grace, as not a few theologians contend, but by actual grace, as Trent seems to imply, when it teaches that justification follows the dispositions of the sinner, the last one of which is contrition (D 1525ff.).[10]

The desire of the sacrament does not have a positive influence on the remission of sins, since it is charity alone that justifies. However, a desire for the sacrament is required as a *necessary condition,* because Christ instituted the sacrament as the necessary means of salvation. But two things should be noted concerning this desire: 1) Desire of the sacrament is not something added extrinsically to perfect contrition, but by its very nature is included in it; for, no one can truly love God , without at least implicitly desiring to receive the sacrament instituted by Christ as necessary with a necessity of means. 2) In relation to justification desire for the sacrament differs from the desire for the other precepts, both because the sacrament, whose desire is had, is not a mere precept, but also the means of salvation, and because perfect contrition, including the desire for the sacrament, is itself also the means for justification. Therefore, the matter can be conceived under these signs of reason: 1) God first instituted the sacrament as the necessary means of salvation; 2) then he commanded that it should be received; 3) finally, he accepts perfect contrition as a vicarious substitute for the sacrament.[11]

121. Scholium 2. *On the formal object of justifying contrition.* As we said, contrition elicited from the motive of charity, justifies ever outside of the actual reception of the sacrament; but this does not happen if the motive is the fear of hell or punishment

9. Contrition was thought to be the formal cause of justification, although partial, by P. Soto, *De paenitentia* lect.4; D. Soto, *De natura et gratia* 2,18; Vázquez, *In 1.2* disp.203; In 3 disp.2 c.6. Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.8 s.3 n.10 does not deny that it is probable; but both he and many other theologians reject that opinion. See Galtier, 88-92.
10. This controversy is reviewed by Billuart, *De gratia* disp.7 a.4; Lange, *De gratia* 343-346. See also M. Quera, *La contrición en la justificación, según Suarez y Vázquez:* EstEcl 22 (1948) 561-569; E. Elorduy, *Suarez en las controversias sobre la gracia:* ArchTG 11 (1948) 117-130.
11. See Lugo, *De paenitentia* disp.3 s.1 n.6f.

(D 1677-1678). But there is a question whether contrition posited from other motives, which are directed to God as the final end, such as the motives of obedience, gratitude, religion, justice..., enjoy the same power of justifying as contrition perfected by charity. There are several theologians, especially Scotists, who hold that such motives suffice for justifying contrition outside of the sacrament.[12] However, many theologians, and surely with more probability, deny this. And rightly so. For the sources recognize as contrition proximately justifying only that which is elicited from charity. Therefore, since all of this depends on the positive institution of God, the prior opinion seems to lack a solid foundation.[13]

122. Scholium 3. *On the intensity of contrition.* Contrition is *appreciatively greatest,* if the will is turned away from sin as the greatest evil; but it is *intensively greatest,* if the will is displeased about sin above its displeasure concerning any other evil. Now according to all theologians, contrition must be appreciatively greatest; for otherwise it would not perfectly turn the soul away from sin. But there was a question among theologians whether intensively greatest contrition would also be required, or at least a certain grade of intensity. Hadrian demanded intensively greatest contrition absolutely, P. Soto comparatively to earthly evils, Juenin, Witase and Berti at least a certain grade of intensity.[14] But the common and certain opinion of theologians holds that no grade of intensity if required, provided that the contrition is appreciatively greatest. See S.Th., *Suppl.* q.5, a. 3. This is also clear both from Trent, where no intensity is mentioned, and from the condemnation of de Bay, from which it is concluded that charity is simply connected with grace; and also from theological reasoning, because even minimal charity, if it is true charity, involves the absolute conversion of the will to God.[15]

What we have said about intensity must also be said, and for the same reasons, *about a certain duration of time.* For the perfection that charity gives to contrition comes essentially from such a motive that it does not demand length of time in order to produce its efficacy.

123. Scholium 4. *On the remission of temporal punishment.* The Angelic Doctor (*Suppl.* q. 5, a. 2) says about this that the contrition can be of such a nature that it wipes out the whole guilt of punishment. And it does it in two ways: "In one way on the part of charity, which causes the displeasure; and thus it happens that charity is intended actually in such a way that the contrition flowing from it will merit not only the removal of the guilt, but also absolution from all punishment. In another way is on the part of sensible sorrow, which the will stirs up in contrition; and because that is also a certain kind of punishment, it can be intended with such vigor that it suffices for the removal of the guilt and the punishment."

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12. See Brancatum de Laurea, *De paenitentia* disp.8 a.2 n.20-25; Minges, *Compendium theologiae dogmaticae specialis* 3.130f. Lugo considered this opinion probable, *De paenitentia* disp.5 s.1 n.4-9.
13. There is more on this in Galtier, 73-77.
14. Hadrian, *De sacramento paenitentiae* q.2; P. Soto, *De paenitentia* lect.14f.; Juenin, *De paenitentia* q.4 c.4 a.1; Witase, *De sacramento paenitentiae* q.3 a.6 s.3; Berti, *De theologicis disciplinis* 1,34 c.6.
15. Puig, 726-732, answers the objections, many of which have already been anticipated.

Thesis 14. Attrition, conceived from a consideration of the heinousness of sin or from the fear of hell and punishment, if it excludes the will of sinning and has hope of forgiveness, is a gift of God.

S.Th. III, q. 85, a. 5; Galtier, 94-113; Lercher-Lakner, 481-488; Puig, 751-768.

124. Definition of terms. *Attrition* is described by Trent (D 1677-1678) while taking into consideration both the *effect* and the *motive*. Therefore, *attrition by reason of its effect* is that imperfect contrition which, "though without the sacrament of penance it cannot of itself lead the sinner to justification, it nevertheless disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance." But *attrition, by reason of the motive,* is that imperfect contrition which is not elicited from charity, but *from the consideration of the heinousness of sin or from the fear of hell and punishment.*

There can be many motives of attrition. However, all seem to be able to be reduced to these two, which are mentioned by Tertullian. For, in every sin the guilt and the punishment are distinguished; therefore, we can detest sin either because of the evil of the guilt (*the heinousness of sin*, unless perfect contrition is present), or because of the evil of punishment (*fear of hell and punishment*). Now these two Tridentine motives will be explained further.

The heinousness of sin is understood as the deformity that sin has, inasmuch as it is opposed to religion (for it violates the honor due to God), to obedience (it violates the precepts of God), to gratitude (it is opposed to his benefits), etc. But here that heinousness is not included, which belongs to sin inasmuch as it is opposed to the absolute goodness of God; for that would be perfect contrition.

Fear is the act of aversion from an imminent and undesirable evil. Therefore, the object of fear is either the punishment itself or the one who inflicts it. Hence there are two kinds of fear—filial and servile. *Filial fear* is that whose object is an offense against God as Father. It is called "filial fear" because a good son fears to displease his parents, not because of a punishment, but because of the offense. *Servile fear* is that whose object is the punishment to be inflicted by God. It is called "servile" because it is characteristic of servants. But servile fear can be either slavishly servile, or simply servile. *Slavishly servile fear* is present when the punishment is feared as the greatest evil. Fear of this kind does not exclude an attachment to sin; in fact it can exist together with sin; but it does exclude the love of God. Therefore it is intrinsically evil. *Simply servile fear* is that whereby the punishment is feared as a true evil, but not as the greatest evil. It proceeds from an ordered love, inasmuch as man desires his own good, but

not to the extent that he prefers it to the goodness of God. It is opposed to the love of God only negatively, inasmuch as here and now it is not present, but it can be. Therefore it is a good fear. See II-II, q. 19, a. 1-6.

Hell here means the eternal punishment of loss and sense.[1]

By *punishment* is understood the temporal punishments of this life and of the next life.[2]

If it excludes the will of sinning, that is, if it excludes all deliberate attachment to sin.

Hope of forgiveness, not out of despair; for the situation has to do with attrition by which reconciliation with God is sought.

It is a gift of God, because in itself it is a good act, and in reference to justification it is a salvific act.

Therefore, a) we say that attrition or the sorrowful detestation of sins because of the motive of the heinousness of sin or the fear of hell or punishment is a gift of God. b) But from this twofold motive, we pay special attention to terrifying attrition, or to the kind that is conceived from fear of hell or punishment; for our adversaries attack this form. c) Nevertheless, only simple servile fear is said by us to be good, useful and in fact salvific; but certainly not slavishly servile fear. d) It is supposed that the will of sinning is excluded, with the hope of forgiveness; and we shall see that this can take place through attrition.

125. Adversaries. 1. *Protestants,* both the old and the modern, rejecting any kind of contrition, especially attack terrifying contrition, which they say is evil because it does not remove attachment to sin, and therefore cannot convert the sinner (D 1456, 1677-1678, 1705).[3]

2. Jansen held that attrition is not a good motion and not supernatural (D 2314-2315).

3. Quesnel said that the one who avoids sin out of fear has already committed them in his heart (D 2460ff,).

4. *The Synod of Pistoia* taught that the fear of punishment or of hell is not good or useful (D 2625).

126. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent* in sess.6 ch.6 (D 1526-1527): "Sinners... from the fear of divine justice... are struck with a salutary shock"; cn.8 (D 1558) defines that the fear of hell is not a sin, and it does

1. See J. Chaine, *Géhenne:* DBS 3,563-579.
2. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.5 s.2; Lugo, *De paenitenita* disp.5 n.137; Palmieri, *De paenitentia* 377f.; A. Landgraf, *Die Lehre der Frühscholastik von der knechtischen Furcht:* DivThom (Fr) 15 (1937) 43.157.308.
3. There is more on this in Galtier, 99f.

not make sinners worse; sess.14 ch.4 (D 1677-1678) teaches that attrition is a gift of God; cn.5 (D 1705) defines attrition from the motive of the ugliness of sin and from the fear of eternal damnation, and says it is a true and useful sorrow and prepares for grace.

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

127. Proof from Holy Scripture. The Holy Scriptures exhort us to detest and avoid sin from motives of attrition. Therefore attrition is good and noble.

The consequence. God cannot commend and urge to things that are not good, for that would be an argument that he is evil.

The antecedent. John the Baptist exhorted those who came to him to do penance, out of fear of the coming wrath: *You brood of vipers! Who warned you to flee from the wrath to come? Bear fruit worthy of repentance* (Matt. 3:7-8). Christ himself also urged penance out of fear of hell: *If your right eye causes you to sin... it is better for you to lose one of your members than for your whole body to be thrown into hell... Fear him who can destroy both soul and body in hell* (Matt. 5:29f.; 10:28).

128. Proof from tradition. The Fathers bear witness to this truth especially in two ways:

1) Inasmuch as they often mention and urge *the motives of attrition;* this supposes that they look upon attrition as good and noble. Thus Tertullian: "If you shrink back from exomologesis, consider in your heart hell, which exomologesis will extinguish for you..." (R 317). Clement of Alexandria: "Justice is twofold—one indeed because of charity, but the other because of fear... For those who are converted from fear to faith and justice, endure forever; and in fact fear effects abstinence from evil" (D 434). St. Gregory of Nyssa: "Salvation comes to some through fear, when, looking at the threats of the sufferings of hell, they are turned away from evil deeds" (R 1025).

2) Inasmuch as they *clearly assert the goodness of attrition.* Here are the words of St. Chrysostom: "What is worse than hell? But there is nothing more useful than fear of it; for the fear of hell brings us the crown of the kingdom... For, nothing consumes sins so much, and makes virtue increase and bear fruit, as the nature of a continual fear" (R 1143). Here are also the words of St. Augustine: "Since therefore the Lord inspires fear, and vehemently inspires it, and repeatedly utters dire threats, shall I say: Have no fear? I will not say that. Clearly fear, you can fear nothing better. There is nothing that you ought to fear more than this" (R 1514).

129. *On the mind of St. Augustine.* The Jansenists claim that St. Augustine only commended fear that proceeds from charity; and therefore that the holy Doctor denied fear in the proper sense.

Actually, according to St. Augustine and also according to us, the fear of hell is not filial fear, that is, it does not reveal a filial mind towards God, for this is proper to a *chaste* fear. Nevertheless fear of hell is a good thing. For, in order for it to be good and useful for salvation, it is sufficient that it does not imply necessarily an attachment to sin. Indeed, St. Augustine openly teaches that positively it moves one to reject an attachment to sin and to embrace the love of God. Listen to St. Augustine himself: "Where their worm dies not, and their fire is not extinguished. Men hear this; and since they are truly future for the wicked, they fear and withdraw themselves from sin. They have fear, and because of this fear they restrain themselves from sin. Surely they have fear, but they do not love justice. But since through fear they restrain themselves from sin, the habit of justice takes place, and what was difficult to be loved begins to take shape, God become sweet; and now, because of that, man begins to live justly, not because he fears punishments, but because he loves eternity" (R 1487).[4]

130. Theological reasoning. The notion itself of attrition implies these three things: 1) sorrowful hatred of sin; 2) fear of hell; 3) ordination of the hatred of sin to avoid hell. But these three things are good and noble. Therefore attrition is good and noble.

The minor. 1) *The sorrowful hatred of sin* is obviously something good.

2) *The fear of hell* is also good. For hell is a true evil, and therefore something to be hated, provided that by this hatred man is not turned away from the true good. Indeed, in some cases, that hatred not only does not turn one away from goodness, but it also turns him away from sins. Therefore the fear of hell is good.

3) *To ordain hatred of sin in order to avoid hell* is also good. For it is a good thing to ordain an apt means to a good end. Indeed, the hatred of sin is the apt and only means to avoid hell. Therefore to ordain hatred of sin in order to avoid hell is a good thing. However, please *observe:* a) that other motives are not excluded because of which sin can be hated; b) that the fear of hell is only a cause of the hatred of sin, but not at all to consider hell as a greater evil than guilt.

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4. See R. Rimmi, *Das Furchtproblem in der Lehre des hl. Augustin:* ZkathTh 45 (1921) 244-249; A. Teixidor, *De mente S. Augustini circa timorem servilem:* Greg (1929) 501-536.

131. Objections. 1. From Rom. 8:15: *For you did not receive a spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received a spirit of adoption.* Therefore fear is foreign to the New Law, and therefore in this economy it cannot be good.

I respond to these words that St. Paul here is only teaching that love reigns rather than fear, while in the economy of the Old Law it was fear rather than love. However, by that the Apostle does not intend to exclude love from the Old Law, nor fear from the New Law. Therefore, with those words, St. Paul is only handing on a real trait, though not exclusive, of both Laws.[5]

2. From 1 John 4:18: *There is no fear in love, but perfect love casts out fear.* Therefore in the New Law any kind of fear is totally excluded.

I respond to these words that St. John is only teaching that where true charity reigns, it drives out servile fear, or such that takes away trust, but not all fear so that the person who enjoys such charity is rendered absolutely certain about his own salvation. Much less does St. John contend that, together with charity, the fear of God cannot exist—either filial or servile.[6]

3. Hatred of sin out of fear of hell does not exclude an attachment to sin; just as a merchant, throwing his goods into the sea because of his fear of shipwreck, has not lost his attachment to those goods. Therefore the fear of hell is not good.

I deny the parity. For, the merchant, in order to avoid shipwreck, does not necessarily have to lose his attachment to his goods; and therefore he can will efficaciously to avoid shipwreck, while retaining his inefficacious attachment to his goods. The sinner, however, in order to escape hell, must completely renounce his affection for sin, since hell will be imposed on him, not only because of his external action, but also because of his internal act of the will. Therefore, if he wishes efficaciously to escape hell, fear of it must wipe out his attachment to sin.

4. Someone who hates sin because of the motive of hell, would sin if hell did not exist. But such a person retains his attachment to sin. Therefore someone who hates sin because of the motive of hell, retains his attachment to sin.

I distinguish the major. Someone who hates sin because of hell is of such a mind that here and now he would wish to sin, if hell did not exist, *denied;* perhaps the sin would not be hated, if there were no hell, *I bypass the major. I distinguish the minor.* Someone who here and now is of such a mind that he would wish to sin, if there were no hell, retains his attachment to sin, *conceded;* someone who perhaps would sin, if there were no hell, retains his attachment to sin, *denied.* For, it is one thing to elicit *this act of the will:* "I would sin if there were no hell," and it is something very different *to have the thought:* "Perhaps I would commit a sin if there were no hell." The first view signifies an attachment to sin; but the second view does not involve an attachment to sin, but only perhaps would be involved in it if there were no hell.

5. See Cornely, *In epistolam ad Romanos* 415-418.
6. See F.C. Ceulemans, *In epistolas catholicas* 143f.

Thesis 15. Attrition disposes proximately to obtain justification in the sacrament of penance.

Galtier, 398-4-6; Lercher-Lakner, 548-557; Puig, 734.750.769.781.

132. Connection. Once the goodness of attrition has been vindicated, then its efficacy for obtaining justification must be investigated. But this is what Trent says, when it teaches that attrition disposes one to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance (D 1677-1678). Theologians, however, dispute whether this disposition is proximate or remote. Together with many others, we hold that it is a proximate disposition.

133. Definition of terms. *Attrition*, that is, the imperfect contrition whose goodness we proved in the previous thesis. It is understood, therefore, as that contrition which is elicited from a consideration of the heinousness of sin or from the fear of hell and punishment, provided that it excludes the will to sin and implies the hope of pardon.

Disposes or prepares someone to acquire justification in the sacrament of penance. But this disposition is thought to have two forms—proximate and remote. It will be *proximate*, if, given the attrition, now nothing more is required for the sinner to be justified in the sacrament. But it will be *remote,* if some love of God is required that is superadded to the attrition.

134. Opinions. 1. *All the adversaries to the preceding thesis* deny that attrition is a disposition for justification in the sacrament of penance, since they reject attrition as evil. But this error has already been refuted there.

2. Also *some older scholastics* deny that attrition is a disposition for justification in the sacrament of penance. We mentioned them above (n. 21) as holding that contrition perfected by charity is required necessarily in order to receive the sacrament of penance; and therefore, according to them, the sacrament does not effect absolution of the guilt of sin, but only its punishment, either eternal or temporal. But we also already rejected this opinion in thesis 1, when we proved that the sacrament of penance remits the guilt itself, and that the sacrament is ordained to this. Therefore perfect contrition cannot be required as a necessary condition, because if it were the sacrament itself would never justify.[1]

1. See G.M. Cserto, O.P., *De timore Dei iuxta doctrinam scholasticorum a Petro Lambardo usque ad S. Thomam* (Vienna 1940); M. Quera, *De contritionismo et attritionismo in scholis usque ad tempus Sancti Thomae traditio:* AnalSacraTarrac 4 (1928) 183-202; A. Michel, *Pénitence:* DTC 12,953f.

3. *Some post-tridentine theologians,*[2] who are called *contritionists,* deny that attrition is a disposition for justification in the sacrament of penance, since, according to them, for the remission of sins contrition perfected by charity is always required. But by distinguishing perfect contrition into *intense* and *remiss* (that is, into an intense or remiss grade), they demand intense contrition for extra-sacramental justification, but remiss for sacramental justification. But this opinion must be rejected for the same reason that the opinion of the older scholastics was, since it really turns out to be the same teaching.

4. *A few old scholastics,* like Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and it seems also St. Thomas,[3] taught that attrition, recognized as such, is not a sufficient disposition for the sacrament of penance; but that perfect contrition suffices, which a penitent thinks he has when he goes to confession but actually has only attrition, so that in virtue of the sacrament the attrition becomes contrition. This was really a singular explanation of the sacramental action; nevertheless, even that being the case, the penitent was justified de facto by the sacrament of penance, without perfect contrition preceding it. Therefore de facto, in this hypothesis, attrition was a proximate disposition of the sacrament.

5. *Some post-tridentine theologians,* conceding that attrition is a disposition for justification in the sacrament of penance, make it not a proximate but a remote disposition, inasmuch as some love of God must be superadded to it. However, they do not agree among themselves in determining what this love of God is. For, Billuart, whose opinion was recently revived by Périnelle, requires a love, not of charity but of benevolence, which is appreciative above all, although it can be remiss.[4] Tournely and Wirceburgenses require the love of concupiscence, as it seems, but formal and not just virtual.[5]

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2. Juenin, *De paenitentia* q.4 c.4 a.1; Berti, *De theologicis disciplinis* 34,5; Drouin, *De contritione et attritione* 4,2; Gazzaniga, *Praelectiones theologicis* t.9 disp.6 c.5; Ch. Lupus, *De contritione et attritione* c.7; Morin, *De administratione sacramenti paenitentiae* 8,4.
3. See Galtier, *De paenitentia* 400; M. Buchberger, *Die Wirkungen des Bussakramentes nach der Lehre des hl. Thomas von Aquin;* H. Dondaine, O.P., *L'attrition suffisante* (Paris 1943); A. García, O.P., *La atrición en Vitoria y su escuela:* CiencTom 71 (1947) 62-94; J. Blic, *Sur l'attrition suffisante:* MélLScRel 2 (1945) 329-366; Göttler, *Der heilige Thomas von Aquin und die vortridentinischen Thomisten über die Wirkungen des Bussakramentes* (Freiburg 1904); De Vooght, *La justification dans le sacrement de la pénitence d'après Saint Thomas:* EphThLov 5 (1928) 225; 7 (1930) 663.
4. That is, according to Billuart, the love of God from his absolute Goodness is divided into *love of charity* (which supposes reciprocal friendship, and therefore is given only in the just), and *love of benevolence* (which does not have the reciprocity of friendship, and therefore is also given in sinners). See Billuart, *De paenitentia* diss.4 a.7; J. Périnelle, O.P., *L'attrition d'après le concile de Trente et d'après Saint Thomas d'Aquin* Le Saulchoir (1927). Garrigou-Lagrange favors the opinion of Billuart, *De Eucharistia et Paenitentia* (Turin 1943) 374-378. It is helpful to read the comments on Périnelle's work made by M. Quera: EstEcl 7 (1927) 318-355; 10 (19310 51f., and by Galtier: Greg 19 (1938) 373-416.
5. Tournely, *De paenitentia* q.5 a.3; Wirceburgenses, *De sacramentis* 154-163.

135. 1. **Our opinion.** Before Trent Scotus, Durandus, H. Gandavensis, Aureolus and the *Scotists* generally taught that attrition is a proximate and sufficient disposition.[6] But after Trent this doctrine became so common that Suarez said that "this opinion is absolutely true"; and Lugo said that the opposite opinion is now not probable.[7] In a decree of the Holy Office, given in the year 1667, although it was forbidden to censure either opinion, nevertheless our opinion was said at that time to be "more common among the scholastics." *The Scotist theologians, the theologians of the Society of Jesus, many Thomists, and generally the moralists under the leadership of St. Alphonsus* teach the same thing.[8]

Therefore, in our opinion, attrition is the proximate sufficient disposition for obtaining justification in the sacrament of penance, so that, besides attrition, no further love of God is required. I said, *besides attrition.* For in it is included necessarily some love of God, and indeed in three ways: *materially,* inasmuch as it is required that the penitent hate the offense to God, which is an evil to God, and therefore materially wills the good of God, since the good of God is the material object of the will; *virtually,* because attrition includes at least the implicit will of keeping all the commandments, and therefore, where a precept urges, also the command of love for God; in a way *formally,* inasmuch as it must be joined together with the hope of pardon or of recovering the divine friendship, where the love of concupiscence is already included.[9] Therefore we concede this much; but we deny that, *in addition to* this implicit love in attrition itself, some other love of God must be superadded.

136. Doctrine of the Church. In this matter, two things above all must be distinguished: 1) that attrition is the disposition, in general, for receiving justification in the sacrament of penance; 2) that attrition is the proximate disposition, without requiring some additional love of God.

1. *Attrition is a disposition for grace:*

Trent in sess.14 ch.4 (D 1677-1678) taught that attrition is an impulse of the Holy Spirit whereby the penitent is helped to prepare himself for justification; and that it disposes him in order to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament; cn.5 (D 1705) defined that attrition prepares someone for grace.

6. Scotus, *In 4* d.20 q.un n.3; d.16 q.1 n.7 (on the correct doctrine of Scotus, see Minges, *Die angebliche laxe Reuelehre des Duns Scotus:* ZkathTh 25 [1901] 230-257); Durandus, *In 4* d.18 q.2 n.6; Henricus Gandavensis, *Quodlibeta* 1 q.32; Aureolus, *In 4* d.18 a.1.
7. Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.20 s.1; Lugo, *De paenitentia* disp.7 s.13 n.273.
8. Among the Thomist theologians, see v.gr. Cano, *Relectio de paenitentia* p.6; Gonet, t.5 disp.7 a.3. See also St. Alphonsus, *De paenitentia* n. 440.
9. See Puig, 769; A. Beugnet, *Attrition:* DTC 1,2235-2262.

2. *Attrition is a proximate disposition:*

This controversy, whether attrition is a proximate or a remote disposition, has not yet been resolved by the Church. However, there is in existence a *decree* of the Holy Office in which, while there is a prohibition that a theological censure not be attached to either opinion, our opinion is said at that time to be "more common among the scholastics" (D 2070).[10]

137. Theological note. 1. That attrition disposes or prepares for grace, in general, is a truth *of defined divine and Catholic faith.*

2. That attrition is a proximate disposition is an opinion which, especially since the time of Trent, daily has become more common so that today it can be said to be *practically certain.*

138. Argument. 1. *From Trent,* sess. 14 ch.4 (D 1677-1678): "Attrition... though without the sacrament of penance it cannot of itself lead the sinner to justification, it nevertheless disposes him to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament penance." *Hence we argue:* From these words it is clear that Trent, speaking about the relation of attrition to the sacrament, says nothing about any formal love that must be added to attrition. But there the Council is speaking about attrition proximately disposing someone for the sacrament. Therefore, attrition alone, without any superadded love, is the proximate disposition for the sacrament of penance.

The minor. According to Trent, there is the same relation of perfect contrition to grace without the sacrament, when it is actually received, as there is of attrition with the sacrament. But the first is a relation of proximate disposition. Therefore also the second. Or also to put it a bit differently. According to Trent, attrition without the sacrament disposes for grace in a different way than attrition with the sacrament. But the first disposition is remote. Therefore the second cannot be remote, but is proximate.

2. *From Trent* in sess.6 ch.6 (D 1526-1527): "Adults are disposed for that justice, when... they begin to love God as the source of all justice." The adversaries seek the main foundation for their opinion from this quote. But these words do not demand in the one who disposes himself for justification any formal love beyond that of attrition. For 1) from the history of this expression it is certain that that act of initial love was not designated by the Tridentine Fathers as necessary, but only as something that generally occurs in the process of justification; therefore from those words it cannot be argued that love of this kind is necessary. 2) From the acts of the Council

10. See L. Ceyssens, O.F.M., *L'origine du decret du Saint-Office concernant l'attrition:* EphThLov 25 (1949) 83-91.

it is clear that those words denote a certain love of concupiscence, which pertains to hope, but not to the love of benevolence because of the absolute goodness of God.[11]

3. *From the praxis of the Church,* which tolerated this doctrine for a long time; but it could not have done this, if the doctrine were false, for there would be a danger of the invalidity or inefficacy of the sacrament, which for other reasons was very necessary.

139. 4. *From theological reasoning:*

a) *The love of charity is not required.* For the disposition required for the sacrament cannot be such that it already has produced grace by the work done; for then the sacrament would be useless. But the love of charity would produce grace. Therefore the love of charity cannot be required.

b) *The love of benevolence is not required.* For, that love is necessarily the love of charity, because it is made from the formal motive of charity, which is the absolute goodness of God. Therefore the love of benevolence cannot be required.

c) *The formal love of concupiscence is not required.* For, provided that it is virtually included in the attrition itself, it already sufficiently influences the conversion, both from the nature of the matter, and also on the part of God who sees all hearts.

140. Objections. 1. From 1 John 3:14: *Whoever does not love abides in death.* Therefore for justification, at least some love of God is required.

I respond that the mind of St. John here is on something else. For here it is asserted that we prudently judge that we have moved from the death of sin to the life of grace, *because we love the brothers;* for the love of neighbors is a sign and effect of justice. And on the contrary, whoever does not love or hates his brother is caught up in the state of injustice.

2. From Joel 2:12: *The Lord says, return to me with all your heart.* But a conversion of this kind is had through charity. Therefore for justification at least some charity is required.

I distinguish the major. God demands conversion from the whole heart, by a total turning away from sin and by conversion to God as the necessary end, *conceded;* precisely by an actual conversion to God, loved because of himself, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* Perfect conversion is had through charity, *conceded:* imperfect conversion, although sufficient to obtain justification in the sacrament, is not had by total aversion from sin and by conversion to God as the necessary end, *denied.*

I explain. It is rightly understood that to obtain justification by the work of the agent

11. See M. Premm, *Das tridentinische "diligere incipimus"* (Graz 1925); Hefner, *Die Entstehungsgeschichte des Trienter Rechtfertigungsdekretes* 154; Palmieri, *De paenitentia* th.30; V. Heynck, O.F.M., *Untersuchungen über die Reuelehre der tridentinischen Zeit:* FranzStud 29 (1942) 25-44.

a perfect conversion through charity is required; for it is fitting that God should require from man in this hypothesis as much as he is able to offer. But when justification must be obtained by the work done, it is not demonstrated that the same thing is required, and the reason is not the same why this should be required. For, then the total conversion to God through attrition suffices, in which, as we explained above, some love of God is also contained.

3. From 1 Cor. 13:3: *If ... I do not have love, I gain nothing.* Therefore without charity justification cannot be obtained.

I respond that here only this is being taught: without habitual and actual charity nothing is gained, or even heroic acts towards the neighbor, regarding merit for eternal life. But the Apostle does not say whether charity is necessary for justification.[12]

141. 4. From Trent (D 1677-1678), when it describes attrition gives the example of the Ninivites, who were living under the economy of the O.T., and were justified by contrition perfected by charity. Therefore some charity is superadded to attrition.

I respond that it is sufficiently clear from the context that the example of the Ninivites was mentioned in order to explain the goodness and utility of attrition, but not in order to declare what the nature of attrition must be, which disposes for the sacrament of penance, since this sacrament did not yet exist.

5. From the same Trent (D 1677-1678), inasmuch as it teaches that attrition disposes the sinner "to obtain the grace of God in the sacrament of penance." Therefore attrition disposes to the extent that it obtains perfect contrition, which alone justifies.

I deny the supposition. For to impetrate means the same thing as to obtain, as is certain from the first words of the same chapter; "This disposition of contrition was necessary at all times for the attainment of the remission of sins" (D 1676). For there the Council is talking about contrition in general, and so also about perfect contrition, and the intended meaning of the objector cannot agree with this. Therefore, to impetrate means the same thing as to obtain; and since, from our proof, Trent is speaking about the proximate disposition, to impetrate is the same thing as to obtain grace, while no act of love is being superadded.[13]

6. In the draft of chapter 4 on penance the following was stated: "This holy Synod establishes and declares that the contrition, which theologians call attrition, not only does not make man a hypocrite and a greater sinner (as some have not feared to say blasphemously), *but also suffices for the establishment of this sacrament... "*[14] But these last words, in which our thesis was contained, were omitted. Therefore it is a sign that according to the Council attrition is not a proximate disposition.

I concede the major and minor. But I deny that the draft was rejected because it taught our thesis. For, the Fathers omitted those words lest they condemn the Catholics

12. See Cornely, *In priorem epistolam ad Corinthios* 395.
13. Other points like these, which are proposed from Trent by Périnelle, are refuted by Galtier: Greg 19 (1938) 403-409.
14. A. Theiner, *Acta genuina S. Oecumenici Concilii Tridentini* 1,584.

who held the opposite.[15] However, as is apparent from our argument, they amended the draft in such a way as to retain the same teaching, that is, our thesis.

142. Scholium. *On a valid and unformed sacrament of penance.* The sacraments, whose substance is independent of the dispositions of the recipient, can easily be thought to exist as valid and unfruitful. But since in the sacrament of penance the disposition of the penitent or contrition, about which only this matter concerns, is a part of the sacrament itself, it is more difficult to understand that a sacrament can be both valid and unfruitful. Because of this, theologians dispute whether a sacrament of penance can be given which is valid but at the same time does not confer grace on the penitent.[16] But it seems that the negative opinion should be embraced, since contrition, which is required for the sacrament, must be *universal* and *efficacious.* Therefore, if the penitent thinks he has attrition when de facto he does not have it, it seems that there is no sacrament. It seems that this must also be said if the motive of attrition is only particular, so that it covers only one of various sins that the penitent has committed. Therefore, we hold as more probable that there is no such thing as a sacrament of Penance that is at the same time valid and unfruitful.

15. A. Theiner, *ibid.* 1,600; Pallavicini, *Historia concilii Tridentini* 12,10,24f.; Galtier: Greg 19 (1938) 408; Cavallera: BullLittEccl (1932) 126-135.

16. See Galtier, *De paenitentia* 417-21; F. Ter Haar, *De sacramento paenitentiae valido et informi:* EphThLov 15 (1938) 625; C. Boyer, *De paenitentia et extrema unctione* (Rome 1942) 334.

ARTICLE III

ON CONFESSION

143. Trent explained and defined the doctrine on confession in sess.14 ch.5 and cns. 6-8 (D 1681-1683, 1706-1708). Here are the main points made there:

1) *The fundamental fact:* Christ instituted the integral confession of sins as necessary.

2) *The way to understand this fact:*

a) *Regarding the fact:* all mortal sins must be submitted to the keys, but not necessarily venial sins; moreover, all the circumstances must be revealed that affect the species of the sin; this must be done after a careful examination of conscience.

b) *Regarding the manner:* public confession was neither commanded nor forbidden by Christ; but secret confession was always recommended by the Church.

Indeed, not a few of the things mentioned here by Trent pertain rather to moral theology. Therefore, we will not enter into those matters and in the following thesis we will consider only the fundamental fact of the necessity of an integral confession according to the divine law; but in the scholiums we will speak about the integrity of confession, about public and secret confession and about the confession of venial sins.

Thesis 16. By the institution of Christ the integral confession of mortal sins is necessary.

S.Th. *Suppl.* q. 6, a. 1-6; Galtier, 422-467; Lercher-Lakner, 558-568; Puig, 783-803.

144. Definition of terms. *By the institution of Christ,* that is, from the divine law, and therefore not from a law of the Church, although it is true, given this necessity from the divine law, that the Church determined it more precisely in Lateran Council IV by the precept of an annual confession (D 812).

Is necessary, and not only with a necessity of precept, but also with a *necessity of means* actually or in desire, so that, if the fallen sinners after baptism do not want to confess, when it is possible and should be done, they cannot obtain salvation. Therefore, the necessity of confession adds something beyond the necessity of the sacrament, which we proved before in thesis 7. For, through the necessity of the sacrament it is certain that all sins will have to be submitted to the keys, but it is not yet said that they

must be submitted for this reason, that is, through their own accusation of every individual sin.

Confession is understood as the accusation of one's own sins made to a competent priest, in order to obtain their pardon. But confession can be generic (confused) or specific (distinct). That is said to be *generic* whereby someone says that he has sinned, without declaring any sin in particular; such a confession is already included in the request alone for absolution. But a *specific* confession is then present when the species and number of sins are distinguished one by one. However, this specific confession can be either *integral* or *non-integral.*

A confession is said to be *integral* when all the sins are manifested. It can be integral: a) *materially* or *objectively,* if all the sins actually committed are declared; b) *formally* or *subjectively,* if all the sins are mentioned which the penitent, after a careful examination of conscience, remembers, and which he is able to manifest.

Mortal sins. For the necessity of confession pertains only to mortal sins. We will consider the confession of venial sins in the scholium.

Therefore, *we say* that Christ the Lord instituted, as necessary with a necessity of means actually or in desire, the confession of mortal sins, and also an integral confession, but with formal integrity, not material. But we will explain this integrity of confession a bit more in the scholium.

145. Adversaries. 1. John Wycliffe (1324-1387) said that confession is useless for someone who is contrite of heart (D 1157); and that it was not instituted by Christ, but was invented by Innocent III.

2. Petrus M. de Osma (fifteenth century) in his little book, *De confessione,* taught that the effect of the sacrament of penance is to be attributed to contrition alone, and that specific confession is an ecclesiastical institution (D 1411f.). Moreover, the learned Doctor had already publicly retracted this doctrine before it was condemned by Sixtus IV.[1]

3. Luther initially retained confession, at least regarding grave and manifest sins (D 1458f.); but later on, already having been condemned for other errors, he began to attack the Church precept of confession, but not yet confession itself; however, he denied the divine institution of confession, and taught that it was not necessary to make it to a priest.[2] Calvin also denied the necessity of confession.[3] *Recent Protestants* also reject the necessity and divine origin of confession. The Anglicans are an

1. See F. Stegmüller: RömQschr 43 (1935) 205-266.
2. See P. Bernard, *Confession chez les Protestants:* DTC 3,935f.; A. Michel, *Pénitence:* DTC 12,1060.
3. Calvin, *Institutions* 4. See P. Bernard: DTC 3,941f.; A. Michel: DTC 12,1064f. On the old Protestant your will find much information in St. Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 3,1.

exception; although they hold, it seems, that confession is of human origin, nevertheless they recommend it as useful and salutary.[4]

4. *Contemporary non-Catholic historians of dogma, influenced by evolutionism,* deny the divine institution of confession and its necessity. However, they say that this custom was introduced into the Church from the praxis of submitting at first public sins, and then secret sins, to ecclesiastical penance; this practice became very common under the influence of the monks.[5]

146. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent* in sess.14 ch.5 (D 1679-1681) taught the divine institution of integral confession and its necessity by divine law for all the lapsed after baptism; actually, the Church always understood that this is contained in the very institution of the sacrament of penance; cn.6 (D 1706) defines that sacramental confession was both instituted and made necessary by divine law; cn.7 (D 1707) defines the necessity of integral confession by divine law; cn.8 (D 1708) defines that the confession of all sins as it is observed in the Church is not impossible.

147. Theological note. 1) It is a truth of *defined divine and Catholic faith:* a) the divine institution of confession; b) the necessity of an integral confession by divine law.

2. It is *at least Catholic doctrine*, from the universal sense of the Church, that the institution of integral confession, and its necessity, is contained in the institution itself of the sacrament of penance.

148. Proof from Holy Scripture. From John 20:23: *If you forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained.* See Trent sess.14 ch.5 (D 1679-1681). From that we construct our argument.

Christ instituted the sacrament of penance as a true judgment, and also as necessary, for all post-baptismal mortal sins. But these require integral confession of all post-baptismal mortal sins. Therefore, by the institution of Christ the integral confession of all post-baptismal mortal sins is necessary.

The major is clear from thesis 5 on the judicial nature of the penitential power, and from thesis 7 on the necessity of the sacrament of penance.

The minor. A judge, in order to give a just sentence, must have complete knowledge of the case. But this cannot be known except by an integral

4. See A. Michel: DTC 12,1067; Morel, *Calvin:* DTC 3,930-935; Caspari, *Beicht:* REPT 2,533-541; R.H. Benson, *Les confessions d'un convertit* 58-84, 110-149.

5. See Galtier, *Pénitence:* DAFC 3,1788-1793.

confession of the penitent. Therefore the integral confession of all post-baptismal mortal sins is necessary. That the case cannot be known in any other way than by an integral confession of the penitent is proved from the fact that the confessor must know: a) *the sins of the penitent,* which are often secret or also merely internal, and in fact they are always internal with regard to the intention; and also *all the sins*, for otherwise he would not have complete knowledge of the case to be judged; and also *all together*, because one sin without the others in the same sinner cannot be remitted; b) *the interior disposition of the penitent,* which cannot be certain without the confession of the penitent; c) moreover the priest, as will be demonstrated below, *is bound to impose a fitting satisfaction* or one proportionate to the sins, which he cannot do unless he knows all the sins.[6]

149. Proof from tradition. The argument from tradition can be presented in two ways, and it is very strongly attacked by the adversaries: a) *Apologetically,* inasmuch as we show to the non-Catholic adversaries, who deny the infallibility of the Church, as it were *ad hominem* from historical facts that the necessity of integral confession comes from Christ the Lord himself. b) *Dogmatically,* inasmuch as the constant and universal consensus of the infallible Church bears witness to the same truth.

a) *The apologetic way.* The necessity of integral confession is a fact that is older than any age claimed by the adversaries. Therefore it must be acknowledged as coming only from Christ himself.

The antecedent. For, three times are designated by the adversaries as the moment in which the necessity of integral confession was introduced: namely, 1) *in 1215* by Lateran Council IV; 2) *in the middle of the fifth century* in the letters of St. Leo the Great; 3) *in the middle of the third century* in the persecution of Decius. But the necessity of integral confession precedes all of these dates, so that it was already practiced at the end of the second century as a tradition coming from Christ. Therefore the necessity of integral confession antedates every period assigned by the adversaries. Nor can it be said to have been invented by men before the third century, in the age in which the Church was very protective about her traditions, and in which she protested against any innovations. Therefore, it must be admitted that it really did take its beginning from the institution of Christ.

The minor of the preceding proof must be developed somewhat more:

1) Calvin said that the necessity of confession was first introduced by Innocent III at *Lateran Council IV.*[7]

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6. St. Bellarmine develops this argument at length, *De paenitentia* 3,2ff.
7. Calvin, *Institutiones* 3,4. See S. Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 3,13.

But this unfounded calumny is refuted by the Council of Trent in sess.14 ch.5 (D 1683): "For the Church did not establish through the Lateran Council that Christ's faithful should confess, which she had understood to be a necessary institution of divine law, but that the precept of confession should be discharged by one and all at least once a year on their reaching the age of discretion." Therefore the Lateran Council did not invent confession, nor did it decree that it is necessary, but only established the precept of annual confession, and in this way it made the divine law specific.

Moreover, they prove that confession was thriving much earlier: a) *The penitential books,* which flourished abundantly from the sixth century[8]; b) statements of the holy Fathers, which will be presented below in the dogmatic argument; c) the consensus of the oriental sects, separated from the Church in the fifth and ninth centuries, which in this matter never contradicted the Catholic truth[9]; d) the necessity of confession is stated in the fifth century by St. Leo the Great (D 323ff.). And so other Reformers prove that Calvin is guilty of falsehood, when they hold that the necessity of confession was introduced by St. Leo the Great.

2) Therefore, other Protestants taught that *St. Leo the Great* introduced the necessity of confession.

Here is our response to them: a) The reading of these letters of St. Leo shows that the Roman Pontiff intended nothing else but to remove the abuse of requiring the faithful to make a public confession, which he says was "against the apostolic regulation." Therefore St. Leo supposed that the necessity of a secret confession was from the apostolic tradition, but in no way invented by him. b) According to the testimony of Socrates and Sozomenus,[10] already in the middle of the third century, the office of the penitential priest had been instituted; this proves that the necessity of confession preceded the time of Leo the Great.

3) Therefore, there are some who say that the necessity of confession was introduced when the office of the penitential priest appeared, *around the middle of the third century.*

Now the reason why bishops established this office at that time was not because of a new necessity of confession, but, because "in order to obtain pardon it was necessary that the sin be confessed," lest the bishops

8. G. Le Bras, *Pénitentiels:* DTC 12,1160-1170: P. Fournier-Le Bras, *Histoire des collectiones en Occident depuis les Fausses Décrétales jusqu'au Décret de Gratien* (Paris 1931); S. González, *Los penitenciales españoles:* EstEcl 16 (1942) 73-98; *La penitencia en la primitiva Iglesia española* (Salamanca 1950) 131-154, 173-218.
9. H. Denzinger, *Ritus Orientalium* 1,105-115.
10. Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 5,19: MG 67,614; Sozomenus, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 16: MG 67,1459.

be too preoccupied with hearing many confessions[11]; therefore at that time confession was already held to be necessary. Moreover, while, at the end of the second century, the Montanist heresy was raging, the Church vindicated for herself the power conferred by Christ or remitting also those sins, which the Montanists reserved to God alone; and this could be done only on the presupposition of confession. Therefore the necessity of confession, and indeed integral, must be acknowledged as coming from Christ the Lord.

150. b) *The dogmatic way. First it must be noted* that, since in the sacrament of penance praxis preceded theory, the explicit doctrine on the necessity of confession was not so frequently extolled in the first centuries of the Church. However, there are not lacking statements of those same Fathers, when they touch on public penance; these certainly become more frequent from the sixth century, especially in the penitential books, and from the eighth century also in particular councils.[12] But we are taking into consideration only the documents of the Fathers.

1. The Fathers describe the confession of sinners *as a part of penance:* therefore, in the mind of the Fathers confession enjoys the same necessity as penance itself. On this Origen says: "And this is the seventh remission of sins through penance, although it is difficult and troublesome, since the sinner washes his bed with his own tears, and day and night his tears are like bread to him, and then he is not ashamed to manifest his sin to the priest of the Lord..." (R 493). And St. Cyprian: "What great faith and fear those have who, although not burdened with any crime of sacrificing to idols or of having a false document, sorrowfully and simply confessing their sin to the priest of God make a good confession..." (R 553). And St. Ephraem: "The principle of penance begins with words; when the confession takes place with a word it is the beginning of penance; wherefore the beginnings of salvation are given to the publican, but they do not perfectly free him from his debt, because he has not yet done his penance perfectly" (R 744). And Pseudo-Gregory: "Three things surely must be considered truly in each penitent, namely, conversion of mind, confession by mouth, and satisfaction for sin."[13] And St. Isidore: "Confession... precedes, remission follows... One who is guilty of sin and has not confessed it is beyond pardon."[14]

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11. See Socrates and Sozomenus in the cited places.
12. These monument of tradition are collected accurately by St. Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 3.5-10; Galtier, 431-467; D'Ales, *De sacramento paenitentiae* 84-10; Vacanard, *Confession:* DTC 3,838-894.
13. *Expositiones in librum I Regum* 6,2,33: ML 79,439.
14. *Etymologiae* 6,19,78: ML 82,259.

151. 2. The Fathers *openly teach the necessity of confession,* either with explicit words, or under the image of a sick person, revealing his wounds to a doctor so he can heal them. Thus Origen: "There is something in this wonderful secret, which urges us to manifest our sin. For everything we have done must be announced in every nation and proclaimed in public... Therefore if in life we anticipate him [the devil], and we are our own accusers, we escape the wickedness of our enemy and accuser, the devil... See therefore that, because the sin was announced, it merits remission of the sin" (R 494). And St. Basil: "The same procedure should be observed in the confession of sins that is used in revealing the illnesses of the body. Therefore, just as men do not reveal the diseases of the body to all, nor to just anyone at all, but to those who know how to cure them, so also the confession of sins must be to those who are able to cure them..." (R 975). And St. Ambrose: "Therefore most evidently are we bidden by the teaching of the Lord to confer again the grace of the heavenly sacrament on those guilty even of the greatest sins, if they with open confession bear the penance due to their sin" (R 1298). And Tertullian: "Yet [we see] most men either shun this work, as to being public exposure of themselves, or else defer it from day to day. I presume [they do so as being] more mindful of modesty than of salvation... Grand indeed is the reward of modesty, which the concealment of our fault promises us!." (R 316). And Origen; "For if... we shall have revealed our sins, not only to God but to those who can cure our wounds and sins, our sins will be forgiven..." (R 477). And Aphraates: "It does not irk a man wounded in battle to turn himself over to a wise doctor, because having been overcome in battle he fell... So also someone who has been stricken by Satan must not be ashamed to confess his crime and to abandon it and beg for penance as a remedy..." (R 685). The same metaphor is used by St. Basil, St. Chrysostom, St. Pacian, St. Ambrose, St. Jerome, St. Asterius.

3. The Fathers *exhort the faithful to confess* all their sins, considering it necessary from the institution of Christ. Listen to St. Pacian: "Therefore I beseech you, brothers, even at risk to myself, cease hiding your wounded conscience from the Lord who sees all hidden things. Prudent sick persons are not afraid of doctors... Is the sinner afraid? Does the sinner blush at purchasing eternal life with his present shame?."[15] And St. Chrysostom: "If until now we were negligent, let us now kill the wickedness by confession, by tears, by the accusation of our own sins. For there is nothing more fatal for sin than the accusation and rejection of sin joined together with an abundance of tears. Have you condemned your sin? You have set aside

15. *Paraenesis ad paenitentiam* 8: ML 13,1086.

your burden. Who says this? God himself, the judge: *Tell your sins first so that you will be justified.* Therefore, I ask, why are you ashamed to manifest your sins?." (R 1132). And St. Ambrose: "If you wish to be justified, confess your sin. For a shamefaced confession of sins looses the bands of transgression"... (R 1299). And St. Leo the Great: "When it is fitting that each Christian heed the judgment of his conscience and not postpone from day to day his return to God or schedule the time for making satisfaction for the end of his life...when there may scarcely be opportunity either for confession on the part of the penitent or reconciliation on the part of the priest..." (D 310).

152. Theological reasoning. There are two reasons of fittingness—one a priori and the other a posteriori:

1. Without the necessity of confession, sacramental forgiveness, from its too easy facility, became an occasion for sinning; but when the necessity of confession was introduced, the danger of abuse or illusion was guarded against. Moreover, this difficulty and the shame itself of going to confession is compensated for by a great peace of conscience which penitents experience (D 1674, 1682).

2. Confession turns out to be very useful, both with regard to the knowledge of consciences, and in order to foster the devotion and humanity of families and peoples.[16]

153. Objections. 1. In the earliest times of the Church great silence is observed about confession among the authors of the time. Therefore this is a sign that at that time confession was not considered necessary by divine law.

I respond that it is already sufficiently clear from the quoted documents that the silence was not so great; moreover, they can still be completed with new texts from *St. Clement of Rome,*[17] from the *Didache* (R 3 and 8), and from *Ho h*

Holy Scripture itself (Acts 19:18; James 5:16).[18] However, we readily concede that at that time confession was not as frequent as it is in our day. For, 1) the practice of confessing venial sins, common and frequent today, at that time was not yet in force; b) also, many were baptized as adults, after a serious conversion, whereby it happened that, given the praxis of not confessing venial sins, they did not need the sacrament of penance.

2. St. John Chrysostom, although he preached so many sermons to commend all the duties of the Christian life, although he often urged Holy Communion even for those who scarcely once a year approached the holy table, although he supposed that these hearers were burdened with many sins, although he gave many homilies on pen-

16. See St. Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 313; Galtier, *Pénitence:* DAFC 3,1785f.
17. *Epistola ad Corinthios* 51 and 57.
18. See Puig, 794; Galtier, 346-357,431f.

ance, Chrysostom, I say, does not have an explicit word about making a confession to a priest; in fact, when he says explicitly, that confession should be made to God alone,[19] he seems to exclude positively confession to a priest. Therefore this is a sign that at the time of Chrysostom the necessity of confession by divine law was not acknowledged in the Church.

I respond to this difficulty, which Galtier[20] proposed to himself, that it can be answered by showing that the teaching about penance and confession, as it was preached by St. Chrysostom, does not exclude the recognition of the necessity and praxis of making a confession to a priest. In fact, Galtier demonstrates this: a) from the use and praxis of other authors of the same period, v.gr., Origen, St. Ambrose, St. Basil, St. Augustine, St. Leo the Great; b) from the history and teaching of the same Chrysostom, since it is certain that his words should not be understood as they sound, and since there are other indications from which it is concluded, even where confession is said to be made to God alone, that this is not absolutely a personal thing, but is actually made to a priest. For, the exhortations of Chrysostom to overcome shame and to go to the doctor of souls seems to suggest this, who, according to the words of Chrysostom himself,

is no one other than a priest (R 1119f.) Here are a few examples: "Why therefore, I ask, are you ashamed and why do you hesitate to tell your sins?." For, do you tell it to a man so that he may abuse you?."[21] "But are you ashamed and do you blush to tell your sins?. But it is not necessary to be so ashamed; for it is shameful and ignominious to sin, but not to confess that you have sinned... Is he ashamed to confess his sins so that he may be freed of his sins?"[22] "God sent to him Nathan the prophet; a prophet comes to a prophet. For it is thus when it concerns doctors; if a doctor is sick, then he needs another doctor. The same thing happens here; a prophet committed a sin, and it was a prophet who brought the remedy. Therefore what does the king say? *I have sinned against the Lord*... So what does Nathan say to him? *The Lord has forgiven your sin.* You have condemned yourself and so I condone your punishment. You have confessed your sin in good faith and so you have erased your sin. You have called down punishment on yourself, so I have rescinded my sentence on you. Do you see that what was written has been fulfilled: *First reveal your iniquities that you may be justified?*"[23]

Indeed, Chrysostom himself acted as such a doctor so that in this matter he was accused by his adversaries: "Because he provides licentiousness for sinners, teaching like this: if you sin again, repent again, and as often as you sin, come to me and I will heal you."[24]

Therefore, if Chrysostom does not exclude and is not ignorant of the necessity of confession to be made to priests, why does he not recommend it in his homilies? *One reason* could be because the priests, in remitting sins, do nothing by their own power

19. *De Lazaro* 4,4: MG 48,1012; *De paenitentia* hom.2,1: MG 49,285.
20. Galtier raises this difficulty for himself and solves is splendidly, 453-467. He had already written about his matter: *Saint Jean Chrysostome et la confession:* RechScRel 1 (1910) 209-240, 313-350.
21. *De Lazaro* 4,4: MG 48, 1012. See *In Genesim* 20,3: MG 53,170.
22. *Homilia non esse ad gratiam conscionandum* 3: MG 50,658.
23. *De paenitentia* hom.2,2: MG 49,286f.
24. See Photius, *Bibliotheca* cod.59: MG 103,111; Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 6,21: MG 67,725.

but are only vicarious ministers or instruments of God, who accomplishes everything through them.[25] *But the main reason* for this singular silence seem rather to be in the prudence, which Chrysostom himself teaches is to be observed by priests in curing the infirmities of their sheep.[26]

154. 3. The Council of Cabillonense II, held in the year 813, teaches in can.33: "Some say that sins must be confessed only to God, but others think they should be confessed to priests; because both take place in the holy Church not without great fruit, thus we confess our sins only to God, who is the forgiver of sins, and we say with David: *I have made my sin known to you*...and according to the institution of the Apostle we confess our sins in both ways. Therefore, the confession that is made to God cleanses sins; but that which is made to a priest, teaches how those sins are forgiven. For God, the author and source of salvation and health, often provides this by the invisible administration of his power, and often by the operation of doctors.[27] Therefore, in the ninth century the necessity of confession was not yet acknowledged in the Church, but was freely made either to God alone or to priests.

I respond that the council in the preceding canon #32 taught the necessity of integral confession[28]; therefore a priori it follows that they did not decree the opposite in the following canon. Therefore, in this canon 33, the controversy is not being presented which at the time was raging about the necessity of confession, but some illiterate people are being referred to who erred in two ways. For, either they held that contrition alone or confession made to God alone suffices, or on the contrary they said that external confession alone to a priest is sufficient, without the need of interior contrition. Moreover, traces of this error are also found in some writers of that period, v.gr., in *Alcuin* (+ 804) and in *Jonas Aurelianensis* (+ 844).[29] But the Council of Cabillonense condemns this error, when it says that both kinds of confession are necessary: "thus also we confess our sins to God...and to one or the other... Therefore the confession made to God cleanses sins," but without taking away the obligation of going to a priest, who, by imposing a suitable satisfaction, "teaches as the sins are being cleansed." This interpretation becomes part of the traditional teaching around the same time through the work of *Theodulphus Aurelianensis* (+ 821).[30] Finally, the last words of the canon mean that the remission of sins is had sometimes before confession through the contrition itself, but sometimes only by receiving absolution of a priest.[31]

4. St. Bonaventure wrote: "The Lord did not per se institute confession... Confession was hinted at by the Lord, instituted by the Apostles, promulgated... by James."[32] Therefore confession was not instituted by Christ.

I respond that the holy Doctor is denying nothing other than the *express* institution

25. St. Chrysostom explains this vividly in *hom.87 in Ioannem:* MG 59,472.
26. *De sacerdoce* 2,2ff.: MG 48,633ff.
27. MGh *Leges* 3,2,1,280.
28. *Ibid.*, 279.
29. Alcuin, *Epistula* 112: ML 100,337; Jonas Aurelianensis, *De institutione laicali* 1,15: ML 106,152.
30. *Capitula ad presbyteros parochiae suae* 30f.46: ML 106.200-207.
31. See A. Debil, *La première distinction du De paenitentia de Gratien:* RevHistEccl 15 (1914) 265f.
32. *In 4* d.17 p.2 a.1 q.3.

of confession, but concedes that it was *implicitly* instituted by Christ, when he instituted the sacrament of penance itself. Here are the words of the same St. Bonaventure found in the same cited place: "From what has been said, four reasons can be given why the Lord did not institute confession immediately and expressly... And if he is said to have instituted it, this is to be understood as hinting at it and giving the authority for it." And a little later in d.22 a.2 q.1 he says: "Penance... was instituted... as to its form, which is the absolution of the priest and binding , and as to the matter, which is a clear and open confession not only in general but also in particular; first of all the Lord instituted it per se and promulgated it, that is, by giving the power of the keys in John 20:23 after his resurrection; but secondly, it was instituted by the Apostles, or to speak more clearly, promulgated by them, because the Lord taught the Apostles, and they, having been taught by the Lord and with the authority received from him, in fact with his authority, promulgated it.[33]

155. Scholium. 1. *On the integrity of confession.* The necessity of confession that is per se distinct according to the species and number of all mortal, sins which have been committed after baptism, follows from the judicial nature of the sacrament of penance. However, since Christ is thought to have instituted confession with the purpose that, considering the ordinary circumstances of men, it should be possible, accidentally (*per accidens*) *a confession only formally integral* will be able to be sufficient, so that the integrity of the matter is not always required for the validity and the fruit of the sacrament of penance. Indeed, sometimes, in a case of necessity, *a generic confession suffices;* for, the penitent manifests his sins in the way that he is able to do it here and now, and such a confession is at least formally integral. But whether a general confession of this kind suffices outside of a case of necessity, that is, when no mortal sin is present, is disputed by the moralists.[34]

156. Scholium 2. *On public and secret confession.* Trent in sess.14 ch.5 (D 1683) responds briefly to the question whether a confession, at least formally integral, which we mentioned above, must be *public* or *secret,* and whether it is of *divine or ecclesiastical institution*: "Though Christ has not forbidden anyone to confess his sins publicly—in expiation for his offenses and in self-humiliation, both as an example to others and for the edification of the Church that has been offended—yet this is not commanded by divine precept, nor would it be really well-considered to enjoin by human law that sins, especially secret ones, must be revealed by public confession. The fact that secret sacramental confession, which Holy Church has used from her beginning and still uses, has always been commended by the most venerable and most ancient Fathers with great and unanimous agreement clearly refutes that empty calumny of those who do not fear to teach that it is a human invention foreign to the divine command originating from the Fathers assembled in the [Fourth] Lateran Council."

Therefore, *confession can be made publicly,* or in the presence of a crowd, both

33. *In 4* d.22 a.2 q.1.
34. See Lehmkuhl, *Theologia moralis* 2,363ff.; Noldin, *De sacramentis* 266.

for the humiliation of the penitent, and as an example for other and for the edification of the Church; but such a public confession was not commanded by Christ, nor did a praxis of this kind flourish, with the approval of the Church, so that secret sins would be publicly manifested, nor in order to be admitted to public penance. Indeed, St. Leo the Great condemned it as contrary to the apostolic regulation (D 323). Therefore, you should take note that public penance and public confession are not the same; for even in the public penance there was not necessarily a confession of sins before a multitude of the faithful.[35]

Therefore, although confession can be made publicly, *still it is not required by the sacrament,* since the nature of a judgment is sufficiently present in a secret or auricular confession, made by a penitent alone to a priest alone. Therefore, the Church from the very beginning has used, and still does use, this secret confession, and it has always recommended it. For, it is not at variance with the institution and mandate of Christ, nor is it a human invention (D 1706).

157. Scholium 3. *On the confession of venial sins.* The doctrine about the confession of venial sins is taught by Trent in sess.14 ch.5 (D 1679-1681) with these words: "As regards venial sins by which we are not excluded from the grace of God and into which we fall more frequently, it is right and profitable and implies no presumption whatever to declare them in confession, as can be seen from the practice of devout people; yet, they may be omitted without guilt and can be expiated by many other remedies." Therefore Trent is teaching three things: a) That venial sins are matter for confession; b) but that they are not the necessary matter; c) that they can be expiated in many other ways without confession.[36]

a) *Venial sin are matter for confession* is a truth defined by Trent in sess.14 cn.7 (D 1707). *That they are sufficient matter* seems to be at least Catholic doctrine (D 1679-1681, 1458, 2639). And it is also certain both from the tradition, which is witness to the fact that from the fourth century confession of venial sins alone was often made, and from the contemporary practice of the Church of confessing only venial sins; it is also certain for the reason that a venial sin is also a real sin, and so the forgiving power conferred on the Church by Christ extends to it too. This also holds for grave sins already forgiven by the sacrament of penance, as is clear from the exhortations of Benedict XI (D 880), and from the contemporary praxis of making general confessions.

b) *Venial sins are not the necessary matter of confession;* this is at least Catholic doctrine (D 1679-1681). For, this is proved both by tradition, according to which for a long time it was common in the Church that venial sins were not submitted to the keys; and by the contemporary praxis of not keeping even formal integrity with respect to venial sins; then there is the additional reason that venial sins do not absolutely close the door of heaven, which therefore necessarily would have to be opened by the keys.

c) *Venial sins can be expiated in many other ways*; this is at least Catholic doctrine (D 1679-1681). Therefore venial sins are remitted, not only by confession, but also by

35. Galtier, 475f.

36. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.18 s.1; Lugo, *De paenitentia* disp.13 s.3.

the reception of the other sacraments (D 1638), by the sacramentals, by any meritorious act, by contrition, and indeed, according to the more common opinion of theologians, also by attrition. But it should be well noted: in someone who has a mortal sin, a venial sin cannot be remitted, unless the mortal sin is remitted; a venial sin cannot be remitted without some repentance; although for the remission of venial sins the infusion of grace is not formally required, nevertheless concomitantly this always happens, since de facto a venial sin is remitted either by the sacraments or by meritorious acts.[37]

Scholium 4. *On the usefulness of the frequent confession of venial sins.* Since recently there have been some, who have lessened and criticized the high estimation of frequent confession among groups of young clerics, Pius XII in his encyclical letter on the *Mystical Body of Christ* has undertaken to defend and strongly recommend the pious use of frequent confession of known venial sins which, he says, "was introduced into the Church not without the stimulus of the Holy Spirit." The Roman Pontiff himself mentions the following benefits of frequent confession: "The real knowledge of oneself is increased, Christian humility grows, corruption of morals is stopped, spiritual negligence and sloth is resisted, the conscience is purified, the will is strengthened, moderation is obtained, and grace is increased in virtue of sacrament itself."[38]

37. See S.Th. III, q. 87; *De malo* q.7 a.11; J. Beumer, *Die Spekulative Durchdringung der Andachtsbeichte in der nachtridentinischen Scholastik:* Schol 13 (1938) 72-86. V. Miano, *La confessione de devozione nella Scolastica pretridentina* (Turin 1947); Vacandard, *Le traitement des peccata leviora dans l'Eglise primitive:* RevClerFr 27 (1901) 449-473, 600-626; M. Fábregas, *Estne opportunum sola venialia confiteri?*: PerMorCanLit 28 (1939) 5-24; K. Rahner, *Vom Sin der häufigem Andachtsbeichts:* ZAszMyst 9 (1934) 323-336.
38. AAS 35 (1943) 235.

ARTICLE IV

ON SATISFACTION

158. Trent developed questions about satisfaction in sess.14 ch.8-9 and cns.12-15 (D 1689-1693, 1712-1715), where, once the fundamental dogmatic foundations had been established, namely, that the whole temporal punishment is not always remitted together with the remitted guilt, and that man, while he lives, can make satisfaction to God for punishment of this kind, it teaches the necessity of imposing salutary and fitting satisfactions in the sacrament of penance. It also teaches what these works of satisfaction are, both within the sacrament of penance and also outside of it.

Therefore we will consider all of this in three propositions, taken singly or in the following order:

1) The whole temporal punishment is not always remitted with the remission of the guilt.

2) Man can make satisfaction to God in this life for such punishment.

3) Hence arises the necessity of sacramental satisfaction.

Thesis 17. In the reconciliation of a sinner by penance, together with the guilt and the eternal punishment, the whole temporal punishment due to him is not always remitted.

S.Th. III, q. 86, a. 4; Lercher-Lakner, 581f.; Galtier, 550-561.

159. Definition of terms. *In the reconciliation of a sinner by penance,* either sacramental or non-sacramental. But we are speaking about justification through penance, because in justification through baptism and through martyrdom the whole temporal punishment is remitted together with the guilt and the eternal punishment.

Together with the guilt and the eternal punishment. A twofold blame is the result of sin—guilt and punishment. *The guilty state of sin* is the habitual guilt, which constitutes man in a state of being habitually turned away from God, if it has to do with grave sin. *The guilty state of punishment* consists in the fact that a man must undergo a certain punishment. *Eternal punishment* is so connected with the guilt itself that these two always exist together and are always removed together. The reason for this is that the remission of the guilt in this order of providence cannot happen without the infusion of sanctifying grace, through which man is made an adoptive son of God, and therefore an heir of glory. Therefore, the question can only be about the permanence or length of the *temporal punishment.*

The whole temporal punishment is not always remitted. This, as we said, is always remitted completely by baptism and martyrdom; indeed, sometimes all of it can be remitted by penitential justification, for example, with an act of perfect contrition, or by the offering of a fully sufficient satisfaction. But this does not always happen; indeed, often, when the guilt has been forgiven through penance, some temporal punishment still remains that must be endured.

Moreover, it is evident that the temporal punishment can be remitted partially, because it is temporal, and so it can be more or less in length of time. But this is not the case with eternal punishment, because this has to be remitted all at once, since it either is or it is not.

160. Adversaries. 1. *The Reformers* thought that a debt of temporal punishment in the justified is harmful to Christ, as if he had not fully made satisfaction to God; and they also thought it is harmful to God, because it is contrary to the liberality and fullness of the forgiveness of sin made by God.

2. *Greek schismatics* denied that any temporal punishment remains after a sin has been forgiven, since it should be resolved by performance of the penance imposed.[1]

161. Doctrine of the Church. *Trent* in sess.14 ch.8 (D 1689-1691) proclaims this doctrine and proves it from Scripture, tradition and theological reasoning; cn.12 (D 1712) defines that the whole punishment is not always remitted together with the guilt; cn.15 (D 1715) also defines that it is not a fiction, "that, after the eternal punishment has been removed by virtue of the keys, there often remains a temporal punishment to be expiated"; sess.6 ch.14 (D 1542-1543) taught the same thing, namely, that the temporal punishment is not always remitted in full; cn.30 (D 1580) had likewise defined that, for any penitent sinner, the guilty state of sin and the penalty of eternal punishment is remitted in such a way that some penalty of temporal punishment remains, which must be expiated either in this life, or in the future in purgatory.

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.*

162. Proof from Scripture. In Holy Scripture God is presented as acting with sinners in such a way that, when their guilt has been forgiven,

1. See St. Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 4,2; Michel, *Pénitence:* DTC 12,1062; Jugie, *Grecque (Eglise)*: DAFC 2,372.375f; Bukowsk, *Die Genugtuung für die Sünde nach Auffassung der russischen Orthodoxie* 82f.; S. Tysziewiez, *Warum verwerfen die Orthodoxen unsere Verdienstlehre:* ZkathTh 41 (1917) 400-406; M. Gordillo, *Compendium theologiae orientalis* 161.

some temporal punishment still remains to be expiated. But this proves that the guilty state of sin and the guilty state of temporal punishment are separable, and de facto are separated. Therefore, when the guilt has been forgiven, the whole temporal punishment is not always forgiven.

The major is made clear by various texts of Scripture:

1) From Num. 14. There note the following: in v.1-10 the sin of the people; 11-12 God's anger; 13-19 the intercession of Moses; 20-21 forgiveness of the sin by God; 22f. imposition of a temporal punishment.

2) From 2 Sam. 11-12. In ch. 11 there is the sin of David; 11:27—12:12 recounts God's anger; 12:13 reports David's repentance and the forgiveness of the sin by God; 12:14f. relates the imposition of a temporal punishment.

163. *You will say.* This is true for the Old Testament, but not for the New, in which complete satisfaction was made by Christ the Lord.

I respond that the separability of the guilty state of sin and the guilty state of punishment holds true for both Testaments, since it depends on their nature. Furthermore, the temporal punishment remains, not from a defect in Christ's satisfaction, but for other reasons, which always suppose that no remission of temporal punishment takes place independently of the satisfaction of Christ (D 1689-1691). Thus what St. Paul wrote in 1 Cor. 11:27-32 pertains to the New Testament; there he says that there are many sick among the Corinthians, and that many have died, because of their unworthy reception of the Holy Eucharist. Therefore God punished those Corinthians with these temporal punishments, however it is not certain, as we gather from the context, that they were also damned with eternal punishment.

164. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers teach this matter in two ways:

a) Inasmuch as often they exhort the faithful that they make satisfaction for their sins through fasts, vigils, alms, etc.

b) Inasmuch as sometimes they also speak explicitly about the present reality. Thus St. Augustine: "The punishment is more prolonged... than the guilt, lest the guilt be considered small, if also the punishment were terminated with it" (R 1845). Also St. Gregory the Great: "The Lord does not forgive the sinner completely, because he does not take away the crime without some punishment. For either man, being repentant, punishes himself, or God when he forgives a man also punishes him. Therefore by no means is the sin completely forgiven, because it is not taken away without some punishment..." (R 2309).

165. Theological reasoning. a) *From the connection of dogmas.* The existence of purgatory and the Catholic doctrine on indulgences necessarily suppose that the whole temporal punishment is not always remitted when the guilt is remitted.

b) *From the reasons of fittingness.* Trent in sess.14 ch.8 (D 1689-1691) proposes this fittingness under three headings: 1) from the divine *justice,* which requires that sinners are received into grace in one way after baptism, and in a different way before baptism; 2) from the divine *mercy,* which for this reason calls us back from our sins, and cures their consequences; 3) in this way we are *put in conformity with Christ*, who satisfied for our sins. See S.Th. III, q.86, a. 4; *Suppl.* q. 12.

166. Objections. 1. From Isa. 43:25: I am he who blots out your transgressions... and I will not remember your sins. From Jer. 31:34: For I will forgive their iniquity, and remember their sin no more. From Ezek. 18:22: None of the transgressions that they have committed shall be remembered. And 33:12: And as for the wickedness of the wicked, it shall not make them stumble when they turn from their wickedness. Now in these texts God promises penitents the full remission of their sins. Therefore, together with the guilt, any punishment is also remitted.

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. God promises full remission of sins as to the guilt, and consequently as to the eternal punishment, and it is this that constitutes the essence of sin, conceded; as to the temporal punishment, I subdistinguish: if the necessary satisfaction is given, conceded; otherwise, denied. Therefore, Holy Scripture teaches both the full remission of sins through penance, and that the temporal punishment sometimes remains, which must be expiated in this life or in the future; however, these two elements cannot be amicably reconciled with each other unless we say that through penance is remitted what constitutes the true essence of sin, that is the guilt, but that often the penalty of temporal punishment remains; the latter however must be expiated by a proportionate satisfaction in this life or in the future.

2. St. Paul, speaking to all the justified, wrote in Rom. 8:1: There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. Therefore, no penalty of temporal punishment remains in any of the justified.

I respond that the words given there pertain to the newly baptized, for whom, as we already pointed out, not only the guilt and eternal punishment have been forgiven, but also any temporal punishment.[2]

3. If the cause is removed, then also the effect is removed. But temporal punishment is the effect of guilt. Therefore, when the guilt ceases so also does the punishment.

I distinguish the major. If the cause is removed, then also the effect is removed, that is, if the cause does not exist, then the effect does not exist, conceded; when the cause ceases, the effect also ceases, I subdistinguish: if the conservation of the effect depends on the existence of the cause, conceded; otherwise, denied. I also distinguish the minor.

2. Cornely, *In epistulam ad Romanos* 395f.

Temporal punishment is the effect of guilt, but in such a way that its conservation does not depend on the guilt, conceded; otherwise, denied. Therefore, at the death of a father, the son does not therefore die; or when an artisan ceases to work for any reason, it does not follow that the works he made also cease to exist.

4. Through the remission of guilt man is made a friend of God. But the need to endure temporal punishment conflicts with this divine friendship. Therefore, when the guilt is remitted, the whole temporal punishment is also remitted.

I concede the major and deny the minor. For also among men lost friendship can be restored, and we are not thereby held to renounce our right, for example, of requiring restitution. Indeed, if this holds true for equals, a fortiori it holds true between a subject and a superior, such as the friendship is of man with God. And therefore man does not remain subject to God's hatred in the strict sense, or his hatred of abomination, but only in an improper sense, to his hatred requiring satisfaction.

167. Scholium. On the way of understanding temporal punishment. St. Thomas teaches that a twofold punishment corresponds to any grave sin: eternal, because of the aversion from God; temporal, because of the conversion to creatures. Now the former punishment is always removed as soon as the guilt is remitted; but the latter, even after the guilt has been remitted, can continue totally or partially. Here are the words of the Angelic Doctor: "In mortal sin there are two things, namely, a turning from the immutable Good, and an inordinate turning to mutable good. Accordingly, insofar as mortal sin turns away from the immutable Good, it induces a debt of eternal punishment, so that whosoever sins against the eternal Good should be punished eternally. Again, insofar as mortal sin turns inordinately to a mutable good, it gives rise to a debt of some punishment because the disorder of guilt is not brought back to the order of justice, except by punishment..." (III, q. 86, a. 4; In 4 d.14 q.2 a.1).[3]

However, Scotus held that, when the guilt has been forgiven, the eternal punishment is commuted to the temporal punishment, which for this reason is said to remain after the remission of sins.[4]

But Suarez explains the matter like this. Evidently God from eternity decreed that this mortal sin, if it remains in man perpetually, will be punished with this eternal punishment; but if he should not remain in it perpetually, he will be punished with a certain temporal punishment. Therefore, when the guilt has been forgiven, in the proper sense there is not a commutation of the eternal punishment into a certain temporal punishment, but he executes the eternal decree about undergoing some temporal punishment for this sin, on the hypothesis that it will be forgiven.[5]

3. See C. Weis, *S. Thomae de satisfactione et indulgentiis doctrina* (Graz 1896).
4. See Montefortino, *Summa theologica* 3 q.86 a.4.
5. *De paenitentia* disp.10 a.3 n.15. See Galtier, 556-560.

Thesis 18. A just man can make satisfaction to God in this life for the temporal punishment.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 13, a. 1; Galtier, 482-501; Lercher-Lakner, 583-588; Puig, 823-837.

168. Definition of terms. *A just man* or one adorned with habitual grace; by the infusion of that grace his grave sin and the consequent eternal punishment have been remitted; however, he still has some temporal punishment to expiate.

Satisfaction in general is an act of justice, by which a debt is compensated, deriving from an injury inflicted on some other person.[1] In this case, satisfaction is *the voluntary suffering of temporal punishment in order to repair the injury done to God by sin.* Hence there are two elements in satisfaction: The work of satisfaction must be in some sense painful (*the material element*), and also it must be voluntarily or endured (*the formal element*). Indeed, the *punishments,* according to the Council of Trent, are of three kinds: a) temporal scourges inflicted by God; b) satisfactions imposed by a priest; c) prayer (every act of divine worship), alms (works of mercy), other pious works (if there are some not contained in the ones just mentioned). See D 1693, 1713).

It should be observed that we make satisfaction through the merits of Christ, but in no way independently of his; for Christ merited for us that we may be able to make satisfaction for sins (D 1689-1691).

In this life. For we suppose from the treatise on the Last Things, that the time of satisfying is completed with death, just as for meriting. For, in the next life, or in purgatory, man *is punished for his sins*, but *he does not make satisfaction* for his sins.

169. Adversaries. 1. *The old Protestants,* explicitly denying any satisfactory power to our works, thought that this would detract from the complete satisfaction of Christ.[2]

2. *Recent non-Catholics,* led by Harnack, hold that this idea of satisfaction was introduced into the Church by Tertullian, and had its origin in the juridical principles, which at that time were commonly held in the Church.[3]

170. Doctrine of the Church. *Florence* (D 1323) listed the diverse works of satisfaction. *Trent* in sess.6 ch.14 (D 1542-1543) also lists the

1. On the word "satisfaction," see A. Deneffe, *Das Wort satisfactio:* ZkathTh 43 (1919) 158-175.
2. See Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 4,3-7.
3. Harnack, *Dogmengeschichte* t.3 1.2 c.2. See also Seeberg, *Dogmengeschichte* 1,366.546.

works of satisfaction; sess.14 ch.8 (D 1689-1691) recommends satisfaction and teaches that it has its power only from Christ; ch.9 (D 1693) enumerates the diverse kinds of works through which we can make satisfaction; cn.12 (D 1712) defines that satisfaction is not fiducial faith in Christ's satisfaction for us; cn.13 (D 1713) defines that it is possible to satisfy for sins, as to their temporal punishment, through the merits of Christ, when punishments are inflicted by God and endured patiently, or imposed by a priest, or voluntarily assumed; cn.14 (D 1714) defines that works of satisfaction are true worship of God.

171. Theological note. 1. To be able to satisfy as to the temporal punishment is a truth of *defined divine and Catholic faith.*

2. That this satisfactory power, from the merits of Christ, is present not only in painful works willingly accepted, or in those imposed by a priest, but also in the temporal sufferings inflicted by God is also a truth of *defined divine and Catholic faith.*

172. Proof from Holy Scripture. God exhorts sinners to atone for their sins by alms and other good works, which by that very fact proves that he accepts them for this purpose. Therefore a fortiori a just man can atone for the guilty state of temporal punishment.

The antecedent. Prov. 16:6: *By loyalty and faithfulness iniquity is atoned for;* Tob. 4:10: *Almsgiving delivers from death and keeps you from going into darkness.* Acts 10:4: *Your prayers and your alms have ascended as a memorial before God...*(see v. 31 and 47).

The consequent. A fortiori, both on the part of the doer and by reason of the thing to be obtained. For, on the part of the doer, a just man is more worthy than a sinner; but on the part of the thing to be obtained, eternal guilt and punishment by far exceed the temporal punishment. Therefore if the sinner, by these acts can atone for his guilt or sin, a fortiori can the just man, with the same works, atone for his temporal punishment.

173. Proof from tradition. The old Protestants themselves, Illyricus and Chemnitius, admit that the tradition is clearly opposed to their own position.[4] And rightly so. But among the many testimonies of the Fathers, Tertullian should be heard: "Then how inept it is, not to perform this penance, and to receive pardon for sins, that is, not to pay the price in order to get the reward in hand. For at this price the Lord established the pardon; as compensation for this penance he proposed that forgiveness

4. See Bellarmine, *De paenitentia* 4,10; in c.9 he gives the argument of tradition.

could be obtained" (R 313). And St. Cyprian: "We feel the whip and the afflictions, because we do not please the Lord with good works and do not make satisfaction for our sins."[5] And Origen: "I have before my eyes my sorrow, and with my present sorrows I can make up for future sorrows of punishments."[6] And St. Ambrose: "Just as someone pays money to satisfy a debt, and the burden of a debt is not removed until the whole amount owed is agreed on and paid; so also the punishment for sin is paid by the compensation of charity and of other good works, or by any kind of satisfaction" (R 1305). And St. Augustine: "Sin cannot go unpunished, it is not fitting for it to be unpunished, it ought not to be; it is not just. Therefore, since sin ought not to be unpunished, let it be punished by You, lest you are punished for it..." (R 1494). And St. Caesarius of Arles: "If we do not give thanks to God in a time of tribulation, and do not atone for our sins by good works, we will have to remain in the purgatory of fire until our above mentioned venial sins are consumed like wood, hay and straw" (R 2233).

174. Theological reasoning. St. Thomas, in *Suppl.* q.13 a. 1, argues like this: a) God cannot command what is impossible. But he commands satisfaction, when he says: *bear fruits worthy of repentance* (Luke 3:8). Therefore satisfaction is possible.

b) "God is more merciful than any man. But it is possible for man to forgive. Therefore so can God."

c) "There is satisfaction when the punishment is equal to the crime... But it happens that a punishment is assumed that is equal to the pleasure which was had in sinning. Therefore it is possible to make satisfaction to God."

175. Objections. 1. From St. Ambrose, speaking about St. Peter, "I read about tears, I do not read about satisfaction" (R 1310). There he seems to say that sins are remitted without satisfaction.

I respond that satisfaction in this case does not mean satisfaction in the proper sense but excuse. For this is manifestly clear from the context. For, before he uttered those words St. Ambrose had written: "He [Peter] did not make excuses... for he preferred to admit his own sin that he might be justified by confessing what he was guilty of by his denial..., I do not find what he said, I find that he wept." And immediately after those words he added: "But what cannot be defended can be washed away; tears wash away the crime."

2. Christ satisfied for us abundantly. Therefore there is no need for our satisfaction.

I distinguish the antecedent. Christ satisfied for us abundantly, inasmuch as he offered a really sufficient price in order to redeem us, *conceded;* inasmuch also as this

5. *Epistola* 11,2. See *Epistola* 55,20.
6. *In Psalmum 37* hom.2,5: MG 12,1385.

price must not be applied to each individual, *denied. I distinguish the consequent.* There is no need for our satisfaction independently of Christ's satisfaction, *conceded;* depending on Christ's satisfaction, *denied.* See D 1689-1691.

3. The concept of satisfaction was introduced into the Church by Tertullian, a lawyer. Therefore the concept of satisfaction does not take its origin from Christ the Lord.

I respond that the word "satisfaction" does indeed have a juridical origin and that this concept was perfected in the Latin Church. But we deny totally that *the matter itself* was not known before Tertullian, as can be deduced from our arguments. This notion was also known in the Greek Church, in which penal works are considered as a remedy that cures sins.

176. Scholium 1. *On the conditions of satisfaction.* In general, the conditions required for satisfying are the same as those required for meriting. Therefore it is necessary that the act be good, free, supernatural, and that it be done by a living person in the state of grace. Moreover it is part of the nature of satisfaction that it be a penal work, since it has to do with paying a debt we owe by freely receiving or accepting the required punishment; and therefore, because an external act increases the punishment, a greater satisfaction is given in an external work than in a work that is an internal work alone. Per se this is not the case with respect to merit.[7]

177. Scholium 2. *On condign satisfaction.* The satisfaction we are talking about in the thesis, we say is not only congruous (*de congruo*), but also condign (*de condigno*). This is because we are defending the idea that the compensation offered for satisfaction is equivalent morally to paying the penalty. In fact, this is a common and certain opinion, opposed to the error of de Bay, which was condemned by Pius V: "When by almsgiving and other good works of penance we make satisfaction to God for temporal punishment, we do not offer a worthy price to God for our sins..., but we do something, in view of which the satisfaction of Christ is applied and communicated to us" (D 1959). And again: "Laborious satisfactions of those who are justified are of no avail to expiate in a condign manner the temporal punishments remaining after the fault has been remitted" (D 1977). However theological reasoning proves it: for, a just man can merit condignly an increase of grace and glory; therefore a fortiori he will be able to satisfy condignly for the temporal punishment of sins.

The objections offered in opposition are not valid:

a) Man cannot satisfy condignly for a mortal sin. Therefore similarly he cannot satisfy for the temporal punishment.

I concede the antecedent, but I deny the consequent and the parity. There is disparity both in the object and in the subject. For, regarding the object, mortal sin includes such intrinsic evil that it exceeds any compensation that can be offered by a mere man, but this does not apply to temporal punishment. But regarding the subject there is a difference, because a sinner would be making satisfaction for a mortal sin, while a just man or an adopted son of God makes satisfaction for the temporal punishment.

7. There is more on this in Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.37 s.2-7.

b) In order for condign satisfaction to be effective, it must be able to equal the punishment to be endured. But the works of this life are not able to absolve the punishments to be endured in the next life. Therefore our satisfaction cannot be said to be condign.

I distinguish the major. It must equal them physically, *denied;* morally, *conceded.* For, although the duration and intensity of the sufferings of this life and of the next life are different, still the works of this life, since they proceed from grace, have a certain proportion and condignity in order to make satisfaction.[8]

c) If we were able to satisfy condignly, "we would be, at least to some extent, redeemers" (D 1959). But man is not a redeemer. Therefore, we cannot make satisfaction condignly.

I distinguish the major. We would be redeemers as to guilt and eternal punishment, *denied;* as to the temporal punishment, *conceded. I also distinguish the minor.* He is not a redeemer as to the guilt and the eternal punishment, *conceded;* as to the temporal punishment, *denied.* For, in this sense Trent taught that "penitents *redeem* their sins through Christ Jesus..." (D 1714).

178. Scholium 3. *On vicarious satisfaction.* There is a common and certain opinion which holds that a just man can satisfy condignly also for the punishments that must be paid by another wayfarer after his sin has been forgiven. And this concerns satisfaction in the strict sense, not just about a prayer or merit. This is certain from the dogma of the communion of saints and is implicitly contained in the dogma concerning purgatory, since it includes the affirmation of the possibility of aiding the souls detained there by the suffrages of the just; for, suffrages are satisfactions, if we want to speak strictly. A just man can also make satisfaction for a sinner in a congruous way. See S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 13, a. 2.

Scholium 4. *On satisfaction for venial sins.* This is also a common and certain opinion. The reason for it is this: venial sin does not turn man away from God as his final end, but only retards his journey towards God through charity. Indeed, such retardation or lessening of the fervor of charity can be well compensated for through the fervor of charity, whereby the just man so directs himself towards God that he turns himself away from some licit created good thing. Therefore, venial sin can be compensated for by a just person. Therefore a just person can make satisfaction for venial sin in a condign manner. See S.Th., I-II, q. 88, a. 1; q. 89, a. 4; III, q. 87, a. 2.

8. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.37 s.8 n.4.

Thesis 19. Therefore, priests must, depending on the nature of the sin and the ability of the penitent, impose on penitents salutary and proportionate satisfactions.

S.Th. *Suppl.* q. 18, a. 4; q. 8, a. 7; Galtier, 503-508; Lercher-Lakner, 589-592; Puig, 839-846.

179. Connection. Having already established two truths—that the whole temporal punishment is not always remitted together with the remission of the guilt and that we can make satisfaction to God for that punishment while we live, now it is necessary to speak about satisfaction, since it is a part of the sacrament of penance. Therefore in this thesis we are treating sacramental satisfaction.

180. Definition of terms. *Therefore,* because the confessor as a judge takes the place of God; as is certain from thesis 17, when he forgives the guilt and the eternal punishment, he does not always forgive the whole temporal punishment due for the sins, but to expiate for them he requires a suitable satisfaction.

They must, that is, priests are bound by the nature of the sacrament to impose a penance; but they can be excused *accidentally* (*per accidens*) from this obligation, either by reason of the incapability of the penitent, or if sometimes it is clear to the confessor that sufficient satisfaction has already been given.[1]

Sacramental satisfaction is the voluntary acceptance of the penance imposed by the confessor, in order to repair the injury done to God by the sin.

Salutary satisfaction is said to be that which can restore the moral order by the satisfaction for and the punishment for past sins (*the vindictive aspect of satisfaction*), and at the same time to guard against new sins of the penitent inasmuch as it helps to preserve the new life and to heal the infirmity (*the medicinal aspect of satisfaction*). See D 1692.

Proportionate satisfaction is that which corresponds to the gravity of the sins, keeping in mind, however, the weakness of the penitent. For, although the confessor is a judge, still at the same time he is a physician who must prescribe a suitable medicine that suits the ability of the penitent. See D 1692.

181. Adversaries. *Protestants* who deny that twofold foundation and who also deny to priests the power of imposing satisfactory penances. Therefore the penances of the early Church, according to the Reformers, were not ordained to give satisfaction to God, but were only for the

1. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.38 s.3 n.4; I. Capella, *De satisfctione Iesu Christi et satisfactione nostra* (Ferrara 1551); V. Coucke, *De satisfactione sacramentali:* CollatBrug 34 (1934) 187-191.

edification of the Church.

182. Doctrine of the Church. 1. *Florence* (D 1323) taught that satisfaction for sins, imposed according to the decision of the priest, is part of the sacrament. *Trent* in sess.14 ch.8 (D 1692) teaches and explains our thesis; cn.15 (D 1715) defines that the imposition of penances on penitents is not contrary to the institution of Christ, nor is it contrary to the purpose of the sacrament.

Theological note. 1. That a satisfaction must be imposed by the confessor is *at least Catholic doctrine,* or also *defined doctrine* in sess.14 ch.8 of Trent.

2. Trent says nothing directly and explicitly about the obligation of the penitent to accept and perform the penance, but this is deduced from the fact that it defined satisfaction in sess.14 ch.4 (D 1704), and also as it is an act of the penitent, to be a part of the sacrament.

183. Argument. 1. *From the use of the Church* which, when she remits sins, always demands some satisfaction from penitents. But she requires this not for the remission of the guilt, because this is remitted as a work of the penitent by his charity alone; nor is it for the remission of the eternal punishment, because this is always remitted together with the guilt. Therefore it is only for the remission of the temporal punishment.

The major. This is clear from many sources:

a) From the institution and practice of the *public penance.*

b) *From the canonical letters* of St. Gregory Thaumaturgus, St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Peter of Alexandria.... *From the penitential canons* of the Council of Nicaea, Illiberitanus, Ancyrus, Neocaesarea, Illerdensis.... *From the decrees of councils* on the different penances to be performed for a variety of sins, which were promulgated by the following councils: Laodicaea, cn.2; Carthage III, cn.31; Agatha, cn.15; Turin, cn.22; Worms, cn.25.... *From the penitential books.*

c) *From statements of the Fathers,* who exhort the faithful to perform the penitential satisfactions. Thus Tertullian: "Exomologesis is the act whereby we confess our sins to the Lord, not indeed as if he were ignorant of them, but inasmuch as by confession satisfaction is settled; of confession repentance is born; by repentance God is appeased... The less quarter you give yourself, the more (believe me) will God give you" (R 315). And St. Cyprian: "I beseech you, let each one of the brothers confess his sin, while the sinner is still in this life, while his confession can be accepted, and while satisfaction and remission through the priests is pleasing to the

Lord... Do full penance..." (R 553-4). And St. Leo the Great: "Christ Jesus has bestowed this power upon those in charge of his Church, so that they might both impose the performance of a penance on those who make their confession and also admit them to the communion of the sacraments through the door of reconciliation..." (D 308). And St. Augustine: "Therefore let a man judge himself... And when he has pronounced a sentence of a severe medicine, let him go to the priests through whom the keys of the Church are administered for him; and now beginning to be a good son, having preserved the order of the maternal members, let him receive from the ministers of the sacraments the measure of his satisfaction..." (R 1530).

2. *In addition there are those fruitful helps* mentioned by Trent in sess.14 ch.8 (D 1689-1691); just as they say, when the guilt has been forgiven, that the whole temporal punishment is not always remitted by God, so also they signify that the priest, as the vicar of God, must act in the same way as He does. Therefore, both the *justice of God,* and his *mercy,* and *conformity with Christ* require that the confessor, when the sin has been forgiven by absolution, impose proportionate penances for the temporal punishment.

184. Scholium 1. *On the efficacy of sacramental satisfaction.* a) This raises two questions: Whether sacramental satisfaction remits the temporal punishment by the performance of the rite itself (*ex opere operato*), and whether it produces grace in like manner by the performance of the rite itself. It is per se clear that the sacramental satisfaction, if it is performed in the state of grace, has the power of satisfying by the action of the agent (*ex opere operantis*). See thesis 18. But the question is whether the penitent also satisfies by the performance of the rite.

According to the common agreement of theologians, but there is one who dissents on this point (Henry Oswald, + 1903),[2] sacramental satisfaction remits at least part of the temporal punishment *ex opere operato,* that is, in virtue of the sacramental rite itself. See *Suppl.* q. 18, a. 2. This is proved from Trent in sess.14 ch.3 and cn.4 (D 1673-1675, 1704) thus: satisfaction is a part of the sacrament, which is required necessarily for the full and perfect remission of sins. But the full remission of sins includes, not only the guilty state of sin, but also the guilty state of temporal punishment. Therefore, the satisfaction produces remission of the temporal punishment, since it is a part of the sacrament, that is, *ex opere operato.*

b) Regarding the second question, whether sacramental satisfaction also produces grace *ex opere operato*, it is necessary to make a distinction.

If the satisfaction is considered *according as it is one with the sacramental sign*, it seems that it must be said that it produces grace *ex opere operato*; for, grace in the sacrament is produced by the whole sign. Suarez teaches this point explicitly.[3] And this also seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas, III, q. 86, a. 6; q. 90, a. 2 as 2. But if the satisfac-

2. *Sakramentenlehre* 2,184. For more on this, see Galtier, *Satisfaction:* DTC 14,1129-1210.
3. *De paenitentia* disp.38 s.2 n.3.

tion is considered *as standing by itself,* especially if it is performed after the absolution, it does not seem that it produces grace *ex opere operato.* Thus Vázquez and Lugo.[4]

185. Scholium 2. *On whether, besides satisfaction, imposed by the confessor, all the subsequent good works of the penitent are elevated in order to make satisfaction ex opere operato.* The words of the formula of absolution seem to indicate this: "May whatever good you do, or evil you endure, be cause to you for the remission of your sins." However, there are some theologians, like Lugo,[5] who absolutely deny this point. But St. Thomas affirms it in *Quodl.* 3 a.28; and because of that, St. Alphonsus[6] says, this opinion is much more common and probable.

And that is surely true. The Church does not use those words without good reason. Therefore from the intention of the Church, the subsequent good works of the penitent seem to receive from the sacrament itself a special power of making satisfaction. But in this way our life becomes a *perpetual penance,* as Trent earnestly desires (D 1694).

186. Scholium 3. *On the time of fulfilling sacramental satisfaction.* Sacramental satisfaction can be fulfilled before the absolution. But *from the condemnations of the Church* against Peter de Osma (D 1415, Jansenists (D 2316ff.), the Synod of Pistoia (D 2635), it is certain that it can also be fulfilled after the absolution. This is also certain *from the daily praxis of the Church.*

A *theological reason* can also be added here. For, the guilty state of temporal punishment does not impede the infusion and increase of grace; and from another point of view the value of satisfaction offered after the absolution will be greater, since it has the power of satisfying, not only *ex opere operato,* but also *ex opere operantis,* that is, by the penitents action.

187. Scholium 4. *On the internal disposition necessary to fulfill a sacramental satisfaction.* The question is whether the sacramental satisfaction can be fulfilled in a state of sin, either before the absolution, or after the absolution if a new mortal sin has been committed. In this hypothesis, it is obvious that the satisfaction cannot be completed by the action of the penitent, because he lacks the state of grace. But the question is whether it can be given at least from the performance of the work (*ex opere operato*).

This must be affirmed. For, that satisfaction, since it was judicially imposed after confession, is ordained to absolution and it is a true part of the sacrament.

But at the same time it is clear that such satisfaction does not obtain its effect *unless the obstacle has been removed* by sacramental absolution, since an enemy of God is not an apt subject for his temporal punishment to be remitted. But, *when the obstacle has been removed* through grace, the sacramental satisfaction obtains its effect *ex opere operato,* because previously it was already raised to a level of efficacy that is truly sacramental.[7]

4. Vázquez, *De paenitentia* q. 94 a.2 dub.5 n.9; Lugo, *De paenitentia* disp.25 s.1 n.2-16.
5. *De paenitentia* disp.25 s.4 n.56.
6. *Theologia Moralis* 1.6 n.507. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.38 s.6 n.7; Galtier, 511.
7. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.38 s.8.

CHAPTER IV

On the minister of the sacrament of penance

188. Considering the parts of session 14 at Trent, we cover the whole session, evaluating questions about the existence, necessity and nature of the sacrament of penance. But while the Council treated the parts of this sacrament, it also spoke about the effects and minister of the sacrament. Therefore it is still necessary to speak about this. First of all we will treat the minister; then, in the following chapter, we will consider the effects of the sacrament.

Indeed, Trent presents the doctrine on the minister of the sacrament of penance in ch.6-7 and cns.10-11 (D 1684f., 1710f.). Here is a summary of what is stated there:

a) The minister of penance is only a priest, not a lay person.

b) And this is the case, even if the priest is in the state of mortal sin.

c) But the priest must have jurisdiction. Therefore, special principles have been established concerning the reservation of cases.

Accordingly, while passing over what pertains more to Moral Theology, we will demonstrate that the minister of the sacrament of penance must be furnished with a twofold power, namely, the power of priestly orders and a suitable power of jurisdiction.

ARTICLE I

ON THE POWER OF ORDERS

Thesis 20. The minister of the sacrament of penance is only a priest.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 8, a.1ff.; Galtier, 528-533; Lercher-Lakner, 604ff.; Puig, 887ff.

189. Connection. We said in thesis 1 that the power of remitting sins was given to the hierarchical Church by Christ the Lord; based on that, it is now necessary to conclude that the ministers of penance are not lay persons. Moreover, within the sacred hierarchy, since there are different grades, we ask whether the ministers are only priests, or also deacons or other lower ministers.

190. Definition of terms. *The minister* of the sacraments is said to be someone who confects a sacrament, by applying the form to the matter, or who administers it. But it is one thing to be a *licit* minister, and another thing to be a valid minister. We are speaking about both.

Only a priest, that is, a bishop or a priest, but not a lay person or a deacon. But if deacons must be excluded, then a fortiori any lower clerics will be also.

191. Adversaries. 1. *The Montanists,* in the third century, according to whom the power of forgiving sins resides only in the *pneumatics* or *spirituals.* Thus Tertullian (see n. 6). And some modern liberal Protestants claim that this was the doctrine of the primitive Church.[1] However, Tertullian himself is opposed to this assertion, since in the same book, *De pudicitia,* he confesses that he has abandoned Catholic teaching on this matter, and from his own teaching, when he was a Catholic (R 383).

2. *Wycliffites* and *Hussites,* in the fifteenth century, for whom good lay people could absolve from sins, but not bad priests (D 1260ff.).

3. *Protestants,* in the sixteenth century, among whom, all the faithful have the power of forgiving sins, either by reproach, if the sins are public, or by a spontaneous confession made to anyone, if the sins are secret (D 1463, 1684, 1710). In recent times the *Old Catholics* have adopted this opinion.

192. Doctrine of the Church. *Florence* (D 1323) said that the minister of penance is a priest. *Trent* in sess.14 ch.6 (D 1684-1685) teaches that not all the faithful, but only bishops and priests have the ministry of the keys, even if they are evil; and the words of institution of the sacrament of penance must not be understood in any other way; cn.10 (D 1710) defines: "If anyone says that priests who are in mortal sin do not have the power of binding and loosing or that priests are not the only ministers of absolution, but that to each and all of the faithful it was said: *Whatever you bind...* let him be anathema"; sess.23 ch.1 (D 1764) teaches that Christ gave the power of binding and loosing sins to the Apostles and their successors in the priesthood; cn.1 (D 1771) defines that the power of remitting and retaining sins pertains to the priesthood; but the priesthood is distinguished from the other orders, even from the deaconate (D 1765, 1772).

193. Theological note. 1. It is a truth of *defined and divine Catholic faith* that only priests are ministers of absolution, but not lay people; in fact, not even a deacon, since it is defined "that only priests are ministers of absolution (D 1710), and since the Council in chapter six of sess.14 (D 1684) speaks about bishops and priests only.[2]

2. It is also a truth of *defined and Catholic faith* that priests have the power of binding and loosing, even if they are in the state of mortal sin (D 1710).

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1. See K. Holl, *Enthusiasmus und Bussgewalt beim griechischen Mönchtum* 312-330.
2. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.24 s.1 n.8; Galtier, 428 2.

3. Finally, it is also *defined* that the words of institution of this sacrament (Matt. 18:18; John 20:23) were addressed, not to the faithful, but only to priests (D 1710).

194. Proof from Holy Scripture. We have demonstrated in thesis 1 that the power of remitting and binding sins was given to the Apostles and to their legitimate successors, that is, the hierarchy of the Church, but not to the individual faithful or to the laity. Actually, from Scripture alone (John 20:23; Matt. 18:18) it is not sufficiently certain who the legitimate successors of the Apostles are in this matter, whether bishops alone or also priests. But from the witness of tradition, as we shall see immediately, and from the interpretation of the ecclesiastical magisterium, especially of the Council of Trent in the cited places (D 1710, 1764-1772), it is certain that the successors of the Apostles regarding the remission and retention of sins are both bishops and priests, and that it pertain to them alone.

195. Proof from tradition. Tradition testifies that the ministers of absolution are not lay persons, nor deacons, but only priests, that is, bishops and priests. Therefore from tradition it is certain that only priests are the ministers of absolution.

The antecedent is explained part by part:

1) *They are not lay persons.* For, as we said in thesis 1, the Fathers, when they mention the ministers of penance, nowhere speak about the laity, but only priests. Thus St. Pacian: "What he [God] does through his priests, is by his own power..." (R 1244). And St. Chrysostom: "Whatever priests do here below, God ratifies them on high..." (R 1119). And St. Leo the Great: " The forgiveness of God cannot be obtained except through the supplications of priests... Jesus Christ has bestowed this power upon those in charge of his Church..." (D 308). "It is up to the priest to judge the gravity of the crimes...."[3]

2) *They are not deacons.* For even though they enjoyed great authority in first centuries of the Church, nowhere, neither in the Fathers, nor in the ancient Rituals, is this prerogative attributed to them, which certainly would have been the most important of all. On the contrary, only priests are always cited there as the ministers of penance. Listen to St. Ambrose: "For this right [of binding and loosing] has been granted only to priests" (R 1293).

3) *They are at least bishops.* No one really doubts this. For if this singular power resides is the holy hierarchy, those necessarily possess it at least who obtain the highest hierarchical grade. And also it is historically certain that in the first centuries the bishops mainly or more commonly

3. St. Innocent I, *Epistula* 25,7: ML 20,559.

administered this sacrament.

4) *But they are also priests,* as the praxis of the Church shows from the earliest times:

a) *At the end of the first century,* at Corinth and Rome. For, St. Clement of Rome exhorts the Corinthians to do penance according to the *presbyters,* and by this name, from the common opinion, they mean not bishops, but priests of the second order (R 27). Somewhat later, for a similar reason it seems that St. Polycarp must be understood when speaking about Asia Minor (R 73).

b) *In the middle of the third century* at Rome, when the Apostolic See was vacant, presbyters gave peace to the fallen.[4]

c) The praxis of designating a penitentiary presbyter, *from the middle of the third century,* clearly confirms the same practice.[5]

d) *About the same time* St. Cyprian speaks about the same practice in the African Church.[6]

e) *At the end of the third century* in the Alexandrian Church St. Dionysius, the bishop of Alexandria, talks about a dying old man, Serapion, speaking like this: "Hurry up, I beg you, and absolve me as soon as possible; send to me one of the priests."[7]

f) *Towards the end of the fourth century,* St. Jerome explicitly teaches this doctrine: "We read in Leviticus about lepers... Therefore how a priest there declares a leper clean or unclean, thus also here a *bishop or priest* binds or loosens, not those who are innocent, but according to his office, when he has heard the diversity of sins, he knows who should be bound and who should be forgiven" (R 1386).

196. Scholium 1. *On deacons.* Contrary to what we have just presented, there are a few historical facts whose importance must now be evaluated.

a) First, *the words of St. Cyprian* are raised as an objection; he prescribes that "if they [the brothers] should be seized with any misfortune and peril of sickness, they should, without waiting for my presence, before any presbyter who might be present, or if a presbyter should not be found and death begins to be imminent, before even a deacon, be able to make confession of their sin, that, with the imposition of hands upon them for repentance, they should come to the Lord with the peace of the martyrs..." (R 570). From these words it seems necessary to conclude that, at least in a case of necessity, even deacons

4. See *Epistula* 30,8 and 8,3 (among the letters of St. Cyprian).
5. See Socrates, *Historia Ecclesiastica,* see Vacandard, *Confession:* DTC 3,842ff.; Batiffol, *Etudes d'histoire et de théologie positive* 329-335; Leclercq, *Pénitence:* DACL 14,211ff.
6. *Epistula* 18,1; 19,2; 16,2 (R 570, 569).
7. See Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 6,44: MG 20,630f.; G. del Ton, *L'episodio eucaristico de Serapione, narrato da Dionigi Alessandrino:* ScuoCatt 70 (1942) 37-47.

can be the ministers of penance.

I respond that this matter is obscure. For, the context indicates that there he is talking about sacramental confession, and it is not easily understood that he does nothing more than be a mediator, or only administer Eucharistic communion. Therefore it seems necessary to concede that St. Cyprian thought that a deacon, in a case of extreme necessity, could become the minister of absolution. However, one or two exceptions, contrary to the universal and constant practice of the Church, cannot overturn the argument from tradition. And if his solution is accepted, then it must be admitted that St. Cyprian in this matter erred in a material way.[8]

b) *The Council of Elvira* in cn.32, following without doubt in the footsteps of St. Cyprian, teaches the same discipline: "If someone is in serious danger of death, it is preferable that he should not make his penance before a presbyter, but rather before a bishop; however, if he is very close to death, it is necessary that a presbyter should offer him communion, and a deacon, if a priest asks him to do it."

It seems that the same *response* should be given as we gave to the case of St. Cyprian, since in this matter the Elvira Fathers depend on the bishop of Carthage.[9]

c) *In the Middle Ages,* from the ninth to the thirteenth century, a custom grew of confessing to a deacon in a case of necessity, as some collections of canons and also some particular councils bear witness to.[10] Therefore deacons were thought to be ministers, at least extraordinary, of penance.

I respond that it is one thing for this custom to have existed in some churches, and it is something else, quite different, than the doctrine that the same churches held regarding the minister of penance. For, in the same documents that recognize this custom it is stated explicitly that deacons could not absolve. Thus, v.gr., Theodorus: "No one else but a bishop or priest should presume to give a penance or to hear a confession. For just as they must not offer sacrifice unless they are bishops or presbyters, to whom the key of the kingdom of heaven have been committed, so others must not usurp the judgment of penitents. However if a necessity occurs, and a presbyter is not present, let a deacon receive the penitent for holy communion."[11] And the *Constitution of St. Odonis:* "Likewise, it is strictly forbidden for deacons in any way to hear confessions, unless in the most severe necessity; for they do not have the keys

8. Other solutions are offered by Petavius, *Diatriba de paenitentia* c.2 and 4 (ed. Vives, 8,445 and 452); Galtier, 531.
9. See S. González, *Los castigos penitenciales del concilio de Elvira:* Greg 22 (1941) 194; *La penitencia en la primitiva Iglesia española* 43.
10. Laurain provides some texts on this, *De l'intervention des laïques, des diacres et des abbesses dans l'administration de la pénitence* (Paris 1897) 78f.
11. Theodorus, c.31: ML 99,946.

and they cannot absolve."[12] Hence, the fact that deacons heard confessions does not prove that they gave absolution, but it only shows how necessary the confession of the penitent was thought to be at that time. Since he did not have a priest present, his sins were confessed to a deacon, so that for his part the deacon would offer all the help that he could.

197. Scholium 2. *On the martyrs.* There are some texts in which they also seem to assign martyrs as ministers of absolution. Here are the main ones.

a) *In the second century* in *a letter from the Church of Lyons* we read: Martyrs, "absolved all and they bound none."[13] Therefore at that time martyrs were thought to enjoy the power of absolution.

I respond that the meaning of this place is clear from the context, where it is said: "The martyrs assumed the defense of all, they accused no one, they absolved all, they bound no one." With these words only this is meant—that the martyrs excused all, especially those who had fallen out of fear of torture, but in no way did they absolve them sacramentally from their sins.

b) St. Cyprian said often in his letters 15-23, that the martyrs remitted sins.

I respond that from the reading of these letters it is sufficiently clear that St. Cyprian did not say that the martyrs remitted sins with authority, but that they besought the bishop that he should remit the sins for those for whom they interceded and to whom they communicated his penances. And in fact this custom was ancient, as St. Cyprian himself testifies: "As was done always in the past was always done under our predecessors."[14] Tertullian, when he was a Catholic, had praised this same custom of the martyrs of praying for sinners, although later, as a Montanist, he criticized the same thing among Catholics.[15]

c) Origen says that the martyrs "administered the remission of sins."[16]

I respond that Origen is speaking about the souls of the martyrs who are in heaven and are praying for those who invoke them. Thus in the same place he says: "The souls of those who, because of their witness to Christ, were killed by a sword, administer remission of sins for those who call upon them...."

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12. *Constitutio S. Odonis Parisiensis* cn.56: Msi 22,676. On this question about deacons, see G. Gromer, *Zur Geschichte der Diakonenbeicht im Mittelalter:* Festschr. Knöpfler (1917) 159-176; P. Bernard, *Confession:* DTC 3,898f.
13. In Eusebius, *Historia Ecclesiastica* 5,2: MG 20,433.
14. *Epistula* 15,1.
15. *Ad martyres* 1:ML 1,693ff. *De pudicitia* 22: ML 2,1081ff. See S. Charrier, *Tertullien et les martyrs pénitentiers:* RevAug 10 (1907) 582; *Le pouvoir pénitentiel des martyrs:* Rev Aug 10 (1907) 692; B Capelle, *L'absolution sacerdotal chez S. Cyprian:* RechThAncMéd 7 (1935) 221-234.
16. *Exhortatio ad martyrium* 30: MG 11,602. He expresses the same concept *In Numeros* hom. 10,2: MG 12,638.

198. Scholium 3. *On the laity. From the eleventh to the sixteenth century* the custom of confessing to lay people became more common, in the case of extreme necessity, or in danger of death, when a priest could not be approached.[17] In the middle of the eleventh century Pseudo-Augustine, *De vera et falsa paenitentia,*[18] strengthened this custom. Relying on his authority, Peter Lombard, St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas said that this confession was necessary....[19]

I respond that a confession of this kind is not strictly sacramental, as St. Thomas himself admits in *Suppl.* q. 8, a.2 ad 1: "When there is reason for urgency, the penitent should fulfill his own part, by being contrite and confessing to whom he can; and although this person cannot perfect the sacrament, so as to fulfill the part of the priest by giving absolution, yet this defect is supplied by the High Priest. Nevertheless confession made to a layman, through lack of a priest, is quasi-sacramental, on account of the absence on the part of the priest."

Therefore a lay person, according to the testimony of those who recommended the practice, could not absolve a penitent. However, this praxis, recommended by these doctors, proves how necessary confession was thought to be by them, and how much power was attributed to the sacrament of penance by the acts of the penitents themselves. It also happens that the shame, inherent in the sacrament, was considered as a certain satisfaction for sins, as Pseudo-Augustine and St. Albert the Great give testimony to in the cited texts.

However, St. Bonaventure and Scotus,[20] who from that time almost all theologians follow, having made a distinction between a confession of humility and a sacramental confession, more correctly taught that a sacramental confession must be made only to a priest. Therefore this praxis of confessing to lay people was gradually abandoned, especially after the Reformers spread the error that lay persons can remit sins.

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17. See A. Teetaert, *La confession aux laïques dans l'Eglise Latin depuis le VIII jusq'au XIV siècle* (Paris 1926) (see H. Weisweller: Schol 3 [1928] 574-580.
18. Pseudo-Augustine, *De vera et falsa paenitentia* 10,25: ML 40,1122.
19. Peter Lombard, *Sententiae* 4 d.17 c.4; St. Albert the Great, *In 4* d.17 a.58f.; St. Thomas, *In 4* d.17 q.3 a.3 sol.3 ad 1; *Suppl.* q. 8, a. 2 ad 1. See Laurain, *De l'intervention des laïques.* 15f.; Gromer, *Die Laienbeicht im Mittelalter* (Munich1909); F. Gillmann, *Zur Frage der Laienbeicht:* Kath 88 (1909 1) 435-451; *Die Laienbeicht nach Stephan Langton:* Kat 93 (1913 2) 59-62; A. Teetaert, *La confession aux laïques chez Albert le Grand:* EphThLov 2 (19250 530-542; *La confession aux laïques dans l'Eglise Latine.* 38-476; B. Poschmann, *Die abendländischen Kirchenbusse im frühen Mittelalter* 183-187. On the same lay confessions among the Greeks the following can be read: E. Vacandard, *Les moins confesseurs en Orient du IV au XIII siècle:* RevClerFr 44 (1905) 236-260; A. Palmieri, *I Padri spirituali nei monasteri d'Oriente e la storia della confessione sacramentale:* RivScTeol 3 (1907) 121-133; J. Hormann, *Untersuchungen zur griechischen Laienbeicht* (1913).
20. St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.17 p.3 a.1 q.1; Scotus, *In 4* d.14 q.4. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.24 s.1 n.11f.

ARTICLE II

ON THE POWER OF JURISDICTION

199. From what has been said, the power of orders, or the priesthood, is a necessary requirement in the minister of penance. Now we ask whether that suffices, or whether something else is also required.

This is the reason for raising a doubt. Since the sacrament of penance is essentially a judgment, and therefore can be exercised only over subjects, it can rightly be doubted whether or not all the faithful are the subjects of any priest whatsoever, just because he has received the power of orders.

Trent responds that both powers, of orders and of jurisdiction, are required in order that the sacrament of penance can be validly conferred. Therefore, these two powers, which per se can be separated, cannot be separated in this sacrament.

Thesis 21. For a priest to absolve validly he must have not only the power of orders, but also the power of jurisdiction.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 8, a. 4; Galtier, 534-539; Lercher-Lakner, 607-610; Puig, 900-907.

200. Definition of terms. *Jurisdiction* is the power of directing subjects to their supernatural end, either sacramentally (in the internal forum or in conscience), or non-sacramentally (in the external forum). But *ordinary jurisdiction* is one thing, namely, that which is had in virtue of an office; *delegated jurisdiction* is something else; it is what is had by appointment from someone who has ordinary jurisdiction. The first type is connected by law to an office; but the second type is committed to a person (CIC 196-210 [1917 Code]).

201. Adversaries. 1. John de Polliaco, in the fourteenth century, urged the necessity of confession to one's own priest to such an extent that he practically denied the requirement of delegated jurisdiction (D 921ff,).

2. *The Synod of Pistoia*, in the eighteenth century: according to it, the power of absolving is only fittingly, not necessarily, exercised over subjects, doubtless, in order to avoid confusion. Therefore the Synod denied the necessity of jurisdiction (D 2637).

202. Doctrine of the Church. *Florence* (D 1323) teaches this: "The minister of this sacrament is the priest who has either ordinary authority to absolve or that commissioned by a superior." Trent in sess.14 ch.7 (D

1686) demands for the valid absolution of a priest that he have ordinary or delegated jurisdiction; it derives this from the judicial nature of the sacrament of penance. See also the condemnations of the adversaries, just cited above.

Theological note. *At least Catholic doctrine,*[1] from the condemnations of the adversaries; but, taking into consideration the Council of Trent, it can also be said to be *defined doctrine* (D 1686-1688).

203. Argument. 1. This is the constant conviction of the Church, as shown by Trent (*the Church of God has always been convinced*), and her praxis, that the priestly absolution, without jurisdiction, is invalid. But in this matter the Church cannot be in error. Therefore jurisdiction is required for validity.

2. The Tridentine Fathers place the *theological reasoning* for this conviction and praxis in the judicial nature of the sacrament of penance. For, a judicial sentence, Trent says, cannot be given except to subjects. Therefore a priest, since he is a judge in conferring this sacrament, cannot absolve except over his own subjects. But a priest does not have any subjects, except by jurisdiction. Therefore jurisdiction is required, or the assigning of subjects.

The major. Because absolution is the act of a superior, who resolves a controversial matter authoritatively. In this case a judge differs from an arbitrator; for, an arbitrator resolves the matter with impartiality, so that he can arrive at an equal or even superior decision.

The minor. For, a priest does not obtain any subjects by his ordination alone, but only with the addition of ordinary or delegated jurisdiction, as Trent clearly teaches (D 1686-1688). Even so, what kind of relation exists between the power of orders and the power of jurisdiction? When and how is jurisdiction conferred? We will treat these questions in the *scholium.*

204. Objections. 1. In the priestly ordination the bishop says: *whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven them.* But these words signify that in the ordination full authority to remit sins is conferred. Therefore in the priestly ordination at the same time both the power of orders and the power of jurisdiction are conferred.

1. Note the *censure* by which both the errors of John de Polliaco and the proposition of the Synod of Pistoia are condemned by the Church. Certainly regarding the errors of John de Polliaco these points are made: *All the above mentioned articles and each one of them we, by apostolic authority, condemn and reprove as false and erroneous and deviating from sound authority. declaring that the true and Catholic doctrine is contrary to them* (D 923-924). The proposition of Pistoia was reproved as *false, rash, disturbing to the peace of souls, contrary to the secure and approved practice of the Church, detracting from the efficacy of the sacrament, and injurious to it* (D 2636).

I concede the major and distinguish the minor. It signifies there that the full power of orders is conferred so that, if at some time subjects are assigned to the priest, he can absolve them sacramentally, *conceded;* it signifies that subjects are already assigned, or that jurisdiction is conferred, *denied.* The meaning of this response will be made clearer in what we say in the scholium.

2. In ordination the judicial power of forgiving sins is conferred, which is truly judicial. But judicial power necessarily includes the power of jurisdiction. Therefore in ordination the power of jurisdiction is also conferred.

I distinguish the minor. In ordination judicial power is conferred, or a power that can be exercised only by way of a judgment, *conceded;* a power is conferred, which without the power of jurisdiction is sufficient in order to exercise this judgment, *denied. I also distinguish the minor.* If the power of jurisdiction is added, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.* Suarez wrote correctly: "From both powers [of orders and jurisdiction] is completed the integral faculty to perform a perfect act of this judgment, which includes both the passing and the execution of a judgment."[2]

3. De facto, in the danger of death all priests enjoy the faculty of absolving from any sin whatsoever. Therefore, this power is received in the ordination itself.

I distinguish the antecedent. All priests obtain this faculty from a concession from the Church, according to Trent (D 1686-1688), *conceded*; in virtue of ordination alone, *denied.*

4. A priest lacks jurisdiction to the extent that he does not have subjects in virtue of his ordination alone. But the penitent himself can make himself a subject of the priest in order to receive absolution. Therefore, in addition to this subjection of the penitent, a new conferral of jurisdiction is not required.

I concede the major and deny the minor. For, since sin is an offense against God, no one can confer jurisdiction to remit it except God himself per se or through his ministers; but the penitent is not a minister chosen by God in order to grant this jurisdiction. And there is no similarity here in the choice of an arbitrator, because, the one who chooses the arbitrator enjoys control over himself, which he can grant to another; this does not apply to a penitent.

205. Scholium 1. *On conferring the power of jurisdiction.* Concerning the time when jurisdiction is conferred, or the relation of this power to the power of priestly orders, Suarez offers three opinions.[3]

The first opinion, advanced by Armacanus, which is favored by Almainus, and which Durandus says is probable, holds that jurisdiction is conferred in the priestly ordination itself, and therefore it is not really distinguished from power of orders and it is not separable from it. However, this opinion is false, and the other theologians are opposed to it. For, in virtue of ordination alone, no office is assumed to which ordinary jurisdiction is necessarily connected; and in the same ordination the bishop or the Ro-

2. Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.16 s.3 n.32.
3. *De paenitentia* disp.16 s.3 n.5-29. See F. Charriere, *Le pouvoir d'ordre et le pouvoir de iurisdiction dans le sacrement de la pénitence:* DivThom(Fr) 23 (1945) 191-213.

man Pontiff does not intend to confer any delegated jurisdiction.

The second opinion teaches that an inchoate and incomplete jurisdiction is conferred in ordination, and it is then completed by the Church when subjects are assigned to the priest. But it seems that this opinion must also be rejected. For, a) it is contrary to the common way of speaking, according to which there are only two kinds of jurisdiction—*ordinary and delegated,* but nowhere is there any mention of this third kind of inchoate jurisdiction; b) also is supposes that jurisdiction is present, when there are no subjects, which seems to be surprising; c) and it does not distinguish completely the power of orders from the power of jurisdiction, since it thinks that both come from the same source.[4]

The third opinion, more approved, says that no jurisdiction is conferred in ordination, but that it is received in another way from the Church. For, in addition to the fact that this seems to have been the mind of St. Thomas and St. Bonaventure,[5] for this reason the essential distinction between the power of orders and the power of jurisdiction is better preserved.

206. Scholium 2. *Whether every priest, in virtue of the power of orders, has jurisdiction at least to forgive venial sins.* Some theologians respond to this question in the affirmative, v.gr., St. Thomas, Scotus, Suarez, Vázquez, Lugo.[6] Some of them thought that jurisdiction is not required for the remission of venial sins; but others thought that the requisite jurisdiction is granted by the Church according to an immemorial custom.

However, the first explanation certainly cannot be held; for, the reason for making a judgment, advanced in the argument for the thesis, is valid for every sin. The other explanation, could be valid in itself, but de facto now there is no such custom or tacit approval from the Church. Indeed, canon law CIC 879 [1917 Code] requires express jurisdiction for hearing confessions of any kind; and this is in accordance with the prohibition of Innocent XI (D 2095).

207. Scholium 3. *On the reservation cases.* Protestants denied that the Church has the power of reserving cases, and the Synod of Pistoia was also in error in this matter (D 2644f). The Council of Trent in sess.14 ch.7 and cn.11 (D 1686-1688, 1711) taught and defined that bishops have the right of reserving cases to themselves. Also, since jurisdiction is conferred according to the will of the one granting is, it can be conferred in a limited way, either regarding the persons or the place, or regarding the time or the kinds of sins. Trent said that this contributes greatly to the education of the Christian people. For, in this way the faithful are deterred from committing more serious sins, or the sins themselves once committed are suitably punished, or certain dangers are removed.

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4. Galtier, 535-538. Sasse also reviews these different opinions, *De sacramentis Ecclesiae* 2,83-85.
5. S.Th., *In 4* d.18 q.1 a.1; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.19 a.2 q.2.
6. S.Th., *In 4* d.18 q.2 a.3; *Suppl.* q.8 a.3; Scotus, *In 4* d.18 q.4 a.2; Vázquez, *In tertiam partem* q.93 a.1 dub.6; Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.26 a.5; Lugo, *De paenitentia* disp.18 a.3 n.41-44.

CHAPTER V

On the effects of the sacrament of penance

208. Trent in sess.14 ch.3 (D 1674) teaches the effects of the sacrament of penance with these words: *As to the reality and the effect of this sacrament, so far as it concerns its power and efficacy, it consists in reconciliation with God. In persons who are pious and receive this sacrament with devotion, it is likely to be followed at times by peace and serenity of conscience with an overwhelming consolation of spirit.*

Hence the effect, which always follows the sacrament of penance, when properly received, is *reconciliation with God.*[1] Peace of conscience and spiritual consolation are sometimes the result for those who piously receive this sacrament.

St. Thomas so explains the effect of reconciliation with God that he first treats the remission or mortal sins, then the remission of venial sins, thirdly the return of forgiven sins, and finally the recovery of the virtues and the revival of merits (III, q. 86-89).

Now *concerning the remission of mortal sins,* we have already demonstrated that through the sacrament of penance all mortal sins committed after baptism are remitted, and in such a way that at the same time together with the guilty state of sin the guilty state of eternal punishment is always forgiven, although the guilt of temporal punishment is not always taken away (thesis 1 and 17).

Concerning the remission of venial sins, we also said that they cannot be remitted without some contrition, just as for someone in the state of mortal sin. Moreover, we also showed that the confession of venial sins, even though these sins are sufficient matter for the sacrament of penance, still they are not the necessary matter, because they can be forgiven in many other ways independently of the sacrament of penance (n. 157).

Concerning the revival of merits, we have already said enough about that in the treatise *On Grace.*[2]

Therefore, there is still one point to clarify, namely, *whether sins already forgiven by the sacrament of penance return because of subsequent sins.* The following thesis responds to this question and in it we defend the

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1. The same effect of *reconciliation with God* is also expressed with other formulas by the magisterium of the Church. For it is called by Innocent III (D 793-794) and by Lyons II (D 854-859) *pardon of sinners;* by Trent (D 1668-1678, 1701, 1579) *remission of sins, reconciliation of the faithful who have fallen after baptism, freedom from admitted sins, recovery of lost justice, resurrection:* by Florence (D 1310-1313, 1323) *spiritual healing, absolution from sins;* by Lateran IV (D 802) *restoration of the fallen.*
2. STh S 3^2, III, 347-351.

view that the remission of sins is so definitive and absolute that they never return again. Nevertheless this proposition, rather than being a new effect of the sacrament of penance, shows the perpetuity and immutability of the remission of sins.

Thesis 22. Sins once forgiven through the sacrament of penance, properly and simply, now no longer return.

S.Th. III, q. 88, a. 1-4; Galtier, 570-576; Lercher-Lakner, 620f.; Puig, 640-659.

209. Definition of terms. *Sins* are understood here as mortal sins. But per se it is also clear that what is said about mortal sins applies a fortiori to venial sins.

Forgiven, certainly, by God in the sacrament of penance, either actually or only in desire.

No longer return, that is, now they are no longer imputed by God as to the guilty state of sin or the guilty state of eternal punishment, or even of the temporal punishment, which has already been forgiven.

Properly and simply. A return of this kind can be conceived as either *proper* or *improper*. For, a sin would return *properly* if, because of a subsequent sin, the exact same sin, which has already been forgiven, would be imputed again, as if it had never been forgiven. However, a sin returns *improperly*, or *in a certain respect,* inasmuch as either by a subsequent sin the loss of grace or the state of sin returns, or the subsequent sin is more serious because of a greater ingratitude, which the person is guilty of whose sins had already been forgiven. However, this ingratitude generally does not constitute a special sin, but only an aggravating circumstance. Therefore, we concede that this return is improper; but we deny a return in the proper sense.

210. Opinions. 1. *Some of the old scholastics,* among whom Hugo of St. Victor is numbered, proposed a return of sins in the proper sense.[3]

2. Peter Lombard in a state of uncertainty said: "Approved teachers favor both sides of this question. And therefore we do not prejudge either side, leaving the judgment to the careful reader."[4]

3. St. Thomas explained the matter so clearly, and he defended the

3. See De Ghellinck, *La réviviscence des péchés pardonnés:* NouvRevTh 41 (1909) 400-408; Hugo of St. Victor, *De sacramentis* 1.2 p.14 c.9: ML 176,570f.
4. P. Lombard, *Sententiae* 4 d.22. See A. Landgraf, *Die frühscholastische Streitfrage von Wiederaufleben der Sünden:* ZkathTh 61 (1937) 509-599; J. Scheller, *Das Nichtwiederaufleben der schweren Sünde:* ZkathTh 14 (1891) 241-267.

negative opinion so effectively, that it now has became common among theologians.[5]

Theological note. This doctrine is *certain.*

211. Proof from Holy Scripture. The Sacred Scriptures clearly state that in every justification (therefore also in justification gained through the sacrament of penance) the sins are remitted or removed perfectly and absolutely. Therefore they cannot return any more. *The antecedent* is proved by running through the different formulas that Holy Scripture uses:

a) Sins are *taken away, they are removed* from man (John 1:29; 2 Sam. 12:13).

b) Sins are *cleansed, washed away, blotted out* (Ps. 51:7.9; 1 Cor. 6:11).

c) Sins are *blotted out* like the way in which words on a wax tablet are erased (Isa.43:25; Acts 3:19).

d) Sins are *removed* from the sinner, they are *buried* in the sea (Ps. 103:12; Mic. 7:19).

e) Sins are like a wound that is *healed* (Isa. 30:26; Matt. 9:12; Luke 10:30).

212. Proof from tradition. The Fathers deny the return of sins for two reasons:

a) Inasmuch as they teach that sins *are truly and absolutely forgiven* when a man is justified. Listen to Origen: "We write the letters of sin. when once you have approached the cross of Christ and the grace of baptism, your handwriting has been nailed to the cross and blotted out in the fount of baptism. Do not write again what has been blotted out, and do not repair what has been destroyed."[6] And Theodoret: "For this is certainly admirable, that he not only overlooks, but also drives our sins from his memory, and he hands them to oblivion like casting them into the sea. For, while explaining this, the blessed Micah also said: He sinks our sins and all of our sins are cast into the depths of the sea. For, just as what is thrown into the depths of the sea no longer exists, so, he said, he will cover over our sins completely with forgetfulness."[7]

b) Inasmuch as they explicitly teach that sins *do not return* because of subsequent sins. Thus St. Ambrose: "We have a good Lord, who wishes to be generous to all, and he calls you through the prophet when he says: *I am,*

5. S.Th. III, q. 88; Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.13 s.1ff.; Vázquez, *In 3* q. 88; Valencia, *De paenitentia* q.5 p.1; Lugo, *De paenitentia* disp.10.
6. *In Genesim* hom.13,4: MG 12,235.
7. *In Michaeum* 7,19: MG 81,1786.

I am he who blots out your iniquities, and I will not remember them; but you should remember them. that is: I do not recall whatever sins of yours I have forgiven—they are now covered over with oblivion; but you should remember them. I, he said, will not remember them because of grace, but you should remember them for the sake of correction; remember so that you will know that your sin has been forgiven."[8] And St. Prosper: "Whoever. abandons Christ and ends his life while being a stranger to grace, what happens except that he falls into perdition? But he does not fall into that which has been forgiven, nor is he condemned for original sin; however, because of his last sins he is afflicted with the death which was due to him because of those that were forgiven."[9] And St. Gelasius: the mercy of God "does not allow forgiven sins to return in punishment."[10]

213. Theological reasoning. For already forgiven sins to return there must be a cause. But no cause can be assigned. Therefore sins once forgiven do not return any more.

The minor. a) *Not God,* since on the one hand God forgave the sins absolutely, and on the other hand it is repugnant that God should bring about a return of sins.

b) *And not man himself because of subsequent sins.* For, although by new sins man is constituted an enemy of God, this new sin is not an exact reproduction of the sin already forgiven, but it has its own guilt, different from the guilt of the former sins.[11]

214. Objections. 1. In the parable of the servant to whom the king forgave all his debt, because the servant refused to have mercy on his fellow servant, the king *handed him over to the torturers until he paid back the whole debt.* Hence, the forgiven debt returns, and once again it is demanded by the king. From this Christ the Lord concludes: *So also my heavenly Father will do to every one of you, if you do not forgive your brother from your heart* (Matt. 18:23-35). Therefore, at least because of sins of unmercifulness, sins already forgiven return.

I respond that the teaching Christ intends to give us in this parable is not about the return of sins, but about fraternal forgiveness. That this is the one point of this parable is clear from the fact that it is introduced as a response to Peter's question: *Lord how often shall my brother sin against me, and I forgive him?.* (Matt. 18:21-22). And so Christ concludes, urging completely the same thing: *So my heavenly Father will do to every one of you, if you do not forgive your brother from your heart* (*ibid.,* 35). Therefore,

8. *De paenitentia* 2,6,40: ML 16,528.
9. *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Gallorum* 1,2: ML 81,158.
10. A. Thiel, *Epistolae Romanorum Pontificum.* 1,507.
11. See S.Th. III, q. 88, a. 1. See also F. Carpino, *Il reditus peccatorum* (Rome 1937); N.G. Rus, *De munere sacramenti paenitentiae in aedificando corpore Christi mystico* (Rome 1947).

Knabenbauer wrote very well: "Everything in the parable should be measured from its intention. But its intention is, as is indicated by v. 21.22.35, to teach that pardon is always to be granted, and to suggest some serious reasons for this matter. Wherefore from the narration it does not follow in any way that God also considers that sins, which have already been forgiven for someone who commits another sin, should then be a matter for punishment.[12]

2. St. John Chrysostom, when interpreting the parable we just referred to, has this to say: "What then is worse than the memory of an injury, when he recalls the already manifested beneficence of God.? For this reason, someone will not have erred, if he says that this sin is graver than every other sin. For, all others could impetrate a pardon; that one alone could not so impetrate pardon that what was already blotted out and already extinct should be brought back."[13] Therefore, according to Chrysostom, sins formerly forgiven return, at least if someone refuses to forgive the injuries inflicted by a neighbor.

I concede the major and distinguish the consequent. Chrysostom thinks that sins already forgiven return *properly,* inasmuch as the same sins which have already been forgiven are again imputed, *denied;* he thinks that they return *improperly,* inasmuch as because of the sin of unmercifulness a man incurs materially the same punishment as he had previously incurred by the sins already forgiven, *conceded.*

I explain. The intention of Chrysostom in this homily is not to investigate whether or not sins already forgiven return, because of subsequent sins; but his intention is to inculcate how serious the sin of unmercifulness is. In fact this is certain from the context itself; for right after the words cited above in the objection, Chrysostom says: "And these words are not mine, but those of the one who will judge us, God. As he said in this place: *So also my heavenly Father will do to you, if you do not forgive your brother from your heart.* And again in another place: *If you forgiven men their sins, your heavenly Father will also forgive you.* Therefore in order for us to obtain pardon and remission, we must earnestly strive to be reconciled with whatever enemies we have.

Moreover, elsewhere Chrysostom teaches that the parables must be interpreted according to their purpose: "In the parables it is not necessary to interpret everything literally, but when we have learned the purpose of the parable, to speak about that, and not examine other points out of curiosity."[14]

3. St. Augustine, while considering the same parable, says this: "That forgiven sins return, where there is no fraternal charity, the Lord teaches very clearly in the Gospel passage about that servant."[15] Therefore, St. Augustine teaches, as the plain doctrine of Christ, that, because of sins of unmercifulness, already forgiven sins return.

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12. Knabenbauer, *In Matthaeum* 141. Puig, 645-650, gathers together several other texts of Scripture against this thesis. But, either the texts are not to the point, or they pertain to a sin not yet forgiven, or the words must be understood as being about the guilt of temporal punishment. For, since often some of the forgiven guilt remains, rightly God demands punishment for it after the sins have been forgiven, although the sins themselves in no way return. See Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.13 s.1 n.7ff.
13. *Homilia in parabolam decem millium talentorum debitoris.*7: MG 51,20. He gives almost the same reason, *In Matthaeum* hom.61.4: MG 58,594.
14. *In Matthaeum* hom.64,3: MG 58,613.
15. *De baptismo* 1,12,20: ML 43,120; CV 51,164. See K. Adam, *Die kirchliche Sündenvergebung nach dem hl. Augustin* 39; Stuffler: ZkathTh 42 (1918) 633; Poschmann: ZkathTh 45 (1921) 225f.

I concede the antecedent and deny the consequent.

I explain. St. Augustine is not dealing in general with the question about the return of sins because of a subsequent sin, but only about a sin whose attraction remains in the mind, when someone receives baptism. Rather, St. Augustine adds this return of sins only in a hypothetical way. For, given the fact, but not conceding, that the baptism, of someone who actively hates his brother, remits his sins, it perfects him completely in the instant of his baptism, while immediately after the baptism, *because of the continuation of his hatred,* the same sins return. Therefore, by arguing in this way, St. Augustine urges the Donatists to return to the Catholic Church, if they wish to receive the forgiveness of their sins. Here are the words of St. Augustine that come immediately after those used in the objection: "But the fact that he had not yet forgiven his fellow servant did not hinder his master, at the time of reckoning, from forgiving him everything he owed; but how did it benefit him, since because of the persistence of his hatred everything was immediately repeated? Thus the grace of baptism is not impeded so that all the sins are forgiven, even though the fraternal hatred continues in the one whose sins have been forgiven. Yesterday's sins are forgiven and whatever else remains is forgiven, even at the very hour and moment before baptism and in baptism; but then immediately he begins to be guilty not only of the following but also of the preceding days, hours, moments, since everything that was forgiven returns."

4. St. Augustine again, while treating the same parable elsewhere, teaches this: "No one knowingly holds on to something against himself, lest it be held against him when he prays. For God says: *forgive and it will be forgiven you;* but I have forgiven before; forgive also afterwards; for, if you do not forgive, I will call you back, and whatever I forgave you, I will demand back from you. For, Truth does not lie; Christ does not deceive nor is he deceived, and he continues by saying: *so also will my heavenly Father do to you."*[16] Therefore, according to St. Augustine, at least because of sins of unmercifulness, sins already forgiven return.

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. They return *properly,* so that the sins already forgiven are imputed again, *denied;* they return *improperly,* so that the sins suffer materially the same punishment because of a new sin, *conceded.* In order to solve both this difficulty and the previous one, it is necessary to note that St. Prosper, a disciple of St. Augustine and his defender against the objection of the Gauls, simply denies the return of forgiven sins: "he does not fall back into what has been forgiven."[17]

5. St. Gregory the Great derives, what follows, from the parable of the unforgiving debtor: "It s evident from the words of the Gospel that if we do not forgive from our hearts the offenses committed against us, we become once more accountable for what we rejoiced in as forgiven through Penance."[18] Therefore, according to St. Gregory, sins already forgiven return because of the sin of unmercifulness.

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. They return *properly, denied; improperly, conceded.* The purpose of St. Gregory in explaining this parable

16. *Sermo* 83,6: ML 38,518.

17. *Pro Augustino responsiones ad capitula obiectionum Gallorum* 1,2: ML 51,158.

18. *Dialogi* 4,60: ML 77,428. St. Thomas offers a solution to this difficulty in III, q. 88, a. 2, where he says: "The ingratitude implied in the hatred of one's brother is a special cause of the return of sins already forgiven."

is not to inquire into whether sins return, because of subsequent sins, but he intends to explain this one point—how grave the sin is of unmercifulness. Moreover, this solution gains strength from the fact that he teaches the complete and absolute remission of sins: "Whoever says, then, that sins are not entirely put away in baptism, let him say that the Egyptians did not really die in the Red Sea. But, if he acknowledges that the Egyptians really died, he must needs acknowledge that sins die entirely in baptism, since surely the truth avails more in our absolution than the shadow of the truth" (R 2298).

CONCLUSION

215. Having now fully investigated, guided by the Council of Trent, the main questions about the sacrament of penance, it is necessary that we present an accurate definition of it, since at the beginning of the treatise we deliberately delayed it, because there it would not have been well understood.

But now, as the conclusion of everything we have presented, and at the same time as a summary of the whole treatise on penance, the sacrament of penance can be defined:

a) **By a metaphysical definition:** *It is the sacrament of reconciliation conferred on a baptized sinner.* Or also somewhat differently: *It is the sacrament whereby a baptized sinner is absolved juridically.*

b) **By a physical definition:** *It is the sacrament, coalescing out of the three acts of the penitent, namely, contrition, confession and absolution as the matter, and out of the absolution of the priest as the form, whose effect is the remission of sins committed after baptism.*

c) **By a descriptive definition:** *It is the sacrament whereby "through a judicial absolution, imparted by a legitimate minister, sins committed after baptism are forgiven to a believer properly disposed"* (CIC 870 [1917 Code]).

APPENDIX

On indulgences

S.Th. *Suppl.* q. 25ff.; Galtier, 597-629; Lercher-Lakner, 626-641; Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.48-57; B. Poschmann, *Der Ablass in Lichte der Bussgeschichte* (1948).

216. Since indulgences are ordered to the full remission of sins, it follows that doctrine about them is intimately connected with the doctrine on the sacrament of penance. For, the full remission of sins means not only the removal of the guilt and the eternal punishment, but also the temporal punishment. Indeed, the temporal punishment is not always remitted entirely along with the remission of the guilt, and also not with the addition of the sacramental satisfaction (see theses 17-19). For this reason, therefore, God willed by means of indulgences to confer on us a certain means whereby we might be able to obtain, while we are still living on this earth, the full and perfect remission of punishments.

Trent in sess.15 passed a decree on indulgences in which, after affirming the existence and utility of indulgences, it concentrates especially on the correct explanation of their use, both regarding the restraint with which indulgences should be granted, and regarding the elimination of their improper use, and regarding the avoidance of superstition, ignorance and irreverence, which can easily get mixed up with the true teaching about indulgences.[1]

Therefore, while passing over what is said about indulgences in Moral Theology and in Canon Law, we will consider only the dogmatic foundations, on which the pious use of indulgences is based. Therefore, we will speak *about the concept of indulgences, about the existence in the Church of the treasure of the satisfactions of Christ and the Saints, about the power the Church has to dispense this treasure, about the usefulness and the conditions of indulgences.*

I. On the concept of indulgences

217. The Code of Canon Law in cn.911 [1917] offers a description of indulgences in these words: *All should have a high regard for indulgences, or, the remission before God of the temporal punishment due for the sins, already forgiven as to their guilt, which the Church authority concedes from the treasury of the Church for the living by way of absolution, for the*

1 See F. Cereceda, *Un projecto tridentino sobre las indulgencias:* EstEcl 20 (1946) 245-255.

dead by way of suffrage. The individual elements will now be explained.

Remission of the temporal punishment. For, it is not concerned with remission of the guilt itself which, if it is mortal, is remitted by the sacrament of penance received actually or in desire; but if it is venial, also by any act of contrition. Therefore they add: *for sins already forgiven as to their guilt.* And it is also not concerned with the remission of eternal punishment, because this is always remitted together with the guilt.

For this reason, therefore, and for no other, some formulas must be understood which, looking at the sound of the words, seem to signify something else. Here they are: a) *An indulgence for the remission of sins* (D 868, 1266): where sin is taken for the guilt of punishment, as is certain because there it is pre-required as a condition of the state of grace. b) *An indulgence from guilt and from punishment:* this was a common formula, whose meaning is clear from history. That is, when the first plenary indulgence was granted to Crusaders by Pope Urban II in 1095, at one stroke permission was granted that they could be absolved from their sins by any priest (*indulgence from guilt*), and that they could gain the remission of the temporal punishment (*indulgence from punishment*). Hence the expression was used commonly: *an indulgence from guilt and from punishment.* Then this way of speaking was transferred to every plenary indulgence, and it was used in that way for a long time.

Remission before God. Certainly the object of this remission is the punishment that is owed before God, not only before the Church. In fact, the magisterium of the Church has often declared this very thing (D 1416, 1468-1472, 1960, 2640). However, the temporal punishments, which are remitted by indulgences, are especially the punishments to be endured in purgatory.

Also, in the first centuries of the Church an indulgence applied to punishments imposed by the Church, that is, it had to do with punishments which were imposed by the ministers of penance for a diversity of sins. From that arose the way of speaking which is still used. For, when we speak about an indulgence of 40 days, 7 years and so forth, the meaning is: the punishment due to God which was paid for by the punishment imposed in antiquity of 40 days, 7 years, and so forth, is remitted by the indulgence, and would be even now if a punishment of this kind were imposed by the Church.

The Church authority concedes. Therefore, on the one hand an indulgence has its efficacy not from the action of the agent (*ex opere operantis*), but from the work done (*ex opere operato*); but on the other hand, an indulgence is not a sacrament.

This final point is clear because indulgences were not instituted by Christ, but by the Church.

However, that an indulgence has its power *ex opere operato* means that its efficacy is not to be attributed to the merit or to the satisfaction of the faithful Christian who gains the indulgence, but to the Church which grants indulgences because of the power of the keys. But the work prescribed to be done acts as a *necessary condition* (*conditio sine qua non*). Therefore, an indulgence does not depend on the fervor of the one gaining it, provided that the conditions are fulfilled. In this way, therefore, an indulgence differs from sacramental penance, which is given in proportion to the disposition of the penitent, both regarding the work to be done and regarding the action of the agent.

From the treasury of the Church. Certainly that punishment is not forgiven without the payment of some price, but it is according as the Church dispenses from her treasury the satisfaction that is required in order to compensate for the punishment. In fact, that *treasury* coalesces out of the summary of the satisfactions of Christ and the Saints. But the Church makes satisfaction differently for the living and for the dead. For, she makes satisfaction for the living by way of absolution, but for the dead by way of suffrages.

By way of absolution. Theologians disagree over the meaning of this formula. However, it seems to involve two elements: a) someone gaining an indulgence is absolved by the Church, that is, in virtue of the power of the keys his temporal punishment is remitted; b) but at the same time everything required for his satisfaction is paid for by the Church.

By way of suffrage, or of the satisfying help, that is, in the way in which the suffrages of the faithful benefit the dead. This takes place by inclining God to accept the satisfactions that are offered, in compensation for the punishments which must be suffered in purgatory by the dead.

But it is not possible to define how much actually is applied to the deceased. Therefore, when a plenary indulgence is offered, this means that the Church for her part grants whatever is required so that, if the total amount is applied, that soul is set free immediately from the pains of purgatory. Nevertheless, the measure of this application depends on the divine will. But Sixtus IV declared that indulgences have more worth with God than private suffrages.[2]

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2 See Galtier, 602-619. This notion of indulgences existed in the Church before Luther, and it cannot be said that it was created on the occasion of Luther's attack. See A. Kurz, *Die katholische Lehre von Ablass vor und nach dem Auftreten Luthers* (Paderborn 1900); F. Göller, *Der Ausbruch der Reformation und die spätmittelalterliche Ablasspraxis* (Freiburg 1917).

II. On the existence of the treasury of satisfactions in the Church

218. All those who reject indulgences, or do not rightly understand them, deny the existence of the treasury, coalescing from the satisfactions of Christ and the saints. For this reason, because he rejected indulgences, Luther said this: "The treasures of the Church from which the pope gives indulgences are not the merits of Christ and of the Saints" (D 1467. See 1447f.).[3] But the *Synod of Pistoia,* since they held "that an indulgence, according to its precise notion, is nothing else than the remission of that part of the penance which had been established by the canons for the sinner," taught that "the scholastics, puffed up by their subtleties, introduced the poorly understood treasury of the merits of Christ and of the Saints" (D 2640f.).

However, the existence of this treasury must be held, at a minimum, as *Catholic doctrine,* not only from the condemnations already mentioned of Luther and the Synod of Pistoia, but from the Bulls of Clement IV and especially of Leo X, in which the existence of the treasury of the Church is clearly stated (D 1025f., 1447f.).[4]

The foundations on which this treasury rests are two: a) *The superabundance of the satisfactions of Christ,* who satisfied infinitely; *of the Blessed Virgin Mary,* who satisfied greatly since she did not need to make satisfaction for herself; *of the Saints*, at least many of them, who satisfied more than necessary to satisfy for themselves.[5] b) *The dogma on the communion of saints,* in virtue of which all the faithful are united in one body with Christ as Head, not only as partakers in the same faith, sacraments and grace, but also inasmuch as among all, whether they are still living here on earth, or in purgatory, or in heaven, a certain communion of goods exists, and because of it some are able to help others with their satisfactions.

III. On the power of the Church to dispense this treasure

219. Wycliffe (D 1192), Luther (D 1468-1472) and the Synod of Pistoia rejected this power of the Church.

But both from the two Bulls just mentioned, and especially from Trent in the decree on indulgences and in the profession of faith (D 1835, 2012),

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3 On the historical question of indulgences at the time of the Reformation, besides the works already cited, see W. Köhler, *Dokumente zum Ablasstreit von 1517* (1912).

4 Suarez, *De paenitentia* disp.51 s.1 n.2, says that the existence of this treasury is a matter of faith and that its denial is considered by theologians to be an error. However, there can be a doubt whether the Bull of Leo X contains a true definition *ex cathedra.* On this Bull, see N. Paulus, *Die Ablassdekretale Leos X von Jahre 1513:* ZkathTh 37 (1913) 394-400.

5 N. Paulus says (in the work just cited, 1,338-354) that Franciscus de Mayronis denied the treasury of the Church; that Durandus doubted whether the satisfactions and merits of the saints contribute to it.

this power of the Church must be admitted as *a defined doctrine of faith.*

Arguments are gathered from two sources:

a) From the praxis of the Church, which for many centuries, as is clear from her history,[6] she has been dispensing *de facto* the treasure of satisfactions of Christ and the Saints; therefore she *can* dispense them.

b) *From theological reasoning.* The Church, as is certain from Matt. 16:19 and 18:18, enjoys the power of absolving any bond whatsoever, by which the faithful are hindered from entering the kingdom of heaven. But the temporal punishment is such a bond. Therefore the Church can absolve it with the help of indulgences.

Moreover, it is evident that she can do this *for the living,* since they are subjects of the Church. But also there is no difficulty *concerning the dead,* since they, although they are not subjects of the Church, still truly pertain to the mystical body of Christ, so that the communion of saints is effective also for them.

IV. On the usefulness of indulgences

220. *Trent* (D 1835, 1867), in general, defends the usefulness of indulgences against the *Reformers*, and Pius VI vindicates them against the *Synod of Pistoia* (D 2643).

However, in particular the various advantages of indulgences are calculated:

a) *The remission of temporal punishment* is useful, whether partial or total, according as the indulgence if partial or plenary.

b) *The explanation of Catholic doctrine* is useful, which is provided by indulgences. For, by their use the doctrine on the communion of saints, on purgatory, on the necessity of satisfaction, on the justice and mercy of God, on the power of the Church is made clear for all to see.

c) *The striving for virtues,* prayer and devotions, good works, the sacraments, which is fostered by indulgences, is useful, since generally the gaining of indulgences is connected with these works.

V. On the conditions for indulgences

221. *For the valid concession of indulgences* both the legitimate authority of the one granting them is required, because it is a dispensation

6 On the history of indulgences, besides the cited works, see N. Paulus, *Geschichte des Ablasses im Mittelalter vom Ursprung bus zur Mittel des 14. Jahrhunderts. Vol.I-III* (Paderborn 1922-1923); F. Gillmann, *Die Ablasslehre der Frühscholastik:* Kath 93 (1913.1) 365-376; 95 (1915.2) 465-473; briefly Galtier, 623-629; Lercher-Lakner, 628.

of the ecclesiastical treasure, and also a pious and just cause, because the one granting them is not their master, but only their dispenser (CIC 913 [1917]; D 1266). St. Thomas puts it well in *Suppl.* q. 25, a. 2: "Whenever the cause assigned tends to the good of the Church and the honor of God, there is sufficient reason for granting an indulgence."

In order to gain indulgences it is necessary: a) to perform the required work, for the purpose and in the way it has been prescribed; b) to have the intention, at least habitual and at one time elicited, of gaining the indulgences; c) that the one for whom the indulgence is intended is in the state of grace; also, the one gaining it must be in the state of grace, since it is conceded only to those of contrite heart.

BOOK II

ON EXTREME UNCTION

222. The doctrine that covers the Sacrament of Extreme Unction must be joined, according to the Council of Trent, to the doctrine of the Sacrament of Penance, "which was considered by the Fathers as the consummation not only of penance but also of the whole Christian life" (D 1694). However, since many things in this treatise pertain to Moral Theology, we will consider only those elements that seem to belong to Dogmatic Theology.

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CHAPTER I

The existence of Extreme Unction

Thesis 1. Extreme Unction is a true sacrament of the New Law.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 20, a. 1-3; Otten, n.260; Puig de la B., n.973; Kern, p.1-80; Huarte,[1] p.271; Lercher-Umberg, n.644-649; Ruch-Godefroy, *Extreme Unction:* DTC 5,1897-2014; Doronzo, 1,31-98.

223. Connection. As in the other sacraments, the first thing to investigate is whether the rite, which by the Church is called "Extreme Unction," is truly a sacrament of the New Law understood in the full sense as has been explained in the previous treatises.

224. Definition of terms. *Extreme Unction* can be defined: The rite of the Church whereby, through anointings and the prayer of a priest, those who are seriously sick are consoled.

Therefore this sacrament is called *Extreme Unction,* "because of all the holy anointings, which our Lord and Savior committed to his Church, this is the last one to be administered."[2]

However, this sacrament is also referred to with other names,[3] according as its different aspects are being considered—either the effects or the rite. Thus:

a) *from the remote matter* it is called: holy oil, the ceremony of holy oil;

b) *from the proximate matter:* Holy Anointing, the Sacrament of holy anointing, the anointing of consecrated oil, the blessing of holy oil, ἅγιον ἔλαιον, θεῖον μύρον, χρίσμα δι'ἔλαιον;

c) *from the matter with a deprecative form:* the prayer of faith εὐχέλαιον;

d) *from the effect:* medicine of soul and body, sacrament of alleviation, the liquid of health, the oil of holy reconciliation καθέρωσις δι'ἔλαιον;

e) *from the subject:* Sacrament of the dying, anointing of the infirm, Extreme Unction;

d) *from the relation to penance:* consummation of penance, complement of penance, perfection of penance.

Under these and other similar names this sacrament was referred to in the Western Church before the twelfth century; from that time the name

1. Huarte, *Tractatus de Ordine et Matrimonio* (with an Appendix on Extreme Unction) (Rome 1922) p.272-284.
2. *Roman Catechism* 2,6,2.
3. On the different names with which this sacrament has been designated, see Kern, p.2-4. On the name of this sacrament among the Orientals, see Spacil: OrCh (1931) 55-58.118; Gordillo, *Comp. Theologiae Orient.* (1939) p. 163, note 4.

"Extreme Unction" began to be preferred. Among the Orientals currently it is usually called *Holy Oil.*

A true sacrament of the New Law. It is, therefore, a sensible and symbolic sign, effective of grace, perennially instituted by Christ.[4]

225. Adversaries. The first adversaries of this sacrament seem to have been the *Waldenisans* and the *Albigensians,* who later were joined by the *Wycliffites* and *Hussites*[5]*;* however, the latter despised the sacrament rather than denied it (D 794, 1259).

With one voice the *Reformers* deny the sacramentality of Extreme Unction, but for different reasons; Luther, because he contends that only those are really sacraments that are expressly contained in the Gospel; but he finds no mention of Extreme Unction.[6] Calvin interpreted the text of St. James as being about a charismatic healing, and he says that the notion of a sacrament was introduced into the Church in the fifth century by Innocent I; therefore he calls Extreme Unction "histrionic hypocrisy."[7]

Historical Protestants try to explain the origin of this sacrament in various ways, and generally they admit that it was in use only from the twelfth century. *Ritualists* and *Anglo-Catholics* admit the sacramentality of Extreme Unction, but only according to the way in which they explain the notion of a sacrament.[8] More recent Protestants do not try to place Extreme Unction in the twelfth century, but they say it was in use already in the eighth century

4. There is more on this in scholium 2.
5. Bossuet (*Histoire des variations,* 1,11, 108f,180), contends that nothing from these heretics about the seven sacraments was new.
6. Luther at first listed Extreme Unction among the sacraments (*Serm. De novo Test.* N.24), but afterwards he denied it, as is evident in his *Confessione Augustana:* "Confirmation and Extreme Unction are rites accepted by the Fathers, which the Church does not require as necessary for salvation, because they do not have the command of God. Wherefore it is not useless to distinguish these rites from the superior ones [that is, the true sacraments] which have an express command of God and the clear permission of grace" (Hasse, *Libri symbolici* p.201). And more expressly in *Captivitate Babylonica:* "I say: if there is insanity anywhere, it is especially regarding this text [of James}. For, I omit the fact that this letter is not by the Apostle James nor is it worthy of the apostolic spirit, although by custom it obtained some authority. However, even if it were by the Apostle, I would say that it is not licit for an Apostle to institute a sacrament by his own authority. For this pertains only to Christ. But nowhere do we read in the Gospel about a sacrament of Extreme Unction."
7. "We admit that the Apostles anointed the sick with oil, whereby they also obtained bodily health; we also admit that the letter of James commands that the presbyters of the Church be summoned to the sick, in order to anoint them with oil and to pray for them that they recover their health; that it is also the duty of the ministers of the Church that they visit the sick, that they console them with the preaching of the Gospel and the dispensation of the Supper, and that together with the Church they pray for their health. However, we deny: 1. when the gift of a miraculous healing does not happen, that this anointing has any further use in the Church; 2. that this is a sacrament of the New Law instituted by Christ, in the true and proper sense, and for this reason it must be placed under anathema" (Augusti, *Corpus librorum symbolicorum,* which in the church of the reformers obtained public authority, p. 425).
8. It is mentioned among those sacraments "in the improper sense," which are referred to in art.25 as "derived from the corrupt following of the Apostles." In the first "*Prayer Book*" the formula for its administration was still given, but in the later editions it was dropped, until the modern Ritualists restored it.

but only as a remedy for a sickness of the body; then in the ninth century it was related to spiritual sickness, that is, to take away sins; then finally in the twelfth century theologians numbered it among the sacraments.[9]

Modernists apply to this sacrament their theory about dogmatic-ritual evolution, and they want to find the origin of this rite in paganism, in Avesta (S. Reinach), in the rites of the Gnostics (Renan) or of the Jews.[10] Others derive it from the opinion, which they falsely attribute to the Jews and Christians during the time of St. James, according to which all diseases come from sin; because of this St. James instituted the Anointing in order to forgive the sins and so cure the sick.[11] Loisy says that St. James did not wish to promulgate a sacrament of Christ, but only to commend a pious custom.[12] Finally, Gibson says that the anointing, which before was called extreme, because it was the last one given after baptism and confirmation, later was given that name because it was administered to the sick who were *in extreme* circumstances. So he explains this transition as a simple ritual evolution.[13]

226. Doctrine of the Church. Innocent I, concerning the minster of Extreme Unction, after he said that not only a presbyter but also a bishop can administer extreme unction, moves on to the question of the subject; and he excludes from extreme unction those doing public penance, especially for this reason: "because it is a kind of sacrament. For, how is it supposed that one species (of sacrament) can be granted to those to whom the rest of the sacraments are denied?" (D 216).

The Synod of Pavia repeats these same words after it recommended that "the saving sacrament. must be made known to the people by skillful teaching" (D 620).

In the profession of faith prescribed for the Waldensians, Innocent III recounts among the sacraments, after penance and before marriage, "the anointing of the sick with the consecrated oil" (D 794).

In the same way Innocent IV, concerning the errors of the Greeks, prescribed: "According to the word of the Apostle James, extreme unction should be conferred upon the sick" (D 833).

9. F.W. Puller, *The Anointing of the Sick in Scripture and Tradition* (London 1904) 13-40; Gore, *Religion of the Church* c.4.
10. See DTC 5,1924.
11. See DTC 5,1916.
12. *Autour d'un petit livre* (Paris 1903) 251. This was condemned in *Lamentabili:* D 3448.
13. Edgar Gibson: "Whereas the original intention of the unction had been primarily for the saving of the sick person's life, by degrees this dropped out and was only administered when all hope of recovery seemed to have passed away; and thus what had been originally simply the last unction (extrema unctio), as being (presumably) applied after the unctions of Baptism and Confirmation, came to be looked upon as nothing but unctio in extremis and was deferred until death seemed imminent" (*The Thirty Nine Articles of the Church of England* [London 1902] 607f.).

The profession of faith of Michael Paleologus teaches: "that there are seven sacraments of the Church: one is baptism. and extreme unction, which, according to the doctrine of the Blessed James, is administered to the sick" (D 860).

Likewise, it is proposed to the Wycliffites and Hussites as a sacrament to be admitted (D 1259); and it is more accurately described, like each one of the seven sacraments, in the decree for the Armenians (D 1324).

Then the *Council of Trent* placed extreme unction among the seven sacraments of the New Law (D 1601); later it embraced the doctrine of this sacrament in four canons, directed against the errors of the Reformers. Cn.1: "If anyone says the extreme unction is not truly and properly a sacrament instituted by Christ our Lord and promulgated by the Blessed Apostle James but only a rite received from the Fathers or a human invention, let him be anathema" (D 1716).

Cn.2: "If anyone says that the sacred anointing of the sick neither confers grace nor remits sins nor comforts the sick; but that it does no longer exist, as if it consisted only in the grace of healing of olden days, let him be anathema" (D 1717). Two other canons look at the rite and the minister of extreme unction (D 1718-1719; see also the chapters D 1694-1700).

St. Pius X condemned the Modernists by decreeing: "In his Epistle, James did not intend to promulgate a sacrament of Christ but only to commend a pious custom. If in this custom he happens to distinguish a means of grace, it is not in that rigorous manner in which it was taken by the theologians who laid down the notion and number of the sacraments" (D 3448).

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith.* And "note that the Sacrament of Extreme Unction in this text is promulgated as *a matter of defined faith* (*de fide definita*)."[14]

227. Proof from Holy Scripture. In the O.T. this sacrament was not prefigured by some sacrament; and St. Thomas[15] says the reason for this is because it is a certain immediate preparation for entrance into glory and the access to that was not yet available in the Old Law, because redemption had not yet taken place.[16]

In the N.T., according to the Council of Trent, the sacrament of Extreme Unction was promulgated by St. James. The classical text in the Catholic Epistle is given in these words: *Is any among you sick? Let him call for the*

14. See C. Boyer, S.J., *Tractatus de Sacramento Paenitentiae et de Extrema Unctione* (Rome 1942) 394.
15. I-II, q. 102, a. 5 ad 3.
16. Lercher, n. 492.

elders of the church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord; and the prayer of faith will save the sick man, and the Lord will raise him up; and if he has committed sins, he will be forgiven (Jas. 5:14f.).

228. *Exegesis of the text.* Protestants and Rationalists have denied the authenticity of this Letter.[17] But they were wrong about this, since it is contained in the canon of Scripture, and even though the patristic commentaries on this Letter have perished, nevertheless it is certain that commentaries on it were published by Clement of Alexandria, Dydimus, Cyril of Alexandria and Augustine.

The Letter of James is present in the Muratorian Fragment, in Origen and St. Jerome[18]; and it concerns directly the Christian converts from Judaism ("to the twelve tribes in the Dispersion"), but what it says is directed to absolutely all Christians. Although there is no unanimity among interpreters about when the Letter was written,[19] still it cannot be placed after the year 61 or before 40. The author, it seems, had read the Letter of St. Paul to the Romans[20] in which the Apostle of the Gentiles extols the necessity and excellence of faith in reference to justification and clearly demonstrates the uselessness of the works of the Law because of the lack of efficacy of legal works in order to obtain justification. But since some Christians had a faulty understanding of St. Paul's Letter, interpreting it to mean that faith alone without works justifies, St. James wishes to prove against them that faith without works is dead. Finally, he exhorts the faithful to bear up under persecution and to practice charity, mercy and almsgiving.[21]

More general precepts immediately precede the text of ch. 5, vv. 14-15: what to do when cheerful, what to do when sad. The Apostle them moves from the more general cases to the particular case of sickness. And as he

17. See above, note 6. In older Protestant editions of the N.T. it was usually omitted as being deuterocanonical, but in the more recent ones almost all accept it.
18. There are many modern and ancient commentaries on this Letter. An extensive bibliography on this matter is found in Quera, S.J.: *Diccionario Enciclopédico Espasa,* under the word "Unción"; and J. Bord, *L'Extrème Onction,* p. 29f. The opinion of *Cajetan* was singular, since he denied that the sacrament of Extreme Unction is proved by this Letter (though he admitted it for other reasons); his words in the Roman edition, at the order of Pius V, were expunged. (See Lépicier, *De Extrema Unctione* p.20, n.21).
19. Some, like Liagre, Cornely, Pelten, Bartmann, Fillion. assign the year 61; but to others, along with Zahn, Ritschl, Schegg, B. Weiss Belser, it is preferable to place the time of the Letter between the years 40 and 41.
20. The following texts can be compared: Jas. 1:21—Rom. 7:23; Jas. 4:4—Rom. 14:4; and especially Jas. 4:14.20ff.—Rom. 3:28ff. to 4:1ff. If this connection between the Letter of James and that of Paul to the Romans is admitted, since the latter was written in Corinth about the year 56 or 57, then the year 61 for the Letter of James must be accepted.
21. You will find a brief synopsis or commentary on this passage in James, in addition to the cited commentaries in note 19, in Corluy, *Specilegium dogmatico-biblicum* 2,452-459; Umberg, *De Sacramentis tractatus dogmatico-moralis* 2,300 n.693ff.; J.B. Bord, *op.cit.*, 25-28.

recommended prayer for those suffering (*Is any one among you suffering? Let him pray*), now against sickness he again recommends but with anointing: *Is any among you sick? Let him call for the elders of the church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord.*

He is sick, ἀσθενεί is usually opposed to ὑγιαινει,[22] but in this place it is opposed to κακοπαθείν and in all the places in the N.T where it is used it signifies a grave illness, not a light one.[23] Afterwards in v. 15 the Apostle uses the word κάμνοντα (it will save *the sick man*), which means "to labor under a sickness," as it were to struggle with death.[24]

Is anyone among you, that is, one of the disciples of the Lord, or one of the Christians to whom the Letter is directed.

229. *Let him call for the elders of the Church.* Προσκαλεσάσθω (let him call) confirms the interpretation given above about the grave illness, for it is not the sick man himself who comes to the elders, but it is they who must go to the sick man who called for them.[25] *Elders* (*presbyteri*) in the Gospels are understood to be the magistrates of the Jewish people, but in Acts and in the Letters of the N.T. they are "priests either of the first or the second order,"[26] which is even more apparent in our text where the word "Church" is added, for in the Catholic Church the presbyters are those who perform the sacerdotal function. In this way all interpret Acts 20:17.[27]

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22. Zorell, *Lexicon graecum Novi Testamenti* under the word ἀσθενείν.
23. It is often found in the N.T with this meaning: Luke 7:2-10 (about the son of the centurion), John 4:46 (the son of the official is sick "ἠσθένει" and v. 47 *he was at the point of death*), John 11:1 (about Lazarus who was dead), Acts 9:37 (Tabitha in Joppa *fell sick* "ἀσθενήσασα" *and died),* Phil. 2:26 (Epaphroditus, over whose sickness St. Paul grieved).
24. Leopold (*Lexicon graeco-latinum*) renders it thus: I am weary, I am tired, I am tired from working, I am ill, I suffer under illness. In the perfect form κάμοντες (κάμνοντες) κεκαμεκότες means "dead." This word is found only twice in the N.T—here and in Heb.12:3 where it expresses a serious spiritual infirmity. Von Soden says that κάμνοντα means that the sick man is now about to die, hence he argues like this: This whole passage is dealing with securing his eternal salvation through the prayer of the priest. For, since the sick man is now about to die, he is not able to elicit acts of faith and contrition. But the elders are called who, by praying for the sick man, obtain for him what he cannot obtain for himself. It is very clear how false the foundation is of this argument.
25. See Puig de la B., N. 976, note 6.
26. Thus, for example, Acts 11:30; 14:23; 20:17; 1 Pet. 5:1. See what is said later in the treatise on Orders. Also Puig de la B., *loc.cit.,* rightly points out in note 7: "The thesis does not depend on the way in which one understands the word "presbyters," for here we are not dealing with the minister of Extreme Unction; but if someone should think that by this word is meant men advanced in age (sometimes it is used with this meaning in the N.T.), he cannot explain precisely why they are called to save and aid the sick and especially to pray over them and to forgive their sins, which certainly is the priestly task and he would also have against him the Tradition and Magisterium of the Church" (D 1695, 1697-1700, 445).
27. There has been much written and argued about this text, but in what concerns our thesis all admit unanimously that it has to do with presbyters who are at least priests (it is disputed whether they are also bishops). See a summary of the opinions on this in F. Puzo, S.J., *Los Obispos presbiteros en el N. Testamento:* EstBibl 5 (1945) 41f.

And let them pray over him. The word εὐχή, προσεύχομαι[28] according to the Hellenists signify liturgical prayer, or the buildings where the liturgical prayers are offered; and προσεύχομαι ἐπ'αὐτόν is used to signify the pouring out of grace upon the one for whom the prayer is offered. *Over him* can be either simply to signify *for him*, or *bent over him;* this last meaning is better understood in a sacramental sense, since hands are imposed on the sick person while the prayer is being said.

Anointing him with oil. The manner of the anointing is not determined, because this does not pertain to the purpose of the Letter, which is not directed exclusively to Presbyters. The aorist tense in the participle seems to indicate that the prayer and the anointing take place at the same time.[29]

In the name of the Lord. Some exegetes[30] join these words with the words "let them pray over him"; in this case they mean, "let them pray over him by calling on the name of the Lord," or in the way the liturgical prayers usually are ended with "through Christ our Lord." But others prefer to join these words with the word "anointing" so that it will be: "anointing him in the name of the Lord," that is, "by the command and authority of the Lord."[31]

230. *And the prayer of faith.* Εὐχή responds to the word προσκαλεσάσθω in v. 14; it is, therefore, a deprecative prayer of the liturgy. It is called *the prayer of faith* not because it is a prayer whose efficacy is due to the faith of the sick man (as Protestants contend), for it is not concerned with the prayer of the sick man,[32] but of the priest; rather, the "prayer of faith" responds to the object or the foundation of the sacramental prayer. In this sense Baptism is wont to be called by St. Augustine "the word of faith,"[33] and the Eucharist is also called "the mystery of faith."

It will save the sick man. Although the word σώζειν is used in many places in the N.T. concerning bodily healing, still it is not always used that way. In fact, St. James uses this word four times (1:21; 2:14; 4:12; 5:20) and always in a spiritual sense; therefore it seems also in this place to signify a spiritual healing. This is confirmed even more by the fact that a bit later (v. 16), when speaking about a bodily healing, he uses the word ἰαθήτε. Therefore the meaning is

28. Zorell, *op.cit.*, under the words προσεύχομαι, προσευχή.
29. From grace Luke 2:16; Acts 10:33.
30. See J. Trepat, *Lletres catòliques* (Fundació biblica catalana. La Santa Biblia. Nou Testament, vol. 15) (Barcelona 1936) 25.
31. That the word κύριος refers to Jesus Christ is clear from the whole O.T., already in particular in Jas. 1:1; 2:1; 5:7.8; and although at times in James is signifies *God,* nevertheless in this place the meaning and context (v. 11) require this sense.
32. Nothing is said about the faith or the prayer of the sick man or of the bystanders. The faith of the sick man is evidently supposed (he has to call the presbyters), but as a condition or disposition not as the cause of the described effect.
33. *In Ioann. Evang.* tr.80 n.3: ML 35,1840.

about freedom from all the hardships of sickness, which are not only material, but also, and quite often, spiritual, such as anxiety, fear of the divine judgment at the approach of death, etc. However, in no way is bodily healing excluded.

231. *And the Lord will raise him up.* The word ἐγείρεν in the N.T. has different meanings:

a) to wake up from sleep (Matt. 8:25; Luke 8:24);

b) to free from a sickness (Matt. 1:31; 9:27; Acts 3:7);

c) to call back from death (Matt. 10:8; John 5:21; 12:1ff.; Rom. 4:24; 8:11; 1 Cor. 5:12; Heb. 11:9).

It also has a spiritual meaning: Rom. 13:11; Eph. 5:14 (*it is time to rise from sleep. Awake, O sleeper.*). These words have a parallelism with "the prayer of faith will save the sick man." However, there are Catholic exegetes who in this phrase are wont to see expressed the material effect of Extreme Unction. However that may be, unless the contrary is proved positively, it cannot be taken in an exclusive sense.

And if he has committed sins, he will be forgiven. Ἀφιέναι ἁμαρτίας means to really forgiven sins, as has already been proved in the treatise on Penance.[34] Ἁμαρτία per se refers to grave sin. Estius and a few others think that it means venial sins[35] and they necessarily remove the conditional form used by St. James so that the effect is always obtained. There has been a big controversy about the syntactical arrangement of this statement. For, some join it with the preceding, but other with what follows. But it seems much more certain that the first view should be accepted, which the meaning itself and the grammatical structure demand; for there are three principle propositions joined together with the conjunction "and": "*and* the prayer of faith. *and* the Lord will raise him up. *and* if he has committed sins."[36]

232. ***Argument.*** A sacrament is a sensible and symbolic sign effective of grace, perennially instituted. But that is the rite St. James speaks about and what we call Extreme Unction. Therefore Extreme Unction is a true sacrament of the New Law.

The major is clear from the treatise on the sacraments in general.

I prove the minor. It is clear that the rite we are considering is Extreme Unction, since the concern is with the anointing of a sick man, who is gravely and mortally ill. It is:

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34. It is a quasi technical word.
35. *In 4* dist.23,4 (Paris 1662) 4.E. See Puig de la B., n. 978. These authors speak in this way because they think that the effect of Extreme Unction is the remission of venial sins.
36. Similar statements are found in the N.T, v.gr., Acts 8:17: *they laid their hands on them* and *they received the Holy Spirit;* here the word "and" has a causal meaning, or it is a causal conjunction.

a) *A sensible and symbolic sign* that becomes sensible through the prayer and anointing. It has a certain similarity with the comforting and the spiritual healing, which it produces (as we will soon see), since athletes anoint their body before a fight in order to enhance their flexibility and muscular strength.

b) *Effective of grace:* this is expressed with the words "the Lord will raise him up."; his sins will be forgiven.; "the prayer of faith will save the sick man"; and we have already said above that this must be understood primarily in a spiritual sense. Moreover, the forgiveness of sins (especially mortal) which he is talking about in this place happens only through sanctifying grace. But if he has no mortal sins, grace will still be given; for, the efficacy of the anointing is such that by itself it can remit sins, or infuse grace. Therefore also where there are no mortal sins it still confers grace, as penance produces sanctifying grace in those who receive it, even though their sins have been forgiven by contrition. But this effect is produced *by the rite itself* (*ex opere operato*), because it is attributed to the rite itself, but not to some disposition (which surely is supposed in the one receiving this anointing; just as for baptism and the other sacraments, although the effect is produced in virtue of the sacrament itself, still a proper disposition or the removal of impediments to grace is required in the recipient).

c) *Perennially instituted:* for, no limitation of time is indicated, but on the contrary, the rite is generally recommended to be used in similar cases.[37] Indeed, there will always be people who are gravely ill. But that *this institution is from Christ* is certain from the fact that no human power can institute a rite which has the ability of remitting sins and conferring grace *ex opere operato.* Moreover, the Apostle himself indicates that perhaps the institution is from Christ when he says: "anointing him *in the name of the Lord";* this phrase could signify (as we noted above) "according to the command of the Lord."

233. Proof from tradition. I. It can be proved *indirectly from theological prescription*[38]; for, ever since the fifth century in the universal Church Extreme Unction has been numbered among the seven sacraments. That among the Nestorian and Armenian dissidents its use was discontinued proves nothing, since it is certain that in the beginning after the schism (fifth century) they made use of this sacrament.[39]

234. II. *Directly. Note.* Protestants say that Extreme Unction did not exist as a sacrament before the twelfth century (even though Calvin admitted that

37. Calvin and many Protestants contend that St. James is talking about a charismatic healing that was not to continue perpetually in the Church; but that is stated gratuitously. See below.
38. See above, on the Sacraments in general, where the number of seven sacraments is treated.
39. Denzinger, *Rit. Orient.* 1,184.

it was introduced or invented in the fifth century by Innocent I); therefore it would be sufficient to prove that already before that time the anointing of this kind of the sick was used in the universal Church as a sacrament. But since the testimonies do not all have the same value, we will construct an argument constructed out of diverse texts in their chronological order.[40]

A) *Before the eighth century.* First and second centuries. It must be admitted that at this time there are no explicit testimonies about Extreme Unction[41]; this explanation can be given for this fact:

1. If only a few small fragments are excepted, commentaries of the Fathers on the Letter of St. James do not exist; but there are a few indications that they did exist at one time.

2. It was not a custom among the Fathers to give sermons on everything that pertains to the Christian life, but depending on the occasion they preached about different articles of faith. There was no great occasion to speak about Extreme Unction (which also is the case in our times), since it is a complement of penance, and is given at the end of life. There was more insistence on the sacrament of penance and on the other sacraments that are necessary during the whole course of one's life.

3. Probably, because of various difficulties, especially during the time of persecution, in the first centuries the use of this sacrament was not very frequent,[42] especially since it would have to be administered in the presence of pagans; and often Christians were baptized at the end of life.

4. Other authors also mention the discipline of the secret in order to show why there is silence on this matter.[43]

235. *Third to fifth centuries.* Many *allusions* of greater or less clarity are found, which, if they are gathered together into one group, show that the anointing of the sick was in use as an ecclesiastical rite to obtain health of

40. Kern has a long explanation and almost all recent authors refer to it. It can be helpful also to consult Bord, *loc.cit.*, and DTC c.11, and Doronzo, *loc.cit.*, 90-191.

41. Authors are not lacking who find some allusion to Extreme Unction in the *Didache* (R 7), where, after prayers recited after receiving communion in a place where afterwards in some liturgical books *a prayer over the oil of the sick* is found, one reads in the Coptic version: "Concerning the anointing give thanks like this: We give you thanks, our Father, for the anointing which you made known to us through your Son, Jesus. Glory be to you forever. Amen."

42. Launoy (*Opera omnia* 1 p.2 page 455) says that Extreme Unction was not given publicly to penitents or to martyrs, or to saints. Chardon agrees with this (DTC 5,1929f,), and adds the motive of the discipline of the secret. But Kern thinks that these statements are too exaggerated (*loc.cit.*, 17-20).

43. Scheeben-Atzberger, *Handbuch der Kat. Dogm.* 4 p.3 page743. But see Kern, p. 20, who says that one must judge moderately concerning the discipline of the secret in the matter we are now treating.

soul and body. Thus Tertullian,[44] St. Athansius,[45] Dydimus,[46] St. Hilary,[47] St. Gregory Nazianzen,[48] St. Ambrose,[49] St. Augustine,[50] Possidius,[51] Cassian,[52] St. Optatus,[53] Theodoret,[54] Victor of Antioch,[55] Arnobius Junior,[56] Arator.[57] There are not lacking very clear and open testimonies of which we offer some examples:

Origen, treating the different ways in which sins can be forgiven, writes: "There is also a seventh way, although it is hard and difficult remission for the penance of sins, since the sinner washes his blanket in his tears, and his tears become for him bread day and night, since he is not ashamed to tell his sin to the priest of the Lord and to ask for medicine, according to the one who said: *I will pronounce against myself my justice to the Lord, and you have forgiven the wickedness of my heart.* There is fulfilled what the Apostle James says: *If anyone is sick, let him call for the elders of the Church and they will impose hands on him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord, and the prayer of faith will save the sick man, and if he has committed sins, he will be forgiven.*[58] Origen is not excluding Penance in this place, but neither is he referring to it alone, as the Protestants contend. For, since Extreme Unction is the complement of Penance, and Origen wishes to show "how many remissions of sins there are," it is not surprising that he joins both sacraments together in the same place.

Aphraates speaks about the various uses of holy oil, and he says: "Beautiful olive trees produce fruits, in which is found the sacrament of life, whereby Christians and priests and kings and prophets are made perfect: it illuminates the darkness, it anoint the sick and it cures penitents by its secret sacrament."[59] The wise Persian enumerates this anointing of the sick among the sacramental anointings (whether in the strict or in the broad sense), which

44. *De praescriptione* 1,1 c.41: ML 2,262. Perhaps also the testimony of St. Hippolytus can be added, *In Danielem* 1,33: GChS 1,1,45; *In Dan.* 1,16: GChS 1,1,26f.
45. *In Ps 22:* MG 27,139; see also 25,234.402.
46. *De Trinitate* 1.2 t.1: MG 39,454.
47. *In Ps 121:* ML 9,665.
48. *Carmina:* MG 37,1392ff. (Kern, 44, note 2).
49. *De paenitentia* 1.1 c.4: ML 16,477.
50. *Speculum de Scrip. Sacr.:* ML 34,887.
51. *Vita S. Augustini* c.27: ML 32,56.
52. *Collationes* 20 c.8: ML 49,1161.
53. *De Schmismate Donati* 1.2 c.19: ML 11,972.
54. *In Ps 22:* MG 80,1027; *In Lev. Interr.* 8: MG 80,311.
55. Cramer, *Catenae graecorum Patrum* 1,324. See De Saint Beuve in Migne, *Cursus Theol. compl.* 24,50. See also below note 63.
56. *In Ps 22:* ML 53,354.
57. *In Act:* ML 68,89.
58. *In Lev. Hom.* 2,4: MG 13,419 (R 486). You will find a more detailed explanation of this place in Kern, 53ff.; Bord, *op.cit.*, 86ff.
59. *Domonstrationes* 23,3: PS 2,6 (R 698). See Graffins: PS 1,55.

are Baptism, Confirmation and Penance. Therefore he also understands the anointing of the sick as a certain special rite, not for the sake of a devotion performed by any Christian, but as something ritual or sacramental.[60]

St. John Chrysostom speaks twice about the anointing of the sick: In *De Sacerdotio* 3,6 he compares priests with parents, and in order to extol both the authority and power of priests, he says: "There is as a great difference between the two as there is between the present and the future life. For, parents generate for this life and priests generate for the future life; but parents cannot remove bodily demise from their children, they cannot ward off serious diseases, but priests often save the sick and soon to be lost soul—for some they take away the punishment and others they prevent from falling; and they do this not by teaching and admonishing alone, but also by helping with their prayers. For they do this not only when they give us rebirth, but also after regeneration they can forgive our confessed sins. For: he says, *Is any among you sick? Let him call for the elders of the Church, and let them pray over him, anointing him with oil in the name of the Lord. And the prayer of faith will save the sick man, and the Lord will raise him up; and if he has committed sins, he will be forgiven.*[61] The holy Doctor also refers to Extreme Unction, which the Greeks administered by torchlight, when he compares the Church with a private home. "For what is here that is not great, that is not tremendous? Surely it is because this table [altar] is by far more honorable and more delightful than yours, and its lamps more than your lamps. But all those know this who, with faith having been anointed at the right time, have been liberated from their illnesses."[62]

Innocent I writing to Decentius, after he treats Confirmation, refers to the text of St. James, and says: "There is no doubt that this anointing ought to be interpreted or understood of the sick faithful, who can be anointed with the holy oil of chrism,[63] which, prepared by a bishop, is permitted not only to priests, but also to all as Christians for anointing in their own necessity or in the necessity of their own (people). Moreover, we see that addition to be superfluous; that what is undoubtedly permitted the presbyters is questioned regarding bishops. For, on this account it was said to priests, because the bishops being hindered by other business cannot go to all the sick. But if a bishop, to whom it belongs to prepare the chrism, is able (to do it) or thinks someone is worthy to be visited by him, he can both bless and anoint with the chrism without delay. For, that cannot be administered to penitents, because it

60. Kern interprets this text, *op.cit.*, 51. See also Otten, n. 265.

61. *De sec.* 1,3,6: MG 48,644 (R 1320). Kern quotes other texts from the same Chrysostom, 29-31.

62. *Hom. in Mt* 32 n.6: MG 57,384. See Bord, *op.cit.*, 89ff.

63. The Supreme Pontiff understands by the word "chrism" in general an *anointing*, for at that time the use of this word was not yet fixed. See Bernard, *Chrême:* DTC 2,2395.

is a kind of sacrament. For, how is it supposed that one species (of sacrament) can be granted to those to whom the rest of the sacraments are denied?" (D 216). From these words it is clearly apparent that the anointing he speaks about in his letter to Decentius, and that is used in the Church according to the words of James, is a sacramental anointing ("a kind of sacrament"); its matter is the oil blessed by the bishop, but it can also be administered by presbyters; the subjects of this sacrament are the sick, and it must be denied to penitents because the other sacraments are also denied to them.

To these testimonies can be added: Eusebius of Caesarea,[64] St. Cyril of Alexandria,[65] Isaac of Antioch,[66] the author of the work *De promissionibus et praedicationibus Dei,*[67] *Evangelium Nicodemi,*[68] Caesarius of Arles.[69]

236. *Sixth to eighth centuries.* In addition to an abundance of particular texts, from this time the historical use of the sacrament is more and more evident.[70] Here are some examples:

Cassiodorus: "After all his admonitions he [James] offers a salutary rule for the faithful when he says: Do not swear and a Christian must say what is and not say what is not; for, if someone is weighed down with the injury of another, or is shaken by the weakness of his body, *let the presbyter be called,* he says, *who by faithful prayer and by the anointing of the holy oil will save him who seems to be afflicted:* he promises also that his sins are forgiven, who has been visited by the prayers of one or two."[71]

Primasius[72] in his interpretation of the words of Revelation "do not harm oil and wine" says: "He forbids that the power of the sacraments in wine and in oil be violated, since it is a precious *anointing* and blood. Hence we read in the Psalm: *Wine to gladden the heart of man, oil to make his face shine"* (Ps. 104:15).

Narrations about the *administration* of Extreme Unction are present: in

64. *In Is* 25: MG 24,267.1111.
65. *De adoratione in spir. et verit.* 1,6: MG 68,472 (R 2092); *In Mc* 6,13; Cramer, *Catenae Graec. Patr.* 1,340. This commentary on Mark probably should be attributed to Victor of Antioch (R 2102 and n.1).
66. Bickell, *S. Isaaci Antiochaeni opera omnia* 1,187ff.
67. A contemporary of Augustine: ML 51,805.
68. P.2 c.3 Tischendorf, *Evang. Apochry.* Pag.393. Kern compares the Greek text with the Latin version (*op.cit.*, 57-59).
69. *Serm.* 263,3: ML 39,2238 (R 2234).
70. An example was already given from Possidius (above in note 51). Then there is the case of St. Hypatius, a contemporary of St. Chrysostom; his disciple, Collinicus, recounts that the sacrament was administered to him (*Act. Sanct.* 17 iun. Pag.251).
71. *Compl. In Epist. Apost.:* ML 70,1380.
72. *In Apoc:* ML 68,837.

the life of *St. Maurus,*[73] *St. Launomarus,*[74] *St. Eutyches,*[75] *St. Laobanus,*[76] *Tressanus,*[77] *St. Eugene Bishop of Ardasthensis.*[78]

B) *After the eighth century.* From this period many texts can be cited both from the decrees of Councils and from the praxis which is now very frequent, and finally from explicit testimonies. From this time there are commentaries on the Letter of St. James, which understand the text of 5:14f. to be about Extreme Unction.

237. From the *Councils* it will suffice to mention: *Cabillonense II* (813 A.D.): "According to the Letter of the blessed James, with which the decrees of the Fathers also agree, the sick must be anointed by the presbyters with the oil blessed by the Bishops. For he says: *Is any among you sick.* Therefore, medicine of this kind must not be made light of, which cures the illnesses of both soul and body."

Aquisgranensis (836 A.D.): "As according to the prescription of the Fathers, if someone is sick, he should be diligently anointed by the priests with holy oil along with the prayers."

"It has also been decreed that, once a year, that is, on Holy Thursday during Holy Week, the anointing of holy oil, in which the salvation of the sick is accomplished, should not be neglected by the bishops in all the cities, as it has up until now been neglected; and let it be performed with all diligence according to the apostolic tradition and the official decrees in which this same matter is prescribed."

"But if someone is oppressed by an infirmity, he should not be deprived of confession and priestly prayer and the anointing of holy oil by his [the presbyter's] negligence. And finally, if he sees that the sick man's end is near, let him commend his Christian soul to the Lord his God in a priestly manner, along with the reception of Holy Communion."

Moguntinum I (847 A.D.): ". according to canonical authority, let not the door of piety seem to be closed to them [penitents] and let them be refreshed with prayers and Church consolations with the holy anointing of oil, animated according to the statutes of the holy Fathers with communion as viaticum."

Synod of Pavia (850 A.D.): "That saving sacrament also that James the Apostle commends, saying: *If anyone is sick.* must be made known to the people by skillful teaching; a truly great mystery and one exceedingly to be

73. Dynamius, *Vita S. Mauri:* ML 80,27.
74. *Act. Sanct.* 19 ian. pag.598.
75. Eustathius, *Vita S. Eutychii: Act Sanct.* 6 april. Pag.558.
76. *Act. Sanct.* 14 mart pag.348.
77. *Act. Sanct.* 7 febr. Pag.55.
78. *Act. Sanct.* 23 aug. pag.627.

sought, through which, if the faithful ask, and their sins are forgiven, it may even follow that health of body is restored. But because it often happens, that a sick person is ignorant of the power of the sacrament, or thinking that his illness is not serious he fails to take care of his health or the advanced stage of his disease is forgotten: the local presbyter should warn him in a kindly way, inasmuch as he also invites the neighboring presbyters to take part in this spiritual cure if they possibly can. This, however, must be known, that, if he who is sick has not been freed from public penance, he cannot receive the remedy of this mystery, unless first by the prescribed reconciliation he has merited the communion of the Body and Blood of Christ. He to whom the other sacraments have been restricted is by no means permitted to use this one. But if the condition of the sick man is such that the bishop judges him worthy of being touched and anointed, he can do it as soon as possible in the proper way; for, the chrism is blessed by him and to him the power has been given of forgiving sins in an official way;"

The Councils of Papiensis (ca. 850) and *Worms* (868 A.D.) speak in a similar way.[79]

238. *A brief argument* can be made from the Fathers with these conclusions:

From the seventh century there are many clear testimonies.

Regarding the prior centuries:

a) Obscure texts are not lacking, in which however the mind of the Fathers shines forth concerning this sacrament, or at least they can hint at the existence of the anointing in order to forgive sins or cure the sick. Thus the *Didache,* Hilary, Theodoret, Arnobius, Ambrose, Possidius:

b) They mention clearly the anointing of the sick, and they appeal to the text of St. James. Thus Origen, Cassiodorus, Augustine, Joseph Nestorianus, etc.

c) Citing the text of St. James, they concede the remission of sins through the anointing: Origen, Caesar of Arles, Chrysostom, Haesychius, Cassiodorus.

d) To the same rite they attribute the power of curing the sick: Procopius of Gaza, Isaac of Antioch, Chrysostom, Cyril of Alexandria.

239. Proof from liturgical books. We present only the more ancient

79. Cabrillonense cn.48, MGh LL (s.3) III 283: MSi 14,104; Aquisgranense c.2 de doctrin.episc. cn.8 (20), MGh LL 710: Msi14,678; c.2 de vita et doct infer. ordin. Capitulum 5 (29), MGh ll (s.3) III. 712: Msi 14,681; Moguntium cn.26, MGh LL (s.11) Capit.RegFranc. I,I, 182: Msi 14,910; Ticiense cn.8, Hrd 5,27: Msi (under the name *Synodi Regiaticinae*) 14,932-933; Papiense cn.8 MGh LL (s.11) I,I 119; Worms, cn. 72 (from the Letter of Innoc. I to Decenc., D 216): MSi 15,881.

documents.[80]

The Canons of Hippolytus (before the fourth century) speak at least twice about Extreme Unction: Can.219: "Moreover, in what pertains to the sick, the medicine prescribed for them is that they frequent the Church, that they take part in prayer, except for someone suffering from a serious disease: he should be visited daily by the clergy, who comfort him."[81] These words are more clearly interpreted in the edition by Riedel and Sarrazy: "The sick obtain a cure if they frequent the Church, so that they can participate in the water of prayer and the oil of prayer [εύχέλαιον], except someone suffering from a serious disease; he should be visited by the cleric who knows him."[82] Here the meaning obviously is: "The sick can obtain their cure through εύχέλαιον but if someone is suffering from dangerous or grave illness, since he cannot personally go to the Church, he will be visited by the priests who will anoint him."[83] Similarly in can. 199, these sick persons are commended to the special care of a Deacon who together with the Bishop should visit the sick.[84]

The oldest formula for the blessing of the oil of the sick is found in the *Constitutione Aegyptiaca:* "As by sanctifying this oil, O God, you give health to those who use it and are touched by it, and by it you anointed kings, priests and prophets, so may it bring comfort to all who taste it and health to those who use it."[85]

The *Sacramentarium* or *Euchologium of Serapion* (fourth century) contains two prayers for the blessing of the oil of the sick: "We beseech You who have all power and virtue, the Savior of all men. and we pray that you will send the power of healing from the heaven of the Only-Begotten down upon this oil, so that it may be to these who are anointed with your creature, or who experience it, a defense against all weakness and infirmity, a help against every evil spirit, an expulsion of every unclean spirit, the removal of every fever and cold and feebleness, for holy grace and remission of sins, a remedy of life and salvation, for the health and integrity of soul and body and spirit, for perfect health."[86] "We bless, in the name of your Only-Begotten

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80. It would take up too much space to list the main texts of the cited authors. For, at this time the examples and testimonies are already explicit concerning the sacramentality of Extreme Unction. In Kern and DTC the texts and names of many authors are gathered together.
81. Ed. H. Achellis (Leipzig 1891): TU 6 fasc.4 pag.123.
82. Cabrol, *Introduction aux études liturgiques* (Paris 1907) 11f. There are more texts in DTC, *loc.cit.*, 1945.
83. See Umberg, 2,306; A. Malvy, *L'Onction des malades dans les Canones d'Hippolyte et les documents apparantés:* RechScRel 10 (1919) 222-229.
84. Ed. Achellis, p. 117.
85. E. Huler, *Didascaliae Apostlorum Fragmenta Veronensia;* fragments of Canons are presented which are said to be from the Apostles and Egyptians 1,108. See Th. Schermann, *Ein Weiherituale der römischen Kirche am Schlusse des ersten Jahrhunderts* (Munich 1914).
86. The prayer for the oil of the sick or for bread or for water. Ed. Funk, *Didascaliae et Constitutiones Apostolorum* 2,190 (R 1241). On the difficulty that can arise from the use of bread and water, see DTC, *loc.cit.*, 1949.

Jesus Christ, these creatures, we pronounce his name, who suffered, was crucified and rose from the dead and sits at the right hand of the Uncreated, over this water and this oil; grant the power of healing to these creatures, so that every fever and all demonism and every sickness may be removed by this drink and anointing, and may the reception of these creatures be the medicine of a cure and the medicine of wholeness in the name of your Only-Begotten Jesus Christ, through whom is given to you glory and honor in the Holy Spirit forever and ever. Amen."[87]

Concerning these and other liturgical documents[88] Umberg rightly comments: "The most ancient liturgical documents often contain only the formulas for the blessing of oil and in them they also give expression to the effects to be obtained by the anointing. It is true that the blessing of the soul and the remission of sins often in no way, often in the same way is presented as it is in the blessing of other things, which pertain to things merely sacramental. But even though the spiritual effect is not expressed in any way, and (this is a hypothesis) in no way was it known, nevertheless objectively an anointing made with such oil, assuming the proper form and a legitimate minister, would have been a true sacrament of the New Law, provided that the minister had the intention of giving the anointing that St. James speaks about in 5:14. For, by that very fact he would have acted in the name of Christ. Therefore, from the difficulty of irrefutably proving from the liturgical formulas (and from the writings of the Fathers) that the Anointing of the sick had the efficacy of healing *ex opere operato*, in no way does it follow that the *sacrament* of Anointing was not administered in the first times."[89]

240. Objections. 1. In the text of St. James he is talking about the gift of healing, not about sacramental anointing.[90]

I deny the antecedent. For, the charism of healing is not restricted to presbyters alone (1 Cor. 12:28-30), nor is it only for those gravely ill, nor to the use of oil.

2. In the text of St. James the remission of sins is promised only conditionally. But the Sacraments obtain that effect absolutely. Therefore.

I distinguish the major. The remission of sins is promised conditionally by reason of

87. Ibid., p.179ff. See Adolf Franz, *Die kirchlichen Benedictionen in Mittelalter* 1,337.

88. Among other sources these can be added: *Const. Apost.* 8,29 Funk, 1.533); *Testam. D.N.I.C.* (ed. Rahmani, 24,48); M. Férotin, *Le liber Ordinum en usage dans l'Eglise wisigothique et mozarabe d'Espagne du cinquieme au onzieme siècle* (*Mon. Eccl. litt.*, ed. Cabrol-Leclercq, 5,71ff.).

89. *De Sacramentis* 2,307f., n. 707.

90. See above note 7. Calvin, whose opinion this is, tries in many ways to prove that there is a big difference between the mind of St. James and the Catholic interpretation of this text. He gives these main differences: By reason of the *effect*: James is treating bodily healing; Catholics about spiritual healing; by reason of the *matter:* James understands oil in a popular way, Catholics say it is a blessed chrism; by reason of the *minister:* James requires the elders of the Church, Catholics presbyters who are priests; by reason of the *subject:* James includes all the sick, Catholics only those seriously ill or dying.

the rite, *denied;* by reason of the subject, *conceded. I also distinguish the minor and deny the consequent.* All the Sacraments confer grace *ex opere operato,* supposing the proper dispositions of the subject, and in this sense it can also be said that all the Sacraments always obtain their effect conditionally. But the sacraments that were instituted primarily to remit sins, but which in addition to the first grace also confer the second grace, can also be received by those who are not lacking the first grace; and thus these Sacraments are said to confer the first grace conditionally, that is, if the one receiving those Sacraments is in the state of mortal sin, which he intends to have forgiven.

3. Alleviation of the soul can be obtained with actual graces. But the sacraments confer habitual grace. Therefore it is not proved that Extreme Unction is a Sacrament.

This objection supposes that the effect of Extreme Unction is only the alleviation of the soul of the sick, which is false, as we shall see later. Hence *I distinguish the major:* Alleviation of the soul is the only effect of Extreme Unction, *denied;* it is one effect that can be obtained separately from the total effect, *conceded. I concede the minor and distinguish the consequent.* If the alleviation of the soul were the only or complete effect of Extreme Unction, *conceded;* since it is not that, *denied.*

241. Scholium 1. *On the value of the text of St. Mark* (6:13). The Council of Trent, when treating the institution of Extreme Unction, says: "The sacred anointing of the sick was instituted by Christ our Lord as a true and proper sacrament of the New Testament. *It is alluded to indeed by Mark,* but it is recommended to the faithful and promulgated by James the Apostle and brother of the Lord" (D 1695). Therefore, there were not lacking theologians who claimed that the existence of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction could be proved from the cited text of St. Mark. Among these Maldonado stands out for his argument and name: "I should wish in this place, he says, that it would be up to me alone to refute the heretics: I would willingly attack them. Now recognizing that some of our own authors are in the camp of the heretics, I fear lest, when I shoot arrows at the heretics, I might perhaps strike a Catholic. I pass over those who are older, whom reverence forbids me to name, and whom their age excuses since they have not yet experienced the new heresies. Now that the heresy of the Lutherans and the Calvinists is thriving, why do some Catholics and learned men say and commit to writing that the oil from the Apostles is not a sacrament for healing souls, but is used as a medicine in order to heal bodies, and that it does not pertain to the Sacrament, Extreme Unction, which the Church now uses? That is the same thing the Lutherans and Calvinists teach. But we do not deny, they say, that it is a sacrament. Therefore, where is the sacrament, if it is not here? For, anyone who denies that we are dealing here with the sacrament of Extreme Unction is trying to eliminate this sacrament completely—maliciously if he is a heretic, shamelessly if he is a Catholic."[91]

But if we examine the text of St. Mark, it does not seem necessary that it must be interpreted to be about the Sacrament or a sacramental rite. For the Evangelist says: *So they* [the Apostles] *went out and preached that men should repent. And they cast out many*

91. *Comm. in Evang. S. Marci,* at this place. Maldonado is followed by De Saint Beuve, Berti, and in our time Schell (*Kat. Dogmat.* t.3 p.2 page 616ff). There is a more detailed exposition of this question in Knabenbauer, at this place.

demons, and anointed with oil many that were sick and healed them. Indeed, as Suarez[92] rightly points out, in the quoted text mention is made only of the anointing to cure diseases miraculously, and that the Apostles were sent only for this (Matt. 10:2; Luke 9:2). Moreover, the Apostles could not administer the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, because they were not yet priests; and also because the anointing was given by the Apostles to all the sick, and the sacraments can be administered only to the faithful.

Therefore, Knabenbauer concludes correctly: "This opinion has been abandoned deservedly, and with Bellarmine, Estius, Lapide, Ians., Calm., and all recent authors it must be held that that anointing was only a prefiguring or adumbration of the sacrament,"[93] or, as Trent says, there the sacrament *is alluded to.*

242. Scholium 2. *On the institution of Extreme Unction.* It is certain from the treatise on the Sacraments in general "that all the Sacraments were instituted by Christ, and all [theologians] agree after the definition of Trent (D 1601) that it is now not permitted to a theologian to call into doubt the immediate institution of all the Sacraments by Christ."[94]

But the ancient Doctors did not think so clearly. Dionysius the Carthusian said: "Some say that Confirmation and Extreme Unction, since they contain a fullness of grace, were not instituted before the sending of the Holy Spirit. Hence according to them, Christ did not institute them personally, but he committed their institution to the Apostles. But since the sacraments pertain to the fundamentals of the law, others with more probability say that the legislator Christ the Lord himself instituted them, although the Apostles promulgated them.[95] For the first opinion mentioned in favor are Hugo of St. Victor, Peter Lombard and St. Bonaventure; but St. Thomas, St. Albert the Great and Scotus follow the Carthusian.[96] There was never a serious dispute about this. Generally theologians defended the institution by Christ, although they did not make use of concrete terminology until after Trent, when, because of the errors of the Protestants, the Catholic doctrine was clearly defined and defended.

Since in the Gospels there is no place where a certain occasion is given on which Christ instituted this Sacrament, we can locate its institution in the time after the Resurrection and before the Ascension, since at that time Christ spoke with the Apostles about what pertains to the kingdom of God (Acts 1:3).

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92. *De paenitentia* d.39 s.1 n.4-7.
93. Knabenbauer, at this place.
94. Sasse, *Institutiones Theologicae de Sacramentis Ecclesiae* 2,125. Learnedly and almost exhaustively Doronzo treats the institution of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, *loc.cit.*, I,198-316, with an ample bibliography.
95. *Summa fidei orthodoxae* 1,4 a.146.
96. Thus Kern, p. 71. About St. Bonaventure there is some doubt, because the holy Doctor does not always use the same terminology. But Fr. Thomas A Vilanova Gerster A Zeil, O.F.M.Cap., says that the final opinion of the Seraphic Doctor is that Extreme Unction was instituted by Christ (*Sacramentum Extremae Unctionis.* Trac. theol. especially according to the mind of St. Bonaventure [Turin 1936] p. 7-12). Regarding medieval teachers, see H. Weisweiller, S.J., *Das sakrament der letzten Oelung in den systematischen Werken der ersten Frühscholastik:* Schol 7 (1932) 321-353, 524-560.

CHAPTER II

On the essence of Extreme Unction

Thesis 2. The matter of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction is the anointing made with blessed oil; but the form consists in the words whereby prayer is offered for the sick.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 29, a. 4-6; Otten, n.272-291; Lercher, n.654-659; Kern, p.115-166; Ruch-Godefroy, *Extrême Onction:* DTC 5,1897-2014; Boyer, 405-410; Doronzo, I,317-588.

243. Connection. Since all the Sacraments are composed out of matter and form, after we have treated the existence of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, it is now necessary to consider its essence or its intrinsic principles. But of those things that pertain to the matter, many of them are the concern of Moral Theology, such as the blessing of the oil done by the Bishop, the renewed blessing each year, and so forth—these things we will pass over in silence.

244. Definition of terms. *Matter and form* we understand in their proper sense already explained above; by them the intrinsic principles of any thing are determined.

The *remote* matter is the material substance that is used in this Sacrament. In Extreme Unction there is no sacramental matter *about which* the action is instituted, but only the matter *out of which* the Sacrament is confected (like the water in Baptism and the chrism in Confirmation). In the Latin Church pure olive oil is used (can. 937 [1917]); among the Orientals it is licit to add various mixtures to it.

According to the same canon 937 the oil for Extreme Unction must be *properly blessed,* and this is required for its validity, as we will explain later (n. 248); but the blessing must be given "by a Bishop or a Priest, who has obtained from the Apostolic See the faculty of blessing it" (can. 945). In the Oriental Church simple priests have received the permission, either explicit or tacit, from the Roman Pontiff, to bless this oil.[1] The required blessing must be special with reference to Extreme Unction; but this more probably does not affect the validity, but only the liceity.[1*]

The proximate matter is the anointing itself or the application of the remote matter. This anointing must be "in the order and way prescribed in the

1. See Benedict XIV in the Bull "*Etsi Pastoralis*" 27 May 1742; Clement VII, *Instruct. De Ritibus Italo-graecorum* 30 August 1595.

1* See the moral authors, v.gr., Arregui, *Summarium Theoologiae Moralis* n.661a.

ritual books., but in a case of necessity one anointing of one sense suffices, or more properly on the forehead with the prescribed brief formula, but once the danger has passed the individual anointings should be supplied" (can. 947,1 [1917]). In antiquity the use of anointing was quite diverse, as we shall see in the argument; but now for the Latin Church the Roman Ritual prescribes a single anointing for each of the senses, in this order: on the eyes, on the ears, on the nose, on the mouth, on the hands, on the feet.[2]

The form of this Sacrament "is the solemn prayer which the priest uses for each anointing."[3] The prayer is understood here in the proper sense, and in ordinary situations it is: "By means of this holy oil, may the Lord pardon you for whatever wrong you have done. Amen." ["*Per istam sanctam unctionem indulgeat tibi Dominus quidquid deliquisti.* Amen.].[4]

As is clear from the formula of anointing, it seems that the form must be deprecative (= beseeching: "may the Lord").

The form is called *formally deprecative* or *indicative* (= imperative: "grant, O Lord") according as the words express formally a prayer or a command; thus, v.gr., "Anoint, O Lord, this thy servant.," "I anoint you." However, the words can sound *materially* like a deprecation, formally (explicitly or implicitly) they can have an indicative meaning; as, for example, when they express that the sacramental effect is obtained by the mediation of the minister, by the authority received from Christ, etc. Therefore this form: "Sanctify, O Lord, by my anointing this your servant," or "O Lord, who through blessed James gave the power of anointing to your priests.," is called materially deprecative and formally explicitly indicative. The form of blessing in common use is also materially deprecative and formally (implicitly) indicative: "May Almighty God bless you."; this form is used by priests, because by a Church custom it is used for a true priestly blessing. But if it were used by a lay person, it would be only materially and formally a deprecative form. The same must be said about a form materially indicative and formally deprecative, whether implicitly or explicitly.

245. Opinions. I. *Concerning the matter:*

a) *remote matter:* no one has ever denied that it must be olive oil; the questions concerned *the necessity of a blessing:* some, like Victoria, Juenin, De Sainte-Beuve, Drouwen, simply deny that any blessing is necessary,

2. Tit. V c.3; The anointing of the loins is now always to be omitted, and "the anointing of the feet can be omitted for any good reason" (*Rit. Rom.* t.VI c.1 n.15).
3. *Rit. Rom.* tit.V c.1 n.20; in the last edition tit.VI c.1 n.19.
4. Ibid., n.21 (20). See Decree of the Holy Office on 25 April 1906 (ASS 39,273; D 3391).

unless it has been prescribed; others, like Suarez and Estius[5] say that the oil must be blessed by a Bishop so that not even the Supreme Pontiff can grant to simple priests the faculty of blessing it; other theologians commonly think that the blessing is indeed necessary, but that it can be blessed by a simple priest, if he has the power from the Apostolic See. Now no one can have a doubt about this based on can. 945 of the CIC (1917). Finally, no one denies that the blessing is required at least for liceity.

b) *proximate matter:* all admit that the anointings are on the body of the sick person, but the disagreement concerns the place and the number of anointings:

1) the anointing of each sense is required, for there is the source of all the sins. Thus the *Decree for the Armenians,*[6] St. Thomas,[7] St. Albert the Great,[8] Scotus,[9] Richardus A Mediavilla,[10] St. Bellarmine.[11] But these authors do not investigate the essentials. Billot thinks that this opinion is probable.[12]

2) One anointing suffices. Thus Suarez,[13] Vázquez, Lugo, Umberg,[14] and *all modern authors.*

II. *Concerning the form*, there are as many opinions as there are species:

a) *Some ancients*[15] deny a form in the Sacrament of Extreme Unction "because the anointing made with such oil is the form by itself." They held this position because they saw a great variety in the formulas of this Sacrament.

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5. Victoria, *Summa Sacramen.* n.219; Juenin, *Comp. Hist. Dogm. de Sacrament.* diss.7 q.3 c.1; De Sainte-Beuve, *De Extrem. Unct.* Disp.3 a.1; Drouwer, *De re sacramentaria contra haereticos* 1,7 q.2 c.1,2; Suarez, disp.40 s.1 n.8; Estius, *In 4* d.23 s.9.
6. D 1324. The Decree is only for the Armenians: and it does not say whether the multiple anointings are essential or only suitable.
7. *Suppl.* q. 32, a. 6.
8. *In 4* d.23 a.16.
9. *In 4* d.23 q.unic.
10. *In 4* d.23 a.5.
11. He calls the second opinion "singular and less safe" (*De Sacram. Extremae Unctionis* c.10: *Opera Omnia* 3,761).
12. p. 253, note 2: "Indeed Florence names seven anointings, but from other sources it is certain that the anointing of the loins and feet is not necessary. Hence the anointing of the five senses is certainly sufficient, but *more probably* it is also essential; although not improbably, speaking speculatively, some say that one anointing with the corresponding general form is alone per se sufficient. See the authors of moral theology on this point."
13. Suarez defends the view that anointing is necessary for each of the senses, at least by a necessity of precept (d.40 s.2 n.4.6), but he thinks it is not improbable that one anointing suffices in a case of necessity, but he does not venture to affirm it (ibid., n.8 d.41 s.3 n.6.8).
14. N.731: "it is certain."
15. Some said that this Sacrament does not have a form, because the anointing itself made with such oil is the form by itself; and to prove this they given these reasons." (St. Albert the Great, *In 4* d.23 q.1). And a little bit later he makes this judgment: "Without prejudice it is necessary to say that, as I think, the first opinion is a distinct novelty contrary to the practice of the Church and the opinion of all the ancients; and therefore I think it is incautious and cannot be maintained without danger of error." St. Thomas says the same thing, *Suppl.* q. 29, a. 7.

b) The form must be *deprecative.* Thus St. Albert the Great,[16] St. Bonaventure,[17] St. Thomas,[18] Scotus,[19] Suarez[20] and *generally modern authors.* This opinion is based on the text of St. James: "*let them pray over him. and the prayer of faith.*

c) The *indicative* formula suffices (but the deprecative is the preferred one), because it expresses sufficiently the effect of Extreme Unction. Thus Richardus A Mediavilla,[21] Paludanus,[22] Aureolus,[23] etc.

This question is still debated. In the Roman Ritual the deprecative formula is given; it seems that the indicative formulas can be reduced to it, and that is even more the case if a moral causality in the Sacraments is admitted.

246. Doctrine of the Church. Since the argument is constructed precisely from Church documents, let it suffice here to recall:

The Council of Trent says: "For the Church has understood that the matter is oil blessed by the bishop.; and the form consists of these words: 'By this unction.'" (D 1695). These words are taken more or less from those proposed to the Armenians by the Council of Florence: "The fifth sacrament is extreme unction. Its matter is olive oil blessed by the bishop. The form of this sacrament is: 'Through this holy anointing.'" (D 1324).

CIC: cn. 937 (1917): "The Sacrament of Extreme Unction must be conferred by holy anointings, using olive oil properly blessed, and with the words in the approved ritual books prescribed by the Church."

Cn. 945: "The olive oil used in the Sacrament of Extreme Unction must be blessed for this purpose by the Bishop, or by a priest who has obtained from the Apostolic See the faculty of blessing it."

Cn. 947: "The words, order and manner of the unction prescribed in the ritual books should be observed accurately; but in the case of necessity one anointing suffices on one sense or even better on the forehead with the prescribed brief form; when the danger ceases, the individual anointings should be supplied."[24]

16. *In 4* d.23 a.4 ad 1.
17. *In 4* d.23 a.1 q.4.
18. *Suppl.* q.29 a.8. Here in answer to the third objection he says: that the indicative mood formulas are dispositions for the form "insofar as they determine the intention of the minister" for that act by the words.
19. *In 4* d.23 q.unic.
20. D.40 s.3 n.7.
21. *In 4* d.23 a.1 q.4 ad 2.
22. *In 4* d.23 q.1 a.2 concl.3.
23. *In 4* d.23 q.1.
24. See the other documents cited in the proof of the thesis.

247. Theological note. a) *The first part,* since it says that the *remote matter* of Extreme Unction is oil and the *proximate matter* is the anointing itself, is *defined divine and Catholic faith.*[25] Inasmuch as it affirms for the validity of the Sacrament that the oil must be *blessed by the Bishop* or by a priest with the required apostolic faculty, *the thesis is certain and common*[26]; and it is so demanded in the documents. But inasmuch as it says that it must be *blessed with specific prayers in reference to the sacrament*—this is the *more probable* teaching and is generally admitted. The thesis is *certain,* according as it says that the *proximate matter* is the anointing of the senses of the sick person, or just on one sense in a case of necessity.

b) *The second part,* inasmuch as it holds that the *form* is the prayer over the sick person, is also *defined and divine faith,*[27] but inasmuch as it does not require the deprecative form and admits that the indicative can be reduced to the deprecative, the thesis is *by far more probable and common.*[28]

248. *Proof of the first part.* I. *The remote matter is blessed oil. Note.* In St. James the word "oil" is clearly understood to be what is made from olives, and the *Council of Florence* openly teaches that (D 1324), as does *Trent*[29] and CIC 945 (1917); therefore it suffices for us to prove that it must be *blessed.*

1. From the declarations of the Church. Innocent I in his letter to Decentius, after quoting the words of St. James, adds: "There is no doubt that this anointing ought to be interpreted or understood of the sick faithful, who can be anointed with the holy oil of chrism,[30] which, *prepared by a Bishop,* is permitted not only to priests, but also to all as Christians for anointing in their own necessity or in the necessity of their (people). But if a Bishop, *to whom it belongs to prepare the chrism,* is able (to do it) or thinks someone is worthy to be visited by him, he can both bless and anoint with chrism without delay" (D 216).[31]

25. D 1695. The Council of Trent in canons 1 and 3 (D 1716, 1718) says that the present-day rite of Extreme Unction is substantially the same as that which is prescribed by St. James. Therefore what it declared in the chapter is included in the canon.
26. Piolanti, *De Sacramentis*[2] p. 392 says: "Many important theologians, but with some exceptions, think that the blessing of the bishop is required *by divine law,* and this view is drawn from tradition."
27. Even though in the canons the Council of Trent says nothing about the form, it is sufficiently understood to be included in canon 3, where it speaks in general about the rite.
28. See Boyer, 406. Otten restricts the censure somewhat.
29. Trent (D 1695) expressly does not say that it is done with *olive* oil, but, unless stated otherwise, this kind of oil is always understood. For, where it is a question of oil that is not pure olive oil, it is clearly stated, as in the case of Confirmation whose oil is called *chrism,* because other substances are mixed into it.
30. Chrism in this place is understood as oil, according to the custom of that time, when the terminology was not yet fixed. See Puig de la B., n.980, note 21.
31. Kern has a more detailed explanation of this text. See the whole letter in ML 20,551-561. Numbers 1-3 give special treatment to our matter.

Paul V (Jan. 13, 1611) declared this opinion to be rash and proximate to error: "That the Sacrament of Extreme Unction may be validly administered with oil not consecrated by an episcopal blessing." Gregory XVI confirmed this decree (D 2763).[32] The same Supreme Pontiff approved this resolution of the Holy Office: "To the doubt: whether a parish priest, in a case of necessity, for the validity of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, may use *oil blessed by himself.* The response is No."[33]

The Holy Office again in 1878 declared: "Oil blessed by a priest is absolutely unsuitable matter for the Sacrament of Extreme Unction."[34]

The Council of Aquisgranense (in the year 836): "It has also been decided that once a year, that is, on Holy Thursday, the anointing of Holy Oil, in which the salvation of the sick is believed, should not be neglected by the bishops in all the cities. but it should be administered with great devotion according to the apostolic tradition and the authentic decrees which prescribe that very same thing."[35]

The Council of Cabillonense II (in the year 813) decreed: "According to the document of the blessed Apostle James, with which also the writings of the Fathers agree, the sick must be anointed by the priests with the oil which is blessed by the Bishop."[36]

The Council of Florence in the Decree for the Armenians says that the matter of Extreme Unction is "olive oil blessed by the Bishop" (D 1324), and the *Council of Trent* confirming this, declares: "For the Church has understood that the matter is oil blessed by the Bishop" (D 1695).

However, it is certain from the *Instruction of Clement VIII* concerning the Italo-Greek rites that the Supreme Pontiff can grant to simple priests the faculty of blessing the oil of Extreme Unction: "Greek priests should not be obliged to receive holy oils, with the exception of chrism, from Latin diocesan bishops, since such oils, according to the ancient rite, are prepared and blessed by them." (D 1992). *Benedict XIV,* in the year 1742, confirmed this declaration.[37] Finally, the CIC (1917) expressly defended this faculty in can. 945.

Therefore, from these documents it is certain that the Church teaches

32. From the Decree of the Holy Office under Paul V, 13 Jan. 1611, and Gregory XVI, 14 Sept. 1842.
33. From the Decree of the Holy Office 14 Sept. 1842. But since the Supreme Pontiff responds: "No, in conformity to the version of the decree [*of the Holy Office*] of January 13, 1611" and in the quoted decree the proposition is denied with the qualification of being rash and proximate to error ("temerarium et errori proximam"), we are bound to give the same qualification to this opinion.
34. *Collect. Decret. S.C. de Prop. Fide* 2 p.121 n.1494.
35. Cap.2 can.8: Hrd 4,1395.
36. Can.48: Hrd 4,1040.
37. In the Const. 26 May 1742, *Bullarium Benedict XIV* (ed. Mechlin, 1,353). *Magn. Bull. Rom.* (ed. Cheratini) 16,96.

that the oil must be blessed by a Bishop, and this is for its validity; otherwise the Congregation of the Holy Office could not say that oil blessed by a simple priest is absolutely unsuitable; hence also cn. 945 which says: "the oil. *must* be blessed by a Bishop." must be interpreted as referring to validity, and not just to licitness.

249. 2. From the consent of theologians. Before the sixteenth century important theologians openly professed this doctrine. Thus the *Master of the Sentences,*[38] St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas,[39] Scotus,[40] St. Bonaventure.[41] In the sixteenth century this doctrine is already completely *common*[42]: but that among some theologians it was defended as a probable doctrine that the episcopal blessing of the oil for Extreme Unction is necessary only because of a precept, not for validity, was no obstacle to the formation of a morally unanimous consensus against them. That is so because those theologians were not important as to their numbers or authority; also, the arguments on which they based their case are not valid.[43]

250. II. *The proximate matter is the anointing of the body of the sick.*

From Holy Scripture and the praxis of the Church. St. James requires nothing other than the anointing of the sick person, but he gives no directions concerning the number and location of the anointings. And the older holy Fathers say nothing that is more explicit. But the Church used different rites, depending on the different conditions of the times and places and persons.

Among the different rituals that still exist the most ancient seems to be the one used in Spain until the eleventh century, designated with the name *Liber Ordinum.* There what concerns Extreme Unction seems to pertain to the fifth century.[44] Therefore, for this sacrament it gives this direction: "*When the priest visits the sick person, he makes the sign of the cross on his head with the blessed oil while saying:* In the name of the Father and of

38. 4. *Sent.* d.23 a.3 q.1f.
39. *Suppl.* q. 29, a. 5 c; ad 2 and ad 5.
40. *In 4* d.23 q.unic. n.5.
41. *In 4* d.23 a.1 q.3.
42. Suarez gives it this qualification (d.40 s.1 n.3).
43. "Having neglected the tradition of the Church, they usually argue either from the fact that St. James says nothing about the consecration of the oil, or from the similarity with baptism, for whose validity consecrated water is not required; but neither of their arguments can easily have any weight, because in this matter the ultimate criterion of truth is the sense of the Church herself" (Otten, n.277f.).
44. *Le "Liber Ordinum" en usage dans l'Eglise wisigothique et mozarabe d'Espagne du cinquième au onzième siècle:* Mon. Eccl. Liturg., 5, ed. M. Férotin (Paris 1904).

the Son and of the Holy Spirit, who reigns forever and ever. Amen."[45] Then antiphons and prayers follow through which the health of soul and body is begged from God.

The Milanese Ritual (thirteenth century, but in it very ancient rites are contained, perhaps from the sixth to seventh centuries or even older) prescribes in the rubrics: "First of all anoint him with the blessed oil on the chest, afterwards the hands, then the feet."[46] The same thing almost to the letter is said in the *Liber Monachorum St. Ambrosii, eleventh century.*[47]

In the very old *Liber Sacramentorum,* which is attributed to Gregory the Great, we read: "Let him make on him [the sick man] the sign of the cross with blessed oil while saying: In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit may this anointing with blessed oil be for you the purification of mind and body."[48]

The old *Codex Ecclesiae Catalaunensis* indicates that the anointings should be made "on the chest and back or shoulders and on the crown of the head and also both on the hands and on the sole of the feet."[49]

In the *Gregorian Sacramentary* (eighth century), after prescribing some prayers, it adds: "And so let him anoint the sick man with the blessed oil, making crosses on the neck and throat, and between the shoulders, and on the chest or on the place where there is more pain."[50] And after the ceremonies it says: "For many priests anoint the sick moreover on the five senses of the body, that is, on the eyebrows, within the nostrils and on the nose, that is, on the outside, and on the lips, and on the hands, that is, on the outside. For they do this so that, if any stain is attached to the five senses of mind and body, it may now be cleansed by the medicine of God."[51]

This rubric, more or less unchanged, is found later in many *Orders*, as can be seen in Martène. From among these *Ordo II* (ninth century) prescribes: "Let him make over him [the sick man] twelve signs of the cross with oil, that is, first of all a large cross between the shoulders reaching up to the neck, and crosswise over the shoulders. Then on the neck up to the crown of the head. The third one should be on the forehead reaching from ear to ear. The fourth and fifth for the vision, that is, on the eyebrows. The sixth for smell, that is, on the nose or in the nostrils. The seventh for taste. The eighth and ninth cross for the hearing, that is, on the ears. The tenth on

45. *Liber Ordinum* col. 71-72.
46. M. Magistretti, *Manuale Ambrosianum:* Mon. Veter. Liturg. Ambros. (Milan 1905) 1,149.
47. *Ibid.*, p.82. Absolutely the same words recur in *Cod. M. Beroldo novo,* edited by the same Magistretti, *op.cit.*, p. 96.
48. *Ordo VIII.* Ed. E. Martène, *De antiquis Ecclesiae ritibus* (Antwerp 1963) 1,311.
49. In Martène, *op.cit.*, l.1 c.7 a.3.8 p. 301.
50. ML 78,235.
51. ML 78,236.

the throat. The eleventh on the chest. The twelfth and thirteenth for touch, that is, on the back side of each hand. The remaining two on the feet." [52]

But *Theodolphus of Orleans* says: "We make fifteen crosses with the holy Oil on the sick man because of the mystery of the Trinity and the signification of the five senses. And because it is customary often to bless with an uneven number (of crosses). Some want to make *twenty* crosses on the sick. Some others with *four,* that is, three between the shoulders, three on the neck, the top of the head and the brain, three on the forehead and the eyebrows, three on the nostrils and lips, two on the throat and chest, two on the hands and two on the feet. Some say it is necessary to make a cross with oil on the forehead of any one, but not on the inside of the hands of a priest. But there is nothing hindering that."[53]

Ordo XIX (twelfth century) assigns anointings "on the crown of the head, on the forehead, on the temples, on the face, and then on the eyes, on the ears, on the nostrils, on the lips, on the throat, on the neck, between the shoulders, on the chest, on the hands, on the feet, on the belly button or on the place where the major pain is."[54]

Ordo IV (ninth century) requires even more anointings: "On the neck, on the throat and between the shoulders, and on the chest, on the five senses of the body, that is, on the eyebrows, etc. also on the knees, on the shins, on the calves of the legs, on the feet and the soles of the feet, and almost on all the members of the body, and he should also be anointed on the place where the greater pain occurs."[55]

Orders XXVII and XXXII add an anointing on the loins[56] (which was also prescribed by the Council of Florence D 1324-1325). But in *Order XXXII* there is a recommendation that this anointing be omitted for women because of modesty. For the same reason, the anointing on the belly button, on the chest and between the shoulders was omitted; thus gradually the anointing was applied only on the five senses.

In the East there never was a uniform and universal rite. *Ordo XXXII,* which is based on the *Euchologium of the Greeks* and belongs in the ninth century, required anointings only of the forehead, on the hands and on the ears.[57] But in the same century, *Theodulphus* also mentions three anointings, and he describes them in different ways: "When the Apostles anointed the sick, they did it with not more than three crosses with oil.

52. Martène, *op.cit.*, 303.
53. Ibiden.
54. In Martène, *op.cit.*, 331.
55. Ed. Martène, *op.cit.*, 306.
56. *Op.cit.*, 342-343 and 348.
57. Ibidem, 355.

Hence the Greeks, who imitate the tradition of the Apostles, likewise make use of only three crosses with oil, pouring the oil of the sick from a flask in the sign of a cross over the head and garments and the whole body of the sick; they begin with a cross from the head down to the feet and then crossing from the right hand along the arm and chest all the way to the left hand."[58]

In the fifteenth century, *Simeon of Thessalonica* also mentions three anointings, but on the forehead, in the form of a cross on the face because of the senses, and on the hands.[59] Somewhat later, *Arcudius* (seventeenth century) says that the anointing should take place on the forehead, on the chin, and on both knees.[60] Moreover, Denzinger says: "We find no indication about which parts of the body are anointed by the Orientals, except what Bernatus de Coptis reports: he mentions only one anointing which is applied to the forehead. But also Vanslebius speaks about only one anointing, which is given by a senior priest. But from the ritual of Gabriel, Patriarch of Renaudotium, and from the Euchologium Tukianum and from Vatican Codex 78 we learn that all priests anoint, but it is not stated whether it is on different parts of the body, and therefore it seems that it should not be admitted."[61] According to *Archangelski*[62] the Greek ritual on this matter has no rubrics, so the priests apply the anointing in the way they have learned how to do it.

Among *modern Orientals* the anointings are made both on the five senses, and on the forehead, the nose, the knees, the mouth, the chest, on the hands inside and outside, and on the forehead, the knees, the hands, the chin, and other similar places.[63]

Finally, for the Roman Church, the *Roman Ritual* prescribes anointing on the five senses, and in the case of necessity, as we said above, it allows one anointing "*on one sense or preferably on the forehead,* but the obligation remains of anointing the individual senses when the danger has passed" (CIC cn.947,1 [1917]).

Therefore, from all of this, it is certain that the anointing of one sense suffices for validity (otherwise it would never be permitted); but for licitness, the Roman Church requires anointing on the five senses, while among the Orientals there are different anointings according to the different rites.

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58. In Martène, *op.cit.*, I,1 c.7 a.3 p.301.
59. *De sacro ritu sancti olei,* quoted by Arcudius.
60. *De Concordia Ecclesiae occidentalis et orientalis in administratione septem sacramentorum libri VII* (Paris 1672) l.5 c.7.
61. H. Denzinger, *Ritus Orientalium* 1,186.
62. *Inquisitio de evolutione historica benedictionis olei* (1895) p.135f.
63. See G. Jaquemier, *L'Extrême Onction chez les Grecs:* EchOr (1899) 194.

251. *Proof of the second part.* I. *The form of Extreme Unction consists in the words by which a prayer is offered for the sick person.*

1. From Holy Scripture. St. James while treating Extreme Unction says: *Is any among you sick? Let him call for the elders of the Church, and let them pray over him. and the prayer of faith will save the sick man.* Now, as we said above [n.229] the *prayer* προσευξάσθωσαν, εύχή is prayer in the proper sense, which is not said by the sick man, but by the elders called to anoint the sick man with oil and, while praying over him, to beseech God for his health.

But that this prayer is a sacramental formula is clear from the connection it has with the anointing (which is the matter) and with the effect ("let them pray. while anointing: and the prayer of faith will save the sick man").

2. From the document and praxis of the Church. In the Decree for the Armenians (D 1324), in the Council of Trent (D 1695) and in other documents mentioned above, it is apparent that the form is found in the words (surely deprecating) or in the prayers, according to the recommendation of St. James: *let them pray over him. and the prayer of faith.* (5:14-15), which accompany the anointing, as it is now found in the Roman Ritual. – As we have done, in treating the proximate matter (n.250), we could here also quote many formulas found in the ritual books and in the Orders. But in general this will be noted by someone reading the rituals or Orders, namely, that there is not as much variety in the formulas as there is in the matter. First of all, usually a general prayer is given alluding to the anointing, without always stating in the rubrics that the anointing should then be given.[64] After that, as many formulas or prayers are added as there were prescribed anointings. In order to present some examples, it will suffice to cite the following ancient documents:

The Book of Orders (fifth century): "*When the priest approaches the sick person he makes the sign of the cross on his head, along with the blessed oil, and says:* In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, who reigns forever and ever. Amen. *And he says the three antiphons in a low voice, and then the prayer in an ordinary tone: Ant.* Save me, O Lord, my bones are shaken and my soul is badly shaken. You, O Lord, have a change of heart and save my soul.—*Vers.:* O Lord, do not be angry.

This antiphon is said when there are many sick persons: Ant. Heal, O

64. The Orders and rituals probably assume first that there will be an imposition of hands (which sometimes is stated expressly as, for example, in Order V) and after that the anointing. But that imposition of hand often coincides with the anointing, probably on the head. Perhaps also it can be said that this prayer is the one that in ancient times was recited while only one anointing was given; but afterwards, while other anointings were added with their own prayers, this one remained as the general prayer.

Lord, all our ills, alleluia: save my life from destruction, alleluia, alleluia. – As we confess.

Ant.: The Lord said to his disciples: Receive the Holy Spirit: in my name drive out devils, and lay your hands on the sick and they will get well. – *Vers.:* God of gods, our Lord.

[*Ant.]:* The Lord raises up the fallen, the Lord sets free those in chains, the Lord heals the sick. – *Vers.:* It is the Lord who heals the contrite of heart.

We pray for [the mercy] of almighty God that he may deign to heal the wounds of his servant (of his servants). – *Prayer.* Jesus, our Lord and Savior, who are the true salvation and medicine, and from whom and of whom is true salvation and medicine, who instruct us by the voice of your Apostle, that by touching the sick with the holy oil we may ask for your divine mercy; look favorably upon this your servant (upon these your servants). Come from the wondrous height of the heavens so that the healing power of your grace may restore the stricken one (or ones), whom weakness depresses and the lack of strength is now pushing towards death. etc.[65]

The Milan Ritual has this formula along with the anointing: "I anoint you with the blessed oil, so that like a soldier anointed and prepared for battle, you may overcome the heavenly powers. Creature of oil do your work. + In the name of the omnipotent Father, + and of the Son, + and of the Holy Spirit: so that the unclean spirit may not lie hidden here, nor in the members or bones, nor in any part of the members of this man (or woman); but may the power of Christ, Son of the Most High who is with God the Father, be working in him. – *When you have anointed him on the chest say:* May God forgive you whatever sins you have committed by the thoughts of your heart. *Then when you have anointed his hands say:* May God forgive you whatever sins you have committed by the action of your hands. *Thirdly, when you have anointed his feet say:* May God forgive you whatever sins you have committed by the movement of your feet. – *Another prayer.* The Lord be with you [All the priests say the same prayer together]. The God of angels, etc."[66]

In the thirty-three *Orders* transcribed by Martène the form is found more or less as it is in the Roman Ritual, although there are some variations, as we shall see shortly. Therefore, the form of Extreme Unction consists in the words that always accompany the anointing or immediately follow it,

65. Ed. M. Férotin, col. 71-72.

66. M. Magistretti, *Manuale Ambrosianum* 1,149-150. Then also in *Cod. M. Beroldo novo* 97; and in the *Libro Monachorum S. Ambrosii* 83.

and by which a request is made for the sick person.

252. II. *The form of Extreme Unction is formally deprecative, but it can also be materially indicative or imperative.*

From the documents and praxis of the Church. Both in the Oriental Churches and in the Roman Church the form of this sacrament is deprecative, but in the ritual books some mixed forms are found (from deprecative and indicative), and also others that at first look seem to be simply indicative or imperative, and others optative. Here are a few examples:

a) *Deprecative forms.* The *Liber Sacramentorum,* attributed to Gregory the Great, says: "*Anoint him [the sick person] with holy oil and say:* Almighty God, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, in the power of the Holy Spirit, his God in the Trinity, have mercy on this servant of yours, and grant him remission of all his sins, and recovery from his present illness through this holy anointing and our humble entreating. Who live."[67]

Ordo XI[68]: "*As soon as the priest begins to anoint the sick person, he says this prayer:* We beseech your mercy, Almighty God, that the oil of your heavenly gift may contribute to the salutary healing of the mind and body of this your servant, whom, while trusting in your mercy, we dare to anoint with the effusion of this blessed liquid; grant that, having experienced the healing of the divine anointing, he may be able to overcome in virtue of your invincible power all the deceits and machinations of the deadly enemy. Through Christ." Afterwards, after having recited two other prayers by two other priests, the anointing is given to each of the senses or members with a prayer for each one. Here is one example: "*On the chest.* O God, observer of the secrets of the heart, who do not cease to protect the hearts of the faithful with an impregnable shield; protect, we beseech you, the inner life of this your servant with this salvific anointing, so that, having removed the delights of carnal affections and the deadly deceits of all unclean spirits, he may be able to remain constant in the contemplation of your divine power. Through Christ."

In the *Ordo XV,* before the individual members and senses are anointed, the rubric says: "*Therefore while the priest is anointing the sick person, he says this prayer while slowly anointing him:* Observe, O Lord, we beseech you, the submission of our humility, and as a friendly cooperator come to our assistance, so that we who impose hands on this sick person may show the anointing of this holy oil and may sense that you take notice of our submission; and just as the grace of the Holy Spirit accompanies the performance of our action, so may all ill-health and weakness depart from

67. Martène, *op.cit.,* Ordo VIII, 311.
68. Martène, *op.cit.,* 314.

this your servant N. and may the fullness of all strength and good health replace it; and when he has risen from his bed of weakness, may he direct his face and his mind to you, the heavenly physician, and because of the restoration of his health may he offer perfect praise to your name forever. Through Christ."[69]

In the *Euchologium of the Greeks* the form goes like this: "Holy Father, physician of souls and bodies, who sent your Only-begotten Son our Lord Jesus Christ who endured great suffering and freed us from the power of death; heal also your servant N. from the infirmity of the body now afflicting him, and revive him by the grace of your Christ through the unfailing intercessions of our Lady, the Mother of God and ever Virgin Mary [*the names of other saints follow*]. and of all the saints. Amen. Because you are the fountain of health, Christ our God, and we give you glory—to the Father and to the Son and to the Holy Spirit: now and always and forever and ever."[70]

b) *Indicative or imperative forms.* Most of the forms or formulas that are found in the Orders belong to the indicative form; thus *Ordo I:* "I anoint you with the blessed oil, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. so that the unclean spirit may not remain in you." *On the eyes:* "I anoint your eyes with the blessed oil, so that whatever wrong you have done by improper looks may be atoned for by the anointing of this oil. Through Christ."[71] In almost the same way, Orders III, V, XII, XV, XVI, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXII, XXIII, etc. give expression to the form as above or in the following way: "In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit I anoint you (your hands, ears, etc.) with the liquid of this sacred oil, so that whatever sin has been committed by the use of hearing (touch, smell.) may be removed by this spiritual medicine." And there are more like it.

Under the *imperative* form anointing is not very frequent, however, there are some examples, as in *Ordo XIII*: "In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, reigning forever and ever. Receive the health of your body and the remission of all yours sins."[72] In the old ritual of the Church of Soissons: "In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, receive health in the name of the Lord. Amen." *And on the feet*: "Receive health in the name of our Lord Jesus Christ—stand up

69. Ibidem, 324.
70. Ibidem, 351.
71. Ibidem, 302.
72. Ibidem, 320.

and walk. Amen."[73]

c) *Optative forms.* The optative form is used in the modern Roman Ritual: "Through this holy anointing and through His tender mercy may the Lord forgive you whatever sins you have committed in the sense of sight (hearing, touch, etc.). Amen."[74] But even in ancient times a similar form was in use. Such a one appears in Orders III, X, XVIII, etc.: "Through this anointing of holy oil and the blessing of God, may the Lord forgive you whatever wrong you have done through sight. *Similarly through all the senses."*[75] Sometimes the optative form is expressed in a prayer rather than in the very words of the anointing, as often happens in the indicative form.

d) *Mixed forms.* A mixed form appears sometimes in one and the same prayer, part of which is indicative or optative, but another part is deprecative. Thus *Ordo I* has a complete anointing of the eyes: "I anoint your eyes with blessed oil, that whatever sins you have committed by improper looks may be atoned for by the anointing of this oil. Through our Lord. Hasten to aid, O Lord, this sick man and cure him with your spiritual medicine, that, in his pristine health restored by you, he may give thanks to you."[76] *Orders V and VI* have this form: "I anoint you with holy oil, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit: beseeching the mercy of our one Lord and God that, having removed all the pains and weaknesses of your body, strength and health may be restored in you: so as through the mystery of this work and through this anointing of the holy oil and our prayer, having been treated and healed by the power of the holy Trinity, you may merit to receive your prior and even improved health. Through Christ. The Lord God is our Savior, who is the true salvation."[77]

But *Ordo XI*, while it gives different prayers for the individual senses, makes some of them optative and some of them deprecative: "*On the neck:* In the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, may this anointing of sanctification be for you the purification of a holy birth. *On the chest*: O God, observer of the secrets of the heart, who do not cease to protect the hearts of the faithful with an impregnable shield; protect, we beseech you, with your salvific anointing the heart and soul of this your servant, so

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73. De Sainte-Beuve, *De Sacramento Unctionis infirmorum Extremae* d.4 a.2. Benedict XIV (*De Synodo* l.5 c.2 n.2) says: "We do not know by what means a prayer can be found in other forms, out of the many ancient rituals published by Menardo and Martène, in which only the words 'I anoint' are used without any other addition and from which a prayer can be formed or fashioned." Actually, forms of this kind are found nowhere in Martène and Menardo, nor, as far as we know, in any Order or Ritual, ancient or modern. Perhaps the distinguished author wrote this from memory and was subject to some confusion.
74. *Rituale Romanum* tit.V c.1 20-21;
75. Ordo XVIII, ed. Martène, *op.cit.*, 330.
76. Ed. Martène, *op.cit.*, 302.
77. Ordo V, *op.cit.*, 307; Ordo VI, *op.cit.*, 310.

that."[78] *Ordo XIV* joins the indicative and imperative form together with the optative: "I anoint you with holy oil, after invoking the majesty of our great Creator, who commanded the prophet Samuel to anoint David as king. Do your work, O creature of oil, in the name of the omnipotent Father, and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; so that the unclean spirit may lurk neither in his limbs, nor in his heart, nor in any part of his body; but may the power of the Most High Christ and the sanctification of the Holy Spirit dwell in him. Through the same."[79]

From these different forms, it is surely apparent that the indicative and optative forms can easily be reduced to the deprecative, or even more, because they are often joined with other deprecative forms, or in them this formula is used: In the name of the Father, and so forth; or: "I anoint you. *beseeching* the mercy of God." Concerning the imperative forms, it should be noted that there are very few of them, and moreover, as it seems, they pertain only to a quasi summation or extract from the liturgical books, and always after the very brief formula there follows a general prayer in which the health of the sick person is sought from God. Therefore really all the formulas can be reduced to the deprecative form.

253. Objections. 1. In the Decree for the Armenians it is said that the sick should be anointed on the five senses and on the loins. Therefore one anointing is not enough.

I distinguish the antecedent. This is said in a preceptive way, *denied;* by way of an instruction, *conceded.* And no author says that the anointing on the loins is necessary; but the one mentioned in the Decree is proposed to be done like the other five anointings, according to the custom of that time.

2. If the necessity ceases, the other anointings must be given and they must be given absolutely. Therefore from the Decree of the Holy Office it cannot be inferred that one anointing is sufficient.

I distinguish the antecedent. The anointing must be supplied for the validity of the sacrament, *denied;* for its integrity, *conceded.* But it is clear that they are supplied absolutely; for otherwise, if they were given only conditionally, it would be possible to call into doubt the validity of the Sacrament already given in a state of necessity. That also takes place in other sacraments, for example in Baptism and Orders, which are unrepeatable Sacraments, and if because of necessity or negligence (even voluntary) something from the accidental rites has been omitted, when the opportunity presents itself, it must be supplied.

78. Martène, *op.cit.*, 314.
79. Ibidem, 321.

CHAPTER III

On the effects of Extreme Unction

Thesis 3. The primary effect of Extreme Unction is the granting of habitual grace along with the actual graces necessary to save the soul by raising up the sick person; but the secondary effects are the remission of sins and their remains and the conditional health of the body.

S.Th. *Suppl.* q. 30, a, 1f,; *In 4* d.23 q.1 a.2 quaestiunc.1f.; *C.Gent.* 1.4 c.73; Suarez, *De Paen.* d.41 s.1 a.4; Kern, 167ff.; Pesch, 7 n.536ff.; Otten, n.292ff.; Lercher-Umberg, n.655-664; Doronzo, II,4-231.

254. Connection. Essential to sacraments is that they confer grace *ex opere operato*, and also that it be habitual grace along with the actual graces in order to obtain the proper effects of the Sacrament. Since, therefore, Extreme Unction is numbered among the Sacraments, and we have already proved its existence and essence, our next task is to explain its effects. But this Sacrament, according to the words of St. James, is given not only to cause grace, but also to produce many other effects. Therefore it is necessary that we explain the nature and degree or excellence of these effects.

255. Definition of terms. Regarding *the effects of the Sacraments,* some are *common* and some are *special.* The common effects are grace considered in itself; but the particular or special effects are the gifts of actual grace, which are granted in each Sacrament in order to obtain the particular end of that Sacrament,

Above all it is necessary to note that "primarily, per se, properly" "secondarily, *per accidens*, improperly" should not be identified. For it can happen that something is intended *per se,* but *not primarily.* Thus in our case, Extreme Unction properly, *primarily and per se* confers the second grace; for, it is a Sacrament of the living; *secondarily,* however, but also *per se,* sometimes it confers the first grace, when, namely, the sick person, unable to receive the Sacrament of Penance, makes an act of sorrow for his sins, and with this disposition receives Extreme Unction.

Along with the actual graces necessary. Actual graces are normally joined to habitual grace, and they are conferred in a special way with each Sacrament. In Extreme Unction the special helps are given which are necessary for the sick person in order to obtain eternal life. Trent describes these helps in this way: "The anointing takes away the sins, if there be any still to be expiated, and also the remains of sin; it comforts and strengthens the soul of the sick person by awakening in him great confidence in the divine mercy; supported

by this, the sick bears more lightly the inconveniences and trials of his illness and resists more easily the temptations of the devil" (D 1696).

A secondary effect is that which is intended by the Sacrament itself, but not with such urgency that it must necessarily be obtained. But it is not a *per accidens* effect (for such an effect is not intended per se, as is had in those Sacraments of the living, like the Eucharist, which can remit sins *per accidens*).

The remission of sin and their remains. Extreme Unction remits both mortal and venial sins, if there are any, and especially all those that in any way impede lest a man endowed with grace be not completely united with God. "Sins of this kind are venial ones not yet remitted by penance, the guilt of temporal punishment, moral weakness by which a man readily gives in to his passions, a special disregard of the divine providence by which God governs his servants—in one word: whatever hinders an offense against God from being said to be entirely removed."[1]

Conditional health of the body. Extreme Unction at times restores bodily health when it is expedient for the salvation of the soul (D 1696); this is what Trent says while explaining the effect of this Sacrament. Therefore, bodily health is also proposed as an intended effect *per se* of the Sacrament—not one to be obtained *absolutely and necessarily,* but only *conditionally* for the salvation of the soul. This bodily cure, which sometimes is obtained by reason of the Sacrament, is not necessarily charismatic or miraculous: for, God allows natural causes to act in order to recover health. Therefore, the effect of health is not to be expected to result infallibly, when this Sacrament is administered too much out of season. But if Extreme Unction is received opportunely, the effect of bodily health (if it is expedient for the salvation of the soul) can be obtained by natural causes governed by the special providence of God, such as enlightening doctors who select the suitable medicines, by assuaging the anxieties of the sick person that can harm one's health, and so forth.

256. Opinions. Often the disagreements among Catholic authors depend on the way of speaking; for, sometimes they identify (at least de facto) the notions "primarily" and "*per se*," "secondarily" and "*per accidens*"; as we noted above, this is not correct. Hence the discussion is concerned only with the excellence of the effect, or in determining the primary and the secondary effect.

1. *The Scotists,* following St. Bonaventure and Scotus, say that the primary effect is the remission of venial sins; but they take this position so that the soul can more quickly obtain the beatitude from which it is

1. Kern, p. 104.

detained by its venial sins. [2]

2. *Other authors* with St. Thomas and Suarez defend our thesis more or less.[3]

3. *The Orientals* deny that bodily health is the secondary effect, but they say it is the principal effect.[4]

4. As to the remission of mortal sins, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Durandus and many others before Trent, say that it is not an effect *per se* of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, but only *per accidens.*[5]

5. Ancient and modern *Protestants* either do not admit this Sacrament, or only concede bodily health as its effect, which during the time of the Apostles was charismatic, but now is no longer granted by God.

257. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Trent* in sess.XIV, ch.2 on Extreme Unction declared: "Further, the reality and effect of this Sacrament *are explained in the words: 'and the prayer of faith will save the sick man, and the Lord will raise him up; and if he be in sins, they will be forgiven him.* For the reality is the grace of the Holy Spirit, whose anointing takes away the sins, if there be any still to be expiated, and also the remains of sin; it comforts and strengthens the soul of the sick person by awakening in him great confidence in the divine mercy; supported by this, the sick bears more lightly the inconveniences and trials of his illness and resists more easily the temptations of the devil, who lies in wait for his heel; at times it also restores bodily health when it is expedient for the salvation of the soul" (D 1696).

The Council of Florence: "The effect is the healing of the mind and, as far as it is good for the soul, of the body as well" (D 1325).

Theological note. *It is a matter of defined faith* that Extreme Unction takes away the remains of sins, raises up the sick, and confers a conditional healing of the body.[6] It is *certain and common doctrine* that the remission of mortal sins is an effect *per se* of Extreme Unction: that it is a secondary effect is *common.*

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2. On the teaching of the Scotists, see Lercher-Umberg, n. 659,2; Weisweiler, *Das Sakrament der Letzten Oelung in den systematischen Werken der ersten Frühscholastik:* Schol 7 (1932) 336f.
3. *Suppl.* q. 84, a. 1 ad 1; Suarez, D.41. Doronzo defends the view that the principal effect of Extreme Unction consists in "taking away the remains of sin, or in healing the weakness and foolishness, which persists in us, from sin and exists in our mind, and which is nothing other than a certain inclination of the mind towards evil, and the difficulty to act well as a result of one's past sins" (*loc.cit.* II, 98-110); and he cites St. Thomas as favoring this opinion.
4. See M. Gordillo, *Compend. Theol. Orient.*[2] (1939) 164.
5. There are many other disagreements concerning the recovery of health, the mediate or immediate remission of venial sins, etc. For more on this, see Kern, 167ff.; Van Noort, *De Sacramentis* 2 n.178; Lercher-Umberg, n. 657-659.
6. Thus Trent: D 1696, 1717; See Council of Florence, D 1325.

258. Proof. I. *The primary effect of Extreme Unction is the granting of habitual grace along with the actual graces necessary to save the soul by raising up the sick person.* That is the primary effect of a Sacrament that can always be obtained (unless an obstacle impedes it) and is intended by the Sacrament. But such is the granting of habitual grace along with the actual graces necessary for raising up the soul. Therefore this is the primary effect of Extreme Unction.

The major is evident from the definition of a primary effect.

Proof of the minor. St. James clearly teaches: *and the Lord will raise him up.* But this "raising up" (spiritual, of course, as was shown above) can always be obtained, but the other effects are not always possible, as will be explained soon. But actual grace is necessary for this spiritual raising up, and indeed such a grace or spiritual help that corresponds to the spiritual needs of the sick person: actual graces of this kind are always as it were specific to each Sacrament and are wont to pertain to its primary effect. Moreover, if the primary effect of Extreme Unction were the raising up or the cure of the body, then it would also have to be administered to baptized infants, to the permanently insane and so forth. But this had been forbidden.[7] Therefore.

259. II. *The remission of sins and their remains is the secondary effect of Extreme Unction.* St. James also clearly teaches that Extreme Unction remits sins (*and if he be in sins, they will be forgiven him*). But the sins about which the Apostle is concerned are "crimes," or also mortal sins, not just venial ones. But often there will not be any sins that are forgiven, and Baptism and Penance were instituted to take away sins with a necessity of means. Therefore the forgiveness of sins is indeed an effect of Extreme Unction, but it is not the primary effect. For, otherwise, at least Penance would not be necessary with a necessity of means, if Extreme Unction had as its primary end the remission of mortal sins.

However, the remains of sins are not just the temporal punishments due to past sins, but also the weakness or infirmity of mind resulting from sins and producing fear, diffidence, anxiety over salvation, etc. In order to take away these remains of sins God gives special helps or also actual graces. Indeed, the removal of these remains of sins can be related partly to the raising up of the mind, and they are included in those special helps of actual grace that God grants in each of the Sacraments and about which we spoke while dealing with the primary effect of Extreme Unction; and thus also the removal of the remains of sins pertains in a certain way to the primary effect

7. CIC (1917) can. 940f.

of this Sacrament. But they also look partly to the quasi remission of sins and of the temporal punishments due for those sins; and under this respect they should be placed among the secondary effects of Extreme Unction.

260. III. *Conditional health of the body.* The health of the body is indicated by St. James when he says: *And the prayer of faith will save the sick man.*[8] But actually bodily health of this kind is not always obtained, and often it cannot be obtained naturally (v.gr., in a case in which someone is afflicted with a lethal disease in some remote place); nor is it apparent from St. James that the cure must be charismatic. Therefore such an effect cannot be primary.

Moreover, the Fathers and Theologians unanimously as something obvious say that an effect of this kind cannot be the primary effect of Extreme Unction; for, it has been decreed for men to die once (Gen. 3:19; Isa. 53:12; Heb. 9:27). Rightly, therefore, St. Thomas says: "Extreme Unction causes a bodily healing, not by a natural property of the matter, but by the divine power which works reasonably. And since reasonable working never produces a secondary effect, except in so far as it is required for the principal effect, it follows that a bodily healing does not always ensue from this Sacrament, but only when it is requisite for the spiritual healing: and then it produces it always, provided there is no obstacle on the part of the recipient."[9]

261. Objections. 1. In the form of Extreme Unction only the remission of sins is expressed. Therefore the remission of sin is the primary effect of this Sacrament.

I distinguish the antecedent. In all formulas of Extreme Unction only the remission of sins is expressed, *denied;* in the form we have in the Roman Ritual, *I subdistinguish:* explicitly, *conceded;* implicitly, *denied.* Really in the actual formula only the remission of sins is expressed *explicitly,* but there was a great variety in the formulas. Moreover, in the form of the Sacrament it is not necessary that its primary formal effect be precisely expressed *explicitly,* since the form must be stated according to the mind of the Church which intends all the effects of the Sacrament. In the form the grace is expressed which

8. See above, where we said *he will save the sick man* also refers to bodily health.
9. *Suppl.* q. 30, a. 2. Note with Boyer that the remains of sin in this place are not taken completely in the same sense as above; for, he says "As to the remnants of sin, they do not mean here those dispositions which result from acts, and are inchoate habits so to speak, but a certain spiritual debility in the mind, which debility being removed, though such like habits or dispositions remain, the mind is not so easily prone to sin" (*Suppl.* q. 30, a. 1 ad 2). Hence the remains of sin, which are taken away by Extreme Unction, are opposed to the good efforts against temptations, more than to the good inclinations that can remain and are steadfastly controlled (*De Paenitentia et Extr. Unct.* p. 415).

the sacraments signify,[10] and since grace is granted by the remission of sins, therefore this conferral of grace, which is the primary effect of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, is expressed in this Sacrament by the remission of sins (this remission is also given, if sins are present).

2. Alleviation of the mind presupposes the remission of sins. Therefore the remission of sins must come first. Therefore the remission of sins is the primary effect.

I distinguish the antecedent. And the remission of sins in the Sacrament of Extreme Unction is ordained to alleviation of the mind, *conceded;* it is independent of it, *denied. I distinguish the consequent.* It must be first in intention, *denied;* in execution, *conceded. Given this distinction, I deny the second consequent.*

3. After the reception of Extreme Unction the spiritual alleviation of the mind in the sick person does not always appear. Therefore alleviation of the mind is not the primary effect.

I distinguish the antecedent. Sometimes *the sick do not appear* to be spiritually alleviated, *I bypass the antecedent; they are not* spiritually alleviated, *I subdistinguish:* because perhaps they did not receive the Sacrament worthily, *I bypass this point;* otherwise, *denied.* External fatigue and internal anxiety can increase with fever and bodily weakness; therefore it is not necessary that *the spiritual alleviation become apparent.* Moreover, it is not necessary that the alleviation be entirely complete so that the anxiety of mind is overcome; thus the effect of the Sacrament can always be obtained even though the fatigue and anxiety remain, which would be even greater if the sick person had not received the Sacrament.

4. Baptism and Penance were instituted to remit sins. Therefore Extreme Unction was not instituted *per se* to remit sins.

I concede the antecedent and distinguish the consequent. Extreme Unction was not instituted per se *and primarily* to remit sins, *conceded; secondarily,* but also per se, *denied.* The Sacraments produce their effects according to the intention of Christ, who instituted them as he willed. To remit sins primarily and per se he instituted the Sacraments of Baptism and Penance, and also with a necessity of means; but he added to them, as a supplement in cases of extreme necessity, the Sacrament of Extreme Unction. Its primary purpose is to alleviate the mind of a sick person especially in the spiritual order, and secondarily, but also from the intention of Christ, to take the place of the Sacrament of Penance in cases of necessity. Hence it follows that the Sacrament of Extreme Unction is different from the other Sacraments of the living (in reference to the remission of sins) inasmuch as the other Sacraments can also remit sins in certain circumstances, but they can do it only *per accidens;* Extreme Unction accomplished that *per se.* But it has this in common with them (also in this order of the remission of sins) that this remission of sins does not free them from the obligation of submitting their sins to the power of the keys when the opportunity presents itself.

10. "It is certain that all the Sacraments of the New Law, as sensible signs and causes of invisible grace, must signify the grace that they produce and produce the grace that they signify" (Pius XII, *Const. Apost. "Sacramentum Ordinis":* AAS 40 [1948] 6).

262. Scholium 1. *Conditions for the remission of mortal sins in Extreme Unction.* Since the Sacrament of Extreme Unction is a Sacrament of the living, per se and primarily it must be received in the state of grace; however, as was said above, also per se, but in a secondary way, it was instituted to remit mortal sins. This is a common and certain opinion.[11]

But there is a disagreement about what the necessary conditions are in order to obtain the remission of mortal sins in this Sacrament. Van Noort[12] teaches that a sick person who cannot go to confession is not required to elicit an act of perfect contrition, but it suffices if he has attrition. Schel does not require even attrition, since he calls Extreme Unction a Sacrament of nature, which removes mortal sin, unless there is a sin against the Holy Spirit present.[13] However, the common opinion of authors requires per se contrition when a sick person is able to elicit this act and knows that he has some mortal sins and is not able to go to confession. But if he does not know that he has some mortal sins (because, v.gr., he thinks he has already confessed them), or he makes an act of attrition while trying to make an act of perfect contrition, or in other similar cases with good faith he has made only an act of attrition, attrition suffices. Indeed, if an unconscious sick person cannot elicit any acts, not even attrition, it suffices if he habitually has attrition, provided that he has not retracted, either actually or verbally, the act which he elicited after he had committed a mortal sin but did not confess it.

263. Scholium 2. *On the moment when grace is conferred in this Sacrament.* The point of this question depends on the nature of the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, which is usually administered by several anointings, each one of which has its own formula expressing the remission of diverse sins and the conferring of sanctifying grace. It is evident that mortal sins cannot be remitted unless they are all included at the same time, and consequently the anointing of the eyes cannot confer sanctifying grace if the committed mortal sins have not yet been forgiven, v. gr., those of the tongue. Hence it is necessary that the Sacrament obtain its effect, when the whole sacrament has been conferred; for, if there are several anointings, there are not as many Sacraments as there are anointings, but only one complete Sacrament with a certain moral unity is conferred. This is the common opinion of the authors.[14] However, this question should not be confused with another matter proposed later (n. 272,2) on the worth of a sacrament administered by several priests. There it will be said that the sacrament is valid if one priest anoints and says the form for one sense and afterwards other priests anoint and say the form for the other senses. It is to be noted that the validity of the sacrament and the effect of the sacrament are not the same. In a case to be mentioned later, the sacrament is said to be valid to the extent that it is supposed (and is true) that the anointing of one sense (n. 250) suffices for the validity; but from that it does not follow that the sacramental grace must be infused after the first anointing.

11. See *Suppl.* q. 30.
12. Van Noort, *De Sacramentis* 2 n.177f. cites in his favor Billot, but this author treats only the sick who are totally unconscious.
13. Kern, p.171,1.
14. Suarez, d.41 s.2 n.11. See Doronzo, *loc.cit.*, II,231-250.

CHAPTER IV

On the subject and minister of Extreme Unction

Thesis 4. The subject of Extreme Unction is a gravely ill baptized adult, who at least at one time had the use of reason; but the minister is every priest and only a priest.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 31, a. 1-3; q. 32, a. 1-4; Suarez, *De Paenit.* d.42 s.1,2; d.43 s.1-2; Bellarmine, *De Extr. Unct.* c.9; Kern, 241; Pesch, n.549f.; Otten, 262-269; Lercher-Umberg, 665-679; Doronzo, II,447-812.

264. Connection. We have considered the main dogmatic questions concerning Extreme Unction, so the only thing remaining is to treat the subject and the minister of this Sacrament . This is important because in Moral Theology cases are proposed that cannot be solved unless one has a clear idea concerning the subject of the Sacrament. Thus, v.gr., sometimes the question is raised about whether or not men condemned to death can receive this Sacrament.

265. Definition of terms. *The subject* of a Sacrament is a person to whom the Sacrament can be validly administered. In Extreme Unction, besides the things that are necessary in every Sacrament, three things are required for someone to be able to be a subject: 1) that he be baptized; 2) that he be gravely ill; 3) that he be an adult who at least at one time had the use of reason.

A grave illness is understood when, according to the opinion of experts, it can develop into a danger of death, although here and now the sick person is not thought to be about to die.[1] Therefore, Extreme Unction cannot be administered to soldiers who are going into battle, although there is a very probable danger of death, for they are not suffering now from a grave illness. For the same reason, it is not valid to administer the sacrament to those condemned to death, unless someone is gravely ill.[2]

An adult is understood to be someone who is at least seven years old. Hence Extreme Unction cannot be given to children under the age

1. A proximate danger suffices, even though death is not imminent or certain. See Decret. S.C. de Propaganda Fide, Feb. 20, 1801.
2. Benedict XIV condemned as an abuse the praxis of the Greeks and Orientals of administering Extreme Unction also for minor sicknesses. However, perhaps they did not use this anointing as a Sacrament, but as a sacramental. Moreover, the Orientals think that the anointing was instituted *only* (or at least primarily) to cure illnesses. Concerning the praxis of administering Extreme Unction and the special norms about the nature and gravity of a sickness, besides the moral theologians, it will be helpful to consult Kern, p. 296ff.; you will find a summary of his views in Otten, n.317. And note that the *Rit. Rom.* tit.V c.1 n.8 includes old age among the sicknesses.

of seven, unless malice has leaped over their age; nor can it be given to the perpetually insane (unless at one time they had the use of reason) and so they are the same as children. However, the Roman Ritual prescribes that Extreme Unction not be conferred on "the impenitent who persist contumaciously in manifest mortal sin."[3] However, the sacred Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith taught that this Sacrament could also be given to a pagan adult who is gravely ill immediately after he has been baptized,[4] because the remains of actual sins really could remain in some of his habits; also, he might have committed a venial sin.

The minister of Extreme Unction is the one who can validly confer the Sacrament. This is a priest (or a Bishop) who has been duly ordained. The power of conferring Extreme Unction is given only in priestly ordination, and therefore neither laymen nor clerics beneath a priest are capable of conferring Extreme Unction. But priests by their priestly ordination alone are qualified to administer this Sacrament validly, and nothing else is required.

But for the *licit* conferral of Extreme Unction the Church prescribes: "Preserving the precept of can. 397, the ordinary minister is the pastor of the place where the sick person lives; but in a case of necessity, or with the permission at least reasonably presumed of the local pastor or the Ordinary of the place, any other priest can administer this Sacrament.[5]

266. Adversaries. Against the first part the *Orientals* and *Greeks* can be cited, since they are accustomed to administer this anointing even to those not gravely ill. Those in the Latin Church who retain the praxis of not administering Extreme Unction unless a person is half dead can also be considered, because of this defect, as in a certain sense adversaries.[6]

Opposed to the second part are the *Protestants*, who understand by the word "presbyters" older men or senior members in the community, although they are laymen. Launoy,[7] basing himself on a false interpretation

3. Tit. V c.1 in ed. 1952, tit. VI c.1 n.10. CIC (1917) can. 942 says the same thing. The reason is because either it is supposed that they do not have the right intention, or because they are unworthy. See Aertnys-Damen, *Theologia Moralis* 2 n.544.
4. September 26, 1821 (*Collect. S.D. de Prop. Fide* 1 p.445 n.768). St. Thomas (*Suppl.* q. 32, a. 4 ad 2) taught that Extreme Unction supposes that an adult has committed actual sins, and that therefore immediately after baptism it could not be administered. But this opinion was opposed by many theologians (see Suarez, d.42 s.2 n.8) and today is not defended. Actually, Suarez was of the opinion that the Blessed Virgin more probably had received Extreme Unction (d.42 s.2 n.11). There has been among theologians a discussion about the case of the Bl. Virgin, but most of them deny that she received this Sacrament, like Boyer (p. 415) and Lercher (n.666 corol.1), because she could not have the remains of sins or any spiritual infirmity. This question depends on the way of conceiving the necessary effects of Extreme Unction.
5. CIC (1917) 938.2.
6. Kern, 282f. where you will find many declarations of ecclesiastical authority criticizing this abuse.
7. Kern, 242.

of certain documents, thought that a deacon could administer Extreme Unction.[8]

267. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Florence:* "This sacrament may not be given except to a sick person whose life is feared for. The minister of this sacrament is the priest" (D 1324-1325).

The Council of Trent: "The directives as to who must receive and administer this sacrament are also clearly transmitted in the words already quoted. They include that the proper ministers of this sacrament are the presbyters of the Church. In this text this word does not refer to those who are senior in age or more influential among the people, but either to bishops or to priests duly ordained by them through the laying on of hands of the *presbyterium*. It is also declared that this anointing is to be administered to the sick, especially to those who are so dangerously ill that they seem near to death, hence it is also called the sacrament of the dying" (D 1697-1698. See also can.4 D 1719).

"If anyone says that the presbyters of the Church who, as blessed James exhorts, should be brought to anoint the sick are not priests ordained by a bishop but the senior members of each community and that, for this reason, the proper minister of extreme unction is not only the priest, let him be anathema" (D 1719).

Theological note. The first part is *certain.* The second part is *defined divine and Catholic faith.*

268. Proof of the first part. *The subject of Extreme Unction is:* a) *someone baptized,* b) *an adult who at least at one time had the use of reason, and* c) *someone seriously ill.*

a) *Someone baptized.* For St. James writes to the faithful and says about them, "Is any among you sick?" Moreover, the Sacrament can be administered only to the baptized, who alone are subjects of the Church.

b) *An adult.* For St. James supposes they could have mortal sins ("if he has committed sins") and the effect of the Sacrament is to raise up the sick person by removing the remains of sins. For, only adults with the use of reason (or who at one time had it) can be guilty of sins. Therefore this Sacrament can be administered only to them.

c) *Those seriously ill.* The Apostle uses the words ἀσθενειν, κάμνοντα, which refer to a serious illness (n. 228). And the Council of Florence

8. Clericali has a peculiar opinion, for he says that a priest, especially a pastor, if no other priest is available, can administer Extreme Unction to himself.

expressly says: "This sacrament many not be given except to a sick person whose life is feared for" (D 1324). And Trent: "It is also declared that this anointing is to be administered to the sick, especially to those who are so dangerously ill that they seem near to death; hence it is also called the sacrament of the dying" (D 1698). Here the word "especially" is not meant to signify that Extreme Unction should also be administered to those only slightly ill, but *among those seriously ill it should be conferred on those mainly or especially,* who are in danger of losing their life.[9]

St. Thomas offers this reason of agreement: "This sacrament is a spiritual healing. and is signified by way of a healing of the body. Hence this sacrament should not be conferred on those who are not subjects for bodily healing. Although spiritual health is the principal effect of this sacrament, yet this same spiritual healing needs to be signified by a healing of the body, although bodily health may not actually ensue. Consequently spiritual health can be conferred by this sacrament on those alone who are competent to receive bodily healing, namely, the sick; even as he alone can receive Baptism who is capable of a bodily washing. This sacrament is the last remedy that the Church can give, since it is an immediate preparation for glory. Therefore it ought to be given to those only, who are so sick as to be in a state of departure from this life, through their sickness being of such a nature as to cause death, the danger of which is to be feared."[10]

269. Proof of the second part. *The minister of Extreme Unction is every priest and only a priest.* **1. From Holy Scripture.** St. James says: *Let him call for the elders of the church.* But πρεσβύτεροι in the N.T. is a technical word for hierarchs constituted[11] by holy orders, especially with the addition of τής Έκκλησίας . Therefore.

The minor is proved by what was said above (n. 229), and also by the treatise on Orders (n. 18f.).

270. 2. From tradition. It is constant from the tradition of the Church in this matter; it is also clear from the texts quoted above (n. 233f.), from the liturgy, from the declarations of the Church (see D 216) and of the Councils; and also from the agreement of theologians against the *Protestants.*[12]

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9. V.gr., Billot, 2,263; Boyer, p. 416.
10. *Suppl.* q. 32, a. 1 and 2.
11. Among others, Acts 14:22; 15:21; 1 Tim. 5:17-22; 2 Tim. 1:5; Tit. 1:5. There is no dispute on this matter among Catholics; they disagree only concerning certain texts in determining whether under the name πρεσβύτεροι one should understand Bishops or just simple priests.
12. More on this can be seen in Kern, 10ff.

271. Objections. 1. The primary effect of Extreme Unction is alleviation of the mind. But those slightly ill and the condemned to death can also obtain this effect; in fact they also need this alleviation of the mind. Therefore, these also are subjects of Extreme Unction.

I distinguish the major. The primary effect of Extreme Unction is alleviation of the mind of the seriously ill, *conceded;* of those with any sickness or needing alleviation, *denied.* This is clear from the arguments. And it cannot be said that these persons are lacking the helps of the Church, for when they are healthy or not seriously ill they can with a good disposition receive the other Sacraments of the Church—namely, Penance and the Eucharist; also, immediately after capital punishment, Extreme Unction can be given to them because of the probable opinion which holds that the soul still remains in the body for some time after the apparent death, and then certainly they are in the state of a grave illness.

2. The Council of Trent calls Extreme Unction the Sacrament of the *dying.* But those condemned to death, or those who are in serious danger of death are *dying.* Therefore it is licit to give them this Sacrament.

I distinguish the major. Trent calls Extreme Unction the Sacrament of the dying in the sense with which the Synod explains it, *conceded;* in the sense of the objection, *denied.* Actually, Trent there says that Extreme Unction should be given not only to the gravely ill, but also to those "infirm" who are so dangerously ill that they seem to be near to death, hence it is also called the Sacrament of the dying. Here it is apparent that they are talking about the sick, and not just anyone in danger of death.

3. Innocent I in his Letter to Decentius says: "This anointing ought to be interpreted or understood of the sick faithful, who can be anointed with the holy oil of chrism, which, prepared by a bishop, is permitted not only to priests, but also to all as Christians for anointing in their necessity on in the necessity of their own (people)" (D 216). Therefore all Christians are ministers of Extreme Unction.

I concede the text and deny the consequent. In the same cited text St. Innocent says that Extreme Unction can be administered only by Bishops and priests. The meaning, therefore, of this section is taken out of context. For, Decentius had asked about the anointing prescribed by St. James; and Innocent, after quoting the text of the Apostle, explains that this anointing is fitting for all Christians and not just for priests, so that all can be anointed. But concerning the minister, he responds later to the question whether, in virtue of the words of St. James, only *presbyters* and not *Bishops* can administer this sacrament. His answer is that Bishops also can be ministers of Extreme Unction. However in this place, where he speaks about the minister, he says nothing about all the faithful. Hence, when he says it is licit for all sick Christians to use this Anointing "in their own necessity or in the necessity of their (people)," it does not mean that it is permitted to lay persons to anoint themselves, but they have themselves anointed. But there are not lacking authors who interpret this text of Innocent by understanding the use of chrism to be something like a sacramental, just as they can sprinkle themselves

with holy water.[13] The text of St. Caesar of Arles has also been interpreted in the prior manner: "As often as an infirmity occurs, the one who is sick should receive the Body and Blood of Christ: and then let him anoint his body that what has been written might be fulfilled in him: *Is any among you sick?.*"[14]

4. Deacons sometimes administered Extreme Unction. Therefore they can also be ministers of this Sacrament.

I respond. They conferred a true Sacrament of Extreme Unction, *denied;* they anointed with an anointing similar to a sacramental, *conceded.* Just as they brought the Eucharist to the sick (but they did not confect the Eucharist), and publicly reconciled sinners (but did not absolve them from their sins); so also they assisted the sick, anointing them with blessed oil, as the Orientals still do. Even in our time, in many places the custom of anointing the sick (even the mildly sick) is still preserved, with the oil of a burning lamp before venerating some image. From the texts cited by the adversaries it cannot be demonstrated that Deacons at one time conferred Extreme Unction, so that Perrone could declare: "I examined the various documents; I found none except those that concern a ceremonial anointing,"[15] that is, of some kind of sacramental.

272. Scholium 1. *On the number of priests conferring Extreme Unction.* St. James speaks about presbyters in the plural number. In the Oriental Church for the administration of Extreme Unction seven priests are required, or at least three; In the Latin Church formerly also several priests conferred this Sacrament at the same time. In what concerns its *validity,* there is no doubt that Extreme Unction can be administered by only one priest, and also by several; but it is necessary to be aware of these points:

1. Suarez,[16] St. Alphonsus,[17] and commonly theologians teach that the Sacrament would be invalid, if one minister applied the matter and another one pronounced the form.

2. The Sacrament will be valid if one minister applies the matter and say the form for one sense, and another or others respectively do it for the other senses. This is the opinion of St. Thomas,[18] Suarez,[19] and commonly all authors. For, the Sacrament seems to be already present by one anointing and then it is completed by the other anointings.

3. The Sacrament will also be valid if several priests apply the whole matter and form, either by doing it at the same time or successively. However, in the latter case, the Sacrament will be conferred by the first anointing minister, but the others follow only with a sacramental. However, some think that the priests can suspend the intention of conferring the Sacrament until the anointing has been made by the last priest. But this does not seem to be probable.[20]

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13. Now it is often taken in this sense, as P. Leher shows: *Die sakramente der Krankenölung im ausgehenden Altertum und im Frühmittelalter, mit besonderer Berüchsichtigung der ältesten römishen Sakramentarien* (1934) 8-11.
14. ML 39,2238 among the spurious *Opera* of St. Augustine.
15. Perrone, *Praelectiones Dogmaticae* 8,80, note 1 (Rome 1941).
16. D.43 s.2 n.3.
17. L.6 n.724.
18. *Suppl.* q. 29, a. 2 ad 3.
19. D.43 s.2 n.6.
20. See on this matter, v.gr., Pesch, n. 560; Bord, p. 26, note 5.

273. Scholium. 2. *On Extreme Unction given to those apparently dead.* The Code of Canon Law, can. 941 (1917), says: "When there is doubt whether a sick person had attained the use of reason, if he is in danger of death or is already dead, this Sacrament may be administered conditionally. Accordingly, it is evident that this Sacrament (just like the others) can in no way be administered to those certainly dead. But if there is a serious doubt about death, it can be administered conditionally. But according to the solid opinion of doctors and moralists generally after apparent death the soul remains in the body for some time,[21] which can continue for a few hours, depending on the different causes of death. If, therefore, a priest anoints a sick person who has just died, he can do it absolutely; but if there has been a delay of some hours, he can anoint him conditionally, for he is not certain that real death has occurred, unless there are signs of corruption or when the death has been caused in a way that eliminates all doubt, such as a case of beheading.

21. Ferreres, *La muerte real y la muerte aparente*[5] (Barcelona 1930).

CHAPTER V

On the necessity, repeatability and revival of Extreme Unction

274. The following points are presented only as a complement or addition to the whole treatise.[1]

I. *The necessity of Extreme Unction.* All serious theologian[2] say that Extreme Unction is a Sacrament that is not necessary to receive, either by a necessity of means (for per se it must be received in the state of grace, and there are other Sacraments instituted in order to obtain the first grace), or of precept (for which there is no evidence; for, St. James does not command it, but proposes it as a counsel). Thus, for example, formerly during the time of an interdict it was not permitted for this Sacrament to be administered, but the other necessary Sacraments were not neglected. CIC, can. 944 (1917) makes this recommendation: "Although this Sacrament per se is not a necessary means for salvation, nevertheless no one should neglect receiving it."

However, *per accidens* it could be necessary in some cases, for example, when the sick person is in the state of mortal sin, and he also has attrition for his sins, but here and now (v.gr., because he is unconscious), cannot use the other salvific means.

Many theologians also teach that a sick person has a serious obligation to receive Extreme Unction, because it is the ordinary means established by God in order to obtain the special graces needed for the last agony. But a grave necessity of this kind seems to apply only to not having contempt for the Sacrament. This serious obligation concerns those whose responsibility it is to warn the sick person about his impending death, and also the priest whose duty it is to administer the Sacrament.

275. II. *The repeatability of Extreme Unction.* There can be two cases: 1, often in life Extreme Unction can be received, if someone in different times and circumstances is gravely ill (and in this case there is no doubt about repeatability); and 2, in the same illness this Sacrament can be repeated. The documents of the Church respond positively to both cases.

The Council of Florence, in its Decree for the Armenians: "The other four however [that is, Sacraments: Penance, Extreme Unction, Eucharist, Matrimony] do not imprint a character and allow for repetition" (D 1313).

1. It will be helpful to read Doronzo, *loc.cit.*, II,250-261, 281-445.
2. S.Th., *In 4* d.23 q.1 a.1 sol.3 ad 1; Suarez, d.44.

Trent says expressly: "If, however, the sick recover after receiving the anointing, they can again receive the help and assistance of this sacrament if they fall into another similar condition." (D 1698). And the *Roman Ritual* advises: "In the same illness this Sacrament must not be repeated, unless it is long lasting and after the sick person has recovered he once again finds himself in danger of death."[3] This is almost a word for word repetition of CIC in can. 940,2 (1917), but with the omission of the phrase "unless it is long lasting" [i.e., the illness]. However, the recovery does not have to be perfect; it suffices if the sick person is no longer in the *proximate* danger of death. Then, if he remains in a *remote danger of death for some time,* when he again falls into the *proximate* danger, Extreme Unction can certainly be repeated, and in fact it ought to be; but if the *remote danger is brief,* it can hardly be said that the sick person has recovered, and therefore not all theologians and moralists concede that the Sacrament can be repeated.[4]

276. III. *The revival of Extreme Unction.* Generally the authors admit that only those Sacraments revive that are not repeatable; because otherwise a man receiving them with an impediment would be permanently deprived of the help intended by the Sacrament. Now Extreme Unction in a certain respect is not repeatable, inasmuch, namely, while the same danger of death continues this Sacrament cannot be repeated.

However, all the authors do not agree on the explanation of the intrinsic reason for the revival of Extreme Unction, since nothing physical remains from the Sacrament and it does not imprint a character. This difficulty is greater for those who defend a physical causality of the Sacraments; but for those who defend a moral disposition or causality, the solution can be much easier. Actually, when the Sacrament has been conferred, which is a moral whole and the vicarious action of Christ, there is present in the recipient a right granted *ex opere operato* to receive the sacramental graces needed in his illness; but an impediment hinders this right being fulfilled on the part of God. But once the impediment is removed, the right becomes operative again and continues as long as the danger of death does. Billot[5] and those

3. Tit. V c.1 n.14.
4. From the quoted documents of the Church, the opinion of P. Kern cannot be maintained when he says: "Extreme Unction, considering its value in the same illness *even when the same danger of death remains,* can be conferred frequently" (p. 338ff). He stresses very much the efficacy of Extreme Unction regarding the alleviation of spiritual and bodily illness.

   In the *Liber Sacramentorum* of St. Gregory the Great, we read that Extreme Unction is administered to the sick during seven continuous days; but this case was not universal, and it is not certain that Extreme Unction was administered each day as a repetition of the Sacrament; perhaps it was considered as only one Sacrament, or on one day as a Sacrament and on the other days as a sacramental.
5. 2,267f.

who defend dispositive intentional causality explain this by a remaining title seeking grace, and, once the impediment is removed, it revives.[6]

This Sacrament can revive frequently, that is, as often as the impediment is removed, during the same danger of death. For, it can happen, that having received Extreme Unction the sick person sins often and each time he confesses his sins; then Extreme Unction with justification always revives.

6. Van Noort explains this title thus: "The title, which the deprecative rite of the Sacrament aptly signifies, is the commendation of the sick person into the hands of the divine mercy made because of his illness itself. Therefore, the title remains as long as the illness remains. Hence it follows that this Sacrament revives in the same danger of death as often as the impediment is removed" (*De Sacramentis* 2 n.183).

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