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SACRAE THEOLOGIAE SUMMA

IVB

ON HOLY ORDERS AND MATRIMONY



ON THE LAST THINGS

by

Francis A P. Solá, S.J.

Joseph F. Sagüés, S.J.

THIRD EDITION

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Kenneth Baker, S.J.

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THEOLOGICAL NOTES

USED IN THIS "SACRAE THEOLOGIAE SUMMA"

Divine faith (de fide divina): what is contained in the word of God written or handed down. The opposite is: *an error in faith (error in fide).*

Divine and catholic faith (de fide divina et catholica): what is contained in the word of God written or handed and is proposed by the Church either by a solemn judgment or by the ordinary and universal Magisterium to be believed as divinely revealed. The opposite is: *heresy.*

Defined divine and catholic faith (de fide divina et catholica definita): what is contained in the word of God written or handed down and is proposed by the Church by a solemn judgment, that is, by the infallible Magisterium, exercised in an extraordinary way, either in an ecumenical council or by the Roman Pontiff speaking "ex cathedra" and to be believed as divinely revealed. [N.B. Even the Chapter Titles in Trent and Vatican I are considered as true *definitions.*]

Proximate to faith (fidei proxima): a truth that by an almost unanimous agreement of theologians is contained in the word of God written or handed down. The opposite is: *proximate to error or heresy.*

Faith based on the authority of the Church (fides ecclesiastica): a truth not formally revealed, which is proposed infallibly by the Magisterium of the Church. The opposite is: *error in ecclesiastical faith.* [Those who do not admit there is such a thing as ecclesiastical faith give a different theological note for such a truth.]

Catholic doctrine (doctrina catholica): a truth that is taught in the whole Church, but not always proposed infallibly (for example, what the Roman Pontiffs wish to teach explicitly in encyclical letters). The opposite is: *error in catholic doctrine.*

Theologically certain (theologice certa): a truth that in the theological schools is certainly recognized as necessarily connected with revealed truths; this connection can be either virtual or presupposition or final. The opposite is: *error in theology.*

A doctrine to be so held that its contrary is temerarious (doctrina ita tenenda, ut contraria sit temeraria): a truth proposed by the Roman Congregations, which proposition however does not enjoy the special approbation of the Roman Pontiff.

Common and certain in theology (communis et certa in theologia): what by the common agreement of theologians is taught in the schools as well founded. The opposite is: *false in theology, temerarious.*

Probable (probabilis): a theological opinion with a lesser grade of certainty.

ABBREVIATIONS

AAS.....Acta Apostolicae Sedis

ACO.....Acta Conciliorum Oecumicorum, iussuatque mandatosocietatis scientiarum Argentoratensis edidit Ed. Schwartz

AmCl.....L'Ami du Clergé

AnalSacraTarrac.....Analecta Sacra Tarraconensia

Ang.....Angelicum

Ant.....Antonianum

AnTh.....L'Année Théologique

Anthr.....Anthropos

ArchHistDoctrLitMA.....Archive d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Age

ArchTG.....Archivo Teológico Granadino

ASS.....Acta Sanctae Sedis

Bess.....Bessarione

Bibl.....Biblica

BiblZeitschr.....Biblische Zeitschrift

BullLitEccl.....Bulletin de Littérature Ecclésiastique

BullThAncMéd.....Bulletin de Théologie Ancienne t Mèdièvale

Cav.....F. Cavallera, S.J., Thesaurus Doctrinae Catholicae...

CE.....Ch. G. Herbermann and associates, The Catholic Encyclopedia

CiencTom.....La Ciencia Thomista

CitNouv.....Cité Nouvelle

CivCatt.....La Civilta Cattolica

CL.....Acta et Decreta sacrorum Conciliorum Recentiorum... Collectio Lacensis...

CollatBrug.....Collationes Brugenses

CollFranc.....Collectanea Franciscana

CollTheol.....Collectanea Theologica

Constr.....Construire

CSEL.....Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiastiorum Latinorum...Academiae... Vindobonensis

CTr.....Concilium Tridentinum... Ed. Societas Goerresiana

D.....H. Denzinger – Peter Hünermann, Enchiridion Symbolorum[43]

DACL.....F. Carrol – H. Leclercq- H. Marrou, Dictionnaire d'Archeologie chrétienne et de Liturgie

DAFC.....A. d'Alès, Dictionnaire Apologétique de la Foi Catholique

DB. ..... F. Vigouroux, Dictionnaire de la Bible
DBS ..... L. Pirot-A. Robert, Dictionnaire de la Bible Supplément
DivThom (Fr). ..... Divus Thomas. Freiburg i. der Schweiz
DivThom (Pi). ..... Divus Thomas. Piacenza
DivThom (W) ..... Divus Thomas (Vienna and Berlin)
DomSt ..... Dominican Studies
DTC ..... A. Vacant-E. Mangenot-E. Amann, Dictionnaire de Théologie catholique
EchOr ..... Echos d'Orient
Eccl ..... Ecclesia
EncCatt ..... Enciclopedia Cattolica
EphLitur ..... Ephemerides Liturgicae
EphThLov ..... Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienses
EstSBibl ..... Estudios Biblicos
EstEcl ..... Estudios Ecclesiasticos
EstFranc ..... Estudios Franciscanos
Et ..... Etudes
EtFranc ..... Etudes Franciscaines
FranzStud ..... Franziscanische Studien
GChS ..... Die griechischen cchristlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte, herausgegeben von der Kirchenväter-Commission der Königlichen preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften
Greg ..... Gregorianum
Hrd ..... J. Harduini, S.I., Conciliorum Collectio regia maxima
Iren ..... Irenikon
IrishThQuart ..... The Irish Theological Quarterly
JThSt ..... The Journal of Theological Studies
Kath ..... Der Katholik
Kch ..... C. Kirch, S.I.-L. Ueding, S.I., Enchiridion Fontium historiae ecclesiasticae antiquae[5]
KL ..... J. Hergenroeter, F. Kaulen, Wetzer und Welte's Kirchenlexikon[2]
LTK ..... M. Buchberger, Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche
LumVie ..... Lumière et Vie
Manr ..... Manresa
MedSt ..... Mediaeval Studies
MélScRel ..... Mélanges Thomistes
ML, MG ..... J. P. Migne, Patrologiae cursus completus Series prima latina. Series graeca.

MGh ..... Monumenta Germaniae historical inde ab Anno Christi quingentesimo usque ad Annum millesimum et quintengesimum, ed Societas aperiendis fintibus rerum germanicarum medii aevi. LL = Leges (s. 3 Concilia) SS = Scriptores

MiscCom ..... Miscellanea Comillas

Msi ..... J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum nova et amplissima collection

NouvRevTh ..... Nouvelle Revue Théologique

OrCh ..... Orientalia Christiana

OrChAn ..... Orientalia Christiana Analecta

OrChP ..... Orientalia Christiana Periodica

PalCl ..... Palestra del Clero

PerMorCanLit ..... Periodica de re morali canonica liturgica

PirClam ..... J. Pirot – A. Clamer, La Sainte Bible

R ..... M. J. Rouët de Journel, S.I., Enchiridion Patristicum[10-11]

RazFe ..... Razón y Fe

RechScRel ..... Recherches de Science Religieuse

RechThAncMéd ..... Recherches de Théologie ancienne et Médiévaleantische Theologie und Kirche

RelCul ..... Religión y Cultura

REPT ..... J.J. Herzog, Realencyclopädie für protestantische Theologie und Kirche

RevApol ..... Revue Apologétique

RevAug ..... Revue Augustienne

RevBibl ..... Revue Biblique

RevClerFr ..... Revue du Clergé Francais

RevEcclLiège ..... Revue Ecclésiastique de Liège

RevEspT ..... Revista Española de Teologïa

RevHistEccl ..... Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique

RevNeoSch ..... Revue Neo-Scholastique

RevQuestHist ..... Revue des Questions Historiques

RevScPhTh ..... Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques

RevScRel ..... Revue des Sciences Religieuses

RevThom ..... Revue Thomiste

RevUnivOtt ..... Revue de l'Université d'Ottawa

RivScTeol ..... Rivista de Scienze Teologiche

RömQschr ..... Römische Quartalschrift

Salm ..... Salmanticensis

SalTer ..... Sal Terrae

ScEccl ..... Sciences Ecclésiastiques
Schol ..... Scholastik
ScuoCatt ..... Scuola Cattolica
StAns ..... Studia Anselmiana
Stimm ..... Stimmen (aus Maria-Laach; ab anno 1915: der Zeit)
Stud ..... Studien
StudCath ..... Studia Catholica
StudFranc ..... Studi Francescani
SyllExcerpDiss ..... Sylloge excerptorum e dissertationibus ad gradum Doctoris in Sacra Theologia vel in Iure canonico consequendum conscriptis (Louvain)
ThGl ..... Theologie und Glaube
ThPraktQschr ..... Theologisch-praktische Quartalschrift
ThQschr ..... Theologische Quartalschrift
ThRev ..... Theologische Revue
ThSt ..... Theological Studies
TU ..... Texte und Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der altchristlichen Literatur
VerDom ..... Verbun Domini
VerVid ..... Verdad y Vida
VieSpir ..... Vie Spirituelle
XenThom ..... Xenia Thomistica
ZAscMyst ..... Zeitschrift für Aszese und Mystik
ZkathTh ..... Zeitschrift für KatholisdcheTheologie
ZNTWiss ..... Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde der älteren Kirche

BOOK I

On the Sacrament of Orders

INTRODUCTION

1. From the law of nature men must recognize their dependence on God and that they should give him the supreme worship of latria. From the beginning of the human race this took place both publicly and privately.[1] Older men or leaders of the community were deputed to perform the public worship and, as social life increased, a special class or *order* of men was established who then were called *priests.* In fact, in the Old Testament, among the Jewish people, God set aside the tribe of Levi, which was a priestly tribe, and from it priests were consecrated (Exod. 28:1; Num. 3:5).

Christ was constituted by God as a true priest forever (Heb. 5:6; Ps.110:5) and he offered to God the Father a perfect sacrifice on the wood of the Cross. The priestly office, therefore, is called the *priesthood*[2]*:* but by the priesthood of Christ every other priesthood was abolished that could be pleasing to God. For, God can determine what worship there should be and who should be its ministers; and no other worship and no other priesthood, except the one established by Him, can please Him. Therefore once the priesthood of Christ has been established, no other one is pleasing to God. Nevertheless, although Christ is a priest forever, and therefore has an eternal priesthood (Heb. 7:24), still since he does not live visibly on earth among men, His priesthood would not be visible to men unless he established another visible priesthood, namely, a power flowing from God or from Christ himself whereby some special men can exercise the priestly functions and offices.

2. Actually, in the Law of Christ or in the New Testament, a twofold priesthood is conceived and exists: visible and invisible, or also internal and external. *Invisible* priesthood is exercised by Christ, who is now the principal priest in the sacrifice of the Mass; the *visible* priesthood is exercised by the men who represent Christ in the Mass. The *internal* is the power itself, which is had by consecration and distinguishes priests from laymen by the internal imprinted character; the *external* is the exercise of this power in a public and sensible manner.

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1. See v.gr. Vigouroux, *Sacrifice:* DB 5,1311-1315. Many things are also said in the treatise on the Eucharist regarding the Sacrifice of the Mass.
2. On the priesthood see the bibliography in the treatise on the Eucharist.

"Moreover, the Sacred Scriptures make it clear and the tradition of the Catholic Church has always taught that this priesthood was instituted by the same Lord and Savior and that the power of consecrating, offering, and administering his Body and Blood, and likewise of remitting and retaining sins, was given to the Apostles and to their successors in the priesthood" (D 1764), as the Council of Trent teaches.

"But since the ministry of so holy a priesthood is something divine, in order that it might be exercised in a more worthy manner and with greater veneration, it was fitting that in the perfectly ordered disposition of the Church that there should be several distinct orders of ministers serving in the priesthood by virtue of their office and that they be so distributed that those already having the clerical tonsure should ascend through the minor to the major orders. For the Sacred Scriptures mention unmistakably not only the priests but also the deacons and teach in the most authoritative words what is chiefly to be observed in their ordination. And from the very beginning of the Church, the name of the following orders and the ministries proper to each one, namely, those of subdeacon, acolyte, exorcist, lector, and porter, are known to have been in use, though they were not of equal rank. For the subdiaconate is counted among the major orders by the Fathers, and the holy councils, in which very frequently we also read about the other lower orders" (D 1765).

It would be possible to explain in detail many points concerning the Sacrament of Orders, but since much of this pertains to moral theology, and some points refer to the sacraments in general and others points are handled in other treatises (as in the treatises on the Eucharist and on Penance), out task here is to determine the existence of this sacrament and its essence, and everything that concerns the sacrament in particular.

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CHAPTER I

On the existence of the Sacrament of Orders

ARTICLE I

ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDERS IN COMMON

Thesis 1. Orders is a true Sacrament of the New Law.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 34, a. 3; St. Bellarmine, c.1-4; Otten, p. 276; Sasse, th.3; Puig de la B., p. 660; Lennerz, p.77; Lercher-Umberg, n.685-692; Michel, *Ordre:* DTC 11,1193-1405.

4. Connection. Christ instituted a visible and external priesthood, for which not all Christians are deputed, but only some who have been especially designated.[1] This deputation takes place in the Church by a sacred external rite whose nature we will now investigate. But first of all we are saying here that we are dealing with a true Sacrament of the New Law.[2]

5. Definition of terms. *Order* according to St. Augustine is defined: "a disposition giving his own place to each one of those being equal and unequal."[3] But by metonymy the status or grades in things and persons are called an *order;* these have their origin in the disposition of things or persons.

The Church, as a society, is composed of different members or persons, among whom a certain relation or *order* must hold sway. Therefore, *the ecclesiastical or hierarchical order,* understood in its widest sense, is the same thing as the Church, or the ecclesiastical society. But "by divine institution in the Church there are clerics distinct from the laity" (CIC 107 [1917]), and so there are two social *orders* or grades in the Church: the clerical order and the lay order.

The *clerical* order is so called (from κλήρος = lot or destiny; κληρόω = I select by lot; κλητός = called, invited, chosen; κληρονομία = inheritance[4]; etc.) because by this choice those who are selected for this order or grade are separated from the society of the faithful. They are subdivided into dif-

1. John 15:16: "You did not choose me, but I chose you and appointed you."
2. See SThS IVA treatise I.
3. *De civitate Dei* 1,19 c.13 n.1: ML 41,640.
4. Concerning these words see Zorell, *Lexicon graecum N.T.*[6] (Paris 1931); W. Bauer, *Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch zu den schriften des N. Testament*[4] (1952); G. Kittel, *Theologische Wörterbuch zum N. Testament*[2] (Stuttgart 1949).

ferent orders or grades: into the order of priests, deacons, subdeacons, etc.; in this way the *holy hierarchy* in the proper sense is constituted *by reason of the order received.*

But concerning *jurisdiction,* which the higher orders or grades have, the sacred hierarchy constitutes these, from the divine institution, "the Pontificate is the highest and the episcopacy is subordinated to it; but from the institution of the Church there are also other grades" (CIC 108,3 [1917]).

6. In this thesis we are considering the hierarchy from the point of view of *orders.* And the *orders* by antonomasia are called various grades in the clerical state; and since the men in these grades are constituted by external rites or ceremonies, these rites are called *orders* or *ordinations.* Thus the word "order" can be taken in various ways:

a) for the ecclesiastical hierarchy; b) *actively* (= ordination) for the action or rite whereby someone is constituted in a definite grade; c) *passively*, for the power conferred in such an ordination.

Order taken actively (here we are treating only this meaning), is defined in this way by St. Thomas: "Order is a seal of the Church, whereby spiritual power is conferred on the person ordained,"[5] or it can also be said that it is a sacred rite whereby spiritual power is conferred in order to perform sacred functions.

The grades or *orders* in the Church are distinct: Bishop, Priest, Deacon, Subdeacon, Acolyte, Exorcist, Lector, Porter; one ascends through these grades beginning with the tonsure, which is not an order. But for an *order* as such to be a sacrament, it is not required that all the grades or orders be a sacrament. It suffices that some of these ordinations are a true sacrament so that we can defend the existence of the Sacrament of Orders. So we will proceed like this: we will prove that an ordination is a sacrament; and then we will consider the individual ordinations.

7. Adversaries. Most *Protestants* reject both a sacred and true hierarchy and in particular the Sacrament of Orders.[6] Luther admitted only a spiritual priesthood common to all Christians, and he expressly denied an external priesthood: "Be certain of this, and do not allow yourself to be deceived by any persuasion, that there is no visible and external priesthood in the New Testament, except what has been established through Satan by human deceits. For us there is only the one and true priesthood of Christ, by

5. *Suppl.* q. 34, a. 2.
6. See V.Gr. C. Crivelli, *Los Protestantes en la America Latina.*

which he offered himself for us and all of us with himself."[7] "The Church of Christ does not know about this sacrament and it was invented by the Church of the Pope; for, not only does it not have any promise of grace stated anywhere, but also the New Testament mentions not even one word about it. But it is ridiculous to say that is a sacrament of God, which can never be demonstrated as something established by God. I do not think that rite should be condemned which has been celebrated for many centuries, but that in holy things I do not want human inventions to be established, and it is not right to propose something as divinely ordained which has not been divinely ordained, lest we seem to be ridiculous to our adversary."[8]

Calvin, although not unwillingly, allowed Orders to be called a sacrament, but he did not want to number it among the sacraments, because "it is not ordinary or common among all the faithful, but it is a special rite for a certain function."[9]

Also Melanchthon was not consistent, for he both admitted and then denied the sacramentality of Orders.[10] Moreover, there is not one opinion of *modern Protestants* on this point.[11]

Modernists want to derive the Catholic doctrine on the Sacrament of Orders from an ancient praxis according to which someone presided over religious or liturgical meetings; the presider gradually exercised some priestly functions, until they arrived at the idea of a sacrament of orders (D 3449).

8. Doctrine of the Church. *Lateran Council II* together with the sacraments of Baptism, Eucharist and Matrimony, mentions "the priesthood and the other ecclesiastical orders" (D 860).

Florence, in the Decree for the Armenians, likewise lists seven sacraments; it cites and briefly explains each one of them (D 1326).

The Council of Trent against the Reformers, after it defined the existence of the visible and external priesthood (cn. 1) and the other orders, major and minor, by which one progresses to the priesthood (cn. 2), declares that Orders is a Sacrament: "If anyone says that orders or sacred ordination is not truly and properly a sacrament instituted by Christ the Lord or that it is a kind of human invention devised by men inexperienced in ecclesiastical matters or that it is only a kind of rite by which are chosen the ministers of the word of God and of the sacraments, let him be anathema" (D 1773).

7. Luther, *De abroganda Missa privata,* Opera omnia, ed. Weimar, 8,311-412.
8. *De Captivitate babylonica. De Ordine.* You will find many texts in Lennerz, *op.cit.,* n.171.
9. Calvin, *Institutionum* l.4 c.19 n.28; see c.14 n.20.
10. *Realencyklopedie für Prot. Theol.* 11^2,76.
11. C. Crivelli, *Los Protestantes en la America Latina* passim.

This doctrine is explained in chapter 3 of session XIII, and it was already defined in cn. 1 (D 1601) of session VII on the Sacraments in general.

St. Pius X, in the Decree *Lamentabili,* condemned this proposition of the Modernists: "When the Christian supper gradually assumed the nature of a liturgical action, those who customarily presided over the supper acquired the sacerdotal character" (D 3449).

Pius XII in the Encyclical *Mystici Corporis* says: "For the social needs of the Church Christ has provided in a particular way by the institution of two other Sacraments. Through Matrimony... Through Holy Orders men are set aside and consecrated to God, to offer the Sacrifice of the Eucharistic Victim, to nourish the flock of the faithful with the Bread of Angels and the food of doctrine, to guide them in the way of God's commandments and counsels and to strengthen them with all other supernatural helps."[12] And in the Encyclical *Mediator Dei:* "That is why the visible, external priesthood of Jesus Christ is not handed down indiscriminately to all members of the Church in general, but is conferred on designated men, through what may be called the spiritual generation of holy orders. This latter, one of the seven sacraments, not only imparts the grace appropriate to the clerical function and state of life, but imparts an indelible 'character' besides, indicating the sacred ministers' conformity to Jesus Christ the Priest and qualifying them to perform those official acts of religion by which men are sanctified and God is duly glorified in keeping with the divine laws and regulations."[13]

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith,* as is clear from the cited documents.

9. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1. Three main texts are usually quoted:

a) From 2 Tim. 1:6: *Hence I remind you to kindle the gift of God that is within you through the laying on of my hands; for God did not give us a spirit of timidity but a spirit of power and self-control.*

Exegesis of the text.[14] Regarding *textual criticism* it is to be noted: in some codices of lesser importance "the grace of *Christ*" is read for "*the grace of God,*" and ὑπομίμνήσκω in place of ἀναμιμνήσκω, I remind you.

Regarding the meaning, the following points should be noted: St. Paul begins his letter to his beloved Timothy, praising his ardent and sincere faith; he exhorts him to preserve and arouse the grace of God, which he has, and to proclaim with fidelity the Gospel received from Paul himself. He

12. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 202.
13. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 538-539.
14. See Knabenbauer, at this place.

says he should conduct himself as befits a Bishop, that is, as a good Pastor, vigilant and holy. Therefore, after he speaks about the real faith of Timothy, which is firm and stable, he goes on to say: *Hence,* that is, "because I know that you do not have pretended faith, therefore *I remind you.*"[15]

I remind you [ἀναμιμνήσκω or ὑπομίμνήσκω] really means to call to mind. But what St. Paul wants Timothy to remember is the fittingness of stirring up the grace that he has. – *To kindle* = to stir up, or better, that you *as it were vivify* or *revive* [ἀναζωπυρείν is used for a fire under the ashes that is almost extinct and which is stirred up by blowing on it and then it revives].[16] So Timothy must stir up that grace, which he has, the way an almost dead fire is restarted, lying under the ashes. -- *The gift of God that is within you,* χάρισμα. Paul does not use the word χάρις. However, χάρισμα[17] does not always mean *charism,* or charismatic grace (*gratia gratis data*), by opposition to *gratifying grace* (*gratia gratificans*) or sanctifying grace. For, *charism* can signify both, and the context here requires that it be habitual grace, which can be stirred up by the will of the one possessing it; this does not happen when the *charism* is a special gift, such as the gift of prophecy, which is given by God when, to whom and how he wills, independently of the will of the recipient. When Paul says that this grace is kindled like a fire he seems to be alluding to the *gift of the Holy Spirit* (Rom. 12:11; Acts 2:3; 18:25); and Paul urged Christians *not to quench the Spirit* (1 Thess. 5:19). In Rom. 5:13 the word χάρισμα is translated in the Vulgate as *gift; but the free gift is not like the trespass,* where doubtless the *free gift* is sanctifying or habitual grace, as is certain from the treatise on the Elevating God and original sin. Therefore in our place it can very well be translated: *kindle the gift of God that is within you,* as St. Ambrose does.[18]

It is more clear from the following that *grace* is not transient but permanent. For, St. Paul says: *that is within you through the laying on of my hands.* Such grace, which remains in Timothy, like fire under the ashes, can only be *internal* grace; *and it is the grace of God,* or supernatural.[19] He has this grace through the imposition of the hands of Paul: διά τής ἐπιθέσεως τών χειρών μου. Evidently it concerns some kind of rite, which consists in the imposition of hands, whereby that internal grace is infused into the soul of Timothy. For, διά signifies a true causality, or the means of that infusion of grace. -- *The imposition of hands* is not an *elevation of hands* (which is

15. Estius, at this place, ed. Vivès² (Paris 1891) 2,733.
16. Prat, *La Théologie de S. Paul* 2 c.11,4; J. Bover, *La Teologia de S. Pablo* (B.A.C.): Lennerz, n.177.
17. χάρισμα, χάρις see F. Zorell, W. Bauer, *loc.cit.*
18. St. Ambrose, *In Epist. 2 ad Tim.:* ML 17,513.
19. In the Council of Trent some Fathers raised a question about the grace, which is signified in this text; but the Council retained the citation of this place, which it understood to be about sanctifying grace.

usually called χειροντονία), but a true imposition (ἐπιθεσις).[20] The words χειροντονία, χειροντονεῖν, χειροθισία, χειροθητεῖν, ἐπιθεσις τῶν χειρῶν, occur often in the later writers, but in the New Testament the only ones found are χειροτονεῖν and ἐπιθεσις τῶν χειρῶν, that is to extend the hands and the imposition of hands. If we collect together the places in which in Acts and in the Pauline Letters *the imposition of hands* is found, this is what we will have:

χειροτονεῖν is found twice: Acts 14:23, *And when they had appointed* [χειροτονήσοντες] *elders for them in every church...,* where what he is talking about is a true priestly ordination, or about the election of those who are to be in charge of the churches or communities. And 2 Cor. 8:19: *We are sending the brother...* [who] *has been appointed* [χειροτονηθείς] *by the churches to travel with us...;* similarly, this can also concern a priestly ordination so that the brother might be a help to Paul in his ministry, or it could designate only a particular election because Paul had asked the churches to give him a companion for his journey.

Ἐπιθεσις or ἐπιτιθημι τάς χείρας appears often: Acts 6:6 on the election [= ordination?] of deacons; 8:17 on the confirmation of the Samaritans by Peter and John; 9:12.17 on Ananias who, by the imposition of his hands, cured Saul of his blindness; 19:6 about the confirmation conferred by Paul; 28:8 on the cure of Publius worked by Paul; Heb. 6:2 probably about confirmation.[21] To these can be added 1 Tim. 4:14 and 5:22 which we will treat later.

After having compared these texts, it now becomes clear that there is no perfect distinction between χειροτονέω and ἐπιθεσις, so that we would be able to say that in virtue of the word χειροτονέω it does not signify a priestly ordination[22]; for, an action designated by this word can also be a true priestly ordination (in Acts 14:23 and 2 Cor. 8:19). But on the other hand ἐπιθεσις τῶν χειρῶν is used both in places in which it seems to be dealing with an ordination (Acts 6:6; 1 Tim. 4:14; 5:22; 2 Tim. 1:6), and also in places in which it is certainly not dealing with ordination (Acts 8:17; 19:6; Heb. 6:2) but with Confirmation and also with a bodily healing (Acts 9:12.17). Therefore from all of this it can be concluded by reason of just the word itself that another meaning besides the imposition of hands

20. In addition to the lexicons of Zorell and Bauer mentioned above, J. Coppens can be consulted, *L'imposition des mains et les rites connexes dans le N.T. et dans l'Eglise ancienne* (Paris 1923) 134-135.

21. Thus, among recent authors, Pirot, *La Sainte Bible*[3] 12 (Paris 1951) 314; J. Coppens, *op.cit.*, 194-195; and commonly among the commentators.

22. "Gradually χειροτονεῖν among the Greeks became the technical term of "ordination" by the sacrament of Orders for deacons, priests and bishops; hence... it is called [*Const. Apost.* 8,28, 2-3]: ἐπισκοπος χειροθετεῖ, χειροτονεῖ; πρεσβύτερος χειροθετεῖ, οὐ χειροτονεῖ" (Zorell, *Lexicon Graeco-latinum N.T.*[6] 1455). But if all the places, which in the *Apostolic Constitutions contain the words* χειροτονέω, χειροθετέω are compared with each other, it will appear that it is not so fixed that it is a law which is established in the *Constitutions.*

for the episcopate cannot be excluded.

But *by reason of the context,* it certainly must be understood to be about ordination. For, he is concerned here with the imposition of hands by St. Paul, by which the internal grace of God has been given, or the supernatural gift of the Holy Spirit, which remains in the soul of Timothy. Because of that he was deputed for the episcopal ministry (since it is for this that Paul exhorts Timothy) and he has the spirit of power, and love and self-control, which are the virtues St. Paul requires for a Bishop (1 Tim. 3); also, he can give testimony to the Lord (v. 8), guard the deposit of faith (v. 14), and labor like a good soldier of Christ (2:3), etc.

In this place he is not talking about *Confirmation.*[23] For although it is true that what St. Paul says can, at the first appearance, be referred to confirmation: *for God did not give us a spirit of timidity but a spirit of power and love and self-control* (see Rom. 8:15: *For you did not receive* [that is, in confirmation] *the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear...*), nevertheless those words are also suitable for priestly and episcopal ordination; and furthermore, in reference to Timothy they cannot allude to Confirmation, because Timothy was not baptized by St. Paul (Acts 16:1), and so he was not confirmed by him, since at that time confirmation was given immediately with baptism.

Therefore the necessary meaning of this text of 2 Tim. 1:6 is: Paul exhorts Timothy to stir up the grace that he received in the episcopal ordination in order to exercise his office in a worthy manner.

10. b) From 1 Tim. 4:14: *Do not neglect the gift you have, which was given you by prophetic utterance when the elders laid their hands upon you.*

Exegesis of the text. This text agrees with the previous one in 2 Tim. 1:6, as is clear, only with this difference: that in 2 Tim. he talks about the imposition of the hands Paul, but now there are several elders, or rather the presbyterate,[24] who impose their hands. But in this matter there is no contradiction; since even now in a priestly ordination, not only the Bishop, but also the assisting priests impose their hands on the newly ordained.[25] And it is not a problem that the concern here is with the ordination of a bishop; for, the presbyterate can also include bishops, since it is a generic term to designate the group of those who preside over communities. But even if it were dealing only with priests, there is no difficulty in the fact that (espe-

23. Thus Lercher, n.688; Estius, at this place; and others, like Pirot, *op.cit.*, 12,234, think that the virtues mentioned in v. 7 are not due to Ordination, but are virtues common to all Christians.

24. In the Codex Sinaiticus it reads, from the first hand πρεσβυτέρου, but another hand corrected that to πρεσβυτερίου. All the other codices, except 69 got., read *presbyterii.*

25. Knabenbauer, at this place; J. Coppens, *L'imposition des mains...* 134.

cially in the first periods of the Church) priests impose their hands in the consecration of a bishop; for, such an imposition is not for validity, but for the solemnity of the occasion; the presbyteral imposition of hands in the consecration of a missionary bishop, when three bishops cannot be present, is done even in our days because of an apostolic indult.[26]

The imposition of hands and *grace* should be understood in the same way as they are in the text quoted above; for the same words recur: ἐπιθεσις τών χειρών and χάρισμα.[27] Therefore he is talking about the imposition in reference to the episcopacy and to internal grace. But when he says *with* (*cum*) the imposition of hands, in place of *by* (*per*), the meaning is the same, for the meaning is not changed, although the causality it not so clearly expressed. Moreover, since the word *per* is more concrete that the preposition *cum*, the latter must be explained by the former, and not the other way around.

By prophetic utterance, διά προφητείας, causes a difficulty, because according to the Greek text it can be translated: *by prophecy* (genitive singular) or *by prophecies* (accusative plural), since both forms are grammatically the same. The exegetes do not fully agree with each other. Corluy summarizes the opinions this way: "Some... take it for a genitive singular, others for an accusative plural. Those who admit the *genitive* form also are divided into two parts. For, either they keep the basic meaning of the preposition διά and want *prophecy* here to designate the sacred formula of ordination which *with* the imposition of hands produced grace in Timothy (Bisping); ... But this meaning of the word προφητεία is quite unusual. – Or they think that διά with the genitive case can also mean *according to,* and therefore that the meaning is: *according to the divine oracle uttered concerning you*, namely, whereby Paul was directed to ordain Timothy.... Those who admit the *accusative* form translate διά as *because of* ; hence it means: *because of the divine oracle uttered concerning you.* Solid probability is not lacking in any of these opinions.[28] If this text is compared with 1:18 in the same letter to Timothy: This charge I commit to you, Timothy, my son, *in accordance with the prophetic utterances* κατά τάς... έπι σέ προφητείας; here it would not be out of place to understand διά προφητείας as being in the accusative plural = according to or on account of prophecy. However, in whatever way it is understood the meaning is sufficiently

26. Pius IV, in the letter of August 11, 1562, granted this permission for India (*Collectanea S. Congr. De Propag. Fide* [Rome 1839] p.408, note 1; see n.1210); Alexander VII, in the Letter *Onerosa,* February 4, 1664, in Sinas (De Martinis, *Ius Pontificium de Propaganda Fide* I,1 341); Clement XI, Letter November 26, 1718 in Benedict XIV, *De Synodo* 13,13 n.2-10.

27. J. Corluy, *Specilegium dogmatico-biblicum* 2,462-463.

28. Generally the exegetes do not disagree on this place; see J. Coppens, *L'imposition des mains...* 133-134.

clear: St. Paul exhorts Timothy to guard the supernatural and internal grace he has received in his episcopal ordination; Paul was moved to confer this ordination by a charismatic illumination by which Timothy had been designated (perhaps through some prophets, see Acts 13:1); otherwise, because of the early age of the youth, Paul would not have ordained him for such an important office. From this it is clear that Timothy did not accept the grace through (*per*) (in a causal way) a prophecy, but from the imposition of hands which followed a prophetic charism of election. By reason of the grammatical order of the words, since first there was a prophecy, or prophecies, and afterwards, as a consequence, the imposition of hands, St. Paul rightly says: through a prophecy, or because of the prophecies with the imposition of hands; that is: *grace was given to you in that imposition of hands, which was done for you because of the prophecies.* The difficulties, which because of the grammatical form can be raised against this text, disappear if it is compared with the previous text of 2 Tim. 1:6. Hence the concern, also in this place, is with an episcopal ordination.

11. c) From 1 Tim. 5:22: *Do not be hasty in the laying on of hands.* A few exegetes,[29] with Galtier,[30] think that this laying on of hands refers to the reconciliation of sinners. But most Catholic and Protestant authors think it has to do with the rite of ordination. For, the context requires this, since he is speaking about priests in the preceding and following verses. Moreover, the imposition of hands for such absolution does not appear in any other place in the N.T; nor is it certain that it was used so quickly in the Church. But if it had done that, doubtless the Church would not have changed the apostolic rite of absolution for the Sacrament of Penance. Therefore, St. Paul seems to recommend, in this place,[31] to Timothy that he proceed carefully in the selection and ordination or priests and of those who should preside over communities or churches.[32]

12. Argument. Therefore, from these texts we argue: St. Paul mentions a sensible and external rite, by which internal grace is signified and conferred and Timothy is deputed to exercise the sacred ministries; and this rite was instituted by Christ. But all of this agrees with the notion of a

29. See I Behm, *Die Handauflegung im Urchristentum* (1911) 53-59; he cites many exegetes.
30. P. Galtier, *La réconciliation des pécheurs dans Saint Paul:* RechScRel 3 (1912) 448-460; Id., *Imposition des mains:* DTC 7,1306-1313.
31. The Fathers at the Council of Trent in ch. 3 (D 1765) omitted a reference to this text. And we do not contend that it has the same value as the previous texts that we used to prove the thesis.
32. There are not lacking authors who also include in the argument of Acts 13:2-3, where the concern is with the imposition of hands on Paul and Barnabas by which they are designated for the apostolic ministry, after they had been chosen by the Holy Spirit. But this text is more difficult; see Lercher, n.688,4.

sacrament (as is clear from the definition). Therefore, in these texts a true sacrament is designated (which, clearly, is the Sacrament of Orders).

Proof of the major. It is a *sensible and external rite,* that is, the imposition of hands not of Paul alone but also of the Presbyters (although the imposition of the hands of the Apostle is sufficient). *It is a symbol of grace*, because the imposition of hands was already a rite used in the O.T. in order to signify the conferring of some supernatural gift,[33] and in general in meant the granting of some power. But since that power given in order to carry out the priestly or episcopal office is necessarily a supernatural power (see the treatise on the Eucharist, n. 31f.), the imposition of hands signifies this spiritual power, or grace. Furthermore, the Apostle himself speaks about this grace, which remains in the soul, and as we said above it cannot be a transient charism, but must be an internal habitual grace. It is also certain from the words of the Apostle, who attributes this grace to the rite and not to the faith or virtue of Timothy, that this grace is conferred *by the performance of the rite itself* (*ex opere operato*). And what the rite confers is not just a grace or *the gift of a task*; for, this cannot be stirred up like a fire; and St. Paul speaks about the grace conferred by the rite, which can be kindled or grow cool or be more or less extinguished. It is evident that the *institution* of this rite comes from Christ, because no man can institute a rite with which internal grace or some supernatural gift is infallibly connected. Finally, this institution is *in perpetuity,* because priests and bishops in the Church who exercise the sacred offices will always be necessary.

Note. From this it is apparent that Christ *in general* instituted the imposition of hands as the rite suitable for designating the handing on of the power and grace of Orders; but from that it does not follow that he determined it *in particular*. But this is proved from what is said in the treatise on the Sacraments in general, and from the fact that the Apostles begin immediately to do this.

13. Proof from tradition. In general the holy Fathers put Ordination in the same category as Baptism; both are unrepeatable sacraments; the Holy Spirit is conferred by both. They also compare it with the Eucharist; and they preach the same things about Orders that they do about the other sacraments, especially with regard to what pertains to the conferring of grace. Here are a few examples:

Firmilianus Caesar: "... all power and grace in the Church is established where the elders preside, who have the power of baptizing and of imposing hands and of ordaining. For, just as a heretic cannot ordain or impose

33. I. Behm, *op.cit.*, 121-140.

hands, so neither can he baptize."[34]

St. Basil: "The first separatists had received their ordination from the Fathers, and possessed the spiritual gift by the laying on of their hands" (R 919).

St. Gregory of Nyssa: "Likewise the same power of the word present in the consecration of the Eucharist and of the Holy Oil also makes a priest holy, consecrated and dignified, separated by his new blessing from the regular community. For, since yesterday and before that he was one man belonging to a multitude, suddenly he is made a preceptor, a presider, a teacher of piety and a protector of the hidden mysteries, and those things happen to him when he is not changed in bodily form; but in what concerns his external looks, he is who he was but with an invisible virtue and grace now having an invisible soul transformed into something better."[35]

St. Jerome: "If in his faith, while baptizing, he was not able to harm the one baptized, so in his faith, while consecrating a priest, he did not defile him."[36]

St. Augustine: "No reason is given why he, who cannot lose his baptism, can lose the right of conferring baptism. For, both are sacraments and both are given to a man by a consecration; the former when he is baptized, the latter when he is ordained; therefore in the Catholic Church it is not allowed to repeat either of them... But if we do something evil, they explain how the sacrament of the baptized cannot be lost, and the sacrament of Orders can be lost; since they say 'one leaving the Church does not lose his baptism, but he does lose the right of conferring baptism.' For, if both are sacraments, which no one doubts, why is the former not lost and the latter is lost? No injury should be done to either sacrament."[37]

St. Gregory the Great: "We receive the sacraments of the Church externally from the teachers of the Church, but we are strengthened interiorly by the power of the sacraments by almighty God. Certainly those who receive this grace, are changed as it were by the reception of a new heart, because those whom the Holy Spirit strengthens with his grace he transforms immediately into what they were not."[38]

The thesis is confirmed from the fact that all the Oriental sects, which separated themselves from the Catholic Church in the 5th century, number sacred ordination among the sacraments.[39] And the perpetual agreement of

34. *Epist.* 75 n.7 (among the works of St. Cyprian) ed. Hartel, 814.
35. *Orat. de Baptismate Christi:* MG 46,582.
36. *Dialog. contra Luciferianos* n.11: ML 23,166.
37. *Contra Epist. Parmen.* 1.2 c.13 n.28-30: ML 43,70.
38. *In I Reg.* l.4 c.5: ML 79,299.
39. Denzinger, *Ritus Orientales* 1,129.

theologians on the point is no less constant.

14. Theological reasoning. Christ instituted a visible and external society (as is proved in the treatise on the Church), with a hierarchy to which he entrusted the office of governing his society and dispensing the sacraments instituted by him. Indeed it was fitting that the administrators of these sacraments should be conformed to Christ, the author of the Sacraments, and therefore also that they should have the spiritual power of conferring these sacraments. But for this task it was also fitting that these administrators of the mysteries of God (1 Cor. 4:1) should be empowered by an external sign with the necessary authority and constituted in the hierarchical order necessary in the Church. But for this purpose some kind of sacrament had to be instituted, which would produce these effects. Therefore it was necessary that the Sacrament of Orders should be instituted.

15. Objection. The imposition of hands χειροτονεῖν means to cast a vote. Therefore it does not signify an ordination.

I distinguish the antecedent. χειροτονεῖν means to cast a vote, *exclusively, denied;* it is also used for this, *I subdistinguish:* and in the cited texts in our proof it means to cast a vote, *denied;* it means something else, namely, ordination, *conceded.* We already explained before the argument what the word χειροτονεῖν means. And we did not insist on the word itself, but on the context. Moreover, in the cited texts the word χειροτονεῖν is not used, but ἐπιθεσις τών χειρών, which is not a technical term to signify the act of voting.

16. Scholium. *On the priesthood of all Christians.* St. Peter is speaking about all the faithful when he says: *And like living stones be yourselves built into a spiritual house, to be a holy priesthood, to offer spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God through Jesus Christ.*[40] *But you are a chose race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, God's own people, that you may declare the wonderful deeds of him who called you out of darkness into his marvelous light. Once you were no people but now you are God's people* (1 Pet. 2:5.9-10). And St. John says: Jesus Christ *has made us a kingdom and priests to his God and Father* (Rev. 1:6), *he has made us a kingdom and priests to our God* (Rev. 5:10). The holy Fathers also have much on this, especially by either quoting these texts or commenting on them, concerning the priesthood of Christians.

However, two errors concerning this teaching have crept in: 1) Of the *Protestants,* who admit no other priesthood besides this one common to all the faithful, and therefore they reject the Sacrament of Orders. 2) Of some *moderns,* who, while excessively exalting the priesthood of Christians, think that the participation of the faithful is necessary

40. For the Greek text a more accurate translation would be: *Et ipsi tanquam lapides vivi aedificamini domus spiritualis in sacerdotium sanctum.*(And you yourselves like living stones are built as a spiritual house for a holy priesthood).

for the validity of the Eucharistic Sacrifice. Against this last error, which can easily contribute to the fostering of a false piety, Pius XII wanted us to be on our guard: "For there are today... those who, approximating to errors long since condemned, teach that in the New Testament by the word 'priesthood' is meant only that priesthood which applies to all who have been baptized... Hence they assert that the people are possessed of a true priestly power, while the priest only acts in virtue of an office committed to him by the community. Wherefore, they look on the Eucharistic Sacrifice as a 'concelebration,' in the literal meaning of the term, and consider it more fitting that priests should 'concelebrate' with the people present than that they should offer the sacrifice privately when the people are absent. It is superfluous to explain how captious errors of this sort completely contradict the truths which we have stated above, when treating of the place of the priest in the Mystical Body of Jesus Christ."[41]

Therefore there are two kinds of priesthood in the Catholic Church: the external priesthood with which only certain ones are endowed and they are so necessarily by means of the Sacrament of Orders; and another internal, moral, mystical priesthood, resulting from the moral union of all the faithful (especially of the just) with Christ the Head. Rightly St. Augustine said: "They will be priests of God and of Christ, and they will reign with Him for a thousand years; of course this has not been said about bishops and priests alone, who in the proper sense are already called priests in the Church; but just as we call all of them Christians because of their mystical charism, so we call all of them priests because we are all members of the one Priest. About these the Apostles Peter said that they are *a holy people, a royal priesthood.*"[42] Surely, by Baptism all the faithful are joined to Christ and become as it were his Body. Christ is truly a Priest and at the same time a Victim for sins, a victim once on the wood of the Cross offered with a bloody sacrifice, and daily by the ministry of priests sacrificed again in an unbloody way.[43] Therefore the faithful, being united to Christ the Head, together with Him, offer the divine Victim to God the Father, and they must offer themselves mystically in a perpetual sacrifice; indeed, "with faith, which is inflamed with charity, on the altar of their minds they offer spiritual sacrifices to God, whereby in general all their good and virtuous actions, which are referred to the glory of God, must be numbered."[44]

41. Encyclical "*Mediator Dei*": AAS 39 (1947) 553-557.
42. *De civitate Dei* 1,20 c.10: ML 41,676.
43. *Council of Trent* sess.22 ch.1f. (D 1739-1742).
44. *Catechismus Romanus* p.2 c.7 n.23.

ARTICLE II

ON THE SACRAMENTAL ORDERS

Thesis 2. The Order of priests has the true and proper nature of a Sacrament.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 37, a. 2; St. Bellarmine, ch. 5f.; Sasse, 296-297; Pesch, 303-307; Otten, 285-294; Puig de la B., n.1007-1012; Lercher-Umberg, n.693-699; Michel, *Ordre:* DTC 11,1381-1385.

17. Connection. In the Latin Church generally seven orders are enumerated (and if the episcopacy is considered separately from the priesthood, eight) that are conferred by sacred rites. Therefore, since it is certain that Orders is a sacrament, immediately the question is raised, namely, whether all the rites have the nature of a sacrament, or only some of them. We respond in this thesis by saying that the priesthood surely has the nature of sacramentality; for the time being we prescind from the other orders.

18. Definition of terms. According to St. Thomas, in the sacrament of Orders there is a division "not of an integral whole into its parts, nor of a universal whole, but of a potential whole, the nature of which is that the notion of the whole is found to be complete in one part, but in the others by some participation thereof."[1] Therefore, the complete power, which the sacrament of Orders (taken as one potential whole) confers, is found in the episcopacy, which is as it were the summit or perfection of the priesthood; but in the other Orders a partial power is conferred. However, each rite, which has the nature of sacramentality, in its own sacramental order is something complete, conferring, that is, the whole power belonging to that order.

Presbyters (πρεσβύτεροι[2]) are designated by name in the N.T.: a) older men or seniors: *But when they heard it they went away, beginning with the eldest,* ἀπο τών πρεσβυτέρων (John 8:9); *youths* or *adolescents* stand in contrast to them;

b) *the elders*, or those who have lived for a long time, especially the old doctors of the Law: *The Pharisees... do not eat unless they wash their hands, observing the tradition of the elders,* τών πρεσβυτέρων (Mark 7:3).

c) those who were *constituted in some office* which was distinguished by the name of πρεσβύτερος. Some from the Sanhedrin were of this kind.

d) then also called "presbyters" were those Christian men who *presided*

1. *Suppl.* q. 37, a. 1 ad 2.
2. F. Zorell, *Lexicon graeco-latinum N.T.* πρεσβύτερος; W. Bauer, *Griechisch-Deutsch Wörterbuch,*

over communities, administered the sacraments, etc. (passim in Acts). It is not easy to know whether these presiders over churches were bishops or simple priests. For, at that time bishops also were designated with the name of *presbyter*. But already in the time of St. Ignatius (+ 107) a distinction was made between a bishop and a priest (R 48, 49, 50, etc.); but common to both was the name of *priest;* and although gradually the name of priest was given only to presbyters, still up until the 10th century the same name was often used also for bishops. Therefore, almost up to the 10th century "priest" without any additions was applied to bishops, but presbyters were called priests of the second order,[3] of a lesser order,[4] second priests,[5] presbyters constituted in the second order,[6] gifted with the office of second rank.[7] But after the 10th century, the name of "priest" without any additions was reserved for the presbyters.

19. *The function* or office of a presbyter formerly was this: To consecrate the Holy Eucharist, to confer solemn Baptism, to absolve from sins and from penances, and also to impose penances; to administer the Sacrament of Extreme Unction, to preach, to bless and to help the bishop in governing the diocese.[8] In the *Apostolic Constitutions* the assignment given to a presbyter is to teach, to offer sacrifice, to baptize, to bless the people.[9] According to the *Canons of Hippolytus,* "a bishop in all things is equal to a presbyter, except for the name of the Chair and Ordination, because the power of ordaining is not given to presbyters."[10] The *Didascalia Apostolorum* contains a prayer to be recited in the ordination of a priest in which it asks "that he assist and govern your people with a pure heart."[11]

The present-day *Roman Pontifical* says: "It is necessary for the priest to offer, to bless, to preside, to preach and to baptize"; and afterwards the power of "forgiving and retaining sins" is given to the priest.[12] By the word "to offer" is understood here what later is said more clearly in the handing over of the chalice with wine and the paten with the host: "Receive the power to offer sacrifice to God, and to celebrate Masses both for the living and for the dead"; and in the prayer after the handing of the instruments:

3. St. Leo the Great, *Serm.* 48,1: ML 54,298.
4. St. Gregory the Great, *In Ezech.* 1,2 hom.10,13: ML 76,1065.
5. Innocent I *to Decentius* c.3 (D 215).
6. Optatus Milev., *Contra Schism. Donat.* 1.1 c.13: ML 11,910.
7. *Pontificale Romanum,* Formula Ordinationis.
8. See Many, *Praelectiones Canonicae de Sacra Ordinatione* 54-56.
9. *Const. Apostol.* 3,19,20; ed. Funck, 217.
10. Cn.32. Duchesne, *Les Origines du Culte chrétien* 533. See *Sacramentarium Serapionis;* ed. Funk, 189f.
11. *Didascaliae Apostolorum fragmenta Veronensia* 71; ed. Hauler, 108-109.
12. *Pontificale Romanum* p.1. *De Ordinatione Presbyteri,* in the sermon of the bishop to the newly ordained.

"in the service of your people [O Lord] let them transform with a spotless blessing the bread and wine into the Body and Blood of your Son."

To bless here refers not only to blessings, which take place in the conferring and application of sacramentals, or for some official prayer of the priest in the name of the Church, but also for a matrimonial blessing, for the administration of Extreme Unction and for the Sacrament of Penance.

To preside means to help the bishop and to take his place in governing a parish. In our time priests help bishops much more than they did in the early Church.

To preach refers to the office priests have of teaching the faithful Christian doctrine, both in solemn sermons and in homilies, and in teaching catechism to children and to adults. In ancient times, normally priests were not allowed to preach in the presence of the Bishop, except for a special reason or delegation.

Finally, *to baptize* solemnly pertains per se to all priests, by reason of their ordination, "but its conferral is reserved to the pastor or to another priest of the same parish, or to a priest by permission of the local Ordinary, which in a case of necessity can be legitimately presumed" (CIC 738,1; see 462,1 [1917]). Something similar is said about *Extreme Unction*: "The ordinary minister is the pastor of the place where the sick person lives; but in a case of necessity, or with the permission at least reasonably presumed of the same pastor or local Ordinary, any other priest can administer this sacrament (CIC 938,2 [1917]). What concerns the Sacrament of Confirmation was already explained in the treatise on Confirmation (n. 135f.).

20. Adversaries. No Catholic has ever denied that the priesthood is a sacrament. Only *Protestants* and *Modernists have dared* to assert the contrary, but they deny an external and visible priesthood.

21. Doctrine of the Church. *The Synod of Benevento*: Cn.1: "Henceforth, let no one be chosen bishop except one found living piously in holy orders. Moreover, we call holy orders the diaconate and the priesthood, since we read that the primitive Church had only these; for these alone do we have a precept of the Apostle" (D 703).

The Council of Florence: "The sixth sacrament is that of order. Its matter is that of the handing over of which the order is conferred: thus the priesthood is conferred by handing over the chalice with wine and the paten with the bread" (D 1326). As is clear, the Council, wishing to propose the doctrine of the Sacrament of Orders, chooses the priesthood.

The Council of Trent says that Christ instituted the visible and external

priesthood to which he gave the power of consecrating, and offering and administering his Body and Blood, and also the power of forgiving and retaining sins (D 1764). Moreover, it says that sacred ordination is a true sacrament (D 1766), which like Baptism and Confirmation imprints a character (D 1767). *Priests* receive this ordination; by this name the Council not only designates bishops, but with a special reason also priests, when it says: "The holy Council teaches, furthermore, that in the ordination of bishops, of priests, and of other grades, neither the consent, call, nor mandate, either of the people or of any civil power or authority, is necessary" (D 1769).

Pius XII in the Constitution *Sacramentum Ordinis,* attributed the sacramental nature to the priesthood[13] (D 3858).

Then also all the documents of the Church that affirm the necessity of the ecclesiastical hierarchy and presuppose that it is had by sacramental ordination, can be cited in favor of this thesis, such as: *Epistola S. Clementis* (D 101), Cornelius I (D 109), St. Siricius on the occasion of urging the law of celibacy (D 185), *the Council of Nicaea II* (D 604), etc.

22. Theological note. The thesis is *defined diving and Catholic faith* in Trent (at least formally implicitly); for the Council, as we shall see in the argument, refers especially to priests when it defines the sacramentality of Orders.

23. Proof from Holy Scripture. Since in the books of the New Testament the distinction between bishops and priests is not clearly apparent, concerning the power of Orders, it is therefore difficult from the texts alone to construct an argument regarding how the sacramentality of the priesthood is different from that of the bishops. However, it is proved sufficiently from those texts that the priesthood is a sacrament, if one pays attention to the value of the quoted texts which we treated in the previous thesis (2 Tim. 1:6; 1 Tim. 4:14; 1 Tim. 5:22), which are referred to the ordination of Timothy. For, even though there the concern was with the ordination of a bishop, nevertheless (at least as the ecclesiastical tradition understood it) the things said there pertain to priests; they are ordained with a similar imposition of hands. Hence it is necessary, as Lennerz[14] rightly points out, to admit that both the episcopacy and the priesthood have the nature of a sacrament, or neither does. But if only one of these two rites were a sacrament, it would have to apply to the priesthood.

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13. *Constitutio Apostolica "Sacramentum Ordinis":* AAS 40 (1948) 5-7.
14. H. Lennerz, *De Sacramento Ordinis* n.170 p.110.

24. Proof from tradition. *The Fathers* usually speak about the *Priesthood*, without making any distinction between presbyters and bishops, and so it is hardly possible to give separate arguments. "But according to the mind of the Fathers, presbyters are also truly and properly priests, although of a second order, and therefore the quoted texts [by us in the previous thesis] must be understood not only about bishops, but about bishops and presbyters."[15] Indeed, the holy Fathers expressly say that between a bishop and a presbyter there is no other basic difference (besides the honor and dignity) except the power of ordaining which is reserved to bishops alone (St. Jerome, R 1371, 1386, 1357). The same idea is also stated in the *Canons of Hippolytus*: "a bishop in all things is equal to a presbyter, except for the name of the Chair and Ordination, because the power of ordaining is not given to presbyters" (cn.32). Therefore everything said in the previous thesis about the sacramentality of Orders, since it must be said about the priesthood in general, and this priesthood pertains also to the presbyterate, must also be affirmed of presbyters. Therefore the presbyterate is a true and proper Sacrament of the New Law.

25. *From the Council of Trent.* The Council of Trent defined that Orders is a true Sacrament, and when treating ordination it places sacramentality in the *priesthood,* because in the priestly ordination a character is imprinted, and therefore "condemns the opinion of those who say that priests of the New Testament have only a temporary power and that those who have once been rightly ordained can again become lay persons" (D 1767; see cn.4, D 1774). Indeed, in this same place (ch.4 sess. XXIII) the Council distinguishes between Bishops and Priests, which it also does elsewhere when it speaks about the Catholic hierarchy (D 1765, 1776, 1777). On the other hand, it says that it pertains to the priesthood to have the power of consecrating, offering, and administering the Body and Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, and likewise of remitting and retaining sins (D 1764); and this also pertains to priests, and not just to bishops. Therefore from the Council of Trent the priesthood is a sacred ordination, which has the true and proper nature of a sacrament.

26. *By a unanimous agreement of theologians,* who never disagreed on this matter, the thesis is straightforwardly handed on. Testimonies taken from the sacred *Liturgy* can be added to their agreement; for, in the rites of priestly ordination they speak in the same way as they do about bishops. Indeed, often the same things are said to be done. Thus, v.gr., the

15. H. Lennerz, *op.cit.*, p.111.

Constitutiones Apostolorum, after they speak at length about the ordination of a bishop, have this to say about the ordination of a priest: "Then about the ordination of presbyters... do this...: Bishop, when you ordain a presbyter, impose your hand on his head, while the presbyters and deacons stand nearby, and praying over him, say...."[16] This is determined even more clearly in the *Constitutiones Ecclesiae Aegyptiacae*: "The bishop ordains the presbyter; he imposes his hand on his head, and then all of the presbyters touch him. And let him pray over him according to the way that we said about bishops."[17] Now in these liturgical rites, the concern is with the sacrament which is conferred in the same way as it is for a bishop. Both in the episcopacy and in the priesthood, the rite used, along with the prayers, has everything that is required for a sacrament, namely, that it be a sensible sign, efficacious of grace, and instituted perennially by Christ.

27. Scholium. *On the priesthood from martyrdom and confession.* 1. Some ancient documents seem to suppose that martyrdom and confession of the faith take the place of the sacrament of Orders. Thus:

The Canons of Hippolytus: "cn.43. When someone is worthy and stands before the tribunal because of his faith and on him is imposed a penalty because of Christ, but afterwards he is set free, such a one afterwards merits the presbyteral grade in the eyes of God, not according to an ordination, which is given by a bishop; indeed, his confession is his ordination.

Cn.44. But if he becomes a bishop, let him be ordained.

Cn.45. If someone, having made his confession, has not been afflicted with torments, he is worthy of the presbyterate; but let him be ordained by a bishop.

Cn.46. If such a man, since he was someone's slave, suffered because of Christ, he likewise is a presbyter for the flock.

Cn.47. For although he has not received the form of the presbyterate, still he has acquired the spirit of the presbyterate. The Bishop, therefore, may omit that part of the prayer that pertains to the Holy Spirit."[18]

The *Traditio Apostolica*: "c.10,1. If a confessor in prison was bound with chains because of the name [of the Lord], hands should not be imposed on him (χειροτονεῖν) for the office of diaconate (διακονία) or presbyterate (πρεσβύτερος), because by his confession he has the honor (τιμή) of a presbyter. But if he is chosen to be a bishop, let hands be imposed on him.

2. If a confessor was summoned before the public authority, and was not punished with chains nor condemned to any punishment, nevertheless, on a given occasion he was mocked because of the name of the Lord—if such a one confessed the faith, let

16. *Const. Apost.* 1,8,1f.; ed. Funck, 521-523.
17. 2(32); ed. Funck, 2,102.
18. *Die Canones Hippolyti:* TU 6,4 p.67-68; ed. H. Achellis.

hands be imposed on him for any order (κλήρος) for which he is worthy.[19]

Constitutiones Ecclesiae Aegyptiacae: "4(34) 1. "But for a confessor, if he was in chains for the name of the Lord, hands should not be imposed on him for the diaconate or the presbyterate; for, he has the dignity of the presbyterate because of his confession. 2. But if he is to be made a bishop, let hands be imposed on him.

3. But if he is a confessor, whom they did not bring before the authorities, and did not punish with chains, did not put in prison, and did not condemn to many other sufferings, but on a given occasion, they punished him with contumelies because of the name of the Lord, and they imposed domestic punishments on him, if he really is a confessor, he is worthy of all clerical grades and let him be ordained."[20]

Similar things are found in the Testament of our Lord Jesus Christ.[21]

It is necessary to point out in the first place that all of these testimonies can be traced to the same source: for, the Canons of Hippolytus, Traditio Apostolica, Constitutiones Aegypticae, the Testament D.N.I.C., Didascalia Apostolorum, the canons said to be of the Apostles, and other similar sources, are more or less only free and interpolated or accommodated versions of the one lost work of Hippolytus. The *Fragmenta Veronansia Didascaliae Apostolorum* do not have these canons, because they are incomplete fragments, and they are the only ancient Latin version and, it seems, the ones more deserving of faith.[22] The other Coptic, Arabic, Syriac, Ethiopian, etc. versions do not completely agree with each other. Jungklaus from the Coptic and Arabian codex, after having compared it with the other versions, attempted a reconstruction of the original text, and he proposed it in this way: "A confessor who, for the sake of the name of Christ, was put in prison and in chains, on him hands should not be imposed for some ministry of the Church, because this is the glory of a deacon; but with regard to the office of presbyter, even if he, because he has confessed the faith, has the honor of this office, nevertheless let the bishop install him by the imposition of his hands. But if the confessor was not hauled before a judge, nor cast into chains, nor detained in prison, nevertheless he has suffered sadness, and given the occasion, he bore many things because of the name of the Lord, he was not condemned to torture. But because he has confessed the name, he is worthy of every office of a presbyter, nevertheless let hands be imposed on him and let him become a deacon."[23] This version avoids the problem of attributing to Hippolytus the rather strange doctrine about

19. G. Dix, *The Apostolic Tradition of St. Hippolytus of Rome* (1937) 18-19; B. Botte, *Hippolyte de Rome. La Tradition Apostolique* (Sources Chrétiennes, 11) 41.
20. Ed. Funck, 2,104-105.
21. L.1 c.39; ed. Rahmani (1899) 98.
22. E. Hauller, *Didascaliae Apostolorum Fragmenta Veronensia latina* (Lipsiae 1900).
23. E. Jungklaus, *Die Gemeinde Hippolyts:* TU 46,2 p.120, k.Xa. Xb.

becoming a presbyter from martyrdom alone; and certainly it can very well explain the mind of Hippolytus. From the same time as the *Testamentum Domini* and some other documents, there are the *Constitutiones Apostolorum,* which derive their teaching from the same source. In fact, in book VIII, when treating confessors, it says: "One does not become a confessor by ordination; for it is a matter of will and endurance; but he is worthy of great honor, namely, someone who has confessed the name of God and of his Christ before gentiles and kings. 3. But if there is a necessity for him to be bishop or a priest or a deacon, let him be ordained. 4. But if some confessor who is not ordained appropriates to himself a dignity of this kind, on the pretext of being a confessor, he is to be deposed and ejected; for he is not that, since he denied the constitution of Christ, and he is worse than an infidel."[24]

The teaching is clear: A confessor of the faith, because he has confessed it, is worthy of any ecclesiastical dignity, whether presbyteral or diaconal, and therefore no inquiries should be made about him, because his confession is sufficient; however, if he wants to exercise the office of presbyter or bishop (perhaps also that of a deacon), he must be ordained. We also know that this was the custom from Tertullian, a contemporary of Hippolytus, Cyprian and Eusebius.[25] The words of the Constitution of the Apostles show that there were not lacking confessors, who appropriated to themselves the dignity of the priesthood, perhaps from a false interpretation of the custom; however, the same document says that this was not the teaching of the Church, but perhaps it was of one or other particular church.

24. L 8,23; ed Funk, 527-529; the same words recur in the *Epitome Const. Apost.* 8,14 (23); ed. Funk, 2,82.
25. Tertullian, *Advers. Valent.* 4; ed. Oheler, 2,385. *De Fuga* 11: 1,480; St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 38 and 39; ed. Hartel, 2,579-581; Eusebius, *H.E.* 6,43.6,20.

Thesis 3. The episcopate is a true Sacrament of the New Law.

S.Th. *Suppl.* q. 40, a. 5; St. Bellarmine, ch. 5; Sasse, 298-300; Pesch, 307-311; Otten, 285-294; Puig de la B., n.1013-1021; Lercher-Lakner, n.693-695.

28. Connection. To the question about the sacramentality of the different Orders we responded in the previous thesis with regard to the presbyterate and now we will treat the Episcopate. In fact there is no doubt that the Episcopate is a sacrament, if it is reduced to the priesthood. But if according as it is distinguished from the priesthood or presbyterate, then there is not one opinion of the theologians. Therefore in this thesis we take the Episcopate as distinct from the presbyterate and we say that it is a true sacrament.

29. Definition of terms. *Bishop* (ἐπίσκοπος from the verb ἐπισκέπτομαι = to inspect[1]) according to its etymology signifies a guardian, a protector, an inspector, and in a special way it was used among the pagans for their household gods and protectors. Among the Athenians it was a technical word to designate the Prefects of colonies.[2]

In the N.T. this word does not appear often,[3] and it always signifies the presiders in Christian communities, or also rectors and pastors of churches. St. Peter applies the word once to Christ whom he calls the Pastor and ἐπίσκοπος of souls (1 Pet. 2:25). But ordinarily it is joined together with the word *presbyter*, although it does not require nor suppose the identity of function or office.

As we said above (n. 18), the Bishop was also designated with the name of *Priest* without any qualification, while afterwards (from the 10th century) the contrary took place. But already in the 2nd century St. Ignatius above all made a distinction between a Bishop and a Presbyter. In opposition to Presbyters, the Bishops were said to be the first, the highest, the supreme priests, etc.[4]

The *Episcopate* was usually called the highest priesthood—the summit, fullness, complement of the priesthood.[5] For, according to the common opinion of theologians, the episcopate is considered as the complement of the presbyterate, so that it per se does not include, but completes it, and therefore requires and presupposes it. But some other theologians (we will treat them later) say that the difference is not adequate, but is such that it allows a simple deacon or layman to be consecrated a bishop without passing through the presbyterate. For now

1. F. Zorell, *op.cit.*, 295-297; W. Bauer, *op.cit.*, 541-542; G. Kittel, *op.cit.*, 2,604-617, especially 611-615; H. Haag, *Bichol Bibel-Lexicon* (1952) 246-247.
2. Aristophenes, see Prat, *Evêque:* DTC 5,1658-1659.
3. Only in these places: Acts 20:28; Phil. 1:1; 1 Tim. 3:2; Tit. 1:7; 1 Pet. 2:25. Ἐπισκοπή as an office is sometimes found in the N.T., as in Acts. 1:20; Luke 19:44; but this does not really concern our thesis.
4. In the *Roman Pontifical* it is said that the *Highest Priesthood* is conferred on bishops.
5. See v.gr. St. Isidor. Hispal., *De eccl. offic.* 2,7: ML 83,787; Innocent III: D 215).

we will prescind from this question,[6] and we ask only whether the episcopate really is an Order distinct from the presbyterate and has the nature of a sacrament.

30. *The function* or office of a Bishop is the same as that of a Priest or Presbyter, but in addition, by reason of his Order (and surely by divine right), he can also *ordain* others.[7] As the ordinary minister he can confer all the Orders; and so he can consecrate other bishops, ordain priests, deacons; and he can establish clerics in the other Orders. Likewise, by divine right, a Bishop is the ordinary minister of the sacrament of *Confirmation.*

The *Roman Pontifical* says: "The role of the Bishop is to judge, to interpret, to consecrate, to ordain, to offer, to baptize and to confirm"[8]; these words, in addition to what pertains to him by divine rite: to ordain and to confirm, and the other duties that pertain to a priest, also include those things which by ecclesiastical law are reserved to the bishop, namely, the consecration of churches, altars, sacred vessels, etc.; also to bless the holy chrism, and to impart some special blessings that are described in the *Roman Ritual.*[9] *To judge*, inasmuch as it means to make a judgment in the internal forum in the sacrament of Penance--the Bishop has this in common with priests; but inasmuch as it refers to a judgment in the external forum in his own diocese, as to *interpret* canon law, this is proper to him.

31. Opinions. 1. Aerius, in the 4th century, said that bishops and presbyters, by divine right, are equals[10]; in the middle ages Marsilius of Padua and John of Janduno repeated this error (D 944); John XXII condemned their propositions as contrary to Holy Scripture, opposed to the Catholic faith, heretical or analogous to heresy, and erroneous (D 946). Likewise Wycliffe (D 1265).

2. Many ancient scholastics (although not all) held that the episcopate is not a sacrament distinct from the priesthood, such as Peter Lombard, St. Albert the Great, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus,[11] and others.[12] Among

6. See below in the necessity of the individual Orders, n. 79.
7. S. Many, *De sacra Ordinatione* 6.
8. *Roman Pontifical* p.1, On the consecration of someone chosen to be a bishop.
9. *Roman Ritual* tit.8 c.20-23; in the most recent edition (1952) tit.9 c.9.
10. In St. Augustine, *De haeres.* q.53: ML 42,39.
11. P. Lombard, *4 Sent.* d.24; St. Albert the Great, *In 4* d.24 L ed. Vivès 30,77; St. Thomas, *In 4* d.24 q.2; *Suppl.* q.40, a. 5; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.24 p.2 a.2 q.3; Scotus, *In 4* e.24.
12. Perrone writes about this controversy: "Cardinal Raymund Capisuchius, O.P. (in *Special Theological Controversies,* Rome 1670, controversy 28 on the episcopate) cites 80 authors, and he says that he has read almost all of them, who deny that the episcopate is an Order, and he quotes the text of each one. He advances this argument in great detail. So what Cano wrote is true: that the number of theologians should not overwhelm anyone. And I would add: and their weight, if indeed they hold a negative opinion contrary to the Master of the Sentences, St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, Innocent V, Estius, etc. (*De Ordine* c.2 n.78 note). But it should be noted that Lombard did not defend the sacramentality of the episcopate; but on the contrary Estius did.

the moderns of this opinion are, it seems, Daffara and in a certain sense P. Vermeer, Journet and Boularand.[13]

3. However, the greater part of theologians supports the sacramentality of the episcopate. Thus among the ancients we find Durandus, Altissidorensis, Paludanus, Navarrus, and others, whom Pesch mentions.[14] Among the modern authors almost all hold our thesis.[15]

32. Doctrine of the Church. The documents, which deal with the sacramentality of Orders, can usually be referred to the episcopate. That is especially true of those that speak about the ecclesiastical hierarchy; for example, St. Clement: "So, preaching in towns and countryside, they [the Apostles] established the first fruits (of their work); they tested them by the Spirit and appointed them bishops and deacons of future believers" (D 101). An establishment of this kind made by the Apostles can only be what we are talking about in the thesis about the sacramentality of Orders.

The Council of Nicaea II, when treating sacred elections, speaks about the *ordination* of a bishop; this ordination is without doubt sacramental: "Indeed, it is especially fitting that a bishop be ordained by all (the bishops) of the province" (D 604).

The Council of Trent says that the priesthood is a sacrament, and then it refers both to priests and to bishops (D 1765, 1766, 1767); also especially because it cites the texts of St. Paul (2 Tim. 1:6 and 1 Tim. 4:14) which are referred to the episcopate.

Pius XII in the Constitution *Sacramentum Ordinis* (D 3858) says that like the episcopate also the priesthood and the diaconate are a true sacrament.

Theological note. The thesis, as it is understood about the episcopate in

13. M. Daffara, O.P., *De Sacramentis et Novissimis* (1944) 603. We say "it seems": because on the one hand he says: "an episcopal ordination is a true sacramental ordination" (p. 605, n. 868), but on the other hand, he proposes this thesis: "It is more probable that the episcopate, per se and as it is distinguished from the presbyterate, does not constitute a special Order taken in the strict sense" (n. 867). And it is also not clear whether he admits that the episcopate is truly a sacrament, but not an order, or whether he is saying that it is an Order but not a sacrament. P. Vermeer in Bijdragen 13 (1925) 262-275; Ch. Journet, *Vues récentes sur le Sacrement de l'Ordre:* RevThom 53 (1953) 81-108; E. Boularand, *La consécration episcopale est-elle sacramentelle?* BullLittEccl 54 (1953) 3-36.

14. Durandus, *In 4* d.24 q.6 n.8; Altissiodorensis, *Summa* l.4 tr.8; Paludanus, *In 4* d.24 q.6 a.3; Navarrus, *Manuale Confessorum* c.22 n.28; Pesch, n.614 cites Gabriel Biel, Maiorem, Almainus, Cajetan, Gulielmus Parisiensis.

15. In our time there has been a lively discussion between I. Bonetti, *Il Potere di Ordine extrasacramentale e la sua importanza nella teologia de St.Tomaso:* DivTh(Pi) (1948) 136-145; (1949) 65-76, 375-381; and A. Mancini, *Il potere di Ordine extrasacramentale...:* DivTh(Pi) (1949) 49-64, 360-374, and *Palestra del Clero* (1950) n.13.

contrast to the presbyterate, *is certain and common.*[16]

33. Proof from Holy Scripture. The texts we used to prove that Orders is a sacrament, namely 2 Tim. 1:6 and 1 Tim. 4:14, treat the ordination of Timothy who was made a bishop by the imposition of hands. But that imposition of hands was, as we have shown, a truly sacramental rite. Therefore the episcopate is a true Sacrament.

34. Proof from tradition. As we pointed out in the previous thesis, the holy Fathers, while treating ordination refer generally to the *Priesthood*, in which they include expressly the episcopate and the presbyterate, and they say that the priesthood is a sacrament. Therefore for them the episcopate is a true sacrament.

This can be confirmed with a few examples; thus St. Leo the Great says: "Now that the mystery of this divine priesthood has descended to human agency, it runs not by the line of birth, nor is that which flesh and blood created, chosen, but without regard to the privilege of paternity and succession by inheritance, those men are received by the Church as its rulers whom the Holy Ghost prepares: so that in the people of God's adoption, the whole body of which is priestly and royal, it is not the prerogative of earthly origin which obtains the unction, but the condescension of divine grace which creates the *bishop*" (R 2190).

St. Augustine says that the episcopate must not be repeated, just like Baptism: "Both [Baptism and Orders] are sacraments and both are conferred on a man by a certain consecration—the former when he is baptized and the latter when he is ordained, and therefore in the Catholic Church neither can be repeated. For, if when *bishops* come over, having corrected their error of schism, and they are received by us, even if it seems necessary that they perform the same offices which they were performing, they are not to be re-ordained, but just like the Baptism in them, so also their Ordination remains integral, because the vice was taken away that was corrected with the peace of unity, not the sacraments, which wherever they may be are true sacraments. And when the Church judges it to be useful that their *prefects,* coming to the Catholic community, do not make use of *their honors* there, still they do not deny the sacraments of their ordination, but they remain with them" (R 1617). Clearly St. Augustine is speaking about the episcopate, because he not only mentions *prefects* (which is not said of

16. St. Bellarmine calls our thesis *very certain* (*loc.cit*). Peter Soto says that it should be held *with certain faith*; Lennerz calls it certain, and indeed only by paying attention to "the external authority of the theologians" whom he cites (n.182); Bozzola says it is *very certain* (*Curs. Theolog.*, 4 *De Sacramentis* [1940] n.482); for Tanquerey it is *a matter of faith (de fide)*; Gasparri, *to be held firmly* (*De Sacra Ordinatione* 1 n.21); Pesch, *theologically certain* (n.613).

presbyters), but expressly cites their *honors,* which are surely episcopal; for, bishops coming over from heresy were admitted into the Church, but usually no authority was given to them, nor were honors assigned to them in some diocese.

35. Proof from the liturgy. In the ancient liturgical books the episcopal ordination customarily is explained at greater length than the priestly, so that in the latter only those things are expressed that should be omitted, rather than what should be done, lest it be confused with the episcopal ordination. But the essential rite of ordination consists in the imposition of hands along with the prayer in which the Holy Spirit is invoked; that is, it is a sensible, symbolic sign and efficacious of grace (as we said in the thesis on the Sacrament of Orders).

36. Proof from Trent. In the Council of Trent, precisely when the sacramentality of Orders is declared, the words of St. Paul to Timothy are quoted: "Since from the testimony of Scripture, apostolic tradition, and the unanimous agreement of the Fathers it is clear that grace is conferred by sacred ordination, which is performed by words and outward signs, no one ought to doubt that orders is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of Holy Church. For the Apostle says: 'I remind you to kindle the gift of God..." (D 1766).

Moreover, the Council says that in ordination *the Holy Spirit is given,* because the Bishop does not say in vain: *Receive the Holy Spirit* (cn.4); but these words are spoken in the episcopal consecration. Then also the Council says that the ordination (episcopal, as is clear from the testimonies which it cites in reference to Timothy) takes place *by external signs,* or by a sensible rite (D 1766); *that it was instituted by Christ the Lord* (D 1764); and *perpetually,* since it is constituted as a necessary ecclesiastical hierarchy in the Church (D 1767, 1776). But all of these points constitute the essential elements in order to have the nature of a sacrament. Therefore episcopal ordination is a true sacrament.

37. Theological reasoning. The diaconate, as we shall see, is a sacrament. Therefore and even more so the episcopate must also be a sacrament, since it is a more excellent office, and requires more grace.

A bishop in virtue of his ordination or consecration has the power of confirming and ordaining, which cannot be taken away from him. But if the episcopal ordination were not a sacrament, this power would be removable or revocable. Therefore the episcopal ordination is a sacrament.

I prove the major. From history it is certain that no Supreme Pontiff ever attempted to revoke this power from any Bishop, even though often it would have been very helpful, v.gr., in the case of heresy, schism, etc. Therefore the fact that the Church never did it is a sign that she does not have the power to do it. And this is even more clear in the history of schisms and in the question about re-ordination in the 4th century; at that time the Church never had doubts about the permanence of the episcopal power, but at most raised questions about the validity of a previous consecration. But when it was certain about the true ordination of a bishop, it admitted the power and validity of the ordinations conferred by him. In cases of suspension, degradation, etc., the Church admits the validity of the ordinations, and only denies the licitness.

I prove the minor. The reason why a power cannot be lost is because it does not come from outside, or from the authority of a pontiff, but from within, by reason of the character or sacrament. For if it came from without, the authority granting the power could also revoke it. Therefore this is a sign that the episcopal ordination, which confers the power of ordaining and confirming, confers it in virtue of the ordination itself, either because of the character or because of the intrinsic efficacy of the sacrament.

38. Objections. 1. The Sacrament of Orders is directed to the Eucharist. But the episcopate is not directed to the Eucharist. Therefore it is not a sacrament.

I deny the major. For this principle is stated gratuitously. Nevertheless, *I bypass the major and distinguish the minor.* The episcopate is not directed to the Eucharist directly, *conceded;* indirectly, *denied.* For, it is not only jurisdiction that belongs to the bishop, but also the power *to ordain,* that is, to constitute ministers of the Eucharist.

2. If the episcopate were a sacrament, there would be eight sacraments and not seven. But according to the Council of Trent, there are neither more nor fewer than seven sacraments. Therefore, the episcopate is not a sacrament.

I distinguish the major. If the episcopate were a sacrament independent of the sacrament of Orders, or the presbyterate and diaconate did not constitute a certain complete power together with the episcopate, as was said above (n.17), *conceded;* but since that is not the case, *denied. I concede the minor and with the given distinction I deny the consequent.* In the episcopate there is the fullness of the Sacrament of Orders, or in the bishop is found the total power that the Sacrament of Orders can confer; in the priesthood and diaconate, not a distinct power and therefore a specifically different sacrament, but a part of that power of Orders is conferred. Therefore, although the episcopate, the priesthood and the diaconate have in themselves the true and proper nature of a sacrament (of Orders), they are not three specifically different sacraments, but one.

39. Scholium 1. *On the distinction between the episcopate and the priesthood.* By the name of *priest* are understood often in the ancient authors those two grades, which

in the course of time become clearly distinct: episcopate and priesthood.

St. Paul in his letter to Titus directs him to establish *presbyters in the cities*, whom he immediately designates with the name of bishops (*episcopi*) (Tit. 1:5-7). Similarly, about Paul himself one reads in Acts 20:17: *And from Miletus he sent to Ephesus and called to him the elders of the church* (τοὺς πρεσβυτέρους τῆς ἐκκλεσίας) and he says to them immediately: *Take heed to yourselves and to all the flock, in which the Holy Spirit has made you guardians* (bishops), *to feed the church of the Lord* (20:28).[17] St. Peter, in the same way as St. Paul did, calls the men "bishops" whom shortly before he had called presbyters (1 Pet. 5:1-3). Also the ancient Fathers[18] seem to use the words bishop and presbyter interchangeably. This was already mentioned by the later Fathers, especially in their commentaries on the greeting in the Letter to the Philippians: *Paul and Timothy, servants of Christ Jesus, to all the saints in Christ Jesus who are at Philippi with the bishops and deacons.* St. Chrysostom writes about these words: "What is this? Were there several bishops in one city? Certainly not; but he called the presbyters so. For at that time they still interchanged the titles, and the bishop was called a presbyter.[19]

St. Jerome speaks about bishops and presbyters, hardly making any distinction between them: "...among the older ones, bishops and presbyters were the same."[20] And in his Letter 146, the whole point is to show that a bishop and a presbyter were the same.[21] Other Fathers speak in the same way. However, at the end of the 2nd century it seems that a practical distinction was made among those who are wont to be called priests of the first and priests of the second order, etc. Indeed, as we showed above, St. Ignatius at the beginning of the 2nd century (+ 107) already clearly admits that there exists a distinction between a bishop and a presbyter with respect to the hierarchy.[22]

Indeed, just as St. Paul to the Philippians names only Bishops and deacons, in the same way the *Didache* seems to ignore the presbyterate: "Elect therefore for yourselves bishops and deacons worthy of the Lord, humble men and not covetous, and faithful and well tested; for they also serve you in the ministry of the prophets and teachers" (R 9). St. Clement of Rome, when writing to the Corinthians (42,4), in the same way does not acknowledge presbyters: "The Apostles... went forth preaching the Gospel of the Kingdom of God that was about to come. Preaching, accordingly, throughout the country and the cities, they appointed their first fruits, after testing them by the Spirit, to be bishops and deacons of those who should believe" (R 20). But these negative testimonies perhaps do not have full value; for, in addition to the fact that at the same time St. Ignatius knew about a complete hierarchy, the *Shepherd Hermas*, writing not long afterwards, in vision 3,5,1 seems not to know about presbyters; for, he says: "Listen now about the stones used for the building. Therefore, the stones—square and white and all of the same size—these are the Apostles and bishops, and the teachers, and the deacons, who walked in the holiness

17. On this difficult question, see F. Puzo, *Les Obispos Presbiteros en el Nuovo Testamento:* EstBibl 5 (1945) 41f.; A. Michels, *L'origine de l'Episcopat* (Louvain 1900) 118-218.
18. Passim in St. Irenaeus, v.gr., *Advers. haeres.* 1.4 c.26 n.2: MG 7,1054.
19. *In Epist. ad Philipp* hom.1 c.1: MG 62,183; R 1205.
20. *Epist.* 69,3: ML 22,656.
21. "For the titles 'presbyter' and 'bishop,' one signifies age and the other a dignity" (ML 22,1198): and he refers to the passage in St. Paul to the Philippians and the other texts cited above.
22. For St. Ignatius, without a hierarchy composed of bishop, priest and deacon there cannot be a Church. See Prat, *Evêque:* DTC 7,1665-1666.

of God; and they performed the office of bishop and taught and administered in a chaste and holy manner to the elect of God..." (R 84). But the Shepherd really did know about presbyters, for he had spoken about them in vision 2,4,3 and elsewhere."[23]

40. *The Council of Trent* says the following:

Cn.6: "If anyone says that in the Catholic Church there is no hierarchy... that consists of bishops, priests, and ministers, let him be anathema" (D 1776).

Cn.7: "If anyone says that bishops are not superior to priests; or that they do not have the power to confirm and ordain, or that the power they have is common both to them and to priests... let him be anathema" (D 1777).

Cn.3: "If anyone says that the ordinary minister of holy confirmation is not the bishop but any simple priest, let him be anathema" (D1630).

Chapter 4 on Orders: "bishops... are superior to priests, confer the sacrament of confirmation, ordain ministers of the Church, and can perform many other functions over which those of a lower order have no power" (D 1768).

Also, in this whole question we are prescinding from the power of jurisdiction, which does not necessarily follow episcopal consecration, as is clear in the case of non-residential bishops. It concerns only the distinction between a bishop and a priest by reason of the power of Orders; therefore the question can be clearly proposed in this way:

By reason of his ordination does a *priest* have the same power (therefore also of confirming and ordaining) as a *bishop*? *Or, to put it the other way around, in the episcopal consecration is a power of Orders given* (of confirming and ordaining) *that is not conferred in the priestly ordination?* Concerning confirmation, it is certain that the power of administering it, at least fundamentally, is conferred on a priest in his ordination; so the question is mainly about Orders, that is, whether in the priestly ordination that power of Orders is conferred on the priest that is necessary so that the priest, having been given the permission by the Holy See, without receiving any other consecration, can validly confer the priesthood.[24]

The Council of Trent certainly established a distinction between bishops and priests, and it is in the power of Orders; for, in order to explain the distinction and superiority of bishops it appeals to the power of confirming and ordaining "and they can perform many other functions over which those of a lower order have no power" (D 1768); and this power in no way is common both to bishops and to priests (cn.7). Moreover, in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which is based on the power of Orders, the Council makes the same distinction between a bishop and a priest, as it does between a priest and the lower ministers (cn.6). However the Council does not expressly affirm or teach whether this power of ordaining, which a bishop has and a priest does not have, must be understood as also a radical power or only a useful one. For the same thing is said about ordination

23. *Shepherd Hermas,* ed. Funk, 441; ed. B.A.C. *Padres Apostolicos* 954.

24. We are saying *priesthood* and not *major Orders,* because as to the subdiaconate, since it is not a sacrament, there is no difficulty; and as to the diaconate perhaps there would not be much of a dispute. The whole question rather has to do with the priesthood and a fortiori with the episcopate. See F. Solá, ¿Hasta que punto puede depender de la potestad de jurisdición el valor de los Sacramentos?: XV Sem. Esp. de Teologia (Madrid 1956) 15f.

as about confirmation, and concerning confirmation we know that a priest has radically, by reason of his ordination, the power of confirming.

41. Before the 4th century there was not discussion about this matter. But Aerius wanted to show that there is no difference between a bishop and a priest. Thus St. Epiphanius explains his heresy: "But his teaching is crazy and monstrous beyond the power of comprehension. For, first of all, he says: 'In what way does a bishop take precedence over a priest? There is no difference between them. For, there is one order for both of them—the same honor and dignity. A bishop imposes hands, a priest also imposes hands; a bishop baptizes, and a priest does the same; the bishop is in charge of the whole divine worship, and so is the priest; the bishop sits on a throne, and so does the priest.'"[25] Then St. Epiphanius responds to these charges: "It is obvious to the prudent that all of that is full of foolishness, that is, to say that a bishop and a priest are equal. And how could this be? For, the former Order pertains to generating fathers, since it produces fathers for the Church; but since the latter Order cannot produce fathers, it gives birth to sons by the washing of regeneration, but not fathers or teachers. And how can it happen that the latter consecrates a priest, since he does not have the right to create him by imposing his hands? So how can he be said to be equal to a bishop?"[26]

St. John Chrysostom, although he has a tendency to diminish the power of bishops, still he does admit an essential difference with priests, inasmuch as the power of ordaining belongs only to bishops: "... there is not much difference between a priest and a bishop: for, priests also have received the office of teaching and they preside over a Church; and what he [Paul] said about bishops, also applies to priests. For, *only in the matter of ordination* are they superior, and hence only in this matter are they seen to excel priests."[27] Clearly the holy Doctor admits a true difference by reason of Orders. Indeed, when treating the ordination of Timothy, St. Chrysostom thinks that by the name of *presbyter* the college of bishops must be understood (and therefore that the bishops and deacons, whom St. Paul mentions in the opening address in Philippians, are all bishops), "but priests do not ordain a bishop."[28]

We find the same opinion in St. Jerome, who also greatly diminishes the authority of a bishop; and after he said that bishops and priests are the same, he adds: "But that afterwards one was elected, who was placed over the others, became a remedy in schism lest each one, by drawing the Church of Christ to himself, might destroy it. For, from Alexandria to Heraclea presbyters always named one chosen from among themselves to a higher position as a bishop, just as an army selects an emperor, or deacons choose from among themselves one whom they know to be industrious, and they call him an Archdeacon. For, what does a bishop do, *except ordination,* that a presbyter does not do?"[29] It is

25. St. Epiphanius, *Haeres.* 75,3: MG 42,505; St. Augustine, *De haeres.* q.53: ML 42,38-39.
26. St. Epiphanius, *Haeres.* 75,4: MG 42,508 (R 1108).
27. St. John Chrysostom, *In Epist. 1 ad Tim.* hom.11: MG 62,553.
28. St. John Chrysostom, *In Epist. ad Philipp.* hom.11: MG 62,183. The argument of St. Chrysostom is not valid, for the consecrating bishop would be St. Paul, with the other presbyters and deacons assisting and imposing hands. But it shows how he would require a bishop for an ordination.
29. St. Jerome, *Epist.* 146,1: ML 22,1192.

apparent that St. Jerome does not attach much value to the power of ordaining, for he says almost nothing about it, or he treats it as having no importance when he says: "What does a bishop do, except ordination, that a presbyter does not do?" Therefore, it is not surprising if in other places[30] in which he compares the episcopate with the presbyterate he does not insist on this matter. But he does admit that there is a difference in the power of ordaining.

Rightly, therefore, it can be concluded: "If you make an exception for Aerius, whom St. Epiphanius says is out of his mind, in antiquity no one ever taught that there is equality between a bishop and a priest."[31]

42. However, there is not one opinion of theologians. Among the ancient scholastics Gulielmus Altissiodorensis, Aureolus and few others denied the distinction between a bishop and a presbyter by reason of their Orders, while all the other canonists and theologians disagreed with them.[32] Modern authors commonly hold that the distinction is such that a priest can in no way ordain, not even with an apostolic indult, and they also reject even the possibility of such an indult. However, a few others (Lennerz and his disciple Baisi) defend the contrary view.[33]

The first opinion is based on the tradition and authority of theologians; they see in its favor the teaching of the Council of Trent, and especially they are not convinced by the arguments of the adversaries.

The second opinion is based on the argument from three documents[34]: Innocent VIII, Boniface IX, and Martin V, in which these authors hold as certain that it is a matter of apostolic indult given to priests (that is, to abbots who were not bishops) to ordain in holy Orders even by conferring the major Orders. We will consider this matter later in the thesis on the minister of the Sacrament of Orders (n. 114).

43. This question has a connection with the one about the minister of the Sacrament of Orders, and with the question about ordination by leaps (i.e., skipping over an Order, v.gr., from deacon to bishop). We will treat both questions in their proper place. In the meantime, since the matter does not seem to be solved for certain from historical studies (as we will soon see), we think that the first opinion should be held. However, we make these observations:

1. The Council of Trent did not wish to define anything expressly about this matter, since the Tridentine theologians and Fathers did not have a certain or common opinion about it; therefore they carefully used expressions that would not decide the question.

2. Theologians admit as theologically certain that simple priests cannot confer the

30. St. Jerome speaks about this matter in *Epist.* 52,7: ML 33,534, and *Comment. in Epist. ad Titum* 1,5: ML 26,562f.

31. Prat, *Evêque, Origine de l'Episcopat:* DTC 5,1669.

32. Baisi, *Il ministro straordinario degli ordini sacramentali* 32-34, cites the main canon lawyer authors who hold the opinion that there is no distinction, and he lists seven; doubtless more can be found. See Puig de la B.: EstEcl (1925) 113f.

33. Recently the following have adopted this opinion: P. Vermeer, E. Boularand, Ch. Journet (see n. 108). S. Many, *De Sacra Ordinatione,* admits this faculty regarding the minor orders, subdiaconate and diaconate, but not with regard to the priesthood, p. 145-149.

34. Many and Baisi did not know about the document of Martin V; Lennerz quotes it.

episcopate; for, as is clear, it does not seem to have the power over a higher Order.

3. The present question must not be confused with the one discussed at Trent concerning the divine or ecclesiastical origin of the episcopate, although it is also intimately connected with it.[35]

44. Scholium 2. *On the divine origin of the episcopate.* The question about the divine or ecclesiastical origin of the episcopate comes to this:

It is a matter of divine faith that Christ instituted the *Priesthood,* but there is this question: Did Christ himself institute distinctly the episcopate and the presbyterate, or, on the contrary, did he leave it to the Church to make a distinction between a bishop and a priest? In this second case Christ could still be the author also of the deaconate; inasmuch as, namely, he taught the Apostles that, in their own time, they should make that distinction. But it could be that the Church by herself, with the passage of time, judged that it was opportune to separate the Priesthood into two grades. From these suppositions, there can be three different possibilities:

1. Christ instituted directly and immediately the episcopate and the presbyterate.

2. Christ instituted the Priesthood, and he left it to the Church in her own time to divide it into the episcopate and the presbyterate.

3. Christ instituted only the Priesthood, and the Church divided it into the episcopate and the presbyterate.

If this question is connected with others, which are related to it, then the cases can be presented like this:

1. In cases 1 and 2, Christ instituted immediately or mediately the episcopate and the presbyterate, so that: a) a bishop can ordain, but a priest cannot ordain; b) a priest can, but he needs an apostolic indult.

2. In case 3, the Church instituted the episcopate and the presbyterate, but: a) the episcopate is not a sacrament; or b) the episcopate is a sacrament, but it is not distinct from the presbyterate; or c) the episcopate is a distinct sacrament. For a) and b) there is no difficulty, because the Church would not use that power over the sacraments; for c) it would be supposed that the Church has power over the sacraments.

Of these opinions the first one seems to be more probable, namely, that Christ immediately instituted both the episcopate and the presbyterate (whether this distinction is adequate or inadequate); but a distinction is not discerned between both Orders, because Christ could have instituted them so that they would be distinguished, or not, by reason of the Order. Also, this disputed question about the distinction of the episcopate and the presbyterate during the time of the Apostles is not solved in this way, because Christ could have taught the Apostles about the *institution* of these Orders, which they would have to establish at the right time.[36]

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35. You will find these questions treated in Lennerz (n.141f.); Baisi, *loc.cit.;* Many, 16-29, for the second opinion; in favor of the complete distinction are Gasparri and almost all the other authors.

36. Passim in the history of this session of the Council of Trent, and Lennerz (n.143f.) whom we have followed in the way of proposing the question, although we hold a different opinion. See A. Michels, *L'origine de l'Episcopat* 231-301.

Thesis 4. The diaconate is a true sacrament of the New Law.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 37, a. 2; St. Bellarmine, ch. 6; Sasse, 298-302; Pesch, 298-303; Otten, 285-292; Puig de la B., n.1013-1025; Lercher-Umberg, n.696; F. Prat, *Evêques:* DTC 5,1656-1726.

45. Connection. Having studied the sacramentality of the Episcopate and the Presbyterate, since the Diaconate also enters into the threefold hierarchy mentioned by St. Ignatius, *apart from these there is nothing that can be called a Church* (R 49), it is necessary for us now to inquire whether the nature of a sacrament of the New Law is also found in the office of deacon.

46. Definition of terms. A *deacon* (διάκονος from the verb διακονέω = to serve) is said to be someone who under some respect can be said to be a minister, as someone who serves at table (Luke 4:39, or comes to the aid of someone in need (Matt. 25:44).[1]

In the more strict sense, in the N.T., a deacon is said to be someone who takes part in the divine ministry, or cooperates in the salvation of souls; and it is said both of Christ himself (Rom. 15:8), and the Apostles (Eph. 3:7), and the Bishops (1 Tim. 4:6).

But in the strictest sense deacons are called clerics who immediately serve the bishop or priest and constitute a special grade in the Church hierarchy. This grade is the Diaconate, which is next to the priesthood.

47. *The office of Deacon* in antiquity was more important than it is now. In Acts 6:6 they are chosen by the Apostles to assist them in service at the tables. But the "tables" here are not understood to be only about temporal ministry to the poor, but also with regard to spiritual functions. For, immediately Philip (Acts 8:5f.) and Stephen (Acts 8:8f.) are on the scene—evangelizing, preaching and baptizing.[2]

St. Justin shows the deacons as ministers at the altar and bringing the Eucharist to prisons and to distant churches.[3] The *Constitutions of the Apostles* describe the deacons as completely subject to the Bishop in the administration of the church; for, they want them to be of one mind and one heart: "Therefore, be of one mind, you bishops and deacons, and with diligence feed the people in total unity, because you both must be one body, father and son, because you are made in the image of the Lord. And let the deacon refer everything to the Bishop, just as Christ does to the Father: but

1. Zorell, *Lexicon Graec. Lat.* 295-297; W. Bauer, 333-335; G. Kittel, 2,81-93; H. Haag, *Diakon:* Bibl-Lexicon 327-328.
2. St. Ignatius (R 48) says that the deacons are not merely ministers of food and drink, but the servants of the Church of God.
3. R 128. See also St. Cyprian, *De Lapsis* 25: ed. Hartel: CSEL, 3,255.

whatever he is capable of doing, let him do it, but the Bishop will decide the other things. However, let the deacon be the ears of the Bishop, and mouth, and heart and soul, because if you both are of one mind through your harmony there will also be peace in the Church."[4] And a little later: "... A deacon, since he is a man, at the command of the bishop should be ready and available for men and for travel and ministry and service."[5] "Therefore it is necessary for you, deacons, to visit all who are in need... And you must be his [the bishop's] soul and his mind, being obedient to him in all things."[6] Therefore the office of the deacons was, as is apparent in the *Constitutions of the Apostles,* to minister at the altar, to serve the bishop in all things pertaining to the temporal and material administration; and for the same reason the deacon stood next to the bishop, directed the ceremonies, organized the people, read the Gospel, etc.[7] Similarly the *Apostolic Tradition* of Hippolytus says that the deacon is ordained "for the service of the bishop, that he do those things commanded by him; for he is not a partaker in the counsel of the clergy, but one who pays attention to things and tells the bishop what should be done."[8]

While pointing out what a deacon does not do, it prescribes: "A deacon does not bless, he does not give benediction, he does not baptize, he does not offer; he gives to the people not like a priest, but as one serving priests. A deacon excommunicates a subdeacon, lector, cantor, the deaconess if, when the priest is absent, the matter demands it."[9] In baptism the deacon prepared those to be baptized, in fact, often he did the baptizing while the bishop anointed (confirmed) those coming out of the water. Deaconesses performed the same function for women. However, the whole action of baptizing, that is, with all the ceremonies, anointings, etc., did not pertain to deacons, but to the priest or bishop.

The *Roman Pontifical* describes the office of the deacon with these words: "It is necessary for the deacon to serve at the altar, to baptize, and to

4. 2,44,1-4; ed Funk, 138.
5. 3,13(19) 1; ed Funk, 214.
6. 3,13(19) 6-7; ed. Funck, 216.
7. *Const. Apost.* 8,4-14, 35-41; ed. Funck, 473-521, 543-551. St. Isidore of Spain describes the office of deacons like this: "It pertains to a deacon to assist the priests and to minister in all things that are done in the sacraments of Christ, namely, in baptism, in chrism, in the paten and chalice; to bring and to arrange the offerings on the altar, to prepare the table of the Lord and to arrange the cloths, to carry the cross, and to preach the Gospel of the Apostles... Also pertaining to him is the office of prayers, the recitation of the names; he urges the people to listen to the Lord, he exhorts by crying out, he announces peace" (*Epist. ad Leudefred.* n.8: ML 83,895).
8. *Didascaliae Apostolorum Fragmenta Veronensis* 72; ed. Hauler, 109.
9. *Const. Apost.* 8,28,4-7; ed. Funk, 531.

preach."[10] Therefore, it belongs to him at the altar to serve the priest as the principal minister; he stands at his right, hands him the instruments, etc.; he sings the Gospel and he dismisses the faithful with the customary formula, *Ite Missa est* ('Go the Mass is ended"). Also, he can *preach* (CIC 1342,1 [1917]); his preaching is not limited to an explanation of the Gospel, but also to any kind of preaching. He is *the extraordinary minister of solemn baptism,* but he cannot use his power without the permission of the Local Ordinary, or the pastor; but for a good reason, when there is a real necessity, it can be legitimately presumed (CIC 741 [1917}). Also as an extraordinary minister the deacon can distribute Holy Communion to the faithful; but this can be done only with the permission of the Local Ordinary or of the pastor; for a good reason it can be presumed in a case of necessity (CIC 845,2 [1917]. Similarly, he can expose the Blessed Sacrament solemnly and repose it in the tabernacle, but he cannot officiate at Benediction of the Blessed Sacrament, unless it is a case in which he brings Viaticum to the sick (CIC 1274,2 [1917]).[11] Finally, there is granted to a deacon "with the permission of the Local Ordinary or of the pastor, when a serious cause urges it, and in a case of necessity this can be legitimately presumed,"[12] the faculty of presiding at a funeral, not only of children but also of adults, and he can use the same rite that is prescribed for priests.

48. Adversaries. That the diaconate is a sacrament was denied among Catholics only by Durandus and Cajetan[13] and a few others; this opinion rests on the general affirmation that only one ordination is a sacrament, namely, the priesthood; and they hold that the lower orders are like sacramentals or are on a different level.

49. Doctrine of the Church. Documents that explicitly explain the sacramentality of the diaconate are not found (unless perhaps an exception is made for the Apostolic Constitution, *Sacramentum Ordinis*); but many decrees mention deacons together with bishops and priests; they suppose a certain parity and this parity can only be in the nature of a sacrament. Here are a few of them:

St. Clement I: "So, preaching in towns and countryside, they [the Apostles] established the first fruits (of their work); they tested them by the Spirit and appointed them bishops and deacons of future believers" (D 101).

10. *Pontificale Romanum* p.1, De Ordinatione Diaconi.
11. See *S.R.C. Decreta* n.3074.
12. *Rituale Romanum* tit.6 c.7 n.5. In the latest edition, tit.7 c.7 n.5; but see the new permission given to a deacon for the burial of adults (tit.7 c.3 n.19).
13. Durandus, *In 4* d.24 q.2; Cajetan, *Tractatus* 11, *De modo tradendi vel suscipiendi sacros Ordines.*

St. Siricius: "For we have learned that many priests of Christ and deacons [Levitas in the Latin text], long after their consecrations..." (D 185). The word "Levites" could have a generic meaning, for any of the lower grades of orders, but here it seems to refer only to deacons.

The Council of Nicaea II: "Every election of a bishop, priest, or deacon made by secular rulers is to remain invalid, according to the canon that says: if any..." (D 604).

The Council of Trent: Cn.4: "If anyone says that by sacred ordination the Holy Spirit is not given and that, therefore, the bishops say in vain: *Receive the Holy Spirit;...* let him be anathema" (D 1774).

Cn.6: "If anyone says that in the Catholic Church there is no hierarchy instituted by divine ordinance that consists of bishops, priests, and ministers, let him be anathema" (D 1776).

Pius XII: "Everyone knows, however, that the sacraments of the New Law, as sensible and efficient signs of invisible grace, owe and signify the grace that they effect and effect the grace that they signify. Now, the effects that should be produced and thus signified by the sacred ordination of the diaconate, presbyterate, and episcopate, namely, power and grace, are found to have been sufficiently signified in all the rites of the universal Church of different times and regions by the imposition of hands and by the words that determine this" (D 3858). "That no occasion for doubt may be offered, We command that in any conferring of any orders, the imposition of hands be made by physically touching the head of the one to be ordained, although even the moral touch suffices for performing a sacrament validly" (D 3861). Here it is apparent how the Supreme Pontiff speaks in the same way about the Diaconate as he does about the other two Orders, which he calls a sacrament.

50. Theological note. Although all theologians generally say that the diaconate is a sacrament, still they are not in full agreement about the theological note of the thesis. However, it can be said today that the doctrine of the thesis is *certain and common.*[14]

51. Proof from Holy Scripture. Acts 6:1-6: *The Hellenists murmured against the Hebrews because their widows were neglected in the daily distribution. And the twelve summoned the body of the disciples and said, "It is not right that we should give up preaching the word of God to serve at tables. Therefore, brethren, pick out from among you seven men of good repute, full of the spirit and of wisdom, whom we may appoint to this duty.*

14. Lennerz, n. 185; Otten, n. 334; Vázquez says it is *de fide* (d.23 c.2 n.12).

But we will devote ourselves to prayer and to the ministry of the word." And they chose Stephen... These they set before the apostles, and they prayed and laid their hands upon them. From this text it is certain that the Apostles constituted those seven men to preside over the distribution of material goods for the Greeks or Hellenists. But they were designated not just for temporal things; for, they wanted them to be men who are wise, holy and of good repute; and moreover they appear immediately exercising an office and ministry that is not only temporal but also spiritual, like Stephen (Acts 7) and Philip (Acts 8). And it is not certain from the text that the order of deacons was inaugurated on this occasion, since probably some deacons had already been instituted for the Hebrews; with the increasing number of the faithful they could not take care of all of them and so tended to neglect the widows of the Hellenists.[15] Therefore, the Apostles, when they saw it was not right for them to abandon the ministry they were involved in to provide for the temporal needs of the Greeks, decided that the Hellenists should choose their own deacons. Therefore, from this passage, we cannot make an argument about the sacramental nature of the diaconate, nor about its establishment as such. Nevertheless, based on the whole *Tradition,* no other place is found that can be referred to the institution of deacons, and the entire Tradition understood it in that way. Actually, given the interpretation of the Tradition, the Apostles appear here as imposing hands and prayer over these deacons. But in Acts such imposition of hands with prayer is a sign of grace (Acts 8:17.19; 13:3; 19:6) and it confers it by the action of the rite itself (*ex opere operato*). Therefore it has the nature of a Sacrament that is required.

52. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers say that: a) the Apostles, according to the will of Christ, instituted the diaconate; b) deacons pertain to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, and they either state this expressly, or implicitly inasmuch as they distinguish Bishops, Priests, and Deacons from other clerics and laymen; c) deacons exercise a spiritual ministry; in fact at times are said to be established in the third priesthood; d) the diaconate is given by a sacred ordination. But all of these elements suppose that the diaconate is a true sacrament of the New Law. Therefore, according to Tradition the diaconate is a true Sacrament.

I prove the major. a) *The Apostles according to the will of Christ instituted the diaconate.* Thus they say:

St. Clement of Rome: "Now the apostles received the Gospel for us from our Lord Jesus Christ. Jesus Christ was sent from God. So Christ is

15. Knabenbauer, at this place, p. 111.

from God, and the apostles are from Christ... Therefore once they received instructions and were fully assured...and were confirmed in the Word of God, they went out to preach the Gospel with the full assurance of the Holy Spirit, proclaiming that the kingdom of God would come. So, preaching in towns and countryside, they established the first fruits (of their work); they tested them by the Spirit and appointed them bishops and deacons of future believers" (R 20, D 101).

St. Ignatius (R 49, 50, 65); St. Irenaeus,[16] who interprets Acts 6:6 to be about the ordination of deacons; *Didascalia Apostolorum*[17]; St. Cyprian: "Deacons must remember that the Lord chose the Apostles, that is the bishops and presiders; but after the Ascension of the Lord into heaven the Apostles established the deacons as ministers of the episcopate and of the Church.." "We see that this comes from divine authority so that a priest in the presence of the people is chosen and he is approved as worthy and suitable for public judgment and testimony... And we see that the Apostles observed this not only in the ordinations of bishops and priests, but also in that of the deacons, as it is described in the Acts (6:6)... Because of this on the basis of the divine tradition and apostolic observation it must be carefully preserved and held."[18] *The Council of Neocaesaraea:* "According to the rule there must be seven deacons, even if it is a large city. The book of Acts gives us assurance about this matter." St. Augustine also alludes to the Apostles when he speaks about the establishment of the diaconate.[19]

b) *Deacons belong to the ecclesiastical hierarchy;* they affirm this with express words or implicitly determine it. There are several documents. Here are a few of them:

Didache: "Elect therefore for yourselves bishops and deacons... for they also serve you in the ministry of the prophets and teachers" (R 9). St. Ignatius, among many others, has this famous testimony: "In the same way all should respect the deacons as they would Jesus Christ, just as they respect the bishop as representing the Father and the priests as the council of God and the college of the Apostles. Apart from these there is nothing that can be called a Church" (R 49; see R 44, 48, 50). St. Polycarp: "Similarly let the youths be blameless in all things... Therefore it is necessary to abstain from all these things, but to be subject to the presbyters and the deacons as to God and to Christ." *Pastor Hermas*[20]; Tertullian: "The high

16. St. Irenaeus, *Advers. Haeres.* 1,26,3; 3,12,10; 4,15,1: MG 7,687.904.1013.
17. *Didascalia Apostolorum* 2,26,3; ed. Funk, 1,102.
18. St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 3,3 and *Epist.* 67,4; ed. Hartel: CSEL 3,471 and 738.
19. *Concilium Neocaesar.:* Msi 2,544; St. Augustine, *In Ioann. Evang.* tr.109,5: ML 35,1919.
20. St. Polycarp, *Epist. ad Phil.* 2; ed. Funk, 1,303; *Pastor Hermas* vis.3,5; ed. Funk, 1,441; ed. B.A.C. *Padres Apostolicos* 954.

priest, who is the bishop, has the right to confer [baptism]; next, the presbyters and deacons, but not without the permission of the bishop, because of the honor of the Church, for by preserving this peace is maintained."[21] Clement of Alexandria: "Here also in the Church there are progressions of bishops, priests and deacons; in my view they are imitations of the angelic glory...."[22] Similarly, St. Cyprian, *Didascalia Apostolorum*, the Council of Nicaea, the Council of Sarda in which Osius explained the fittingness of ascending through the grades to the episcopate "for it is not fitting, nor does knowledge or good conduct prescribe that someone casually and lightly be proposed so that he is constituted quickly and easily as a bishop or presbyter or deacon."[23] Optatus Milevitanus: "The Church has her own members—bishops, presbyters, deacons, ministers and the mass of the faithful... Since there are, as I said above, four kind of leaders in the Church: bishops, presbyters, deacons and the faithful, and since you did not wish to forgive one of them, you have turned away the souls of men."[24] Finally, St. Augustine distinguished deacons from the other minor clerics: "For the concern was not about priests or deacons or clerics of a lower order, but about the college."[25]

c) *Deacons exercise spiritual ministries, not just material ones.* Gradually they became so equal to presbyters that the bishops and other writers had to stress their inferiority. Of the many texts that could be quoted, we will present just a few:

Didache (R 9); St. Ignatius: "As ministers of the mysteries of Jesus Christ, the deacons should please all in every way they can; for they are not merely ministers of food and drink, but the servants of the Church of God" (R 48; see R 44). St. Polycarp: "Similarly the deacons must be blameless in the sight of his justice, as ministers of God and Christ, not of men."[26] St. Justin (R 128). Tertullian says that among other things it pertain to the deacons to administer baptism.[27] St. Cyprian: "But since I see that the opportunity of coming to you has not yet arrived and that summer has started... if they were occupied with some inconvenience and the danger of some infirmity, and our expected presence as a priest does not take place, and if a priest is not found and the danger of death is near, they can make the confession of their sin to the deacon, so that having imposed his hand

21. Tertullian, *De Baptismo* 17: CSEL 20,214. See *De praescr. haeret.* 41: ML 2,56.
22. Clement of Alexandria, *Stromata* 6,13,107,2: MG 9,328.
23. St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 15 and 18: CSEL 3,513 and 523, and passim; *Didascalia Apostolorum* 2,26,3 and passim; ed. Funk, 102; *Conc. Nicaenum* cn.18: Msi 2,675; *Conc. Sardic.* Cn.10: Msi 3,14.
24. Optatus Milevitanus, *Contra Parmen. donatistam* l.2 c.14: CSEL, 26,48.
25. St. Augustine, *Epist.* 43,7: ML 33,163.
26. St. Polycarp, *Epist. ad Philip.* 5; ed. Funk, 1,301.
27. *De Baptismo* 17: CSEL 20,214.

upon them in penance they may come to the Lord in the peace, which the martyrs desired to give according to the letters sent to us."[28] Optatus Milevitanus: "What should I say about the laymen who at that time [of persecution] did not stand up for their dignity in the Church? What about many ministers? What about the deacons constituted in the third, what about the priests constituted in the second priesthood? Some bishops of that time, the leaders and heads of all... impiously handed over the instruments of the divine law."[29]

d) *Finally, deacons are constituted by a sacred ordination,* and as we shall see in the following argument, taken from the liturgy, the Fathers often insist on the fact that the ordination of deacons and priests is accomplished by the imposition of hands. St. Irenaeus sees in the imposition of hands (Acts 6:6) the ordination of deacons, and he asserts that explicitly about St. Stephen.[30] Hippolytus in the *Traditio Apostolica* explains the ordination of a deacon: "But when a deacon is ordained, let him be chosen according to what has been said [treating the ordination of a priest], likewise with the bishop alone imposing hands, just as we have commanded. Accordingly, in the ordination of a deacon only the bishop imposes hands, because he is not ordained for the priesthood, but for the service of the bishop, so that he does what the bishop commands. For, he is not a partaker in the counsel of the clergy, but he notices things and tells the bishop what should be done; he does not receive that common spirit of the priest, in which the priests all share, but that which is placed under the power of the bishop. Wherefore the bishop alone makes the deacon, but when a priest is ordained the other priests impose hands on him because of the common and similar spirit of the clergy."[31] The Council of Antioch permits suffragan bishops (that is, bishops in towns or villages) to ordain lectors, subdeacons and exorcists, but not priests and deacons.[32] St. Ambrose: "The office of deacons is not mediocre, for the Lord said about it: *Behold, I have chosen deacons...* We knew this because the deacons are not numbered among the others, but are preferred before all who are chosen from among all and are sanctified."[33] Ambrosiaster writes against the pride of the deacons: "For what is the bishop but the first priest, that is, the high priest? Finally, he

28. St. Cyprian, *Epist.* 18: CEL 3,523. Whether in this place St. Cyprian supposes that deacons could absolve from sins in an extraordinary case is discussed in the treatise on Penance. If it were so, then it would concern a singular and false opinion; but, in our view, this opinion should not be attributed to such a great man unless the proof for it is certain.
29. Optatus Milevitanus, *Contra Parmen. donatistam* l.1 c.13: CSEL 26,15.
30. St. Irenaeus, as above in note 16.
31. St. Hippolytus, *Traditio Apostolica;* ed. Hauler (*Didascaliae... fragmenta veron.*) 109.
32. *Concilium Antiochenum:* Msi 2,1311.
33. St. Ambrose, *De Officiis* 1,249: ML 16,99.

calls them nothing other than his co-presbyters and his co-priests. Does the bishop also call the ministers his co-deacons? Not at all, because they are much more inferior."[34] And this text of St. Jerome is famous: "I am told that one has been mad enough to put deacons before presbyters, that is, before bishops. For when the Apostle clearly teaches that presbyters are the same as bishops, must not a mere server of tables and of widows to be insane to set himself up arrogantly over men through whose prayers the body and blood of Christ are produced?" (R 1357). Socrates, when referring to the decree of the Council of Nicaea, says: "It seemed good to the bishops that a new law should be established for the Church that those who are chosen for holy orders, that is, bishops, priests and deacons, should abstain from copulation with their wives."[35]

I prove the minor. For, if the diaconate was instituted by Christ, if it pertains to the ecclesiastical hierarchy, which will always be in existence, if its office is spiritual, if finally it has this in common with the episcopate and the priesthood that it is obtained by the imposition of hands; then it has all the properties that are required for the notion of a Sacrament of the New Law: an external and sensible sign (imposition of hands), signifying grace (as was said in the two preceding theses), instituted perpetually by Christ. Therefore it is really a true Sacrament of the New Law.

53. Proof from the rite of Ordination. Absolutely all books of Ordinations, and all liturgical documents that deal with ordination for the diaconate, prescribe the election, the imposition of hands and a special prayer of ordination[36]; in fact, the imposition of hands must be done only by the bishop, and it must in no way be completed by a priest or by another deacon. It has, therefore, according to the rituals, the same sacramental nature as the episcopate and the presbyterate. Therefore it is a Sacrament.

That all the liturgical books dealing with the diaconate describe the rite by the imposition of hands is very clear to anyone who reads the liturgical documents. Here are a few examples:

Surely the first ordination of deacons was done by the imposition of hands: *These they set before the apostles, and they prayed and laid their hands upon them* (Acts 6:6).

St. Hippolytus: "But when a deacon is ordained, let him be chosen according to what has been said [treating the ordination of a priest], likewise with the bishop alone imposing hands, just as we have commanded...

34. Ambrosiaster, *Liber Quaestionum* c.101, among the works of St. Augustine: ML 35,2502.
35. Socrates, *Hist. Eccles.* 1,11,4: MG 67,102.
36. Coppens, *L'imposition des mains...* 148-149.

But over the deacon let him say this: 'O God, who have created all things and preordained them by your Word, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, whom you sent to carry out your will and to make known to us your desires, bestow the Holy Spirit of grace and solicitude and diligence on this your servant, whom you have chosen to serve your Church and to bring offerings,'"[37] which are offered to you (O God) through your priest.[38] In the Canons of Hippolytus, with some changes, these statements are found: "*Cn.33.* If a deacon is ordained, let these individual canons be observed and let the prayer be said over him, however this does not pertain to the presbyterate but to the diaconate, as a servant of God. *Cn.38.* But the Bishop lays his hand on him and pronounces this prayer over him, saying: *Cn.39.* O God, the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, we beseech you eagerly to pour out your Holy Spirit on your servant N. and prepare him to work with those who serve you according to your gracious purpose, like Stephen. *Cn.40.* May you grant him the strength to overcome all the power of the crafty one by the sign of your cross, with which he has been signed. *Cn.41.* May you grant him good morals without sin in the eyes of all men, and pure doctrine for the many, whereby he can lead many people into your holy Church without any scandal. *Cn.42.* Accept all his service through our Lord Jesus Christ, through whom with the Holy Spirit may there be glory to you for ever and ever. Amen."[39]

The Book of Orders (5th century): *Preface for the ordination of a deacon.* Soon he will come to be ordained; the Bishop places the stole on his left shoulder, and then says these three prayers over him: Let the common prayer accompany the common desire, so that by the prayer of the Church the one who is prepared for the ministry of the diaconate, being helped by God, may be outstanding in his office of diaconal blessing: and being bright among the venerated lilies of the holy altar with spiritual blessings, may he shine with the grace of holiness. *Also another blessing.* O God, the author of all things, the source of life, the reader of minds, the sanctifier of souls, look down on this your servant and deign to be favorable to the one whom we humbly are offering to you at your holy altar and are dedicating in the office of deacon... You can use your heavenly judgment in this matter, you remain with the Paraclete, your Spirit... May he be well prepared to stand at your altars..., that being assisted by the grace of the Holy Spirit, and faithful in the judgment of your Son our Lord, may he enjoy his full confidence. We beseech your glory, merciful Father, who as one God glory

37. *Canonum reliquiae,* ed. Hauler, 109-110.
38. Similarly in the *Const. Apost.* 8,17,18; ed. Funk, 523; and *Testamentum D.N.I.Ch.* 11-38; ed. Rahmani, 91f.; he depends on Hippolytus.
39. *Canones Hippolyti,* ed. Achellis: TU 6,4 p.64-67.

in the Trinity for ever and ever. Amen. *There is also another prayer...* May he enjoy the power of the Holy Spirit, so that being made worthy of grace he may always in a fitting way present your chalice to those thirsting for you. Amen.[40] There follows the *Completion of the same* and the *Confirmation after the ordination of a deacon.* In the Mozarabic rite the book of the Gospels and the stole were given to the newly ordained (in Spain, it was allowed only for bishops, priests and deacons to wear it[41]); and nothing is said about the imposition of hands. But from the common practice and as is admitted by all liturgists, it is very clear that this rite was not lacking; and it is also not mentioned in the ordination of priests, where most certainly it was not omitted. Probably the hand was imposed while the first prayer was being said.

The Sacramentary of St. Gregory (7th century): "When a deacon is ordained the bishop alone, who blesses him, places his hand on his head... And this prayer follows: Be present, we beseech you, almighty God... Send forth on him, O Lord, we beseech you, your Holy Spirit, whereby in faithfully exercising the work of his ministry he may be strengthened by the gift of your sevenfold grace."[42]

The Milanese Pontifical (9th century): "*Prayer for the ordination of a deacon.* Because he is not consecrated for the priesthood but for service, the bishop alone, who blesses him, places his hands on his head, while saying to the people: Let us pray, beloved, to God the Almighty Father; that on this servant of his, whom he has deigned to admit to this holy order, he may mercifully pour out the grace of his blessing, and confer on him the gift of consecration, through which he can lead him to his eternal reward... – Let us pray. *And the deacon as above.* Listen to our prayers, O Lord; and pour out the Spirit of your blessing on this your servant; so that enriched by your heavenly gift, he may both obtain the grace of your majesty and give to others an example of virtuous living, through Christ...." Then there follows the *Consecration* or preface, as it is in the *Liber Ordinum,* and almost as it is in the *Roman Pontifical.* When the ordination rite has been completed, the rubrics add: "When he has been consecrated, he puts on the stole and dalmatic and he gives a kiss to the bishop and to the priests: and then he stands to the right of the bishop."[43]

The Euchologium of the Greeks: "The Bishop while extending his right

40. *Liber Ordinum,* ed. Férotin, 48.

41. It was so prescribed by the *Conc. Bracarensi* (563 A.D.) ch.9; *Conc. Toletano VI* (633 A.D.) cn.40: Msi 9,777 and 10,629. See Duchesne, *Orgines du culte chrétien* 376.

42. ML 78,221f.

43. M. Magistretti, *Pontificale in usum Ecclesiae Mediolanensis...* (1897) 40-43 (Monumenta Vet. Liturg. Ambrosian. 1).

hand prays in this way: O Lord our God... pour out the grace first given by you to Stephen the protomartyr for the work of this ministry... O Lord, fill this your servant, whom you willed to call to the ministry of a deacon, by the coming of your holy and vivifying Holy Spirit with all faith and charity and holiness...."[44]

The contemporary *Roman Pontifical* preserves the ancient rite; it has added to it the handing over of the instruments, which was done in different ways in different times. However, the prayers and the imposition of hands reflect the very ancient rite: "*The bishop alone, extending his right hand, places it on the head of the one being ordained; and no one else does that, because he is being consecrated not for the priesthood, but for service, and he says to each one:* 'Receive the Holy Spirit for the strength to resist the devil and his temptations. In the name of the Lord.' *Then he continues... holding his right hand extended until the end of the Preface:* "Send down upon them, we beseech you, O Lord, the Holy Spirit, whereby in faithfully exercising the work of his ministry he may be strengthened by the gift of your sevenfold grace..."[45]

54. Proof from the Council of Trent: The Council of Trent, speaking in general about Ordination and concerning Ordination as a Sacrament, says: "If anyone says that by sacred ordination the Holy Spirit is not given and that, therefore, the bishops say in vain: Receive the Holy Spirit...: let him be anathema" (D 1774). Then the Council also says that the ecclesiastical hierarchy is constituted, by divine institution, by bishops, priests and ministers (under this name deacons are meant). Indeed, these points suppose that grace is given in the diaconate (for the bishop also says to the deacon: Receive the Holy Spirit), that the diaconate was instituted by Christ (mediately or immediately), that the interior effect of grace is *ex opere operato;* all of these elements pertain to the essence of the Sacrament."[46]

55. Objections. 1. The diaconate was not instituted by Christ. Therefore it is not a Sacrament. *I prove the antecedent.* For it is not certain that Acts 6:6 is concerned with the institution of the diaconate, and also, if that text does refer to them, those deacons were established to wait on tables.

I deny the antecedent and I distinguish its proof. In Acts 6:6 it is not certain that it is dealing with the institution of the diaconate, *I bypass;* therefore Christ or the Apostles did not institute the diaconate, *denied; I distinguish the second part:* deacons were instituted to wait on tables *only, denied; also* for this, *conceded.*

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44. *Euchologium* ed. Goar, 250.
45. *Pontificale Romanum,* p.1. On the Ordination of a Deacon.
46. See Michel, *loc.cit.,* 1381f.; Lercher-Umberg, n.696,1.

From the text of Acts 6:6 really it cannot be deduced absolutely that it is dealing with the institution of deacons and must less of the diaconate. For, nowhere is it said that those men were deacons. But a *very ancient tradition* calls them deacons, especially concerning Stephen there is hardly anyone who does not call him a deacon. Moreover, even if there he is not dealing with the institution of deacons, it does not follow from that that deacons were not instituted by the Apostles, since during the time of the Apostles there certainly were deacons already, as is clear from the quoted texts of Eph. 3:7 and 1 Tim. 4:6. Also, at that time revelation was not yet closed, and therefore the Apostles could have instituted the diaconate either per se or by the command and revelation of Christ. But since in this matter it is not certain from Scripture alone, we must pay attention to the Tradition, which is unanimous in this matter. And we have already said above that the deacons were not instituted *solely* to wait on tables.

2. But the Tradition is not uniform. For, several Fathers, like St. Cyprian, St. Jerome and others say that bishops and priests were established by God, but deacons by the Apostles. Therefore the diaconate is not an institution of Christ.

I distinguish the subsumed minor. These Fathers simply deny that the diaconate was instituted by Christ, *denied;* they make a certain distinction between the deacons and the bishops and priests, also by reason of their election, *conceded.* St. Cyprian says: But the deacons must keep in mind that the Lord chose the Apostles, that is, bishops and presiders, but after the Ascension of the Lord into heaven the Apostles established for themselves deacons as servants of their apostolate and church." Here he opposed the *election,* but not the institution of the order; but he does this in order to reprimand the arrogance of a certain deacon. This arrogance at times increased to such an extent that it was necessary to establish ecclesiastical penalties, and it provided an occasion for some of the Fathers, like St. Jerome, to write sharply against the deacons. -- Moreover, even if it were true that these Fathers wanted to oppose the institution of the diaconate, the objector could still not conclude from this that the Apostles did not do it because of a command from Christ.

3. St. Jerome says that the deacons are only "ministers of the tables and the widows." But for this office grace is not necessary, nor is it constituted as a sacrament. Therefore.

I distinguish the major. St. Jerome says this exclusively, *denied;* in a limited way, *conceded.* As we said in the solution of the previous objection, St. Jerome wanted to reprove the arrogance of the deacons, who tried to promote themselves above the bishops. Moreover, St. Ignatius, an authentic witness of the tradition, wrote: "And, as ministers of the mysteries of Jesus Christ, the deacons should please all in every way they can; *for they are not merely minister of food and drink,* but servants of the Church of God" (R 48).

56. Scholium. *On deaconesses and priestesses.* St. Paul to the Romans 16:1, says: *I commend to you our sister, Phoebe, a deaconess* [οὐσαν διάκονον] *of the church at Cenchreae:* and it is certain that there were deaconesses in the early Church. However, it is not so certain as to whether these ancient deaconesses should be distinguished from the widows or be identified with them. Actually, the *Testamentum Domini nostri Jesu*

Christi[47] probably refers, in this matter, to the discipline of the 2nd and 3rd centuries, and they are assigned to widows, which later were committed to the care of the deaconesses. But even there the deaconesses are named, but they do not receive a blessing and live subject to the widows. Gradually the authority of the deaconesses increased, and the *Constitutiones Apostolorum* has this to say about them: "Therefore, bishop, establish for yourself workers of justice... Of those who please you from among all the people, select some men and install them as deacons to take care of many necessary things; and women for the ministry to women. For, there are homes into which you cannot send a deacon to care for women because of the pagans, but you can send deaconesses. For, in many other matters it is necessary to have the help of women deaconesses. First of all, when women go down into the water, those descending into the water should be anointed with the oil of anointing by a deaconess. And when a woman and especially a deaconess is not found, it is necessary for the one baptizing to anoint the woman who is baptized. But when a woman is present and especially a deaconess, it is not fitting for women to be looked at by men; also in the imposition of hands you anoint only the head... and afterwards... a deaconess anoints the women, but a man pronounces over them the names of the invocation of the Deity in the water... Therefore, you will have a deaconess necessary for other things, so that she can enter the homes of those pagans, where you cannot go, because of the faithful women present, so that she can do what is necessary for those who are sick, and so that she can wash in the baths those who are well."[48] It was also the task of the deaconesses to guard the doors of women in the churches, to assign seats for them, to awaken those who fall asleep, to accompany them when they go to the deacon or the bishop, to teach illiterate women what is required for baptism, and other things like these.[49]

It was not necessary for deaconesses to be virgins, for they could be chosen also from the widows who had only one husband, or from the wives of bishops, or (in the Latin Church) from the wives of priests and deacons.[50]

The required age for deaconesses in general depended on whether they were widows or virgins. According to St. Paul the widows had to be sixty years of age: *Let a widow be enrolled if she is not less than sixty years of age* (1 Tim. 5:9). Generally Theodosius required the same age for deaconesses.[51] But later, at the *Council of Chalcedon*, cn.5, he reduced the age to forty years. St. Paul himself, speaking about widows, mentioned the virtues or good morals required: *She must have been the wife of one husband; and she must be well attested for her good deeds, as one who has brought up children, shown hospitality, washed the feet of the saints, relieved the afflicted, and devoted herself to doing good in every way* (1 Tim. 5:9-10). In the law of Theodosius several other qualities are required.[52]

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47. Ed. Rahmani, 1,23,40 etc.; 2,8,20 etc. p.37.97.129.141.
48. *Didascalia Apostolorum* 3,17(16); ed. Funk, 208-210.
49. *Didascalia Apostolorum* 1,2 passim. See S. Many, 180,2.
50. See the *Council in Trullo* (in the year 692) cn.48: Msi 11,966; see 12,47; Morin, *De sacris Ecclesiae Ordinationibus* part 3, exerc.10 c.2 n.4.
51. *Codex Theodotionus*, ed. Ritter, 6,59.
52. *Codex Theodotionus*, ed. Ritter, 6,60-63.

57. The *rite* by which deaconesses were installed in their office was somewhat similar to the rite of ordination for deacons, namely, the imposition of hands of the bishop and a prayer. In the *Constitutiones Apostolorum* it is given this description: "Concerning the deaconess... Bishop, you lay your hands on her, in the presence of the presbyterate together with the deacons and deaconesses, and you will say: 'Eternal God, Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, creator of man and woman... now also look favorably on this your servant, chosen for ministry, and give her the Holy Spirit, and cleanse her from all stain of the flesh and the spirit, that she may accomplish the work entrusted to her worthily for your glory and for the praise of your Christ; with him may there be glory and adoration to you and the Holy Spirit for ever and ever, amen.'"[53] Among the Orientals also often a stole was given to the deaconess; she was then to go to a priest to receive communion, and this was done in the same way as for the ordination of a deacon.[54] But the same rite was not in force everywhere. In the *Constitutiones Ecclesiae Aegyptiacae* no deaconesses are present, but in their place are the widows, about whom it is expressly stated: "If a widow is established, she is not to be ordained and let her be chosen by name."[55] These widows are the ones who "are chosen for the ministry of baptizing women."[56]

In the West, the ordination of deaconesses does not appear in the most ancient liturgical books, as in the Mozarabic Book of Orders, in the Canons of Hippolytus, etc.; and afterwards, in the *Roman Order IX* mention is made of deaconesses who are only said to be *blessed:* "Similarly also [they enter the church] women deaconesses and priestesses, and on the same day they are *blessed.*[57] But in the 9th century, the *Roman Order vulgate* describes the ordination of deaconesses with almost the same ceremonies as those used for deacons, but with the exception of the imposition of hands and the other things special for deacons. A stole is placed on the deaconess, the litanies are recited, the Holy Spirit is invoked, etc.[58]

Although the imposition of hands sometimes was given and the Holy Spirit invoked upon the deaconess, nevertheless that consecration was never considered to be a true sacrament; and the deaconesses were not numbered among the clergy, although sometimes it may seem that they are. Thus the *Constitutions of the Apostles* say: "A deaconess does not bless, nor does she do any of the things that priests or deacons do; she only guards the doors, and for the sake of modesty she assists the priests when they baptize women."[59] However, the deaconesses enjoyed certain privileges and because of these in a certain way they were compared with the clergy. It is not certain what preferences they had among the different grades of ecclesiastical ministry; for, in the different reports about them, sometimes they are found immediately after the deacons before the rest of the clergy, sometimes after the men and before the women, now after the widows

53. *Const. Apostol.* 8,19-20, ed. Funk, 525.
54. See Morin, *De sacris Ecclesiae Orindationibus* part 2, p.56-80; Assemani, *Bibliotheca Orientalis* 3 part 2, De Synodis Nestorianis, 10.
55. *Const. Eccl. Aegyp.* 7(37); ed funk, 2,105.
56. *Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua* c.12.
57. ML 78,1003.
58. Hittorpius, *De divinis officiis* (1568) 144.
59. *Const. Apost.* 8,28,6; ed. Funk, 531. See St. Epiphanius, *Haeres.* 79,3: MG 42,473; he calls the diaconate of women an *order,* but from the context it is sufficiently clear that by this word he means a *grade* or *function.*

and then before the widows. Doubtless this is a sign that there was not a fixed rule about this, but different customs were in force in different places.

58. Just as there were different ecclesiastical disciplines for different regions, so also the existence of deaconesses did not begin at the same time everywhere, nor did they cease to exist at the same time. In Gaul they hardly ever existed; and in Spain for a long time they were not found. In the 12th century they are not found anywhere in the West, while in the Orient in some churches they still survived. And even now they are found among the Maronites, but with severe restrictions.

Since the principal function of the deaconesses was to assist women in the rite of baptism, for the sake of modesty, when the baptism of adults became less frequent, and when baptism by immersion was totally extinct, gradually the reason for the existence of deaconesses ceased to exist. Thus, without any universal law about this, in the 12th century the rite of ordaining or blessing deaconesses is not found anywhere.

59. Sometimes also the words *priestess and episcopess* (*presbytera, presbyterissa* and *episcopa*) occur, but in no way do they signify a special office pertaining to the priesthood. Sometimes an older woman was called a *priestess* (*presbytera* or *presbyterissa*).[60] Often *priestess* and *widow* meant the same thing, for in general the widows tended to be older; however, at times they are also distinguished: "The virgins and αἱ χῆραι καὶ αἱ πρεσβύτιδες are the first of all to stand or to sit."[61]

Sometimes by the name of *priestess* an Abbess is meant; in Spain she was also called the mother of virgins[62]; or a woman who had the care of the deaconesses[63]; or more frequently the spouse of a priest. St. Gregory the Great understands it in this third sense,[64] or the *Council of Turin II*: "If a presbyter is found with his *presbytera,* or a deacon is found with his *diaconessa*, or a subdeacon with his *subdiaconessa,* he is to be excommunicated.[65] The same thing is said about the word *episcopess*: "No crowd of women follows a bishop, who does not have an *episcopa*.[66] The famous Theodora appears with the name of *Episcopa*; she was the mother of Paschal I, and with Paschal her son and with other Supreme Pontiffs she was buried in the church of St. Praxedes in Rome in a chapel built by her son for her as a tomb. Therefore the word "Episcopa," like the word "Presbytera," can designate the mother of a bishop or a priest.[67]

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60. *Didascalia Apostolorum, Const. Apost.* 2,28,1-3; ed. Funk, 108.
61. *Const. Apost.* 2,57,12; ed. Fund, 165.
62. See Férotin, *Liber Ordinum* 66-67, note 2.
63. In this sense it occurs in St. Epiphanius, *Haeres.* 79,4: MG 42,476.
64. St. Gregory the Great, *Dialog.* 4,11: ML 77,336; *Epist.* 1,9,7: ML 77,946.
65. *Concilium Turonense II* (in the year 567) cn.19: Mi 9,796.
66. Ibid., cn.13: Msi 9,795.
67. On *episcopa, presbytera, diaconissa,* the following can be consulted: DACL, DTC, under the respective words; and also W. Bauer, under the words πρεσβύτερα πρεσβίς. Morin, *De sacris Ecclesiae Ordinationibus* exercise 10 on deaconesses; Hallier, *De sacris electionibus* in Migne, *Theologiae Cursus Completus* 24,830f.; A. Kalsbach, *Die altkirchliche Einrichtung der Diakonissen bis zu ihrem Erlöschen* (1926).

ARTICLE III

ON THE NON-SACRAMENTAL ORDERS

Thesis 5. The orders below the Diaconate are not a Sacrament.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 35, a. 2; q. 37, a. 2-3; St. Bellarmine, c.7-8; Sasse, 302-306; Pesch, 289-295; Otten, 300-308; Puig de la B., 1028-1039; Many, 29-44; Gasparri, 1,6-9, 20-25; Lercher-Umberg, n.697.

60. Connection. In the previous article we said that the three orders—episcopate, priesthood and diaconate—are sacraments. Now we will inquire about the orders below the diaconate. And surely the nature of our inquiry comes especially from the fact that per se these lower orders do not seem to pertain to the priesthood, in which in a special way the nature of a sacrament is found. But on the other hand, the rite of ordination is special; the first three are called Orders and in the Church they have always been held in high regard.

61. Definition of terms. In the Latin Church, besides the sacramental orders, which we have already treated, there are other orders: *subdeacon, acolyte, exorcist, lector* and *porter,* for which the tonsure is required. The *tonsure* is not considered to be among the orders; therefore we will not consider it, but later we will say a few things about it. On the time when these orders were instituted in the Church we will say something in scholium 1; now we will briefly treat these offices.

The *subdiaconate* (ὑποδιάκονος) was numbered among the minor orders until the 11th or 12th century; from that time along with the diaconate it is listed among the major orders. But in the Oriental Church it is still considered to be among the minor orders (see n. 71). The *office* of subdeacon is described by St. Isidore thus: "in the temple of the Lord they receive the offerings from the people; they (the subdeacons) are obedient to the deacons, and they also present the vessels of the body and blood of Christ on the altar to the deacons... These therefore, when they are ordained, do not receive the imposition of hands as the Priests and Deacons do, but only the paten and the chalice from the hand of the bishop, and from the Archdeacon they receive the goblet of water with the water for washing and the towel."[1] In the *Roman Pontifical* the office of the subdeacon is described in these words: "For the deacon must prepare the water for service at the altar;

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1 St. Isidore of Spain, *De Ecclesiasticis Officiis* l.2 c.10: ML 83,790-791; see *Etymol.* L.7 c.12,23: ML 82,292; see *Epist. ad Leudefr.* n.7: ML 83.893.

he must serve the Deacon, wash the altar linens and corporals, and present to him the chalice and paten for use in the sacrifice."[2]

Ecclesiastical laws prescribe that "the subdiaconate must not be conferred before the completion of the twenty-first year" (CIC 975 [1917]), and not before the end of his third year of theological studies" (cn.976,2) and at least one year after he has received the order of acolyte (cn.978,2) and has made a profession of faith (cn.1406,1.7). By his ordination the subdeacon assumes the obligation of praying the Divine Office daily and of observing the law of celibacy.

62. An *acolyte* (ἀκόλουθος from the verb ἀκολουθέω = I follow, I run after, I accompany[3]) is the same as a companion, or one who accompanies the ministers at the altar. The Greek "acolytes" in Latin are called "candle bearers" because they carry candles when the Gospel is read or the sacrifice is being offered; for then the candles are lit by them and carried..."[4] According to the *Roman Pontifical* "it is necessary for the acolyte to carry a candle; to light the candles of the church; to serve the wine and water at the Eucharist."[5] At his ordination a candelabrum with an unlit candle and a pitcher are given to the acolyte. But formerly the function of the acolyte was to carry the Holy Eucharist deposited in a special purse: "Then acolytes were accustomed to carry purses at a pontifical High Mass in order to receive the consecrated offerings—both those that were broken in the Mass for the communion of the faithful, and those that were sent to the titular churches in Rome."[6] Therefore in the ordination a purse was given to them, as is stated in the Roman Order VIII.

Exorcists were present during the first times of the Church, but they were not considered to be clerics, but charismatic men; therefore, by reason of their charism they could be ordained to an ecclesiastical grade: "An exorcist is not ordained; for, this praise of battle depends on a free and good will and on the grace of God, through Christ, by the advent of the Holy Spirit; for, whoever accepts the charism of healing is made known by a revelation from God and the grace that is in him is manifest to all. But if it is necessary for him to become a bishop or priest or deacon, let him be ordained."[7] Therefore, in the Orient it was not considered a *holy*

2. *Roman Pontifical,* part 1, De ordinatione Subdiaconi.
3. Ἀκόλουθος, F. Zorell, *Lexicon Graeco-Latin;* W. Bauer, 56.
4. St. Isidore of Spain, *De Eccles. Offic.* L.2 c.14: ML 85,793; *Etymologicorum* 1.7 c.12.29: ML 82,293; in his *Epist. ad Leudefr.* n.3 he adds: "he carries the taper and prepares the chalice for the Eucharist of the subdeacons.."
5. *Roman Pontifical* part 1. In ordinatione Acolythi.
6. Mabillon, *In Ordinem Romanum commentarius praevius* c.16: ML 78,911.
7. *Const. Apost.* 8,26; ed. Funk, 529.

order, although they placed the exorcists among the *ecclesiastical* orders or grades with deaconesses, widows, etc. The *office* of an exorcist was always to deliver the possessed from an evil spirit, which they obtained by the imposition of hands and the recitation of certain prayers (which were called the exorcism). In the *Roman Pontifical* this office is still recommended for exorcists: "The task of an exorcist is to drive out demons... and to pour out water in their ministry." This pouring out of water refers to the baptismal fount, which the exorcists are supposed to keep full. However, no one, even if he is endowed with the faculty of exorcizing, can perform exorcisms without the express permission of the Ordinary; and this permission is to be granted only to an approved priest (CIC 1151 [1917]).

63. *Lectors* are numbered among the first minor orders, at least in the West. In the East it often happened that they were also ordained by an imposition of the hands. But the same documents that prohibit the imposition of hands for the subdiaconate also forbid it for the lectorate.[8] And his ordination was customarily found after the ordination of a subdeacon but before the ordination of the other ministries. The office of lector was very important in antiquity when few knew how to read and reading was difficult because of no spaces between words. Hence St. Isidore rightly noted: "But whoever is promoted to this grade, he will be familiar with the teaching in the books, and endowed with a knowledge of the meaning of the words, so that he understands the distinction between the sentences—where the joining together ends, where the meaning continues, where the sentence ends. Having been prepared in this way, he will pronounce the words clearly, so that he can move the minds of the hearers to understand everything, by being careful about his pronunciation and by expressing the true meaning of each sentence, now by a voice of emphasis, now of sorrow, now or rebuke, now of exhortation, and similar emphases according to the different kinds of pronunciation."[9] The *office* of lectors was always to read the Holy Scriptures in the assemblies, but not the Gospel which was reserved to the Deacons. Later the songs were also entrusted to the lectors, and the *schola of lectors* and the *schola of cantors* was one and the same thing. The *Roman Pontifical* grants to the lector "to read that which he preaches, and to sing the reading; and to bless the bread and all the new fruits." Regarding this blessing of bread and of fruits, the CIC states: "Deacons and Lectors can give validly and licitly only those blessings that are expressly assigned to them by the law" (cn.1147,4 [1917]).

8. They are the *Canones Hippolyti, Const. Aegypt., Epitome Const. Apost.*, etc.
9. St. Isidore of Spain, *De Eccles. Offic.* L.2 c.11: ML 83,791; *Etymolog.* 1.7 c.12.24: ML 82,292.

Porters, also called door-keepers, were in charge "of the doors of the temple. For, holding the keys, they guard everything inside and outside, and they pass judgment on the good and the bad, that is, they receive the faithful and reject unbelievers."[10] With these words St. Isidore describes the *office* of porter, which was very necessary during the time of persecution; for then porters were vigilant and gave a warning if they perceived some danger. In the *Constitutiones Apostolorum* porters are mentioned who guard the doors of the church through which the men entered, while the deaconesses guarded the doors of the women; the doors were guarded lest any unbeliever or unbaptized person would try to enter.[11] In the *Didascalia Apostolorum* this office is entrusted to the deacons. According to the *Roman Pontifical* "The porter should strike the cymbal and ring the bell, open the church, and the sanctuary, and open the book for the one who preaches."[12] The sanctuary (*sacrarium*) was also called the "treasury" and is really the sacristy, or the place where the sacred vessels and vestments for the holy liturgy are kept.

64. Opinions. 1. Almost all the older scholastics said that these orders are a sacrament, like St. Thomas, St. Bonaventure, Scotus,[13] etc.; but they did not always propose this opinion as certain, but held that it was open to debate. This opinion is said to be *more probable* and *probable* by St. Bellarmine, Billuart, etc., and among modern authors Wirceburgenses, Billot, Tanquerey, Van Noort, Hervé, Galtier,Tymczak.[14]

2. A few authors distinguish between the subdiaconate, which they think is a sacrament, and the other minor orders, whose sacramentality they deny; thus Medina, Navarrus, Vázquez.[15]

3. The opinion denying the sacramentality of these orders is *more frequent,* and among the modern authors *more common.* Among others, those who follow this opinion are: Morinus, Benedict XIV, St. Alphonsus, Perrone, Wernz, Gasparri, Pesch, Diekamp, Puig de la B., Otten, Lennerz,

10. Id., *De Eccl. Offic.* 1.2 c.15: ML 83,794; *Etymol.* 1.7 c.12.32: ML 82,293.
11. *Const. Apost.* 2,57,10f. (in the Greek text); ed. Funk, 163; *Didascalia Apost.* 2,57,6f. (in the Latin text); ed. Funk, 62.
12. *Roman Pontifical* part 1. On the minor orders, Ordination of a Porter.
13. St. Thomas, *loc.cit.,* and *In 4* d.24 q.2 a.7 q.ª3; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.24 p.2 a.1 q.1-4; Scotus, *In 4* d.24 q.1.
14. St. Bellarmine, *De Ordine* c.8; Billuart, *De Ordine* d.1 a.3; Wirceburgenses[3], 10,335-344; Billot, *De Sacramentis Ecclesiae* 2 th.29; Tanquerey[19], *Synopsis Theol. dogmat.* 3,565-566; Van Noort, *De Sacramentis* 2 n.216-217; Hervé, *Manuale theol. dogm.* 4 n.401-402; Galtier, *Imposition des mains:* DTC 7,14.18-19; Tymczak, *Quaestiones disputatae de ordine* 84-85.
15. Medina, see Benedict XIV, *De Synodo* 1.8 c.9 n.4; Navarrus, *Manuale* c.22,18; Vázquez, *In 3 D.Th.* d.237 c.2; d.238 c.2.13.

Bozzola, and many others[16]; they were already preceded by Hugo of St. Victor, Lombard, Durandus, Gratian.[17]

65. Doctrine of the Church. The documents in which it is stated expressly that the orders below the diaconate are not a sacrament do not exist. However, we can cite some ecclesiastical documents which are concerned with these orders.

St. Cornelius I: "Did not that defender of the Gospel [Novatian] know that there ought to be one bishop in the Catholic Church? It was not hidden from him (for how could it be?) that in this there are forty-six priests, seven deacons, seven subdeacons, forty-two acolytes, and fifty-two exorcists, lectors and porters as well as more than fifteen hundred widows and indigents" (D 109).

Ancient statutes of the Church, after they teach that the ordination of a Bishop, a deacon and subdeacon must be done by the imposition of hands, then add: "When a subdeacon is ordained, because he does not receive the imposition of hands, let him receive the empty paten from the hand of the bishop...." Afterwards he explains the ordination of an Acolyte, Exorcist, Lector, Porter, Psalmist, and finally of virgins and widows (D 326-329).

The Council of Lyons I: "In addition to this We wish and We expressly command that the Greek bishops in the future confer the seven orders according to the custom of the Roman Church, since they are said to have neglected or to have omitted hitherto three of the minor ones with respect to those to be ordained. But let those who already have been so ordained by them, because of their exceedingly great number, be kept in the orders thus received" (D 836).

The Council of Trent later, when treating the seven orders, spoke about the priesthood, diaconate and subdiaconate and said this: "from the very beginning of the Church,[18] the names of the following orders and the ministries proper to each one, namely, those of subdeacon, acolyte, exorcist, lector, and porter, are known to have been in use, though they were not of equal rank. For the subdiaconate is counted among the major orders by the Fathers and the holy councils, in which very frequently we read about the other, lower (orders)" (D 1765). Moreover, in chapter 4 on the ecclesiastical hierarchy and ordination, it makes a distinction between bishops and

16. Morinus, *De sacris Eccl Ordinat.* 3,11,1 p.152; Benedict XIV, *De Synodo* 8,9; St. Alphonsus, *Theol. Moral.* 3, 1.6 tr.5 c.2 n.736-737; Perrone, *De Ordine* n.81; Wernz-Vidal., *Ius Can.* 4,206-216; Gasparri, *De Sacr. Ordin.* N.41' Pesch, *op.cit.,* n.577f.; Diekamp, *Theol. dogm. Manuale* 4,401; Puig de la B., *De Sacramentis* n.1028; Otten, *op.cit.,* n.350f.; Lennerz, n.188-201; Bozzola, *De Sacramentis* n.474f.
17. Hugo of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* l.2 p.3ª c.12; Lombard, *4 Sent.* d.24; Durandus, *In 4* d.24 q.1 n.2 and q.2 n.6; Gratian, d.21.
18. How these words of the Council should be understood is explained in scholium 3, n.. 73.

priests (D 1767). And in cn.2 it condemns under anathema anyone who says "that besides the priesthood there are in the Catholic Church no other orders, major and minor" (D 1772).

Pius VI condemned the errors of the Synod of Pistoia, which ridiculed what had been decreed by the Council of Trent concerning the minor orders (D 2655)

Theological note. We defend the thesis as *common and much more probable.*[19]

66. Proof from the nature of a Sacrament. The sacraments were instituted by Christ. But these orders were not instituted by Christ. Therefore they are not a sacrament.

The major is certain from the treatise on the Sacraments in general.

The minor is certain enough from history, for these orders did not always exist in the Church (see scholium 3, n.73f.), but in the various churches and at different times these individual offices were distributed in different ways. To give just one example, if the Greek text of the *Constitutiones Apostolorum* is compared with the Latin text (which is called the *Didascalia Apostolorum*) it is apparent that the office of porter (*ostiarius*) (which in the *Constitutiones* seems to pertain to a distinct order) is exercised by deacons and deaconesses (and in the *Didascalia* the porter is never even mentioned).[20] In the Oriental Church all the minor orders, which we have in the Latin Church, were never in use and they are not now.

It cannot be said that the minor orders were instituted by the Apostles or by a command of the Apostles, because there is no evidence for such a mandate nor is there any such tradition. That the Apostles did not institute these orders is obvious from the fact that before the 3rd century they did not exist.

Then also the holy Fathers clearly distinguish between the three sacramental orders and the others, which either they do not mention or they refer to them as something completely different.[21]

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19. Gasparri calls this opinion much more probable, and we could even say certain, and among recent authors it is so received (*De Sacra Ordinatione* 1, n.41). From the fact that Pius XII in the Apostolic Constitution, *Sacramentum Ordinis,* as a sacrament only mentions the episcopate, presbyterate and diaconate, our thesis seemingly does not follow from that, because the Supreme Pontiff does not seem to be treating them *exclusively* (*exclusive*), but separately (*praecisive*). See Hürth: PerMorCanLit (1948) 11f.
20. *Const. Apost.* 2,57,10f.; *Didascalia Apost.* 2,57,6.; ed. Funk, 163.162.
21. In these ordinations or rites there is only an exhortation to fulfill the office and a handing over of the instruments; but this handing over does not signify some kind of spiritual power, as it does in the other ordinations, as is clear from the words with which the handing over is performed.

67. Proof from the rite of ordination. These rites are not a sacrament, if the matter and form of the sacrament or orders are lacking in them. But it is so in these ordinations. Therefore they are not a sacrament.

The major is clear. Proof of the minor: The rite, which the Apostles (evidently from the mandate of Christ) used in order to confer the sacrament, was always the imposition of hands, and no other rite appears in the first centuries, before the appearance of the orders lower than the diaconate. A prayer or invocation of the Holy Spirit expressing the conferring of sanctifying grace was joined to this imposition of hands. Actually none of this is found in conferring these minor orders. For:

The very old *Liber Ordinum* (which recognizes only a Bishop, Priest, Deacon. Subdeacon, sacristan and the one to whom the care of the books and clerks is committed) when it treats "the blessing for the ordination of a subdeacon" says: "First of all, the ministry of washing hands is given to him by the Archdeacon, and also the paten and chalice. Then this prayer is said over him: [a prayer follows which certainly contains an invocation of the Holy Spirit]. When that is finished, the bishop hands him a codex of the Apostle Paul and says to him solemnly: Receive the apostolic documents and proclaim them in the Church of God. See also that what you proclaim with your mouth you believe in your heart: that what you believe you also carry out in deeds. Amen."[22]

The Ancient Statutes of the Church[23] prescribe the imposition of hands for the diaconate, presbyterate and episcopate, but for the subdiaconate they say: "When a subdeacon is ordained, because he does not receive the imposition of hands, let him receive the empty paten from the hand of the bishop and the empty chalice" (D 329).

The Canons of Hippolytus: "Cn.7,48. ὑποδιάκονος according to this order."[24] But the order is had in the *Constitutiones Ecclesiae Aegyptiacae*: "Hands are not imposed on the subdeacon, but he is nominated to follow the deacons."[25]

This way of ordaining subdeacons was observed until the 5th century; but even after this century ordination without the imposition of hands is often found, as in the cited *Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua,* in *Testamentum D.N. Iesu Christi,* in *Synodus Achisgranensis* (817), in the *Pontificale ad usum Eccl. Mediolanensis* (9th century), and in several Orders edited by

22. Férotin, *Liber Ordinum* col. 46-47.
23. This ancient document was thought to have come from the *Council of Carthage IV* (in the year 398), but scholars have serious doubts about the existence of this Council. Recently perhaps it is more likely attributed to St. Caesar of Arles (+ 542). But this is not fully certain. Moreover, what is said in this document refers to a much more ancient praxis. See D 326, note 1 (ed. 8).
24. Ed. Achellis, p.71.
25. 6(36); ed. Funk, 2,105.

Martène.[26] Of the 23 Orders edited by Martène, the last five pertain to the oriental rite, and these contain the imposition of hands in the ordination of a subdeacon; the other 18 all refer to the rites of the Latin Church. Actually, of these: *Ordo 19* treats only the Episcopate; *Ordo 1* does not contain any rubrics; *Ordo 12* does not treat the subdiaconate; *Ordo 9* directly treats only the Presbyterate, but with respect to the other ordinations it says: "... when and where it pleases the lord bishop, the lesser orders may be conferred up to the office of subdeacon; but deacons and priests never [are ordained] except in a public ordination"[27]; *Ordo 16,* although expressly it does not say that the imposition of hands is not given, still it presents all the rubrics for the ordination of a subdeacon and does not mention the imposition, while immediately in the ordination of a deacon it is required. The other 14 *Orders* all have this rubric more or less unchanged: "When a subdeacon is ordained, because he does not receive the imposition of hands, let him receive the empty paten from the hand of the bishop...."[28] From these texts, therefore, it is made very clear that the subdiaconate with the lower orders is very different from the sacramental orders. And although the subdiaconate is numbered among the major orders, still it is clearly distinguished from the diaconate. Also, it is not always counted among the major orders, as we shall point out later.

Rightly, therefore, Férotin says: "The absence of solemnity in the conferring of the Subdiaconate was the cause of some very grave problems. Subdeacons thought that they were not breaking any ecclesiastical law if they got married "claiming, as the Council of Toledo VIII (653) says in cn.6, that this was permitted to them, because they know that they did not receive a blessing from the Bishop." Therefore, the Council judged it opportune to publish this decree: "Therefore, in order to remove every cover for excuses, we command it to be observed that, when the same subdeacons are ordained, a benediction be given to them along with the vessels of their ministry, just as in some churches there is an ancient custom of doing this." Doubtless after this decree of the National Council the formulas of our Visigothic ritual [*Libri Ordinum*] were put together."[29]

Regarding the other ordinations, or with respect to the *acolytes, exorcists, lectors and porters,* much more universal is the praxis of not imposing hands in their ordination, unless perhaps you make an exception for one case in the *Const. Apost.* where it says about the ordination of a lector:

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26. *Testamentum D.N.I.Ch.* 1 44; ed. Rahmani, 105; Synodus Achisgranensis (817) cn.6: Msi 14,347; *Pontificale Mediolanense,* ed. Magistretti, 32; Martène, *De antiquis Ecclesaie ritibus* 2,50f.
27. Ordo IX, Martène, *De antiquis Ecclesae ritibus* 2 54.
28. Id., p. 30-95, afterwards up to page 120 the oriental rites are given.
29. Férotin, *Le Liber Ordinum* col.46-47, note 4.

"Create a lector by imposing hands on him, and while praying to God, say: Eternal God...."[30] But one should note that the *Epitome of the Const. Apost.* (where the same but abbreviated teaching is always found) in this one part differs from the *Const. Apost.*, just like all the other documents which have the same source.[31]

68. This thesis is confirmed by a consideration by the offices that the clerics who are endowed with these orders must perform: for, these offices are not of such a nature that they require a special sacramental grace, and therefore there is no reason why Christ should be said to have instituted them. Indeed, in what concerns the minor orders, the Church already permitted for many centuries that laymen could perform some of those offices[32]; and the Council of Trent, desiring to increase the use of these orders but knowing that celibate clerics could not always be found to exercise these ministries, says: "married men, known for their virtue, can suffice for this, provided they have not been married twice and are suitable for performing these tasks, and have received the tonsure and wear the clerical habit in the church."[33]

69. Objections. 1. In the early Church the functions of the lower orders, because of a lack of ministers, were committed to the deacons, "nevertheless all the powers to do all these things were included in the one power of the deacon, though implicitly. But afterwards the divine worship developed, and the Church committed expressly to several persons that which hitherto had been committed implicitly to one Order."[34] Therefore, according to St. Thomas and several scholastics, there is nothing opposed to the sacramentality of the minor orders, which did not exist explicitly in the early Church.

First response. There is a dispute about the definitive opinion of St. Thomas.[35]

Second response. I deny the antecedent until it is proved, namely, that formerly all the minor orders were included in the diaconate.

Third response. I distinguish the antecedent. The minor orders were included in the diaconate by the institution of Christ either mediately or immediately, *denied;* they were included in the diaconate by the will of the Church, *I subdistinguish:* inasmuch as the Church later instituted the different orders in which were exercised some of the things that had been done by the deacons, *conceded;* inasmuch as from the beginning to deacons was committed whatever afterwards was committed to the diverse orders, *denied.* Actually, in the beginning some offices were entrusted to the deacons which af-

30. *Const. Apost.* 8,22,2; ed. Funk, 527.
31. *Epitome Const. Apost.* 3(23); ed. Funk, 2,82; *Const. Aegypt.* 5(35); ed. Funk, 2,105; *Canones Hippolyti,* cn.7,48; ed. Achellis, 70.
32. Otten, *op.cit.,* n.356; see Pesch, *op.cit.,* n.588.
33. *Council of Trent,* sess.23 c.17, Decree on the Reformation.
34. *Suppl.* q.37, a. 2 ad 2.
35. See Pesch, *op.cit.,* 589.

terwards were given to the subdeacons and acolytes; but from that it does not follow that the *power* of a deacon was as it were manifested in the other orders, inasmuch as by the will of Christ the diaconate included all the other minor orders. Only in this way would Christ directly or indirectly have instituted the minor orders.[36] But history shows just the opposite, namely, that the deacons did not perform some offices, v.gr., of exorcists or acolytes in carrying candles, etc. In fact, it seems certain that these offices at first were entrusted to laymen, and only gradually were special rites instituted in which these functions were committed to members of the faithful, who then performed them officially.

2. The minor orders cannot be repeated. Therefore they imprint a character and consequently are a sacrament.

First response. I rebut your argument. Tonsure, the consecration of virgins, the blessings of abbesses, and many other things like this are not repeated. Therefore they imprint a character.

Second response. I distinguish the antecedent. They are not repeated by their very nature, *denied;* by the will of the Church, *conceded.* And *I deny the consequent*, for because they are not repeated it does not follow that they imprint a character. It is certain that the imprint of a character hinders repetition, but the converse is not true.

3. The Decree for the Armenians says: "The sixth sacrament is that of order. Its matter is that by the handing over of which the order is conferred: thus the priesthood is conferred by handing over the chalice with wine... the diaconate by giving the book of the Gospels; the subdiaconate by handing over the empty chalice covered with an empty paten: and similarly the other orders by assigning the things pertaining to their office" (D 1326). Therefore it supposes that the subdiaconate and the other minor orders are of the same nature with the sacramental major orders.

I concede the antecedent, bypass the consequent and deny the supposition, namely, that the Decree for the Armenians has the value of a definition *ex cathedra.* In our case it suffices to point out that the Fathers at the Council of Trent knew and cited this Decree, and nevertheless wished to leave the question about the matter and form of the sacrament of Orders open to free debate. Therefore, this is a sign that the Tridentine Fathers did not give a definitive judgment about the Decree for the Armenians. Moreover, we can concede that that Decree clearly enough hints that the minor orders are a sacrament, but in this matter it is doing nothing other than reproducing the opinion which at that time was quite common among the scholastics. We will evaluate this Decree when we treat the matter and form of the Sacrament of Orders.[37]

4. The Council of Trent teaches that minor orders are a sacrament, because it says: "From the very beginning of the Church, the names of the following orders and the ministries proper to each one, namely, those of subdeacon, acolyte... are known to have been in use" (D 1765). Therefore it supposes them to be of divine institution.

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36. Lennerz, *De Sacramento Ordinis* n.206-207.

37. Puig de la B., n.1033, with the notes, where he treats this whole question in a comprehensive and scholarly way; and especially M. Quera: EstEcl 1925.1926.1927.1947. But there are still some authors who say that this decree has a value of being more than a simple instruction because, as they say, it was promulgated solemnly: thus F. Hürth: PerMorCanLit (1948) 17f. But the value is different according to the diversity of things contained in the document.

I concede the text and deny the consequent. Although the words of Trent seem to favor the position of the objector, still the conciliar Fathers so changed the different versions of the quoted text that it is clearly apparent that they did not want to define anything concerning this matter.[38]

70. Scholium 1. *On the number of the Orders.* The Council of Trent teaches that the ecclesiastical hierarchy is composed of "bishops, priests and ministers" (D 1776), that there are grades in the hierarchy (D 1769), and that besides the priests and deacons there are "from the very beginning of the Church, the names of the following orders and the ministries proper to each one, namely, those of subdeacon, acolyte, exorcist, lector and porter" (D1765). For this listing Chiffletius, presider at the second meeting of the XXIII session, proposed the title, *On the Seven Orders;* but actually the Tridentine Synod did not decide anything about the number of orders.

The old scholastics wanted to preserve the number of *seven* orders, and therefore they did not list the tonsure and the episcopate among the orders. Modern authors commonly enumerate *eight* orders, by including the episcopate and excluding the tonsure. But those who want to add the tonsure to the other orders come up with *nine* orders; but if they call neither the episcopate nor the tonsure an order, then they revert to the *number of seven orders.*

71. Scholium 2. *On the division of the Orders into major and minor.* It was defined in the Council of Trent: "Cn.2. If anyone says that besides the priesthood there are in the Catholic Church no other orders, major and minor, by which, as by various steps, one advances towards the priesthood, let him be anathema" (D 1772). And in chapter 2 the holy Synod teaches: "The subdiaconate is counted among the major orders by the Fathers and the holy councils, in which very frequently we also read about the other, lower (orders)" (D 1765). From this it is now concluded that the Latin Church has as *major orders* the episcopate, presbyterate, diaconate and subdiaconate; but she considers the other orders as *minor.* The *Roman Pontifical* also uses this terminology in the first part, in which it treats the rites of ordination.

Therefore, now the Latin Church counts the subdiaconate among the major orders, but the other orders from the acolyte are among the minor orders. However, the Oriental Church still counts the subdiaconate among the minor orders.

But also in the Latin Church formerly the subdiaconate was a minor order. It is not fully certain how it became a major order. However, if one pays attention to the terminology, the matter without doubt becomes clear. For, the division among *major* and *minor* orders is recent; formerly the orders were said to be *sacred* and *non-sacred.*[39] In the 11th century Alexander II calls the subdiaconate a sacred order: "Let the impious be ashamed and let them clearly know that, by the judgment of the Holy Spirit those who

38. M. Quera, *El Concilio de Trento y las Ordines inferiores al diaconado:* EstEcl (1925) 337-358; see also scholium 3, n. 73.

39. The *Roman Pontifical* joins together both terminologies where it says: "On the sacred Ordinations in general: the Sacred and major orders are the subdiaconate...." But shortly before it had said: "On the minor Orders. The four minor Orders..." (part I).

are placed in the presbyterate, diaconate and subdiaconate, unless they have separated themselves from women and are living chastely, must be excluded from every dignity of their grade."[40] A little later in the same 11th century, Urban II at the Synod of Benevento, did not recognize any other orders except the presbyterate and the diaconate, "since we read that the primitive Church had only these; for these alone do we have a precept of the Apostle" (D 703); and it added: "But we concede that subdeacons, because they also serve at the altar, if there is a true necessity (can be named bishops), but it should be very rare...."[41]

It is apparent that uncertainty still remained in the 12th century because Hugo of St. Victor and Peter Lombard[42] seem to think that the subdiaconate is not a sacred order. Therefore Peter Cantor (+ 1197) observed: "*Once again* it has been decided that the subdiaconate is a sacred order"[43]; and his contemporary Innocent III wrote in almost the same year: "Although the subdiaconate was not considered to be a sacred order in the primitive Church, nevertheless from the practice of Gregory and Urban, according to modern times, there is no doubt that it is a sacred grade."[44] And since from the decision of the Synod of Benevento, conceding as a rarity that a subdeacon could be chosen to be a bishop, not a few controversies were brought to an end, and Innocent III decreed: "Wishing to put an end to the debates about this matter, We decree that a subdeacon can freely be elected a bishop, just like a deacon or priest."[45]

72. Without doubt the teaching of the scholastics contributed a great deal to the strengthening of this opinion; they made a distinction between sacred and non-sacred orders depending on their relation to the Eucharist. For the subdiaconate there was a doubt; but gradually they saw a relation to the Eucharist in the fact that the custody of the sacred vessels was given to the subdeacon.[46]

Therefore doubtless there were two reasons for raising the subdiaconate to a major order: 1) The law of celibacy which was extended to subdeacons, and therefore by separating them from the minor clerics it put them together with the major orders. 2) The distinction between sacred and non-sacred Orders; and since the order of subdeacon was considered to be sacred, it was joined together with the diaconate and the presbyterate. And it is possible to add a third reason, namely, the decision of the Synod of Benevento and Innocent III allowing that a bishop could be chosen from among the subdeacons, which before that was permitted only from deacons and priests. The Council of Trent chose to call them *major* and *minor* orders, perhaps in order to avoid the question about the sacramentality of the subdiaconate, if it were called a sacred order; moreover, from what has been said it is clear that the Council is speaking discreetly when it says: "the subdiaconate is counted among the major orders by the Fathers and the holy councils"

40. Msi 19,76.
41. *Synod of Benevento:* Msi 20,738.
42. Hugo of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis* l.2 part 3 c.13; Lombard, *4 Sent.* d.24 n.9.
43. Peter Cantor, *Verbum abbreviatum* 60: ML 205,194.
44. Innocent III, in *Decretales* l.1 tit.14 c.9; ed. Friedberg, 2,128.
45. It can be found in the *Decretales* l.1 tit.14 c.9; ed Friedberg, 2,128.
46. Thus, for example, St. Thomas, *In 4* d.24 q.2 a.1 sol.3; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.24 p.1 a.2 q.2.

(D 1765), for it did not want to define that the orders from the apostolic tradition are divided into major and minor, but only to extol against the Protestants the venerable antiquity of the minor orders.

73. Scholium 3. *On the origin of the orders lower than the diaconate.* Until the 3rd century the ecclesiastical hierarchy consisted in three grades: episcopate, priesthood, diaconate. On this matter there cannot be any doubt.[47] But if someone examines the lower orders, not without reason Benedict XIV gives this warning: "It is difficult to investigate the origin of these orders, and it is almost impossible to find it."[48]

It seems that the Council of Trent says that all the orders, both major and minor, take their origin (from the beginning of the Church" (D 1765). But this is not to be so understood that it is believed that absolutely all the orders were instituted by the Apostles and were put into use already in the 1st century. For, Scripture mentions only bishops, presbyters and deacons. *Subdeacons* first appear in Hippolytus (ca. 218), and he also names *exorcists* and *lectors;* while Tertullian (ca. 204) mentions only *lectors*, and this is the first about the existence and antiquity of the *lectorate*. St. Cornelius I (251-253) gives a list of the orders as we now have them: "Did he [Novatian]... not know that there must be only one bishop in the Catholic Church?... that there are forty-six presbyters, seven deacons, seven *subdeacons*, forty-two *acolytes,* but fifty two *exorcists* and *lectors* with *porters*" (D 109).

But besides these orders already in the 4th century there were *cantors* or *musicians, grave-diggers and clerks,* etc. In the Roman Synod under Sylvester we read: "If anyone wishes to serve or advance in the Church, let him first be approved as a *porter*, then a *lector* and afterwards an *exorcist* for some time, which the bishop will determine; then an *acolyte* for five years, a *subdeacon* for five years, a *guard of martyrs* for five years, a deacon for five years, a presbyter for three years...."[49] Here a new order appears, a *guard of martyrs*, placed between the subdiaconate and the diaconate. *Pseudo-Ignatius*, in his letter to Antioch, seems to enumerate many orders: "I salute the holy presbyterate, I salute the holy deacons... I salute the subdeacons, lectors, cantors, porters, workers, exorcists and confessors. I salute the deaconesses, guards of the holy doors... I salute the virgins... I salute the widows. I salute the people of the Lord...."[50] St. Epiphanius also gives a long list.[51] But there is some doubt about whether all of these were considered as true orders. Probably they were all grouped together, and some were just functions enacted in that church. Then often two offices were performed by the same individual;

47. See Michel, *Ordre:* DTC 11,1207-1231 where he concludes: "From what has already been said it can be concluded that the evolution of the priesthood into a hierarchy composed of three grades—bishops, presbyters, deacons—is a fact that was admitted in the universal Church from the beginning of the 2nd century, at least in the Orient, and shortly thereafter in the West. These three grades of Order everywhere are understood as pertaining to divine institution, promulgated by the Apostles and their immediate successors" (col. 1231).
48. *De Synodo* 8,9,5.
49. Synod of Rome (314-335): Msi 2,183.
50. *Epist. ad Antioch* c.12: *Pattres Apostolici*[3]; ed. Funk-Diekamp, 2,221-223.
51. *Expositio Fidei* c.21: MG 42,821-824.

thus lectors and cantors were often the same persons.[52]

In the Oriental Church only subdeacons, lectors and cantors are mentioned, but the subdeacons performed the office of acolytes.[53]

74. Since there was such great variety in the minor orders, modern theologians commonly admit that they were instituted by the Church, and therefore could be decreased or increased according as the Church judged it to be opportune. De facto the use of the minor orders now is scarcely put in practice. However, the office of exorcist cannot be exercised unless someone "has obtained from the Ordinary individual and express permission. This permission is given by the Ordinary only to a priest noted for his piety, prudence and integrity of life" (CIC 1151,1.2 [1917]).

The Council of Trent wanted to urge the exercise again of the minor orders, recommending that the ministries proper to each order be exercised only by those who have been installed in those orders; but if celibate clerics are not available for the exercise of the ministries of the four orders, then married men of good repute could also suffice, provided that they have been married only once, are qualified to handle the office, and wear the tonsure and the clerical habit in the church.[54] But it seems that this conciliar decree was never put into effect. Actually, now the minor orders are required by the Church as stages "by which, as by various steps, one advances towards the priesthood" (D 1772).

75. Scholium 4. *Clerical tonsure.* "Any ancient authors who wrote about this matter attribute the origin of the clerical tonsure to Peter the Apostles and to the other Apostles."[55] Those cited in favor of this assertion are St. Gregory of Turin, St. Isidore, St.Bede, Godefridus, Amalarius, Rabanus Maurus, Alcuin, Ratramnus, Honorius Augustod,[56] and many others could be cited.

The custom in the *West* was to cut the hair like a crown more or less full because, they said, St. Peter did this in memory of the crown of thorns which Christ carried. In the *East* they made the tonsure differently, appealing to a tradition, which they said came from St. Paul. They cut the hair off completely, but not all the way to the skin. St.

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52. In the *Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua*: after the rites of the individual orders are briefly described, and the bishop always appears as the minister of them, when it comes to the Psalmist or Cantor, we read: "The Psalmist, that is, the Cantor, can receive his office of singing without the knowledge of the bishop, by the sole order of the presbyter—the presbyter saying to him: *See that what you sing with your heart, and what you believe with your heart, you confirm with your deeds"* (D 158).
53. Jugie, *Theol. dogmat. christian. Ab Eccles. cathol. dissident,* 3,401. But the office of cantor existed only among the Maronites and Syrians. However, some think that that the other minor orders are contained virtually in the subdiaconate. See Wernz-Vidal, *Ius Canon.* 208-210 and the canonists.
54. Sess. 23 c.17, De Reformatione.
55. Martène, *De antiquis ritibus* 2 1.1 c.8 a.7.
56. St. Gregory of Turin, *De Gloria Martyr.* 1,27; St. Isidore of Spain, *De eccles. offic.* 2, c.4: ML 83,779; Bede, *Hist. Eccl.* 1.5 c.21: ML 95,277-278; *Liber de vita et mirac. S. Cuthberti* 6: ML 94,742; Godefridus, in Bedam, *loc.cit.*; Amalarius, *Liber officialis* [*De divinis officiis*] 2 c.5.8; ed. Hanssens, 2,212 [*Amelarii Opera Liturgica omnia*: Studi e Testi 199], and l.4 c.39; 2,527-528; Rabanus Maurus, *De Instit. Cleric.* 1 c.3: ML 107,298; Alcuin, *De divinis officiis* c.35: ML 101,1233; Ratramnus, *Contra Opposita Graecorum* 4 c.5; Honorius August., *De Gemma animae* l.1 c.194: ML 172,603.

Jerome alludes to this custom: "Clearly it is demonstrated not with shaved heads, as the priests and worshippers of Isis and Serapidis must do; also they do not grow their hair long, which is a sign of dissoluteness and is found among foreigners and soldiers; but let it be shown as a dignified appearance... It is not our custom to shave the head bald, nor do we so cut off the hair on the head that we seem to be like razors, but we cut off only enough hair so the skin can be seen. And certainly the priests should always cover their heads.[57]

But it is not to be believed that one custom was in force everywhere, not even among the eastern Catholics or the western. For, we know from St. Gregory of Turin, at least during his time (although he is speaking about the bishop, Nicotius, in the 5th century), that the tonsure was given in such a way that the head was shaved but a circle of hair above the ears remained, as still in our time is the custom among some religious men, like the Order of St. Francis. But the Council of Toledo IV (633 A.D.) commanded: "All clerics or lectors, whether deacons or priests, having sheared the whole top of the head, should leave a crown around the head; but not as lectors recently in parts of Gallicia seem to have done; with long hair, like laymen, only on the top of the head do they cut off a small circle. For that rite up until now in Spain was kept by the heretics. Therefore it is necessary, in order to remove scandal from the Church, that this sign of shame be eliminated, and that there be one tonsure or appearance, as is the custom in all of Spain. And whoever does not follow this rule will be an enemy of the Catholic faith...."[58]

76. A custom of this kind applied to absolutely all clerics, not just to priests and deacons. Ecclesiastical statutes prescribed that the hair should be so arranged that the ears would be visible, and that the tonsure would be more or less ample.[59] Thus gradually the custom grew of wearing longer hair, and on the top of the head to cut a small circle "so that the status and grade of each one of them [the clerics] could easily be discerned."[60] The Church gave no direct rules for the size of the tonsure or the crown, but in the *Roman Pontifical* and in the *Ceremonial for Bishops* it recommends to bishops that they wear a larger crown and it seems to suppose that the size of the tonsure should correspond to the dignity of the order. Accordingly, the liturgists are accustomed to recommend these measurements: a diameter of 8,5 cm for a bishop, 7,5 cm for a priest, 6,5 cm for a deacon; 5,5 cm for a subdeacon and so step by step to 2,5 cm for a simple cleric.[61] The obligation of the tonsure for all clerics is prescribed in CIC 136 and 2379 [1917].

77. The foundation of the clerical tonsure is found in St. Paul: *Does not nature it-*

57. St. Jerome, *In Ezech. 13* c.44 at the words: *They shall not shave their heads or let their locks grow long; they shall only trim the hair of their heads*: ML 25,437.
58. *Council of Toledo IV* c.41: Loaisa, *Collectio Conciliorum Hispanorum* (1594) 348; Msi 10,630. Thus also St. Martin Bracar., c.66: *Canones ex Orientalium Patrum Synodis* cn.66; ed. C.W. Barlow, *Martini Episcopi Bracarensis Opera Omnia* (1950) 140.
59. Martène, *loc.cit.*, p.16 cites the statutes of different Councils from the year 1248 to 1650.
60. *Concilium Colon.* (1452 A.D,): Msi 32,147.
61. See v.gr. R. Lesage, *Dictionnaire practique de Liturgie Romaine* (Paris 1952) 1039.

self teach you that for a man to wear long hair is degrading to him, but if a woman has long hair it is her pride? For her hair is given to her for a covering (1 Cor. 11:14-15). Relying on this principle, Clement of Alexandria does not want men to have hair down to their shoulders and carefully coifed[62]; the *Didascalia Apostolorum* recommends: "Do not fuss over the hair on your head, but cut it, and do not comb it or adorn it or anoint it... for it is not allowed for you as a man of God to fuss with your hair, to comb and oil it; that is the sensual pleasure of lewdness; and you should not curl it and adorn it nor try to make it look beautiful."[63]

The first certain testimony about the tonsure of clerics, it seems, is found in the history of Julian the Apostate; in order to imitate the monastic austerity, in Nicomedia, he had his hair cut off (ca. 353). From this it is deduced that the tonsure even then was in use among the ascetics. St. Epiphanius reprehends the monks in Marseilles because they do not cut their hair according to the counsel of St. Paul.[64] Therefore the tonsure began in the East with the monks. And among the clerics it is already found in the year 379 when Otreios, the bishop of Milelene, established the lector, St. Euthymius, in his church: "And receiving the youth, when he had baptized him and cut off his hair (ἀποτρίξος), he made him a lector of his church."[65] Later the testimonies are more frequent.

In the West the *Liber Pontificalis* narrates about St. Anicetus (155-166): "He decreed that a cleric should not fuss with his hair, according to the precept of the Apostle."[66] *Prudentius* says of St. Cyprian when he was elevated to the priesthood: "He had the flowing head of hair cut short."[67] However, it does not seem to have been a universal law that all clerics must wear the tonsure. For, painted images in the ancient Roman catacombs show priests without the tonsure. Probably in the West, as in the East, this custom spread from the monks to all the clergy.

78. Concerning the rite of giving the tonsure: in the East it was never separated from the reception of the first order (as told in the case of St. Euthymius). But in the West, first it was given to the monks when they embraced the monastic life; afterwards it was given to clerics when they received the first order; then gradually the rite of tonsure was separated from the other orders, so that already in the 12th century there were many who received the clerical tonsure, and then never advanced to the other orders—not even minor orders.[68]

79. Scholium 5. *On the necessity of the individual orders.* In the primitive Church those who had not received the lower orders were often chosen for the episcopate, priesthood and diaconate. Thus St. Cyprian, St. Ambrose and many others were still

62. *Paedagogus* 3 3 and 11: MG 8,577-592, 633-636.
63. *Didascalia Apost.* 1,3,8 and 10; ed. Funk, 10; *Const. Apost.* 1,3,8,10: ed. Funk, 11. See St. Jerome, *Epist.* 20,28: ML 22,413-416; St. John Chrysostom, *In Kalend.* 5: MG 48,900.
64. *Adversus Haeres.* 80,7: MG 42,765-768.
65. Cyrillus Scythopol., *Vita S. Euthymii Abbat.*: I.B. Cotelier, *Ecclesiae Graecae Monumenta* (1692) 4 p.9.
66. Duchesne, *Liber pontificalis* 1,134.
67. *Peristephanon* hymn 13; *Passio S. Cypriani* 30: ML 60,573.
68. This whole question is treated in a scholarly way by Ph. Gobillot, *Sur le tonsure chrétienne et ses prétendues origines païnnes:* RevHistEccl (1925) 399-454.

catechumens when they were made bishops.

With the passage of time it became a rule "clerics are always made bishops,"[69] that is, bishops were chosen only from among those who were clerics. St. Leo the Great desired that a bishop "be chosen from among the presbyters of the same church [to which he belongs] or a suitable man from the deacons."[70] Urban II permitted that "very rarely" bishops could also be designated from the subdeacons; and Innocent III, after abolishing the "very rarely," made it a general law.[71] Now CIC 977 [1917] sets the rule: "Orders are to be conferred step by step, so that ordinations by skipping are absolutely forbidden."

But there is a question about whether this prohibition affects only the licitness, or also the validity. To this question canonists and theologians reply:

1. Minor orders *certainly are not necessary for validity;* for, they were instituted by the Church, they did not always exist, and they have often been omitted.

2. It is also admitted *by a unanimous consent* that the priesthood can be validly received by a layman, or by someone who is not a deacon.

3. *The disputed opinion* concerns the necessity of the priesthood in order to receive the episcopate. A fairly common opinion holds that the priesthood is required for the validity of the episcopate; but a few others say that the episcopate can be conferred directly on a layman or a deacon.

This difference of opinion depends generally on the opinion which each one has about the nature of the episcopate. Those who say that the episcopate confers only the power of confirming and ordaining, necessarily require a priestly ordination; but those who suppose that in the priesthood in some way such power is already conferred, say that necessarily in the consecration of a bishop all the power is included that is transmitted in the priesthood; that is, since the episcopate and the priesthood are not distinguished—according to them—in the nature of an order, both ordinations can be imparted independently of the other. However others, who grant that the episcopate and the priesthood are different in the nature of an order, say that the episcopal ordination includes the priestly, and therefore de facto the latter can be omitted.

Some more recent authors, like Lennerz and Many, recount some facts in which it seems that bishops were ordained who were not yet priests, and "about this independence (of the episcopate from the priesthood), they say, from history there cannot be any doubt."[72]

But actually, after considering all the cases mentioned, it does not seem so clear from the proposed facts that they do not allow for another interpretation. And in these matters it is required that it be proved positively that a non-priest was consecrated directly into the episcopate; for, those statements, such as "he was a deacon," or "he was created a bishop from among the deacons," or "a catechumen immediately after his baptism was consecrated a bishop," etc., can simply signify the last grade which he had before his election; as one could say, "someone still a catechumen was made a bishop,"

69. *Synodus Romanus* (402 A.D.) cn.12: Msi 3,1138.

70. *Epist* 14 c.6: ML 54,672.

71. Urban II in the *Council of Benevento:* Msi 20,738; Innocent III, in *Decretales* l.1 tit.18 c.7; ed. Friedberg, 2,143.

72. S. Many, *De Sacra Ordinatione* 16,21; Lennerz, *De Sacramento Ordiniis* n.147f.

in which case all would understand that the episcopal consecration was conferred only after he had been baptized. Thus in these cases it suffices to note the last grade, and it is supposed that the things required for the consecration had been done. There is explicit certainty about some facts according to which an individual on one day received several orders including the episcopate.[73]

80. Perhaps both opinions can be brought together, if a clear distinction is made about what is understood under the name of *ordination.* For, ordination is a *rite* whereby the power for a definite order is conferred on someone. Actually, the *rite* can be changed, and the Church can determine the rite licitly and validly, provided that the substance is preserved. Just as someone could validly receive during the celebration of one Mass all the minor and major orders (because, as it is done now, the rite of one ordination does not hinder another ordination, but follows it); so also the priesthood and the episcopate could be conferred during one and the same Mass. In fact, since the matter and form of the priesthood and the episcopate consist in the imposition of hands and in the words expressing the power being conferred, no repugnance is apparent in the fact that with only one imposition of hands, with the words signifying the priestly power together with the episcopal power, both orders could be conferred at the same time. In this way we could interpret those facts, which were cited about deacons being raised to the episcopate, or about a lector immediately consecrated a bishop. But now in the formula which the Roman Pontifical uses, this could not be done, because for the episcopal consecration it says: "Complete the fullness of your ministry in this your *priest.*"[74] These words supposed that the priesthood has been received.

Therefore we believe that the position of Cardinal Gasparri is prudent: "The arguments for one or the other opinion are not conclusive. We, therefore, think that the second opinion [that priestly ordination is prerequired] is truly probable both intrinsically and extrinsically because of the authority of so many and such great teachers."[75]

73. In the *Liber Pontificalis* the ordination of Constantine is narrated, who received at the same time the diaconate and the subdiaconate (ed. Duchesne, 1,468).
74. *Roman Pontifical* for the Ordination of a priest. See Huarte, 110; Michel, *loc.cit.*, 1387.
75. *De Sacr. Ordine* 1 c.1 n.26.

CHAPTER II

On the essence of the Sacrament of Orders

81. Connection. We have treated the existence of the Sacrament of Orders; now it is necessary to consider its essence. But in this matter there are two questions that must be completely separated: the historical and the dogmatic.

The historical question investigates the practical or liturgical process, which the rite of Ordination underwent in the course of the centuries. But the dogmatic question looks at what must be held right now about the essence of the sacrament of Orders according to the dogmas of faith. Therefore we divide this chapter on the essence of the Sacrament of Orders into two articles, corresponding to the two questions.

Although the essence of Orders includes both the *matter* and the *form*, we will pay more attention to the matter because of the greater difficulty involved; but afterwards we will present a brief investigation into the form.

ARTICLE I

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDERS CONSIDERED HISTORICALLY

Thesis 6. The only matter of the Sacrament of Orders was always the imposition of the hand of the Bishop.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 37, a. 5; Sasse, 307-318; Pesch, 311-320; Otten, 308-322; Puig de la B., n.1041-1049; Gasparri, 2,202-205, 229-281; Van Rossum, *De essentia Sacramenti Ordinis;* Michel, *Ordre:* DTC 11,1322-1333.

82. Connection. We are speaking about the *Sacrament* of Orders in the strictest sense, and therefore we are considering only those orders which we said are a sacrament, namely, the episcopate, priesthood and diaconate. For, concerning the other orders, since they are not a sacrament, there is no question to ask.

Moreover, since the special nature of the Sacrament of Orders is found in the priesthood (the diaconate is its preparation and the episcopate is its consummation), and since the same thing can be said about the episcopate and the diaconate, the necessary distinction having been made, as is said about the priesthood, we are limiting our historical investigation to the priesthood.

Indeed, in the actual rite of priestly ordination (the same thing takes

place in the other two ordinations) there are several ceremonies to perform; hence there is a question about whether the Church always considered one and the same rite as essential, or did she change it so that a certain rite that before was essential, afterwards was no longer essential; or was another rite equally essential joined to that first essential rite. We will answer these questions in our thesis.

83. Definition of terms. First of all, the actual rite of priestly Ordination should be kept in focus. According to the *Roman Pontifical*, priestly Ordination must take place according to these rites:

1. When those to be ordained have been presented and an inquiry made about their fittingness, the Bishop addresses them.

2. The Bishop places both of his hands at the same time on the head of each ordinand in succession, saying nothing. All the priests present, after the Bishop, do the same.

3. While extending the right hand (both the Bishop and the priests present), and after saying a prayer, the Bishop sings or reads the Preface.

4. He places on the ordinand the stole and chasuble.

5. At the beginning of the hymn, *Veni Creator Spiritus,* the Bishop while sitting anoints both hands of each ordinand.

6. He hands over the chalice with wine and water, and the paten with a host on it. Then the Mass continues.

7. After the communion, and having said the response *I do not call you servants,* the ordained recite the *Creed* and the Bishop imposes his hands on each one saying: *Receive the Holy Spirit, whose sins you shall forgive....*

8. He unfolds the chasuble, accepts his obedience, and gives the kiss of peace.

We understand the *matter* of the Sacrament of Orders in the same way as we explained in the other sacraments.

We say the *only* matter in order to exclude from the essence of the sacrament of Orders any handing over of instruments of those mentioned above in n. 4.6.8., and also to exclude the anointing of the hands (n.5) and the last laying on of hands (n.7).

The imposition of hands refers to the first imposition (n.2); it excludes the second (n.7). Sometimes that which is had while the Bishop says the prayer and the Preface is considered to be a second imposition of hands; however this cannot be said to be a second one, but it is a continuation of the first imposition.

We say the imposition of the *hand* and not of the *hands,* because we want to prescind from the question whether both hands are necessary, or

the imposition of one hand is sufficient. The documents we have speak about both the imposition of the *hand* and of the *hands.* If the statement has *the imposition of the hand* for the rubric, it could signify one hand or both hands, for it would be a generic expression, for the rite in general. But if it says expressly: *the Bishop imposes the right hand,* or something similar, then it is dealing with one hand only in opposition to both hands.

In the meantime we are prescinding from the question whether the touch of the hand must be physical or whether a moral touch suffices. Later we will have something to say about this briefly.

84. Opinions. In this historical question we recount the different opinions in the order and way they are proposed by Cardinal Van Rossum.[1]

First. It held that the matter consists in the handing over alone of the instruments. Thus especially the *Thomists* from the 16th century to the middle of the 18th century; recently Galtier and Hugon adopted this position.[2] All of these are based on the Decree for the Armenians. Many scholastics preceded them in this view, like Gilbertus Torniac, St. Albert the Great, Richard of Mediavilla, Mayron, Durandus, Capreolus, St. Antoninus, Biel, and some others whom Van Rossum cites.[3]

Second. The matter consists in the handing over of the instruments and the last imposition of hands. It is based on the Decree for the Armenians and on the Council of Trent (D 1774). Many authors in the 17th to 18th centuries defended this opinion, like Vázquez, Sánchez, St. Bellarmine, Lessius, Tanner, Coninck, Laymann, John of St. Thomas, Salmanticenses, Sylvester Maurus, Reiffenstuel, Catalanus, Billuart, Ferraris, Wirceburgenses.[4] Scotus initiated this opinion and he was followed by Petrus de Palude, Argentina, Gerson, Silvius, Catharinus, Medina, Toledo.[5]

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1. Van Rossum, *De essentia Sacramenti Ordinis*[2] p.12-16, 37-42, 51-52, 54-55, 60-61, 62-68. D'Ales in RechScRel (1932) 599, gives a synopsis of the opinions reported by Card. Van Rossum.
2. P. Galtier, *Imposition des mains:* DTC 7,1408; Hugon, *Tractatus dogmaticus de Sacram. in communi* q.1 a.4.
3. Gilbertus Torniac, *Tract. de officio episcopi* c.33; St. Albert the Great, *In 4* d.24 a.38; Richard of Mediavilla, *In 4* d.24 a.4 q.3;Mayron, *In 4* d.24 q.2; Durandus, *In 4* d.24 q.3; Capreolus, *In 4* d.24 q.1 a.3 ad 3 arg.1 concl. Scoti and ad 5 2nd concl.; St. Antoninus, *Summa* p.3. tit.14 c.16,4; Biel, *Suppl. In 4* d.24 q.1 a.1.
4. Vázquez, *In Summa* d.239 c,3-5; Th. Sánchez, *Consilia Moralia* l.7 c.1 dub.3; St. Bellarmine, *De Ordine* l.1 c.9; Lessius, *De Sacr. Ord.* c.1 dub.5-5; Tanner, d.7 q.2 dub.4; Coninck, d.20 dub.7; Laymann, *De Sacr. Ordin.* C.5; John of St. Thomas, *Comp. totius Doctr. Christi* p.1 c.11; Salmanticenses, *Theologia mor. De Sacram.* tr.8 c.3 punct.5; Sylvester Maurus, *Opus Theol.* l.13 tr.29 q.266 n.7f.; Reiffenstuel, *Theol. mor.* Tr.14 d.12 q.2 n.32; Catalanus, *Univers. Iur. corpus* p.3 q.8 c.3; Billuart, *De Sacram. Ord.* d.3 a.3; Ferraris, *Bibliotheca* ad verbum *Ordo* n.48; Wirceburgenses, *De Ord.* c. 2 a.8.
5. Scotus, *In 4* d.24 q.unic. a.3; Petrus de Palude, *In 4* d.24 q. 2 a. 3; Argentina, *In 4* d.24 q.1 a.2-3 and d.2 q.1 a.3; Gerson, *Reg. Mor. De Sacram. Ordin.* N.159; Silvius, *In Supppl.* Q.37 a.2 q.4; Catharinus, *Quaest. Utrum rat. ord. an vero ratione iurisdict...;* Medina, *De Sacrament. homin. contin.* L.1 c.21-22 and 39; Toledo, *Instruct. Sacerdot. Tract. de Sacram. Ordinis* c.2. Of these, the last two depend on the Council of Trent, but the others on the custom of their time.

Third. It also admits a twofold matter: handing over of the instruments and the imposition of hands, but the first imposition and not the second. Thus Berti, Gazzaniga, Tanquerey, Billot, Noldin, De Guibert, Tymczak,[6] and a few others.

Fourth. The matter is threefold: handing over the instruments and both impositions of hands. This view has few followers: Lugo, Simmonet, Gotti, Amort, Egger.[7]

Fifth. Both the first imposition of hands and the handing over of the instruments *can be* the matter. Both are not required, but either one or the other, for the whole matter of the sacrament is present in each one. There were very few promoters of this theory: Amicus, Diana, Esparza, Clericatus.[8]

Sixth. This is our thesis. *Generally all modern authors* hold this thesis. But it is not just modern, since it was supported by Gulielmus Altissiodorensis, St. Bonaventure, Petrus de Tarantasia, Hugo Argent., Bachon, Dionysius Carthus., Eck, Peter Soto, St. Peter Canisius, Suarez, Petavius, Morinus, Martène, etc.[9]

85. Doctrine of the Church. The *Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua* do not assign any other matter for the ordination or a priest or deacon but the imposition of hand, but for the episcopate they prescribe the imposition of hands and also "let two bishops place and hold the book of the Gospels above his head" (D 326).

The Council of Nicaea II: "If, however, this is difficult [for all of the bishops of the area to come], either because of some pressing necessity or because of the length of the journey, let at least three (bishops) join together in the same place, then let the consecration (χειροτονίαν) take

6. I.L. Berti, *De Theolog. Disciplin.* 1.36 c.12; Gazzaniga, *Praelectiones Theol.* Dis.8 de Sacram. Ord. C.2,27f.; Tanquerey, *Synopsis Theol. Dogm.* De Ordine a.2 n.39; Billot, *De Sacramentis* 2 th.30; Noldin, *Theolog. Moralis.* De Ordine n.456; De Guibert: BullLittEccl (1919) 81f.150f.195f.; Tymczak, *Quaestiones disputatae de Ordine* 318-341.
7. Lugo, *Disputat. Schol. de Sacram. in genere* d.2 a.5 n.90-98; E. Simmonet, *Instit. Theolog.* Tr.17 d.3 a.2,2; Gotti, *Theol. schol. dogmat. de Sacram. Ordinis* q.6 dub.2,2; E. Amort, *Theolog. elect. Thom.* 3,19 and *Theol. mor.* Tr.14,4 q.2; F. Egger, *Enchiridion theol. dogm.* tr.12 c.2 n.1016.
8. F. Amicus, *Cursus Theol.* 7, *De Sacramentis in gen.* d.2 s.4 and 8, d.22 s.5; A. Diana, *Resol. Mor.* p.3 tr.4 resol.187 and p.8 r.1 resol. 42; M. Esparza, *Cursus Theol.* 1.10 q.104 a.7; I. Clericatus, *Deciss. sacram. de sacra Ordinatione* d.7.
9. Gulielmus Altissiodorensis, *In 4* tr.8 a.1; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.24 p.2 a.2 q.4; P. de Tarantasia, *In 4* d.24 q.5 a.3; Hugo Argentinensis, *Breve totius theol. veritatis Compendium* l.6 c.36; I. Bachon, *In 4* d.24 q.1 a.2; Dionysius Carthusianus, *Enarratio in Epist. 1 Tim.* a.4; I. Eck, *Enchiridion locorum communium contra Lutherum* c.7; P. Soto, *Tractatus de Institutione Sacerd.* Lect.4-5; St. Peter Canisius, *Opus Catech. de sacr. Ordin. q.*1.3.5; F. Suarez, *De Sacram.* d.2 s.3 and d.33 s.4 (Suarez did not treat this question expressly, but as a consequence of his teaching he necessarily supports the sixth opinion); Petavius, *De Eccles. hierarch.* L.2 c.6 n.13; Morinus, *De Sacris Ecclesiae Ordinationibus* p.3 ex.7 c.1.2-5; Martène, *De antiqua Ecclesiae ritibus* l.1 c.8 a.9 n.16-18.

place" (D 604).

Gregory IX: "When a priest and a deacon are ordained, according to the rite introduced by the Apostles, they receive the imposition of hands by bodily contact" (D 826).

The Council of Trent: "For they indicate that the proper ministers of this sacrament [Extreme Unction] are the presbyters of the Church. In this text this word does not refer to those who are senior in age or more influential among the people, but either to bishops or to priests duly ordained by them *through the laying on of hands of the presbyterium"* (D 1697).

Chapter 3: "Since from the testimony of Scripture, apostolic tradition, and the unanimous agreement of the Fathers it is clear that grace is conferred by sacred ordination, which is performed by words and outward signs, no one ought to doubt that orders is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of Holy Church. For the Apostle says: *I remind you to rekindle the gift of God that is within you through the laying on of my hands*" (D 1766).

Leo XIII: while treating Anglican orders, and speaking about the matter and the form, which as essential parts of the sacrament must signify grace, he says: "Even if this signification must be found in the whole essential rite, namely, in the matter and form, nevertheless, it pertains in a special way to the form, since the matter is the part not determined by itself but determined by the form. And this appears even more clearly in the sacrament of orders, the matter of which, as far as it can be considered in this case, is the imposition of hands, which, indeed, by itself signifies nothing definite" (D 3315).

Pius XII: "Now the effects that should be produced and thus signified by the sacred ordination of diaconate, presbyterate and episcopate, namely, power and grace, are found to have been sufficiently signified in all the rites of the universal Church of different times and regions by the imposition of hands and by the words that determine this" (D 3858).

Theological note. This historical thesis, inasmuch as it says that the imposition of hands was always the essential matter of Orders, is *absolutely certain;* inasmuch as it excludes the handing over of the instruments and other rites, it is *at least more probable.*

86. Proof from the rite of Ordination. *Note.* We divide the argument, for the sake of clarity, into two parts: in the first one we show that the imposition of hands was always the matter of the Sacrament of Orders; in the second part we will prove that it was the *only* matter or the essential rite.

FIRST PART: *The imposition of hands was always the essential matter*

of Ordination.

The proof. That rite must be said to be essential, or the matter, of the sacrament of Orders, which a) at times was the only one; b) was always used; c) was never abrogated by the Church. But such is the imposition of hands. Therefore the imposition of hands was always the matter, or the essential rite, of the sacrament of Orders.[10]

The major seems sufficiently clear from the complete enumeration of its members.

87. *The minor is proved regarding* a): *the imposition of hands at times was the only rite of Ordination.*

1. From Holy Scripture. In Scripture the only rite mentioned is the imposition of hands: For deacons: Acts 6:6: *And they prayed and laid their hands upon them.* For priests[11]: Acts 14:23: *And when they had appointed* (χειροτονήσαντες) *elders for them in every church.* For bishops: 2 Tim. 1:6; 1 Tim. 4:14; 5:22.[12]

2. From the holy Fathers. The first one to imply in some way the rite of ordination is Clement of Alexandria (+ 217): "He is really a presbyter of the Church and a true deacon, that is, a minister of the will of God, if he does and teaches what comes from the Lord, not as if he were appointed (χειροτονούμενος) by men, nor that he is thought to be a just elder, but that he is a just man in the presbyterate."[13]

St. Cornelius: "When that famous man [Novatian] left the Church of God, in which after receiving baptism he obtained the grade of a presbyter, it was done by the grace of a bishop who, by laying his hands on him, raised him to the order of the presbyters. But when all the clergy and many of the people opposed him, because he did not allow a certain one of those who, when they were seriously sick in bed just as he had been, were baptized, to be accepted into the clergy; the bishop asked them that this man be permitted to be promoted by him by the imposition of hands."[14] At the

10. Some authors, like Card. Van Rossum, argue in this way: "That rite is essential, which was never omitted or changed. If another rite is found that was not universal and always used, it must be rejected, *unless it is admitted that the Church received from Christ the power of changing the essentials of a sacrament"* (n.113). If we argue in this way, then we depart from a fully historical way, and enter upon a very difficult way. Therefore it has seemed better to us to avoid this way.
11. Here we do not want to decide whether πρεσβύτεροι were bishops or priests, because for out thesis it is the same. See n. 39.
12. The text of Acts6:6 has been explained in n. 51; the others in Timothy in n. 9-11.
13. *Stromata* 6,13: MG 9,327.
14. *Epist. ad Fabianum Antioch.* In Eusebius, *H.E.*, 643: MG 20,619.

same time Cornelius narrates how at Rome Novatian forced three uneducated and simple bishops to confer on him "the episcopate by the imposition of hands."

It seems that St. Cyprian does not know any other rite of ordination but the imposition of hands: "We see what was done among you [Spaniards] in the ordination of our colleague Sabinus—that with the agreement of the whole community and of the bishops, who had gathered together and who had sent letters to you about him—in their judgment the episcopate should be conferred on him and hands should be imposed on him in the Basilica."[15]

Eusebius Caesariensis narrates the priestly ordination of Origen: "... when they [the bishops of Caesarea and Jerusalem] judged Origen to be worthy of the prerogatives and summit of the highest honor, by imposing hands on him they ordained him a priest." A little bit later he repeats almost the same words. He mentions only the imposition of hands in narrating the ordination of Anatolius and Fabian.[16]

The following authors, when they treat ordination, always speak in exactly the same way about the imposition alone of hands: St. Ephraem, St. Basil, Timothy of Alexandria, Theophilus of Alexandria, St. Gregory Nazianzen, St. Epiphanius, St. Gregory of Nyssa, Ambrosiaster, St. Optatus Mil., St. Innocent I, St. Jerome, St. Augustine, St. Caelestine I, Theodoretus Cyrensis, Isidorus Pelusiota, St. Leo the Great.[17] Van Rossum cites several others.[18] And these testimonies are not merely negative, inasmuch as they are silent about other rites, but they are also truly positive, inasmuch as they attribute the efficacy of the sacrament to the imposition of hands alone together with prayer. In fact, some of these Fathers seem to explain the rite of ordination in great detail, like St. Gregory of Nyssa and Theophilus of Alex.; others, like St. Jerome and St. Augustine speak about the imposition of hands in such a way that, if it were not an essential rite, their argument would lack all force.

3. From the rite of ordination. It would be tedious to mention the codices and to quote the texts, so let it suffice to cite the following: the Leo-

15. *Epist 68 ad clerum et plebes Hispaniae:* ML 4,402.
16. *H.E.* 6,8.32; 6,29: MG 20,538.575.730.587.
17. St. Ephraem, *Sermo de Sacerdotio;* ed. Paris 6,258; St. Basil, *Epist.* 53: MG 32,397; Theophilus of Alex., *Commonit.* Cn.6: MG 65,39; St. Gregory of Naz., *Oratio* 104 and 18,33-34: MG 35,830.1027; St. Epiphanius, *Adversus Haeres.* l.3; *Expositio fidei* n.13: MG 42,805; St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De vita S. Greg. Thaumat.:* MG 46,909; Ambrosiaster, *In 1 Tim* 4,14: ML 17,475; St. Optatus Milevitanus, *De Schismate Donati* l.1 n.18.19: ML 11,918; St. Innocent I, *Epist* 16 c.3: ML 20,530; St. Jerome, *In Isaiam* c.58: ML24,569; St. Augustine, *Epist.* 78: ML 43,705; *De Trinitate* l.15 c.26: ML 42,1093; St. Caelestine I, *Epist. ad Synod. Ephesin.:* ML 50,539; Theodoretus Cyrensis, *Relig. Hist.* c.13: MG 82,1402; c.19 col. 1427; Isidorus Pelusiota, *Epist.* 26.2930: MG 78,198f.; St. Leo the Great, *Epist.* 12 c.2; *Epist.* 9 c.1: ML 54,624,645.
18. Van Rossum, *op.cit.,* 74-104.

nine, Gelasian and Gregorian *Sacramentaries* are not aware of any handing over of instruments. The most ancient *Roman Orders* before the 10th century speak only about the imposition of hands. The very same thing is found in the *Roman Pontifical.* Eugenius Toletanus, writing to St. Braulius and explaining what things are necessary for an ordination, mentions three things: the bringing to the altar, the imposition of hands, the bestowing of blessing from on high, while the clerics are singing.[19] The first testimony of the handing over of instruments is found in a certain codex edited by Morinus; he thinks it was "composed by an Italian near Rome," [20]and pertains to the 10th century.

The Orientals never had any other matter of the sacrament of Orders but the imposition of hands, and no trace of it is found in the ritual or liturgical books or in the Sacramentaries.

Finally, it should be carefully noted that, in many codices and liturgical books, when the subject treated is the ordination of a subdeacon, the statement is made: "When a subdeacon is ordained, because he does not receive the imposition of hands, let him receive the empty paten from the hand of the bishop and the empty chalice..." (D 329). The same direction is found in the Ancient Statutes of the Church, the Constitutions of the Apostles, Didascalia Apostolorum, Testamentum D.N. Jesu Christi, and the greater part of the Orders edited by Mabillon and Martène.

88. *The minor is proved regarding* b): *the imposition of hands was always used.*

From the rite of Ordination. As has been said, before the 10th century the handing over of the instruments does not appear. However, before that time other ceremonies were added to the imposition of hands. For example, there was the handing over or *the placing of a stole* on the deacon, a *chasuble* on priest, and the *Gospels* over the head of the bishop. Moreover, also in use was the rite of anointing the hands of a priest and the head of a bishop.

These rites were quite ancient. The Book of Orders mentions the imposition of the stole, the chasuble and the maniple: "When the one to be ordained a priest comes forth—a stole is placed around his neck, and he is clothed with a chasuble; and with his right knee bent before the altar, the priests place their hands on him and so he is blessed by the bishop with these three blessings"; when that is over and the "prayers" have been said, the rubrics go on to say: "When this has been finished, he gives him the

19. ML 80,680-682.
20. Morinus, *De sacr. Eccles. Ordinat.* p.2.

manual [it was a kind of ritual or prayer book], and gives him this confirmation... In conclusion, the bishop kisses him and he stands with the other priests."[21]

Sometimes the books of Orders or the Sacramentaries do not mention the handing over of the stole for a priest; this is probably because he was already wearing it, since all the deacons received the stole in their ordination. But the Gelasian Sacramentary, the Missal of the Franks, the Sacramentary Corbiense, etc., do not have this rite, neither regarding the stole nor the chasuble.

The *anointing of the hands* is found already in the Letter of Nicolas I to Rudolphus Bituricensis (858-67), and it is mentioned by Amalarius and by the Pontifical of Milan in the 9th century.[22] But it does not appear in the Gelasian Sacramentary, in the Codex Corbiensis and in the Book of Orders. In England there was an anointing of the head in addition to the anointing of the hands. The anointing of a bishop was always done on the head, not on the hands.

The last imposition of hands appears for the first time in the Pontifical of Arles in the 15th to 16th centuries; but it was done not after communion, but after the handing over of the chalice and paten. In this way the rite seems to be older, and so it was defended already by Scotus as an essential rite together with the handing over of the instruments. However, it should not be placed before the 12th century.[23]

Indeed, since all these rites were used along with the imposition of hands, this first imposition of hands was never omitted; in fact, often the codices hardly mention these rites and special prayers are not attached to them, but the imposition of the chasuble, etc., took place in the sacristy before those to be ordained proceeded to the altar.

89. *The minor is proved regarding* c): *the rite of the imposition of hands was never abrogated.*

For: 1. No document exists by which an abrogation can be demonstrated.

2. The Church made use of the imposition of hands as a rite of ordination even when she handed over the instruments, as is clear from what has just been said.

3. Sometimes rubrics like these appear in the rituals: "Let him take the paten with the host, and the chalice with the wine, and let him place them

21. Ed. Férotin, col.54-55. See G. Ellard, S.J., *Ordination Anointings in the Western Church before 1000 a.d.* (Cambridge 1933).
22. Ed. Magistretti, p.44-47.
23. Martène, *De antiquis Eccl. ritibus* l.1 c.8 a.9 n.12.

in the hands of *each of the ordained.*[24] Therefore it supposes that the priesthood has already been conferred before the handing over of the instruments, and that it was done by the imposition of hands.

90. SECOND PART: *The imposition of hands was the only essential rite in ordination.*

This is clear, because from the first part it is certain that the imposition of hands always was the matter of the sacrament of Orders. That being so, we argue: The imposition of hands was always the *only* matter, or essential rite of the sacrament of Orders, if no other matter or rite as essential was added to it. But no other rite was added as essential for an Ordination. Therefore the imposition of hands always was the only essential rite or matter of the sacrament of Orders.

The major is clear; proof for the minor. From what we just said, it is apparent how the handing over of the instruments was had as something added *after the ordination had taken place* (at least in some rituals), and no one ever dared to omit it, while frequently the handing over of the instruments was omitted. Indeed, in Rome (as we shall see in the next thesis) the Supreme Pontiffs desired that Greek Bishops always be present to ordain priests in their own rite, and they did it with the imposition of hands alone. Moreover, nowhere is there any pontifical document from which the essential necessity of the handing over of the instruments could be deduced. Therefore it is necessary to say that the imposition of hands as the only essential rite has always been the rule.

91. Objections. 1. Holy Scripture recounts the ordination of the Apostles with words that seem to imply the handing over of instruments (Matt. 26:26; Mark 14:22; Luke 22:19; 1 Cor. 2:24-25); for, Christ handed the chalice to the Apostles saying: Receive, drink, etc. Therefore from Scripture it is proved that the handing over of the instruments must be the matter of the sacrament of Orders.

I bypass the antecedent and its reason; and I deny the supposition, that is, that the ordination of the Apostles must be placed in the handing over of the body and blood of the Lord, or in the handing over of these instruments. For, the ordination rather must be placed in the words *do this in memory of me;* because with these words Christ gave the Apostles the power of sacrificing; but he did not do it with those other words *receive, eat, drink,* which refer only to the consuming of the Eucharist.

Furthermore, it is not licit to argue from the way in which Christ acted, but one should argue from the way the Apostles acted at the command of Christ. For, Christ, as the author of the Sacraments, in virtue of the excellence of his power over the sacraments, could confer the effect of a sacrament without using the sacrament; and so with-

24. See Martène, *op.cit.*, 1.1 c.8 a.9 n.16.

out any ceremony or sensible rite he could ordain the Apostles.

92. 2. *The Decree for the Armenians* in the Council of Florence changed the matter of the Sacrament of Orders, because it defined: "The sixth sacrament is that of order. Its matter is that by the handing over of which the order is conferred: thus the priesthood is conferred by handing over the chalice with wine and the paten with the bread; the diaconate by giving the book of the Gospels..." (D 1326). Therefore from the time of the Council of Florence the matter was now not the imposition of hands, but the handing over of the instruments.

I deny the antecedent, and distinguish its proof. The Council *defined this, denied;* it gave an instruction, *conceded. Also, I deny the consequent and the consequence.*

Constantine V, Patriarch of the Armenians, was invited by Eugenius IV to attend the ecumenical Council of Florence; since he himself could not come, he sent some legates to the Council who, after enduring great difficulties in their journey, arrived in Florence when the Greeks already there wanted to leave. Then after some meetings with the Latins, on November 22, 1439, in a solemn session a document was read about the union of the Armenians with the Latin Church.

This document was not published with the decrees of the Council, but it remained hidden until the middle of the 16th century, when Tapper discovered it. With knowledge of the decree, immediately the opinions of the theologians about the document and the matter of the sacrament of Orders divided into various camps.

This document contains various things: some formulas of faith, the Nicene and Athanasian Creeds, the definitions of the Council of Chalcedon on the two natures in Christ, and of the Council of Constantinople on his two wills; then some disciplinary declarations; and finally a doctrinal explanation on the Sacraments.

There are four main interpretations about the worth of this document. 1. It has to do with *a definitive decree determining the faith.* This is the view of Tapper, Billot, Galtier.[25] 2. It is not a decree, but a *practical instruction* in the part that concerns the sacraments; the Supreme Pontiff is not deciding, but only teaching the Latin rites to the Armenians. D'Annibale, Denzinger and especially Quera have embraced this opinion. And it is a fairly common opinion among modern authors.[26] 3. It is indeed a *doctrinal decree, but not definitive or infallible,* because Eugene IV is not speaking *ex cathedra,* as is clear from his way of acting and speaking. Card. Gasparri proposed this solution.[27] 4. Finally, Michel tries to work out some kind of reconciliation of opinions by referring this document to the power of the Supreme Pontiff in reference to the sacraments[28]; but perhaps this opinion is the same as the second one.

25. R. Tapper, *De Sacramento Ordinis* a.17; Billot, *De Sacramentis* 2 th.30; P. Galtier, *Imposition des mains:* DTC 7,1412-1413.
26. D'Annibale, *Summula Theologiae Moralis* 3 n.231; Denzinger, *Enchiridion Symb.* note to n. 695; in the 24th edition this note was changed somewhat. M. Quera, *El decreto de Eugenio IV para los Armenios y el Sacramento del Orden:* EstEcl (1925) 138-153, 227-250; (1926) 327-332; (1927) 54-78, 157-170; Id., *Una palabra más sobre el decreto pro armenis:* EstEcl (1947) 187-207; Hoffmann: OrCh (1939) 169-170; Puig de la B., *De Sacramentis* n.1033.
27. Gasparri, *De sacra Ordinatione* 2 n.1007.
28. Michel, *Ordre:* DTC 11,1320-1322.

It seems to us that the second opinion is the one to be defended. The main reasons for this are: a) The Council of Florence, after many long and painful disputes with the Greeks, approved their sacramental rites; can it be possible that then immediately it approved a decree against the Armenians? To this question Billot and Hugon respond that Eugene IV published the decree by changing the matter of Orders for the Latin Church, but not for the Oriental Church. But really, it would be unheard of that a change in such a serious matter was given to the Orientals for the Latin Church; and also that it would have been given in such a way that it was not made public with the decrees of the Council, but remained secret. Also it should be noted that among the decrees of Eugene IV never was any allusion made to this change.

b) If the Council of Florence had passed a solemn and doctrinal decree, then at the Council of Trent without doubt the theologians would have spoken about it in favor of the handing over of the instruments when they were considering the matter of the sacrament of Orders. However, even though the Fathers and Theologians knew about the Florentine document (the sacrament of Orders was handled in 1563), it seems that they did not attribute any authority to it. Otherwise, in all probability, there would have been a significant debate about this matter.

c) After the Council of Trent, theologians still debated about the matter of the sacrament of Orders; this could not have happened if the Council of Florence had made a solemn decree on this matter; for, the Church would not have permitted disputes of this kind; for she is wont fervidly to protect her solemn definitions.

d) Then the form itself of the document, in which it is not so intent on giving a decree as it is in recommending some quasi formulas, indicates that it is not giving a decree but an instruction. At that time the teaching about the handing over of the instruments as the matter of the sacrament of Orders was actually quite frequent; therefore it is not surprising that the theologians or Fathers at the Council of Florence composed a brief summary from the small book of St. Thomas on the sacraments and gave it to the Armenians by way of an instruction.[29]

e) Furthermore, as is stated in D 701 [in the pre-1963 editions] in the note, the Supreme Pontiffs always preserved the Oriental rites and they did not impose anything new on them. At the very time when the document was read at the Council of Florence during one of the sessions, the Greeks and Armenians explained their rites.

93. 3. The Council of Florence placed the form of Orders in these words: "Receive the power of offering the Sacrifice...." But this form is had in the handing over of the instruments and alludes to it. Therefore the matter was the handing over of the instruments.

29. St. Thomas, *In articulos fidei et Sacramenta Ecclesiae expositio.* Everyone knows that the teaching on the matter and form of the Sacraments, in the technical sense, began shortly before St. Thomas. Indeed, it seems certain that it was St. Thomas himself who applied this theory to each of the sacraments; hence it is not surprising that in the beginning all the applications were not so successful. In this small work of St. Thomas and in the instruction for the Armenians regarding the Eucharist he is talking about the remote matter, not the proximate; and for matrimony no matter and no form are mentioned, but just *the efficient cause.* See Göttler, *Der heilige Thomas von Aquin und die vortridentinischen Thomisten über die Wirkungen des Bussakrament* (1904) 35. M. Quera, *Más acerca del decreto de Eugenio IV para los Armenios y el Sacramento del Orden:* EstEcl (1927) 161.

I concede the major and minor, but deny the consequent based on what was said in the solution to the difficulty given immediately above. The Council uses the words of St. Thomas and is not concerned about the dogmatic value of the teaching. It is giving a practical norm, and it shows that the matter and form must be that which perfects the sacrament. This formula, like the handing over of the instruments, does not appear before the 10th century. All the ancient liturgical books seem to know nothing about it.

ARTICLE II

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDERS CONSIDERED DOGMATICALLY

Thesis 7. The matter of the Sacrament of orders is the imposition of hands alone. But the words by which the sacramental effect is expressed are the form.

Bibliography, as in the previous thesis.

94. Connection. From the historical point of view we have investigated what rite of Ordination always was used and what the matter is for the sacrament of Orders. We found that the latter is the imposition of hands. Now we will treat the same matter in the dogmatic way. The main reason for distinguishing between the historical and the dogmatic approach is clarity of judgment in proposing the various opinions of the authors. For since now, after Rome has spoken it is no longer allowed to debate about the real matter of the Sacrament of Orders, nevertheless a free way remains open to debate concerning the given facts. For, the Supreme Pontiff did not wish, by determining the matter and form of the Sacrament of Orders, to make a decision about the value of the instruction for the Armenians. Therefore it is still permitted to discuss whether at one time another matter was valid, or whether the Church at one time changed the essential rite.[1]

Hence one should carefully note the difference between both theses: in the *historical* thesis we said that the *only* matter of Orders *was always* the imposition of hands; in the dogmatic thesis we are saying that the imposition of hands *always was* the matter of Orders and that *at least now* it is the only one; therefore we are prescinding from the question whether at one time it was not the only one.

95. Definition of terms. We understand the *matter* and the form as in the previous thesis. We are dealing with the fact, that is, we are determining now that the matter of the sacrament of Orders is the imposition of hands.

As in the previous thesis, we do not wish to determine whether for the episcopate and the presbyterate the imposition of both hands of the bishop is necessary for the validity, or whether one hand suffices, as for the diaconate the right hand suffices. The Pontifical document speaks about the imposition of *hands*, but it is not certain whether it wants to determine this point, or only is speaking in a generic way (see scholium 2, n.103f.).

1. See F. Hürth in the notes for the Apostolic Constitution *Sacramentum Ordinis:* PerMorCanLit (1948) 17f.

The one imposition of hands we are talking about is the first one, which takes place in the rite of priestly ordination, and it is the same one in the other ordinations.

The Supreme Pontiff Pius XII has determined the *form* for each of the sacramental Ordinations. But it is evident that the pontifical document does not affect the material words themselves, but the formal ones, that is, the form must be expressed in such words that express the grace signified by each sacrament or Ordination. But with regard to the form, since in the wording of the thesis nothing else is stated but what in general usually is defined under the name of the form, it is not necessary to give a special proof; therefore it will suffice to treat the form in a scholium.

96. Opinions. After the document of Pius XII, *Sacramentum Ordinis,* there can now be no disagreement among Catholic theologians; therefore this dogmatic thesis does not have adversaries, since we are proposing it here separated from the historical question.

97. Doctrine of the Church. In addition to the documents cited in the previous thesis, we add: Gregory IX (D 826), Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua (D 326), the Council of Trent (D 1697-1700), Leo XIII (D 3315) and Pius XII (D 3858,3). The following should also be noted:

Leo XIII in the definition of the nullity of Anglican Ordinations, when referring to the opinion of Clement XI, which he quoted: "Let John Clement Gordon be ordained *fully and absolutely* to all the sacred orders and especially the priesthood...," then goes on to say: "This opinion, and it is important to consider it carefully, did not consider the lack *of the handing over of the instruments* to have any importance: for then the prescription would be the usual one that the ordination should be performed *conditionally.*"[2] This supposes that the handing over of the instruments is not considered to be the matter of Orders, otherwise the ordination would have to be repeated not conditionally but absolutely; but it would have had to be done conditionally, because at that time there was a dispute about this matter, and the Church always demands the safer course when the concern is with the validity of the sacraments.

Pius XII in the Constitution *Sacramentum Ordinis:* "Since these things are so, having invoked the divine light, by virtue of Our supreme apostolic authority, We declare with sure knowledge, and, as far as it be necessary, we determine and ordain: the matter of the holy orders of the diaconate,

2. *Epist. "Apostolicae curae"*: ASS (1896-1897 198. The arrangement of the text is not ours, but the Supreme Pontiff's.

priesthood, and episcopate, is the laying on of hands alone... Hence it follows that in order to do away with all controversy and prevent anxieties of conscience, by Our apostolic authority We declare, and if other provisions have been legitimately made in the past at any time, We now determine that, at least in the future, the handing over of the instruments is not necessary for the validity of the holy orders of the diaconate, the priesthood, and the episcopate."

"But regarding the matter... in the conferring of every order, by Our same supreme apostolic authority We decree and establish the following: In the ordination of deacons, the matter is the imposition of the bishop's hand, which occurs once in the rite of that ordination... In the ordination of priests, the matter is the first imposition of the bishop's hands, which is done in silence, but not the continuation of the same imposition by an extension of the right hand or the last, to which these words are joined: *Receive the Holy Spirit: whose sins you shall forgive...* Finally, in the episcopal ordination or consecration the matter is the imposition of the hands by the consecrating bishop" (D 3859-3860).

Theological note. The thesis supports *Catholic doctrine.*

98. 1. Proof from Holy Scripture. That is the matter of the Sacrament of Orders, which alone is proposed in Holy Scripture. But in the places in Scripture, where it speaks about ordination, only the imposition of hands is expressed. Therefore the imposition of hands is the only matter of the Sacrament of Orders.

The major. For, the Apostles conferred the sacraments according to the command received from Christ. Therefore, if they used only the imposition of hands for ordination, it is a sign that this matter was taught to them by Christ.

The minor. As in the previous thesis and in the theses before that we often said, in Acts 6:6; 14:22; 2 Tim. 1:6; 1 Tim. 4:14; 5:22 (which are the only places in which it mentions ordinations) the imposition of hands is always assigned as the only matter of this sacrament.

2. Proof from tradition. In the previous thesis it is established for certain that the older Fathers acknowledged no other matter in Ordination but the imposition of hands. But it may help to add a few more testimonies: Ammonius of Alexandria, while commenting on Acts 6:6: *they prayed and laid their hands upon them,* wrote: "It should be noted that with prayers and the imposition of hands with the accompanying words ordination and

the dignity of the diaconate was given to deacons from the beginning; and that custom has continued up until our time."[3]

St. Isidore of Spain often speaks about ordination and he never fails to mention the imposition of hands. In his book, *De ecclesiasticis officiis*, he says this: "But that by the imposition of hands bishops are ordained by their predecessors is an ancient custom... Thus our Lord Jesus Christ by the imposition of hands blessed his Apostles, as we find it written in the Gospel of Luke: *Then he led them out as for as Bethany, and lifting up his hands he blessed them...*(Luke 24:50). And in the Acts of the Apostles, at the command of the Holy Spirit, hands were imposed on Paul and Barnabas by the Apostles to make them bishops, and so they were sent out to evangelize (Acts 13:1-3)." Then he explains the ordination of a bishop, a priest and a deacon by the imposition of hands, but when he treats the subdeacons, he say: "When these are ordained, they do not receive the imposition of hands as the priests and deacons do, but only the paten and chalice from the hand of the bishop and from the archdeacon they receive a cup of water with a basin and a towel."[4] This is the same as is found more clearly by the word *because* (*quia*) in the Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua, in the Constitution of the Apostles, and in almost all the Roman Orders, as we pointed out above (n. 87,3).

St. Eugenius Toletanus counsels St. Braulius about what he should do with a certain man whom he found in his diocese "who had not been ordained a priest, but was functioning as a priest. Having been asked [i.e., Eugenius] by the king to ordain him as a priest, because he could not resist the command of the prince, he found this way of proceeding [= pretending]. He led him to the altar and did not impose his hands, and, while the clerics were singing, he pronounced a malediction instead of a blessing. Then what does your prudence say should be done? Please tell me. For, I do not know whether he should be considered a priest, or if those who, having been baptized by him and anointed with chrism, can really be called Christians."[5] Rightly Eugenius has doubts about the validity of the ordination of this pseudo-priest. St. Braulius gives a rather indirect answer, and perhaps from that it could be concluded that he did not have perfect knowledge about the essence of the presbyterate. But in both Fathers it is apparent that the imposition of hands is the only rite known for a priestly ordination.[6]

St. Bede: "They are selling pigeons who give the received grace of the

3. *Fragmenta:* MG 85,1530.
4. *De Eccles. offic.* 12 c.5; c.10 n.2: ML 83,782-791. See *Decret.* 5: ML 84,167.200.595; *Etymolog.* 1.7 c.12: ML 82,290.
5. J. Madoz, *Epistolario de S. Braulio de Zaragoza,* epist.35 p.159-161; the response of St. Braulius is in epist.36 p.163f.
6. On this matter, see J. Madoz, *op.cit.,* p. 161, n.19.

Holy Spirit not freely, as has been commanded, but for a price; who use the imposition of hands, by which the Holy Spirit is imparted, although in this case not for the sake of money but to seek the favor of the people; who confer the sacred orders not because of a virtuous life, but as a gift."[7]

Amalarius, while treating the ordination of deacons, explains the meaning of the imposition of hands in which ordination consists: "By the work of the hands we understand the gifts of the Holy Spirit through the fingers"; and a little before: "We have a certain little book about the sacred orders and I do not know who the author is [= the ancient Roman Order], which says that only the bishop should impose hands on a deacon, 'because he is not consecrated for the priesthood, but for ministry.' Is the author of that book more learned and more holy than the Apostles, who placed several hands on the deacons when they were consecrated...?" And he does not mention any other rite except the imposition of hands, which he then explains: "We understand the works of the Holy Spirit through the imposition of hands." However, concerning presbyters he writes: "Presbyters are appointed in place of the sons of Aaron. It is written in the Book of Numbers: *These are the names of the sons of Aaron the priests, who have been anointed; their consecration by hand has been completed so that they can function in the priesthood.* Our bishops observe this custom; they anoint the hands of priests with oil." However, Amalarius does not consider this anointing as the essential rite of ordination, since he adds immediately: "It is obvious why they do this; so that the sacrifices to be offered to God may be clean, and abundant for the other offices of piety; and both are designated by oil—both the grace of healing and the charity of benevolence." But the consecration or ordination is had by the imposition of hands: "These—he adds immediately—are placed over the Levites [= deacons]... For, when the former are *consecrated* they receive the imposition of hands. What that means, according to what God gave us, we have already explained."[8] Amalarius seems to place the consecration of a bishop in the anointing of the head, and he does not speak about the imposition of hands. But this is so, because for him "according to the authority of the Fathers, namely, Paul the Apostle and Ambrose the Archbishop and Jerome the priest, the consecration of a bishop in order to offer sacrifice was already done in his ordination as a priest"[9]; that is, for Amalarius the presbyterate and the episcopate are not two distinct sacraments, at least not adequately distinct.

If we move on to the 12th century, when the handing over of the instru-

7. *Homil.* l.1,22: ML 94,116.
8. *Liber officialis* [De Eccl. offic.] l.2 c.12 n.11,9,13; c.3 n.1-2; ed. Hanssens, 2,224-227.
9. Id., c.14 p.233-236.

ments was already certainly in liturgical use, there are still many authors who make no mention of it, or place the essence of the sacrament in the imposition of hands. Among them are: Honorius Augustodunensis, Guilbertus Abbas, St. Bruno, Algerius Leodicens., Herveus, Gratianus, Rupertus Tuit., St. Thomas Cantuar., Richardus Cantuar., Petrus Cantor, Hugo Rothomag.[10] But other authors in the same century explain the essence of ordination by the imposition of hands, and afterwards explain the handing over of the instruments as a rite that is secondary or explanatory or symbolic of the power that they have received by the imposition of hands. Hugo Victorinus proceeds in this way: "After the invocation of the Holy Spirit they receive the stole over both shoulders... they also receive the chalice with wine and the paten with a host from the hand of the bishop, inasmuch as with these instruments they know that they have received the power to offer sacrifices pleasing to God.[11] But before he had said that the power of offering sacrifice is given through the imposition of hands.

The words of Hugo Victorinus are repeated almost word for word by Peter Lombard, a certain *anonymous Author,* Innocent III, Stephanus de Balgiaco, etc., and many others are cited by Card. Van Rossum.[12]

Therefore, from these testimonies it is sufficiently certain that the rite of imposing hands was used in the Church and was considered as being essential for the sacrament even after the handing over of the instruments had been introduced.

99. 3. **Proof from the rite of Ordination and the praxis of the Church.** That must be the matter of the sacrament of Orders, which always existed in the Latin Church and in the Oriental Church. But this is found only in the imposition of hands, as it appears in the liturgical books. Therefore the imposition of hands is the essential matter of the Sacrament of Orders.

The major. If a) a rite appears always in use for ordination and also sometimes the *only one* in use; and b) there is no decree or pontifical document from which it is certain that the matter has been changed or some-

10. Honorius Augustodunensis, *Gemma animae* l.1 c.175: ML 172,599; Guilbertus Abbas, *De Pignoribus sanctorum* 12 c.3,6: ML 156,637; St. Bruno, *In 1 2 Tim.* 1.6: ML 153,460; Algerius Leodin., *Liber de misericordia et iustitia* p.3 c.23: ML 180,941; Herveus, *Comment. in 1 Tim.* c.4: ML 181,1430; Gratianus, *Decretum:* ML 187 (he says absolutely nothing about the handing over of the instruments); Rupertus Tuit., *De divinis offic.* L.3 c.9: ML 170,64f.; St. Thomas Cantuariensis, *Vita St. Thomae Cant.* 13 c.12: ML 190,1113 (in Herbertum de Boseham); Richardus Cant., *Epist. ad Episcopos Angliae:* ML 207,160 (among the works of Blessi, epist.53); Petrus Cantor, *Verbum abbreviatum* c.60: ML 205,184; Hugo Rothomagensis, *Dogmatum christianae fidei* l.2 c.2-3; Rocaberti, *Bibliotheca Maxima Pontif.* 22,1347.

11. Hugo Victorin., *De Sacramentis* l.2 p.3 c.12: ML 117,351.

12. P. Lombard, *4 Sent.* d.24 n.9: ML 192,904; *Anonymous Author, SS. Eccles. Rit. Divinorumque offic. explic. ex* Ms. Vaticano 5046, in Van Rossum, 158-159; Innocent III, *De sacro altaris mystrio* l.1 c.5: ML 217,780; Stephanus de Balgiaco, *Liber de Sacram. Altaris* c.9: ML 172,1281; Van Rossum, *op.cit.*, 158-162.

thing essential has been added; then such a rite evidently is the essential rite, and therefore it is the matter of Ordination.

The minor. It is certain from the liturgical documents cited in the previous thesis that the imposition of hands is a rite of that kind; and it is not necessary to repeat them here.

Concerning the praxis of the Church, it is to be noted what Leo XIII said with respect to the decree of Clement XI, mentioned above (in it the Supreme Pontiff ordered that the priestly ordination of John Clement Gordon should be repeated entirely and *absolutely*): "This opinion, and it is important to consider it carefully, did not consider the lack *of the handing over of the instruments* to have any importance: for then the prescription would be the usual one that the ordination should be performed *conditionally.*"[13] What is certain and essential is not repeated conditionally, but only that which is *probably* essential. Therefore this is a sign that Leo XIII at least did not know about any pontifical decree by which it was made certain that a change had been made or an addition of an essential rite to the matter of the Sacrament of Orders.

100. Objections. 1. Several authors and important Theologians considered the handing over of the instruments as a true and unique matter of the sacrament of Orders. Therefore, at least at one time the imposition of hands was not the matter of the sacrament of Orders.

I distinguish the major. And these authors defended this matter as certain, *denied;* as an opinion, *conceded.* We could really bypass this difficulty, which per se does not touch on our thesis, but the previous one. For, in this dogmatic thesis we wish to teach directly that *now* the only matter is the imposition of hands. However, since it really does raise a difficulty, we wish to point out that generally the authors, who dealt with this matter and spoke as the objector says they did, proceeded either by not affirming it but giving an opinion, or by prescinding from it. This took place especially in the authors of the 12th to the 14th century. At that time the teaching about the matter and form of the sacraments had its beginning, and it was not completely fixed. Therefore, since they were not certain, they proposed various matters for the individual sacraments, as we said in the preceding thesis in note 29. But the later theologians, who in an affirmative way said that the matter is the handing over of the instruments, were relying on the Decree for the Armenians, about whose worth we have already spoken, and against which can be quoted he words just cited of Leo XIII, who was well aware of this decree.

2. The Council of Trent did not wish to define the matter and form of the sacrament of Orders. But if the imposition of hands were certainly the matter, it would have indicated this in some way. Therefore, for the Council of Trent the imposition of hands was not the matter of the sacrament of Orders.

I concede the major, bypass the minor, and deny the consequent. For really the

13. *Epist. "Apostolicae curae":* ASS 29 (1896-1897) 198. On this argument, see M. Quera, *El decreto de Eugenio IV para los Armenios y el Sacramento del Orden:* EstEcl (1925) 237-240; (1927) 166-167.

Council of Trent did not wish to give a definition in questions disputed among Catholics, and in this particular case, precisely at that time the Decree for the Armenians had been discovered by Tapper and it was the occasion for the discussions. Nevertheless the Council of Trent sufficiently suggested that the matter of Ordination is the imposition of hands, for whenever it speaks about the rite of ordination it mentions the imposition of hands, as in chapter 3 on the Sacrament of Extreme Unction: "They indicate that the proper ministers of this sacrament are the presbyters of the Church. In this text this word does not refer to those who are senior in age or more influential among the people, but either to bishops or to priests duly ordained by them *through the laying on of hands of the presbyterium"* (D 1697); and in chapter 3 on the Sacrament of Orders, where it shows the sacramentality of Orders, evidently it alludes to the matter when it says: "Since from the testimony of Scripture, apostolic tradition, and the unanimous agreement of the Fathers it is clear that grace is conferred by sacred ordination, which is performed *by words and outward signs* [= therefore the matter and form], no one ought to doubt that orders is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of Holy Church. For the Apostle says: *I remind you to rekindle the gift of God that is within you through the laying on of my hands..."* (D 1766) and he cites 2 Tim. 1:5-7; 1 Tim. 4:14).

101. Scholium 1. *On the form of the Sacrament of Orders.* The form of the Sacrament of Orders is expressed in Holy Scripture by the word "praying" (Acts 6:6; etc.). In the primitive and most ancient liturgical books a prayer is often mentioned in which the grace of the Holy Spirit is invoked. Thus, for example, in the Apostolic Constitutions: "When you ordain a priest, bishop, place your hand upon his head..., and while praying say: Omnipotent Lord... Now also look down upon this your servant, who has been accepted into the priesthood by the approval and judgment of all the clergy, and fill him with the spirit of grace and counsel, that he may aid and govern your people...."[14] In the old *Liber Ordinum* after the imposition of hands this blessing is given: "Brothers, let there be a common prayer from us to God, that this man who is chosen to assist us and for the promotion of your salvation, may obtain the blessing of the priesthood by the granting of this divine office and be enriched with the munificence of the Holy Spirit, and may he obtain the dignity of honor and the virtue lest he be reprehended for anything. Amen. *Prayer for the ordination of a priest.* O God, who commanded that there be an order of elders, who preside over your Church in order to establish the tabernacle of your temple: sanctify this your servant, the one whom we are consecrating with the honor of the priesthood in the Church by the laying on of our hands. May he observe the discipline of the holy Church with the performance of a good life. May he fulfill his accepted office with no fault and be outstanding in the evidence of a virtuous life. Teacher of the people and director of subjects, may he hold on to the Catholic faith in an orderly way, and proclaim to all the true salvation. May he also cultivate his mind and chastise his flesh. May he put his reading into action, and multiply his works by good reading. May his faith be sufficient for him for life, chastity for his priesthood, rest for his humility: so that living in faith and chastity, he may both nourish himself with the doctrine

14. *Const. Apost.* 8,16,2-5; ed Funk, 522.

given to him and give a good example by his works. Amen. May the Lord look upon you with favor. *A prayer.* Fulfill now, O Lord, in Thy priest the perfection of Thy ministry, and sanctify with the dew of heavenly ointment him who is adorned with the ointments of all glorification. Amen." There is added to this the handing over of the handbook and a "confirmation after the priest has been ordained."[15]

Thus more or less unchanged the formulas of ordination are presented, which gradually become longer. In the primitive Orders they are simple, and it is customary to distinguish between the prayers *for the ordination of presbyters,* and *for the consecration of presbyters.* The first prayers follow the imposition of the stole, but afterwards the *consecration* follows, and it is the same Preface, which is read in the current *Roman Pontifical,* and it responds to that very ancient *prayer*, which appears in the *Liber Ordinum* and in similar Gallican liturgical books.

102. *The Council of Florence* in its Decree for the Armenians places the form of ordination in the words: "Receive the power of offering the Sacrifice in the Church for the living and the dead, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit" (D1326). But this formula does not appear for the first time except in the manuscript of the *Radbord Pontifical,* pertaining to the 11th to 12th centuries; ancient authors did not know about it. Moreover, about the value of the Instruction for the Armenians we have already spoken (n. 92).

Pius XII in the Apostolic Constitution, *Sacramentum Ordinis,* determined not only the matter, but also the form of the Sacrament of Orders: "But regarding... the form in the conferring of every order, by Our same supreme apostolic authority We decree and establish the following: In the ordination of deacons... the form consists of the words of the '*Preface,*' of which the following are essential and so required for validity: *Send forth upon him, we beseech, O Lord, the Holy Spirit, by which for the work of faithfully performing your ministry he may be strengthened by the gift of Thy sevenfold grace.* In the ordination of priests... the form consists of the words of the '*Preface,*" of which the following are essential and so required for validity: *Bestow, we beseech, almighty Father, upon this Thy servant the dignity of the priesthood; renew in his heart the spirit of holiness, so that he may hold the office of the second order received from Thee, God, and through the example of his conduct promote right morals.* Finally, in the episcopal ordination or consecration... the form consists of the words of the '*Preface,*' of which the following are essential and thus required for validity: *Fulfill in Thy priest the perfection of Thy ministry, and sanctify with the dew of heavenly ointment him who is adorned with the ornaments of all glorification...*" (D 3860,5).

103. Scholium 2. *On the imposition of one or two hands.* The Constitution, *Sacramentum Ordinis,* determining the matter of this sacrament prescribes the imposition of one hand (*right hand*) for the diaconate and *of two hands* for the priesthood and episcopate. Hence there can be a question about the necessity of the imposition of both hands for the priesthood and episcopate.

Holy Scripture often mentions the imposition of the hand. A diverse series of texts

15. *Liber Ordinum,* ed. Férotin, 54-55.

can be distinguished: a) texts which deal with ordination; b) texts that refer to confirmation; c) other texts, v.gr., treating charismatic healing.

a) These texts concern ordination: Acts 6:6 *praying* [the Apostles] ἐπέθησαν αὐτοις τάς χείρας [ordination of deacons]

Acts 14:23: *And when they had appointed* (χειροτονήσαντες) *elders for them in every church...*

2 Tim. 1:6: *I remind you to rekindle the gift of God that is within you* διά τής ἐπιθέσεως τών χειρών μου.

1 Tim. 4:14: *Do not neglect the gift you have, which was given you by prophetic utterance* with the ἐπιθέσεως τών χειρών τού πρεσβυτερίου.

1 Tim. 5:22: χεῖρας ταχέως μηδενί ἐπιτίθει.

Acts 13:3: and praying ἐπιθεντες τάς χεῖρας αύτοις...

2 Cor. 8:19: *...and not only that, but he has been appointed* (χειροτονηθείς) *by the churches to travel with us.*

Heb. 6:2: *with instruction about* ἐπιθέσεως χειρών, *of the resurrection of the dead;*

b) These texts refer to confirmation:

Acts 8:17-20: *Then* ἐπετίθεσαν τάς χεῖρας *on them and they received the Holy Spirit. Now when Simon saw that the Spirit was given* διά τής ἐπιθέσεως τών χειρών *of the apostless' hands, he offered them money, saying: Give me also this power, that any one on whom* ἐπιθώ τάς χεῖρας....

Acts 19:6: *And* ἐπιθέντος αύτοῖς τοῦ Παύλου χεῖρας *the Holy Spirit came on them.*

c) They act in charismatic healings:

Acts 9:12.17: *And he has seen a man named Ananias...* ἐπιθέντα αύτώ χεῖρας... *So Ananias departed... and* ἐπιθείς ἐπ'αυτόν τάς χεῖρας....

Acts 28:8: *And Paul visited him and prayed, and* ἐπιθείς τάς χεῖρας *he healed him.*

Acts 9:41: *And he* [Peter] *gave her* [Tabitha] χεῖρα *and lifted her up.*

Mark 6:5: *And he could do no mighty work there, except that* ἐπιθείς τάς χεῖρας *and healed them.*

About the children blessed by the Lord it is said: Matt. 19:13: *Then children were brought to him that* τάς χεῖρας ἐπιθή... καί ἐπιθείς τάς χεῖρας αύτοῖς *and went away.* And Mark 10:16: *and he took them in his arms and* τιθείς τάς χεῖρας, *he blessed them.*

Similar texts could be multiplied. But these are sufficient for our purpose. For, as is evident from them, almost always Scripture is speaking about the imposition of *hands.* It speaks about the *hand* only where St. Peter raised Tabitha; in the other texts it speaks about the imposition of hands. Twice the word χειροτονεῖν (Acts 14:23 and 2 Cor. 8:19) is used; nothing can be deduced from that. Moreover, three times (Acts19:6; 1 Tim. 5:22; Heb. 6:2) the word hand (χεῖρας) is used without the article; but actually in these places the meaning is generic, and is equivalent to the Spanish formula, *imposición de manos;* in Acts 19:6 this generic sense is not really clear, but it should be noted that the reading

without the article is not found in all the codices; finally, in Acts 9:12.17 it is found both ways—without the article (v.12) and with it (v. 17).

From these texts one could conclude that in Sacred Scripture the use of imposing two hands at the same time is being reported. But this opinion should not be embraced too quickly. For: a) the texts generally are in the plural number, that is, they refer to the imposition of hands not of one man, but of several; and therefore the text has to use the plural number, even if each one imposes only his right hand; b) In Acts 9:12.17; 19:6 there is one who imposes hands, but either it is said indiscriminately with the article and without the article, or in the second text it is had simply without the article, and therefore in a generic form. c) Finally, there is one text in which the statement is clear about the imposition of hands (τών χειρών μου) of Paul; it is in 2 Tim. 1:6:... the gift of God that is within you through the laying on *of my hands.*

104. But it is not necessary to understand the imposition of hands in the way that it is done now. Often hands were raised in the way in which priests extend their right hand over those to be ordained during the Preface. But we will treat this point later.

In the Greek ritual books generally the word χειροτονεῖν; or the same variety appears also in Scripture. In the Latin Church it is not easy to determine this per se, because it uses a generic rubric: *imposition of the hand* or *imposition of the hands.* Martène[16] published 23 Orders, five of which pertain to the Oriental Churches (14 20 21 22 23); three (12 16 18) treat only the ordination of a bishop; Orders 1 and 7 can hardly be called rubrics. Therefore, from these five remaining we can draw the following conclusion: of the five Oriental, Ordo 21 says expressly that *both hands* of the bishop must be imposed; Ordo 22 prescribes several impositions, both with the right hand and with two hands; the other three Orders, 14 20 23, speak about only one hand being imposed, which Ordo 20 says expressly is the right hand. Thirteen Roman Orders remain; of these, Ordo 17 mentions *both hands*, Ordo 19 *the right hand,* and Orders 2 9 15 have this rubric; "... and while the bishop is blessing him, *he holds his hands over him,* and also the priests who are present hold their hands next to the *hand* of the bishop over his head." But the other Orders, 3 5 6 8 10 11 13, explain the rubric thus: "After the litany, *he places his hand over their heads,* and the nearby priests hold their hands next to the *hand* of the bishop over their heads." If the two rubrics are compared with each other, it appears immediately that there is hardly any difference, since in both cases the priests should place their hands next to the *hand* of the bishop; but in the prior Orders, 2 9 15, the bishop before is said to impose his *hands.* Hence it must be concluded: *of the eighteen Orders* that have rubrics, 5 of them (2 9 15 17 21) require two hands (although not expressly except in two Orders, 17 21), although later they say that the priests place their hands next to the *hand* of the bishop; all the remaining ones, that is, 3 4 5 6 8 10 11 13 14 19 20 21 acknowledge the imposition of one *hand*; one Ordo, 22, prescribes that both one and both hands be imposed. Therefore most of them require that only one hand be imposed.

The texts of the holy Fathers and the Councils could also be consulted, and we would find the same proportion, when they deal expressly with the rite of ordination. For, if they

16. Martène, *De anitquis Ecclesiae ritibus* 2 c.8 a.11 p.34-119.

speak in a general way about the imposition of hands, we would not be able to conclude anything. More important are those citations in which the imposition of the right hand is definitely prescribed, as is present in Pseudo-Dionysius: "Then the bishop, who has been chosen for an episcopal consecration, while kneeling on both knees before the altar, has the divine Scriptures above his head, *and the hand of the bishop*, and in this way he is consecrated by the bishop who consecrates him with holy prayers. But a priest, with both knees bent before the altar, *has the right hand of the bishop on his head,* and in this way he is consecrated by the bishop who consecrates him with holy invocations. Then a deacon, while bending one knee before the divine altar, has over his head the right hand of the bishop consecrating him and he is consecrated by him with invocations suitable for the consecration of ministers."[17]

105. Scholium 3. *On physical touch in the imposition of hands.* The Apostolic Constitution, *Sacramentum Ordinis,* also handles this question: "That no occasion for doubt may be offered, We command that in any conferring of any orders, the imposition of hands be made by physically touching the head of the one to be ordained, although even the moral touch suffices for performing a sacrament validly..." (D 3861,6).

However, this disposition of Pius XII does not lack a historical foundation. As we saw in scholium 2, Holy Scripture speaks about the imposition of the hand in the same way when it deals with Ordination, confirmation and other uses, such as blessings, charismatic healings, etc. In cases of this kind it is certain from the praxis of the ancients, preserved in drawings and representations on different monuments, that the imposition of the hand was not always done by physical contact on the head of someone. To impose hands was said often about the *extension* of the hands or of the right hand to take an oath or to make a promise in some election. Those impositions of hands which are mentioned in the Constitution of the Apostles, Didascalia, the Testament of our Lord Jesus Christ, etc., and in several other documents, for the election of a Bishop or also of a priest, must be understood to be about the extension of the hands whereby the faithful or the priests approve the choice of someone being consecrated for a particular office. Often also this imposition of the hand for a consecration or ordination took place by an extension of this kind. Hence generally it was customary as a synonym to have the Greek words χειροθισία and χειροτονία, which however per se signify the imposition and extension of the hand. But gradually the distinction even in technical church terminology was lost, but not before the 8th century; for, only after the Council of Nicaea II (787) definitely among the Greeks the word χειροθισία is used for minor orders, but the word χειροτονία is reserved for major orders.[18] In the Catacombs of St. Hermetis there is a painting of a priestly ordination, where the bishop and the priests present are portrayed with their hands extended.[19] Rightly, therefore, the Supreme Pontiff does not demand, for the validity of an Ordination, the imposition of hands with a real physical contact.[20]

17. *De Eccles. Hierarch.* C.5,7: MG 3,510.
18. See P. Meester in his review of the work *Teschinu chirotensii i chirotonii:* RevBen 24 (1907) 55-553.
19. In DB 3,849.
20. On this whole matter, see P. Galtier, *Imposition des mains:* DTC 7,1302-1425, especially 1408-1425.

CHAPTER III

On the minister and subject of the Sacrament of Orders

ARTICLE I

ON THE MINISTER OF ORDERS

Thesis 8. The ordinary minister of the Sacrament of Orders is the bishop alone; but a priest, with an apostolic indult, can be the minister of non-sacramental orders only.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 38, a. 1 ad 3; Pesch, 336-339; Otten, n. 376-383; Puig de la B., n. 1050-1062; Lercher-Umberg, n.725-731; Lennerz, n.236-241; Gasparri, 2 n.774; Michel, *Ordre:* DTC 11,1385f.

106. Connection. The ecclesiastical hierarchy and power to confer officially and validly the sacraments is handed on in the Church by the Sacrament of Orders. For, priests are the dispensers of the mysteries of God. But there will be no sacrament, if the minister is not qualified, that is, endowed with the power to administer the sacrament. Hence the importance of this question for the whole Christian life is obvious; its center is the Eucharistic Sacrifice and its nourishment is the grace which primarily is conferred through the sacraments, and its increase supposes the first sacramental grace.

107. Definition of terms. *The minister of the Sacrament of Orders* is the one who has the power of validly conferring the rite of Ordination. It is not a question of licitness but of validity. But the orders are *sacramental* and *non-sacramental* according to whether or not they are conferred by a sacrament. The sacramental Orders are: the episcopate, priesthood and diaconate; the other Orders are non-sacramental.

The ordinary minister is the one who by reason of the Order already received can validly confer an order; but the *extraordinary minister* is the one who needs an apostolic indult to validly confer an order. Therefore, a bishop is the ordinary minister of holy Confirmation, because by reason of his episcopal power he can validly confirm anywhere (although he would do so illicitly outside of his own jurisdiction without the permission of the local Ordinary); but a priest cannot validly confirm unless the Apostolic See, either by the common law or by a particular indult, gives permission for it, although for this a special ordination is not required, because he already has the quasi radical power for it from his priestly ordination.

In the Latin Church three bishops are required for an episcopal consecration, but this prescription refers only to the licitness, but not at all to the validity.[1]

108. Opinions. Against the first part there are hardly any adversaries among Catholics. But in some sense Wycliffe denied the thesis when he said: "The Confirmation of youths, the ordination of clerics, the consecration of places are reserved to the Pope and Bishops because of their cupidity for temporal gain and honor" (D 608).

Against the second part of the thesis, inasmuch as it says that a priest can be the extraordinary minister of non-sacramental Orders, there are no adversaries; but inasmuch as the word "only" is added, and therefore the possibility of an Apostolic delegation of conferring Sacramental Orders is excluded (at least of the priesthood and diaconate), those opposed are Morinus, Many (but he only regarding the diaconate[2]), Lepicier, Lennerz, Baisi, Vermeer, Boularad, Journet, and some others, who admit some facts of this delegation.[3] Indeed, during the past five years a tendency has been manifested in favor or a new opinion.[3*]

109. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Florence* (Decree for the Armenians): "The sixth sacrament is that of order... The ordinary minister of this sacrament is the bishop" (D 1326).

Profession of Faith Prescribed for the Waldensians: "For this reason, we firmly believe and confess that no person, no matter how honest, religious, holy, and prudent he may be, can or should consecrate the Eucharist or carry out the Sacrifice of the Altar unless he is a priest ordained according to the rules by a visible and tangible bishop. We believe three things are necessary for this office: namely, a specific person, that is, a priest, who, as we said above, has been properly constituted for this office by a bishop..." (D 794).

The Council of Trent: "If anyone says that bishops are not superior to priests; or that they do not have the power to confirm and ordain, or that

1. Pius XII, *Const. Apost. "Episcopalis consecrationis:* Nov. 30, 1944: AAS 37 (1945) 133f.
2. S. Many, *De sacra Ordinatione,* regarding the priesthood says: "this opinion [that a priest could ordain another priest] must be numbered among the fairy tales" (p. 149).
3. Lennerz, *op.cit.,* n.236-241; C. Baisi, *Il ministro straordinario degli Ordini sacramentali* (Rome 1935); P. Vermeer: Bijdragen 13 (1953) 262-275; E. Boularad, *La consécration épiscopal est-elle sacramentalle?:* BullLitEccl 54 (1953) 3-36; Ch. Journet, *Vues rcentes sur le sacremant de l'Ordre:* RevThom 53 (1953) 81-108.

3* This matter was treated in the *XV Semana Española de Teología.* In a volume soon to be published will be found quite extensive bibliography, especially in explanations: P. Solá, *Hasta qué punto depender de la potestad de jurisdición el valor de los sacraamentos;* and D. Fernández, ¿Qué supone ya en el simple presbítero y qué le añade el Romano Pontifice para capacitarlo para administrar el sacramento de la confirmación? ¿Cabe discurrir igualmente acerca del sacramento del orden?

the power they have is common both to them and to priests... let him be anathema" (D 1777).

These also prescribe a Bishop for an ordination: *The Council of Nicaea I*, cn.4 and *The Councils of Antioch* (a.341), *Sardis* (a.347), *Carthage II* (a.397) and *Nicaea II.*[4]

110. Theological note. 1. It is a *certain and common opinion* that the Episcopate can be conferred only by a bishop.

2. It is *implicitly defined faith* in Trent (D 1777) that bishops are the *ordinary* ministers of the Sacrament of Orders, even though it does not use the word *ordinary.*

3. It is a *certain and common opinion* that a simple priest is the extraordinary minister of the non-sacramental orders.

4. It seems to be a *matter of faith* from Trent (D 1777) that a simple priest is not the *ordinary* minister of the sacramental orders.

5. It is a *much more probable opinion* that a simple priest cannot be the *extraordinary minister of the priesthood* (some say it is at least very probable, certain and common).[5]

6. It is a *probable opinion* that a simple priest cannot be the extraordinary minister of the diaconate.

111. FIRST PART. *The ordinary minister of Orders is the bishop alone.*

1. **Proof from Holy Scripture.** Wherever in the N.T. ordinations are reported, all are said to be done by bishops, but never by a simple priest.[6]

2. **Proof from tradition.** The Fathers and theologians, since they make a distinction between a bishop and a priest, place the difference in the power of Orders. But by proceeding in this way that show that simple priests can in no way be the ministers of the sacramental Orders. Therefore only a bishop is the ordinary minister of the Sacramental Orders.

The major is clear and does not need proof; the testimony suffices of St. Athanasius, St. Epiphanius, St. Jerome, the *Constitutions of the Apostles,*

4. *Council of Nicaea I* (a.325) cn.4: Msi 2,660; *Council of Antioch,* cn.13: Msi 2,1314; *Council Sardis,* cn.19: Msi 5,29; *Council of Carthage II,* cn.12: Msi 3,872; *Council of Nicaea II,* cn.12: Msi 13,755.

5. F.M. Capello says: "This other opinion is far more common, especially if one looks at the tradition and church discipline, it must be considered *more probable;* but also the other opinion seems to be intrinsically probable" (*Tractatus canonico-moralis de Sacramentis* [1947] 4 p.194 n.299). Pesch says: this opinion [contrary to our thesis] *must not be admitted* (n.669); Umberg repeats the same view (n.945); Puig de la B.: *at least more probable* (n.1053); S. Many with regard to the priesthood says that the affirmative opinion is a fairly tale (p.149).

6. This also occurs in ecclesiastical documents; see v.gr. D 326f. in the *Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua,* in the *Constitutions of the Apostles,* etc.

etc. (R 753, 1108, 1357, 1234,1236,1237.

Proof of the minor. For, if priests were able to be the ministers (at least extraordinary) of the sacrament of Orders, the Fathers and theologians would be saying falsely that bishops are superior to priests *only in the power* of Ordaining, since this also holds for confirmation. But what the Council of Trent (D 1777) says: "If anyone says that bishops... do not have the power *to confirm and ordain,* or that the power they have is common both to them and to priests...let him be anathema"—this does not have any weight against our proof; because about confirmation Trent expressly teaches that bishops are the *ordinary* ministers, conceding therefore that priests can be the extraordinary ministers. But it never said this about Ordination. Indeed, in this matter it did not follow the instruction in the Decree for the Armenians, in which the bishop is said to be the ordinary minister of the sacrament of orders.

Moreover, the CIC says: "The ordinary minister of sacred ordination is a consecrated bishop; the extraordinary minister is one who, even if he lacks the episcopal character, has received from the law or from the Apostolic See, by a special indult, the power of conferring some orders" (cn. 951). Here it is made sufficiently clear that a simple priest, with an Apostolic indult, can confer not all, but only *some* Orders.[7]

3. For, the case can be argued *from its non use.* Actually, if such power existed, without doubt in difficult circumstances of persecution, on the missions and in distant places, the Church would *often* have granted this power to simple priests. But there is no evidence that such power has ever been granted. Therefore, this is a sign that the Church supposes that an indult of this kind cannot be granted.

This is even more evident, because the faculty of conferring minor orders is granted to a Prefect Apostolic, to Abbots, to Cardinals who are not bishops; and the administration of confirmation is also conceded to pastors in certain cases of necessity. Indeed, both minor Orders and Confirmation are not as necessary as priestly Ordination in those special circumstances.

112. SECOND PART. *The extraordinary minister of non-sacramental Orders can be a simple priest.* This is certain from the perpetual praxis of the Latin Church. For often the Supreme Pontiffs have granted this faculty to Abbots, Prefects Apostolic, etc. By the common law Cardinals, who are

7. Famous canonists give this interpretation (see Wernz-Vidal, 4.1 p.230f., especially p. 234; F.M. Capello, *Tractatus canonico-moralis de Sacramentis* [1947] 4 p.188 n.287: "This power, in the current discipline of the Latin Church, concerns only the first tonsure and the minor orders").

not bishops, also have this faculty. This praxis was very ancient: for, the Council of Nicaea (cn.14) allowed Abbots to confer the lectorate on their monks; many other documents in favor of this practice could be cited.[8]

Regarding the *subdiaconate,* there is at least the document of Gelasius to the bishops of Lucania in which he says: "And he should not forget [the priest] that he does not have the right of ordaining a subdeacon or acolyte without the approval of the Supreme Pontiff."[9] St. Pius X and Clement VIII also granted to some Cistercian Abbots the faculty of ordaining their own subjects as subdeacons.[10]

113. Theological reasoning also shows that this faculty can be conceded; for, since non-sacramental Orders were instituted by the Church, it is fitting that the Supreme Pontiff can grant to a simple priest the power of conferring Orders created by the Church.

114. Objections. 1. There is a Bull of Innocent VIII, April 9, 1489, by which is conceded to an Abbot of the Order of Cistercians and to four other Abbots the power of conferring on their subjects the diaconate and the subdiaconate.[11] Therefore at least there is certainty about this concession.

We admit the authenticity of the Bull, but deny that one can conclude from it what the objector says. For, besides other explanations, which have been given of this document and concession,[12] please note: a) what Puig de la B. has on this matter is quite good: "This Bull is granted *for an urgent request:* 'As the petition presented recently for your part contains... Being favorable in this matter to your requests...'" Indeed, this petition, which is described in the first part of the Bull, *does not speak about the diaconate and subdiaconate, but only* (in addition to the pontifical use) *requests the faculty to confer all the minor orders;* but in the other part of the Bull, where it deals with what the Supreme Pontiff concedes, *there is not even a word about the minor Orders, but only* (besides the others which we have mentioned) *about the subdiaconate and diaconate,* and it does it in such a way that if, for the words "subdiaconate and diaconate," these other words "all minor orders" were substituted, the petition and the concession would correspond completely. If we add to this that it is certain that, at that time and in the same year of 1489 when the Bull was issued, there was a coalition of some officials of the Roman Curia who had an interest in producing false Bulls, as Pastor reports,[13] we are easily led to conclude that the words "subdiaconate and diaconate" were interpo-

8. Otten, *op.cit.*, 387.
9. *Epist* 9 c.8: ML 59,50.
10. Wirceburgenses, n.147; Pesch, n.668; they provide some more examples.
11. The complete text of this Bull is found in *Analecta Ecclesiastica* (1901) 331f.
12. Much has been written about this. For a summary see Wernz-Vidal, 4,1,233-235; Capello, *op.cit.*, 195-205; Puig de la B., n.1058.
13. *Historia de los papas* (Barcelona) 8,355f.

lated in place of "all minor orders."[14]

b) Moreover, what concerns the subdiaconate does not cause a problem, because we admit that this faculty can be conceded by the Supreme Pontiff.

c) Regarding the *diaconate*: although we said the opinion is really probable that this faculty cannot be granted, still the contrary is also probable; and there are some reasons on the basis of which the opinion of the adversaries can be supported. For, if we consider the reasons which the holy Fathers gives to show that only bishops can be the ministers of the Sacrament of Orders, they seem to refer primarily and per se to the priesthood; for the diaconate is only a preparation for the priesthood and in order to assist it. Therefore, although we are much more inclined to the opinion proposed in the thesis, nevertheless with regard to the diaconate, we would not defend it to the extent that we will the priesthood.

115. 2. Boniface IX granted to the Abbot of the Canons Regular of the Monastery of Saint Osseythae (in the Diocese of London) that he could confer Orders on his own monks, including the priesthood. Therefore.

We also admit the authenticity of this Bull granted in the year 1400, but again we reject the interpretation of the objector. The text of the Bull concedes that the named Abbots "can freely and licitly confer all minor orders and also the subdiaconate, diaconate and priesthood at the times determined by law."[15] If the text were interpreted as the objector desires, it cannot be understood why the Bishop of London complained that his jurisdiction had been violated. But it can be well understood if the question is not about the concession of Ordaining to the Abbots, but about some bishop doing the ordaining without the knowledge and consent of the Bishop of London. In this way the meaning of the Bull is interpreted in a more fitting way, that is, concerning a conflict (which certainly took place between the Abbots of a Monastery and the Bishop of London) because the Abbot asked the Supreme Pontiff for the faculty "of freely and licitly conferring orders, even major" without having recourse to the Ordinary of the place, that is, he was asking for an exemption. And it was granted to him. The expression "*to confer* orders freely and licitly" is not opposed to our position, because it remains true if the orders are conferred *by himself* or *by others,* which must be designated from the subject matter. This is confirmed by the fact that the Bishop of London, having complained about the violation of his jurisdiction, was successful in having the privilege revoked.[16]

It should be noted that serious authors[17] point out that the infallibility of the Supreme Pontiff is not injured if in a particular case he grants an invalid concession, after relying on the opinion of one or several theologians.

3. The third case concerns the Bull of Martin V to the Abbot of the Monastery of Cella Sancta Maria, of the Cistercian Order, in the diocese of Misnensis; in it again a

14. Puig de la B., *op.cit.* n.1058.
15. Puig de la B. published the whole text with photocopies: EstEcl (1925) 16-19.
16. Puig de la B.: EstEcl (1925) 115f.; Gilmann, *Zur Lehre der Scholastiker vom Spender der Firmung und des Weihesakramentes* (1920) 137: RevTh (1926) 263f.
17. Pesch, *op.cit.,* n.668; Lercher-Umberg, responds to the difficulty in this way: "*I distinguish the minor.* It holds true for things that the Supreme Pontiff does often, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied,* and this applies precisely in our case," n.728.

faculty is granted for all Orders, even the major ones. Therefore.

Also in this third case we admit the authenticity of the Bull and we totally reject the interpretation of the objector. The Bull was issued November 16, 1427, and the concession is expressed in this way: "We are wishing that you and the monastery continue with the privilege of grace and honor; it is granted to you, my son, the Abbot, as often as this would be opportune every five years.... And we also concede the faculty... by our apostolic authority, of conferring all sacred orders on the individual monks of the same monastery and persons subject to you, the Abbot, and the permission for this is not required from the Ordinary of the diocese."[18] The text is very similar to the previous one, where the expression "to confer orders" is true, whether it is done by an Abbot or by another bishop appointed by him "with the permission of the diocesan bishop not being required." The privilege, therefore, consists in an exemption from the local Ordinary. The expression just quoted, "with the permission of the diocesan bishop not being required," is quite certain and the history of the Monastery confirms it.

4. *The objector insists.* The diaconate is a Sacrament. But a priest can be the extraordinary minister of the diaconate. Therefore he can be the extraordinary minister of the Sacrament of Orders. Therefore also of the priesthood.

I concede the major and minor and deny the consequent. For, 1) I rebut the argument: Any Christian can confer baptism. But baptism is a sacrament. Therefore any Christian can confer any Sacrament. Therefore.

2) *The major can be distinguished:* the diaconate is a Sacrament, that is, it is the whole Sacrament of Orders, *denied;* it is a participation in the Sacrament of Orders, *conceded.* – The Sacrament of Orders, as was stated above in n. 18, consists in "the total power whose nature is this—that the whole, according to a certain measure, is in one, but in others there is a certain participation in it." Surely, concerning this participation, part is in the Diaconate and another part is in the Priesthood. For, a deacon receives no power that touches on the validity of the Sacraments; but in the priesthood the power is given of transubstantiating bread and wine into the Body and Blood of Christ, of forgiving sins, of conferring the other sacraments, etc. Therefore it is not surprising that a priest can (probably) confer the Diaconate, but not the Priesthood.

Another reason for this can be given. If the Supreme Pontiff, relying on a probable opinion should concede to a priest the power of ordaining a deacon (and objectively it turned out to be invalid), it would not expose the validity of the sacraments to any danger, because the diaconate is not required for the validity of any sacrament. But that certainly would be the case, if a priest, by reason of an Apostolic indult that is objectively invalid, attempted to ordain a priest, who, since objectively he is not ordained, could not validly consecrate the Eucharist, nor absolve from sins, nor confer other sacraments like these. Therefore the reason because of which from the possibility for the diaconate the possibility for the priesthood is deduced does not at all appear to be fitting.[18*]

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18. The Bull of Martin V was published by Karl August Fink in Zeitschrift der Sevigny für Rechtsgeschichte, Kanon Abteilung (1943) 506-508.

18* We treated this matter extensively in *XV Semana Española de Teología:* F. Solá, *Hasta qué punto puede depender de la potestad de jurisdicción el valor de los Sacramentos.*

5. Suffragan bishops[19] were simple priests, and nevertheless they could ordain priests. Therefore a priest can be the minister of the sacramental Orders.

I deny the major until it is proved, at least before the Council of Laodicea (343-381). Surely Morinus affirms that because in cn.10 of the Council of Antioch it is said: "But the bishop of the city ordains the suffragan bishop." Hence he concludes that suffragan bishops cannot be bishops, because otherwise they would have to be ordained not by one but by three bishops. But both points in this argumentation are faulty; for, 1) it is not necessary for validity that there are three bishops consecrating another one[20]; and 2) the Council of Antioch also speaks in the plural number and expressly says that they are bishops. For, it says: "Although they received the imposition of hands of the *bishops*, and *were consecrated as bishops*...."[21] The expression "The Bishop of the city ordains the suffragan bishop" means that it belongs to the bishop of the large city to ordain the bishops subject to him in the small villages, just as priests must be ordained by their own bishop. *The Council of Laodicea* says: "It is not necessary to put bishops on farms or in country districts, but visitors. But those who are already there should not do anything without the knowledge of the bishop of the city. And also the priests should not do anything without the advice of the bishop" (Kch 525); and in the *Council of Sardis* this was proposed: "Permission should not be given to ordain a bishop either in some village or small town; for them one priest is sufficient, because it is not necessary for a bishop to be there, lest the name of a bishop and his authority become worthless. Those invited from another province should not function as a bishop, unless it is in the cities that have a bishop, or if the place is so populous that it deserves to have a bishop. Does everyone agree with this? The Synod responds: Yes" (Kch 503). From these two councils it is perfectly clear that the suffragan bishops were truly bishops. Indeed, the adversaries have not in any way proved that the suffragan bishops who ordained priests were not real bishops. And this is precisely what they must prove.

116. Scholium 1. *On how many bishops are required for an episcopal consecration. The Council of Nicaea I,* in cn.4, decreed: "It is very fitting that a bishop should be ordained by all the bishops who are in the province. But if this turns out to be difficult, either because of the pressing necessity or because of the length of the journey, let the ordination be celebrated by three bishops gathered together for that purpose, both in the absence of the people and of those who have approved the ordination in writing. But the firmness of what is done throughout each province should be made known to the metropolitan bishop" (Kch 404). Different councils in the 4th century adopted the same rule, such as *Antioch* (341), *Sardis* (347), *Carthage II* (397),[22] and also the *Statuta Ecclesiae Antiqua* (D 326). But already in the previous century St. Cyprian, appealing to the apos-

19. Suffragan bishops (*Chorepiscopi*) were those who were placed over priests in villages and took the place of the bishop in small towns. This office exists only among the Jacobites. See D'Herbigny, *De ecclesia*[3] 2 n.369; St. Isidore of Spain, *De Eccles. offic.* l.2 c.6: ML 83,786.

20. Pius XII has now decreed this definitively: *Const. Apost. "Episcopalis consecrationis"* Nov. 30, 1944: AAS 37 (1945) 133.

21. Kch 499.

22. *Council of Antioch* cn.19: Msi 2,1315; *Council of Sardis* cn.5: Msi 3,24; *Council of Carthage II* cn.12: Msi 3,872.

tolic tradition, said: "For which reason you must diligently observe and keep the practice delivered from divine tradition and apostolic observance, which is also maintained among us, and almost throughout all the provinces; that for the proper celebration of ordinations all the neighboring bishops of the same province should assemble with that people for which a prelate is ordained. And the bishop should be chosen in the presence of the people, who have most fully known the life of each one, and have looked upon the doings of each one as respects his habitual conduct" (R 588).

And doubtless this same rule was the Roman praxis. For, Hippolytus in the *Apostolic Tradition,* even though he does not determine the number of bishops, supposed that several are present: "Let a bishop be ordained who is chosen by the people; when he has been nominated and is pleasing to all, let him assemble on Sunday the people together with the presbyterate and with the attending bishops... From them let one of the present bishops, at the request of all, impose hands on the one to be ordained a bishop, and let him pray in the following words...."[23]

Because of the above, the question arose about whether for validity the presence of several bishops is required in order to consecrate a bishop, or is it required only for licitness. Three main opinions about this were given: 1) the presence of at least three bishops for an episcopal ordination is so necessary for validity that not even the Supreme Pontiff can dispense from this rule. Thus Morinus, Gonet, Tournely (who requires only two bishops).[24] 2) The Supreme Pontiff can dispense in this case, otherwise the consecration will be invalid. Those who followed this opinion are Cajetan, St. Bellarmine, Arriaga, Vázquez.[25] 3) The third opinion says that there is one bishop *consecrating* and two others *assisting him*, and therefore that for validity one bishop suffices. This opinion, which many authors including Benedict XIV[26] defend, *is now the only true one.* It is expressly stated in CIC 954 (1917): "The consecrating bishop must have two other bishops, who *assist* him in the consecration, unless in this matter he has a dispensation from the Apostolic See." And recently Pius XII decreed definitively that one consecrating bishop suffices, although he requires that two others assist him and also recite the consecrating prayers (but this is not for validity); and they are not merely assisting, but also truly consecrating.[27]

This is not something new. For, there are many historical facts that prove that sometimes in diverse difficult circumstances there was only one consecrating bishop, as is narrated about the Celtic church.[28] And the Supreme Pontiffs often dispensed from this rule, such as St. Gregory the Great who dispensed St. Augustine, the apostle of the English (R 2300). In the Latin Church episcopal consecration is reserved to the Supreme Pontiff, who usually designates the consecrating bishops.

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23. Ed. Hauler, *Fragmenta Veronensia* 103; see *Const. Eccl. Aegypt.* 1(31); ed. Funk, 2,98; *Epitome Const. Apost.* 6(16); ed. Funk 2,79-80; *Const. Apost.* 8.4,2f.; ed. Funk 473; *Canones Hippolyti* cn.2; ed Achellis: TU 6,4 p.39; *Testamentum D.N.J.Ch.* 1,20; ed. Rahmani, p. 69.
24. Morinus, *De Sacris Ordination.* part 1, exercise 4 c.2; Gonet, *De Ordine* d.4 a.3; Tournely, *De Ordine* q.6 a.1, *De ministro Ordinis Episcopalis.*
25. Cajetan, *Opusculum de potestate Papae;* St. Bellarmine, *De Conciliis et Eccl.* L.4 c.8; Arriaga, *De Ordine* d.57; Vázquez, d.243 c.6 n.63.
26. Benedict XIV, *De Synodo* 13,13,4-5.
27. *Const. Apost. "Episcopalis consecrationis":* AAS 37 (1945) 133.
28. See *Celtiques (Liturgies):* DACL 2,3023-3024; Gasparri, *op.cit.,* 2,1087.

117. Scholium 2. *On Ordinations done by simoniacal bishops.* There should not be any doubt about the validity of the ordinations performed by heretical, schismatic and simoniacal bishops, since we know from the general treatise on the Sacraments, that the efficacy of the sacraments does not depend on the faith or holiness of the minister. However, there were special doubts regarding the ordinations conferred by simoniacal bishops.

The teaching of the Church was always clear, although at times it was obscured. In the battle against the *Donatists* the foundation of the doctrine was completely established by St. Augustine by comparing and fully equating Baptism with Orders: "For both are sacraments and by a certain consecration both are given to man; the former when he is baptized, the latter when he is ordained; and therefore in the Catholic Church both cannot be repeated. For if when bishops, for the sake of peace, return, and after they have abandoned their error or schism, they are taken back; and if it seems necessary that they exercise the same office they held before, they should not be ordained again, but just as their baptism is valid so also is their ordination, because there was a vice in their separation, which for the sake of unity has been corrected, but there was no fault in the sacraments which are valid wherever they are" (R 1617). The influence of Augustine remained until the 8th century. But from the 9th and 10th centuries "various prejudices, theological ignorance, political and religious passions obscured the doctrine that the great genius of Augustine had made clearer than the light of day.[29] More than once during that time various bishops judged the ordinations to be null and void that were conferred by bishops opposed to them. Indeed, Stephen II, after having removed the usurper of the Holy See of Constantinople, at a convened Council, ordered the re-ordination of all those who had been constituted in sacred Orders by Constantine. Photius seized the See of Constantinople by force and in six days received all the Orders, including the episcopate. He was deposed by Nicolaus I, and the Council of Constantinople IV declared that Photius "never was a bishop, and that there is no reason why those raised by him should remain in the grade of the priesthood to which they were promoted by him." Much has been discovered that happened lamentably with Pope Formosus and those ordained by him.[30]

118. Then in the 10th century there was a big discussion about the validity of the ordinations conferred by *simoniacal* bishops. On the one hand, St. Peter Damianus defended the true doctrine, and with him Cardinal Atto of Milan, Anselmus Lucensis. On the other side, Cardinal Humbertus with Cardinal Deusdedit and Bernaldo[31] denied the validity of those ordinations. The Supreme Pontiffs in this obscure controversy, always maintaining the true doctrine, often in the praxis of the Church, decreed re-ordinations in order to follow the safer course (tutiorism) in reference to the sacraments. Thus Leo IX: "It does not escape our attention that, according to our memory, Pope Leo IX ordained

29. Michel, *Ordre:* DTC 11,1282-1283.
30. On these points see *Réordinations:* DTC 13,2385-2431.
31. Petrus Damianus, *Liber gratissimus:* MGh. *Libelli...* 1: ML 145,90; Atto, ed. Mal, *Scriptorum veterum nova collectio* 6,60f; Anselmus Lucensis, unpublished work, see Dictionnaire d'Histoire, and Géographie écclésiastique 3,942; Humbertus, *Adversus simoniaces:* ML 143,1005; MGh. Libelli 1; Deusdedit, *Libellus contra invasores et simoniaces;* Bernoldus: ML 148,1166.

again several simoniacal and badly advanced bishops."[32] In the *Council of Gerundense* under Amatus, the legate of Gregory VII, it was decreed: "Likewise they decreed that if some churches have been consecrated for money, or by a simoniacal bishop, let them be consecrated canonically by a legitimate bishop. Also, if some clerics, by offering money, or by a simoniacal bishop, have been ordained, in the same way let them be ordained by a Catholic bishop. For, in these cases there is not a repetition, but the real consecration itself, since nothing preceded that can be ratified." Afterwards Urban II said: "... Whoever knowingly allows himself to be consecrated, indeed to be cursed, by a simoniacal bishop, we decree that their consecration is absolutely null and void."[33]

In the 12th century this controversy was still going on so that Peter Lombard began his treatment of the question with these words: "It is also usual to ask if heretics, separated from and condemned by the Church, can hand on sacred orders: and if those ordained by them, when they return to the unity of the Church, must be re-ordained. The words of the doctors make this question perplexing and *almost unsolvable:* they seem to be in great disagreement about this." And he proposes four opinions without saying which one he favors. Commonly, he says, the authors taught that the heretics ordain *validly* (and with the heretics he places those guilty of simony), but they doubted about heretics who had been condemned or excommunicate or degraded; others said that they ordain *invalidly;* others *validly and licitly;* others *validly but illicitly;* finally, others distinguished between those who had been ordained in the Church or outside of the Church by already degraded heretics.[34]

But the teaching of Bruno de Segni, a friend of Urban II, did not lessen the confusion, but rather increased it. He distinguished between those ordained in good faith, and those who knowingly accepted ordination from simoniacal or heretical bishops. Those who were ordained in good faith received their ordination validly, but the others must be re-ordained, because they received no ordination. The beginning of peace after so much controversy began to shine with the *Decree of Gratian,* but he did not yet propose definitely and fully the Catholic doctrine.[35] Commentators on the Decree followed the Master, thus Rollandus Bandinelli (when he became Pope under the name of Alexander III he did not maintain his particular opinion, but acted according to the true Catholic doctrine),[36] Omnebene and Rufinus. But the truth finally prevailed in the writings and doctrine of Hugo Pisani and St. Raymond of Peñafort.

This whole controversy was similar to that between St. Cyprian and the Supreme Pontiff: on both sides the doctrine about *re-ordination in the proper sense* was rejected. The question could be a moral one—about the intention of the ordainer and the ordained, because of which the opinion was made to be obscure. However, if the theologians and canonists of that time had kept in mind the teaching of St. Augustine, as St.

32. St. Petrus Damianus, *Opusculum* 5: ML 145,93.
33. Msi 20,519.
34. *4 Sent.* d.25.
35. Gigalski, *Bruno, Bischof von Segni* (Münster 1898) 184.
36. In *Summa Decreti* (ed. Thaner, 15) he defended the view that the Ordination was invalid, if the ordaining bishop had been consecrated by a heretic; or if the form (i.e., the ceremonies) prescribed by the Church had not been used.

Peter Damian did, and if (which in that whole controversy was perhaps the main problem) political passions had not been so intense, they would have been able more clearly and easily to put a stop to the controversy once it got started.[37]

119. Scholium 3. *On the Anglican Ordinations.* This is only a special case of ordinations conferred by heretics, and should not be confused with what we said in the previous scholium. For, the Supreme Pontiff, Leo XIII, did not declare those ordination to be invalid because they were conferred by heretics. But he had another reason, which will now be explained.

All would say without hesitation that the bishop, Matthew Parker, from whom the Anglican ordinations take their origin, had been duly and validly consecrated, but it is necessary to confess that the episcopal and priestly ordinations conferred by him were invalid, not because of the heresy or wickedness of the bishop, but at least for some other reasons.

Thus Leo XIII, with a definitive judgment, on Sept. 13, 1896 declared: "All know that the sacraments of the New Law, inasmuch as they are sensible and efficacious signs of invisible grace, must both signify the grace that they effect and effect the grace that they signify... The words that, until quite recent times, have been generally held by Anglicans to be the proper form of priestly ordination: 'Receive the Holy Spirit.' certainly do not signify definitely the order of the priesthood or its grace and power..." (D 3315-3316). The Supreme Pontiff said that the same is true for the episcopate; and then he concludes: "With this inherent defect of form is joined the defect of intention, which is equally essential for it to be a sacrament" (D 3318).

As is clear from the pontifical document, the reason for the nullity of Anglican Orders comes from a twofold defect: of form and of intention. History itself proves this. For, in the year 1550 Edward VI introduced the proper rite of ordination in his *Edwardian Ordinal.* He made some other changes in the edition published in 1552. Queen Mary, a Catholic, rejected the *Edwardian Ordinal* in 1553; but when Elizabeth ascended the throne in 1558, in the next year she restored the *Ordinal*, with a few changes, and published a third edition, which has continued unchanged up to the present time.

In the *Edwardian Ordinal* only three Orders are recognized: diaconate, priesthood and episcopate. In the rite of ordination the imposition of hands is maintained, but the Catholic form was changed to this: "Receive the Holy Spirit. Whose sins you shall forgive, they are forgiven, and whose sins you shall retain they are retained. May you be a faithful dispenser of the word of God and his sacraments." In the episcopal consecration the form is this: "Receive the Holy Spirit, and remember to resuscitate the grace of God which is in you by the imposition of hands; for God did not give us a spirit of fear, but of power and love and sobriety." As is clear, these formulas not only omit the words that refer to the power of consecrating and offering sacrifice, but signify the power in such a way that the Protestant meaning of denying a true and specific priesthood, the Eucha-

37. On this whole controversy, see *Réordinations:* DTC 13,2411-2431; Michel, *Ordre:* DTC 11,1275-1278, especially from column 1286; F. Solá, ¿Hasta qué punto puede depender de la potestad de jurisdicción el valor de los sacramentos?: XV Sem. Esp. Teol. (1956) 15-19.

ristic sacrifice, the conferring of grace and all the other things that they either deny or explain differently than the Catholic Church does, becomes patently clear. In the year 1662, when all the Anglican priests and bishops had received their Orders in the new rite, these words were added to the formula for the episcopal ordination: "Receive the Holy Spirit for the office and work of a bishop in the Church of God committed to you already by the imposition of our hands; in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit; Amen; and remember to resuscitate... etc."; and similar words were added to the formula of a priestly ordination: "Receive the Holy Spirit for the office and work of a priest in the Church of God committed to you already by the imposition of our hands; whose sins you shall forgive...etc." Rightly, therefore, Leo XIII said: "But this proves, rather than anything else, that the Anglicans themselves had recognized that the first form had been defective and inadequate. Even if this addition could have lent the form a legitimate signification, it was made too late, when a century had already elapsed since the adoption of the Edwardine *Ordinale* and when, consequently, with the hierarchy now extinct, the power of ordaining no longer existed" (D 3316).[38]

On July 5, 1955 official representatives of the Anglican Church at a meeting of Canterbury and York by a unanimous consent of the bishops declared that the ordinations of the church in India and Australia are valid and that they were surely conferred by the Anglican ordinations. However, since it is certain that the Protestants in India do not admit the priesthood in the Catholic sense, rightly the Anglican Protestants themselves now have doubts about their own ordination.[39]

120. Corollary. From what has been said it is concluded that a schismatic, heretic or degraded cleric, etc., cannot licitly exercise holy Orders. Hence the *minister of a licit ordination* is only a bishop in communion with the Roman Pontiff, and acting according to the laws given by him directly or by the common law. These laws are stated in CIC, tit.6, c.1 (cn.951f. [1917]), and concern the conditions required on the part of a candidate so that he can be admitted to holy Orders; they concern the episcopal jurisdiction, which covers only his subjects within the limits of his own diocese; the ceremonies to be observed; the times and places suitable for ordinations; the record and testimony of the conferred ordinations. They also prescribe the various reasons why the exercise of ordination can be hindered, namely, by some ecclesiastical punishment or by irregularity. But all of these points are treated in Moral Theology and in the course on Canon Law.

38. After the decree of Leo XIII, some Anglican bishops were ordained and consecrated by schismatic bishops, and therefore in praxis it must be seen in individual cases from which bishops the priests received their Ordination.

39. See v.gr. what W. Hannan wrote on July 4, 1955, the day before the declaration was published; and H. Ross Williamson because of that converted to Catholicism: *A Convert Explains:* The Month, Nov. 1955.

ARTICLE II

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDERS

Proposition 1. "A baptized male alone receives sacred ordination validly" (CIC 968,1 [1917]). Hence:

121. *A female is incapable of receiving the Sacrament of Orders.* This seems to be *the Catholic doctrine of faith* with respect to the Episcopate and the priesthood, and *certain* with respect to the diaconate. Indeed this is made clear from the writings of St. Irenaeus, Epiphanius, Augustine,[1] who consider as *heretics* the Pepuzians, Marconians or Marcosians and the Collyridians.

The *Pepuzians* belonged to a sect of Montanists (named for the city of Pepuza in Phrygia) among whom "women are bishops and priests, and they are chosen for the other grades, making no distinction according to sex. For, *in Christ Jesus there is neither male nor female* (Gal. 3:28)."[2] They were also called *Artotyrites,* because in the sacrifice they used cheese together with bread (ἄρτος τυρόν); or also *Cataphrygians* from the region where they lived.

Marcus Magnus, whom St. Irenaeus mentions, deluded some women and urged them to offer sacrifice.

The *Collyridians* formed a sect in Armenia; their women were accustomed to offer sacrifice in honor of the Blessed Virgin Mary.

The foundation of their practice is found in St. Paul: *The women should keep silence in the churches. For they are not permitted to speak, but should be subordinate, as even the law says. If there is anything they desire to know, let them ask their husbands at home. For it is shameful for a woman to speak in church* (1 Cor. 14:34-35); likewise in 1 Tim. 2:11f.: *During instruction, a woman should be quiet and respectful. I am not giving permission for a woman to teach or to tell a man what to do. A woman ought not to speak...* " Indeed, if by the divine law (for St. Paul is acting as an Apostle in the name of Christ) a woman is not permitted in church even to ask a question in order to learn, and also if the Apostle wants her to be subject in all things, much less will she be allowed to offer sacrifice, which supposes that she is in charge, teaches, and so forth. The whole Catholic tradition acted in this way and considered those opposed to it as heretics,

1. St. Irenaeus, *Adversus Haeres.* 1,13,2: ML 7,579; St. Epiphanius, *Haeres.* 49,2-3: MG 41,882; St. Augustine, *De haeresibus* 23: ML 42,30.
2. St. Epiphanius, *Haeres.* 49,2-3: MG 41,882; St. Augustine and St. Irenaeus, *loc.cit.;* Ambrosiaster, *Commentar. in Epist. 1 Tim 3,1:* ML 17,470.

as we have said.

There is no obstacle in the fact that the office of deaconess was conferred on women. For, it was already pointed out above (n.56f.) that the office of being a deaconess was not a holy Order, but at most a sacramental; the same holds for the blessing of an *abbess.* For the latter do not have any power of Orders, but their office concerns the governing of a monastery.[3]

Proposition 2. Unless he is baptized, no man can validly receive holy Orders.

122. This question now is not doubtful; for it is certain that baptism is the door of the Church or of the spiritual life (D 1213), the foundation of the religious life, the door of the sacraments...[4]; but formerly there was a serious dispute about this.

The foundation is simply the will of Christ, who entrusted the sacraments to the Church, and therefore unless one becomes a member of the Church by receiving the first sacrament, he cannot receive the other sacraments. We have certainty about this will of Christ from the doctrine itself of the Church.

The Council of Nicaea I in cn.19, while treating the Paulianists who were baptizing invalidly, since they were using a totally invalid formula, says: "With regard to the Paulianists who subsequently seek refuge in the Catholic Church, it is decided that they must, by all means, be rebaptized. In cases where some of them, in the past, were members of the clergy, if they seem blameless and above reproach, once they are rebaptized, they are to be ordained by the bishop of the Catholic Church" (D 128). Therefore the Council supposes that the first ordination was invalid, otherwise it would not have ordered them to be re-ordained. But the nullity of the first ordination comes from the fact that they had not been validly baptized.

This law of the Council of Nicaea was extended to general cases, as is apparent in the *Paenitentiali Theodori* (ca. 690): "If any ordained priest learns that he was not baptized, let him be baptized and ordained again."[5]

Innocent III proposed that the question about the ordination of a non-baptized man be debated theoretically in his presence and he confesses that there was a great variety of opinions. Here is the argument of those denying the validity of such an ordination: Since baptism is the foundation of the other sacraments, and since no one can construct a building without a

3. For a longer explanation and discussion of the texts of some Fathers, see S. Many, *De sacra Ordinatione* 188-194.
4. *Roman Ritual* tit.2 c.1 n.1; CIC 737,1 and 968,1 [1917].
5. C.2: ML 99,928.

foundation, therefore without baptism the other sacraments, including ordination, are invalid. To this the adversaries replied that for four main reasons the ordination of someone who had not received baptism is valid: 1. The Foundation, or to become a member of Christ, is attained not only through the sacrament of faith, but also through faith of the sacrament; that is, baptism of desire is sufficient. 2. The sacrament of Baptism was instituted after the sacrament of Orders; therefore it does not seem that it must necessarily precede. 3. The non-baptized can receive the sacraments of Matrimony and the Eucharist; therefore it is not so universal that baptism is the foundation of the other sacraments. 4. There are grave disadvantages if baptism is required for Orders; for, it can happen that someone thinks he has been baptized, and de facto he was not; afterwards, when he has become a bishop, this makes all of his ordinations invalid; and if one of those ordained by him becomes a bishop, similarly the ordinations conferred by him will be invalid; and thus it continues in the future

Because of these difficulties or reasons, Innocent seems to favor the opinion accepting the validity of the ordination of a non-baptized man; however, in praxis he embraced the safer opinion and ordered the non-baptized priest to be baptized and afterwards to be ordained, "because it is not understood to be repeated when it is uncertain that it was done"; but he calls this case "doubtful."[6] Later scholastics[7] fully answered the reasons of the adversaries, and so now no one has doubts about this matter. For, regarding 1), the baptism of desire does not make one a member of Christ, except in a beginning way, and therefore in the proper sense he does not yet belong to the Church. Regarding 2): One must not look at the order of the institution of the sacraments, but at the hierarchy of causes, so to speak, that is, to the reason why they were instituted. And it is not at all certain that baptism was not instituted before the death of Christ. Regarding 3): In the sacrament of Matrimony there is a natural contract and a sacrament; someone who in good faith, thinking he is baptized, wants to contract matrimony as a sacrament, certainly contracts it inasmuch as it is a natural contract (unless because of the other person who is baptized the matrimony as such should be said to be a sacrament, as will be seen in the treatise on Matrimony). Regarding the Eucharist, the non-baptized person who receives communion, surely receives the sacrament *materially,* but not formally. Regarding 4) on those serious disadvantages, St. Thomas said: "Such a man if he be ordained to the priesthood [since he is not baptized] is not a priest, and he can neither consecrate, nor absolve in the tribunal of Penance. Wherefore

6. Innocent III, *Epist.* 1.9 epist.54: ML 215,864-866.
7. See St. Thomas, *Suppl.* q.35, a. 3; Tournely, *De Sacramentis Ordinis* q.4 a.4; Perrone, *De Ordine* n.130.

according to the canons he must be baptized and re-ordained...; and even though he be raised to the episcopate, those whom he ordains receive not the Order. Yet it may piously be believed that as regards the ultimate effects of the sacraments, the High Priest will supply the defect, and that he would not allow this to be so hidden as to endanger the Church."[8]

Proposition 3. Every baptized male is capable of receiving Orders independently of his age.

123. Very few theologians have denied that boys before the use of reason can be a subject capable of receiving holy Orders. Durandus, Tournely and Habert[9] are mentioned in this regard. They rely on the necessity of the intention which, either as their own or interpreted for them, is required for the reception of a sacrament. But infants are not capable of having their own intention; but the sacrament of Orders, as a free and burdensome sacrament, cannot be received by the interpretive intention of someone else, as baptism can.

However, the doctrine of the Church is otherwise. For, Innocent III, responding to a question about what should be done with a man who in his infancy (*before the years of discretion*) had received the minor orders and the subdiaconate, said that he must receive the order of diaconate, but that he had already received the other orders.[10] Benedict XIV speaking about the custom among the Copts of ordaining infants in all the minor orders and the diaconate (they consider the subdiaconate among the minor orders), does not deny the validity of the ordinations, but, on this supposition, he gives various instructions and makes a decree about their law of celibacy.[11]

St. Thomas gives the reason for this: "Wherefore the like are unfit [infants] to receive all those sacraments which require an act on the part of the recipient of the sacrament, such as Penance, Matrimony, and so forth. But since infused powers like natural powers precede acts—although acquired powers follow acts—and the removal of that which comes after does not entail the removal of what comes first, it follows that children and those who lack the use of reason can receive all the sacraments in which an act on the part of the recipient is not required for the validity of sacrament, but some spiritual power is conferred from above."[12]

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8. *Suppl.* q.35, a. 3 ad 2.
9. Durandus, *In 4* d.25 q.2 n.8; Tournely, *op.cit.*, q.4 a.4; Habert, *De Sacramentis in genere* (1755) c.17 q.4,118.
10. Innocent III, Epist. *Tuae nobis* to bishop Bonon., in the *Decretales* 5,29; ed. Friedberg, 2,833.
11. *Instructio de Ritibus Coptorum* 20, May 4, 1745.
12. *Suppl.* q.39, a. 2.

124. If infants, who have not yet reached the age of reason, are capable of ordination, also *mentally ill males* can receive holy Orders. However, if it is a case of mentally ill adults, since for them the intention to receive the sacraments is required, if they, before they became mentally ill, wanted in no way to be ordained, then they cannot validly receive holy Orders in their present mental state.

St. Thomas, both with regard to infants and to the mentally ill, made an exception with respect to the episcopate: "But for the episcopate whereby a man receives power also over the mystical body, the act of accepting the pastoral care of souls is required; wherefore the use of reason is necessary for the validity of episcopal consecration."[13] But this exception is not necessary, since the sacrament of Orders does not consist in an act, but in a spiritual power; and this power can be present, even if here and now it is not able to be put into act.[14]

Proposition 4. Some requirements of CIC are necessary for a licit ordination.

125. The main requirements established by Canon Law for an ordination to be licit are: The one being ordained must be *in the state of grace*; for this is a sacrament of the living; and the greater the disposition of holiness is, by that measure the communication of the Holy Spirit will be more complete. It is also required that he be *confirmed* (cn. 974,1,1 [1917]); he should have *the moral character suitable for receiving orders;* and also *the canonical age*, which for the subdiaconate cannot be before the age of 21, and for the diaconate not before the age of 22; for the priesthood not before the completion of his 24th year. The age for the tonsure is not determined, but it is required that the one receiving the tonsure has started the course in theology (cn. 975-976,1). Sufficient *knowledge* is required, which is supposed for the subdiaconate in someone who, according to the judgment of the professors, is doing well in the third year of theology; for the diaconate, if he is in the fourth year; and for the priesthood, if he had completed at least half of the fourth year (cn. 976,2). This study of theology cannot be done privately, but must be done in schools established for that purpose according to the prescribed course of studies (cn. 976,3); Pius XI determined this course of studies in the Apostolic Constitution *Deus scientarum Dominus,* May 24, 1931.

A candidate cannot be ordained licitly in one grade unless he has al-

13. Ibidem.
14. See Umberg, *De Sacramentis* 2 n.921.

ready received the lower grade and for the major Orders the lower Orders are required (cn. 974,1,5 and 977). But this gradation must be observed not only for the Orders themselves, but also the time interval between the different Orders must be observed (at least for the major Orders). The interval between the first tonsure and the Order of porter, or between the other minor Orders, is left to the prudent judgment of the Bishop; between the Order of acolyte and subdeacon there must be an interval of a whole year; between the last Orders an interval of three months suffices. However, if necessity or the needs of the Church require something else, the whole matter is left to the judgment of the Bishop (cn. 978,2).

Finally, in addition to the other requirements contained in Canon Law, for a licit ordination it is necessary that he who is to receive the Orders not be burdened with any irregularity or impediment (cn. 968,1). Ecclesiastical discipline of this kind was already observed in Christian antiquity, since St. Paul imposed some rules on Titus by which he was to be governed in his selection of bishops and priests: *This is why I left you in Crete, that you might amend what was defective, and appoint elders in every town as I directed you, if any man is blameless, the husband of one wife, and his children are believers and not open to the charge of being profligate or insubordinate. For a bishop, as God's steward, must be blameless; he must not be arrogant or quick-tempered or a drunkard or violent or greedy for gain, but hospitable, a lover of goodness, master of himself, upright, holy, and self-controlled; he must hold firm to the sure word as taught so that he may be able to give instruction in sound doctrine and also to confute those who contradict it* (Tit. 1:5-9). St. Leo the Great excluded slaves from the priesthood and especially from the Episcopate[15]; and according to the diversity of times and circumstances the formal decrees of the Church were different.

126. Scholium. *On the necessity of the Sacrament of Orders.* If one looks at individual men, the sacrament of Orders is not necessary for anyone with a *necessity of means* for salvation. For, it is not apparent that there is any case in which someone could not obtain the necessary graces unless he received this sacrament. It cannot even be said that it is necessary for someone *per accidens,* in the way that matrimony is necessary for someone who, without it, cannot observe continence in his state of life; for, no case is found in which this accidental necessity is required. Certainly in a particular case God could call someone to the priesthood in such a way that it would force him to embrace holy Orders under the obligation of an explicit command. But this case would be truly exceptional, and the concern would be about *the necessity of a precept* in that particular case. Moreover, not even such a necessity of precept is had per se, since it leads God

15. *Epist.* 4,1: ML 54,611.

to suggest the priesthood as a way of perfection; and he does not command someone to seek perfection, but he does counsel it.

However, for the *Church,* looked at in itself, the sacrament of Orders is *necessary with a necessity of means,* because it is the means without which in the Church the hierarchy would not be preserved; the administration and conferring of the sacraments would not exist, and consequently the principal fount of the spiritual and supernatural life would be lacking. "Hence it follows that the Church must see to it that there is always a sufficient number of youths preparing for holy Orders. But she cannot obtain this by laws that directly require the reception of Orders; she can do it indirectly through her ministers who strive with all their might to see that families are truly Catholic, that youths are attracted by the exemplary life of priests and their apostolic zeal, that many fervent prayers are said (especially by associations established for this purpose) in order to promote priestly vocations.."[16]

16. Lercher-Umberg, n.724,2.

CHAPTER IV

On the effects of the Sacrament of Orders

127. "That is why the visible, external priesthood of Jesus Christ is not handed down indiscriminately to all members of the Church in general, but is conferred on designated men, through what may be called the spiritual generation of holy orders. This latter, one of the seven sacraments, not only imparts the grace appropriate to the clerical function and state of life, but imparts an indelible 'character' besides, indicating the sacred ministers' conformity to Jesus Christ the Priest and qualifying them to perform those official acts of religion by which men are sanctified and God is duly glorified in keeping with the divine laws and regulations."[1]

From these words of Pius XII three principal effects of the Sacrament of Orders stand out: 1) a special grace; 2) an indelible character; 3) spiritual power. In addition to these, in the scholium we will explain some of the obligations arising from ordination, especially ecclesiastical celibacy

ARTICLE I

ON THE SPECIAL GRACE OF THE SACRAMENT OF ORDERS

128. *Hence I remind you to rekindle the gift of God that is within you through the laying on of my hands* (2 Tim. 1:6) *and do not neglect the gift you have, which was given to you by prophetic utterance when the elders laid their hands on you* (1 Tim. 4:14). With these words the Apostle Paul reminds his dear Timothy of the marvelous internal and permanent effect which the imposition of hands produced in him.

For the sacrament of Orders, like the other sacraments of the living, produces an increase of sanctifying grace in the soul. This is a *special* grace. Thus Pius XI[2] extols it with these weighty words: "The priest receives not only this priestly form, not... just... exceptional powers through the sacrament of Orders, but the priest receives *new and special grace* with special helps. Thereby, if only he will loyally further, by his free and personal cooperation, the divinely powerful action of the grace itself, he will be able worthily to fulfill all the duties, however arduous, of his lofty calling" (D 3756). In a similar way we have heard Pius XII saying that this grace is

1. Encyclical *"Mediator Dei,"* Nov. 20, 1947: AAS 39 (1947) 538-539.
2. Encyclical *"Ad catholici sacerdotii"* December 20, 1935: AAS 28 (1936) 15f.

proper to the *special* condition and office of a priest.

The holy Fathers extolled[3] this marvel in their own way and they said that it produces an internal change, which wholly surpasses external charisms, as St. Gregory of Nyssa said (R 1063). In a splendid way St. John Chrysostom said: "For the priesthood is carried out on earth, but it obtains the level of heavenly orders: and that is right and just. For, not a man, not an angel, nor any other created power, but the Paraclete himself established this office, who was the author for those remaining in the flesh that they might receive in their soul the ministry of angels. Therefore it is fitting that someone receiving the priesthood should be so pure, as if he were placed in heaven with those powers... But if he should consider the things that pertain to grace, he would give little thought to those horrible and dreadful things... For when you see the Lord immolated and slain, and the priest offering sacrifice and praying, and all the people red with that precious blood, do you think that you are still with men and her on earth? Or not rather translated into heaven, and freed from all carnal thoughts with a pure mind and heart you are contemplating heavenly things? O miracle! O the goodness of God! He who sits with the Father on high, in that hour he is held by the hands of all, and he gives himself to those who embrace and accept him... Those things are to be admired [the miracle when fire fell from heaven on the sacrifice prepared by Elijah, 1 Kings 18] which are fully amazing. Remove yourself from there to what is now being done, and you will see not only marvelous things, but things surpassing all astonishment. For the priest brings down not just fire, but the Holy Spirit...."[4]

The Council of Trent with explicit words and under anathema teaches: "If anyone says that by sacred ordination the Holy Spirit is not given... let him be anathema" (D 1774, see 1766). And in *the Ritual books the Holy Spirit* is also invoked to descend on those being ordained. And in a special way it is the *sevenfold* Spirit. Thus in the ordination of a deacon this is the formula: "Send forth, we beseech you, O Lord, the Holy Spirit on him, whereby in faithfully carrying out the work of your ministry he may be strengthened by the assistance *of your sevenfold grace."* The Bishop exhorts those being ordained priests: "Since you have been numbered among the seventy men and elders, if with the help of the *sevenfold Spirit* you

3. The Fathers, especially the Greeks, greatly extol the communication of the Holy Spirit through the imposition of hands, v.gr. Origen: MG 16c,3020; St. Athanasius, *Epist. ad Drac.* 2,3,4: MG 25,524.525-528; St. Basil, *Epist.* 188,1: MG 32,669-670; St. Gregory Naz., *Orat.* 43,78: MG 36,600; St. John Chrysostom, *De Sacerdotio* 3,4-5: MG 48,642-643; *Homil. de resurrectione mort.* n.8: MG50,432; *In 2 Tim* homil.1,2: MG 62,602-603, etc.; St. Gregory of Nyssa, *In Baptismo Ch.:* MG 46.581; and many others. Among the Latin, v.gr. Ambrosiaster, *Quaest. Veter. et Nov. Test.* Q.93,2: ML 35,2287 (in the works of St. Augustine); *In 1 Tim* 4,14: ML 17,475.

4. *De Sacerdotio* l.3 c.4: MG 48,641.

guard the decalogue of the law, you will be upright and mature both in knowledge and in works."[5] Therefore, for a special reason the gifts of the Holy Spirit are conferred on the newly ordained. And this is as it should be, for the care of souls is committed to bishops and priests; for that purpose the fullness of all the gifts of the Holy Spirit will be necessary.

129. With the increase of sanctifying grace, *special helps* and *the right* to obtain further graces are also given. For the grace, which is conferred in this sacrament, is given "so that one may be a suitable minister of Christ" (D 1326). This suitability not only demands internal holiness, but also a certain aptitude in carrying out his spiritual ministry on the same spiritual order. Wherefore together with the increase of habitual grace, the right or title is given to the ordained to the graces or actual helps which per se are not granted except in the time or occasion when it is needed. The right or title to these helps is conferred in the ordination itself, unless it is prevented by some obstacle; in such a case the title is not given unless it revives with the sacrament. This right or title is never lost, but it can be rendered inefficacious, if after ordination a grave sin is committed, but when it is forgiven the efficacious title is recuperated.

In order to keep this grace, to nourish it and perhaps recuperate it, Pius XI[6] exhorts priests to make Spiritual Exercises: "From holy retreats [of spiritual exercises] of this kind such usefulness can also at times flow forth, that one, who has entered 'in sortem Domini' not at the call of Christ himself but induced by his earthly motives, may be able 'to stir up the grace of God'; for since he is now bound to Christ and the Church by an everlasting bond, he can accordingly do nothing but adopt the words of St. Bernard: 'For the future make good your ways and your ambitions and make holy your ministry; if sanctity of life did not precede, at least let it follow.' The grace which is commonly given by God and is given in a special manner to him who accepts the sacrament of orders, will undoubtedly aid him, if he really desires it, no less for amending what in the beginning was planned wrongly by him, than for executing and taking care of the duties of his office" (D 3755-3756).

5. *Pontificale Romanum* part 1, De sacris Ordinibus.
6. Encyclical *"Ad catholici sacerdotii"* December 20, 1935: AAS 28 (1936) 50.

ARTICLE II

ON THE CHARACTER CONFERRED IN THE SACRAMENT OF ORDERS

130. The doctrine on the character was already considered in the treatise on the Sacraments in general (tr.1, nn.50-65); now only those aspects of it will be treated that refer in a special way to the character conferred in the Sacrament of Orders.

1. The first function of the character is to configure the ordained man to Christ. Pius XI says about the priestly character: "The priest is the minister of Christ... He is indeed 'another Christ'; for, in some way, he is himself a continuation of Christ" (D 3755). And Pius XII: "The visible and external priesthood of Jesus Christ... not only imparts grace... but it imparts an indelible 'character' besides, indicating the sacred ministers' conformity to Jesus Christ the Priest...."[7]

2. Another effect of the character is *to confer a special power over holy things,* so that whoever has the character can, on his own right and as an ordinary minister, at least legitimately, perform holy rites. We say *at least legitimately,* because there are some things that a simple layman can do validly as, for example, bring the Eucharist to the faithful. But in this case a deacon acts legitimately and as a true ordinary minister; for, by reason of the diaconal character, he exercises his ministry in his own right. But faithful laymen, or those who have received minor orders, if at times they exercise diaconal functions, either they do it illegitimately or, if they have obtained a dispensation or permission in special cases, they do it as *extraordinary* ministers and they are not using their own right.

3. The character, besides its physical entity, also has a *moral power* joined to it, which is lost along with earthly life. Thus priests retain in the next life also indelibly their priestly character, but they cannot offer the sacrifice of the Mass and perform the other priestly functions.

131. There are three sacramental Orders: Diaconate, Priesthood and Episcopate; therefore these three orders imprint a character. This, at least regarding the priesthood, was defined as a matter of faith in the Councils of Florence and Trent (D 1313, 1609, 1774), when these Councils decreed that a character is imprinted in the Sacrament of Orders. Regarding the other two Orders, which is held as a certain doctrine, there is the following explanation:

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7. Encylical "*Mediator Dei*" November 20, 1947: AAS 39 (1947) 538-539.

Therefore, since there are three Orders that imprint a character, there has been a discussion *about the number and species of the character.* For, the character can be conceived: 1) *one numerically and three specifically,* that is, what is received in the diaconate is amplified in the other Orders; 2) *specifically one and numerically three,* that is, the specifically same character is received in each Order and it is as it were placed over the other; 3) there are *three characters numerically and specifically distinct*—one for each Ordination.

In the first case (which is defended by Paludanus, Vázquez, Coninck[8] and generally by Thomists) it can be explained in two ways: a) the character that is received in the first ordination, afterwards in the other ordinations by an extrinsic title is applied by God to the power of the other Orders. This is the position of the three authors just mentioned. b) The first character is amplified in the later Ordinations not just in an intensive way, but also extensively. It is really one character that is virtually multiple. It is usually defended in this way by Thomists.[9]

In the second case, the character is received in each Ordination with the same intensity and extension. Therefore there is a quasi sum of characters, or a superposition of the character, whereby the advocates of this opinion say that a greater intensity in the character follows, not by reason of each one, but because of the increase of the number.

The third case is the more common opinion, and admits, for each sacrament, a different character that is numerically and specifically distinct. But this distinction does not refer to the intensity, but rather to the extension of the power.

132. The second explanation seems to be more difficult; for, in that hypothesis it is not understood how the power is different in the different Orders, if the character, conferring the power, is specifically the same. And it cannot be admitted, as is quite clear, that the superposition of the character increases the power, since not the number but the quality of the character is what is important, since the diversity of power depends on that.

The first and third opinions sufficiently explain the difference of the power in the different Orders; the third opinion is much better, which also has in its favor CIC 951 [1917], which speaks about the *episcopal character*; moreover, it has in its favor the precept of the Church ordering that a priest who was not a deacon must be positively ordained in the diaconate.[10]

8. Paludanus, *In 4* d.24 q.7 n.4; Vázquez, d.240 c.5 n.54; see d.239 c.5 n.56.
9. However there never has been a concordant opinion of Thomists on this matter, as Billuart himself admits (*Summa S. Thomae* 3, De Sacra Ordinat., d.4 a.2), and Billot, *De Sacramentis* 2,306-308, etc.
10. Innocent III, *Epist ad Episc. Bononiae,* in the *Decretales* 5,29; ed. Friedberg, 2,833.

Indeed, according to the first opinion, the episcopal character contains the fullness of the character, and the priestly character comprehends also the diaconal; hence someone who would be consecrated a bishop directly, would already implicitly receive the orders of diaconate and the priesthood. But this last point does not agree with the obligation of ordaining in the diaconate a priest who has not received the diaconate.[11]

Moreover, Lennerz has this to say about the character: "Without doubt in sacramental Ordination a power is handed on and a character is imprinted.

But concerning the nature of the character from the dogmatic point of view it is certain only that it is an indelible sign... Theologians have speculated much about the nature and function of the character, but they have not reached a consensus about it."[12]

133. NOTE. *Minor orders* are not a sacrament, but a *sacramental,* and therefore they do not produce any grace *ex opere operato,* but obtain the effects "both by way of constitutive consecrations and by way of invocative consecrations."[13] Therefore Lennerz again writes: "In the Latin Church orders below the subdiaconate gradually lost their importance as offices, and they became steps by which one ascends to the diaconate or priesthood, and also as such were not considered to be necessary. Today in the Latin Church they are mere steps to the higher orders without any practical value."[14] Regarding the effects of the *subdiaconate,* it is on the same level as the minor orders.

ARTICLE III

ON THE SPIRITUAL POWER CONFERRED IN ORDERS

134. The spiritual power, which is conferred in Orders, is tied to the character; all agree about this and it is for this purpose that the character is imprinted. However, we already said that the power is separable from the character, since in the next life the character remains without the power.[15] It is for this reason that we have separated the treatment of the power from the character.

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11. On the character, see B. Duret, *De characteribus sacramentalibus expositio methodologica-speculativa:* Xenia Thomistica 2 (1925) 541f.
12. *De Sacramento Ordinis* n.182.2 p.113.
13. F. Diekamp, *Theologiae Dogmat. Manuale* 4,409 (ed. 1934).
14. *De Sacramento Ordinis* n.188 p.113.
15. See Tanner, d.7 q.2 dub.5 n.159.

The power given in Orders pertains directly to the priesthood. About this as it were infinite power and dignity St. John Chrysostom says wonderfully: "If someone considers how great it is, namely, that a man of flesh and blood is constituted next to that blessed and immortal nature, then he fully understands with what great honor the Spirit has crowned priests with his grace. For, through them these things are done and others not inferior to them, which pertain to the nature of our dignity and salvation. For, those who dwell on the earth and remain there have been commissioned to dispense things that are in heaven, and they have received a power which God has not given to angels or archangels... Indeed, those who live on earth have the power of binding, not just bodies alone; but this bond touches the soul itself and goes beyond the heavens; and whatever priests do here below, God confirms on high; God himself ratifies the sentence of his servants. For what else did he given them but power over all heavenly things?... For these are the ones, these are the ones, to whom spiritual birth and generation through baptism have been confided; through them we put on Christ, and we are buried with the Son of God and made members of that blessed head... Not in punishing alone, but also in being benefactors God has given more power to priests than to parents: and there is as much difference between both of them as there is between the present and the future life... If those to whom the high offices of cities have been confided, unless they are very prudent and vigilant, have often brought both the republic and themselves to disaster, one who takes to himself the adorned spouse of Christ, seems to you to be in need of such great power, both his own and what is given from heaven so that he does not sin."[16] On the same high level St. Gregory of Nyssa said: "Thus the mystical oil, thus the wine, since they are things of little worth before the blessing, after the sanctification, which proceeds from the Spirit, both of them work excellently. Likewise, the same power of the word also makes the priest holy and worthy of honor, separated from the community of the people by the newness of his blessing. For since yesterday and in time past he was one of the multitude and the people, suddenly he is made a teacher, presider, doctor of piety, the protector of hidden mysteries: and these things happen to him, even though nothing has changed in his body or form; but with regard to his external appearance—he is who he was, but now he has an invisible soul changed for the better by invisible power and grace."[17]

With grave words the bishop explains this power to the deacons in his exhortation before the Ordination: "Having been raised, beloved sons, to

16. *De Sacerdotio* l.3 c.5-6: MG 48,643-644.
17. *In Baptismo Ch.:* MG 46,581-582.

the Order of Deacon, think carefully about the lofty grade of the Church you are assuming. For, the deacon must assist at the altar, baptize and preach... and such great dignity has been given to him [of the tribe of Levi], that no one, except from his tribe, would dare to officiate at the divine worship and function... And you, beloved sons, who have accepted the name from your paternal inheritance, stand free of all carnal desires... And because you are co-ministers and cooperators of the Body and Blood or the Lord, be far removed from all enticements of the flesh...."

And the Bishop says to priests in their Ordination: "Having been consecrated, beloved sons, in the office of the priesthood, take pains to receive it worthily and once received carry it out in a praiseworthy manner. For, the priest must confer the sacraments, bless, preside, preach, and baptize. Certainly with great fear one must ascend to such a grade, and see to it that heavenly wisdom, good morals, and the constant practice of justice commend those chosen for this office... Therefore, you should strive to live in a worthy manner so that you merit to be chosen, by the grace of God, as a helper for Moses and the twelve Apostles, that is, the Catholic bishops... Therefore beloved sons..., acknowledge what you are doing; imitate what you handle; since you celebrate the mystery of the Lord's death, strive to mortify your members from all vices and evil desires. May your teaching be a spiritual medicine for the people of God; may the odor of your life be a delight for the Church of Christ; so that by your preaching and your good example you may build up the house, that is, the family of God, so that we may not merit to be condemned by the Lord because of your promotion, or you be condemned for assuming such an office, but rather merit to be rewarded." The Supreme Pontiffs Pius XI and Pius XII in a marvelous way have extolled the power handed on in the Sacrament of Orders.

135. As is evident from the already cited liturgical books, this spiritual power pertains to the office for which they are ordained, and it is that which renders the ordained fitting to duly exercise their office. It is a power of orders, not of jurisdiction, so that "he who once has been a priest cannot again become a layman" (D 1774); this applies also to the diaconate, that is, the power once given cannot be lost, even though a priest may be reduced to the lay state; and so priestly acts performed in such a case are surely valid but illicit (with the exception of those cases where they have jurisdiction for validity). This power is not lost except with the loss of earthly life. When treating the individual Orders we have already explained the nature of the power contained in each of the Orders.

136. Although this power makes the ordained man suitable to duly perform his offices, this does not mean that his own activity and study should be neglected. For, this power is not charismatic, but it is one that requires the cooperation of man, in all those areas which can be mastered by his own natural powers. It is necessary for the priest to preside, to preach...; the priestly character grants to him the official power and authority to perform these functions; but he must obtain for himself suitable knowledge by study and reading. Therefore the Priest, initiated into holy Orders, *chosen from among men, is appointed to act on behalf of men in relation to God* (Heb. 5:1) must be eminent for his knowledge and doctrine, for his piety and good morals, so that men, seeing his good works, may glorify the Father who is in heaven (Matt. 5:16). And in every way priests should be such that men esteem them *as servants of Christ and stewards of the mysteries of God* (1 Cor. 4:1; 2 Cor. 6:4).

137. Scholium. *On ecclesiastical celibacy.* Since we have dealt with the effects of the Sacrament of Orders, and at the same time have indicated some of the things that the Church desires in her priests, and the priestly state also demands, it seems now opportune to treat ecclesiastical celibacy, or to make a few comments about it.

Ecclesiastical law forbids priests in the Latin Church to marry, or sacred ordination to be conferred on married men who have a permanent bond of marriage. That the law of celibacy is not of divine origin is clear from the fact that the Catholic Church does not require the Oriental Churches to observe this law, and she has also at times allowed some exceptions from it.[18]

It is not fully certain when the law of celibacy began, or by what precise decree it was sanctioned. In the 3rd century it seems that the praxis of celibacy was already very common, which the holy Fathers based on the Apostles. Tertullian says that the Apostles were continent or eunuchs[19] St. Jerome says the same thing.[20] Concerning St. Peter it is certain, because of his mother-in-law, that he had a wife, but no mention is made of her; for this reason the common opinion among the ancients was that he left his wife after Pentecost, or observed continence. And it is in this sense that some interpret the words of St. Paul: *Do we not have the right to be accompanied by a wife, as the other Apostles and the brethren of the Lord and Cephas?* (1 Cor. 9:5); it is as if the Apostle were speaking about the wives which they had before their apostolate, and after their apostolate they had them no longer as wives, but as sisters. However, others see in this

18. The Church sometimes, for serious reasons, relaxes the law of celibacy in particular cases; but generally a priest is reduced to the lay state. Recently, because of the disadvantages that some Protestant ministers have experienced on converting to the Catholic Church if they were required to relinquish the priestly office or matrimony, the Church, having examined individual cases and not by way of a general law, has been prepared, in these very special circumstances, to permit that such pastors receive holy Orders in the Catholic Church and to remain married; the Church has done this more than once since 1952.
19. *De Monogamia* c.8: ML 2,939.
20. *Adversus Iovinian.* 1,26: ML 23,247.

text pious women, who followed and served the Apostles in domestic chores, as we read in the Gospels happened with Christ.[21]

138. *The Council of Illiberitanus* (ca. 306) cn.33 ordains: "It ordered completely to prohibit bishops, priests and deacons, or all clerics active in ministry, to abstain from their spouses and not to generate sons; but whoever shall have done this, let him be removed from the honor of the clergy."[22] But this precept supposes a more general law, which the Council of Illiberitanus, by adding a punishment, intends to enforce. It appeals more explicitly to a certain law, but also to one existing for a long time. St. Siricius says: "Let us come now to the most sacred orders of the clergy, which we find so abused and so disorderly... For we have learned that very many priests and levites of Christ, after long periods of their consecration, have begotten offspring from their wives as well as by shameful intercourse, and they defend their crime by this excuse, that in the Old Testament it is read that the faculty of procreating was given to the priests as ministers... Therefore the Lord Jesus, when he had enlightened us by his coming, testifies is the Gospel, that *he came to fulfill the Law, not to destroy it* (Matt. 5:17). And so he has wished the beauty of the Church, whose spouse he is, to radiate with the splendor of chastity, so that on the day of judgment, when he will have come again, he may be able to find her *without spot or wrinkle* (Eph. 5:27) as he instituted her through his Apostle. All priests and levites *are bound by the indissoluble law* of these sanctions, so that from the day of our ordination, we give up both our hearts and our bodies to continence and chastity, provided only that through all things we may please our God in these sacrifices which we daily offer. *But those who are in the flesh,* as the vessel of election says, *cannot please God* (Rom. 8:8)" (D 185). Many documents are found from this time in which the law of celibacy is seen to be in existence.[23]

139. The oriental church also observed the law of celibacy, as St. Jerome says: "What do the churches of the Orient do? What about those of Egypt and the Apostolic See, who either accept virginal clerics, or the continent, or if they happen to have wives, do they not cease to be a husband?"[24] And St. Epiphanius is even more clear: "Surely a man who is still living in matrimony and taking care of his children, even though he is the husband of one wife, the Church does not in any way accept for the order of a deacon, priest, bishop or archdeacon; but she accepts only a man, who abstains himself

21. Thus Tertullian, *De Monogamia* c.8: ML 2,939; St.Augustine, *De opere monach.* C.4,5: ML 40,552.
22. The grammatical sense of this canon causes a difficulty: "*It ordered... to prohibit* bishops... to abstain from their spouses"... and there are not lacking Protestants who quote this canon of the Council of Illiberitanus in order to show that the law of celibacy did not exist in *the Church of Christ* (Samuel Vila, *Los Fuentes del Cristianismo* 52). But evidently, from the context, the meaning is absolutely the opposite: *to prohibit that they use their wives.* This is clear from the Council of Worms (in 868) in which the canon of Illiberitanus is quoted in this way: "It ordered that bishops, priests, deacons, and subdeacons abstain from their wives, and not to generate children; but if they violate this decree, let them be expelled from the honor of the clergy" (cn.9: Msi 15,871. See also Pius XI, Encyclical "*Ad catholici sacerdotii*": AAS 28 (1936).
23. On this matter the letter of Siricius to the *Episcopos Aphros. (Epist.,* 1,5,10: ML 13,1155) is excellent; see also the letter of Innocent I (*Epist.* 2 c.9 n.12; *Epist.* 6 c.1 n.2: ML 40,475-476, 496-497) and the letter of Leo the Great (*Epist.* 14 n.4: ML 54,672).
24. *Contra Vigilant.* N.2: ML 23,340.

from the intimacy of a wife or has been separated from her, which happens especially in those places where the ecclesiastical laws are carefully observed."[25]

With these last words St. Epiphanius implies that the ecclesiastical laws were not observed in the whole Orient, and this took place especially after the break with the West. Therefore the primeval ecclesiastical law derived from Christ and from the example of the Apostles,[26] while it was preserved with great care in the West, in the Orient gradually ceased to be observed, or it continued with a more lenient observance, and this happened not without serious damage to the whole Oriental Church.

There is no one who does not see—a point that needs no further explanation-- the advantages that the Church gains from ecclesiastical celibacy, and the reasons why she prescribes and more and more urges this law in her ministries.

25. *Haeres.* 59 n.4: MG 41,1021-1024.

26. There is really not one opinion of theologians about the first beginning of the law of celibacy, and since we do not have explicit documents about it, we can hardly say anything for certain about both sides of the question. But the reasons that trace the law of celibacy back to the Apostles seem to be more valid. That is especially the case if the law is understood in a more general sense and as a type of counsel during the first years when it was not easy to find celibate men suitable for establishing and ruling churches. Gradually the doctrine itself of the Church extolled the dignity of the priesthood and the merit of virginity, and so it became a law which, perhaps at first only by way of counsel, became more the rule.

BOOK II

On matrimony

INTRODUCTION

140. *So God created man in his own image, in the image of God he created him; male and female he created them. And God blessed them, and God said to them, 'Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and over every living things that moves upon the earth'* (Gen. 1:27-28).

With these simple words Moses describes the institution of human society, for which God indicated the procreation of children: *Be fruitful and multiply.* But men must be fruitful and multiply not just in any way whatsoever, but by *Matrimony,* whose holiness (even in the natural law) God wished to signify by the marvelous formation of the first woman from the first man: *Then the Lord God said, 'It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make a helper fit for him.' So out of the ground the Lord God formed every beast of the field and every bird of the air, and brought them to the man to see what he would call them... But for the man there was not found a helper fit for him. So the Lord God caused a deep sleep to fall upon the man, and while he slept he took one of his ribs and closed up its place with flesh; and the rib which the Lord God had taken from the man he made into a woman and brought her to the man. Then the man said, 'This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; and shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of Man. Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife, and they become one flesh* (Gen. 2:18-24).

The *holiness,* therefore, of matrimony flows from the fact that the woman was formed in a deep sleep or in ecstasy[1] or revelation and brought to Adam, who found only in her a helper fit for himself, and he recognized a great mystery operating in himself. And from that Pius XI deduces the excellence of matrimony: "How great is the *dignity* of chaste wedlock may be judged best from this that Christ our Lord, Son of the Eternal Father, having assumed the nature of fallen man, not only, with his loving desire of compassing the redemption of our race, ordained it in an especial manner as the principal and foundation of domestic society and therefore of all human intercourse, but also raised it to the rank of a truly and great sacrament of the New Law, restored it to the original purity of its divine institution, and

1. In the LXX the reading is: Καί ἐπέβαλον ὁ θεός ἔκστασιν ἐπί τόν Ἀδάμ. St. Augustine also always reads *ecstasy* (see *De Genesi ad litteram* 9,1: CSEL 28,268).

accordingly entrusted all its discipline and care to his spouse the Church."[2]

In matrimony, therefore, we can distinguish as it were *two stages*: before the coming of Christ only a natural contract was instituted by God; after the coming of Christ, matrimony between Christians pertains to the genus of the sacraments. Hence our treatment will have two parts: natural matrimony and matrimony as a sacrament. But since the first part pertains directly more to Ethics than it does to Theology, we will consider it in a short chapter; we will explain the sacrament in greater detail in this treatise.

2. AAS 22 (1930) 539.

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CHAPTER I

Matrimony in the Law of Nature

142. *Matrimony,* according to its primeval institution, is an office of nature, and it is called "matrimony" because "a woman must marry in order to become a *mother;* or because it is the role of a mother to conceive, give birth to and educate her child."[3] But by reason of the *joining together* (*coniunctio*), which is proper to matrimony, it is called *wedlock* (*coniugium*); or also marriage (*consortium*), since the lot of the man and the woman must concern both their bodies and minds. Finally, from the rite whereby in antiquity those contracting matrimony were covered with a veil, it is called a *connubial union* (*connubium*) or also *nuptials* (*nuptiae*).[4]

143. Matrimony can be considered according as it is: a) an *act* whereby a man and a woman are constituted in the state of matrimony; and it is called *matrimony in becoming,* or taken *actively;* b) for the *state* of matrimony; and then it is called *actual matrimony,* or taken *passively.*

Inasmuch as it is an *act,* or matrimony taken actively, it is usually *defined* as: the contract whereby a man and a woman in a legitimate way mutually exchange the right to the acts necessary for the generation and education of offspring, and they commit themselves to a common society of life.[5]

Taken *passively,* or as *already actual*, matrimony is defined as: the marital union of a man and a woman, between legitimate persons, who preserve a personal intimacy of life.[6]

144. *Matrimony taken actively or in becoming* is a contract (see below, n. 194f.), and as such, it is subject to certain laws, and therefore it is not absolutely free, but only in a certain respect. Namely, it is surely free *as to its exercise*, because essentially no one is bound in particular to enter into matrimony; but it is not free *as to its specification*, inasmuch as since it is a freely posited act whereby someone wants to enter into a matrimonial contract, an individual cannot according to his own wishes add conditions to the contract, but must fulfill those conditions which legitimate authority has laid down for a matrimonial contract.

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3. *Roman Catechism* p.2 c.8 n.2. These words are taken from St. Augustine, *Contra Faustum* l.19 c.26: ML 42,1365. See S.Th., *Suppl.* q.44, a.2 ad 1: "Although the father ranks above the mother, the mother has more to do with the offspring than the father has."
4. St. Ambrose, *De Abraham* 1,9,93: ML 14,477; St. Isidore, *Etymolog.* 9,7,9,10,27: ML 82,365.367.
5. Pesch, *op.cit.*, n.682.
6. P. Lombard, *4 Sent.* d.27 n.2; *Catechism of Trent,* De Matrimonio c.8 n.3.

In every contract *consent* is required which first of all and essentially must be *internal*, but it must also be expressed *externally*, at least in some way. However, per se it is not required that the consent be expressed in writing or in express words, but it suffices that it is expressed by a gesture or some other legitimate sign. However, legitimate authority can determine some conditions in this matter.

In the act of contracting matrimony these distinctions can be made: a) the act itself of making the contract; b) the pact or agreement made; c) the external solemnities accompanying the contract.

The *pact* or *agreement* in matrimony comprehends two elements: 1) what concerns the offspring (education, etc.), the mutual rights and obligations; in a word, the object of the pact; 2) the temporal goods, which the contracting parties being to the new familiar society that they are creating.

Finally, *the external solemnity* can also prescribe some other necessary accidentals. Thus, for example, the Church requires the presence of a priest and two witnesses.

145. *Matrimony taken passively, or as already actually existing,* is a state, or also a *bond* between spouses that results from the act of matrimony and is permanent; it is a consequence of the act of entering into matrimony. But these points can be exactly distinguished: a) the connection or bond, whereby the united spouses now have mutual obligations; b) the obligations flowing from it concerning their life together and the education of children; c) the right to conjugal intercourse and to the establishment of a family life and society.

146. Matrimony between the non-baptized validly celebrated is said to be a *legitimate* marriage; that validly contracted between the baptized is said to be *ratified,* if it has not been carnally consummated; it is said to be *ratified and consummated* (*ratum et consummatum*), if between the spouses the marital act has taken place, to which by its very nature the matrimonial contract is ordered and is that by which the spouses become one flesh. An invalid matrimony is called *putative,* if it was celebrated in good faith by at least one of the spouses, until both of them become aware of the nullity (CIC, cn. 1015 [1917]).

ARTICLE I

ON THE INSTITUTION, SANCTITY AND NECESSITY OF MATRIMONY

Proposition 1. God instituted matrimony in the creation of human nature, and he did it by a positive disposition.

147. The procreation of children is necessary for the propagation of the human race, and it cannot be obtained in any other way than by the union of a man and a woman. Indeed, God in creating the human race, which was endowed with such a nature that it can be propagated only by generation, necessarily willed this generation; for unless he had willed this, he would not have created them male and female, nor would he have given them the instinct for generation.

Moreover, he also manifested this will *positively,* since he said: *Be fruitful and multiply* (Gen. 1:27); and also when he formed Eve and gave her to Adam as his helper, and he did it especially with reference to generation.

148. But by commanding the multiplication of the human race and forming Eve, God *instituted matrimony.* For Eve is given to Adam as his helper, since not one of the living beings then existing was found to be fitting for Adam. This was the case not only because of the diversity of species, but also because of the difference of a rational nature. Therefore God placed Adam in a state of ecstasy so that he might know the singular nature of the propagation of the human race: the other animals can copulate when and as they wish; but man must be led by reason even in the propagation of the species. He must not be led simply by some kind of instinct, but being aware of his own nature, he will leave his father and mother and cleave to his wife. In this regard St. Augustine said: "And for this reason, also that ecstasy, which God caused in Adam, that he should fall into a deep sleep, is rightly understood as being given so that also his mind, because of the ecstasy, might become a partaker as it were of the angelic assembly and entering into the heavenly court might understand the last things. Finally, when he awoke, and being full of prophecy, when he saw the woman brought to him, he said immediately, what the Apostle says is a great mystery: this now is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called woman because she was taken from man. And because of this a man shall leave his father and mother and cleave to his wife and they will be two in one flesh. These words, which Scripture testifies were said by the first man, the Lord in the Gospel declares that they were said by God... that from this we might

understand that through the ecstasy, which took place previously in Adam, he was able to say this, having been divinely inspired like a prophet.[7]

From what we will say about the unity and indissolubility of matrimony in the law of nature, it is easily shown that God did not institute just any kind of sexual union, but he established true matrimony.

149. The following have taught the same thing constantly:

a) Christ himself when he restored the unity of matrimony, citing the words spoken by Adam and by Holy Scripture Matt. 19:3-6; Mark 10:2-9); b) the tradition of the universal Church; c) pontifical documents.

a) *The testimony of Christ* will be explained more at length when we treat the Sacrament of Matrimony.

b) *The tradition of the Church.* It should be noted that the Fathers often against the Gnostics and Manicheans defend the sanctity of matrimony on the basis of its divine institution. Here are some examples:

St. Augustine: he responds to Julian the Pelagian who asked why original sin is transmitted by generation: "What then is [Julian's] object when he inquires of us, 'By what means sin may be found in an infant, through the will, or through marriage, or through the parents?'... Now there is an answer for him to all these questions given by the Apostle, who censures neither the infant's will... nor marriage, which, as such, has not only its institution, but its blessing also from God..." (R 1876).

Theodoret says: "But if matrimony were evil, God would not have established it from the beginning, nor would he have called the conception of children a blessing. Wherefore he did not forbid many of the ancients to have wives so that the human race might be increased... But the Lord himself not only did not forbid matrimony, but he took part in a wedding celebration, and he gave to the spouses wine produced without human effort. Therefore he confirmed the law of matrimony, and he binds with another law any man who, except for the cause of fornication, wants to dissolve his marriage" (R 2155).

And there is no obstacle in the fact that sometimes the holy Fathers say that matrimony is an effect of original sin.[8] For, the Fathers were indicating rather that the concupiscence and disorder, which often can take place in the use of matrimony, would not have happened before sin.[9]

c) Likewise the Supreme Pontiffs, speaking out against the abuses of matrimony, recount its divine institution. We will quote only the more re-

7. *De Genesi ad litteram* 9,19: CSEL 28,294.
8. See v.gr. St. Athanasius (R 804) and St. John Chrysostom (R 1150).
9. St. Augustine spoke at length about this often against the Pelagians; especially in *De Genesi ad litteram* l.9: CSEL 28,268-294.

cent Pontiffs; thus Leo XIII said: "Nevertheless, the naturalists, as well as all who profess that they worship above all things the divinity of the state, and strive to disturb whole communities with such wicked doctrines, cannot escape the charge of delusion. Marriage has God for its Author, and was from the very beginning a kind of foreshadowing of the Incarnation of his Son; and therefore there abides in it something holy and religious; not extraneous, but innate; not derived from men, but implanted by nature. Innocent III, therefore, and Honorius III, our predecessors, affirmed not falsely nor rashly that a sacrament of marriage existed even amongst the faithful and unbelievers."[10] And also in the letter *Ingens Nobis:* "The most important principles of Christianity and the basic notions of natural law would have to be rejected in order to be able to say that matrimony is a creation of the State, and nothing other than a simple contract and social companionship completely civil in nature. The connubial union is not a human or invented work: God himself, the supreme Artisan of nature from the beginning, by that union ordained both the propagation of the human race, and the establishment of the family; and in the law of grace raising it to the dignity of a sacrament, he made it more noble."[11]

Pius XI, before he hands on the doctrine about Christian marriage, desires these points to be established: "...Let it be repeated as an immutable and inviolable fundamental doctrine that matrimony was not instituted or restored by man but by God; not by man were the laws made to strengthen and confirm and elevate it but by God, the Author of nature, and by Christ our Lord by whom nature was redeemed, and hence these laws cannot be subject to any human decrees or to any contrary pact even of the spouses themselves. This is the doctrine of Holy Scripture; this is the constant tradition of the Universal Church; this is the solemn definition of the sacred Council of Trent, which declares and establishes from the words of Holy Writ itself that God is the Author of the perpetual stability of the marriage bond, its unity and firmness."[12]

Proposition 2. Matrimony is an honorable thing, and its state is good and praiseworthy.

150. A demonstration of the divine institution of matrimony would suffice, so that thereby its uprightness would be evident. But there have not

10. Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": ASS 12 (1879-1880) 392.
11. The Letter "*Ingens Nobis,*" June 1, 1879, ad Archiep. et Episcop. ecclesiastic. provinc. Taurini, Vercelliae et Genuae: ASS 12 (1879-1880) 4-5.
12. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 541.

been lacking opinions against the holiness and uprightness of matrimony. Those holding such a view were:

a) *Encratites.* Right from the beginning of Christianity some of the faithful, being exaggerated lovers of virginity, maintained that marriage is evil, or at least an imperfect state (from a positive defect of virtue). These were the Encratites, who were not condemned by the Church as heretics, but rather they were Christians with a rigoristic point of view. St. Paul seems to allude to them, since he rebukes those who say: *Do not handle, Do not taste, Do not touch (referring to things which all perish as they are used), according to human precepts and doctrines* (Col. 2:20-22); and even more clearly: *Now the Spirit expressly says that in later times some will depart from the faith by giving heed to deceitful spirits and doctrines of demons... who forbid marriage* (1 Tim. 4:1-3). Some ancient apocryphal writings contain this encratistic tendency, such as the Acts of Paul, of Andrew, of Peter, of John and of Thomas.[13]

b) *Gnostics.* Having made a distinction between matter and spirit, they divided men into pneumatics and materialists. They rejected matter, or the flesh; for this reason they were opposed to marriage. The principal heretics were: Basilides, Marcion, Apelles, Tatian and Julius Cassianus.[14]

c) The *Montanists* did not condemn marriage, but since they were expecting the Parousia, they recommended virginity, cultivated an exaggerated rigorism, and they counseled others to dissolve their marriage so that in chastity the spouses could wait for the coming of Christ.[15]

d) The *Novatians* professed rigorism with the Montanists; they did not reject marriage, but they forbade second marriages.[16]

e) The *Priscillianists* rejected marriage, as is clear from the Council of Toledo (447 A.D.): "If anyone ... believes that human marriages that are regarded as permissible according to divine law are blameworthy, let him be anathema" (D 206).[17]

151. To these can be added some ascetics, who in the 3rd century extolled virginity among devout Christians in an exaggerated way; they con-

13. *Les Actes de Paul* (ed. L. Vouaux) c.5-14; *Les Acts de Pierre* (ed. L. Vouaux) p.63-64; *Acta Andreae, Thomae, etc.*:E. Hennecke, *Neutestamentliche Apokryphen* (1924) 250-289.

14. See St. Irenaeus, *Contra haeres.* 1,24,1: MG 7,678.690-691; St. Epiphanius, *Haeres.* 24,3: MG 41,312-313; Tertullian, *Adv. Marcion* 1,20; 4,11: ML 2,280382; *De Praescriptione* n.33: ML 2,46; St. Jerome, *In Epist. ad Gal* 3,6: ML 26,431;
Adversus Iovinianum 1,3: ML 23,213.

15. A. D'Ales, *Théologie de Tertullien* (Paris 1905) 370-378.

16. St. Epiphanius, *Haeres.* 59,3: MG 41,1021-1022; Socrates, *Hist. Eccles.* 5,22: MG 67,641.

17. Cn.16: Msi 3,1003. In the *Council of Braga* it is repeated: "If anyone condemns human marriage and despises the procreation of children, as Manichaeus and Priscillian have said, let him be anathema": Msi 9,774, D 461.

sidered marriage as a true sin and therefore to be avoided.[18] In the later centuries there were no errors about the holiness of marriage, except at times there was a tendency among some of extolling virginity in an exaggerated way to the detriment of marriage. But in our days it is necessary to praise virginity, and in particular *the state of virginity* (which we will treat further on); but this is not to be done at the expense of marriage.

Protestants have denied the sacramentality of marriage to such an extent that even though they consider God the author of matrimony, nevertheless they say that it is merely a civil affair, and hence as a result of this doctrine the holiness of matrimony has been completely rejected and abandoned. Marriages are not religious, but civil; they are not thought to be indissoluble, but with great ease civil authorities grant a perfect divorce.

152. Contrary to all these errors the Church has always praised the sanctity of marriage. Before he became a Montanist Tertullian said beautifully: "From what source are we able to recount the happiness of the marriage that the Church provides, and offering confirms, and a blessing seals, angels announce, and the Father recognizes as ratified?... What sort of bond is this of two with one hope, of one discipline, of the same subjection! Both are brothers, both fellow servants, and there is no difference of spirit or flesh. They pray together, they will together, and they fast together... Both are alike in the Church of God, alike in the banquet of God, alike in troubles, in persecutions, in consolations; neither is a problem for the other... When Christ sees and hears such as these he rejoices and he sends them his peace. Where there are two, there he is; and where he is, there evil is not found."[19]

Against the cited errors the holy Fathers said that marriage is good; and especially against the *Manicheans* (who said that matrimony was a work of the devil) they showed the uprightness of marriage, proving that marriage was instituted by God and blessed by Christ. Afterwards, while defending the sanctity of marriage, they responded to the *Pelagians*, who made the objection that marriage is something evil if by it original sin is propagated. Finally, against those attacking virginity, or those wanting simply to extol virginity, they said that marriage is indeed good, but that virginity is more excellent. Thus St. Cyril of Jerusalem, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. Ambrose,

18. See Socrates, *Hist. Eccles.* 4,3: MG 67,351; Sozomenus, *Hist. Eccles.* 3,4: MG 177,1079.
19. *Ad uxorem* 9: ML 1,1302-1304 (ed. 1415-1416).

St. Jerome, Theodoret, St. John Damascene, etc.[20] In particular, St. John Chrysostom and St. Augustine must be quoted.

St. John Chrysostom so praised virginity that he could be thought to be opposed to marriage; but that is a mistake: "Marriage is an honorable thing and I admit that: *Let marriage be held in honor among all,* says St. Paul, *and let the marriage bed be undefiled; for God will judge the immoral and adulterous* (Heb. 13:4). "Virginity is good and I assent to this; and it is also better than marriage, and I also assent to this. And if you please, I will add how much better it is: It is as much as heaven is better than earth, angels better than men; indeed in order to say something even stronger, it is also more so" (R 1115, 1116). He admits that marriage is honorable, but he prefers virginity.[21]

St. Augustine expressly responds to the objection: You prefer virginity because you contemn marriage. "Therefore marriage and fornication are not two evils, of which one is worse than the other, but marriage and continence are two goods, of which one is better than the other, just as bodily health and imbecility are not two evils, of which one is worse than the other, but health and immortality are two goods, of which one is better... We praise the goodness of Suzanna in conjugal chastity, but we place the goodness of the widow Anne and much more that of the Virgin Mary before her... But in these two goods... it could not be that one is better, unless the other is passed over or abandoned. Hence it should be understood from this that marriage must not be thought to be evil, because, if one does not abstain from it, a widow' chastity or virginal integrity cannot be had. Therefore what Martha was doing was not therefore evil, because, if she did not continue doing it, her sister would not have done what was better."[22]

Proposition 3. Matrimony per se in the concrete is not necessary for any human person; but there can be circumstances in which it is rendered morally necessary.

153. We are not saying that marriage is not necessary in general, but in individual cases; that is, God laid down a law for the human race: *Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth* (Gen. 1:28), and since this law necessarily

20. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* 4,24,25: MG 33,487-488; St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Virginitate* 7: MG 46,353-354; St. Ambrose, *De viduis* 4: ML 16,241. See DTC: *Mariage,* 9,2090-2091; St. Jerome (R 1349, 1361, 1378); Theodoret, (R 2155); St. John Damascene (R 2374). See also G. Bossier, *La fin du Paganisme* (1804) 2,364-365.

21. See also *In Gen. 5,* hom.21,4: MG 53,190; *In Matt.* hom.43,5: MG 57,464f. You will find much on this in M. Moulard, *S. Jean Chrysostome le defenseur du Mariage et l'apôtre de la virginité* (Paris 1923).

22. *Di bono coniugali* 7,8: CSEL 41,118-119.

must be fulfilled by marriage, marriage is necessary for *humanity,* and as long as God wills men to exist, during that time it will be necessary that there be men who enter into marriage.

But this general law does not single out any man in particular, because it does not depend on any particular man that the human race be multiplied or not extinguished. For Adam and Eve marriage was obligatory, and also for their first children. Marriage was also necessary for the sons of Noah after the flood; and in general, the law concerns only those in particular upon whom it depends that the human race not be extinguished.

154. Beside this general law, there is no law which, prescribing marriage, applies to each individual. For, it would have to be a positive law coming from God, or a natural law. But neither can be affirmed. There is no *positive law,* because there is no certainty about such a law; and in addition Christ recommended virginity. Therefore there is more certainty about the opposite.

And there is no *natural law*: for, nature alone demands only those things necessary in general for the human race, which pertain essentially to the perfection of individuals. Surely marriage is not something essential for the perfection of each individual man, or in order for him to attain his last end, as is per se evident. Actually, in order to obtain the last end better and more perfectly, the evangelical counsels are more effective than general laws; but among the counsels must be counted virginity or perfect continence: *If such is the case of a man with his wife, it is not expedient to marry. But he* [Jesus) *said to them: Not all men can receive this precept, but only those to whom it is given* (Matt. 19: 10-11); and St. Paul: *I wish that all were as I myself am... To the unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain single as I do* (1 Cor. 7:7-8). Indeed, often married life in some cases can be the cause of many evils, because of which it can be said with the Apostle: *It is not necessary to marry.* Therefore in that particular case a man is not required to get married.

155. However, it is said *per se* that no one in the concrete is bound to get married, because *per accidens* certain circumstances could be found in which a definite man would be held, at least morally, to contract matrimony. Such could be the case of an extraordinary ardor of concupiscence, or some similar circumstances, in which unless a man marries, it is morally certain that he will fall into sin. Therefore St. Paul said: *If they cannot exercise self-control, they should marry. For it is better to marry than to be aflame with passion* (1 Cor. 7:9). And the Lord himself pointed out that virginity is a gift of God: *not all men can receive this precept, but only those to whom it is given* (Matt. 19:11).

156. The objections which are often raised by the adversaries of virginity are these:

1. Marriage is necessary for the human race. Therefore all men are held to enter into it.

I distinguish the antecedent: marriage is necessary in general, *conceded;* it is necessary in particular for each person or for a definite man, *I subdistinguish:* per se, *denied; per accidens, I bypass it because it has already been explained.*

2. *Objector insists:* it is at least useful for the human race. But a man, inasmuch as he is a social being, should do what is useful for the human race or society. Therefore he should marry.

I bypass the major and distinguish the minor. A man, because he is social, should do *everything* that is useful for society, *denied;* he should do something that is useful for society, *conceded.* Sociability requires that a man work for the good of society, but this does not mean that each and every man is held to perform each and every good for society; that is absolutely impossible. Otherwise all men would have to be farmers, governors, etc., because they are functions useful for the human race and society. Indeed, human sociability really requires a variety of functions, and so it is necessary that men engage in different activities. Surely some of these are obtained better in the state of continence rather than in the state of marriage. Rightly therefore St. Thomas says: "Wherefore sufficient provision is made for the human multitude, if some betake themselves to carnal procreation, while other abstaining from this betake themselves to the contemplation of divine things, for the beauty and welfare of the whole human race. Thus too in an army, some take sentry duty, others are standard bearers, and other fight with the sword; yet all these things are necessary for the multitude, although they cannot be done by one person."[23]

3. If marriage were obligatory for no man, it could happen that no one would wish to be married, and therefore the human race would die out. But this is contrary to the will of God. Therefore it is required by necessity that men marry.

a) *I distinguish the major.* If the proposed case were given, then some men would be held per se to get married, *denied;* per accidens, *I bypass the point.*

b) *I distinguish the major.* If marriage were not obligatory it could happen that the human race would die out, unless the inclination of nature for marriage and the providence of God existed, *conceded;* since the inclination of nature and the providence of God do exist, *denied.* On this point St. Thomas says: "Human nature has a general inclination to various offices and acts, as already stated. But since it is different in various subjects, as individualized in this or that one, it inclines one subject more to one of those offices, and another subject more to another, according to the difference of temperament of various individuals. And it is owing to this difference, as well as to divine providence which governs all, that one person chooses one office such as husbandry, and another person another. And so it is too that some choose the married life and some the contemplative. Wherefore no danger threatens."[24]

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23. II-II, Q. 152, a.2 ad 1.
24. *Suppl.* q.41, a. 2 ad 4.

ARTICLE II

ON THE ENDS OF MATRIMONY

157. Matrimony in the natural law has diverse ends.[25] St. Isidore proposed them in these words: "A wife is taken for three reasons: the first reason is *offspring*, about which one reads in Genesis: *And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply* (Gen. 1:28); the second reason is the need of a *helper*, about which it is stated there in Genesis: *It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper fit for him* (2:18); the third reason is *incontinence,* hence the Apostle says that whoever cannot be continent should marry."[26] The Augustinian division of the goods or ends of marriage is famous: "These goods are, because of which marriage is a good thing: *offspring, faith, sacrament.*"[27] But the holy Doctor understands the sacrament especially as matrimonial indissolubility, which is also required in non-Christian matrimony.

Regarding the ends of matrimony, we are asking whether among them there is a gradation of some kind of hierarchy, and therefore, what the primary end is and what the secondary end is. For the sake of brevity, we will consider three things: the primary end, the secondary end, and the recent theory of some modernists.

Proposition 4. The primary end of matrimony is the procreation and education of children (CIC 1013,1 [117]).

158. *The primary end* is that because of which something is done, or the good that is intended immediately and for its own sake, and it is that for which the work is destined and for which it is necessary.

We are saying that the primary end of matrimony is *offspring*: this requires that it be generated, educated and perfected in every way: material, intellectual and also spiritual. St. Augustine explains this with these words: "In the child that he be lovingly accepted, carefully nourished, religiously

25. There is an ample bibliography on this below in notes 54 and 56.

26. *Etymolog.* 9,7,27: ML 82,367. Please note that St. Isidore was the first author who expressly distinguished the *ends* or causes of matrimony; in this way he embraces the doctrine of St. Augustine about the *goods* of matrimony.

27. *De bono coniugali* 24,33: CSEL 41,277; see also *De Genesi ad litteram* 9,7: CSEL 28,275-276; ML 34,397. Although the *goods* and *ends* of matrimony per se are not the same, nevertheless often they are understood in the same way, and in the teaching of St. Augustine the *good* and the *cause* of matrimony often have the same meaning.

educated."[28] And although we are not yet treating matrimony as a sacrament, still even in the order of nature, that is, inasmuch as matrimony pertains to the divine institution ordaining the propagation of the human race through generation, we cannot prescind from the character of supernaturality, which the whole ordination of the human race to its last supernatural end has. Hence the procreation of children also is ordained, and especially so, for the generation of adopted children of God, as Pius XI says: "How great a boon of God this is, and how great a blessing of matrimony is clear from a consideration of man's dignity and of his sublime end. For man surpasses all other visible creatures by the superiority of his rational nature alone. Besides, God wishes men to be born not only that they should live and fill the earth, but much more that they should be worshippers of God, that they may know him and love him and finally enjoy him forever in heaven; and this end, since man is raised by God in a marvelous way to the supernatural order, surpasses all that eye has seen, and ear heard, and all that has entered into the heart of man. From which it is easily seen how great a gift of divine goodness and how a remarkable fruit of marriage are children born by the omnipotent power of God through the cooperation of those bound in wedlock."[29]

159. That the procreation of children is the primary end of matrimony is clear: 1) From the testimony *of Holy Scripture.* Because God willed that the human race be propagated, he created both male and female; and the first divine blessing of the human race was: *Male and female he created them. And God blessed them, and God said to them: Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth* (Gen. 1:27-28). And he repeats this blessing for Noah upon leaving the ark: *And God blessed Noah and his sons, and said to them: Be fruitful and multiply, and fill the earth* (Gen. 9:1); and because of this he ordered that the animals *two and two, male and female* should enter into the ark (Gen. 8:9), and Noah should enter with his wife and his sons together with their wives.

In Gen. 2:18-24, where Scripture describes the formation of Eve from Adam's rib, God is presented as forming her so that a helper for Adam might be found: *It is not good that the man should be alone; I will make him a helper fit for him* (v. 18). Regarding this St. Augustine says: "But if the woman was not made for Adam as a helper in generating children, and if there was not yet work so that he needed a helper for that, and, even if there were work, a man would be a better helper. And this can be said also

28. *De Genesi ad litteram* 9,7,12: CSEL 28,276; ML 34,397.
29. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 544.

about consolation, if perhaps he was tired of his solitude. For how much more agreeable for living together and conversing it is when two friends live together rather than a man and a woman. But if it was necessary that they live together with one commanding and the other obeying, lest the contrary wills of the inhabitants disturb the peace, not even to retain this would the order have been lacking, by which one is prior and the other posterior, especially if the posterior were created from the prior, as the woman was created. And will someone say about the rib taken from the man that God, if he so wished, could make only a woman and not a man? Therefore I do not find for what help for the man the woman was made, if the purpose of having children is denied."[30] St. Augustine says this about the state in which Adam was when he did not have concupiscence. Indeed the whole context is concerned with matrimony, for Adam as soon as he sees Eve said about matrimony: *This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh; she shall be called Woman, because she was taken out of Man. Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife, and they become one flesh* (v. 23). But if these last words are attributed to the author of the book, it is still the same regarding our point, for this signifies that the inspired author sees in this context the institution of matrimony.

160. 2) *The documents of the Church* clearly proclaim that the procreation of children is the primary end of matrimony. Here are a few examples:

The Council of Florence in its Decree for the Armenians: "A triple good is found in matrimony. The first is the begetting of children and their education to the worship of God..." (D 1327).

Leo XIII, after recalling the words of St. Paul to the Ephesians in ch. 5 and to the Corinthians in ch. 7, adds: "Furthermore, the Christian perfection and completeness of marriage are not comprised in those points only which have been mentioned. For, first, there has been vouchsafed to the marriage union a higher and nobler purpose than was ever previously given to it. By the command of Christ, it not only looks to the propagation of the human race, but of the bringing forth of children for the Church...."[31] This was about Christian marriage, but earlier he had spoken about matrimony in general: "We record what is known to all, and cannot be doubted by any, that God, on the sixth day of creation, having made man from the slime of the earth... gave him a companion... God thus, in his most far-reaching foresight, decreed that this husband and wife should be the natural beginning of the human race, from whom it might be propagated and preserved

30. *De Genesi a litteram* 9,5: CSEL 28,273; ML 34,396; 9,7: CSEL 28,275.
31. Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": ASS 12 (1879-1880) 389.

by an unfailing fruitfulness through all futurity of time."[32]

Pius XI: "Since Christian matrimony tends not only to spiritual union and temporal good, but it was also divinely ordained especially for the generation of children so that the human race according to the command of God might increase and fill the earth."[33] And in the Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": "Thus, among the goods of marriage, the child holds the first place. And, indeed, the Creator of the human race himself, who in his goodness wishes to use men as his helpers in the propagation of life, taught this when instituting marriage in paradise, he said to our first parents, and through them to all future spouses: *Increase and multiply, and fill the earth* (Gen. 1:28). This thought St. Augustine very beautifully infers from the words of St. Paul the Apostle to Timothy (1 Tim. 5:14), when he says: 'So the Apostle is witness that marriage is accomplished for the sake of generation. *I wish,* he says, *young girls to marry.* And as if someone said to him: *Why?* He immediately adds: *To bear children, to be mothers of families*'" (D 3704).

Pius XII often proposed this teaching in his talks to spouses and in allocutions to the officials of the Roman Rota.[34]

161. 3) *The holy Fathers* at the beginning say almost nothing expressly about the ends of matrimony, but they are more concerned about vindicating its holiness against the Encratites. Afterwards, when in the 4th century this theory spread, inducing laxism and attacking virginity, St. Jerome was provoked.[35] Even before that St. Ambrose saw the necessity of writing about the institution and fruits of marriage.[36] But St. Augustine, as in many other theological treatises, in this matter of matrimony laid the foundation of systematic theology. Especially under two aspects the struggle with the heretics was proposed: the *Manicheans* said that marriage came from an evil principle and therefore is something essentially evil; the *Pelagians,* by rejecting original sin (which is transmitted by generation), said that matrimony is only a work of nature. St. Augustine set out to prove that matrimony is essentially good, but that concupiscence (an effect of original sin) has often introduced into it a certain disorder.[37] The holy Doctor distinguished

32. *Ibid.,* 386.
33. *Motu Proprio,* December 8, 1938: AAS 30 (1938) 410-413.
34. October 3, 1941: AAS 33 (1941) 423. On the teaching of Pius XII on matrimony, see B. Lavaud, *Pie XII Docteur du Mariage et defenseur de la morale conjugale:* RevThom 52 (1952) 119-141. He treats the end of marriage on pp. 129-141.
35. Especially in his *Adversus Iovinianum:* ML 22,21,213f.
36. *De Viduis et De Virginibus* (a.377). *De Virginitate* (a. 378).
37. He explains his teaching especially in the small books, *De bono coniugali* and *De bono viduitatis* (ca. 400), *De adulterinis coniugis,* and *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* (a.419-420).

three goods in marriage: offspring, faith, sacrament.[38] The child always occupies the first place. Although he does not use the word "end," nevertheless he retains its meaning when he says: "All of these goods are the reason why marriage is good."[39] That refers not only to Christian marriage, but above all he makes a distinction between pagans, or marriage according to the law of nature, and between Christians. Thus he says: "Therefore the good of marriage is for all peoples, and for all men for the sake of generating there is faith in chastity. But in what concerns the people of God, also in the sanctity of the sacrament, it is wrong for a woman to divorce and marry another, while her husband is still living, *not even for the purpose of giving birth, which is the only reason for the existence of marriage;* and if the marriage does not produce offspring, it is evil to dissolve the nuptial bond, unless the spouse dies... The Apostle thus testifies that generation is the reason for marriage: *I desire,* he said, *that young girls marry;* and if someone were to say to him: *Why?* He immediately adds: *To bear children, and to be the mothers of families.*"[40] And he builds an argument from the etymology of the word "matrimony": "Matrimony surely gets that name from the fact that a woman should not marry for any other reason than to become a mother."[41]

162. 4) *Theologians,* following St. Augustine, defended those three goods as the ends of marriage, and considered the first one to be the generation of offspring. But in the beginning they did not raise questions about the hierarchy among those diverse ends of marriage.

Ivo Carnotensis said about generation: "This is the only reason for getting married."[42] Peter Lombard: "Therefore the principal final cause of contracting matrimony is the procreation of children; for, it is because of this that God instituted marriage between the first parents."[43] Then after him all the scholastics proposed the hierarchy between the ends of marriage, and they say that the first one is the procreation of children.[44]

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38. On the teaching of St. Augustine, see B. Alves Pereira, *La doctrine du Mariage selon St. Augustin* (Paris 1930).
39. *De bono coniugali* 2432: CSEL 41,277. In the edition of ML 40,394 it reads: "marriages are good," for the word "good." Pius XI uses the same reading in the Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 543. See also *De adulterinis coniugis* 2,12: ML 40,478, where he speaks about the *causes* of marriage.
40. *De bono coniugali* 24,32: CSEL 41,226-227; ML 40,478.
41. *Contra Faustum* 19,26: ML 42,385.
42. *Panorm.* 6,22: ML 161,1248.
43. *Sent.* 4 d.30 c.4.
44. On the teaching of the scholastics, see P. Abellán, *El fin y la significación sacramental del matrimonio desde S. Anselmo hasta Guiliermo de Auxerre* (Granada 1939); C. Scharl, *La doctrine des fins du mariage dans la théologie scholastique* (Paris 1948); Dom Boissard, *Les fins du mariage dans la théologie scholastique:* RevThom 49 (1949) 289-309.

Proposition 5. The secondary end of matrimony is mutual assistance and a remedy of concupiscence (CIC 1013,1 [1917]).

163. *The secondary end* of matrimony is that good to which matrimony is ordered secondarily. It can take many forms, but it is usually comprehended in these two goods: mutual assistance and a remedy of concupiscence.

The mutual assistance or help must be both moral and material. It consists in mutual love and a close friendship, in other moral helps, for example, in mutual counseling, correction, spiritual consolations, etc.; in material helps or in the mutual procuring and management of domestic affairs, in observing civil and ecclesiastical laws. This is what Tertullian wonderfully explains: "From what source are we able to recount the happiness of the marriage that the Church provides, and oblation confirms, and a blessing seals, angels announce, and the Father recognizes as ratified?... What sort of bond is this of two with one hope, of one discipline, of the same subjection! Both are brothers, both fellow servants, and there is no difference of spirit or flesh. They pray together, they will together, and they fast together... Both are alike in the Church of God, alike in the banquet of God, alike in troubles, in persecutions, in consolations; neither is a problem for the other...."[45]

God himself created Eve that she might be a helper for Adam (Gen. 2:18); and although Eve must be for Adam primarily a helper in the procreation of children, still this word "helper" has a broader meaning, as is clear, where the concern is with matrimony. And St. Augustine, who locates this assistance primarily and per se in the procreation of children, also places it in mutual spiritual association: "This seems to me to be not just for the procreation of children, but also for the natural society found in the different sexes. Otherwise there would be no marriage among old people, especially if, they had either lost their children or never had any. But in a marriage of many years, even if the ardor of youth between male and female has dwindled, still the order of love between husband and wife remains strong."[46] Therefore the holy Doctor calls matrimony "a nursery of the city."[47]

Pius XI calls this mutual assistance, with St. Augustine, *faith,* inasmuch as it must be founded on faith or conjugal fidelity: "The second blessing of matrimony which we said was mentioned by St. Augustine, is the blessing of conjugal honor which consists in the mutual fidelity of the spouses in

45. *Ad uxorem* 9: ML 1,1302-1304 (col. 1415-1416).
46. *De bono coniugali* 3,3: ML 40,375.
47. *De civitate Dei* 1,15,16,3: ML 41,459.

fulfilling the marriage contract, so that what belongs to one of the parties by reason of this contract sanctioned by divine law, may not be denied to him or permitted to any third person; nor may there be conceded to one of the parties anything which, being contrary to the rights and laws of God and entirely opposed to marital faith, can never be conceded. Wherefore, conjugal faith, or honor, demands in the first place the complete unity of matrimony which the Creator himself laid down in the beginning when he wished it to be not otherwise than between one man and one woman....

"This conjugal faith, however, which is most aptly called by St. Augustine the 'faith of chastity' blooms more freely, more beautifully and more nobly, when it is rooted in that more excellent soil, the love of husband and wife which pervades all the duties of married life and holds pride of place in Christian marriage... The love, then, of which we are speaking is not that based on the passing lust of the moment nor does it consist in pleasing words only, but in the deep attachment of the heart which is expressed in action, since love is proved by deeds.[48] This outward expression of love in the home demands not only mutual help but must go further; must have as its primary purpose that man and wife help each other day by day in forming and perfecting themselves in the interior life so that through their partnership in life they may advance ever more and more in virtue, and above all that they may grow in true love toward God and their neighbor, on which indeed 'depends the whole Law and the Prophets.'"[49]

164. *Remedy of concupiscence.* It is also often said to be a remedy of infirmity. The first Fathers insisted very much on this purpose of marriage, which perhaps they exaggerated. For, they said that, after original sin, the power of concupiscence is so great that the conjugal act can hardly be performed without sin, at least venial sin. And in this way they understood the words of St. Paul: *Do not refuse one another except perhaps by agreement for a season, that you may devote yourselves to prayer; but then come together again, lest Satan tempt you through lack of self-control. I say this by way of concession, not of command. I wish that all were as I myself am* (1 Cor. 7:5-7). They interpreted this "by way of concession" as permission for the lesser evil, or as a certain tolerance of the Apostle, because of the problem of incontinence or the power of concupiscence.[50]

48. St. Gregory the Great, *In evangelia hom.* 1,30: ML 76,1220.
49. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 546-549.
50. Thus, for example, St. Augustine distinguishes: "Conjugal copulation for the sake of generating is not sinful; but if done to satisfy concupiscence, with one's spouse, because of the faith of the marriage bed it is a venial sin; but if it is adultery or fornication it is a mortal sin. And for this reason abstinence from all copulation is better than even marital copulation, which becomes the cause of generating" (*De bono coniugali* 7: CSEL 41,195).

St. Paul clearly says that matrimony also has this end, namely, so that the spouses can legitimately exercise the sexual instinct of nature without offending God. Although he prefers that all be continent as he himself is, nevertheless admitting that continence is a gift of God, he recommends it but with discretion: *But each has his own special gift from God, one of one kind and one of another.* Hence he concludes: *To the unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain single as I do. But if they cannot exercise self-control, they should marry. For it is better to marry than to be aflame with passion* (1 Cor. 7:7-9).

Because of this the Fathers proposed to themselves the question, whether in paradise, or if original sin had not been committed, there would have been concupiscence in generating. St. Augustine, speaking at length on this question, among other things says: "finally, the infirmity of both sexes inclining them to the ruin of turpitude is rightly curbed by the goodness of marriage, so that *what could be an office for the healthy is a remedy for those who are sick.* For, it is not because incontinence is evil that therefore marriage or the copulation of the incontinent is not a good thing; indeed it is not because that culpable evil is this good thing, but because of this good that evil is slight, because that which is good in marriage and by which marriage is good, can never be a sin."[51] In general the Fathers teach that there was no concupiscence in paradise and de facto Adam and Eve did not generate any children. Therefore then matrimony had the end only of generating offspring. However, there were not lacking those who said that the marital act can never take place without concupiscence; against them St. Augustine said: "For although having been ejected from paradise they are reported to have come together and to have generated, still I do not see what could have hindered that there were for them even in paradise an honorable marriage and an immaculate marriage bed, since God was giving this to those living faithfully and justly and to those serving him in an obedient and holy manner, so that without any restless ardor of lust, without any labor and suffering of giving birth, offspring are generated from their seed... For, those who believe that could not have taken place are paying attention to nothing other than the operation of nature as it functions now after sin and its punishment; but we should not be counted among the number of those who do not believe anything except what they have been accustomed to see."[52]

The scholastics also made a distinction between marriage in paradise and after sin. "Nothing prevents matrimony from having two or three di-

51. *De Genesi ad litteram* 9,7: CSEL 28,275.
52. *De Genesi ad litteram* 9,3: CSEL 28,271-272.

vine institutions: one according to nature as in itself, one according to corrupt nature, and a third one according to the state of nature restored by Christ; and so marriage is a sacrament of the innocent, of the Old Law, and of the New Law."[53] And according to this division they say the secondary end of marriage is that it is a remedy for concupiscence.

165. *A recent question* and dispute among certain authors has broken out concerning the ends of marriage. Some modern authors, among whom H. Doms and B. Krempel[54] stand out, by relying on phenomenology have chosen to speak about the *fruits* rather than the *ends* of marriage.

According to them marriage perfects the human personality, inasmuch as it satisfies the sense of sexual fulfillment. For, sex pertains not only to the body but also to the mind, to the affections, to the passions; in fact it even affects the supernatural life because of the influence it has on all these aspects. The spouses mutually fulfill each other by their spiritual union, since by following their sexual inclinations they are joined together in matrimony. But this spiritual union is perfected and increased by their bodily union or by the marital act.

The essence, therefore, of marriage, in this theory, consists in the mutual perfection of the spouses. Hence the primary end of marriage is this spiritual coming together of the spouses. From this union various *goods* or *fruits* are the result: in the personal order, fulfillment, or, so to speak, the completeness of the personality; in the biological order, the proper disposition so that offspring may be generated and if they are educated, the result is the total perfection of marriage.

The reasons given by these authors to support their theory are the following:

1. Spouses are not moved generally to contract marriage because of the desire for children, but for the mutual union.

2. Some pontifical documents seems to suggest this course, like this text of Pius XI: "This mutual moulding of husband and wife, this determined effort to perfect each other, can in a very real sense, as the Roman Catechism teaches, be said to be *the chief reason and purpose of matrimony....*"[55]

3. Some other arguments from biology that have little to do with our position.

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53. St. Albert the Great, *In 4* d.26 a.5.
54. H. Doms, *Vom Sinn und Zweck der Ehe* Breslau 1935); B. Krempel, *Die Zweckfrage der Ehe in neuer Beleuchtung* (Einsiedeln 1941).
55. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 548.

However, we can give a response to these arguments[56]:

1. I bypasss the argument that the spouses are moved to contract marriage more because of their mutual union than for the sake of the procreation of children. But that is no obstacle to the fact that the primary end intended by God and established in the institution of marriage is the generation of offspring. For, it suffices that men wish to contract a true marriage, and do not exclude the end of marriage; for, they are not bound to desire the primary end for itself, but it is sufficient that they are moved to contract marriage because of its secondary end. Thus it can happen that a man wishes to observe complete continence, with a love of chastity, but because of the pressure of his sexual drive he chooses *to marry rather than to be aflame with passion* (1 Cor. 7:9). Moreover, if we are urged to look at what engaged couples usually do, it is necessary to say rather that more often they are seeking bodily union rather than spiritual; this is apparent from the large number of divorces and other evils that are opposed to the sanctity of marriage.

2. Regarding the document of Pius XI, it is true that those are the words of the Supreme Pontiff, but the whole context should be kept in mind. For, the Supreme Pontiff says: "... it can be said to be the chief reason and purpose of matrimony, *provided* matrimony be looked at *not in the restricted sense* as instituted for the proper conception and education of the child, but *more widely* as the blending of life as a whole and the mutual interchange and sharing thereof."[57]

166. And so it is. For, what these authors are proposing pertains more

56. The principal writings published recently are: G. Dauvillier, *Le Mariage dans le droit classique de l'Eglise* (Paris 1933); B. Lavaud, *Recensio operis N. Rocholl:* RevThom 43 (1937) 303-315; *Sens et fin du mariage: la thèse du Doms et la critique:* RevThom 44 (1938) 737-765; *L'idée divine du mariage:* EtCarm 23 (1938) 165-203; *La théologie du mariage:* RevThom 52 (1952) 119-141 (on the end of marriage, p. 128-140); *Le monde moderne et le mariage chrétien* (Paris 1934); H. Doms, *Von Sinn und Zweck der Ehe* (Breslau 1935); *Reponse au P. Boigelot:* NouvRevTh 45 (1939) 513-533; *Amorces d'une conception personaliste du mariage d'après Saint Thomas:* RevThom 45 (1939) 754-763; N. Rocholl, *Die Ehe als geweihtes Leben* (Dülmen 1935); P. Abellán, *El fin y la significación sacramental del matrimonio desde S. Anselmo hasta Gulielmo de Auxerre* (Granada 1939); J. Rohmer, *La finalité moral chez les théologiens* (Paris 1939); B. Krempel, *Die Zweckfrage der Ehe in neuer Beleuchtung* (Einsiedeln 1941); N. Ladomersky, *S. Augustin docteur du mariage chrétien* (Rome 1942); Boissard, *Questions théologiques sur le mariage* (Paris 1948); C. Scharl, *La doctrine des fins du mariage dans la théologie scholastique* (Paris 1948); R. Allers, *L'amour et l'instinct:* EtCarm 21 (1936) 99-124; P. Donceur, *La sainteté du mariage chrétien:*Et 236 (1938) 38-55; R. Boigelot, *Du sens et la fin du mariage:* RevTheol 66 (1939) 5-34; *Du sens et de la fin du mariage:* NouvRevTh 45 (1939) 5-33; M.J. Gerlaud, *Note sur le fin du mariage d'après St. Thomas:* RevThom 45 (1939) 764-773; M.-J. Nicolas, *Remarques sur le sens et le fin du mariage:* RevThom 45 (1939) 774-793; A. Lanza, *De fine primario matrimonii:* Apollinaris 13 (1940) 53-83, 218-264; R. Carpentier, *Les fins du mariage* (Decret 29 Mars 1944): NouvRevTh 67 (1945) 838-842; Boissard, *Les fins du mariage dans la théologie scholastique:* RevThom 49 (1949) 289-309; L. Lochet, *Les fins du mariage:* NouvRevTh 73 (1951) 449-465, 561-586; Le Bras, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2077-2317.

57. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 548-549.

to *marital social living* rather than to marriage considered in itself. Hence the Holy Office published this decree:

"[*In certain writings it is asserted]* that the primary end of matrimony is not the generation of offspring or that the secondary ends are not subordinate to the primary ends but are independent of it.

"In these works, the primary end of marriage is designated differently by the various writers, as for example: the completion and personal perfection of the spouses through a complete mutual fellowship of life and action; mutual love and the fostering and perfection of the union of the spouses by the psychic and bodily surrender of one's own person; and many other such things.

"In the same writings a sense is sometimes attributed to words in the current documents of the Church (as for example, primary, secondary purpose), which does not agree with these words according to the common usage by theologians.

"This revolutionary way of thinking and speaking aims to foster errors and uncertainties, to avoid which the Most Eminent and Very Reverend Fathers of this supreme Sacred Congregation, charged with the guarding of faith and morals, in a plenary session, on Wednesday, the 29th of March, 1944, when the question was proposed to them: 'Whether the opinion of certain recent persons can be admitted, who either deny that the primary purpose of matrimony is the generation and raising of offspring, or teach that the secondary purposes are not essentially subordinate to the primary purpose, but are equally first and independent,' have decreed that the answer must be: In the negative" (D 3838).

ARTICLE III

ON THE PROPERTIES OF MATRIMONY

167. Although when considering the sacrament of matrimony we will give a more extensive treatment of the properties or effects of matrimony, still at this point, we will examine matrimony also as a function of nature, since there are not lacking those who think that the properties of marriage are of one kind in the law of nature and of another kind in the law of Christ.

Proposition 6. From a legitimate matrimony there arise between the spouses obligations to be observed and rights to be protected, and from these the bond of marriage is the result.

168. Matrimony is a true contract (this will be explained better in n.214f. on the sacrament of matrimony), and therefore it is "the consent of two people to the same thing, which produces an obligation." That is, from this marital contract, just as from every contract, obligations and rights are the result, which bind together those making the contract, and therefore there is a certain *bond* between them that unites them.

The primary object of the matrimonial contract is the right to the body of the other in reference to generation, and St. Paul expresses it with these words: *The husband should give to his wife her conjugal rights, and likewise the wife to her husband. For the wife does not rule over her own body, but the husband does; likewise the husband does not rule over his own body, but the wife does* (1 Cor. 7:3-4).

The bond, therefore, looks primarily at these obligations in reference to generation; therefore the nature of the bond and its properties must be sought in the essence and ends or object of matrimony, since it is a contract. A contract, as we have already said, is a free act, but not just of any kind whatsoever: for, it is free regarding its exercise, but not regarding it specification. Rightly, therefore, Pius XI said: "Yet although matrimony is of its very nature of divine institution, the human will, too, enters into it and performs a most noble part. For each individual marriage, inasmuch as it is a conjugal union of a particular man and woman, arises only from the free consent of each of the spouses; and this free act of the will, by which each party hands over and accepts those rights proper to the state of marriage, is so necessary to constitute true marriage that it cannot be supplied by any human power. This freedom, however, regards only the

question whether the contracting parties really wish to enter upon matrimony or to marry this particular person; but the nature of matrimony is entirely independent of the free will of man, so that if one has once contracted matrimony he is thereby subject to its divinely made laws and its essential properties."[58]

The divine laws and essential properties, which by the divine institution of matrimony arise from the matrimonial bond, are mainly: indissolubility and unity.

Proposition 7. The primary end and especially the secondary end of matrimony demand its absolute perpetuity or indissolubility.

169. *Dissolubility* is opposed to perpetuity.[59] Matrimony could be dissolved *intrinsically*, that is, from the will of those contracting it; and *extrinsically,* or from the will of a superior who cancels the marital bond.

Moreover, this dissolution could take place either *per se* and *generally,* if, just as the spouses were permitted to enter into the contract, so also it were allowed at their good pleasure to decide on a separation; or *per accidens*, that is, only in a certain case, for a grave reason and approved by a legitimate judge.

Finally, the separation of spouses is called *imperfect,* if it is only with regard to cohabitation, since the bond remains; but *perfect,* if the bond itself is dissolved, so that the spouses can marry someone else.

The indissolubility of matrimony prohibits *intrinsic* and per se solubility. Therefore the spouses themselves can never render the matrimony null and void or dissolve it. Extrinsic dissolubility depends on a competent authority, which, however, cannot do everything it might wish to do, but only what does not contradict the divine positive law or the natural law.

Regarding matrimony between Christians, the Church is the only competent authority, and laws concerning the essence of matrimony and its essential properties can be determined only by her, and only she can establish exceptions. But in this matter the Church has her authority from Christ, and therefore she cannot act contrary to the law of Christ. Further on we will explain in what cases the Church can dispense.

Concerning matrimony between pagans, it is necessary to follow the positive laws of God in the institution of matrimony. And although before

58. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 541.
59. See Cathrein, *Moralphilosophie* 2,425f.

Christ he had often made dispensations regarding the indissolubility and oneness of matrimony, nevertheless God himself through Christ restored matrimony in general to its first rigor. Therefore civil laws governing non-Christian marriages cannot contradict the law of God.

170. It is clear that matrimony, *by divine institution*, is indissoluble from the very words with which wedlock was instituted: *Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife, and they become one flesh* (Gen. 2:24). For, that a man leave father and mother and the other things he loved, for the sake of a wife, demands maximum fidelity; this could not be the case if matrimony were per se dissoluble.

Christ himself, since he restored matrimony to perfect indissolubility, shows that it was that way from the beginning, and that only by the indulgence of God was a relaxation of the bond granted for a time.

Pius IX in the *Syllabus* condemned this proposition: "By natural law the bond of matrimony is not indissoluble, and in various cases divorce, properly so-called, can be sanctioned by civil authority" (D 2967). Similarly Leo XIII, Pius VI, Pius XI.[60]

We say that the primary end and the secondary end of matrimony demand its indissolubility, since the procreation and education of offspring (which is the primary end of matrimony) require the continuing participation of the father and mother; this is even more clear from the fact that when, for some reason, like the death of one of the parents, only one spouse has to educate the children. Indeed, for the education of the children the spouses must remain naturally joined together, both because of the mutual providing for family life, because of their mutual friendship, and because of their mutual love for each other. But this state of union must be maintained for many years. In fact, when because of age the spouses can no longer procreate, then they need their mutual help even more, and therefore their mutual friendship must be even closer. Therefore really, by looking at the ends of marriage, we see that matrimony per se in indissoluble.

But if matrimony is per se and generally indissoluble, it is also indissoluble *per accidens*. For, since man has an inclination towards lust and is inconstant especially in sensual love, and since the conjugal burden is so grave and the education of offspring so long, if there were even the slightest hope or a possibility were present for the dissolution of matrimony, mutual suspicions and quarrels could easily be stirred up, and from that the desire of changing one's condition. Consequently, the mutual love

60. Pius XI, Encycl. "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 551. See below n. 235.

would grow cold and by that very fact the mutual desire both of providing for the family and educating the children would suffer serious damage.

171. The indissolubility of matrimony is also demonstrated *extrinsically.* For the common good also demands this complete indissolubility: both because from divorce legal battles and dissentions easily arise between the relatives of the spouses, and also because the family, as history certainly shows, is the natural means whereby both the moral institutions and religious documents and the common traditions of the country and the connatural sharing in material goods are perpetually handed on from one generation to the next; without these safeguards the peace and order of society cannot be sustained. Indeed, it is immediately apparent that things of this nature are damaged, if marriages could be easily dissolved. And this could easily take place, if matrimony were not absolutely indissoluble.[61]

172. Objections. 1. The dissolution of marriage is either intrinsically evil or not. If it is the first, then God cannot dispense from it; if the other, then men can do it. Therefore.

I distinguish the antecedent. The dissolution of marriage is either intrinsically evil or not, either *absolutely* or *conditionally, conceded;* precisely *absolutely, denied.* Marriage, as it was instituted by God, can in itself demand something, which *per se and in general* must be fulfilled, *unless God himself,* the creator of marriage, makes an exception. In this case, since the indissolubility of marriage is directed more to the secondary ends rather than to the primary end (for a second wife can love and educate her husband's children), therefore God can also dispense from it. Therefore we said in the wording of the proposition: the primary end and *especially* the secondary end of matrimony demand perpetuity.

2. Matrimony takes its origin from a free contract. Therefore it can also be freely dissolved.

I distinguish the antecedent. It takes its origin from a free contract as to its exercise, *conceded;* as to its specification, *denied.* We already explained in the previous proposition in what sense matrimony is free.

Proposition 8. The primary end and especially the secondary end of matrimony demand its complete unity.

173. The *unity* of matrimony consists in the fact that it is an exclusive joining together of one man and one woman. Therefore, *polyandry* is opposed to this unity (the simultaneous union of one woman with

61. See J.B.M. Mayaud, *L'indissolubilité du mariage. Etude historico-canonique* (Strasbourg-Paris 1952).

several men) and *polygyny* (the union of one man with several women). *Polygamy* per se signifies the union of one with many; it includes both polyandry and polygyny, but often it is used for polygyny. We will consider this matter more in detail when we treat the effects of the sacrament of matrimony.

Plurality, whether simultaneous or successive, is opposed to unity. Successive plurality is understood as that which is had when a prior bond of marriage still exists, for example, if a man leaves his wife and marries another. But if a prior marriage has been legitimately dissolved, for example, because of the death of the spouse, and the survivor enters into a second marriage, then this plurality is not to be repudiated; but we are not considering this case here.

The unity of matrimony consists in the words themselves, quoted above, with which God instituted matrimony in paradise. For, since he said, *the two will become one flesh,* he indicated the perfect unity. The action of Lamech, who was the first one to have two wives, was condemned by the Fathers.[62]

It is very evident that polygamy is opposed to the ends of matrimony, especially to the secondary ends. For, the procreation and education of offspring should be perfect, and therefore attention paid to the spiritual and supernatural education. Certainly in polygamy there are often many quarrels, dissentions and disharmonies. Conflicts are frequent and many other things which have a bad influence on the education of the children, as is abundantly clear from experience. Moreover, the mutual love and harmony, which should be present in marriage, cannot be achieved: in simultaneous polygamy it is impossible that the love of a man is the same for several women. And considering the feminine condition, the less loved wife becomes a servant, her children are despised, and so forth. There is an example of this in Scripture in the case of Abraham who, at the urging of Sarah, conceived a child from Hagar (Gen. 16 and 21).

Proposition 9. The authority concerned per se with matrimony is the religious authority; and matrimony before the coming of Christ was a "Sacrament of nature."

174. Matrimony, as has been said, is a contract whose object is the bodies of the spouses and whose primary end is the procreation of off-

62. St. Jerome, *Adversus Iovinianum* 1,14: ML 23,280; Innocent III *ad Episc. Tiberiad.: Decretales* 4,19,8 (ed. A. Friedberg, 2,724); Pius XI, Encycl. *"Casti connubii":* AAS 22 (1930) 551-554.

spring. From both of these elements it is concluded that matrimony has a certain character of holiness or of being a holy thing, which places it under religious authority.

1) *From the object of the contract.* Petrus a Tarantasia says: "I respond that for the purpose that it be truly contracted in the realm of conscience and of God, who knows the secrets of hearts, true interior consent is required, although this would not be sufficient without the divine institution, because *since man and woman are fully subject to the dominion of God, it would not be licit for one to transfer his body to the power of another, unless it were approved by the will and authority of God.*[63] Therefore St. Bonaventure said: "The consent of both persons is the proximate cause of matrimony, *but together with the divine institution.*"[64] And St. Thomas: "The conjoining or relation itself, which is matrimony, is always from God."[65]

And although Scotus held a contrary view, namely, that God always leaves man's freedom untouched, and therefore that man is free with respect to the handing over of his body whether in servitude or in matrimony,[66] nevertheless both the Thomistic school and the Scotistic school admit that the matrimonial contract is entirely different from all other contracts.

2) *From the divine institution.* God, since he created the other things of the earth with one word, when he came to the creation of man wanted to do it with a special act: *Let us make man in our image, after our likeness* (Gen. 1:26); and in order to show the dignity of matrimony, he willed to produce the body of Eve by a direct operation from Adam; and when he had created the soul of Eve, he brought the woman to Adam so that Adam would take her as his wife (Gen. 2:22). Thus God directly and immediately, by instituting matrimony, declared its holiness; and by his blessing constituted it as a "sacrament of nature," and reserved to himself the rights over the laws of matrimony.[67]

175. This phrase "sacrament of nature," applied to matrimony, is found in scholastic and pontifical documents. St. Bonaventure said about the marriage of non-believers: "it has only the half-full nature of an office, a remedy and a sacrament"[68]; and St. Thomas said on the same mat-

63. *In 4* d.27 q.2.
64. *In 4* d.27 a.2 q.1.
65. *In 4* d.27 a.2 q.1 ad 3.
66. 66 *Opus Oxoniense* d.26 q.unic. n.10.
67. See L. Godefroy, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2047.
68. *In 4* d.39.

ter: "Such a marriage is in some sense a sacrament habitually, although not actually, because they do not really contract it in the faith of the Church."[69]

Honorius III and Innocent III said that the marriage of unbelievers is holy and valid "because the sacrament of marriage exists not only among Latins and Greeks, but also among the faithful and unbelievers."[70] Leo XIII repeats this and explains the doctrine more in detail: "Marriage has God for its Author, and was from the very beginning a kind of foreshadowing of the Incarnation of his Son; and therefore *there abides in it something holy and religious; not extraneous, but innate; not derived from men, but implanted by nature.* Innocent III, therefore, and Honorius III, our predecessors, affirmed not falsely nor rashly that *a sacrament of marriage existed even amongst the faithful and unbelievers.* We call to witness the monuments of antiquity, as also the manners and customs of those people who, being the most civilized, had the greatest knowledge of law and equity. In the minds of all of them it was a fixed and foregone conclusion that, *when marriage was thought of, it was thought of as conjoined with religion and holiness. Hence, among them, marriages were commonly celebrated with religious ceremonies, and with the ministry of priests."*[71] Hence the Supreme Pontiff concludes: "As, then, marriage is *holy by its own power, in its own nature, and of itself, it ought not to be regulated and administered by the will of civil rulers, but by the divine authority of the Church, which alone in sacred matters professes the office of teaching."*

And the Supreme Pontiff is not speaking about Christian marriage, but in general about any marriage, according as it has been instituted by God; for, immediately he then makes a transition to speak about marriage among Christians, which is a sacrament in the proper sense.

This testimony of Leo XIII is confirmed by ethnology and by the branch which is called "comparative religion." For, in almost all primitive peoples marriage is found to be joined together with religious ceremonies; often it is blessed by priests, or at least it is celebrated in the presence of religious authorities. Often the marriage is celebrated in the home of the bride or the groom, and from there all go to the new home where the dowry of the bride is handed over, the contract is ratified, and a sacrifice or a religious ceremony is performed.[72]

69. *In 4* d.39 q.1 a.2 ad 1.
70. Innocent III *ad Episc. Tiberiad.: Decretales* 4,9,8 on divorce (ed. Friedberg 2,723); Honorius III: *Decretales* 1,36,11 on transactions (ed. Friedberg 2,210).
71. Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": ASS 12 (1879-1880) 392.
72. See v.gr. Tacchi Venturi, *Historia de las Religiones* (Barcelona 1947).

In the 19th century, the *evolutionary school* wanted to find in the primeval condition of the human race complete sexual promiscuity, in order to show that those primeval peoples had absolutely no idea about the primary end of marriage, but indulged only in their sexual instinct. After a long period of such incontinence, gradually matriarchy took shape, and patriarchy developed out of that. This is the view, more or less, of J.J. Bachofen, Tylor, Morgan,[73] etc.; a doctrine of this kind was very pleasing to Marx, Engels, Simons.

But Westermarck, Lowie, Malinowsky,[74] and others, wrote against this false evolutionary theory, and they maintained: a) It cannot be proved that there was any people in which sexual promiscuity was practiced systematically; b) patriarchy and matriarchy have no chronological relation to each other, but patriarchy prevailed among pastoral peoples and matriarchy among agricultural; c) primeval marriage favored monogamy; polygamy quickly crept in, but it never became universal, so that gradually, with the growth of the culture, polygamy was abandoned, even though divorce became more frequent.[75]

To these points the custom can also be added, which was very common among the ancients and still is among contemporary peoples with a more primitive culture, *of initiation*; this always took place with some kind of religious rite, and it had a close relation to marriage.

176. Marriage, therefore, at the beginning was connected with religious authority (and it was often confused with paternal and patriarchal power). But since the family is "a certain seminary of the city,"[76] it is not surprising that gradually it came under the influence of the civil authority, with the result that the religious aspect of marriage fell completely into oblivion. But this was quite infrequent, and the complete separation between the religious and civil authority has gained strength among modern states rather than among the ancient peoples.

Civil society demands that the states determine many things which pertain to marriage. Thus St. Thomas assigns three quasi ends of marriage: continuity of the species, continuity of civil life, continuity of the Church. "Therefore inasmuch as it [marriage] is ordered to the good of nature, which is the continuity of the species... it is said to be a task of nature; but inasmuch as it is order to the political good it is subject to

73. Tylor, *Primitive Culture*[6] (1920); L.H. Morgan, *Ancient Society* (1877).
74. E. Westermark, *The History of Human Marriage* (London 1911); R.H. Lowie, *Primitive Society* (London 1921); B. Malinowsky, *Sex Repression and Savage Society.*
75. See R. Bocessino, *La religión de los primitivos,* in Tacchi Venturi, *Historia de las Religiones* 1,57-58.
76. St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* 1,15,16,3: ML 41,459.

the directives of civil law; but inasmuch as it is ordered to the good of the Church, it is necessary that it be subject to ecclesiastical authority."[77] But, according to the scholastics, what pertains to the political good concerns the dowry, or the question about money, the distribution of material goods, inheritance, and so forth; and in these matters "marriage, because it takes place by means of a contract, is subject to the directives of positive law, just like other contracts."[78] But we will treat these matters later in the part about the sacrament of matrimony.

77. CG 4,78.
78. *In 4* d.36 q.1 a.5.

CHAPTER II

On the existence and essence of the Sacrament of Matrimony

ARTICLE I

ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY

Thesis 1. Matrimony among Christians is a Sacrament.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q.42, a. 1; Palmieri, 54-78; Sasse, 365-375; Pesch, 351-362; Puig de la B., n. 1064-1077; Otten, 356-367; Lercher-Umberg, 736-746; Godefroy-Le Bras-Jugie, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2045-2335.

177. Connection. Matrimony was instituted by God at the beginning of the human race, and also, as we said above, it was always considered as something sacred. Christ also spoke about matrimony, recalling it to its pristine institution, and he sanctified it by his presence (John 2:1-11). Therefore what must be treated first in questions concerning matrimony is its sacramentality, namely, whether really in the N.T. it preserves only its ancient species of sanctity, or beyond that it must be numbered among the sacraments of the New Law.

178. Definition of terms. *Matrimony,* as we said above, can be understood *actively* or *passively* according as one looks at the acts whereby the spouses enter into the matrimonial state and bind themselves with definite obligations, or to this permanent state.

Now we are taking matrimony in the *active* sense, that is, for the action by which those contracting marriage become husband and wife, and it can be defined as: *A legitimate contract by which a man and a woman mutually confer on each other the exclusive and perpetual right over the body in reference to the generation of children.*

From this definition, matrimony taken actively, or as a contract, a permanent *bond* is the result; it is a mutual juridical and moral bond, which sometimes is also called a sacrament, but improperly, since the sacrament does not consist in the bond, but in the contract which produces the bond. Indeed, the matrimonial bond has been elevated by Christ to represent the bond between Christ and the Church; but even this matrimonial bond is signified by the contract, and therefore it is a quasi *material symbol, the reality and the sacrament* (*res et sacramentum*), while the contract is the *sacrament only* (*sacramentum tantum*).

Among Christians signifies all those who have received a valid bap-

tism, even if they are not Catholics. The non-baptized, or pagans can contract a valid marriage, but for them it is only an office of nature,[1] and they cannot receive any sacrament because they have not been baptized.

The word *Sacrament* is taken in the strictest sense; but since the matrimonial contract existed before Christ, Christ did not institute matrimony, but the matrimony that existed already in paradise he raised to the supernatural order, and therefore he became the Creator of the *Sacrament* of matrimony.

179. Adversaries. a) *Encratites, Gnostics, Manicheans, Priscillianists* thought that matrimony is something evil, a material evil, a work of the devil, an incentive of concupiscence. Later the *Albigensians*[2] followed them. It is not certain whether the Armenians denied the sacramentality of matrimony, but they certainly did say "the marriage act and even matrimony itself is a sin" (D 1012).

b) *The Protestants* denied the sacramentality of matrimony. For example, Luther said: "Matrimony not only is thought to be a sacrament with no support of Scripture, but the tradition on which it is claimed to be a sacrament is nothing but a mockery."[3] Calvin: "Matrimony, which all claim was instituted by God, no one before the time of Gregory saw that it was given as a sacrament. And what sane person would ever think it to be such? The ordination of God is good and holy; and farming, architecture, shoemaking, barbering are legitimate ordinations of God, but they are not sacraments."[4] Other Protestants, like Melanchthon and Chemnitz, admit that some grace is given in matrimony, but not properly sanctifying grace, as in the sacraments that they accept (Baptism and Eucharist), and therefore it cannot properly be called a sacrament, although improperly it merits this name.[5]

c) *Modernists,* because of their principles about the evolution of dogmas, deny that matrimony could be considered as a sacrament, even from the first centuries of the Church. They were condemned by St. Pius X (D 3451).

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1. It can also be called, with Leo XIII, "*a Sacrament of nature,*" inasmuch as matrimony, as we just said, has always and everywhere been considered as something sacred. Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": ASS 22 (1879-1880) 382.
2. Several councils and Supreme Pontiffs took action against them: *Symbolum Toletanum* (D 206); *Conc. Bracarense* II (D 461); *Lateran Council II* (D 718); Lucius III (D 761); Innocent III (D 793-794); *Lateran Council IV* (D 802). To these should be added the condemnation of the *Fraticelli,* who "are said to babble many things against the venerable sacrament of matrimony."
3. *De capitivitate Babylon.,* chapter on Matrimony.
4. *Institut.* L.4 c.19,34.
5. See St. Robert Bellarmine, *De Matrimonio* c.1.

180. Doctrine of the Church. In addition to the cited documents (in note 2), by which the Church condemned definite errors concerning the sanctity of marriage, rather than concerning its sacramentality, there are more that can be quoted, which expressly call matrimony a sacrament:

Lateran Council II in the same context of sacramentality mentions the Eucharist, Baptism and Matrimony (D 718).[6] Almost the same words are repeated in the *Council of Verona* (D 761).

Innocent III, when treating the bond of matrimony and the Pauline privilege, denies that this privilege is extended to a case in which a believing spouse falls into heresy or lapses into the error of the heathens, because "the sacrament of faith (baptism) once conferred is never lost, and indeed it makes the sacrament of marriage ratified so that it (the marriage itself) endures in the spouses as long as (the baptism) endures" (D 769), and in the *Profession of Faith* prescribed for the Waldensians the Supreme Pontiff lists the seven sacraments, among which matrimony is included (D 794). Under the same Pontiff *Lateran Council IV* mentions matrimony along with Baptism, Eucharist and Penance (D 802).

The Council of Lyons II also includes marriage among the seven sacraments (which it lists individually) (D 860).

John XXII, in condemning the errors of the Fraticelli, says: "There are many other things that these very presumptuous men are said to babble against the venerable sacrament of matrimony" (D 916).

The Council of Florence in its Decree for the Armenians: "The seventh is the sacrament of matrimony, which is a sign of the union of Christ and the Church" (D 1327).

181. *The Council of Trent* solemnly defined not only that there are seven sacraments, among which matrimony is enumerated (D 1601), but says expressly in sess.24: "If anyone says that matrimony is not truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the Gospel, instituted by Christ the Lord, but that it was devised in the Church by men and does not confer grace, let him be anathema" (D 1801). But in the beginning the first formula of this canon proposed took this form: "If anyone says that matrimony is not a true sacrament of the evangelical law divinely instituted, but devised by men in the Church, let him be anathema."[7] This canon responded to the first article proposed to the theologians: "Matrimony is not a sacrament instituted by God, but devised by men in the

6. Cn.23. These words are taken literally from the *Council of Toulouse* (a.1119) and they were approved in *Lateran II* against Peter of Bruys and the neo-Manichean precursors of the Albigensians (see D, the note at 718).

7. CTr 9,639.

Church, and it does not have a promise of grace."[8] Several emendations were proposed, especially with the addition of the words *properly one of the seven sacraments* (Card. Lotharingus[9]), *instituted by Christ and confers grace* (Bishop Hydruntinus[10]), or *with a promise of grace* (Bishop of Brugnatensis[11]); the Bishop of Paris wanted the words *matrimony of Christians* to be added,[12] but the General of the Dominicans, Vincentius Justinianus, opposed it, because "according to some doctors not every marriage of Christians is a sacrament, as is clear concerning a marriage contracted by a procurator, which is a true marriage but is not a sacrament. Likewise Gropperius in the Council of Cologne denies clandestine marriage, as long as it is clandestine, is a sacrament."[13] The Bishop of Bracarensis recommended that the canon be fully revised "because of the opinion of Durandus, who said that matrimony is a true sacrament, but not univocally with the other sacraments."[14] Other Fathers also referred to this opinion of Durandus.[15] Keeping all of this in mind, the new form of canon 1 was drafted, which, after being presented in the general congregation on August 7, 1565, remained unchanged in the next two revisions of the canons (Sept. 5 and Oct. 11), and in the definitive form (Nov. 11, 1563) was solemnly approved and defined.[16]

The Council itself, heeding the requests of many Fathers, placed a summary of the doctrine on the Sacrament of Matrimony before the canons: "Since, through Christ, matrimony in the evangelical law surpasses marital unions of the Old Law in grace, our holy Fathers, the councils, and the tradition of the universal Church have with good reason always taught that it is to be numbered among the sacraments of the New Law. Contrary to this teaching, impious men of this age, in their foolishness not only have entertained false ideas about this venerable sacrament..." (D 1800).

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8. CTr 9,380.
9. CTr 9,642.
10. CTr 9,643.
11. CTr 9,656.
12. CTr 9,658.
13. CTr 9,678 and read the note added there about the doctrine of Gropperius at the *Council of Cologne*.
14. CTr 9,650.
15. Thus the *Bishop of Leriensis* (CTr 9,661), the *General of the Servites* (679), the *Bishop of Hyprensis* (728), and also the censure of the Fathers (639). The Fathers of the Council had doubts about the doctrine of Durandus, as is clear from the Acts; and some recent theologians think that he simply denied the sacramentality of matrimony (Hurter, *Nomenclator Litterarius* [1899] 4,433. But he really does admit its sacramentality (see *In 4* d.26 q.3). The Servite General rightly pointed out: "It is said to confer grace, because of the Master of the Sentences, who says nothing about grace, and from this it seems that Durandus was mistaken" (CTr 9,679). Moreover, it must be kept in mind that, according to Durandus, the sacraments do not cause grace, but are only conditions or causes without which there is no grace (causas sine quibus non).
16. You fill find the five different revisions of the canons on matrimony in CTr 9,639.682.760.889.967.

After the Council of Trent the sacramentality of matrimony is vindicated, among others, by Pius IX in his *Allocution "Acerbissimum vobiscum"* on civil marriage (D 2991); Leo XIII in his Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae sapientiae*" (D 3142); St. Pius X in his condemnation of the errors of the modernists (D 3451); Pius XI often in his Encyclical "*Casti connubii*" (D 3700-3701, 3713-3714); finally, Pius XII in his Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis.*"[17]

Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 1801).[18]

182. Proof by the argument of prescription. Before the Council of Trent there was already through many centuries a unanimous consent of theologians about the sacramentality of matrimony. But a consent of this kind takes us back to the 5th century; and if it was said in the 5th century, it is a sign that it is apostolic. Therefore...

The major. The consent of theologians from Peter Lombard to the Council of Trent was unanimous. For, the only one to dispute it was Durandus, but he taught the true sacramentality of matrimony; for, to the question about whether matrimony is a sacrament he responded: "It must be held absolutely that matrimony is a sacrament, since the Church determines this when she says, *Beyond the heretics, in order to destroy,* where it is said thus: 'All those who...' [and it quotes the Council of Verona, D 761][19]... Therefore two things must be held about matrimony, and their opposites cannot be held or proposed without the danger of heresy. The first one is that matrimony is licit... The second one is that matrimony is a sacrament, in the way in which the sign of a sacred thing is said to be a sacrament, and to say the opposite is similar to something heretical... But in addition to these two elements, there are two other things about matrimony, concerning which without the danger of heresy it is licit to have a contrary opinion: one of them is theological, namely, whether in matrimony grace is conferred *ex opere operato*, as in the other sacraments of the New Law. The second is logical, namely, whether matrimony is fully univocal with the other sacraments."[20] To the first point, Durandus says that canonists deny that matrimony confers grace, but that modern theologians, more or less commonly, hold "that through the sacrament of matrimony grace is conferred, unless the spouses place an obstacle"; Durandus himself determines nothing on this, but he does point out that the doctrine

17. AAS 35 (1943) 202.
18. See also D 183,294 (R 2189) 761.769.916.1327.1601.2991.2966f.
19. Durandus took this from the *Decretales* 5,7,9 (ed. Friedberg, 2,780).
20. *In 4* d.26 a.3 n.3 and see above note 15.

is debatable.[21] "Regarding the second point...it is necessary to know that, since the things that have the same name in common are univocal, and the reason for it, that is, the definition according to that name is the same, one must run through the reasons or definitions of a sacrament... among them the first and more common definition of a sacrament is, that a sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing, and according to this definition there is no doubt but that the sacrament of wedlock is univocally a sacrament with the others."[22] Therefore, evidently, Durandus truly applies the notion of a sacrament to matrimony.[23]

The minor. Before Peter Lombard the doctrine on the sacramentality of matrimony followed the same slow development as it did with the other sacraments. It appears in the first sevenfold catalogue of the *Sententiae Divinitatis* (by an unknown author, but from the school of Gilbert of Poitiers), and later it was approved by Abelard and Hugo of St. Victor.[24] Before the year one thousand, as with the other sacraments, so also with matrimony it was spoken of as a holy thing, and as a sign of the union of Christ with the Church, etc., and specially it merits the name of *sacrament* because the Vulgate version used that word for the word mystery (Eph. 5:32).

From the 5th century the word *sacrament* is used often when treating matrimony, and that was in the sense that the other sacraments were understood, although a definite doctrine on the sacraments did not yet exist. St. Leo the Great, St. Gregory, Nicolas I[25] and others, when giving answers to particular questions, in general consider the indissolubility of matrimony and insist on the representation of a sacred thing, which matrimony clearly manifests, so as to show and vindicate its indissoluble character.[26] Hence it is clear that the sacramentality of matrimony was admitted (although not with perfect clarity) by the authors living between the 5th and the 11th centuries. Regarding the 5th century, in a special way it can be proved from St. Augustine, who gave much thought to matrimony; he wrote against the heretics and he places matrimony on the same level with Baptism and Orders (as we shall see in the argument from the

21. *Loc.cit.* nn.6.8.
22. *Loc.cit.* n.9.
23. *The question which was raised about the sacramentality of a clandestine marriage* arose from the fact that those marriages were thought to be *tolerated by the Church,* and therefore valid, but not *approved,* and hence not a sacrament. However, few theologians dealt with this matter. See CTr 9,678 re the response of the General of the Dominicans and the note.
24. Abelard, *Epitome theologiae christianae,* c.31 on the sacrament of marriage: ML 178,1745; Hugo of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis christianis fidei*: ML 176,479,520.
25. St. Leo the Great, *Epist.* 167,1V: ML 54,1204; St. Gregorius, *Epist.* 1,11,45 and 50: ML 77,1161.1169; Nicolas I, *Ad Bulgar.*:ML 119,879-880.
26. See L. Godefroy, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2101-2123.

Fathers). Indeed, the holy Doctor holds that Baptism and Orders are true sacraments (see R 1876, 1642, 1478). St. Leo the Great, having been consulted on a case by Niceta, in his conclusion responds: "Hence, since the marriage tie was from the beginning so constituted as apart from the joining of the sexes to symbolize the mystic union of Christ with his Church, it is undoubted that that woman has no part in matrimony, in whose case it is shown that the mystery of marriage has not taken place" (R 2189).

183. Proof from Scripture. *Note.* That matrimony is a sacrament perhaps cannot be proved directly with certitude from Scripture alone,[27] but those things are found whereby it is easily understood that the sacramentality of matrimony was maintained in the apostolic Church and that the holy Fathers or tradition developed that doctrine. Thus Christ restored the indissolubility and the unity of matrimony, extolled its holiness, and did not ignore the difficulties inherent in it (Matt. 19:4-9). And the Apostle concluded from that: *If such is the case of a man with his wife, it is not expedient to marry* (v. 10). Christ does not deny the conclusion or weaken it, but rather confirms it. Hence it can be concluded that, in order to protect this holiness and elevation of matrimony established by Christ, a special grace would be necessary, and not just for special cases but in general for every marriage, or for the state of matrimony.

We are taking the *argument* in particular from St. Paul[28] given in Eph. 5:22-32: 22 *Wives, be subject to your husbands, as to the Lord.* 23 *For the husband is the head of the wife as Christ is the head of the church, his body, and is himself its Savior.* 24 *As the church is subject* [= ὑποτάσσεται] *to Christ, so let wives also be subject in everything* [= ἐν παντί] *to their husbands.* 25 *Husbands, love your wives, as Christ loved the church and gave himself up for her,* 26 *that he might sanctify her, having cleansed* [= καθαρίσας] *her by the washing of water with the word* [omit, *of life*], 27 *that he might present* [= παραστήθη] *the church to himself in splendor, without spot or wrinkle or any such thing, that she might be holy and without blemish.* 28 *Even so husbands should love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his wife loves himself.* 29 *For no man*

27. Theologians disagree concerning the value of the argument taken from Eph. 5:23-32. The Council of Trent, not wishing to decide the matter, said that the Apostles *hints at* the sacramentality of matrimony. However, if one looks not just at the bare text but at the context together with the general Pauline terminology, the argument can be sufficiently valid. See Prat, *La Théologie de S. Paul* 1,584f. [1934]; also L. Godefroy, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2067-2070.

28. We are transcribing the words according to the punctuation and numbering of the verses of the Vulgate (which differs from the Greek). Between brackets [ ] we are including what is omitted in the Greek text, or what more accurately, according to the same text, can be translated. In general we are following the critical observations of P. Bover, *Las Epistolas de S. Pablo* 2,438-442.

ever hates his own flesh, but nourishes [= ἐκτρέφει] *and cherishes it, as Christ does the church,* 30 *because we are members of his body.* 31 *For this reason* [= ἀντί τούτο[29]] *a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined* [= προσκολληθήσεται] *to his wife* [= πρός γυναῖκα αὐτοῦ], *and the two shall become one* [= οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκαν μίαν]. 32 *This is a great mystery* [= τό μυστήριον τοῦτο], *and I mean in reference to Christ and the church.*

184. *Explanation of the text.*[30] St. Paul in his Letter to the Ephesians explains the *doctrine of the mystery* (1:9) which has been brought to completion (1:15-22) in the work of the Church and preached by Paul. Then he comes to the second part of the letter, where he explains the nature of the Christian life as the result of a *mystery* (chapter 4 at the end). In this second part, after giving some general warnings about virtue, he addresses the Christian family and shows the excellence of its role in the Church.

Then in order to extol it, he says that Christian marriage should be likened to the mystical marriage of Christ with the Church: Christ loved the Church and he established the means so that it might be pure and permanent (without a wrinkle); and he is the head of the Church.

From that some practical conclusions are drawn: A husband should represent the image and office of Christ; therefore he should be the head and love his wife as himself. The wife similarly represents the Church; therefore she should be subject to her husband in all things. Husband and wife, in this familial society taken as a whole, represent that mystical union, which is a true *mystery,* and indeed it is a *great one.*

The mystery for St. Paul is something hidden before the ages and now finally has been revealed. Τό μυστήριον, *the mystery,* by antonomasia is for St. Paul the divine economy hidden before the ages and now made known through Christ. The Son himself is an essential part of this economy or mystery, inasmuch as he himself is the quasi work of this economy, which is based on such love that God should give the world his Son (John 3:16) and the Son should hand himself over (Eph. 5:2.25; Gal. 2:20). Christ therefore, by handing himself over, willed not only by the hypostatic union to contract as it were a marriage with humanity, but especially to perfect through grace his union with the Church, whose mystical head he is in this way. Matrimony, therefore, is a holy thing—the sign of that

29. In the LXX the reading is ἕνεκα τούτο and St. Jerome, concerning this text, pointed out that St. Paul here used ἀντί instead of ἕνεκα. See Estius at this place (ed. Vivès, 2,389).

30. Approved exegetes can be consulted regarding this text, e.g., A. Lapide, Knabenbauer, Bover, etc., or also theologians, like Lercher-Umberg, n.739.

great mystery, and it itself is also a great mystery.

This mystery (which is the image or symbol of that great mystery by antonomasia) merits the name of mystery inasmuch as it takes place by its relation to Christ and the Church; that is, inasmuch as the man and the woman, who contract marriage, intend to reproduce, in their own small Christian society, what Christ did for all of society.

St. Paul also quotes the words of Gen. 2:24 in which he seems as it were to detect a prophetical prefiguration of the union of Christ with the Church, and therefore he sees there the mystery hidden through the ages and now finally revealed.

185. Argument.[31] That being the case, it is possible to argue thus: 1) St. Paul says that matrimony is: a) a sensible sign; b) of grace. But in the New Law every sign of grace is efficacious of grace. Therefore matrimony is a sensible sign and efficacious of grace, and therefore it is a sacrament.

The major. a) Matrimony is a *sensible* sign, because it is the mutual handing over of rights to the body, which does not take place except by some external manifestation. That St. Paul actually says this is manifest, since he is treating matrimony, or the marriage contract.

The major. b) it is a *sign of grace.* This is clear from what we said recently in the explanation of the text. For, the Apostle exhorts the spouses to love each other, so that they may perform their commitments to each other—always keeping in mind the union of Christ with the Church; in this way marriage will be not only a representation of the mystery, but also a great mystery. In the same letter (ch. 4:7-16) the Apostle shows that the union of Christ with the Church takes place through grace; there he says that grace has been given to each one according to the measure of the gift of Christ, as it is in accordance with the ministry that each one has in building up the body of Christ; *speaking the truth in love, we are to grow up in every way into him who is the head, into Christ, from whom the whole body, joined and knit together by every joint with which it is supplied..., makes bodily growth and upbuilds itself in love* (v.15-16). And from that he concludes: *And be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and put on the new nature, created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness* (v. 23-24). By putting on the new man, therefore, the spouses can love each other as Christ loves the Church. And therefore St. Paul says: *no man ever hates his own flesh, but nourishes and cherishes it, as Christ does the Church.* Indeed, Christ nourishes the Church with

31. This argument is developed by Palmieri, *op.cit.*, 66f.; Sasse, 371, and by others cited in the bibliography.

his own most holy Body and most precious Blood and sanctifying grace. Therefore in reality matrimony, if it is a sign of the union of Christ with the Church, is a sign of sanctifying grace.

The minor. In the New Law *every sign of grace is efficacious of grace.* And this is certainly the mind of St. Paul, not exclusively in this place, but always; for, he often contrasts the Old Law with the New Law: the former has empty signs, that is, everything took place in signs and as it were in shadows, but in the New Law everything happens in truth. For this reason St. Paul, wishing to turn the Galatians away from the servitude of the Old Law, relied on this point—that the Old Law is empty: *But now that you have come to know God, or rather to be known by God, how can you turn back again to the weak and beggarly elemental spirits, whose slaves you want to be once more?* (Gal. 4:9). The Old Law was a shadow: *The old law has but a shadow of the good things to come instead of the true form of these realities* (Heb. 10:1).[32] Therefore in the New Law the signs that were established, were established by Christ in order to indicate the grace with which those signs are full, or, what comes to the same thing, these signs of the New Law are efficacious signs of grace because they contain the grace that they signify.

186. 2) *It can be argued in another way:* St. Paul proposes matrimony not only as a state with which many difficulties are connected, but rather as a way of living with which obligations are attached. But the difficulties of this state do not increase precisely because they have a relation to the obligations existing between Christ and the Church, and for this reason the matrimonial state is elevated to the supernatural order just as those difficulties are, and therefore that state demands supernatural grace so that in fulfilling those obligations it truly presents a likeness of such a great mystery.[33] Thus St. Paul lays a foundation on the basis of which the holy Fathers and theologians develop the sacramentality of matrimony.

187. Proof from tradition. 1. The holy Fathers derive from the Gospel and from St. Paul these conclusions for matrimony: Christ restored the sanctity of matrimony, he elevated matrimony to a mystical signification, and he imposed difficult obligations on it; but since the experience of paganism teaches that there are almost insuperable difficulties arising from the sanctity of matrimony, it is necessary that Christ give the abso-

32. Gal. 4:9; Heb. 7:18; 9:9f. St. John Chrysostom, commenting on Gal. 4:9, says: "They were needy because they were only a shadow of the future good things, and weak because they lacked the power of justifying and sanctifying."

33. This is the argument of L. Godefroy, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2069. See Prat, *La théologie de S. Paul* 1,584f.

lutely necessary means in order to be able to overcome these difficulties, namely, that he confer his grace on the spouses.

Indeed: *that matrimony has been sanctified by Christ,* the Fathers find: a) *in the assistance of Christ at the marriage in Cana.* St. Epiphanius says: "In Cana of Galilee the marriage was celebrated out of doors, and the water was said to be changed into wine for two reasons—that he might restrain with moral purity and goodness the excessive lust of passionate men in the matter of marriage, and that he might cure what was lacking and please men with the sweetness of excellent wine and his grace" (R 1094). And St. Augustine: "And for this cause, therefore, did the Lord, on being invited, come to the marriage, that conjugal chastity might be strengthened and that the sacrament of marriage might be manifested. For the bridegroom in that marriage, to whom it was said, 'You have kept the good wine until now,' represented the person of the Lord. For the good wine—namely, the Gospel—Christ has kept until now" (R 1812). Also St. Cyril of Alexandria: "When the marriage is celebrated, chastely and virtuously, the mother of the Savior is present, but he also, having been invited, comes with his disciples, not so much to eat but to perform a miracle, and also to sanctify the principle of human generation, which certainly pertains to the flesh" (R 2108).

b) *In the restoration of indissolubility* (Matt. 19:4-10), as St. Ambrose says: "We do not say that marriage was not sanctified by Christ, since the Word of God says: *The two shall become one flesh and one spirit"* (R 1253).

c) *But especially in the comments on or allusions to Eph. 5:22-33,* where they treat the meaning of a mystic marriage. It is done often by Tertullian, and excellently by St. John Chrysostom, St. Jerome, Ambrosiaster, and others.[34]

188. 2. The holy Fathers often imply *that marriage confers grace,* but not in the technical way in which later theologians speak. For example, there are statements in which they affirm that God blesses marriages, helps spouses to be faithful, etc.: Tertullian: "How shall we ever be able adequately to describe the happiness of that marriage which the Church arranges, the Sacrifice strengthens, upon which the blessing sets a seal, at which angels are present as witnesses, and to which the Father gives his consent?" (R 320). Marriages made outside of the Church are rejected, and

34. A. D'Ales gathers together the texts of Tertullian, *La théologie de Tertullian* 321-323; St. John Chrysostom, *In epist. ad Eph* c.5 hom,20: MG 62,1350; St. Jerome, *Comment. in epist. ad Eph* 1.3 c.5: ML 26,530-537; Ambrosiaster, at this place: ML 16,398-399 (in the works of St. Ambrose).

they are not endowed with this divine help, because "Accordingly, among us, secret connections as well—connections, that is, not first professed in presence of the Church—run risk of being judged akin to adultery and fornication" (R 384). Origen: "Certainly God is the one who unites two into one, so that, when a woman marries a man, they are no longer two; and since God joined them together, therefore grace is in them, because they have been united by God. Being aware of this, St. Paul pronounced marriage in conformity to the Word of God a grace, just as a chaste celibacy is a grace. For this he says: I wish all men to be as I myself am, but each person has his own gift from God—but one has this grace and another something different. But those who have been joined together by God, know this and so act: Husbands love your wives just as Christ loved the Church."[35]

189. 3. The Fathers often apply the word *sacrament* to marriage, relying on the Vulgate word μυστήριον; this version is very ancient, because Tertullian already was familiar with it. But the meaning of this word *sacrament* is so broad that not even in individual cases can its meaning be determined with complete certitude.[36] Yet St. Augustine insisted very much on the notion of a *sacrament,* requiring these three things for a Christian marriage: offspring, faith, sacrament. In general by this word the holy Doctor understands the indissoluble bond of marriage, which however gets its durability from its sanctity, or from the fact that marriage is a holy thing, and therefore comparable to Baptism and Orders: "Therefore the good of marriage for all peoples and all men consists in its power of generating, and in the fidelity of chastity; but this pertains to the people of God, also in the sanctity of the sacrament, according to which it is wrong for a woman to separate herself and marry another, while her husband is still living, not even for the purpose of having a child. She is the only one with whom the marriage was made, and just because she does not have a child the nuptial bond is not dissolved except by the death of her husband. Similarly, if the ordination of a cleric takes place so he can serve the people, even if the gathering of the people does not take place, nevertheless the sacrament of ordination remains in those ordained; and if because of some fault anyone is removed from that office, he will not lose the sacrament of the Lord once received, even if he continues under that judgment."[37]

35. *In Mt comment.* 1.14 n.16: MG 13,1230 (partly in R 505).

36. See P. de Ghellinck, *Pour l'histoire du mot Sacrament,* 11. For St. Cyprian, D'Ales, *La théologie de S. Cyprien* 84-89. Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum N. Testament* 4,809-834 (on the text of Eph. 3:32, p.829-830); W. Baner, *Griechisch-Deutsches Wörterbuch...* (1952) 960-961.

37. *De bono coniugali* 24,32: ML 40,394.

Matrimony is, because it is a *sacrament*, like the baptismal character in the baptized, "just like the soul of an apostate, since he has left his union with Christ, also with a loss of faith, does not lose the sacrament of faith which he accepted through the washing of regeneration." Here is the whole text: "Since it is not only fecundity, whose fruit consists in the offspring, and not only the chastity, whose fruit is faith, but also the sacrament of marriage which is recommended to faithful spouses, and hence the Apostle says: Husbands love your wives, just as Christ loved the Church: without doubt the reality of this sacrament is that a man and a woman, joined together in marriage, for as long as they live are to remain together inseparably; and it is not allowed, except for the case of adultery, for one spouse to be separated from the other. For this is observed in Christ and the Church that a man living with his wife is never separated by any divorce. Such observance there is of this sacrament in the city of our God, on his holy mountain, that is, in the Church of Christ for all the faithful spouses, who doubtless are members of Christ, so that, for the purpose of generating children women either marry or are already wives; and it is not allowed to abandon a sterile spouse in order to marry a fecund one. But if someone should do this, he will not be judged by the law of this age, where divorce is allowed and without a crime it is permitted to enter into marriage with another... but according to the law of the Gospel he is guilty of adultery; the same holds for the woman if she marries another. To such an extent the rights of marriage, once entered into, remain among the living, so that those who have been separated from a spouse, still remain more that person's spouse than they are with the one with whom they are cohabitating. Certainly they would not be adulterers with others, unless they continued as spouses with each other. Finally, at the death of the man, with whom there was a true marriage, a true marriage can take place with someone with whom previously it was adultery. Thus there remains among the living something conjugal, which neither separation nor copulation with another can take away. But it remains for the offense of a crime, not for the bond of a contract: "just like the soul of an apostate, since he has left his union with Christ, also with a loss of faith, does not lose the sacrament of faith which he accepted through the washing of regeneration."[38]

Although the technical notion of a sacrament was not yet explicit, nevertheless all the elements are given by St. Augustine so that later

38. *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1,10,11: ML 44,420.

theologians can vindicate the true sacramentality of matrimony.[39] Rightly therefore Lennerz says: "The Fathers *explicitly* do not treat theoretically the sacramentality of matrimony in the strict sense. The controversies, which were current about matrimony during the time of the Fathers, were about the licitness and morality of marriage, about virginity and marriage, about the licitness of second marriages and such like things, but not precisely about the sacramentality. But in the things they affirm about matrimony it is apparent that the Fathers consider matrimony not to be a merely civil affair, but that for them matrimony is a holy thing sanctified by Christ, in which graces are conferred to fulfill one's duties and whose care pertains to the Church. Surely if these individual bare facts are considered in themselves, they are not speaking directly and strictly about the sacramentality of matrimony, but taking into consideration the times, the circumstances and the purpose the Fathers had in writing as they did, they show sufficiently that the conviction about Christian marriage as a sacrament was at the root of their work.[40]

190. It is proved or confirmed also by the *universal consensus of theologians* already for several centuries before the Council of Trent,[41] and *from the liturgical documents and praxis.* For, from the very beginning it is apparent that matrimony in the Church is understood as a religious rite. St. Ignatius recommends that matrimony be celebrated in the presence of the Bishop[42]; but this *counsel* already in the time of Tertullian was a *custom*; he speaks about it as a common things: "How shall we ever be able adequately to describe the happiness of that marriage which the Church arranges, the Sacrifice strengthens, upon which the blessing sets a seal, at which angels are present as witnesses, and to which the Father gives his consent?" (R 320).

We have no certain knowledge about the rite of *conciliating* and *blessing* and *witnessing* that was current at that time. St. Ambrose refers to a

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39. Vázquez (*In 3 S.Th.*, De Matrimonio d.2 c.5 n.30) collects all the texts of St. Augustine where the word *sacrament,* dealing with marriage, occurs; but perhaps he draws an overly restrictive conclusion. On the opposite side, Perrone seems to be too broad (*De Matrimonio* 1 n.121); he finds there true sacramentality in the strict sense. L. Godefroy is more balanced, *loc.cit.*, 2106-2109.
40. Lennerz, *Sex theses de Ordine et Matrimonio* (Rome 1928) 42f. *Trent* taught: "Since, through Christ, matrimony in the evangelical law surpasses marital unions of the Old Law in grace, our holy Fathers, the councils, and the tradition of the universal Church have with good reason always taught that it is to be numbered among the sacraments of the New Law" (D 1800). See also R 67, 320, 384, 505, 1094, 1349, 1512, 2218, etc. You will find many citations in Lercher-Umberg, n.742, and especially in J. Müllendorf, Über den patristischen Beweis für die Ehe als Sakrament: ZkathTh 2,187; 8,633-649.
41. Many texts of the older theologians are cited by H. Lennerz, *De Sacramento in genere* n.65f.; there he also deals with the theologians and canonists who said that matrimony does not confer grace (n.272).
42. *Epist. ad Polycarpum* 5,2; ed. Ruiz Bueno, *Padres Apostólicos* (B.A.C.) 500.

blessing and a *veiling* (R 1249), and in a similar way St. Siricius, who by reason of the *blessing* [i.e., of a sacrament?] says that it is something like a sacrilege to break the marital bond (D 88a). The *Statuta Ecclesiae antiqua* prescribe in cn. 13: "When the groom and the bride are to be blessed by the priest, let them be offered by their parents or by the bridesman and the bridesmaid. When they have received the blessing, let them remain in virginity on that same night as a sign of reverence for the blessing" (Kch 952). St. Gregory Nazianzen mentions the ceremony of the Greeks of having the priest place the hand of the groom into the hand of the bride.[43]

Other ceremonies and prayers are not known until the time in which the rituals and sacramental books were composed. In the *Sacramentarium Leoninum, Gelasianum, Gregorianus,* etc., in the *Ordines Romani,* and in the *Liber Ordinum Mozarabicus*[44] rites and prayers are found, which more or less are the same as those found in the Roman Ritual. The first one who describes the special ceremonies of matrimony is Nicolas I in the *Responsa ad consulta Bulgarorum.*[45]

In the later rituals, starting in the 12th century the following title is given: *De Sacramento Matrimonii,* or something similar; in the older ones it says only: *In benedictione nuptiarum,* etc. Therefore from the ancient documents one cannot build a certain argument for the sacramentality of matrimony from the liturgy alone. But the thesis is surely *confirmed* because it is presented as something holy, done before priests, with a special blessing and prayers, which sometimes give the impression of a truly sacramental form.

191. Objections. 1. The sacraments confer the grace they signify. But matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church which it does not confer. Therefore.

I bypass the major or distinguish it. The sacraments confer *only* the grace that they signify, *denied; also, conceded. I distinguish the minor.* Matrimony does not confer, that is, it does not perfect the union of Christ with the Church, *conceded;* it does not confer an increase of sanctifying grace, through which grace the union of Christ with the Church is perfected, *denied.*

When it is said that *a sacrament confers the grace it signifies*, it does not mean that the sacraments must perfect *all and only* those things which they signify, but that they are *efficacious* signs of grace. Indeed, sanctifying grace and actual graces, which the sacraments confer, tend to perfect what they signify. Thus, for example, in the

43. *Epist.* 193: MG 37,315-316.

44. *Sacrament. Leon.* Ed. Ch.L. Feltoe (Cambridge 1896) 140-142; *Sacrament Gelas.* Ed. H.A. Wilson (Oxford 1884) 265-268; *Sacrament. Gregorianum:* ML 78,261 see 580. *Ordines Romani,* in Martène, *De antiquis Ecclesiae ritibus* 1.1 c.9 a.5 (col. 2,127-144) where all the diverse ceremonies are found, both of the Latins and the Greeks; *Liber Ordinum,* ed. Férotin, col.433-442, and it should be noted that "les belles formules de la bénédiction nuptiale sont d'un très grand intérêt. On les chercherait vainement ailleurs" (432 note 1).

45. C.3: ML 119,980; Msi 15,463.

Eucharist, an increase of grace is given, which tends to increase the union between the soul and Christ, just as material nourishment is converted into the substance of the one eating it; Confirmation gives the grace of strength so that one can fight for the faith, etc. But matrimony signifies the union of Christ with the Church and confers the grace whereby the spouses can always remain united so that they really are a reflection of that supernatural union of Christ with the Church. For this purpose they need an increase of sanctifying grace and of many actual graces, which will never be lacking unless they place an obstacle to them. So it is in this sense that the sacrament of matrimony confers the grace that it signifies.

2. The sacraments were instituted by Christ. But matrimony was not instituted by Christ. Therefore.

I grant the major and distinguish the minor. Matrimony as a natural contract was not instituted by Christ, *conceded;* as a sacrament, *denied* (see scholium n. 192).

3. Matrimony and its principal act is something sinful. But something evil cannot be a sacrament. Therefore.

I deny the major absolutely. The heretics said this and we spoke about them when we listed the adversaries. St. Augustine defended the sanctity of matrimony brilliantly on many occasions in his fight against the Manicheans.

4. *The objector insists:* But matrimony is at least an imperfect state. For, virginity is better than matrimony. But virginity is not a sacrament. Therefore neither is matrimony.

I deny the consequent or rather the supposition, namely, that a sacrament must be about something more perfect, or that the perfection of state is the reason why matrimony is consecrated as a sacrament. For, provided that it is not something evil, it depends on the will of Christ whether or not it is a sacrament. But that being the case, "it is easily understood that it was a very wise institution that Christian matrimony should be a sacrament. For the purpose of Christian matrimony is to propagate the people of God, as a result of which heavy burdens are imposed on spouses. Moreover, the matrimony of Christians has a special unity and indissolubility, from which again great difficulties can arise; hence it is easily understood that Christ wanted to support and assist with sacramental grace those who assume these burdens."[46]

With regard to the perfection of state, Palmieri rightly says: "If state is compared with state, the state of continence is more perfect; but nothing prevents a state in itself more imperfect from being consecrated by a sacrament, and under this aspect to have precedence over the other. Just as one sacrament is for penitents, not for the innocent, even though the latter state is more perfect. But the reason why matrimony was consecrated with sanctifying grace and became a sacrament in the New Law, on which the family and all of society depends and whereby the creative action of God is continued by the propagation of children fit for the worship of him, was so that in this way under the protection and direction of the Church, to which the sacraments have been entrusted, the whole human family might be holy in its beginning.[47]

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46. Lennerz, *Sex theses de Sacramento Matrimonii* p.13.
47. *Tractatus de Matrimonio* p.72.

192. Scholium. *At what time the sacrament of matrimony was instituted.*

As has been said, matrimony was instituted by God at the beginning of the human race, and Christ raised the marital contract to the dignity of a sacrament. The Council of Trent in cn.1 on the Sacraments in general (D 1601) says that *all* the sacraments were instituted by Jesus Christ our Lord; but later, when considering matrimony in particular, it had proposed cn.1 under this formula: "If anyone says that matrimony is not a true sacrament of the law of the Gospel instituted by God, but devised by men in the Church, let him be anathema."[48] But, at the request of many Fathers, afterwards it was decreed that it was "instituted by Christ the Lord" (D 1801). Theologians ask whether there is any certainty about the occasion on which Christ instituted the sacramentality of marriage.

Omitting the opinion which holds that marriage was already a true sacrament from the beginning, because even then it referred prophetically to the union of Christ with the Church,[49] there are three principal places in the Gospel that can be alleged:

1. *The marriage at Cana of Galilee* (John 2:1-11), at which Christ was present and where many Fathers say that marriage was sanctified by the presence of Christ. But the Fathers quote this passage as evidence against the heretics who said that marriage is something evil, in order to show its holiness; for Christ would not have honored by his presence and by his miracle something evil.

2. Matt. 9:3, where Christ restored the unity and indissolubility of marriage. From the Gospel nothing else is expressed, but Christ appeals to the divine precept given to Adam; and St. Paul appeals to the same text to prove the union of Christ with the Church signified in marriage (Eph. 5:31). Therefore on this occasion Christ could have had the intention of instituting the sacrament of marriage, for this reason especially, that the unity and indissolubility are properties which shine forth more in the union between Christ and the Church, and in marriage they can be the causes of many difficulties and a heavy burden (as the hearers themselves pointed out: *If such is the case of a man with his wife, it is not expedient to marry,* v. 10). For this, therefore, grace is required, and because of this de facto it is given in the sacrament of matrimony.[50]

3. Finally, *Acts 1:3* is proposed. Before his definitive Ascension Christ appeared often to the Apostles and he associated with them *speaking about the kingdom of God.* Christ really in his mind could have instituted solemnly the sacrament of matrimony when he restored its unity and indissolubility, while removing solemnly the permission granted in olden times because of their hardness of heart. And later, after the resurrection, he could have notified the Apostles about its institution, just as he taught them about the other sacraments.[51]

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48. CTr 9,639.
49. As we already said, it was, at most, *a sacrament of nature*, and it did not confer grace *ex opere operato;* in no way was it a sacrament in the proper sense.
50. St. Thomas from this text proposes an argument of fittingness for the sacramentality of marriage. See Pesch, n.716. At the Council of Trent the Bishop of Prague requested that for the words *instituted by God* in the first redaction of cn.1 it should be said: "instituted by Christ; and it is given where Christ instituted it, namely, where he said: 'What God has joined together, let no man put asunder'" (CTr 9,651).
51. Rosset considers this question more at length, *De sacramento matrimonii* 1 n.75f.

ARTICLE II

ON THE ESSENCE OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY

Thesis 2. The sacrament of matrimony consists essentially in the matrimonial contract itself, so that between the baptized a valid matrimony cannot be contracted that is not a sacrament.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 45, a. 5; St. Bellarmine, c.7; Palmieri, 78087; Pesch, n.718f.; Sasse, 384-389; Huarte, 186-166; Otten, 368-376; Puig de la B., n.1078-1086; lercher-Umberg, n.747-758.

193. Connection. Above it was already said that matrimony was instituted by God at the beginning of the human race, and that Christ raised it to the dignity of a sacrament. Wherefore a question presents itself: When Christ instituted the sacramentality of matrimony, did he leave the contract of matrimony as it was (in which the essence of matrimony still consists among the non-baptized), or did he add something else to it? Or in other words: the Church prescribes many things in the rite of celebration of the sacrament of matrimony: a blessing, the giving of the ring, asking for consent, etc.; are these things, or some of them, necessary for the validity of the sacrament? We respond to this question: that the essence of the sacrament of matrimony consists in the contract alone, so that among the baptized the contract cannot be separated from the sacrament, and consequently there cannot be a valid matrimony between them without it being a sacrament.

194. Definition of terms. We understand *matrimony* in the same way as in the previous thesis. The word *sacrament* is also taken in the same way.

When we say *essentially* we wish to signify the *essence* itself of the sacrament, or what comes to the same thing, the internal constitutive element of the sacrament itself. In the other sacraments we usually distinguish between the *matter and the form* as the parts essentially constituting the sacramental reality; for now in this sacrament we are prescinding from the component parts, such as the matter and form, the essence itself of the sacrament. This is not because these parts do not exist, or cannot be thought, but because this point does not concern us here. We will consider these elements later.

A contract is a pact or agreement to be regulated by judicial obligations. As was said above (n. 144), it can be free as to its exercise and necessary as to its specification. Therefore, it is not required that the juridical obligations be determined by the contracting persons or those making the contract, but it suffices that the parties making the contract oblige them-

selves to something which has already been determined by the competent authority. From this contract the result is a bond or the reality of a marriage.

As is evident, we can distinguish between the contract and the sacrament; for, before the coming of Christ marriage existed, as a true contract, and it was not a sacrament; and even now, the non-baptized validly contract marriage, but it is not a sacrament. But we defend this distinction between matrimony and the marriage contract between the non-baptized as only a logical distinction, not a real distinction, so that the sacramentality cannot be separated from the contract.

195. Opinions. In addition to our opinion, which is also the opinion of St. Thomas and of almost all the old theologians, two other opinions can be added:

1. *The first one distinguishes the Sacrament and the contract,* and this is proposed in three ways:

a) Matrimony consists in the contract, but the sacrament in the priestly blessing which is given to the spouses; therefore the distinction between the sacrament and the matrimony is *total* and therefore there can be a separation between them. Thus Launoy, De Dominis with the *Regalists.* Likewise the *Gallicans* and the *Josephinists.* Afterwards Nuytz,[1] etc.

b) Matrimony consists in the contract, but the sacrament in the contract as the matter and in the blessing as the form: therefore the distinction is *partial.* Thus Cano, Sylvius, Estius,[2] etc.

c) The sacrament consists in the contract itself, but the spouses can exclude the nature of a sacrament, and the contract is still valid. In this opinion the distinction is also to a certain extent *partial,* or rather it is a real distinction inasmuch as the intention is that which must be added in order for the contract to be a sacrament. This opinion was held by Billuart, Vázquez, Wirceburgenses,[3] etc.

2. *The second one denies that matrimony consists in the contract.* It situates matrimony in an *organic relationship, in a formal juridical arrangement, in an institution,* etc. It seems to confuse the act of getting married with the state of marriage; and so it refers to the bond resulting from marriage rather than to the act of marrying. This opinion, which had been completely abandoned, has appeared again. Thus Lefèvre, Giménez

1. J. Launoy, *Regia in matrimonium potestas* (1674); De Dominis, M.A., *De republica ecclesiastica* (1620); J. Nuytz advocated his doctrine in various works which were condemned by Pius IX.
2. Cano, *De locis theologicis* l.8 c.5; Sylvius, *In 3 divi Th.* q.42 a.1 q.ª2 concl.1-3.
3. Billuart, *De Matrimonio* d.1 a.5; Vázquez, *De Sacramentis* d.138 c.5 n.63-64; Wirceburgenses, *De Matrimonio* n.300-303.

Fernández, T. García Barberena,[4] and a few others.

196. Doctrine of the Church. The Church has often defended the teaching of this thesis when the occasion demanded it. Nicolas I, responding to some questions of the Bulgarians, explains the ceremonies used by the Roman Church in the nuptial blessing, and he concludes: "Such a great lack of resources sometimes limits them, so that in preparation for marriage they have almost nothing; and because of this according to the laws the consent alone of those who wish to get married suffices. And if, by chance, this consent alone is lacking in the marriage, everything else is vain, even if solemnized by intercourse."[4a]

Innocent III: "You have asked Us whether the mute and the deaf can be united to each other in marriage. To this question We respond to Your Fraternity thus: Since... and for marriage only the consent of those whose union is concerned suffices, it seems that, if such a one wishes to contract (a marriage), it cannot and it ought not to be denied him, since what he cannot declare by words he can declare by signs" (D 766).[5]

Alexander III: "If between a man and a woman legitimate consent... at the present time takes place, so that the one expressly receives the other as his (spouse) by mutual consent..., whether or not an oath has is introduced, it is not permitted for the woman to marry another" (D 756).

Eugene IV in the Decree for the Armenians: "The efficient cause of matrimony is the mutual consent duly expressed in words relating to the present" (D 1327).

The Council of Trent held as fully valid clandestine marriages which were entered into without any religious ceremonies, although the same Council decreed that in the future they would be invalid: "There is no doubt that secret marriages, entered by free consent of the parties, are true and valid marriages as long as the Church has not made them null" (D 1813).

Pius VI: It is a dogma of faith that matrimony, which before the coming of Christ was nothing other than an indissoluble contract, after the coming of Christ was made one of the seven sacraments of the New Law instituted by Christ the Lord... [therefore only the Church can determine the form of this contract]... These causes do not for any other reason pertain to the one

4. Lefèvre, *Le mariage civil n'est il au'un contrat?:* Nouvelle Revue Historique de droit français et étranger (1902) 300-304; Giménez Fernández, *La institutión matrimonial* (Madrid 1947); T. García Barberena, *Sobre la idea contractual del Matrimonio Canónico:* MiscCom 16 (1951) 158-179, with a bibliography on p. 162, note 16. O. Robleda, S.J., wrote against this author, *Sobre el matrimonio in fieri:* EstEcl 28 (1954) 5-56; García Barberena responded to him, *Sobre el matrimonio in fieri:* Salmanticensis 1 (1954) 422-440.

4° *Resp. Ad consulta Bulgarorum:* Msi 15,403; ML 119,980 (partially in D 643).

5. The same pontiff in his *Epist. ad Episcop. Mutinensem* repeats almost exactly the words of Nicolas I: *Decretales* 4,4,5 (ed. Friedberg 2,682).

judgment of the Church except for the fact that the matrimonial contract is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the law of the Gospel."[6]

Pius IX strengthened this doctrine especially when he condemned the works and teaching of John Nepomucene Nuytz that were opposed to the sacramentality of the contract: "... Since no Catholic is ignorant or cannot know that matrimony is truly and properly one of the seven sacraments of the evangelical law, instituted by Christ the Lord, and that for that reason, there can be no marriage between the faithful without there being at one and the same time a sacrament, and that, therefore, any other union of man and woman among Christians, except the sacramental union, even if contracted under the power of any civil law, is nothing else than a disgraceful and death-bringing concubinage very frequently condemned by the Church, and, hence, that the sacrament can never be separated from the conjugal agreement, and that it pertains absolutely to the power of the Church to discern those things which can pertain in any way to the same matrimony" (D 2991).

In the *Syllabus* he condemned the following propositions relating to the essence of matrimony: "The sacrament of matrimony is nothing but an appendage to the contract and separable from it, and the sacrament itself consists merely in the nuptial blessing" (D 2966). "A true marriage can exist between Christians by virtue of a purely civil contract, and it is false to assert that the contract of marriage between Christians is always a sacrament or that there is no contract if the sacrament is excluded" (D 2973).

Leo XIII repeats the same idea with grave words: "Let no one, then, be deceived by the distinction that some civil jurists have so strongly insisted upon—the distinction, namely, by virtue of which they sever the matrimonial contract from the sacrament, with intent to hand over the contract to the power and will of the rulers of the State, while reserving questions concerning the sacrament to the Church. A distinction, or rather severance, of this kind cannot be approved; for certain it is that in Christian marriage *the contract is inseparable from the sacrament* and that, for this reason, the contract cannot be true and legitimate without being a sacrament as well. For Christ our Lord added to marriage the dignity of a sacrament; *but marriage is the contract itself,* whenever the contract is lawfully concluded... Hence it is clear that among Christians every true marriage is, in itself and by itself, a sacrament; and that nothing can be farther from the truth than to say that the sacrament is a certain added ornament, or outward endowment, which can be separated and torn away from the contract at the caprice of man" (D 3145-3146).

6. *Epist.ad Episcop. Matulensem,* Sept. 16, 1788.

Pius XI: "And since the valid matrimonial consent among the faithful was constituted by Christ as a sign of grace, the sacramental nature is so intimately bound up with Christian wedlock that there can be no true marriage between baptized persons without it being by that very fact a sacrament" (D 3713).

CIC cn. 1012 [1917]: 1. Christ the Lord raised the matrimonial contract between baptized persons to the dignity of a sacrament. 2. Therefore there cannot be a valid matrimonial contract between baptized persons without it being by that very fact a sacrament."

197. Theological note. The thesis contains *Catholic doctrine.*[7].

198. Proof. *Note.* The main argumentation in order to obtain certitude in this matter is taken from the quoted pontifical documents. But this does not prevent us from offering other arguments, especially from the agreement of theologians, which either separately or taken as a group generate certitude. For the proof it suffices to demonstrate that the sacrament cannot be separated from the contract; from this it is concluded that there is no Christian marriage that is not a sacrament.

Proof from Scripture. St. Paul says that matrimony is a symbol of the union of Christ with the Church. But St. Paul is dealing with the matrimonial contract. Therefore the matrimonial contract is a sacrament, or what comes to the same thing, the essence of the sacrament consists in the contract itself.

The major was proved in the previous thesis. And lest we seem to add something in the conclusion, namely the sacramentality, which was not in the premises, it should be noted that St. Paul is treating matrimony as it is celebrated and supported in the Church, which we already proved in the previous thesis is a sacrament. Indeed, there we presented our proof with diverse arguments (*also* from St. Paul), so that now we can prescind from the argument from St. Paul for the sacramentality (that argument, as we already pointed out, is not the main one nor is it absolutely certain), and base ourselves only on what he says about the true marriage of the faithful that

7. The authors usually call it *at least theologically certain,* and we said the same thing in the first edition. But the documents of the Church seem to demand something more. Leo XIII and Pius XI without any restrictions clearly teach the thesis; Pius IX is an important document, the *Syllabus,* teaches the same thing, and writing to the King of Sardinia he says: "It is a *dogma of faith* that matrimony was elevated by Jesus Christ our Lord to the dignity of a sacrament, and it is a *doctrine of the Catholic faith* that the sacrament is not an accidental quality added to the contract, but is of the very essence of matrimony..." (Sept. 9, 1852; prop. 73 of the *Syllabus* was taken from this letter). The Roman Rota has said that this doctrine is a truth that is *proximate to faith* (AAS 3 [1910] 933).

is also approved by the Church.

The minor. St. Paul quotes the words of Scripture in Gen. 2:24, *Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and cleaves to his wife, and they become one flesh* (Eph. 5:31). But in Genesis, obviously, the text is speaking only about the matrimonial contract. Therefore, concerning the matrimonial contract St. Paul says that it is a sign of the union of Christ with the Church.

199. Proof from the Fathers. The Fathers,[8] just as they did not ask technical questions about the sacramentality of matrimony, so also they were not preoccupied directly with its essence. However, a negative argument is constructed from the fact that they never made a distinction between the matrimony of the faithful and the sacrament, but about wedlock itself as they were considering a sacred thing in the Church. Indeed, without doubt they did not deal explicitly with sacramentality precisely because they placed matrimony in the contract itself, and only required that it be entered into with the blessing of the Church.

Furthermore, for special reasons, they warned the faithful regarding second marriages, but nevertheless if someone after the death of a spouse wanted to get married again, he could do it licitly and validly, and indeed in the presence of a priest, but sometimes the blessing and always the veiling did not take place. But second marriages of this kind were held to be true Christian or ecclesiastical marriages or a sacrament, and they were not merely civil arrangements; they were not preceded by any ceremonies, and still they were not considered to be different from other Christian marriages. Therefore, this is a sign that the Fathers did not make a distinction between the matrimonial contract and the matrimonial sacrament, but the whole reality of matrimony in the Church was contained in the matrimonial contract.

200. Proof from the agreement of theologians. Theologians already in the 12th century, when they studied the sacramentality of matrimony, placed its essence in the contract.

Indeed, the first canon lawyers, while commenting of Roman law, placed matrimony in the bare contract: "A contract is the consent given by both parties at the same time, as in marriage or making a purchase."[9] Hence the theologians apply the teaching about contracts to the sacrament.

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8. Perrone developed the argument from the Fathers, *De Matrimonio christiano* 1.1 c.6 a.1.
9. Petri, *Exceptiones legum romanorum,* App.1 c.20; in Le Bras, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2182.

Peter Lombard speaks about the *conjugal pact,*[10] and St. Albert the Great is already clearly treating the contract-sacrament: "... that sacrament, as was said already, consists in a certain exchange or contract of the contracting persons; but such an exchange cannot take place without the consent of the one exchanging or contracting; therefore consent is required for that and not for the other things."[11] St. Bonaventure distinguished between the blessing and the contract, which he requires for the essence; "For the reality of matrimony these two things suffice, namely, legitimacy of the persons and unity of consent. But for the solemnity and beauty, the handing over of the parents and the blessing of the priests are required."[12] And in this view all theologians and canonists were unanimous until M. Cano who, in proposing his opinion, said that he did not agree with the community of theologians: "None of these things [Holy Scripture or apostolic institution] can bring it about that matrimony contracted civilly without a minister is a sacrament of the New Law. Even if all the Thomists are with the Scotists, if the younger theologians along with the older ones want to fight against me, still my position is better."[13] Cano said this because he thought that the old theologians did not pay attention to the distinction between the contract and the sacrament, and for this reason he thought he was the first to open up a new way which subsequent theologians would follow. Thus in this case perhaps a common consent was reached, since on the contrary it could happen that, if he were the first one to claim that not every marriage of the faithful is a sacrament, but only what was established in a religious and sacred manner, a second, third and other theologians, since it would seem probable to them, would follow the same opinion.." But his hope deceived him. He was almost the only one to follow that road, which a second and a third and no others after that followed. However, we can make the following deduction from his testimony, namely, that the doctrine of our thesis at that time was the common opinion of theologians.

201. Objections. 1. The essence of a sacrament is composed of its matter and form. But the matrimonial contract is not composed of matter and form. Therefore the contract is not a sacrament.

I distinguish the major. The essence of a sacrament is composed of its matter and form as being from material or physical things, in the univocal sense with the matter and form of the hylemorphic system, *denied;* in an analogous sense and not exactly from material and physical things, *conceded. I also distinguish the minor and deny the*

10. *Sentent.* 4 d.27 c.4.
11. *In 4* d.27 a.6.
12. *In 4* d.28 a.1 q.5. Similarly Scotus, *In 4* d.26 a.2 q.2.
13. *De locis theologicis* 1.8 c.5.

consequent. It has already been explained in the treatise on the sacraments in general how matter and form in the sacraments is to be understood. Moreover, we have already said that in this treatise on the essence of matrimony we make a distinction between the essence and the constitutive elements of the essence, that is, between the essence in general and the matter and form as the essential parts; this latter question we will treat in the next thesis. For, really in the sacrament of matrimony essential parts are also found, which are something like matter and form.

2. In order to have the sacrament of matrimony, the intention of receiving and conferring the sacrament is required in those contracting marriage. But the contractors can desire to make a contract and still not receive the sacrament. Therefore in the sacrament of matrimony the contract and the sacrament can be separated.

I bypass the major, and deny the minor or distinguish: if the contract itself is not raised to the nature of a sacrament they can distinguish between the contract and the sacrament and will one without the other, *conceded;* if the contract itself is a sacrament they can will one without the other, *denied.*

In order to solve this objection (which is the main difficulty) one must pay attention to the manner in which matrimony was raised by Christ to the nature of a sacrament. Matrimony is a contract, and it is also a public contract (since it affects society itself), and therefore it is subject to the competent authority, whose duty it is to attach conditions to its validity. Thus, for example, in buying and selling, for a contract to be valid, authority can require that definite provisions be made, such as clearly stating the day and the location; if these details are partially or totally absent, then the contract will be void. In every contract the intention is required (and if the contrary is not stated expressly, it is supposed).

Matrimony was instituted by God; it is a sacred thing and it depends on God. But also prescinding from this special dependence, God, as the Creator of the human race, legislator and Lord, can add essential conditions to human contracts. Christ, who is God, has this authority and using it he decreed that between the baptized the matrimonial contract would be a sacrament. Consequently, if any baptized person wants to contract a valid marriage, he must also want (at least in a vague, not necessarily explicit way) its sacramentality. Therefore any Christian, who by his explicit will excludes sacramentality from the essence of his matrimony, by that very fact excludes an essential condition of the contract, and therefore that contract is not valid. However, if he wants to exclude the sacrament, but the will to make a valid contract predominates, then de facto the sacrament is not excluded, and consequently the marriage is valid.

The comparison that has been made with baptism is not valid; for, in baptism, if the intention is nor present the sacrament is not conferred and it remains just a washing (therefore we have bypassed the major). For Christ did not raise to the dignity of a sacrament *every* natural ablution; but he did raise *every* matrimonial contract.

3. The essential properties of things flow from the essence of a thing. But the essential properties of matrimony (unity and indissolubility) do not come from the will of the contracting parties or from the contract. Therefore matrimony is not a contract.

I bypass the major and distinguish the minor: the essential properties of matrimony

do not flow from the act of the will of the contracting parties *freely* establishing these properties, *conceded;* establishing them *necessarily, denied.* The supposition could also be denied, namely, that the concern is with already contracted marriage. For, really, the objector is dealing with the state of matrimony, which consists in the bond with its properties. But the act of contracting matrimony, which we are considering, is the contract itself which gives birth to the bond and ordains the obligations of the contracting parties. As was said in the previous objection, in a contract that is not just private but also social, as matrimony is, the competent authority can add conditions and establish rights or obligations and properties which are connected with a contract *freely* entered into.[14]

202. Corollary 1. Since the essence of the sacrament of matrimony is the contract, per se it can admit all those formalities that the Church accepts in such a contract. Therefore, it is not opposed to its sacramentality that matrimony may be contracted *through a proxy,* since this form of contract is admitted by the Church and also by the civil authority. And the comparison with the other sacraments, which cannot be received without being present, is not an obstacle to this[15]; for, the other sacraments are not constituted essentially by a natural contract, but are of such a nature that they require the presence of the subject.

203. Corollary 2. *The sacrament of matrimony is transient and not permanent.* This is a consequence of the very nature of a contract, which is something transient and not permanent. Of course, the obligation arising from the contract remains, and *in matrimony the bond remains*, but this bond is not the contract itself but the effect or result of the contract. St. Robert Bellarmine, because the matrimonial bond represents the union of Christ with the Church, wants that bond to be called a sacrament: "The sacrament of marriage can be considered in two ways: in one way when it takes place; in another way while it remains after it has taken place. For, it is a sacrament like the Eucharist, which is a sacrament not only when it takes place, but also when it remains; for, as long as the spouses live their association together is always a sacrament of Christ and of the Church."[16] And Pius XI uses these words to exhort spouses to live in a holy manner: "In order that they may make this firm resolution, keep it and put it into practice, an oft-repeated consideration of their state of life, and a diligent reflection on the sacrament they have received, will be of great assistance to them. Let them constantly keep in mind, that they have been sanctified and strengthened for the duties and the dignity of their state by a special sacrament, the efficacious power of which, although it does not impress a character, is undying. To this purpose we may ponder over the words full of real comfort of holy Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, who with other well-

14. See O. Robleda, *Sobre el matrimonio in fieri:* EstEcl 28 (1945) 35-44. Other difficulties, which arise from a radical sanation (*sanatio in radice*), a simple convalidation and the celebration of matrimony with the conviction that it is not valid, are treated and solved by Robleda, *loc.cit.*, 44-56. Other objections, which are usually raised concerning the distinction between the sacrament and the contract, can be reduced more or less to the objections given here. See Otten, n.430, and Puig de la B., n.1084-1086.
15. Cano argues in this way for his opinion, *op.cit.*, 1.8 c.5.
16. *De Controveersiis* 3: *De Matrimonio,* controv.2 c.6.

known theologians[17] with devout conviction thus expresses himself."[18] The Supreme Pontiff proposes this as *a pious consideration*, not as doctrine, and therefore it is not to be preferred to the opposite certain opinion. For, St. Bellarmine himself compares the bond, which arises from the contract, with the baptismal character; but no one says that the character is a sacrament. Thus the bond is not the *sacrament alone* (*sacramentum tantum*); at the most it will be the *sacrament and the reality* (*sacramentum et res*). Furthermore, as the holy Doctor also does, it is necessary to make a distinction between matrimony as a sacrament and the *state* of matrimony. Surely the state is permanent as long as the bond remains; but the act whereby someone was constituted in that state was a transient act. But if matrimony is compared with the other sacraments, which do not impress a character (except the Eucharist), it has this particular result that it produces a bond, which is something more than a mere title demanding grace. However, it should also be well noted that this bond does not come formally from the sacrament because it is a sacrament, but from a sacrament inasmuch as it is a contract; and so a sacrament always appears as something transient, but as leaving a permanent effect as a result of its power. And for this reason matrimony can be compared with the sacraments that impress a character, or even with the Eucharist.

204. Corollary 3. *The use of matrimony is not the essence of the sacrament.* This is clear from what has been said. For, matrimony is a contract, from which arises in both spouses the right to the body of the other spouse. However, this right is not the same as the use of the right. Thus, two men can make a contract or pact binding themselves to help each other, and nevertheless de facto never ask for that mutual help. Likewise, the contracting parties in marriage through the marital contract alone grant the right to each other concerning the body, but it is not necessary, in virtue of the contract, that de facto one party demands of the other the use of the body. Nevertheless, those persons contract a true and valid marriage who promise to each other to observe virginity, as the holy Fathers testify that a true marriage was contracted between the Bl. Virgin Mary and Joseph with this firm proposal, or also with a vow and solemn agreement to observe perfect virginity.[19]

ARTICLE III

ON THE MATTER, FORM AND MINISTER OF THE SACRAMENT OF MATRIMONY

205. When the theory of hylemorphism was applied to the sacraments, immediately serious difficulties and discussions among theologians made

17. These main theologians are P. Sánchez, *De Matrimonio* 1.2 d.5 n.7; Lavmann, *Theologia moralis* 1.5 tr.10 p.2 n.4.
18. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 583.
19. Pesch treats this matter at length, n.741-753; see also J.A. Aldama, SThS IIIA, Mariology n.75-78 with an ample bibliography on the virginal marriage of the Blessed Virgin Mary with St. Joseph.

their appearance. For the sacraments, as such, are moral entities, although most of them are composed of physical elements. Therefore it is not surprising that the theory of matter and form was not applied in the same way by the different authors to the various sacraments.

In what pertains to matrimony, a difficulty arose from the fact that the theologians did not find in it the matter and form in the way in which water and oil are used in baptism and extreme unction. Alexander of Hales,[20] because of the difficulty involved in assigning the matter and form for the sacrament of matrimony, thought that an exception should be made for the sacraments of the law of nature, such as matrimony, for which the matter and form should not be designated. Scotus preferred not to assign any matter for the sacrament of matrimony.[21]

But other authors do not hesitate to look for the matter and form in matrimony itself. Thus Hugo A S. Caro: "It can be said better that the consent to marital intercourse expressed through words when they are present together is the sacrament, and it is the quasi matter of the sacrament; the form of the words is the quasi form of the same sacrament."[22]

Petrus de Palude placed the matter in the bodies of the spouses, because the bodies are that which is handed over in matrimony.[23] Later St. Antoninus followed this opinion.[24] Richard of Mediavilla[25] had a different idea about it; he said that the nature of the matter is found in the words spoken by the spouses in reference to the matrimonial contract. This opinion was accepted by St. Albert the Great and St. Thomas, and afterwards it will become more common.[26] But Robert Fitsacre, whom few followed, thought that the matter is the consent itself and the union of the bodies.[27]

206. Regarding the form, the debate was more lively. For Scotus, having denied that there is any matter in matrimony, placed the whole power of the sacrament in the form, and therefore his whole effort was directed to the study of it. The basis of the doubt for Scotus came from the nature of the contract: for, since matrimony takes place in the contract, he immediately asked himself this question: If matrimony consists in the contract as such, will the form of the sacrament be the special way in which the contract takes place?; "for either God instituted thus an indefinite sign to be the effi-

20. *Summa* 4 q.5 m.1 a.1.
21. *Reportata parisiensia* d.28 n.23.
22. Ms. unpublished in Le Bras, *Mariage: DTC 9,2202.*
23. Petrus de Palude, *In 4* d.26 q.4.
24. St. Antoninus, *Summa Sacrae Theologiae* p.3.ª tit.1 c.2.
25. Richard A Mediavilla, *In 4* d.26 q.2 ad 1.
26. St. Albert the Great, *In 4* d.26 a.14 ad q.1 ad 2; St. Thomas, *In 4* d.26 q.2 a.1 ad 2.
27. Ms. 43 fol.207 Oriel College (Oxford).

cacious sign of grace, like the indefinite sign required for the contract; or he determined the sign that must be efficacious of grace; and if that is so, either he determined some precise words, such as, 'I accept you as my wife, or my husband'; or he determined indifferently the words to be used for the consent."[28] The question posed in this way was not just speculative, but also practical; for, if God determined that certain words must be used as the form of the contract, a mute man could not pronounce them and so he could not contract a marriage. The Subtle Doctor offered this solution: "For the sacrament of matrimony a definite sensible sign is required, as audible with certain words, because without the certain words there is no sacrament of matrimony, although there could be a contract of matrimony without the certain words... But this audible sign, which is necessary for the sacrament of matrimony, or the certain words themselves, are the form of the sacrament... For unless this sacrament had for the whole form a definite sensible sign, like certain words, there would perhaps not be one sacrament... and then the form of the sacrament would be very broad, because sensible signs of any kind would be the form, which the Catholic Church does not hold; but this takes place only in a definite way now through words."[29]

This opinion of Scotus had not a few followers, until gradually the opposite opinion prevailed, namely, that definite pronounced words are not required. St. Bonaventure taught that opinion: "But in some [Sacraments] the power does not come from the exterior word, but from the interior, as in penance with regard to confession, and in matrimony. In these sacraments any kind of expression is sufficient—either with words, or in writing, or any kind of gesture."[30]

207. This question is now no longer disputed, but this point is held *commonly*: the *matter* and *form* of the sacrament of matrimony are those parts that produce the contract essentially, since the sacrament consists in the contract; but these are only the mutual handing over and acceptance of those contracting marriage. The handing over is assigned as the matter

28. Scotus, *Opus oxoniense* d.26 q.unic. n.14.

29. Ibid. n.23. This opinion of Scotus is not opposed to the unanimity of theologians concerning the doctrine of the matrimonial contract defended in the thesis. For, Scotus supposes that the sacrament of matrimony has from the institution of Christ a definite form that a mute man could not use and therefore that God has provided for this special case, so that, although such a man does not receive the sacrament, nevertheless he does not lack some grace. Logically this opinion must separate the sacramentality from the contract, but it was not understood in this way by either the *Subtle Doctor* or Cano or Vázquez, etc. In fact Scotus, on the opinion that does not put the sacrament in the consent, said: "I think that this opinion, because it would be singular, until now does not have any supporter, or defender, because beside the fact that none of those who up till now have written about this even mention it, it is not apparent how it could be sustained" (*In 4* d.26 q.2 a.3).

30. *In 4* d.28 a.unic. q.4.

and the acceptance as the form. Since in this sacrament there is no material thing (like the water in baptism) for the remote matter out of which (*ex qua*), therefore in the Decree for the Armenians, matter and form are not assigned for the sacrament of matrimony, but only "the efficient cause of matrimony is the mutual consent duly expressed in words relating to the present" (D 1327).

Some, like Vázquez, who wanted the matter to be the bodies of the contracting parties, assigned the matter *about which* (*circa quam*) the contract is concerned, rather than the matter *from which* (*ex qua*), or the matter *which* (*quae*). The opinion of M. Cano is similar, who placed the form in the blessing and the matter in the handing over of the bodies; this view is refuted in the proof of our thesis.

208. *The ministers of the sacrament of matrimony* are the contracting parties, since they are the ones who apply the form to the matter. The priest is required by the Church as a qualified witness, and one that is necessary. Therefore, for the baptized a *civil marriage* is invalid, because Christ, raising matrimony to the dignity of a sacrament, committed every matrimonial contract to the Church, and it is her right to attach conditions to it for the sake of validity. But the Church requires that a priest be present as a witness to the contract; to do that he must have the necessary jurisdiction, either on his own right or delegated. However, in a case in which no priest is present for a long time, the Church accepts as a sufficient and competent witness some official who, according to the civil law, in required for a valid matrimonial contract.

A long time ago the older scholastics[31] seemed to suppose that the minister of the sacrament of matrimony is the priest, who bestows the nuptial blessing. For, in matrimony they distinguished the end of subduing concupiscence and procreating children. The first pertained to matrimony as such, the other to the sacrament. The point is not that they were separable regarding the nature of the contract of the sacrament, but that they were distinguished according to the end and intentions of the contracting parties. For the sacrament they required the sacerdotal blessing.

It should be noted that this whole question is a result of the preoccupation they had about sacramental grace and about the sanctity of marriage. But with regard to the sacerdotal blessing, certainly they did not think that it is the form or an essential part of the sacrament; "In matrimony our acts are the sufficient cause in order to bring about the proximate effect, which is the obligation; because whoever exists in his own right can obligate him-

31. Sylvius, *In 3 Th.*, q. 42 a.1 q.2 conc.1-3.

self to another; and therefore the sacerdotal blessing is not required in matrimony as being of the essence of the sacrament"; that is what St. Thomas[32] says; a short time before he had written: "the words whereby matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, but not the sacerdotal blessing, which is a sacramental."[33] And Gabriel Biel is even clearer: "It is not correct to say that the priest confers this sacrament like the others, but the spouses mutually confer it and receive it."[34] Much more concisely Duns Scotus says: "The ministers are those administering the sacrament to each other"; and "sometimes fathers contract for their sons or daughters, while they are present, even though they express no proper signs; therefore if this is a sacrament, it is necessary to say that the minister of this sacrament can be without distinction whoever can be the minister in the matrimonial contract."[35]

Pius XII said: In matrimony "the spouses are the ministers of grace for each other."[36]

ARTICLE IV

ON THE SACRAMENTAL CHARACTER OF SOME MARRIAGES

209. There were not lacking theologians who said that all marriages, even those of unbelievers, are a sacrament.[37] But this opinion has been completely abandoned and is not maintained by anyone. In the previous thesis we treated only the marriage between two baptized persons; but there can still be two special cases in which there can be a doubt about sacramentality:

1. *Marriage between a Christian and an unbeliever.* From the fact that 1) the marriage contract is just one thing between a believer and an unbeliever, but the unbeliever cannot receive a sacrament; and 2) a marriage

32. *In 4* d.28 q.1 a.3 ad 2.
33. *In 4* d.26 q.2 a.1 ad 1.
34. *In 4* d.25 q.2 a.2 p.8; although this part is not by Biel himself but by some transcriber.
35. *Reportata parisiensia* 4 d.28 n.23-24; *Opus oxoniense* 4 d.28 q.unic. n.15.
36. Encyclical "*Mystici Corporis*": AAS 35 (1943) 202. In some sense the priest can be said to be the minister of matrimony, surely not the minister of the matrimonial contract or of the sacrament of matrimony, but of the solemnity of the marriage, inasmuch as he has been consecrated by the Church to carry out the sacred rites involved in the marital contract.
37. These authors relied on the prophetic meaning of the union of Christ with the Church, which was intended by God when he instituted marriage in paradise. They confirmed this opinion with the words of Honorius III (D 777), to which now can be added those of Leo XIII: "For since marriage has God as its author and since it was from the very beginning a certain foreshadowing of the Incarnation..." ("*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": ASS 2 [1879-1880] 392).

of this kind can be dissolved by the Supreme Pontiff; some authors, like Sánchez and Wirceburgenses,[38] deny that the reality of the sacrament is received by the Christian.

Nevertheless not a few theologians[38a] hold the contrary opinion. The reasons, on which this opinion is based principally, are: a) On the part of the faithful, marriage reflects the likeness of the union of Christ with the Church; it is a sacramental sign; therefore sacramentality should not be denied to it. b) The part of the unbeliever can be the minister of the sacrament of marriage, as he can also be in baptism. c) There does not seem to be a difficulty in the fact that the contract is one, but when it is received by two and it is conferred by two, it is a sacrament in one of the parties but not in the other. d) The rite of marriage is done by the Church, with a Church dispensation, with the witness of a priest and according to the conditions established by the Church, and since no repugnance appears in the fact the unbeliever is a minister of the sacrament, there is no reason to deny the sacramentality of this contract in the person who is capable of receiving the sacraments.

There is no obstacle in the fact that a marriage of this kind can be dissolved by the Supreme Pontiff, while the Church cannot do this for a marriage that is *ratified and consummated* (*ratum et consummatum*). For, the root of the indissolubility is not the sacramentality, nor the consummation, nor both taken together, but it is the natural law (see n. 253). But since it is said that the Supreme Pontiff cannot dissolve a marriage that is *ratified* and consummated, it must be made very clear that, for the argument of the adversaries to be valid, the concern is with a marriage that has been *ratified only by one of the parties,* but not *with a marriage ratified by both parties.* For, if this point is not made crystal clear, an argument cannot be made for the non-sacramentality from the extrinsic dissolubility. For, a marriage of this kind can be (because of the reasons given) ratified by the faithful party, and legitimate (i.e., not ratified) by the unbelieving party; and from the lesser party it receives a general name. Hence a marriage of this kind can in general be said to be not ratified (and therefore dissoluble), even though in the faithful party it is ratified or a sacrament.

210. 2. *The marriage of unbelievers after the conversion of the spouses.* Those who admitted in some way, the separability of the sacrament from

38. Sánchez, *De Matrimonio, loc.cit.;* Wircebrugenses, *De Matrimonio* n.288f.

38a P.E. Escanciano, S.J., who holds the contrary opinion, cites in his own favor Sánchez, Billuart, Billot, Huarte, Wernz-Vidal, Gasparri, De Smet, Paven, Dander; but for our opinion he quotes modern authors—Palmieri, Perrone, Pesch, Rosset, Sasse, Lercher-Umberg. See ¿Sacramento indissoluble?: EstEcl 30 (1956) 228-229.

the marital contract, evidently could not admit that marriage, previously entered into when the spouses were unbelievers, is raised to the dignity of the sacrament by the reception of baptism alone. But they demanded either a priestly blessing, or the renewal of consent, according as they made the sacramentality depend on the external rite of the Church, or on the intention of the contracting parties.

For another reason many Thomists[39] hold the same thing, that is, because Christ raised the first marital contract to the dignity of a sacrament, but not the consent renewed after Baptism.

211. Many theologians, and some of them are very well known,[40] hold the contrary view; they teach that from the very fact of conversion the previously contracted marriage is now a sacrament without the requirement of a renewal of consent.[41] And they say this because neither St. Paul, nor the Roman Pontiffs ever made a distinction between a marriage entered into before conversion and after conversion; then also because of the absolute indissolubility which arises immediately after baptism (before baptism the marriage was dissoluble by a Pauline privilege) and now no dispensation from indissolubility is admitted. But that a new consent is not required is proved for the following reasons: a) "since unbelievers pertain to the Church by a divine determination, their marriages also are a sacrament by that determination, and for this reason they are rightly thought to have entered the marital state with the tacit objective condition that, if they received baptism, their martial contract would become a sacrament; once this condition is fulfilled, nothing more is required; b) in the reception of baptism they profess at least implicitly that they want to continue, in the Christian way, in their current marital state; this implicit profession seems to be sufficient that thereby the marital contract previously entered into becomes the sacrament; c) from new converts like this the Church does not demand an express renewal of the contract, but it considers their marriage as ratified, as we already said above."[42]

Against this opinion *a difficulty arises* from the principle previously admitted—that the sacrament of matrimony is transient and not permanent (n. 203); hence it is possible to argue like this: the sacrament of matrimony consists in the contract, which is an act at the present time; but this contract is transient and it does not continue; therefore it

39. With Capreolus, *In 4* d.26 q.1 a.3 ad 3. Likewise Vázquez, *De Sacramentis in genere* d.138 c.5; *De Matrimonio* d.2 c.10.

40. Sánchez, *De matrimonio* 1.2 d.9 n.5; Palmieri, *De matrimonio* th.11 app. P.103; Pesch, n.727; Otten, n427.

41. However some theologians, like St. Robert Bellarmine (De matrimonio 11 c.5) require a renewal of consent, because the matter and form of the sacrament consist in this; but if there is no renewal of consent, there will be no sacrament.

42. Otten, n.427 p.373.

cannot be raised to the dignity of a sacrament by baptism.

To this *we respond*: This is an ordinary case of the revival of a sacrament; hence with this same argument the revival of all sacraments could be denied, except for the Eucharist since the sacramental species continue to exist. Wherefore, just as happens in the revival of the sacraments, so also in our case we can respond with this distinction: the marital contract continues in no way, *denied;* in some way it does not continue, but in another way it does, *conceded* (that is, it continues in the indissoluble bond, which is the effect of the contract). As in the sacraments impressing a character the permanence of the character, and in other sacraments the moral permanence of the sacrament is the sufficient reason for the revival of the sacrament, so also in our case, the permanence of the bond (which is the sacrament and the reality [*sacramentum et res*] suffices for the elevation of the permanent contract in the bond..

212. *Note.* Because of the reason given above about the absolute indissolubility or matrimony arising from the baptism alone of both spouses, it turns out that a marriage contracted in the state of unbelief is not raised to the dignity of the sacrament *if only one of the spouses is baptized.* For then the marriage, even after the baptism of one of the spouses, already consummated can be dissolved with a Pauline Privilege, which is not the case when both spouses are baptized.

CHAPTER III

On the effects of the Sacrament of Matrimony

213. There are two principal effects of the sacrament of matrimony: the intrinsic bond between the contracting parties and sacramental grace.

It is true that the bond is not the exclusive effect of the sacrament of matrimony between Christians alone, since every legitimate marriage, even between the non-baptized, gives rise to an internal bond. But since because of the sacramentality this bond is more strict, and is something of great importance for Christian matrimony, we have chosen to treat it in this place rather than at the beginning of the treatise when we were dealing with matrimony in general.

Therefore the bond resulting from marriage has two properties: unity and indissolubility, that is: marriage between Christians produces an exclusive and perpetual bond. We will explain these two properties in the next two articles, and then we will add a third one concerning sacramental grace.

Often the unity and indissolubility are designated as the *properties of matrimony*, as the CIC 1013,2 [1917] does. But then matrimony is understood as already actually existing, or for the permanent bond. For this reason, in order for us to understand matrimony as a contract or in its process of becoming, we have chosen to speak about the *effects* of matrimony rather than about its *properties*.

ARTICLE I

ON THE UNITY OR ONENESS OF MATRIMONY

Thesis 3. The matrimonial bond is so exclusive between Christians that polygamy, both simultaneous and successive, by positive divine law is null and void.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q.65, a. 1; St. Bellarmine, c.10; Palmieri, 114-136; Pesch, 416-422; Huarte, 238-249; Puig de la B., n.1090-1097; Otten, 390-400; Godebroy, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2050-2057. 2062-2064; Lercher-Umberg, n.765-769.

214. Definition of terms. *The matrimonial bond,* as we have explained (nn.145 and 168), is that union of minds (but not taken in the psychological sense) which is produced between spouses because of the mutual hand-

ing over and receiving of rights as a result of the marriage contract. This bond is not something physical (as the character is; for marriage does not impress a character), but it is something moral or juridical, which continues to exist as long as the contract does. In the next thesis we will treat the duration of the value of the contract.

It is exclusive, that is, the marriage bond existing between two persons excludes the possibility of a marriage contract with a third person. Therefore, as long as the legitimate contract of marriage lasts, the husband or wife cannot be married to a third person.

Between Christians. Although what is stated in the thesis applies to all marriages, even to those of non-Christians, still since in the second part we refer to the divine law, and because we are treating a sacrament, we intend here to consider only marriage between the baptized.

Polygamy (or rather *polygyny*[1]) is the union of one man with several women. If many women are had at the same time, it is called *simultaneous* polygamy; if after leaving one, another is taken, it is called *successive.* However, this successive polygamy in the terminology of the Encyclical "*Casti connubii*" is understood to be about the union with another woman while the bond with the first one, who has been abandoned, is still in effect. In this way both types of polygamy, simultaneous and successive, are null and void. But if, in agreement with many authors, successive polygamy is had by a union with another woman, if the bond is dissolved (for example, by death) that existed with the first spouse, then it is not prohibited but licit; this is usually called a *second marriage.*[2]

Polyandry is like polygamy, or the union of one woman with several men. In the thesis we are not dealing explicitly with this, but it is also to be rejected and we will say more about it in the scholium.

By positive divine law. For, we leave to the philosophers the question about the prohibition of the natural law, and so we are considering only those who are baptized. Therefore we are also prescinding from the question about the rights and duties of non-Christians, and about the positive laws, regarding marriage, enforced by the non-Christian civil government and for the non-baptized. This point was treated in part at the beginning of this treatise (n. 173), and we will say more about it later (n 227).

It is null and void, that is, not only is the union with a second woman

1. *Polygamy* is a *generic* term that includes both *polygyny* and *polyandry;* but since the usual case concerns polygyny, therefore under the *generic* name, the main kind is understood.
2. Thus Palmieri, Sasse and most theologians before the Encyclical "*Casti connubii*" (D 3706). However, some authors, like Lercher-Umberg, still keep this terminology; we have preferred to use that employed by Pius XI. See F. Hürth, *Leo XIII et Pius XI, De Matrimonio christiano* (Textus et Documenta, Rome, 1942, Series Theologica, 25) n.21 on the Encyclical "*Casti connubii*" p.81..

illicit while the bond exists with the first woman, but no marriage is the result of such an attempted marriage, even if the first woman has been abandoned.

215. Adversaries. Luther and Melanchthon permitted polygamy: "Now it is not forbidden for Christians to have several wives at the same time, but I think it is a matter of free choice. However, I do not want to introduce this new custom, but I cannot disapprove of it, since it is allowed even now to follow the example of the Fathers of the Old Law."[3] The *Anabaptists* followed this teaching, but in general the other Protestants rejected it; in fact, Calvin said that the ancient Patriarchs, who are said to have had many wives in the Old Law, were adulterers.

The *Gnostics,* Simon Magus, Valentinus, etc., also taught and practiced polygamy; afterwards the *Albigensians* did the same.[4]

Socialists and *communists* in our time adopted an excess of freedom in this matter, so that they did not even object to polyandry.

216. Doctrine of the Church. St. Siricius: "But you have inquired concerning the marriage veil, whether one can receive in matrimony a girl betrothed to another. Let this not be done. We prohibit it in every way, because if that blessing which the priest gives to the bride is violated by any transgression, it is like a kind of sacrilege among the faithful" (D 88a; ed. before 1963).

Nicolas I: "To have two wives at the same time, neither the beginning of the human race admits, nor does any law of Christians allow."[5]

Innocent III: "But since pagans divide their conjugal affection among many women at the same time, there is just cause to question whether after conversion they should retain some or all of them. But this practice seems to be contrary and hostile to the Christian faith, since in the beginning one rib was changed into one woman... No one was ever permitted to have several wives at one time unless this was granted to him by divine revelation... This opinion is also manifested as certainly true by the witness of the Truth, who testifies in the Gospel: *Whoever dismisses his wife, except in the case of fornication, and marries another, commits adultery.* If, therefore, when one's wife has been dismissed, another wife cannot be taken according to the law, all the more reason should one's wife be retained; from which, it is clearly shown that for both sexes—since they are not judged differently—

3. In Gen. c.16. For the teachintg of Luther and of other Protestants see in Bellarmine, *De matrimonio* c.10.
4. This is certain from the Profession of Faith Prescribed for the Waldensians (D 793-794).
5. *Ad consulta Bulgar.* c.51: ML 119,999; Msi 15.

plurality with respect to marriage must be condemned. Moreover, he who according to his rite puts away a lawful wife, since Truth in the Gospel has condemned such a repudiation, never while she lives, even after being converted to the faith of Christ, can he have another wife..." D 778-779).[6]

The Council of Lyons II: "As regards matrimony, she holds that neither is a man allowed to have several wives at the same time nor a woman several husbands. But, when a legitimate marriage is dissolved by the death of one of the spouses, she declares that a second and afterward a third marriage are successively legitimate" (D 860).

The Council of Trent, cn.2 on Matrimony: "If anyone says that it is lawful for Christians to have several wives at the same time and that this is not forbidden by any divine law, let him be anathema" (D 1802). And in the chapter: "But that only two are united and joined together by this bond, Christ the Lord taught more clearly when, referring to these words as having been uttered by God, he said: *So they are no longer two but one* [Matt. 19:6], and immediately confirmed the stability of the bond that was proclaimed long ago by Adam in these words: *What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder"* (D 1798).

Leo XIII: "What was received from the Apostles as teachers must be retained; this is what our holy Fathers, the Councils and the universal tradition of the Church have always taught, namely, that "Christ our Lord raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament; that to husband and wife, guarded and strengthened by the heavenly grace that his merits gained for them, he gave power to attain holiness in the married state; and that, in a wondrous way, making marriage an example of the mystical union between himself and his Church, he not only perfected that love which is according to nature, but also made the naturally indivisible union of one man with one woman far more perfect through the bond of heavenly love" (D 3142).

As Leo XIII points out, the Supreme Pontiffs (as is clear from the quoted testimonies) and also local Councils, like *Illiberitanum* cn.9, *Milevitanum II,* cn.17,[7] etc., have always judged this matter in the same way.

Pius XI: "Wherefore, conjugal faith, or honor, demands in the first place the complete unity of matrimony which the Creator himself laid down in the beginning when he wished to be not otherwise than between one man and one woman. And although afterwards this primeval law was relaxed to some extent by God, the Supreme Legislator, there is no doubt that the law of the Gospel fully restored that original and perfect unity, and abrogated all dispensations as the words of Christ and the constant teach-

6. *Epist. ad Episc. Tiberiad:* (D 778-779).
7. *Conc. Illiberitanum* cn.9: Msi 2,7; ed. Loaisa, 20; ed. González, 167f.; *Milevitanumn II* cn.17: Msi 4,331.

ing and action of the Church show plainly... Nor did Christ our Lord wish only to condemn any form of polygamy or polyandry, as they are called, whether successive or simultaneous, and every other external dishonorable act, but, in order that the sacred bonds of marriage may be guarded absolutely inviolate, he forbade also even willful thoughts and desires of such like things: *But I say to you, that whosoever shall look upon a woman to lust after her has already committed adultery with her in his heart.* These words of Christ our Lord cannot be annulled even by the consent of one of the partners of marriage for they express a law of God and of nature which no will of man can bread or bend."[8]

These Church documents, especially of Pius XI, condemn absolutely all forms of polygamy: simultaneous, successive, polyandry, polygyny. St. Siricius, Innocent III, the Council of Trent and Leo XIII mention both the divine institution in general and the precept of Christ in particular. Pius XI presents an argument from the very nature of things, inasmuch as fidelity and the sanctity of marriage require its unity; then he confirms and strengthens the express restoration of marriage to its unity from the divine law of the Creator and of Christ. Nicolas I does the same thing.

The words *prohibit, forbid,* etc., although per se do not necessarily imply nullity but can also be said to be about mere licitness, nevertheless when they are applied to the natural law they have a more strict meaning. The Council of Trent says *it is lawful* (*licere*), but in the chapter it is also referred to validity. Furthermore, as we will note later in the argument, when it is said about this type of marriage that it is not lawful, it is referring to the true invalidity of the contract.

217. Theological note. It is *defined divine and Catholic faith* that polygamy between Christians is illicit by positive divine law; *that it is also invalid* is *divine and Catholic faith* and it also seems to be *defined.*[9]

218. Proof from Holy Scripture. a) Mark 10:11: *Whoever divorces his wife and marries another, commits adultery against her.* But if he commits adultery, the union with that woman is not only illicit, but also invalid (otherwise it would not be adultery, but fornication). Therefore polygamy is invalid.

As is completely clear, if this successive polygamy is invalid, for the same reason it is necessary to say that simultaneous polygamy is invalid,

8. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 546-547.
9. Puig de la B., n.1096 and note 16; he cites Palmieri, Sasse, Pesch, Huarte and Umberg; Lercher-Umberg calls it *Catholic doctrine.*

in which the permanence of the bond is more evident and which is the cause of the adultery.[10] There cannot be any doubt that it is from the positive divine law, because the argument is drawn from the words of Christ as teacher and lawgiver.

b) With crystal clear words St. Paul transmits this teaching in Rom. 7:1-3: *"Do you not know, brethren..., that the law is binding on a person only during his life? Thus a married woman is bound by law to her husband as long as he lives; but if her husband dies she is discharged from the law concerning her husband. Accordingly, she will be called an adulteress if she lives with another man while her husband is alive. But if her husband dies she is free from the law, and if she marries another man she is not an adulteress.*

What he says in this place about the woman alone, in 1 Cor. 7:2-4 he gives his teaching for both spouses: *But because of the temptation to immorality, each man should have his own wife, and each woman her own husband* (ἑκαστος τήν ἑαυτοῦ γυναίκα ἐχέτω, καί ἑκαστη τόν ἰδιον ἀνδρα = each man is own wife and each woman HER OWN [particular and exclusive] husband).

And further on he insists: *To the married I give charge, not I but the Lord, that the wife should not separate from her husband (but if she does, let her remain single or else be reconciled to her husband)—and that the husband should not divorce his wife.* And in the sermon of the Apostle constant mention is made about the unity of marriage, inasmuch as he speaks only about one wife for one man (Eph. 5:31-33).

Surely, as is apparent, St. Paul proposes different circumstances in which a case of divorce could be given: the departure of a man from his wife, having repudiated his spouse, and living with another spouse; then also imperfect divorce, or separation from bed and board. In all of these cases, while the wife is living, the husband cannot marry another woman, nor the woman take another man; if the departure was only temporal, that is, not by a true civil divorce according to Roman laws, they remain bound by the same contract, and they cannot enter into another marriage: let them either be reconciled and again live together, or let both spouses remain single, that is, they cannot contract another marriage. Therefore St. Paul did not admit the validity of legal divorce, nor did he admit any kind of divorce, and therefore he always thought that any union with another person, while the first spouse is still living, is adultery. Therefore the unity of matrimony was clearly defended. Moreover, St. Paul says that he is teaching

10. Thus Innocent III: "If, therefore, when one's wife has been dismissed, another wife cannot be taken according to the law" (D 778).

this unity of matrimony not on his own authority, that is, not as a counsel, but by divine authority, since the Lord himself commanded it, and he is doing nothing other than recalling to mind and urging a precept of the Lord. Therefore polygamy is really rejected on the basis of the positive divine law.

219. *Note.* It is clear that he is dealing with the true invalidity or nullity of attempted marriage in these texts, not only because he is talking about adultery, but also from the very nature of matrimony. For, Mark and St. Paul appeal to the positive law of Christ, or to the divine law concerning matrimony. Indeed, matrimony, as we said above, consists in the contract, to which the positive law can attach conditions, which render the contract invalid. This is clear from the way in which Scripture mentions the precept of the Lord.

220. Proof from tradition. Catholic doctrine right from the beginning to pagans appeared holy because of the unity of matrimony and the love of virginity. Therefore the testimonies of tradition are very abundant, as is seen in the commentaries on Mark 10:11.[11] Among the many testimonies, here are a few examples:

St. Justin: "Just as there are those who from the human law enter into two marriages, so those who look upon a woman in order to lust after her are sinners according to our Teaching."[12]

Athenagoras: "Not by the way of words, but by demonstration and by the discipline of action our reality is made known, so that each one either remains as he was born, or lives in one marriage"[13]: then he quotes, as proof, the text of Mark 10:11.

Clement of Alexandria: "While the Lord renews the Old Law, he no longer approves polygamy..., but monogamy for the sake of the propagation of children and management of the home; it is for this that the woman has been given as a helper."

St. Ambrose: "It is not permitted for you, as long as your wife is living, to marry another; for, to seek another while you have your own is the crime of adultery" (R 1322).

St. Augustine in many books about matrimony against the Manicheans and often in his sermons teaches the unity of matrimony and totally rejects

11. V.gr. A. Lapide and Knabenbauer, who have collected together many texts.
12. *Apolog.* 1,15: MG 6,349.
13. *Leg. Pro christ.* n.33: MG 6,965.

all forms of polygamy.[14] One example will suffice: "A man is bound as long as his wife lives. This obligation brings it about that he cannot be united to others without adulterous intercourse."[15]

221. Theological reasoning. 1. The marriage of Christians should reflect the union of Christ with the Church. But Christ loved only one Church (Eph. 5:22f.). Therefore...

2. Polygamy does not per se work against the primary end of marriage, but it certainly does against the other ends. For, although it can help regarding procreation, still it will often hinder the education, and certainly it will be a source if discord among the members of the family, etc., as past experience teaches.[16]

222. Objections. They are usually sought either from the essence of polygamy, which does not damage the primary end of marriage (and these difficulties are solved in Ethics), or from certain documents. In order to solve the difficulties, these points should be kept in mind:

1. It is true that Christ did not impose moral precepts beyond the natural law. But polygamy, as has been said, is opposed to the secondary ends of marriage and can be very hurtful for the education of the children. Moreover, in this matter Christ did not institute anything new, but restored marriage to its pristine divine institution, by nullifying a privilege or temporary concession.

2. When the Fathers speak about *concubines,* whom they permitted, they understand them as women of a lower social status (a morganatic marriage), not as spouses or second-class wives, as we understand it in the O.T. and in our own times. Morganatic marriages were forbidden in Roman law; but the Catholic Church permitted them.[17]

3. Often the holy Fathers say that men married twice must not be denied the sacraments, etc., but they understand it as polygamy in the improper sense, or as the second marriage after the death of a spouse.[18]

4. There is also an objection that the emperor Valentinianus had two wives and

14. Much has been written about the teaching of St. Augustine on matrimony; see Portalié, *Augustin*: DTC 1,2461-2; J. Peters, *Die Ehe nach der Lehre des hl. Augustinus;* N. Ladomersky, *Saint Augustin docteur du mariage chrétien* (Rome 1942); Pereira, *La doctrine du mariage selon St. Augustin* (Paris 1930).
15. *De adulterinis coniug.* 1,2 c.9: ML 40,476 and passim. See Above n.189.
16. This argument is explained more at length in Ethics; see Pesch, n. 829-831; Otten, n.461, in reference to diff.1, and especially Lercher-Umberg, n.768f., p.367-370.
17. The word *concubine* is found in the Fathers with a twofold meaning, which must be gathered from the context. Roman law called concubines wives who, though legitimate, still did not have any right to inheritance, etc., but only to some promised dowry. See Palmieri, *op.cit.* 337.
18. In the use of this word also one must pay attention to the context. There were heretics and also some very rigid Fathers who forbade second marriages. Contrary to them, the Catholic doctrine said that a digamous person could be approved, that is, those who contracted a second or third marriage. See scholium 2.

passed a law permitting polygamy. But this whole affair seems to be false.[19] And even if it were true, it would have no effect against our thesis. For, the civil powers often abuse their authority, and they legislate things that they are not permitted to do, and that do not fall under their authority.

223. *On polyandry.*[20] The arguments directly deal in general with polygamy, hence it is also apparent that polyandry is prohibited by positive divine law. Nevertheless, since generally the word "polygamy" refers to the union of one man with several women, therefore here we will say something briefly about polyandry.

It is clear that it was never permitted in the O.T. The reason can be drawn from the very nature of the case and from the social customs of that time.[21] a) Polyandry more than polygyny is opposed to the primary end of marriage, which is the procreation of offspring; for, one woman cannot have more children because she has several husbands; indeed, polyandry easily induces the sterility of the woman. Since polyandry makes the father uncertain, the mother alone is forced to educate the child; but she alone is unequal to the task.

b) Because of concern about the end of marriage, namely, the procreation of offspring, in antiquity there was great concern about increasing the number of children, and therefore a number of women was permitted, because it was not opposed to this end, especially in the case of the sterility of the woman. But since sterility on the part of the man was hardly known, there was no custom of having several husbands on the part of one woman. Also contributing to this was the concept of the woman, who was considered wholly subject to the man; St. Paul himself gave directions about this. The law of the Gospel raised the estimation of the woman, but before Christ you would have to say that women were more slaves than wives (in general). Therefore Roman law, and in general civil laws, granted many more rights to men than to women. Therefore in this understanding of life and in this social situation the permission was given to men to have several wives, but not for women to have several husbands.

If these practices were customary among the pagans,[22] there was much less of it among the chosen people, where the precepts and social laws were prescribed at the direction of God. God himself, although he tolerated

19. Although Socrates (*Hist. Eccles.* l,4 c.31) makes this statement, it is not to be believed without temerity, because neither Sozomenus nor Theodoret report such a thing about Valentinianus, but on the contrary they extol his holiness; indeed, St. Jerome proposes this emperor as a defender of chastity (*Epist.* 1: ML 22,326).
20. On polyandry see J.-A. Ryan, *Marriage (History of):* The Catholic Encyclopedia, 9,694-695; L. Vannicelli, *Poliandria:* Enciclopedia Cattolica (Città Vaticano, 1952) 9,1668-1669.
21. Iahn, *Archaelogia biblica* 10,150: Cursus Scripturae Migne, Paris) 2,919.
22. They are still found among some tribes in China, India, Africa; see L. Vannicelli, *Poliandria, loc.cit.*

polygyny, never permitted but gravely punished other sins against nature, like the punishment of Onan, the destruction of Sodom, etc.

224. Scholium. 1. *Polygamy in the O.T.* Christ the Lord in order to restore the dignity of marriage appeals to the divine decree given to Adam: *Have you not read that he who made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said: For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one* (Matt. 19:4f.). There it is to be noted that Christ places in the mouth of God what Gen. 2:24 places in the mouth of Adam,[23] and therefore that the unity of marriage is a matter of positive divine precept *from the beginning.* Thus the holy Fathers and exegetes generally admit that monogamy flourished up until the time of the flood. This is clear from the rebuke of Lamech: "Lamech, a bloody murderer, was the first to divide the one flesh into two: the same punishment of the flood destroyed fratricide and digamy."[24]

But it is admitted that even after the flood polygamy was practiced. This could take place either from the positive permission of God, or from the necessity of increasing the human race, at the time so small and almost extinct; because of this, men could think that polygamy was permitted (as, for example, the daughters of Lot who committed a major crime from their good intention, thinking that besides themselves and their father there were now no more human beings after the destruction of Sodom). But afterwards, by reason of custom, it became a law.

Some exegetes[25] see at least a hint for the permission of polygamy in Gen. 21:12, when God said to Abraham: *Whatever Sarah says to you, do as she tells you.* However, in this place Sarah is urging Abraham to send Ishmael away from home. But perhaps it could be supposed that God said something similar to Abraham when Sarah spoke to him about a *marriage* with Hagar: *Behold now, the Lord has prevented me from bearing children; go in to my maid; it may be that I shall obtain children by her. And Abram hearkened to the voice of Sarah... and she took Hagar the Egyptian, her maid, and gave her to Abram her husband as a wife* (Gen. 16:2-3). Actually, from the narration it seems that Abraham either had permission from God and then *acquiesced* to the pleas of Sarah, or polygamy was so frequent that it was not thought in any way to be evil. And if we look at Abraham's ancestors, even after the flood, it is not certain that they were polygamous; he is presented as the first one to engage in polygamy. Since, therefore, he seems so diligent and upright in what pertains to his sons (as is clear from Gen. 21:12, where he does not want to give in to Sarah urging him to send Ishmael away; and he does not do it except when God commands him to do what Sarah says); it is very probable that Abraham would not have accepted a wife before Hagar unless he had obtained permission from God to do it. But if this dispensation of God in this place cannot be proved, certainly the silence of God in this case, especially given the promise already made to

23. Therefore it seems, also in the context of Genesis, that Adam spoke moved by divine inspiration, and therefore that Adam's words express only the divine mind. See *Trent* (D 1797).
24. St. Jerome. *Adversus Iovinianum* 1.1 n.14: ML 23,230.
25. See V. Heylen, *Tractatus de Matrimonio* (1945) 307-308.

Abraham, about a son of Abraham from Sarah (Gen. 15:4-6), is a sign of the divine permission concerning Abraham's polygamy.[26]

225. Whatever may be the case concerning the time or age in which God permitted polygamy in the Israelite people, this fact is certain from the words of Christ: *For your hardness of heart Moses allowed you to divorce your wives* (Matt. 19:8). But this dispensation *because of the hardness of heart* shows sufficiently that God tolerated something as a lesser evil which de facto was not opposed to the primary end of marriage, lest the Israelites, when they saw a heavy burden placed on them, abandon the true God and so embrace false gods. For this reason God allowed them to retain the customs of other peoples, which primarily and per se are not opposed to the divine and natural law or to religion. However he wanted to counsel the primary end of marriage, and, so that it might be integral, also the secondary ends; for this reason Moses laid down many laws concerning marriage and polygamy.[27] But that the words of Christ concern directly the indissolubility of marriage does not prevent them from also being applied to its unity; for, the quoted words of God certainly apply to both of them.[28]

226. Scholium 2. *On second marriages.* CIC 984,4 [1917] lists *bigamists* among the irregular because of a defect of the sacrament, "namely those who have contracted successively two or more valid marriages." This ruling discipline is nothing but a genuine echo and constant tradition of the mind of the early Church. Although against the Manicheans and other heretics she defended the licitness of second and further marriages, nevertheless she always *recommended* continence after the first marriage. For this reason St. Paul, while extolling virginity and continence, wrote: *To the unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain single as I do* (1 Cor. 7:8), and then he added: *But if they cannot exercise self-control, they should marry. For it is better to marry than to be aflame with passion.* The Apostle never disapproved of second marriages.[29] But he did not want bigamists to be appointed to the higher offices in the Church,[30] nor did he admit among the widows women who did not remain such after their first widowhood (1 Tim. 5:9). For he wanted the splendor of chastity to shine in the Church; but in second or successive marriages the ancients seemed to see an indication

26. On polygamy, H. Lesêtre, *Polygamie:* DB 5,508-513; Iahn, *Archaelogie biblica* 1,10,150: Cursus Scripturae Sacrae (Paris, Migne) 2,919; M. Hetzenauer, *Theologia Biblica* 29; Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* 4,737-743, at the word μοιχέω; L. Vannicelli, *Poligamia-Poliandria:* Enciclopedia Cattoica (Città Vaticano, 1952) 9,1669.
27. Deut. 22:25; Lev. 18, etc.
28. C.G. Joyce, *Die christliche Ehe. Ein geschichtliche und dogmatische Studie* (Leipzig 1934).
29. See Rom. 7:3; 1 Tim. 4:14.
30. 1 Tim. 2:2; Tit. 1:6. See Knabenbauer at this place.

of incontinence.[31]

Therefore St. Ambrose: "We do not forbid second marriages, but we do not approve them often repeated"[32]; and St. Jerome: "What therefore? Do we condemn second marriages? Not at all, but we praise the first one. Do we expel bigamists from the Church? Certainly not, but we urge the monogamous to be continent."[33] Clement of Alexandria: "If the Apostle concedes to someone the right to a second marriage because of intemperance and the flame of passion... he does not sin against God's will (for it is not forbidden by law), but he does not fulfill the greatest perfection of life that is recommended by the Gospel."[34] And similarly St. Epiphanius: "But if someone out of weakness wishes to be married a second time after the death of his wife, the rule of truth certainly does not forbid it, unless of course a priest is not present. But they [Montanists] forbid it... But we do not use any force against him, but we urge him; with good arguments and counsels we try to persuade the one who can do it to remain continent; but if he is not able to do it, we do not force him nor do we exclude him from salvation."[35]

The Church always permitted not only second marriages but also more than that. St. Jerome said expressly: "My calumniator should be ashamed for saying I condemn first marriages when he reads: I do not condemn digamy and trigamy, and if it is possible to be said, even octogamy."[36] And while considering a more general law, St. Augustine said: "Men are wont to raise questions about third and fourth and even more marriages. Hence, in order to respond briefly, I do not venture to condemn any marriages... For who am I to set a limit, when I see that the Apostle did not set a limit? For he says: *A woman is bound as long as her husband lives.* He did not say the first husband or the third or the fourth, but he said *the woman is bound as long as her husband lives. If the husband dies, she is free to be married to whom she wishes, only in the Lord. But in my judgment she is happier if she remains as she is.* Concerning this matter, I do not know what could be added to or changed in the view of the Apostle."[37] And Eugene IV, in the Decree for the Jacobites, taught: "We declare that it is licit to contract not only second, but third and fourth and more marriages, if there is no impediment. However, we recommend, if they abstain from further marriages, that they remain in chastity.[38]

227. Scholium 3. *On the restoration of the unity of matrimony for the non-baptized.* The authors dispute whether the permission of God to have several wives was extended also to the gentiles, as God had made this concession to the Hebrew people. The whole

31. Some of the Fathers seem too rigid on this point: thus St. Basil (*Epist.* 188,4: MG 32,674; St. Augustine (*De bono viduitatis* c.12: ML 40,439). And sometimes ecclesiastical punishments were imposed, as in *Conc. Laodicens.* (a.372) cn.1 (Kch 520). *Conc. Neocaesar.* (a. 314) cn.3,7: Msi 2,540-541. And Athenagorus had already written: "A second marriage is only a specious adultery" (R 167).
32. *De viduis* c.11: ML 16,254.
33. *Epist.* 123 n.9: ML 22,1033
34. *Stromata* 3,12: MG 8,1183.
35. *Adversus haeres.* 2,48,9: MG 41,870; haeres. 49,3: MG 41,1022f.
36. *Epist.* 48,0; see n.18: ML 22,499-507.
37. *De bono viduitatis* c.12: ML 40,439. B.A. Pereira, *La doctrine de mariage selon S. Agustin* (Paris 1930).
38. Hd 9,1028. Similarly Benedict XIV, *Constit. "Etsi Pastoralis"* (May 25, 1742) 8 n.3; *Constit. "Eo quamvis tempore"* (May 4, 1745) 28.27.29: Magnum Bullarium Romanum 166,100.295f.

essence of the dispute depends on the different suppositions of both parties: some think that polygamy first existed among the gentiles and that Sarah borrowed it from them when she urged Abraham to take Hagar as his wife; so then God permitted polygamy, lest the chosen people be in a more difficult situation than the gentiles. Others, on the contrary, thinking that God first permitted the Hebrews to practice polygamy, and that the gentiles borrowed it from them, hold that God tolerated or permitted it also among the gentiles, lest they be scandalized by the practice of the Hebrews.

Whatever may be the answer to this question[39] or to the *general* origin of polygamy, it seems to be more fitting to suppose that God also tolerated the hardness of the gentiles and allowed them to practice polygamy.

But Christ nullified this exception and he fully restored the general law that was in effect at the beginning of humanity by adding to the institution of primeval matrimony the sanctity and meaning of a sacrament. The sacrament of course can be conferred only on the baptized, but the restoring of the primeval law includes absolutely all human beings. Therefore the unity of matrimony obliges not only the baptized, but also all mankind. And theologians teach this as *certain doctrine.*[40] But regarding the obligation for individual non-believers it is necessary to observe the general norms governing the promulgation of the law of the Gospel.

39. It seems almost certain that before Abraham polygamy was practiced, at least with some limitations. In the Codex of Hammurabi we read: "If a man marries a wife and this wife, who bears children for him, gives him her handmaid, if this man wishes to have the concubine, it is not allowed and he cannot have a concubine. If a man marries a wife who does not give him children, if he wants to take a concubine, he can take a concubine and join her to himself. But he will not place this concubine on an equal level with his wife" (144,145; ed. Schell [1904] 27-28).

40. See De Smet, *Tractatus theologico-canonicus de sponsalibus et matrimonio* (ed. 4 n.308); V. Heylen, *op.cit.*, p.311.

ARTICLE II

ON THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF MATRIMONY

228. Connection. Another property or effect of matrimony is its indissolubility, which is closely connected with its unity. But the civil laws make a big distinction between these two effects of matrimony. For, while in general almost nowhere (except nearly always among the Muslims) simultaneous polygamy, or the union of one man with two women, is permitted, nevertheless the breaking of the marital bond by divorce is permitted very often and there are laws concerning this. Therefore it is necessary to defend the indissolubility of matrimony in a vigorous way.

§ I. On the intrinsic indissolubility of matrimony

Thesis 4. The matrimonial bond is intrinsically indissoluble; and it cannot be dissolved by the adultery of a spouse.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q.67, a. 1; St. Bellarmine, c.15-17,82; Sasse, 409-428; Pesch, 387-397; Palmieri, the.16-23; Huarte, 178-307; Puig de la B., n.1098-1108; Otten, 401-419; Lercher-Umberg, n.770-777; A. Villier, *Divorce:* DTC 4,1455-1478; L. Godefroy, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2116-2123.

229. Connection. In this thesis we are treating only the sacrament of matrimony, and so we are prescinding from the indissolubility of the marital contract in the natural law (which we covered in n. 169-172) and from the divine dispensation in the O.T. that we considered in n. 224. We are also limiting this thesis to intrinsic indissolubility, which we will explain next, because we will talk about the extrinsic form in the following paragraph.

230. Definition of terms. As we said above (n.169), a contract is said to be *intrinsically dissolvable* if it can be dissolved at the will of both parties or of just one party. But if the solubility is not in the power of the parties, but depends on some competent authority, the contract is said to be intrinsically indissoluble, but *extrinsically dissolvable.*

The matrimonial bond (see n.145 and 167), or the moral relation between the spouses resulting from the marital contract, is *intrinsically indissoluble,* that is, its solubility does not depend in any way on the will of the spouses, who, although they freely entered into the marital contract, nevertheless are not able to dissolve it.

Adultery is called intercourse with a married person. *It is distinguished from polygamy,* because in adultery another marriage is not attempted, but

only carnal relations are had with a third person. This can occur both on the part of the woman and on the part of the man; it is an offense against conjugal fidelity, but it is not a sufficient cause to dissolve the marriage intrinsically or extrinsically. Per se it is included in the very essence of indissolubility; about this we will raise a special question because of the Greeks, and because the Council of Trent dealt with it specifically; we will deal with it also because a special difficulty presents itself from the words of Christ.

231. Just as polygamy is opposed to the unity of marriage, so *divorce* is opposed to indissolubility and it can be defined as: the separation of spouses from a legitimate marriage. It can be *perfect* (dissolution of the bond of marriage, so that the separated spouses can enter into another marriage); or *in the improper sense* or *imperfect divorce*, which consists in a separation of living together, or only with regard to the marriage bed or the use of marriage. In this case the martial bond remains, and so the separated spouses cannot contract a second marriage before the death of the first spouse.

232. Adversaries. *Protestants* are opposed to the thesis; since the 16th century many of them assign reasons because of which they say that perfect divorce can be obtained. *Modernists* are more lax concerning this teaching, and not only easily grant perfect divorce, but also sometimes in practice permit temporary marriages (that is, a marital contract for a certain time, v.gr., for three or four years). *Socialism* and *Communism* pervert the whole Christian and natural concept of marriage,[1] and it is the logical result of their *materialistic* doctrine.

Dissident Orientals are opposed to the second part; although in theory they do not admit any reason other than adultery as a cause for divorce, nevertheless de facto they dissolve marriages for many other reasons.[2]

233. Doctrine of the Church. *Concilium Illiberitanum:* "Cn.8: Likewise women who, for no preceding reason, have left their husbands and have united themselves with others, may not receive communion at the end of life. Cn.9. Likewise a Christian woman, who has abandoned her believing husband and married someone else, is forbidden to have a real marriage; but if she does marry, she cannot receive communion unless the first husband had died, unless perhaps the necessity of illness makes it urgent to

1. This error perhaps is more in practice than in theory, that is, they construct a theory not from principles, but from a desire for freedom and pleasure.
2. M. Jugie: DTC 9,2323-2329; 2332-2334.

give it. Cn.10: But if she is a member of the faithful, who is married by a man who left his guiltless wife, and she knows that he has a wife whom he abandoned without cause, the decision is that she not be given communion at the end of her life."[3] These canons refer to the early rigid ecclesiastical discipline (at least in Spain) concerning divorce.

St. Innocent I: "... This principle is to be observed by all, so that, if a woman marries another while her husband still lives, she is to be considered an adulteress, and she will not be given permission to do penance unless one of them has died" (R 2015).

The Council of Carthage (n. 407): "It has been resolved, according to the apostolic and evangelical discipline, that neither a husband dismissed by his wife, nor a wife dismissed by her husband may be joined together with another; but let them remain as they are or be reconciled with each other."[4]

St. Leo the Great was given a case of women who, when the husband was absent because of war or being a captive and was thought to be dead, entered into a second marriage, but afterwards the man returned home unharmed and there were doubts about the second marriage; here is his response: "But because we have known the Scripture that *a woman is joined to a man by God* (Sir. 26:2), and again we acknowledge the precept that *what God has joined together let no man put asunder* (Matt. 19:6), it is necessary that we believe a legitimate contract of marriage should be restored, and having removed the evils which hostility produced, what was had legitimately should be restored; with every effort it should be brought about that each one receives what belongs to him"; but if it happened that, during the time of the absence of the husband the wives lost their affection for him, and when the husband returns the women do not want to live with him again, "they are to be excommunicated."[5]

Alexander III: "If between a man and a woman legitimate consent... at the present time takes place, so that the one expressly receives the other as his spouse by mutual consent with the accustomed words... whether or not an oath is introduced, it is not permitted for the woman to marry another. And if she has married another, even if sexual union has taken place, she must be separated from him and be compelled by ecclesiastical rigor to return to the first, even if others may think otherwise and even if at times some of Our predecessors might have judged otherwise" (D 756). And in a letter to the Bishop of Brescia he distinguished between a marriage *ratified*

3. Kch 332[1] 332[2] ed. Loaisa, *Collectio Conciliorum Hispanorum* (Madrid 1593) 6; ed. Em. González Téllez (Lyons 1665) 163.167.181..
4. Msi 4,331.
5. *Epist.* ad Nicetam episcop. Aquilens. 1-4: ML 54,1136-1137.

and consummated and one *ratified and not consummated.* The second one can be dissolved (extrinsically) at times (he gives the case of entrance into a religious order); but the first type can never be dissolved, and the reason is because "for truly, what the Lord says in the Gospel, namely, *that it is not permitted for a man to renounce his wife, except in the case of fornication* (Matt. 5:32; 19:9), should be understood according to the interpretation of the holy Word, in reference to those whose marriage is consummated by carnal union, without which marriage cannot be consummated; and, therefore, if the above-mentioned woman was not known [carnally] by her husband, she is permitted to enter religious life" (D 754).

Innocent III says about Christian marriage: "Between believers, however, a true and ratified marriage exists, because the sacrament of faith (baptism) once conferred is never lost, and indeed it makes the sacrament of marriage ratified so that it (the marriage itself) endures in the spouses as long as (the baptism) endures" (D 769). And from that he deduces the difference from the marriage of unbelievers, which can be dissolved by the Pauline Privilege; but both are intrinsically indissoluble. The same is found in the Profession of Faith Prescribed for the Waldensians (D 794).

The Council of Florence: "The third [good] is the indissolubility of marriage, inasmuch as it represents the indissoluble union of Christ and the Church. But, although it is permitted to separate on account of fornication, nevertheless it is not permitted to contract another marriage since the bond of a marriage legitimately contracted is perpetual" (D 1327). The intrinsic bond requires the absolute indissolubility of marriage, but adultery can be a reason only for living separately.

234. *The Council of Trent* proposed to the theologians for study this article 3 taken from the Protestants: "that it [divorce] is permitted, after a wife has been repudiated because of fornication, while the first wife is still living, and it is an error to permit divorce outside of the sin of fornication."[6] Afterwards some canons were proposed for discussion, and among them these pertain to our thesis: "Cn.5: If anyone says that because of heresy or unhappy home life or loss of affection the bond of marriage between spouses can be dissolved, let him be anathema."[7] "Cn.6: If anyone says that because of the adultery of one spouse the marriage can be dissolved and that it is permissible for both spouses, or *at least for the innocent one* who did not engage in adultery, to changes spouses, and says that the man

6. In the congregation held on February 4, 1563: CTr 9,682.
7. This is the definitive formula, but since there were no discussions about this canon, we are not presenting the different small suggested changes.

does not commit adultery who, having dismissed an adulterous wife, marries someone else, nor the woman who, having left an adulterous husband, marries another man, let him be anathema."[8] There were innumerable discussions about this canon, which in the following revisions occupied the seventh place. A second formula was proposed, in which the words *it is permissible to change spouses* were changed to this form: *it is permissible, while the other spouse is living, to contract another marriage.*[9]

A third formula was crafted to satisfy a request of the Venetians, who did not want to see the Greeks condemned because they admitted divorce in the case of adultery, but they did not say that the Latin Church erred in its doctrine on the indissolubility of marriage. So Cardinal Lotheringus proposed the following formula, which found the approval of 69 Fathers: "If anyone says that the Catholic Church erred or does err, when because of the adultery of one spouse, she taught and does teach—a teaching based on the Holy Scriptures—that the bond of marriage cannot be dissolved, and both spouses, including the innocent one who did not commit adultery, cannot contract another marriage while the first spouse is still living, and says that the man does not commit adultery who, having dismissed an adulterous wife, marries someone else, nor the woman who, having left an adulterous husband, marries another man, let him be anathema."[10]

After a new discussion was held, a fourth formula was put together, in which only a few words were changed: *a teaching based on Holy Scripture* was changed to: *in accordance with the evangelical and apostolic doctrine;* and *the marriage bond cannot be dissolved* was changed to: *the marriage cannot be dissolved.*[11] But this last phrase was restored to its pristine form in the fifth formula.[12] Finally, after almost ten months of discussion, they produced the sixth and definitive formula, which reflected only some stylistic improvements: "If anyone says that the Church is in error for having taught and for still teaching that in accordance with the evangelical and apostolic doctrine (Mark 10; 1 Cor. 7), the marriage bond can be dissolved because of adultery on the part of one of the spouses and that neither of the two, not even the innocent one who has given no cause for infidelity, can contract another marriage during the lifetime of the other; and that the husband who dismisses an adulterous wife and marries again and the wife who dismisses an adulterous husband and marries again are both guilty of

8. In the congregation held on July 20, 1563: CTr 9,640.
9. Congregation on August 7, 1563: CTr 9,680.
10. Congregation on August 23, 1563: CTr 9,742.
11. Congregation on September 5, 1563: CTr 9,760.
12. Congregation on October 13, 1563: CTr 9,889.

adultery, let him be anathema" (D 1807).[13]

The same Council in the chapter defined: "The first father of the human race, inspired by the divine Spirit, proclaimed the perpetual and indissoluble bond of matrimony when he explained: *This at last is bone of my bones and flesh of my flesh. Therefore a man leaves his father and his mother and clings to his wife, and they become one flesh"* (D 1797).

It is clear that the *Council of Trent* is speaking about the marital bond that is intrinsically indissoluble, because it cannot be dissolved by reason of itself, because this indissolubility comes from the divine institution itself. Also, it should be noted that the Council wanted to condemn as heretical the doctrine of the Protestants,[14] which it singles out in some particular cases (cn.6 and 7); but it did not want to condemn the Greeks as heretics; and therefore in the canon it does not define our thesis, which is universal; but they do affirm it expressly in the chapter.

235. Benedict XIV in the Profession of Faith for the Orientals (Maronites) said with regard to marriage: "Likewise, (I profess) that the bond of the sacrament of matrimony is indissoluble and that, although a separation of bed and board may be possible between the spouses because of adultery, heresy, and some other causes, nevertheless it is not lawful for them to contract another marriage" (D 2536).

Pius VI: "It is manifestly clear that matrimony, even in the state of nature, and especially since it has been raised to the dignity of a real sacrament, was so instituted by God that it bears in itself a perpetual and indissoluble bond, which therefore cannot be dissolved by any civil law. Therefore, even though the nature of a sacrament can be separated from marriage, as it is among unbelievers, still in such a marriage, since it is true that a marriage must remain unchanged, that perpetual bond remains completely unchanged, which from its first divine origin by divine law is to such an extent a part of marriage that it is not subject to any civil power. And so whatever marriage is said to be contracted, or is contracted in such a way that it is really a true marriage, then it has joined to it that perpetual bond that belongs by divine law to every true marriage; or it is supposed that the marriage was contracted without that perpetual bond, then the marriage does not exist, but it is an illicit union opposed objectively to the

13. Session 24, November 11, 1563: CTr 9,967.

14. D 1803-1807, and it had said: "Wishing to oppose their temerity [Protestants}, this holy and universal council has decided to remove the more notable heresies and errors of the above-mentioned schismatics by decreeing the following anathemas against the heretics themselves and their errors, so that their pernicious contagion may not attract more to them" (D 1800).

divine law; therefore it cannot be entered into nor can it be retained."[15]

Leo XIII often in the Encyclical *"Arcanum divinae Sapientiae"* often mentions the indissolubility of marriage and the evils that result from divorce. He says that Christ restored the sanctity of marriage and its original properties, among which are its perpetuity and indissolubility.[16] Moreover, he recounts the cases in which the Supreme Pontiffs have vigorously defended the indissolubility of the bond against the secular powers: "As often, indeed, as the supreme pontiffs have resisted the most powerful among rulers, in their threatening demands that divorces carried out by them should be confirmed by the Church, so often must we account them to have been contending for the safety, not only of religion, but also of the human race. For this reason all generations of men will admire the proofs of unbending courage which are to be found in the decrees of Nicolas I against Lothair; of Urban II and Pascal II against Philip I of France; of Celestine III and Innocent III against Alphonsus of Leon and Philip II of France; of Clement VII and Paul III against Henry VIII; and, lastly, of Pius VII, that holy and courageous pontiff, against Napoleon I, when at the height of his prosperity and in the fullness of his power."[17]

Pius XI in his Encyclical *"Casti connubii"* will repeat everything said by Leo XIII, and in addition he said many things about the indissolubility of marriage, some of which we will quote here: "But this accumulation of benefits is completed and, as it were, crowned by that blessing of Christian marriage which in the words of St. Augustine we have called the *sacrament,* by which is denoted both the indissolubility of the bond and the raising and hallowing of the contract by Christ himself, whereby he made it an efficacious sign of grace. In the first place Christ himself lays stress on the indissolubility and firmness of the marriage bond when he says: *What God has joined together let no man put asunder* (Matt. 19:6); and: *Everyone who puts away his wife and marries another commits adultery, and he that marries her that is put away from her husband commits adultery* (Luke 16:18)... And this inviolable stability, although not in the same perfect measure in every case, belongs to every true marriage... And if this stability seems to be open to exception, however rare the exception may be, as in the case of certain natural marriages between unbelievers, or amongst Christians in the case of those marriages which though valid have not been consummated, that exception does not depend on the will of men

15. *Rescriptio* ad episcop. Agiens., July 11, 1789.
16. Encyclical *"Arcanum divinae Sapientiae":* ASS 12 (1879-1880)386-387; e. F. Hürth (Textus et documenta, ser. Theol. 25) n.4,19f.
17. Encyclical *"Arcanum divinae Sapientiae": loc.cit.,* 398f. There are other documents in D and CIC, 1118 [1017].

nor on that of any merely human power, but on divine law, of which the only guardian and interpreter is the Church of Christ. However, not even this power can ever affect for any cause whatsoever a Christian marriage which is valid and has been consummated, for as it is plain that here the marriage contract has its full completion, so, by the will of God, there is also the greatest firmness and indissolubility which may not be destroyed by any human authority."[18]

Pius XII: "Finally, what concerns the dissolution of a bond validly contacted, in some cases even the Holy Roman Rota is called upon to investigate whether everything has been done that is required for a valid and licit dissolution of the bond, and consequently whether the granting of the exception being sought can be recommended to the Supreme Pontiff. It is unnecessary before a juridical Tribunal, such as yours, but it is fitting for our explanation once again to assert that a marriage that is ratified and consummated is by the divine law indissoluble, because it cannot be dissolved by any human power, while other marriages, although they are intrinsically indissoluble, still do not have absolute extrinsic indissolubility; given certain necessary presuppositions (the concern is, as has been pointed out, with quite rare cases, if they are compared with others) these can be dissolved, not only in virtue of the Pauline Privilege but also in virtue of the ministerial power that the Roman Pontiff possesses."[19] Pius XII says clearly that all marriages are intrinsically indissoluble, although some of them can be dissolved extrinsically. It should be noted that the words of the Supreme Pontiff were uttered with a certain solemn gravity, for, as he said in another allocution to the Roman Rota, he spoke to the assembled Prelates "in order that we may explain the mind and will of the Church, which attributes the greatest importance to marriage."[20]

CIC 1013,2 [1917]: The essential properties of Matrimony are unity and indissolubility, which obtain a special firmness in Christian marriage because of the sacrament.

236. Theological note. That marriage is intrinsically indissoluble in the case of heresy or burdensome cohabitation, or in the willful absence of one of the spouses is *defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 1805).

It is also *defined divine and Catholic faith* that the Church does not err in her doctrine on the indissolubility of marriage because of adultery.

If the thesis is taken *universally,* as we do, *it is not a defined article of*

18. Encyclical *"Casti connubii":* AAS 22 (1930) 550-552.
19. Allocution to the Roman Rota, October 3, 1941: AAS 33 (1941) 424-425. For the complete text see S. Tromp: Textus et Documenta, series theol. 27 (Rome 1944).
20. Allocution to the Roman Rota, October 2, 1944: AAS 36 (1944) 281; see ed. Tromp, p. 3.

faith, but it is *at least proximate to faith.* Indeed, if we prescind from the case of adultery, it could be said to be simply *a matter of ecclesiastical faith*, or even *divine and Catholic faith.* But if one admits the value of the definition in the chapter quoted from Trent, and keeps in mind the statements of Leo XIII and Pius XI, then one could say that it is *defined divine and Catholic faith.*[21]

237. Proof. *Note.* Even though the thesis seems to have two parts, nevertheless since the second part is only the special case of a general law, both parts will be proved by one and the same argument.

Proof from Holy Scripture. 1. Matt. 19:3-6: *And Pharisees came up to him and tested him by asking: Is it lawful to divorce one's wife for any cause? He answered: Have you not read that he who made them from the beginning made them male and female, and said: For this reason a man shall leave his father and mother and be joined to his wife, and the two shall become one? So they are no longer two but one. What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder.* Mark 10:11: *Whoever divorces his wife and marries another, commits adultery against her; and if she divorces her husband and marries another, she commits adultery.* Luke 16:18: *Every one who divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery, and he who marries a woman divorced from her husband commits adultery.*

When the question is asked about the dissolubility of marriage for any cause, Christ responds absolutely that marriage is indissoluble; and he takes the reason from the divine institution itself *from the beginning,* that is, from the beginning of humanity. Hence he draws the conclusion: *What God has joined together, let no man put asunder.* After hearing Christ's response the Pharisees insist: *Why then did Moses command one to give a certificate of divorce, and to put her away?* (Matt. 19:7). But Jesus then responds by insisting on indissolubility: *For your hardness of heart Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so* (v.8). Afterwards at home the disciples ask him again about this matter: *If such is the case of a man with his wife, it is not expedient to marry* (v.10). And Jesus insists: *Whoever divorces his wife and marries another, commits adultery against her; and if she divorces her husband and marries another, she commits adultery* (Mark 10:11-12).

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21. Pesch says simply that it is a matter *of faith* (*de fide*); Otten that it is *at least proximate to faith,* n.465; Puig de la B., *seems to say it is de fide* in n.1100; for proof he cites the Profession of Faith Prescribed for the Orientals.

Therefore from these texts and from the context it is clear that the bond of marriage is intrinsically indissoluble, because it cannot be dissolved by the will of the spouses. For, it is not allowed for one spouse to leave the other, nor can the one abandoned marry someone else without committing adultery. And this is the difference between the New Law and the Old; because in the Old Law God permitted that a certificate of divorce could be given, with a real dissolving of the bond, but in the New Law such a certificate is not allowed; the woman sent away remained free to marry and her husband could marry again; but in the kingdom of Christ the dismissed woman and the dismissing man remain bound together and they cannot remarry.

238. 2. 1 Cor. 7:10: *To the married I give charge, not I but the Lord, that the wife should not separate from her husband; but if she does, let her remain single or else be reconciled to her husband.* Rom. 7:1-3: *Do you not know, brethren... that the law is binding on a person only during his life? Thus a married woman is bound by law to her husband as long as he lives; but if her husband dies she is discharged from the law concerning her husband. Accordingly, she will be called an adulteress if she lives with another man while her husband is alive. But if her husband dies she is free from that law, and if she marries another man she is not an adulteress.*

The doctrine of St. Paul agrees completely with the teaching of Christ, and says expressly that the bond of marriage is indissoluble, since it continues during one's whole life, so that, if the husband or wife dismisses a spouse, or abandons him or her, he or she remains obligated by the bond and cannot enter into a second marriage, unless the spouse dies. Therefore the bond is really wholly indissoluble, and it is such intrinsically.

239. Proof from tradition. The Fathers, in their opposition to pagan customs, often extol and recommend the indissolubility of marriage, not only by relying on natural reasons, but also by building their argument from the quoted texts of Scripture and from the primeval institution of matrimony.

The Shepherd Hermas: "I said to him: 'Sir, allow me to ask you a few questions.' 'Ask them,' he said. 'Sir,' I said, 'if a man has a wife who believes in the Lord and surprises her in adultery, does he commit sin if he lives with her?' 'Before he finds out,' he said, 'he does not. But, if her husband knows the sin, and she does not repent, but persists in her fornication, he becomes guilty of her sin, as long as he lives with her, and an accomplice in her adultery.' 'Sir,' I said, 'what then is he to do, if the wife continues in this passion?' 'Let him divorce her,' he said, 'and remain

single. But, if he divorces her and marries another woman, he himself commits adultery'" (R 86).

Clement of Alexandria: "Now that the Scripture counsels marriage, and allows no release from the union, is expressly contained in the law. 'You shall not put away your wife, except for the cause of fornication' (Matt. 5:32; 19:9); and it regards as fornication, the marriage of those separated while the other is alive... 'He that takes a woman that has been put away,' it is said, 'commits adultery; and if one puts away his wife, he makes her an adulteress' (Mark 10:11), that is, compels her to commit adultery. And not only is he who puts her away guilty of this, but he who takes her, by giving to the woman the opportunity of sinning; for did he not take her, she would return to her husband" (R 420).

Origen: "But now contrary to what was written, some even of the rulers of the Church have permitted a woman to marry, even when her husband was living, doing contrary to what was written, where it is said, 'A wife is bound for so long time as her husband lives; shall she be joined to another man she shall be called an adulteress' (Rom. 7:2-3) not indeed, altogether without reason, for it is probable this concession was permitted in comparison with worse things, contrary to what was from the beginning ordained by law and written" (R 506). Further on he raises an objection from the text of Matt. 5:32 (which we will examine later) and asks whether a certificate of divorce could be given only because of adultery; and then he concludes: "But as a woman is an adulteress, even though she seem to be married to a man, while the former husband is still living, so also the man who seems to marry her who has been put away, does not so much marry her as commit adultery with her according to the declaration of our Savior" (R 507).

Lactantius: "Lest anyone think that he can circumscribe the divine precepts, there are added those that take away all calumny and occasion of fraud; he is an adulterer who marries a divorced spouse, and he who dismisses his wife commits adultery, for God is unwilling to dissociate the body" (R 642).

St. Hilary[22] (R 854) and St. Basil[23] (R 922) speak in the same way; St. Gregory Nazianzen (R 1002) and St. John Chrysostom: "Therefore, what is the nature of this law that Paul gives to us? *The woman*, he says, *is bound by the law.* It is necessary, therefore, that she not be separated, during the life of her husband, nor can she accept another husband, nor can she enter into a second marriage. And see with what care he makes use of the right words. For he did not say: She may live with her husband as long as he

22. St. Hilary at first look seems to admit an exception for the case of adultery, but if the context is carefully analyzed it can be properly interpreted.

23. St. Basil in his *Epist.* 188,9: MG 32,677, mentions the custom contrary to the law of Christ, but he does not approve of it.

lives, but *the woman is bound by the law to her husband as long as he lives.* And that remains to be the case, even if he gives her a certificate of divorce, even if he leaves the house, even if he goes to another, she is bound by the law and is an adulteress... Do not quote to me laws established by civil authority, directing that a certificate of divorce is given and that they can be separated. For God will not judge you on the last day according to those laws, but according to those he himself established" (R 1212).

St. Ambrose, who knew the Roman laws that sometimes granted a divorce, says that the divine law, which always forbids divorce, is above human laws (R 1308; see also 1322). St. Jerome also contrasts the Roman law or those of Caesar to the law of Christ, which does not allow divorce for any reason: "The Apostle has thus cut away every plea and has clearly declared that, if a woman marries again while her husband is living, she is an adulteress... A husband may be an adulterer or sodomite, he may be stained with every crime and may have been left by his wife because of his sins; yet he is still her husband and, so long as he lives, she may not marry another" (R 1351). And "with us Christians what is unlawful for women is equally unlawful for men, and as both serve the same God both are bound by the same obligations" (R 1352).

240. St. Augustine treated this matter excellently; he wrote a whole book about it, *De adulterinis coniugiis,* and Pius XI often mentions his authority in his Encyclical "*Casti connubii.*" Besides that, therefore, which is recounted in the Encyclical, Augustine also says this: "Accordingly, therefore, as we have said: Whoever marries a woman, dismissed by her husband because of adultery, commits adultery; we say this without any doubt. However, we do not absolve from this crime the man who marries a woman dismissed because of fornication, but we have no doubt that both are adulterers; thus we pronounce him to be an adulterer who besides the cause of fornication dismissed his wife and married another; and so we do not defend from the guilt of sin the man who dismissed his wife because of fornication and then married another. For, we know that both are still adulterers, although one is more guilty than the other" (R 1861). "But once they have been married in the city of our God, where also from the first intercourse of two persons a certain sacrament of marriage is produced, in no way can it be dissolved except by the death of one of them. For the bond of marriage remains, even if a child, who is the reason for marriage, does not result because of sterility, so that now, when the spouses know they will not have children, it is not allowed for them to separate for the sake of children and to marry someone else. But if they do that, they commit adultery with

those with whom they have intercourse, but they still remain spouses."[24] "But because of any kind of fornication, whether of the flesh or of the spirit, where also infidelity is understood, if the husband is dismissed she is not allowed to marry another, and if the wife is dismissed, he cannot marry another woman, because the Lord, after making no exceptions, said: *if a woman divorces her husband and marries another she commits adultery;* and *whoever divorces his wife and marries another commits adultery."*[25] "These words of the Apostle (Rom. 5:7) so often repeated, so often inculcated, are true, are living, are healthy, are complete. A woman does not begin to be the wife of any subsequent man, unless she has ceased to be the wife of her first husband. But she ceases to be the wife of the first, if the husband dies, but not if he commits fornication. It is allowed, therefore, that a spouse be dismissed because of fornication, but the bond of purity remains, and because of this he is guilty of adultery who marries a divorced woman even for the cause of fornication" (R 1863).

241. Theological reasoning. Christian marriage is a symbol of the union of Christ with the Church. But the union of Christ with the Church is absolutely indissoluble. Therefore also marriage between Christians.

St. Thomas[26] explains this reason, and the Supreme Pontiff Pius XI uses it while referring to the words of St. Augustine: "If we wish with all reverence to inquire into the intimate reason of this divine decree, Venerable Brethren, we shall easily see it in the mystical signification of Christian marriage which is fully and perfectly verified in consummated marriage between Christians. For, as the Apostle says in his Epistle to the Ephesians, the marriage of Christians recalls that most perfect union which exists between Christ and the Church: 'Sacramentum hoc magnum est, ego autem dico, in Christo et in ecclesia'; which union, as long as Christ shall live and the Church through him, can never be dissolved by any separation. And this St. Augustine clearly declares in these words: 'This is safeguarded in Christ and the Church, which, living with Christ who lives for ever may never be divorced from him. The observance of this sacrament is such in the City of God... that is, in the Church of Christ, that when for the sake of begetting children, women marry or are taken to wife, it is wrong to leave a wife that is sterile in order to take another by whom children may be had. Anyone doing this is guilty of adultery, just as if he married another, guilty not by the law of the day, according to which when one's partner is put

24. *De bono coniugali* 15: CSEL, 41,209-210. See *De nuptiis et concupiscentia* 1,10.
25. *De adulterinis coniug.* 1,25,31: CSEL 41,379.
26. *Suppl.* q.67, a. 1 ad 2.

away another may be taken, which the Lord allowed in the law of Moses because of the hardness of the hearts of the people of Israel; but by the law of the Gospel."[27]

242. Objections. 1. St. Innocent I solves a case in this way: "We have established, with the approval of the Catholic faith, that to be a marriage which was first founded on the divine grace; and that a union with a second woman, while the first one still lives, *and has not been dismissed by divorce,* cannot in any way be legitimate" (R 2017). Therefore, according to the Catholic faith, if a woman has been dismissed by divorce, her husband can marry someone else.

I distinguish the antecedent. The Supreme Pontiff says that marriage can be dissolved, *denied;* he says it is not to be dissolved, *conceded.* Or to put it in other words: *I distinguish the antecedent:* the phrase *and has not been dismissed by divorce* is taken in connection with what precedes it, *denied;* it is taken as a citation of the civil law, *conceded, and I deny the consequent and the consequence.*

The solution of this case is correct, for it is declared that the marriage is not to be dissolved. St. Innocent I gives the reason by referring to the civil law that granted a severance of the bond in the case of divorce; but the Supreme Pontiff takes the first part from this law, which was in his favor and which *was approved by the Catholic faith.* Constantine had granted to the bishops that in marriage cases they could perform the function of a civil judge, so that their decisions would have weight even in the civil forum; therefore the Supreme Pontiff applies the civil law according as it agrees with the divine law. Moreover, above we already quoted other documents of Innocent I which defend the perfect indissolubility of marriage.

2. Gregory II wrote to Boniface: "For what you have proposed, if a woman, suffering from an infirmity, cannot have intercourse with her husband, what is the extent of the marital bond? It would be good if it remained as it is, and that they practice abstinence. But because this is an important matter, let him who could not practice continence marry again; however he is not to remove his support from the woman who is hindered by ill-health and detestable guilt does not exclude it."[28]

I respond. Since the proposed case is not given, but only the solution, a certain response cannot be given in such an obscure case; but the objector also cannot deduce anything from this uncertain case that touches the general law. Perhaps it was a case about the impediment of impotence,[29] or about a dispensation about a marriage ratified and not consummated in a serious case.[30]

3. The Council of Verberiacum (a.756) and the Council of Compendianum (a.757)[31] granted the dissolution of the bond in the case of a woman afflicted with leprosy, and in various other cases. Therefore the bond of marriage is not indissoluble.

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27. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 553-554.
28. *Epist.* ad Bonifacium: ML 59,525.
29. As interpreted by St. Robert Bellarmine, *De Summo Pontifice* l.4 c.12.
30. See Villien, *Divorce:* DTC 4,1164-1165.
31. See Villien, *Divorce:* DTC 4,1164-1165.

I distinguish the antecedent. Those particular councils that made these concessions represent the doctrine of the Church, *denied;* they do not represent it, *conceded.* It is true that those councils granted (better, permitted) divorce; but it is necessary to keep this in mind: a) it has to do with particular councils; b) and especially, in these councils the civil power was involved, for they were mixed councils where the State wanted to be in agreement with the Church on marriage legislation, especially in some more difficult cases. The civil law admitted many reasons for divorce. Therefore in those councils the civil authority tried, as much as it could, to bend the ecclesiastical authority to its own position. The ecclesiastical authority took care not to urge, within certain limits, the law on the indissolubility of marriage, so that it could improve its relationship with the State. Therefore, in these mixed councils the true doctrine of the Church is not to be sought; for if the bishops had insisted on ecclesiastical discipline, the royal legates would have totally rejected them. The bishops lacked the necessary freedom and perhaps also the courage to resist.[32]

4. According to Matt. 5:32 Christ said: *Every one who divorces his wife,* ***except on the ground of fornication****, makes her an adulteress; and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery.* And in 19:9: *Whoever divorces his wife,* ***except for fornication****, and marries another, commits adultery.* But in these texts it appears that Christ permits divorce in the case of the adultery of the woman. Therefore the bond of marriage is not intrinsically indissoluble.

First response. I concede the major and distinguish the minor. The phrase *except for fornication* (πορνεία) signifies *adultery, denied;* it signifies concubinage or a *putative marriage, conceded* (see below, n.244,4).

Second response. I concede the major and distinguish the minor. Christ permits in the case of the adultery of the woman perfect divorce, *denied;* he permits imperfect divorce, *conceded.*

243. Many explanations of these texts have been given,[33] so we will recall the main solutions that can be admitted. But:

a) The *context* demands the complete indissolubility of the bond. For, when the Pharisees ask: *Is it lawful to divorce one's wife for any reason?* (19:3), Jesus responds by recalling to mind the institution or marriage, and he concludes: *What therefore God has joined together, let no man put asunder* (v.6). The Pharisees understand that Jesus is denying the ability to divorce, and so they insist: *Why then did Moses command one to give a certificate of divorce, and to put her away?* (v.7). But Jesus does not explain his position, for example, by saying, "it is not allowed for just any cause to put her away,

32. M. Esmein treated the history of these councils, *Le mariage en droit canonique* (Paris 1891) 2,64.

33. You will find a summary of them in A. Tafi, *Excepta fornicationis causa; Nisi ob fornicationem:* VerDom (1948) 18-26 (opinions are explained in pp. 22-25); M. Brunec, *De clausulis divortii* (1949) 3-16; T. Schweglev, *De clausulis divortii* (1948) 214-217. Then A. Mancini, *Intorno ai passi de S. Mateo in referenza all'indissolubilità del matrimonio:* Palestra del Clero (1949) 50. Then also in Lercher-Umberg, n.773; and A. Allgeier, *Die crux interpretum in neutestamentlichen Ehescheidungsverbot:* Ang 20 (1943) 128-142; U. Holzmeister, *Die Streitfrage der Ehescheidungstexte bei Mt.:* Bibl (1945) 143f.; J. Bonsirven, *Le divorce dans le nouveau testament* (Paris 1948), explains his opinion on p. 46; A Vaccari, *De Matrimonio et divortio apud Matthaeum:* Bibl 36 (1955) 149-151.

but only because of fornication"; but sticking to his universal view about the indissolubility of marriage, he replies: *For your hardness of heart Moses allowed you to divorce your wives, but from the beginning it was not so* (v.8). Therefore the universal law established by Christ remains. Indeed, the Apostles understand the difficulty that results from this for every marriage, and so they ask him: *If such is the case of a man with his wife, it is not expedient to marry* (v.10). Christ silently agrees and explains in an indirect way the superiority of virginity (v.12).

b) The *matter* of his words also demands the indissolubility of the bond. For, marriage gives equality before the law to both spouses. Indeed, if in the words of Christ divorce were permitted because of the adultery of the woman, the law would not be equal for the man and the woman.

c) If it were dealing with perfect divorce in the case of adultery or fornication, there would be an absurd result, namely, that the new law is more lax than the old law. For, in the O.T. there were severe penalties for adulterous women,[34] and in the N.T. not only would there be no penalty, but divorce would be rendered easy by adultery; given this exception, women who want a divorce would be easily inclined to commit adultery.

d) *The very words* of Christ demand indissolubility. For Christ says: *Whoever divorces his wife, except for fornication, and marries another, commits adultery; and he who marries a divorced woman commits adultery;* these are universal statement and refer to any *divorced* woman (whether because of fornication or for any other cause permitted in the old law); therefore, if he who marries a divorced woman commits adultery, this is a sign that the woman remains tied by the marital bond.

e) The *parallel texts* of Mark 10:11 and Luke 16:18, in which no exception is given, point in the same direction. And it cannot be said that Mark and Luke must be explained as dependent on Matt., as if Matt. states the rule and the exception, while Mark and Luke state only the rule. For, since Mark and Luke wish (as also does Matt.) to show the difference between the ancient and the new legislation or the Gospel, what they say would be false if they stated an exception. Therefore, Matt. is to be explained from Mark and Luke, and not vice versa.[35]

244. The main solutions or explanations of the texts are:

1) The traditional one from St. Augustine to our times: Christ admits no reason for dissolving the bond, and in general not even for living separately; but adultery would be a sufficient reason for separation from bed and board, but the marital bond remains. "Christ rejects in his kingdom a certificate of divorce, whereby a divorced woman would be free from the bond; hence in the new law a woman divorced by her husband remains bound, and therefore he who divorced her, causes her to commit adultery or puts her in danger of adultery; this is so except for the case in which the woman was an adulteress. For, if such a woman is divorced, she is justly divorced, nor can it be said of the man who dismissed her: *he caused her to commit adultery;* for she is already an adulteress. Therefore the old law said: Whoever dismisses a wife, let him give her a certificate of divorce, i.e., *he frees*

34. Deut. 22:22-24; Lev. 20:10.

35. This expressly St. Augustine, *De adulterinis coniug.* 1,12,11: CSEL 41,359-360.

her from the marital bond. The new law says: Whoever dismisses a wife, *causes her to commit adultery.*"[36] Hence St. Augustine says: "Therefore who are we to say: the one who marries another, after divorcing his wife, commits adultery, and someone who does this does not commit adultery, since the Gospel says that everyone who does this commits adultery? Therefore, if anyone does this, that is, everyone who does this, when he marries after dismissing his wife, commits adultery, without doubt both are there, both the one who besides fornication and the one who because of fornication divorces his wife; now it all comes to this: whoever divorces, that is, every one who divorces."[37]

2) The words παρεκτός λόγου πορνείας [= excepta fornicationis causa; except for fornication] and μή έπι [= nisi ob; except for fornication] do not signify an exception, but the contrary; παρεκτός would be equivalent to "praeter" [= in addition to], which can signify; *except this* or *also this.* Innocent III, Salmerón and others[38] interpret it in this way. Then the meaning would be: Whoever divorces his wife, even in the case of fornication, and marries another, commits adultery.

3) Christ wanted only to bring to an end the question disputed among the Jews, or he applied these words to marriage as it was understood among the Jews.[39] Actually, in Deut. 24:1 Moses commanded: *When a man takes a wife and marries her, if then she finds no favor in his eyes because he has found some indecency* [êrwat dâbâr] *in her, and he writes her a bill of divorce and puts it in her hand and sends her out of his house.* There were two interpretations of that expression êrwat dâbâr (*because of some indecency*): the School of Hillel, in a more lax sense, thought that anything suffices (even the smallest thing), which displeases the man, so that he could divorce his wife. The School of Shammai, being more strict, required a truly serious cause and one pertaining to her uprightness. Therefore to the question of the Pharisees about whether it is permitted for any cause to divorce one's wife, Christ responded by answering the question in favor of the more rigid school.[40]

40 The word πορνεία does not signify adultery, but a marriage that does not exist, is invalid, attempted with a diriment impediment (like the marriages mentioned in Lev. 18:6-18), concubinage. So the meaning of Christ's words would be: It is not permitted to divorce a wife, except in the case of concubinage or of a putative or invalid marriage.

Other less suitable explanations are found in the authors cited in note 33; any of those just mentioned here can be admitted. The third explanation is found favorable by some modern exegetes, but in this interpretation it is necessary to suppose that Matthew is reporting a dialogue between the Pharisees and Christ, while Mark and Luke instead quote the words of Christ as spoken on another occasion or even on the same day.

The first interpretation has the advantage that it is the *traditional* opinion. However,

36. Lennerz, *Tres theses de Matrimonio* (Rome 1946) n.45.
37. *De adulterinis coniug.* 1,9,10: CSEL 41,358.
38. Innocent III, *Epist.* ad Episcop. Tiberiad.: Decretales 4,9,8, on divorce: ed. Friedberg, 2,723; see A. Allgeier, *Die crux interpretum im neutestamentliche Ehescheidungsverbot:* Ang 20 (1943) 141f.
39. J. Sickenberg, *Introduzione al Nuovo Testamento* (Turin 1942); see Lercher-Umberg, n.773,1(2), (b), (d).
40. See v.gr. Pirot-Calmer, *La Sainte Bible* IX (Paris 1950) 66-67 at this place; U. Tralija, *L'indissolubilità del matrimonio nella N.L. e le parole di Gesù Cristo presso Mateo 5,32 e 19,9:* ScuoCatt 56 (1948) 419.

40ª Other reasons are added by A Vaccari, *De Matrimonio et divortio apud Matthaeum:* Bibl 36 (1955) 149-151, against B. Vawer who defended the second interpretation.

we prefer the fourth interpretation for the following main reasons: a) Christ in this verse and in the following ones, where he is talking about *divorce*, uses the word μοιχάσθαι, μοιχεύειν; he also should have used the substantive μοιχεία instead of πορνεία. b) When speaking about concubinage, St. Paul uses the word πορνεία (1 Cor. 5:1). c) The first opinion has, among other disadvantages, the fact that among the Jews imperfect divorce or the legal separation from cohabitation, while the marital bond remains, was unknown; therefore, another explanation was required. d) But the cases of concubinage were frequent, as with the Samaritan woman (John 4:18; *and he whom you now have is not your husband*).[40a]

§ II. On the extrinsic indissolubility of matrimony

245. Above all a distinction must be made between the *dissolution* of a marriage and a decree of *nullity.* In the latter case the marriage objectively never existed, but only fictitious (if entered with bad will) or it was a supposed or putative (if entered with good will) contact, inasmuch, namely, as there was a hidden or unknown diriment impediment. Once this is detected, the Church declares that the presumed spouses were not in any way united by the bond of marriage.

It is certain that no marriage can be dissolved *intrinsically* with regard to the bond; but *extrinsically* the marriage bond can be dissolved only by the vicarious power of the Roman Pontiff, which has been divinely conferred on him by Christ. No other power can dissolve a legitimate marriage (among both believers and unbelievers, whether consummated or not). For this reason the following assertions are proposed:

Assertion 1. No human power can dissolve a legitimate marriage.

246. A *legitimate* marriage (by opposition to a *ratified* marriage) is that which is contracted validly among unbelievers.

Concerning this marriage the Church has per se no power, since unbelievers are not subject to the Church, except by right but not actually[41]; that is, the Church, as founded by Christ, has a right concerning all the peoples redeemed by Christ, but she does not exercise this right except over her subjects, or those who belong to her through baptism. But unbelievers, since they do not belong to the body of the Church, are not subject to her laws.

But the civil power has no power over matrimonial causes, except inasmuch as it can establish some impediments before a marriage is contracted;

41. *The Council of Trent*, speaking about baptism, says: "It is beyond question that the minister of baptism need not be a judge since the Church does not exercise judgment on anyone who has not first entered her through the gate of baptism" (D 1671).

and also inasmuch as marriage is a contract, concerning which the State exercises some authority. But this concerns only marriage among unbelievers, which is not a sacrament. But when marriage is validly contracted, then *by divine right* it is indissoluble, and therefore only that authority will be able to dissolve a marriage that has received the power for it from God. But it is certain that the State has not received such power. Therefore it cannot dissolve any legitimate marriage.

247. Indeed, the contrary is positively certain, namely, that the civil State does not have this power. Thus the Supreme Pontiffs have declared expressly:

Pius VI: "From this it is manifestly clear that matrimony, even in the state of nature, and surely long before it was raised to the dignity of a sacrament properly so called, was so established by God that it carries with it a perpetual and indissoluble bond, which, accordingly, cannot be dissolved by any civil law. And so, although the sacramental element can be separated from matrimony, as is true in a marriage between infidels, still in such a marriage, inasmuch as it is a true marriage, there must remain and surely does remain that perpetual bond which by divine right is so inherent in marriage from its very beginning that it is not subject to any civil power" (D 2235; ed. before 1963). Pius XI made these words of Pius VI his own.[42]

Leo XIII: "The most potent principles of Christianity, and also the elementary notions of natural law would have to be repudiated, in order to be able to say that marriage is a creation of the State, and that it is nothing other than a common contract and social arrangement that is completely civil."[43] Hence the Supreme Pontiff concludes that marriage is in no way subject to human power.

Pius XII: "Another thing that clearly shows the difference between the ecclesiastical juridical system and the civil is matrimony. It is, according to the will of the Creator, *something sacred.* For this reason, when there is a question about a union between the baptized, by its very nature it remains outside of the reach of the civil authority. But also the marriages between the non-baptized, legitimately contracted, in the order of nature are something sacred, so much so that civil tribunals have no power of dissolving them, and in such cases the Church has never recognized the value of decrees of divorce. However, this does not hinder the fact that simple declarations of nullity of such marriages—quite rare if they are compared with the

42. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 551-552.

43. *A letter "Ingens Nobis,"* June 1, 1879, ad Episc. Prov. Eccles. Taurini, Vercellae et Genuae: ASS 12 (1879-1880) 4. Also in the Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae:* ASS 12 (1879-1880) 396-399.

granting of divorces—in some circumstances can be justly pronounced by a civil tribunal, and so be recognized by the Church."[44]

In the *Syllabus* Pius IX condemned this proposition: "By natural law the bond of matrimony is not indissoluble, and in various cases divorce, properly so-called, can be sanctioned by civil authority" (D 2967). This proposition is directed at some particular cases; therefore, from it alone our assertion would not be proved.

Finally, *reason* also indicates the same thing. For, the dissolution of the bond would be against a precept of the natural law (although it is a secondary precept). But the civil authority cannot dispense from the precepts of the natural law. Therefore, it does not belong to the civil authority to dissolve any legitimate marriages.

Assertion 2. No human power can dissolve a ratified and consummated marriage.

247. A *ratified* marriage (by opposition to a *legitimate* marriage) is what is contracted between the baptized and it is a sacrament, as is certain from Innocent III: "For even if, in fact, a true marriage exists between unbelievers, it is still not ratified. Between believers, however, a true and ratified marriage exists, because the sacrament of faith (baptism) once conferred is never lost, and indeed it makes the sacrament of marriage ratified so that it (the marriage itself) endures in the spouses as long as (the baptism) endures" (D 769).

However, a marriage is said to be *consummated*, if the marital act has been performed, even though a child does not result from it.[45] But if the marital act took place before the marriage was contracted, and afterwards the act is not repeated, the marriage will be in fact ratified but not consummated.

248. Proof. If a ratified and consummated marriage could be dissolved, there certainly would be some human authority capable of dissolving it. But not only is that not certain, but it is positively certain that the contrary is the case. Therefore.

The major is clear. But the power would be either civil or ecclesiastical. But it cannot be a civil power, as we proved in the first assertion. For, if the civil power has no power over legitimate marriages, much less would it have it over ratified marriages. Therefore it must be an ecclesiastical power.

The minor is proved from the statements and actions of ecclesiastical power.

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44. Allocution to the Prelates of the Roman Rota, October 6, 1946: AAS 38 (1946) 395.
45. On this consult Moral Theology, v.gr., Mondría-Ferreres, 2,548f.

a) *From the statements.* The Supreme Pontiffs have often said that they have no power over ratified and consummated marriages. Innocent III, when consulted about whether the Pauline Privilege could be extended to the case of a Christian marriage in which one of the spouses fell into heresy or paganism, responded: "We do not believe that in this case the abandoned one can enter into a second marriage while the other spouse is living, even though in this case a greater insult to the Creator may be evident" (D 769). And he gives the reason, which we quoted above, namely, that the ratified sacrament makes that marriage so firm that it cannot in any way be dissolved.

Benedict XII condemned this error of the Armenians: "Likewise, among the Armenians, if after the marriage has been contracted, and carnal intercourse has taken place, and a child has been born, the wife is not pleasing to her husband, or conversely; the one to whom the other spouse is not pleasing, or both of them if they feel the same way, they go to the bishop or priest; after some money has been given to them, according to their mutual agreement, the bishop or priest then separates the said marriage, and gives permission to marry another, even if the other spouse does not agree to this; this happens often among the Armenians."[46]

Gregory XVI: "Marriage, if it has once been validly contracted and consummated, according to the evangelical and apostolic teaching... among Christians can never be dissolved with regard to the bond...."[47]

Pius IX: "In fact this perpetual and indissoluble firmness of the marital bond is so strong in a consummated marriage, both by divine law and by the natural law, that it cannot ever be dissolved for any reason, not even by the Roman Pontiff, even if the conjugal fidelity has been broken by the adultery of one of the spouses."[48]

Pius XI: "And if this stability seems to be open to exception, however rare the exception may be... not even this power can ever affect for any cause whatsoever a Christian marriage that is valid and has been consummated, for as it is plain that here the marriage contract has its full completion, so, by the will of God, there is also the greatest firmness and indissolubility, which may not be destroyed by any human authority" (D 3712).

Pius XII: "It is superfluous... but it is in accord with Our explanation, to assert once again, that a ratified and consummated marriage by the divine law is indissoluble, since it cannot be dissolved by any human power, while other marriages, although they are intrinsically indissoluble, still do not have absolute extrinsic indissolubility."[49]

46. Error 102: Msi 25,1265.
47. Letter "*Accepimus,*" February 8, 1836: Acta Gregorii XVI, 2,98.
48. *Epist. "Verbis exprimere,"* August 15, 1859: Acta Pii IX 3,100.
49. Allocution to the Prelates of the Roman Rota, October 3, 1941: AAS 33 (1941) 424.

b) *From the facts.* The Roman Pontiffs not only have never attempted to dissolve the bond of a ratified and consummated marriage, but often when they were asked by secular authorities to do it, they refused. Above we already mentioned the facts enumerated by Leo XIII (n.235): against Lotharius, Philip I of France, Philip II, Henry VIII, Napoleon I. To these can be added innumerable decisions of the Holy Roman Rota, which have rejected requests for a perfect divorce.[50]

249. The *reason* why Christian consummated marriage is wholly indissoluble must be sought in the *divine will* (as Pius XI says in the text just quoted). It cannot be sought in the sacramental meaning alone (which also exists in a ratified but not consummated marriage, which can be dissolved); nor in the consummation alone of marriage (since a consummated marriage among unbelievers can be dissolved by the Pauline Privilege); but it is necessary to attend to both of them together, so that a certain proportion may be found why God does not dispense in these marriages.

For, on the one hand, the sacramental meaning introduces a certain indissolubility, which intrinsically cannot be frustrated, but a ministerial or vicarious power can dissolve the bond, which has not yet been perfected by carnal intercourse. For the mystical meaning of marriage is twofold: *the union of Christ with the Church, and the union of the divine Word with the Humanity of Christ.*[51] The first is a spiritual union through grace, and the moral union in matrimony between the spouses through the marital contract corresponds to this; the hypostatic union is substantial and physical, which is signified by the union of the bodies, and this union perfects even more the one flesh. Therefore, this twofold mystical meaning of marriage is present only in a ratified and consummated marriage. For, in a legitimate marriage, there is indeed a bodily union, but it remains in the natural order and it is only a type of foreshadowing of the mystical representation that the marriage of Christians has. Hence it is easily understood that such a legitimate marriage occasionally can be dissolved, in order to make it possible to attain spiritual perfection. On the other hand, a ratified but not yet consummated marriage does not have a representation of the Incarnation, and therefore just as a ratified and consummated marriage cannot be dissolved except by death, so also a ratified marriage can be dissolved by spiritual death, such as is found in religious profession, or also by the authority of the Supreme Pontiff, when this dissolution contributes to a greater spiri-

50. See *Romanae Rotae decisiones,* or ASS and AAS passim.

51. Leo XIII, "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": ASS 12 (1879-1880) 392: "For since marriage has God for its author, and it was from the beginning a certain adumbration of the Incarnation of the Word of God...."

tual good. But a ratified and consummated marriage, which already has the fullness of sacramental meaning, cannot be dissolved for any reason.

Pius XI says this also: "If we wish with all reverence to inquire into the intimate reason of this divine decree... we shall easily see it in the mystical signification of Christian marriage which is fully and perfectly verified in consummated marriage between Christians. For, as the Apostle says... the marriage of Christians recalls that most perfect union which exists between Christ and the Church: *This is a great mystery, and I mean in reference to Christ and the Church;* this union, as long as Christ shall live and the Church through him, can never be dissolved by any separation. And this St. Augustine clearly declares in these words: 'This is safeguarded in Christ and the Church, which, living with Christ who lives forever may never be divorced from him. The observance of this sacrament is such in the City of God... that is, in the Church of Christ, that when for the sake of begetting children, women marry or are taken to wife, it is wrong to leave a wife that is sterile in order to take another by whom children may be had. Anyone doing this is guilty of adultery, just as if he married another, guilty not by the law of the day, according to which when one's partner is put away another may be taken... but guilty by the law of the Gospel.'"[52]

§ III. On the dissolution of the bond

A) On the Dissolution of the Bond by Ecclesiastical Power

250. Up to this point we have spoken about marriage as intrinsically and extrinsically indissoluble. Now we will consider those that can sometimes be dissolved. Only God can dissolve a marriage; but he also confers this power on the Supreme Pontiff who, by using his ministerial or vicarious power, does dissolve some marriages. But the Supreme Pontiff can apply this power in individual cases, or make a general law according to which some facts bring about the dissolution of the bond. Therefore, it is customary to distinguish between a dissolution of the bond *by ecclesiastical power* (or of the Pontiff) and by some facts. For the sake of clarity, we also are making this distinction. And so first of all we will deal with the dissolubility of the bond by ecclesiastical power.

Assertion 3. The Supreme Pontiff, by his vicarious power, can dissolve a ratified and non-consummated marriage.

52. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 552-553. See also S.Th., *Suppl.* q.61 a.2 ad 1; Pesch, n. 820; Lercher-Umberg, n. 779,3b.

251. It is clear that we are treating a marriage between Christians, or between two baptized persons. And also we are considering a marriage that can be dissolved not by some fact, but only by the authority of the Pontiff.

Vicarious power is opposed to *one's own* power, and it is said to be that which is exercised in the place of or by the right of another, to whom it belongs properly.[53]

Occasionally some theologians[54] have denied, or placed in doubt, that the Supreme Pontiff has vicarious power to dissolve ratified marriages that have not been consummated. But now no one promotes this doubt seriously, for the existence of this faculty is a doctrine that is *at least theologically certain.*[55]

252. Proof. The Supreme Pontiff cannot err in things that pertain to faith and morals. But to dissolve marriages pertains to morals, and the Pontiffs often have done this for ratified and non-consummated marriages. Therefore the Supreme Pontiff has the faculty of dissolving such marriages.

The major is certain. Nor can it be objected with D. Soto[56] that the Supreme Pontiff can err in a particular case. For the question now is not about a particular case, but about many cases dissolved by different Pontiffs. Therefore, actually, if the Supreme Pontiff did not have the power of dispensing, since the Pontiffs have exercised it so many times, they would have erred gravely in a matter pertaining to morals.

The minor in the first part, that is, to dispense or to dissolve marriages pertains to morals—this is very clear. Regarding the second part, or that the Supreme Pontiffs have done this often, in fact, that they have expressly declared this, is proved as follows:

Alexander III in a case proposed to him about a ratified and non-consummated marriage, but in which the woman left her husband and married someone else, he responded: "it is not permitted for the woman to marry another. And if she has married another, even if sexual union has taken place, she must be separated from him and be compelled by ecclesiastical rigor to return to the first, even if others may think otherwise and even if at times some of Our predecessors might have judged otherwise" (D 756). Here the Supreme Pontiff does not wish, for a reason that he does not reveal, to dissolve the first marriage; but he admits that others think otherwise, that is, that there are canonists and theologians who think that it is at least opportune to grant such a dissolution. In fact, he admits that some of his predecessors did

53. See SThS vol.1, treatise on the Church, n. 252.
54. Tapper, *De matrimonio* a.18; D. Soto, *In 4* d.27 q.1 a.4, and a few others whom Perrone cites, *De matrimonio* 3,504.
55. See Ballerini, *Opus Morale* 6 n.763; Ferreres-Mondría, *Compendium Theologiae Moralis* 2 n.1041.
56. *In 4* d.27 q.1 a.4.

that. Therefore, he admits de facto the possibility of a dissolution, although he, for a just reason, refuses to dissolve the first marriage.[57]

Alexander III himself said that a ratified and non-consummated marriage is to be dissolved in a case where the woman wants to enter the religious life; but the reason he gives is general for every marriage that is ratified and not consummated: "For truly, what the Lord says in the Gospel, namely, that it is not permitted for a man to renounce his wife, except in the case of fornication (Matt. 5:32; 19:9) should be understood, according to the interpretation of the holy Word, in reference to those whose marriage is consummated by carnal union, without which marriage cannot be consummated" (D 754).

Many other cases are mentioned of Martin V and Eugene IV[58]; already in the 16th century this dispensation was quite frequent, so that afterwards Benedict XIV could write; "No further question can be raised about the power of the Supreme Pontiff in what pertains to the dispensation of a ratified and non-consummated marriage, since today the affirmative opinion is common among theologians and canonists and it is accepted in practice, as is well known."[59]

Benedict XIV himself declared: "The indissolubility of a ratified [and not consummated] marriage also ceases in all other cases outside of religious profession in which the Supreme Pontiff, for just and serious reasons, thinks that there is cause for this dissolution; Tradition recommends this, observance of the law requires this, and finally the continuous praxis of the Apostolic See convinces us; for these reasons the interpretation of the divine law can be very well arrived at."[60]

To these the words quoted above of Pius XI and Pius XII can be added; they distinguished between a ratified and consummated marriage, which they said is absolutely indissoluble, and a ratified and non-consummated marriage, which they said could at times be dissolved.

Pius IX: "It is not hidden from any of you that, according to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, the ratified marriage of the faithful, before it has been consummated, can be dissolved by the solemn profession in an approved religious congregation by either one of the spouses, or by a canonical dispensation, which can be granted by the Roman Pontiff and which is given only very rarely for the gravest reasons."[61]

Pius XI: "And if this stability seems to be open to exception, however rare the exception may be, as in the case of certain natural marriages between

57. Gasparri, *De matrimonio* 1,627, but he explains this text of Alexander III differently.
58. See the historical note on this matter in Lercher-Umberg, n.791,2.
59. *Quaestiones canonicae* q.479; also q.108 and 546.
60. *Quaestiones canonicae* q.546 n.36.
61. *Epist. "Verbis exprimere,"* August 15, 1859: Acta Pii IX 3,99.

unbelievers, or amongst Christians in the case of those marriages which though valid have not been consummated, that exception does not depend on the will of men nor on that of any merely human power, but on divine law, of which the only guardian and interpreter is the Church of Christ."[62]

And Pius XII, when he said that a ratified and consummated marriage is absolutely indissoluble, added this: "Other marriages, although they are intrinsically indissoluble, nevertheless do not have absolute extrinsic indissolubility, but given certain necessary presuppositions (this has to do, as is well known, with cases that are very rare, if they are compared with others) they can be dissolved, not only in virtue of the Pauline privilege, but also by the Roman Pontiff in virtue of the ministerial power that he has."[63]

As the Supreme Pontiff rightly points out, these cases are very rare, but only relatively if they are compared with others; but they are sufficiently frequent so that it is possible to say that the Supreme Pontiff frequently uses this ministerial or vicarious power.[64]

253. The *reason* for the dissolubility is the *divine will,* which determined the matter in this way and granted to the Church the ministerial power of dissolving certain marriages. But the Supreme Pontiffs and the theologians investigate certain, as it were, proportions by which they show why God has dispensed from indissolubility in these marriages. The main ones are these: a) the lack of *consummation* (Alexander III); b) that they do not have full or perfect sacramental meaning; c) because non-consummated marriage does not so perfectly fulfill the words of Christ with which he proclaimed the indissolubility of marriage: *and they are no longer two but one flesh.* (See what was said above in n. 249 about the reason for the indissolubility of a ratified and consummated marriage).

Assertion 4. The Supreme Pontiff, by his vicarious power, can dissolve the marriage of those couples in which only one of the spouses was baptized, even if the marriage was consummated.

254. This has to do with a case in which a believer is married to an unbeliever; and therefore it is not a marriage that is *simply* ratified (although probably it is a sacrament on the part of the believer, see. n. 209). But the consummation of the marriage can be had either before or after the conversion of one of the spouses. Hence the cases that arise are the following:

62. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930_ 552.
63. Allocution to the prelates of the Roman Rota, October 3, 1941: AAS 33 (1941) 424-425.
64. Feije presents a long review of these pontifical decisions, *De impedimentis et dispensatione matrimoniali,* Appendix.

1. The believer consummates the marriage with the unbeliever before the conversion of the faithful spouse, but not after it.

2. They consummated the marriage also after the conversion of the faithful party.

3. When the marriage is consummated or not consummated after the conversion, the unbelieving spouse departs, for example, because of being made a captive, but he does not want to dissolve the bond; but during the absence of the spouse, the believing spouse contracts a second marriage, and in the meantime the unbelieving spouse is converted.

Therefore in these three cases, and in all such cases that can be proposed, we are saying that the Supreme Pontiff can dissolve the matrimonial bond. The assertion that we are now defending must not be confused with the Pauline privilege; for in this case special conditions are required, as we shall see, which could not be present in the case of our assertion.

255. It is certain that this power exists from the praxis of the Church, which has often dissolved such marriages. Gregory XIII in a case in which a converted woman who did not know where her first husband was or whether he was still alive, dissolved the marriage and added: "that if afterwards it became known that unbelieving spouses, for a solid reason, were not able to declare their will, and that they were converted to the faith during the time of the second contracted marriage, nevertheless such second marriages must never be rescinded, but we decree that they are ratified and stable and that the offspring from them will be considered as legitimate."[65] Likewise, Paul III, Pius V, Urban VIII.[66]

And the *reason* is because in these marriages, whether the consummation was done before or after the conversion, the marriage was never ratified. But since the captured spouse became a convert, he was not able to consummate the marriage after his conversion, and therefore the marriage, which was ratified (perhaps unknown to the other spouse since she did not know about the conversion of her captured spouse) was not, as such, consummated; and therefore there never was a ratified and consummated marriage, which would be absolutely indissoluble.

To this another case can be added in which Pius XI gave a dispensation: a non-Catholic man (a Protestant), who was not baptized, contracted marriage with a baptized non-Catholic woman; after obtaining a civil divorce, the non-baptized woman converted to the Catholic faith. Then the Supreme

65. Letter "*Populis et Nationibus,*" July 25, 1585.

66. Paul III, *Altitudo,* June 1, 1537; St. Pius V, *Romani Pontifices,* August 2, 1571; Urban VIII, October 20, 1624; September 17, 1627; see CIC 1125 [1917], and documents IV to VI in the Appendix.

Pontiff "in favor of the faith" dissolved the first marriage. For, this case can be reduced to the former ones; for, there never was a marriage at the same time ratified and consummated. But what the Supreme Pontiff granted "in favor of the faith" does not mean that Pius XI applied the Pauline Privilege (which supposes that it was contracted by two unbelievers), but it means that he was moved to grant the dispensation "in favor of the faith."[67]

B) On the Dissolution of the Bond by Some Fact

256. When we say that some *fact* dissolves the marriage, we are not excluding ecclesiastical authority, as if independently of it a fact could dissolve the marriage. But we mean only that *per se* an ecclesiastical declaration is not required in every individual case, but it is sufficient that the fact be made known in order to dissolve the marriage.

We said *per se*, because it can happen that ecclesiastical authority establishes certain requirements (for example, an appeal to the court, a declaration, etc.), which must be fulfilled under the penalty of nullity. But in this case a condition is not established that dissolves the bond. Thus in the use of the Pauline privilege, it is necessary that the baptized party make an appeal to the court, but the first marriage is not dissolved except by the following marriage.

The facts that can dissolve a marriage are: a solemn profession (in a religious order) and the Pauline privilege.

Assertion 5. A ratified and non-consummated marriage is dissolved by the solemn profession of one spouse.

257. Not just any religious profession, but it must be a solemn profession. Therefore the profession of simple vows does not dissolve the marriage, even though they are taken in a religious congregation or are perpetual vows, nor does the reception of Holy Orders dissolve it. *Religious profession* is the pronouncing of public vows in a religious congregation approved by the Church. The vows are said to be solemn, if they are recognized by the Church as such (CIC, 1308,2 [1917]).

That a solemn profession dissolves a ratified and non-consummated marriage is a doctrine solemnly defined by the Council of Trent, and therefore it is *defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 1806).

67. Recently given dispensations are the following: Pius XI: Decree of the Holy Office, April 2, 1924, July 10, 1924, November 5, 1924, May 25, 1933, October 1936. Pius XII, July 18, 1947, August 10, 1947, January 30, 1950. See E. Escanciano, S.J., ¿Sacramento e indissoluble?: EstEcl 30 (1956) 228, note 2, 231-236; I. Prieto, *Una nueva aplicatión del "privilegio de la fe"*: RevDerCan 10 (1955) 233-236.

258. Proof from the Magisterium of the Church. Alexander III: "Since the aforementioned woman, although betrothed to the aforementioned man, still—as is asserted, has not known him (carnally) up till now, We direct Your Fraternity, by apostolic letter, that if the aforementioned man has not known this woman carnally, and the same woman (as you have made known to Us) wishes to enter religious life: after having received from her a sufficient guarantee that, in the space of two months, she either enters religious life or returns to her husband... if she does enter religious life, each may restore to the other what they are known to have received; and the man himself, if she assumes the religious habit, has permission to contract another marriage" (D 754).

And he established as a general law for the Archbishop of Salerno: "After legitimate consent at the present time is given, it is permitted for the one, even with the other resisting, to choose the monastery, as indeed some saints were called from marriage, as long as carnal union has not taken place between them; and if the one remaining, after being advised, does not wish to maintain continence, he is permitted to enter into a second marriage; for since they did not become one flesh, the one can pass over fully to God and the other remain in the world" (D 755).

Innocent III supposes that it has to do with a doctrine received and adopted in practice: "On this matter, We do not wish to deviate suddenly from the footsteps or Our predecessors, who, having been consulted, responded that before marriage is consummated by sexual union, it is permitted for one of the parties, even without consulting the other, to enter into religious life, so that the remaining party could subsequently marry another legitimately: We advise you to observe the same thing" (D 786).

Pius IX: "It is not hidden from any of you that, according to the doctrine of the Catholic Church, the ratified marriage of the faithful, before it has been consummated, can be dissolved by the solemn profession in an approved religious congregation."[68]

CIC 1119 [1917]: "A non-consummated marriage, between the baptized or between a baptized party and someone who is not baptized, is dissolved by the law itself by a solemn religious profession...."

259. From the holy Fathers special testimonies about this are not available, but stories are narrated, some very ancient, about Saints for whom the dissolution of marriage took place because of a solemn profession (the only kind existing at that time for a religious life).

In *The Acts of Paul and Thecla* (2nd century), Thecla is mentioned as

68. *Epist. "Verbis exprimere,"* August 15, 1859; Acta Pii IX 3,99.

a woman who, in love with chastity, left her spouse in order to follow Paul in a life of chastity. It is true that in this apocryphal story nothing is said about the dissolution of the bond so that the abandoned husband could marry again, but since she is praised by the holy Fathers,[69] and nothing is said about the consent of the husband, it is necessary to suppose that he remained free to contract a second marriage, especially since he was a gentile.

St. Augustine narrates similar facts,[70] and they are recounted frequently in the lives of the ancient Saints. This is convincing evidence that the opinion was common that marriage could be abandoned because of the desire for a more perfect life. This certainly is to be noted, because in our case it is necessary in order to explain the development of doctrine: a) the Fathers always held for the indissolubility of marriage; b) they always forbade separation, even with regard to living together, unless it was for very grave reasons; c) since they lived in pagan culture, they strongly urged the words of Christ: *Everyone who divorces his wife, except for the cause of fornication, makes her an adulteress* (Matt. 5:32). From these points it is gathered that the holy Fathers understood that entrance into the way of perfection is a sufficient cause to divorce a spouse without making him an adulterer. This is even more apparent, if one considers the examples often given by the Fathers that the entrance into the monastic life happened because of a sudden impulse, without consultation with one's spouse.

260. By what right a ratified and non-consummated marriage is dissolved by a solemn religious profession is explained differently by the authors. Some[71] appeal to the *divine natural law,* inasmuch as it is always permitted to move from a less perfect state to a more perfect state; but since the marriage has not been consummated, there is between the spouses a spiritual bond that can be dissolved by the spiritual death of one of them, just as by physical death the carnal bond coming from intercourse is dissolved. Others[72] appeal to ecclesiastical law because, as they say, it is not certain from divine positive law, for such a bond, even after the consummation of the marriage is no obstacle to religious profession, as is certain in the case in which both spouses accept such a state. Finally others[73] deduce the indissolubility *from the divine positive law together with the ecclesi-*

69. St. Ambrose, *De Virgin.* 2,3,19: ML 16,211; St. Epiphanius, *Haeres.* 78,16: MG 42,726.
70. *Confessions* 8,6,15: ML 32,756.
71. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 61, a. 2; see q. 53, a. 2.
72. Suarez, *De religione* 1.9 c.33 n.20; Lessius, *De iure et iustitia* 1.2 c.41 dub.8.
73. Sánchez, *De matrimonio* 1.2 d.19 n.3; Perrone, etc. Palmieri thus in the first edition (1880), but later changed his opinion.

astical law: but the divine positive law has decreed the dissolution of the bond for the reason of embracing a more perfect state of life; ecclesiastical law has determined that not just any profession suffices, but only a solemn one.

Buy it seems that it can be stated more simply, namely, that the religious profession is dissolved because the Supreme Pontiff, using his ministerial power, decreed that in general the religious profession is a sufficient cause for the dissolution of the bond, and therefore, whenever such a cause is given, it will not be necessary to recur to the Holy See. In other cases, however, this recourse will be necessary.

Assertion 6. A legitimate and consummated marriage can be dissolved in favor of the faith by the Pauline privilege.

261. What is called the *Pauline privilege* is located in these words of St. Paul: *If any brother has a wife who is an unbeliever, and she consents to live with him, he should not divorce her. If any woman has a husband who is an unbeliever, and he consents to live with her, she should not divorce him... But if the unbelieving partner desires to separate, let it be so; in such a case the brother or sister is not bound. For God has called us to peace* (1 Cor. 7:12-15).[74]

This privilege in itself is the case already mentioned above concerning the dissolution of a marriage between a baptized person and someone not baptized. For, the concern here is with a marriage contacted in unbelief, that is, between two unbelievers, one of whom converts to the Christian faith (or at least to the Catholic faith). In such a marriage the Supreme Pontiff has the vicarious faculty in order to dispense, if there are grave reasons for it. In fact, if the cause is in favor of the faith (according to what we will say next), such a dispensation may take place without a necessary recourse to the Holy See, in virtue of the Pauline privilege. However, the Holy See requires as appeal to the court. Innocent III and the CIC have determined how the Pauline privilege is to be understood:

Innocent III, after he proposed a case to himself, gave this response: "We, therefore, responding to your inquiry, in conformity with the common advice of Our brothers, make a distinction... when there are two unbelievers and one converts to the Catholic faith, or when there are two believers and one lapses into heresy or falls into the error of the heathens. For if, indeed, one of the two unbelieving spouses converts to the Catholic faith, and the

74. Concerning the Pauline privilege, in addition to the commentaries on St. Paul and approved moral theologians, see also A. Bride, *Privilège Paulin:* DTC 13,400-416.

other does not wish to live together in any manner, or at least not without blaspheming the divine name or leading the other into mortal sin, the one who is abandoned, if wishing to, may enter into a second marriage, and in this case, We understand what was said by the Apostle... [1 Cor. 7:15]. And likewise, (We understand) the canon that says: 'The insult to the Creator dissolves the juridical bond of marriage for the one who is thus abandoned" (D 768). And again: "Moreover, he who according to his rite puts away a lawful wife... never while she lives, even after being converted to the faith of Christ, can he have another wife, unless after his conversion she refuses to live with him, or even though she does consent, it is nevertheless not without insulting the Creator or inducing (her husband) to mortal sin... But if her conversion follows his conversion to the faith before (for the above-mentioned reasons) he takes a legitimate wife, he would be compelled to receive her back again" (D 778).

CIC in cn. 1120 to 1127 decreed: 1) This privilege does not apply when the marriage was contacted with a dispensation of disparity of cult from the impediment; 2) before the baptized party enters into a new marriage, the non-baptized party must be interrogated whether he or she wishes to receive baptism, or at least wishes to cohabit peacefully with the baptized party without affront to the Creator; 3) it explains how the interrogations must be carried out; 4) if the non-baptized party responds negatively, the baptized party has the right to contract a new marriage, unless he or she after baptism gave just cause to the non-baptized party to separate; 5) if the non-baptized party wishes to cohabit peacefully, the baptized party does not lose the right to a new marriage, if by chance the non-baptized party later should change his will; 6) the marriage bond is not dissolved until the baptized party actually enters into a new valid marriage; 7) finally, in a doubtful matter the privilege of faith possesses the favor of the law.

262. From these laws the *limitation* and the *extension* of the Pauline privilege are apparent.[75] It deals with a marriage contracted between two unbelievers, not between a believer and an unbeliever; of these one converts to the faith and receives baptism. If the unbelieving party wishes to remain peacefully with the baptized party, and there is no danger of the faith or of blasphemy of the Creator, no permission is given to contract another marriage; if this danger of faith exists or such offense to the Creator, or the unbelieving party does not want to cohabitate, the option is given to the baptized party to enter another marriage. Moreover, the option for an-

75. For a longer explanation of the explanation and evolution of this privilege see A. Briade, *loc.cit.*, and Lercher-Umberg, n.784f.; Ferreres-Mondría, *Compendium Theologiae Moralis* 2 n.1042-1048.

other marriage is given to the baptized party, not to the non-baptized party; and therefore the first marriage is dissolved by the subsequent marriage of the baptized party. For this reason, if the baptized party departs but does not contract a new marriage, the marriage bond is not dissolved, and the non-baptized party cannot marry someone else. This is the way in which the Church explains the meaning of the words of St. Paul.

The *interrogations (or appellations)* must take place for the validity of the subsequent marriage, but the Apostolic See can dispense from this.

The Pauline privilege should not be confused with *the privilege of the faith,* mentioned in cn. 1127. The privilege of the faith is broader and includes the Pauline privilege, but it also includes the cases mentioned in cn. 1125, namely, concerning a non-baptized polygamous man, who converts, and it is conceded to him that in marriage he may keep the woman who is baptized with him, even though this woman is not the first of the wives he had.

263. Whether the Pauline privilege *applies also to the non-baptized party who is baptized in a heretical sect* is a matter of dispute, but the more probable opinion is that it also applies to heretics. And the reason is, because St. Paul is speaking about baptism, and it is baptism that gives one the right to this privilege. God without doubt has granted this privilege for Catholics, but since he has attached it to baptism, it applies also secondarily to heretics.

ARTICLE III

ON SACRAMENTAL GRACE

264. Like the other sacraments, matrimony confers *ex opere operato* sanctifying grace and the right to the special helps proper to this sacrament and that will be conferred when needed. Concerning sanctifying grace, the *Council of Trent* defined: "If anyone says that matrimony... does not confer grace, let him be anathema" (D 1801). And concerning actual graces the same Council said: "Christ himself, who instituted the holy sacraments and brought them to perfection, merited for us by his Passion the grace that perfects that natural love, confirms the indissoluble union, and sanctifies the spouses. St. Paul suggests this when he says, *Husbands, love your wives, as Christ loved the Church and gave himself up for her* [Eph. 5:25], adding immediately: *This is a great mystery, and I mean in reference to Christ and the Church* [v.32] (D 1799).

The *sanctifying grace,* which this sacrament confers, is a grace that is *per se second,* since matrimony is a sacrament of the living; but *per accidens,* like the other sacraments of the living, it can confer the *first* grace.[76]

The grace is conferred in the very moment in which the sacrament is confected, unless an obstacle prevents its infusion. However, it revives when the obstacle is removed. But the reason for the revival can be sought either in the bond, which endures as an effect of the sacrament and is generally called *the reality and the sacrament* (*res et sacramentum*),[77] or also and especially in the necessity of sacramental grace, which the spouses experience. Indeed, since the sacrament of matrimony cannot be repeated as long as the bond of marriage remains, it seems to be fitting to the divine goodness that the spouses not be deprived of the sacramental grace that is so necessary in order to carry out the various matrimonial duties, and because of which matrimony was raised to the dignity of a sacrament.

265. The *special helps* are those that God is ready to grant to spouses in order to carry out their marital duties better and more perfectly, when necessity requires it. Pius XI refers to this when he says: "When the faithful with sincere minds give such consent, they open up a treasure of sacramental grace for themselves, from which they draw supernatural strength for fulfilling their obligations and duties faithfully, nobly, and perseveringly even until death. This sacrament, in the case of those who, as they say, place no *obex* (obstacle) in its way, not only increases the permanent principle of supernatural life, namely sanctifying grace, but also bestows peculiar gifts, good dispositions of mind, and seeds of grace, by increasing and perfecting the natural powers, so that the spouses are able not only to understand by reason, but to know intimately, to hold firmly, to wish efficaciously, and to carry out, indeed, whatever pertains to the married state, both its ends and obligations; finally, it grants them the right to obtain the actual assistance of grace as often as they need it for fulfilling the duties of this state" (D 2237; eds. before 1963).

Leo XIII briefly touched on the same point: "[*Universal tradition teaches*] that Christ our Lord raised marriage to the dignity of a sacrament; that to husband and wife, guarded and strengthened by the heavenly grace that his merits gained for them, he gave power to attain holiness in the married state; and that, in a wondrous way, making marriage an example of the mystical union between himself and his Church, he not only perfected that love which

76. See among other authors, A. de Belleure, *La grâce sacramentelle* (Paris 1900) 383-393; E. Neveut, *La grâce sacramentelle:* DivTh(Pi) 38 (1935) 282f.

77. Billot, *De sacramentis Ecclesiae* 2,377.

is according to nature, but also made the naturally indivisible union of one man with one woman far more perfect through the bond of heavenly love" (D 3142).

Then he adds immediately how the spouses have a constant need for the assistance of grace and for what reasons: "For, *first,* there has been vouchsafed to the marriage union a higher and nobler purpose than was ever previously given to it. By the command of Christ, it looks not only to the propagation of the human race, but to the bringing forth of children for the Church... *Secondly,* the mutual duties of husband and wife have been defined, and their several rights accurately established. They are bound, namely, to have such feelings for one another as to cherish always very great mutual love, to be ever faithful to their marriage vow, and to give one another unfailing and unselfish help... As regards the children, they ought to submit to the parents and obey them, and give them honor for conscience' sake; while, on the other hand, parents are bound to give all care and watchful thought to the education of their offspring... From this we see clearly that the duties of husbands and wives are neither few nor light; although to married people who are good these burdens become not only bearable but agreeable, owing to the strength which they gain through the sacrament."[78]

266. Therefore, sacramental graces look at the ends of marriage, both the primary and the secondary. They concern the *primary* end, since the parents need grace to overcome the difficulties that arise from the generation of children. What must be considered more and more in our days is the accursed evil of *the limitation of children,* which has become not only a family disease but also a national one.[79] Pius XI did not hesitate to say this with the gravest solemnity: "Since, therefore, openly departing from the uninterrupted Christian tradition some recently have judged it possible solemnly to declare another doctrine regarding this question, the Catholic Church, to whom God has entrusted the defense of the integrity and purity of morals, standing erect in the midst of the moral ruin which surrounds her, in order that she may preserve the chastity of the nuptial union from being defiled by this foul stain, raises her voice in token of her divine ambassadorship and through Our mouth proclaims anew: any use whatsoever of matrimony exercised in such a way that the act is deliberately frustrated in its natural power to generate life is an offense against the law of God and of nature, and those who indulge in such are branded with the guilt of a grave sin."[80]

78. Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": ASS 12 (1879-1880) 389-390.
79. Le Bras, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2310f.; F.A. Vuillermet, *Le suicide d'une race* (Paris 1911[4]).
80. Whether the words of the Supreme Pontiff contain a definition *ex cathedra* or not is a matter of dispute. See F. Hürth, *Litterae Encyclicae... De matrimonio christiano:* Textus et Documenta, ser. Theol. 25 p.83-84.

Then he recounts the causes or reasons used by men in order to avoid the procreation of offspring: the danger to the mother, lack of finances, and other such things. But all of these are easily overcome with the assistance of divine grace; in fact, perhaps the family will encounter greater calamities because of the offense against God, because of the punishment of sins, than can possibly come from the procreation of offspring.[81]

267. *Looking at the secondary ends of marriage,* sacramental sanctifying grace brings with itself *the habit of theological charity,* and in marriage for a special reason it is conferred with attention paid to the relations between the spouses. Those contracting marriage are themselves the ministers of the sacrament, and as such the male spouse "confers on his wife, as the recipient, the theological charity whose material object in a special way is her husband, and vice versa."[82]

The exact same thing must be said about the graces and special helps that are conferred in the course of time, and which are concerned in a special way with tempering concupiscence, promoting mutual assistance, and so forth. Accordingly, St. Bonaventure says: "For by reason of the giving of consent to a mutual way of life, and by reason of the blessing of the Church, whose task it is to properly dispense the sacraments, the soul is raised above the inordinate corruption of concupiscence, and grace is given for exclusive intercourse and useful intercourse, and for inseparable intercourse... Grace is given to the man that he desire to be united to his wife only... Grace is given that he not know his wife except for the sake of a child... Grace is given that he may always wish to be with that one."[83]

268. But it is also necessary that *the spouses cooperate with grace:* "Nevertheless," says Pius XI, "since it is a law of divine Providence in the supernatural order that men do not reap the full fruit of the Sacraments which they receive after acquiring the use of reason unless they cooperate with grace, the grace of matrimony will remain for the most part an unused talent hidden in the field unless the parties exercise these supernatural powers and cultivate and develop the seeds of grace they have received. If, however, doing all that lies with their power, they cooperate diligently, they will be able with ease to bear the burdens of their state and to fulfill their duties. By such a sacrament they will be strengthened, sanctified and in a manner consecrated. For, as St. Augustine teaches, just as by Baptism and

81. Encyclical "*Casti Connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 560-565.
82. Lercher-Umberg, n.762; B. Rive-J. Umberg, *Die Ehe in dogmatischer, moralischer und sozialer Besichtung* (1921) 111.
83. *In 4* d.26 a.2 q.2.

Holy Orders a man is set aside and assisted either for the duties of Christian life or for the priestly office and is never deprived of their sacramental aid, almost in the same way (although not by a sacramental character), the faithful once joined by marriage ties can never be deprived of the help and the binding force of the sacrament. Indeed, as the holy Doctor adds, even those who commit adultery carry with them that sacred yoke, although in this case not as a title to the glory of grace but for the ignominy of their guilty action, as the soul by apostasy, withdrawing as it were from marriage with Christ, even though it may have lost its faith, does not lose the sacrament of Faith which it received at the laver of regeneration.

"These parties, be it noted, not fettered but adorned by the golden bond of the sacrament, not hampered but assisted, should strive with all their might to the end that their wedlock, not only through the power and symbolism of the sacrament, but also through their spirit and manner of life, may be and remain always the living image of the most fruitful union of Christ with the Church, which is so venerated as the sacred token of most perfect love."[84]

Rightly therefore St. Augustine exhorts spouses that " they join good morals to this great plan so that they may obtain certain security from this powerful reward; they know surely that for themselves and all the faithful, the chosen members of Christ, with many coming from the East and from the West, although distant from one another they manifest this great thing in common, that with Abraham and Isaac and Jacob they may rest in the kingdom of God; it was not because of this world, but for the sake of Christ that they were spouses, for the sake of Christ that they were fathers."[85]

269. Scholium. *On the quasi-character of the sacrament of matrimony.* From all the effects of the sacrament of matrimony, especially from the indissoluble bond, the authors[86] sometimes draw the conclusion that matrimony impresses a quasi-character: "We can conclude from the constant teaching of important theologians that something like the reality and the sacrament (*res et sacramentum*) *is impressed*, as they say, on the soul whereby the spouses are bound to inseparability, whereby grace is constantly required, whereby the union of Christ with the Church is signified. However, this efficacious symbol is not a character in the same sense as it is in the other sacraments that impress a character, especially because this adornment, as they say, does not seem to be perpetually indelible."[87]

They find the basis for this teaching in the statements of some theologians and doctors, like St. Robert Bellarmine. "For, matrimony is like the Eucharist, which, not only

84. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 555-556.
85. *De bono coniugali* 26,35: CSEL 41,230.
86. Schwetz, *Theologia dogmatica* 3,166f.; Oswald, *Die dogmatische Lehre von den heiligen Sakramenten* p.104; O. Laaque, Über den sakramentalen charakter (Munich 1903) 156-201; J.L. Farine, *Der sakramenale charakter* p.77-95: Strasburg theol. Studien 6,5.
87. V. Heylen, *Tractatus de Matrimonio* (1945) 381.

while it is happening but also while it continues to exist, is a sacrament: for while the spouses are living, their society is always a sacrament of Christ and of the Church."[88] These words are also quoted by Pius XI.[89]

But St. Antoninus is more clear: "However, matrimony impresses, since it is a sacrament of the New Law, an adornment that is called a bond or a tying together. This is not just a logical relation, but something absolute that disposes one for grace. This adornment is not impressed in a marriage contracted before baptism, just as the character disposing for grace that is conferred in confirmation is not impressed before baptism. For this reason also, non-baptized spouses, when they have received baptism, if the man and the woman renew the contract between them or continue in their prior consent, then that adornment is impressed and their marriage is now a sacrament of the New Law."[90]

270. But actually what continues in the marriage cannot be called a character, nor is it correct to call it a quasi-character, although if the question is well explained it would be more a matter of words rather than one of the reality.[91]

For, in what pertains to St. Robert Bellarmine, we already said above (n. 203) that he does not manifest the common opinion in this matter, except inasmuch as he understands the marital state as actually existing, which however is not properly said to be a permanent sacrament. And the Supreme Pontiff does not quote the words of the holy doctor so as to affirm them, but only in order to show the dignity and sanctity of matrimony.[92]

St. Antoninus admits that the bond is something absolute which is the foundation of the disposition for grace, but he also openly teaches that it is not a character. For, by comparing that permanent reality, which he says is a *bond* or an adornment, with the character of confirmation, he clearly distinguishes between the adornment in matrimony and in confirmation. In matrimony, the *adornment* (which is the same thing as the bond or the tying together) disposes for grace, just as the *character* disposes for grace in the sacrament of confirmation. Therefore, in matrimony the adornment takes the place of the character.

St. Thomas explains the matter better: "Just as the water of baptism or the form of the words does not produce grace immediately, but the character, so the exterior acts and the words expressing consent directly produce a certain bond, which is the sacrament of matrimony [in actuality]; and this bond produces grace in a dispositive way in virtue of the divine institution."[93]

Some modern authors,[94] who do not want to accept the procreation of offspring as the primary end of matrimony, insist very much on this quasi-character of matrimony, but it is much better, in our view, to avoid using this terminology.

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88. *De matrimonio* 1.6.
89. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 583.
90. *Summa sacrae theologiae* 3 tit.1 c.2.
91. See the refutation of H. Moureau, *Caractère:* DTC 2,1708; G. Le Bras, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2304.
92. Furthermore, the Supreme Pontiff a little later says that matrimony does not impress a character.
93. *In 4* d.26 q.2 a.3 ad 2.
94. H. Doms, *Vom Sinn und Zweck der Ehe* (French trans. P.117-153); N. Rochell, *Die Ehe als geweihtes Leben* 137-145; A.W. Hoegen, *Over de sin van het huwelijk* (Utrecht 1938) 117-135; H. Joanntoberns, *De praecipuis effectibus gratiae matrimonii paenes theologos s.XVI* (Verona 1940).

CHAPTER IV

On power over Christian Matrimony

ARTICLE I

ON THE AUTHORITY OF THE CHURCH

271. From what has been said above, namely, that Christ raised the marital contract to the dignity of a sacrament, it is easily deduced that the Church has a right over those things that pertain to Christian marriage. Nevertheless, because of the difficulties of adversaries and the errors still practically thriving, with special reason in two theses we will now explain in detail the Catholic doctrine on the Church's power over Christian marriage.

The Church can exercise her authority over marriages in diverse ways, namely: to attach certain conditions under pain of nullity to the contract of matrimony, or by requiring conditions that affect the contracting persons, or in other ways. All of these elements are signified under the general name of *impediments.*

Thesis 5. By divine right the authority of establishing diriment impediments over Christian matrimony belongs to the Church.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 50; St. Bellarmine, c.21,114; Palmieri, 245-292; Pesch, 441-444; Huarte, 251-258; Puig de la B., n.1109-1118; Otten, 456-464; Lercher-Umberg, n.792-801; Godefroy, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2109-2123; Le Bras, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2261-2283.

272. Connection. Matrimony, as a contract, seems to pertain not only to the Church, but also to the civil authority. But since Christ elevated every marital contract among the baptized to the dignity of a sacrament, it can be asked whether the authority that the Church exercises over matrimony is derived from the civil authority or from the divine law. In this thesis we defend the second position.

273. Definition of terms. Under the name of *Church* in this thesis we understand not the society of the faithful, inasmuch as they constitute one moral person, but the ecclesiastical authority in contrast to the civil power or authority. Ecclesiastical power or authority (we take these two words as meaning the same thing) in order to establish diriment impediments, to grant dispensations, etc., pertains to the competence of the Roman Pontiff

or an Ecumenical Council.

"It belongs to the supreme ecclesiastical authority alone to declare authentically when the divine law impedes or nullifies a marriage" (CIC 1038,1 [1917]). However, bishops in their own diocese can forbid marriages in certain cases, but only for a time, for a just cause and as long as it continues (CIC 1039,1).

By divine right, that is, this power of the Church by its own authority, or by authority accepted from Christ, not one borrowed from the civil authority. But we do not wish to say that all impediments are of divine right, but that the Church, even it establishing impediments of ecclesiastical right, uses the authority given to her directly from God.

However, we do concede that the civil authority can and should intercede in many areas, such as rights of inheritance, and so forth. But this authority does not extend to the matrimonial contract itself. In the scholium we will treat the matter of a civil marriage between baptized persons.

Impediments can be defined as: laws incapacitating men to contract marriage[1]; or a circumstance affecting a person, as it is the object of a contract, because of which a valid or licit celebration is forbidden.[2]

This is the definition of an impediment taken *in the strict sense,* as opposed to obstacles which affect not the person but either the form of matrimony or the consent. Thus the Church can add certain conditions, v.gr., the presence of witnesses, which affects the validity itself of the contract.

These impediments, inasmuch as they concern the nullity of marriage or hinder only its licitness, are called *diriment* or *impeding*.[3] In this thesis we are considering only diriment impediments, because, granted that the Church has this power, it is evident that she also has the power to establish impeding impediments.

The Church, by establishing a diriment impediment, does not change the nature of the contract (which would be to change the essence of the sacrament), for example, by declaring that such a marital contract is not a sacrament; but by using her authority, she decrees that a *person,* who wants to enter into a definite matrimonial contract, is not capable of entering into such a contract.

Some impediments come from the *law of nature,* others from *the divine positive law,* and still others from *merely ecclesiastical law;* accordingly,

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1. Coronata, *Institutiones Iuris Canonici, De Sacramentis tractatus canonicus* (1947) 3 n.115.
2. V. Heylen, *Tractatus de Matrimonio* (1945) 453; in almost the same way, Coronata, *loc. cit.;* Wernz-Vidal, *Ius matrimoniale* 146; De Smet, *Tractatus theologico-canonicus de sponsalibus et matrimonio* (1927) 463.
3. M.A. de Dominis, *De Republica Ecclesiastica;* J. Launoy, *De Regia in matrimonium potestas (1674).* The first division appears in Magister Rolandus (1159-1181); the first catalogue of impediments is given by Gregory II (a.721)'

the various impediments have different names.

It is not our task here to determine what impediments have been actually established in the Church, nor to determine others that pertain to Moral Theology and Canon Law.[4]

When we say *Christian matrimony* we understand it also as a marriage between a baptized man and a non-baptized woman, or vice versa.

274. Adversaries. 1. Luther and Calvin admitted only the impediments that are found in Holy Scripture, that is, of consanguinity and of affinity in the first grade.[5] They did not concede any authority of the Church over matrimony. Almost all the *Protestants* have followed this teaching, including the modern *Rationalists, Socialists* and *Communists.*

2. In the 17th century Marcus Antonius de Dominis (Archbishop of Spalathra, later an apostate; he was excommunicated and joined the Anglicans) and John Launoy became the leaders of the *Regalists.*[6] These authors, distinguishing between the contract and the sacrament, transferred all authority over matrimony to the civil power; but the Church could determine only those things that pertain to the sacrament. The civil authority can dissolve marriages or determine the conditions of the contract.[7]

3. *Legal experts* and *Josephinists* (named in this way after the Emperor Joseph II) followed this doctrine in the German Empire; *Jansenists* in France along with the Synod of Pistoia; and a few *Spanish jurists* (19th century), like Franciscus A P. Vigil.[8]

275. Documents of the Church. *The Councils of Illiberitanum, Neo-Caesarea* and *Arles* (4th century) published disciplinary canons which suppose even then that there are laws in the Church concerning marriages, and by which Christians marriages must be regulated.[9]

Likewise, afterwards the *Councils of Chalcedon, Milevitanum II, Agathense*[10] and many others determine ecclesiastical discipline and recognize

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4. Therefore we are prescinding from this question completely. For more on this, consult the approved moralists and canonists.
5. Luther in his *Sermone de aetate matrimonii* (1519) still held the correct doctrine, but in *De Captiv. Babylon.* He opposed the Catholic position. Calvin, *Institutio Religionis christianae:* Corpus Reformatorum 32,1121f.
6. M.A. de Dominis, *De Republica Ecclesiastica;* J. Launoy, *De Regia in matrimonium potestas.*
7. On this question see L. Godefroy, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2108f.
8. F. Vigil, *Defensa de la autoridad de los Gobiernos y de los Obispos contra las pretensiones de la Curia Romana.* This work was condemned by Pius IX (June 10, 1851); from it was taken proposition 68 condemned in the *Syllabus.*
9. *Conc. Illiberitanum* cn.13.15.16.17: Msi 2,8; see Hefele-Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles* 1,226f.; *Conc. Neocaesar.*, cn.2: Msi 2,543; Arelatense IV (a.314): Msi 2,472.
10. *Conc. Chalcedonense* cn.16: Msi 7,365; *Conc. Milevitanum II* cn.17: Msi 4,331 (it is given also for cn.8 of *Conc. Carthagense XI*).

some impediments, which render marriages invalid (see the argument from Tradition).

St. Callistus III permitted, contrary to Roman law, the clandestine marriages of Patricians with women of a lower social class, and he accepted also as valid and legitimate (or also ratified) marriages between a free man and a female slave or vice versa.[11] St. Leo the Great acted in a similar way.[12]

The Council of Trent: "If anyone says that the Church did not have the power to establish diriment impediments for marriage or that she has erred in establishing them, let him be anathema" (D 1804). Cn. 12: "If anyone says that matrimonial cases do not belong to ecclesiastical judges, let him be anathema" (D 1812).[13]

Pius VI: "It is a dogma of faith that matrimony, which before the coming of Christ was only an indissoluble contract, after the advent of Christ became one of the seven sacraments of the law of the Gospel... Hence it comes about that only to the Church, to whom the total protection of the sacraments has been entrusted, that all right and authority pertains of assigning the form to this contract, which has been raised to the sublime dignity of a sacrament, and to pass judgment on the validity or the invalidity of marriages."[14] The Supreme Pontiff confirmed this by the authority of canon 12 of the Council of Trent.[15] See also D (28th edition) 1500a.

The same Pontiff said against the Synod of Pistoia: "The doctrine of the synod asserting that 'to the supreme civil power alone originally belongs the right to apply to the contract of marriage impediments... as if the Church could not and cannot always in Christian marriages establish by her own rights impediments that not only hinder marriage, but also render it null as regards the bond and also dispense from those impediments by which Christians are held bound even in the countries of infidels; this is destructive of canons 3, 4, 9 and 12 of session 24 of the Council of Trent and heretical" (D 2659).

Pius IX in the *Syllabus* condemned the following errors: "The Church does not have the power to establish impediments nullifying marriage; but that power belongs to civil authority by which the existing impediments should be removed." "The Church in later centuries began to introduce diriment impediments, not by her own right, but by making use of a right that she had borrowed from the civil power." "The canons of the Council of Trent that impose the censure of anathema on those who have the bold-

11. In Hippolytus, *Philosophumena* 9,12: MG 16,3386.
12. *Epist.* 167,4: ML 54,1204f.
13. Questions concerning cn.12 will be answered in the following thesis, n 286.
14. *Letter* on September 16,1788 to the Bishop of Motulensis.
15. See on this letter, Palmieri, *op.cit.*, 284-285.

ness to deny to the Church the power of introducing diriment impediments are either not dogmatic or should be understood in terms of this borrowed power" (D 2968-2970).[16]

Leo XIII: "Christ, therefore, having renewed marriage to such and so great excellence, commended and entrusted all the discipline bearing upon these matters of his Church. The Church, always and everywhere, has so used her power with reference to the marriages of Christians that men have seen clearly how it belongs to her as of native right; not being made hers by any human grant, but given divinely to her by the will of her Founder."[17] And a little after that: "As, then, marriage is holy by its own power, in its own nature, and of itself, it ought not to be regulated and administered by the will of civil rulers, but by the divine authority of the Church, which alone in sacred matters professes the office of teaching... Lastly should be borne in mind the great weight and crucial test of history, by which it is plainly proved that the legislative and judicial authority of which We are speaking has been freely and constantly used by the Church, even in times when some foolishly suppose the head of the State either to have consented to it or connived at it... The Council of Trent, therefore, had the clearest right to define that it is in the Church's power 'to establish diriment impediments of matrimony,' and that 'matrimonial causes pertain to ecclesiastical judges.'"[18]

Pius XI repeats the same doctrine right from the first words of his great Encyclical on marriage: "How great is the dignity of chaste wedlock, Venerable Brethren, may be judged best from this that Christ our Lord... raised it [matrimony] to the rank of a truly and great sacrament of the New Law... and accordingly entrusted all its discipline and care to his spouse the Church."[19]

276. Theological note. The thesis, according as it affirms that the Church has power over marriages and can establish diriment impediments, is *defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 1804). Inasmuch as the documents of the Church say that this power over the marriages of Christians pertains to the Church *alone* (but which will be established more explicitly in the next thesis) is *at least theologically certain.* That the Church has this right given to her by God is also *a matter of divine and Catholic faith* based on the condemnation of the Synod of Pistoia (D 2659).

16. He published many other things in his letter to the king of Sardinia, etc. See Gasparri, *Fontes Iuris Canonici.*
17. Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": ASS 12 (1879-1880) 390.
18. Ibidem, 392-393. See also the texts cited in the following thesis.
19. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 539.

277. Proof. *Note.* We will give only one proof for the whole thesis, since the arguments, as will be seen, show at the same time that the Church has power over the marriages of Christians, that she can attach impediments to them, and that she has this by divine right.

Proof from Holy Scripture. 1. Christ had legislative power over marriages, and he had this in what pertains to the properties of marriage. But Christ entrusted this power to the Church. Therefore the Church by divine right has legislative power over marriages, at least those of Christians. Therefore she can also establish diriment impediments.

Proof of the major: Christ, in promulgating the New Law by divine authority, withdrew the permission of polygamy, and he restored the indissolubility of marriage. For, expressly opposing the New Law to the Old Law he says: *It was also said: whoever divorces his wife, let him give her a certificate of divorce. But I say to you that every one who divorces his wife, except on the ground of fornication, makes her an adulteress; and whoever marries a divorced woman commits adultery* (Matt. 5:31-32). Indeed, in the whole Sermon on the Mount Christ appears as the divine legate who, with divine authority, changes the Old Law and proclaims his own New Law. Therefore Christ really has legislative power over marriages.[20]

Proof of the minor. Christ handed over this power to the Church, because in that sermon he proposed moral norms and principles by which the society founded by him must be ruled; and he handed over to his Apostles and their successors, under the authority of Peter and his successors, the government of his society with the fullness of power. Therefore he gave them authority over marriages.[21] That is even more evident from the fact that marriage is something essential in order for the society to endure, and the good health of the society depends very much on the goodness or sanctity of the family.

Proof of the second consequent, namely, the Church can establish impediments for marriages. For, if the legislative power, which the Church has, must be exercised, it is necessary that it be able to extended to those things which, while preserving the essence of marriage, are necessary for the good government of the society founded by Christ and entrusted to the Church. But it is such that it can establish diriment impediments for marriage. Therefore.

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20. SThS, Vol. 1, treatise On Christ the Divine Legate.
21. See the words of Pius VI quoted above, n. 275.

278. 2. From St. Paul. The Corinthians wrote to the Apostle and proposed some questions about the indissolubility of marriage. St. Paul answered them authoritatively, with an authority received from God and concerning very grave matters, as in the so-called Pauline privilege. But this way of proceeding shows that St. Paul supposes that the Church has the power of legislating in the area of marriage, and it has this from divine authority. Therefore.

Proof of the minor. For, St. Paul says with express words, for example (1 Cor. 7): *I say this by way of concession, not of command* (v.6)... *To the unmarried and the widows I say* (v.8)... *I give charge, not I but the Lord* (v.10)... *To the rest I say, not the Lord* (v.12)... *I have no command of the Lord, but I give my opinion* (v.25)... *and I would spare you that* (v.28)... *I say this for your own benefit* (v.32)..., and so forth. Here it is clear how he proceeds with authority, by repeating the pronoun "I," and how accurately he distinguishes between counsel, Church law and a divine precept. Surely if St. Paul says that he had received power to dissolve the marriage of unbelievers in favor of the faith, it cannot be denied that he has what is less than that, namely, the power of establishing some impediments. Indeed, if this authority belongs to the Apostle, it is not something belonging to him personally except inasmuch as he is an Apostle of the Church to which such power has been given.[22]

279. Proof from tradition. The tradition bears witness to the authority of the Church over marriages not so much directly in writings as in facts with regard to impediments and in general with regard to the right which she has received from God.

Tertullian mentions the praxis among Christians of avoiding marriages with gentiles,[23] and from his way of speaking he seems to allude to an existing law[24]; he also has knowledge about the impediment of clandestine marriages,[25] which among the Romans was not recognized.

The Council of Illiberitanum and some other particular councils (as we noted above) suppose special legislation on this matter. *The Council of Neocaesarea.* also recognizes an impediment from of illicit intercourse[26]; St. Gregory I approves of this impediment (R 2301).

Among the Fathers, St. Basil explains the praxis of the Oriental Church, which he says is a law that must be observed: "Therefore, the first thing

22. On how this authority was given to the Apostles, see the treatise on the Church.
23. *De corona militis* 13: ML 2,116.
24. *Ad uxorem* 2,3: ML 1,1405-1406.
25. *De pudicitia* 4: ML 2,987; CSEL 20,225.
26. Cn.2: Msi 2,543.

that is most important in this matter is that we can give the example of our custom—*one that has the power of a law*—because these rules have been handed down to us by holy men."[27] Among these *laws* he mentions the impediments of illicit intercourse,[28] of affinity[29] and of a vow.[30]

In a similar way St. Gregory the Great says: "A certain earthly law in the Roman republic allows the son and daughter, whether of a brother and sister, or of two brothers, or of two sisters, to marry together. But we have learned by experience that progeny cannot ensue from such marriages... Whence it follows that only the third or fourth generations of believers may be lawfully joined together. For the second, which we have spoken of, ought by all means to abstain from each other" (R 2299).

In the same way St. Siricius proposes the praxis of the Church,[31] the Author of the book *De lapsu virginis consecratae,*[32] St. Innocent I,[33] etc. Hence the following conclusions[34] can be established:

1. In the first centuries the Church did not wish, as it were in the abstract, to claim for herself authority over marriages, but rather exercised her authority in solving individual cases; from this gradually the law was developed.

2. Then she exercised her truly legislative authority; for, she did not restrict her power to the cases contained in the Gospel, but extended it to all the cases that the appropriateness of time and situation demanded.

3. The Church does not borrow this power from the civil authorities, but exercises it on its own right; for often (as is certain from the quoted words of St. Gregory and will become even more clear in the next thesis) the Church acted contrary to the civil law.

4. Finally, the authority of the Church is complete and comprehends everything connected with marriage, so that she can define and attach conditions, impediments, and everything else that is not opposed to the divine law.

280. Theological reasoning. The nature of the matrimonial contract requires that the entity having power over marriage is the one that can establish impeding impediments. But power over Christian marriages belongs

27. *Epist.* 160,2: MG 32,624.
28. *Epist.* 188,4: MG 32,647; *Epist.* 160,2: MG 32,624.
29. *Epist.* 199,23: MG 32,723.
30. *Epist.* 188,6: MG 32,674.
31. *Epist.* 1,5 and 8: ML 13,1136f.
32. ML 16,373 among the works of St. Ambrose.
33. *Epist ad Victor.* N.15: ML 20,478-479.
34. See L. Godefroy, *loc.cit.*, col.2113; E. Valton, *Empechements de Mariage:* DTC 4,1445f. Palmieri has a summary of the history of this question, *De matrimonio* c.4, especially th. 29-30.

to the Church. Therefore the Church has the power to establish impeding impediments.

The major. Marriage is a contract from which many good things or evils can devolve on a society. For this reason, if there were no power strong enough to determine which persons are capable of making such an important contract, and which ones are not capable of it, very serious evils would result, for example, clandestine marriages, the killing of a spouse in order to be able to contract a second marriage, and so forth.

The minor. Marriage between Christians is a sacrament. But what pertains to the sacraments has been entrusted to the Church. Therefore the Church has power over marriages, and she has it from her divine institution.

281. Objections. 1. The holy Fathers, when they speak about diriment impediments, appeal to Leviticus (18:6-18). But in this way they indicate that impediments are not established by the Church, but that the Church only applies those that have been already established by God. Therefore the Church per se does not have the power of imposing diriment impediments.

I distinguish the major. The Fathers always appeal to Leviticus, *denied;* they do so sometimes, *I subdistinguish:* and they appeal to the law that the Church follows, *conceded;* they mean that the Church depends on the O.T. with regard to impediments, *denied. I also distinguish the minor, and deny the consequent and the consequence..*

2. Marriage is a civil contract. But the Church does not have any right over civil contracts. Therefore she does not have the right to impose diriment impediments on marriages.

I distinguish the major. Marriage is a merely civil contract, *denied;* it is a contract whose effects pertain in part to the civil law, *conceded. I also distinguish the minor, and deny the consequent and the consequence.* It would be possible also simply to deny the major, inasmuch as the matrimonial contract itself has been raised to the dignity of a sacrament, and therefore now it is not a civil contract, but a religious contract.

ARTICLE II

ON CIVIL AUTHORITY

Thesis 6. The power of establishing diriment impediments for Christian marriages does not belong in any way to the civil authority.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 17, a. 2; St. Bellarmine, c.21,115; c.32,142; Palmieri, 282-311; Sasse, 452-465; Huarte, 258-266; Puig de la B., n.1119-1130; Otten, 464-467; Valton, *Empechements de Mariage:* DTC 4,2450f.; Le Bras, *Mariage:* DTC 9,2261f., 2275f.; Lercher-Umberg, n.799.

282. Connection. Having proved in the previous thesis that the Church by divine right has the authority to impose diriment impediments on Christian marriage, it now appears that no right remains for the civil authority; but because some theologians assert the contrary, and there could perhaps, speaking theoretically, still remain some right pertaining to the civil authority, therefore we propose the present thesis, which several authors consider as a corollary of the previous thesis or as a part of it.

283. Definition of terms. It belongs to the civil authority to establish laws and norms by which the civil effects of Christian marriage are regulated, such as the goods of the spouses, the rights of inheritance, and similar things.[1]

Indeed, concerning non-Christian marriages, many theologians concede that the civil authority has the power to establish diriment impediments[2] and that the Church can also recognize those impediments. This civil authority may establish them either for the marriages of non-Christians, or also (by an abuse of its own authority) for Christian marriages.[3]

But in the thesis we deny that the civil authority can, in its own right, impose such impediments on Christian marriages. Indeed, the ones that it does establish and that the Church sanctions, have their validity not from the civil authority, but from the ecclesiastical law. Therefore any diriment impediments imposed by the civil law, if the Church does not recognize them, are null and void and do not obligate Christians in any

1. These authors can be consulted: W. Onclin, *De regimine matrimonii fidelem inter et infidelem:* EphThLov 10 (1933) 47-62; V. Coucke, *De potestate principis civilis in matrimonium baptizatorum:* CollBrug 32 (1932) 40-44.
2. Gasparri says: "this is a controversy that especially in our times is freely debated among Catholics" (*De matrimonio* 1,169, note 1).
3. Cn.1080 [1917]: "those who by the civil law are held incapable of entering into a marriage with each other, because of a legal relationship coming from an adoption, by virtue of canon law cannot validly contract a marriage with each other."

way. Therefore we vindicate, in favor of the Church, the exclusive right over Christian marriages.

284. Adversaries. The *Regalists* are opposed to the thesis; we spoke about them in n. 193. They make a distinction between the sacrament and the contract, and they refer the latter to the civil authority and the former to the Church.

A few important theologians,[4] but among the very early ones, agree with them theoretically. However, they granted either by concession, or from praxis, or for some other causes that such power now belongs only to the ecclesiastical authority.

285. Doctrine of the Church. All the documents cited in the previous thesis also support this thesis, since they say that the right over marriage belongs to the Church in such a way that de facto (at least implicitly, as will be clear from the argument) they exclude the competence of the civil authority. Among many other documents, the following can be added to the above:

Benedict XIV: "This law [of Theodosius], since it was established by a lay prince, must have no power over marriages"; therefore it is necessary to ask "whether this impediment was enacted by canon law, or was accepted by the common custom of the Catholic Church."[5]

Pius VI: "To the Church alone... pertains every right and power of assigning its form to this contract, which has been raised to the sublime dignity of a sacrament, and therefore to pass judgment on the validity or the invalidity of marriages."[6]

Pius VIII: "Let it [the sanctity of marriage, etc.] be in turn unique; it is governed not by human law alone, but it must be regulated by the divine law and it must be accounted not among earthly but among holy things, and therefore the Christian people is to be taught clearly that it is wholly subject to the Church."[7] And afterwards he said that marriage had been raised to the dignity of a sacrament, and he then concluded: "Therefore, teach the people what is sanctioned and what is condemned by the rules of the Church and the decrees of the Councils. Also explain those things which pertain to the essence of the sacrament. Then they will be able to

4. P. Soto, *De matrimonio* lect.4; Catharinus, *Opusculum de clandestino coniug.*; Sánchez, *De matrimonio* l.7 d.3 n.2f. Gaspar de Casale, the Bishop of Leriensis, has something similar, in the discussions about the canons on matrimony during the Congregation on July 27, 1563: CTr 9,661.
5. *Letter* of February 9, 1749 to Card. Eborac. Nn.7-8: Opera omnia (Prati 1845) 17,11.
6. *Letter* of September 16, 1788 to the Bishop of Motulensis.
7. *Letter* of September 16, 1788 to the Bishop of Maguntinum.

accomplish those things and will not dare to attempt what the Church detests."[8]

Gregory XVI: "Being mindful that it [marriage] is foreshadowed by holy things and therefore is subject to the Church, let them have before their eyes the laws of the same Church instituted for it, and let them obey them in a holy and precise manner, for on their observance the force, strength and just association of that same marriage depend completely,"[9]

Pius IX: "Therefore there is no other means of conciliation except that Caesar cares for the things of Caesar, and he leaves to the Church the things that pertain to her. The civil authority legislates only what concerns the civil effects that flow from marriage; but it leaves to the Church to ordain its functioning among Christians."[10]

Leo XIII: With serious words and examples he propounds the doctrine in the Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": "Christ, therefore, having renewed marriage to such and so great excellence, commended and entrusted all the discipline bearing upon these matters of his Church. The Church, always and everywhere, has so used her power with reference to the marriages of Christians that men have seen clearly how it belongs to her as of native right; not being made hers by any human grant, but given divinely to her by the will of her Founder... Lastly should be borne in mind the great weight and crucial test of history, by which it is plainly proved that the legislative and judicial authority of which We are speaking has been freely and constantly used by the Church, even in times when some foolishly suppose the head of the State either to have consented to it or connived at it. It would, for instance, be incredible and altogether absurd to assume that Christ our Lord condemned the long-standing practice of polygamy and divorce by authority delegated to him by the procurator of the province, or the principal ruler of the Jews. And it would be equally extravagant to think that, when the Apostle Paul taught that divorces and incestuous marriages were not lawful, it was because Tiberius, Caligula, and Nero agreed with him or secretly commanded him to so teach...." The Supreme Pontiff recalls some facts and decrees of the Church against the Roman legislation on marriage, and shows that those princes, Honorius, the younger Theodosius and Justinian did not arrogate to themselves power over marriages, but acknowledged that it pertains to the Church. And finally he concludes: "Neither, therefore, by reasoning can it be shown, nor by any testimony of history be proved, that power

8. Encyclical "*Traditi humilitati,*" May 24, 1829; Bullarium Romanum (Prati, 1856) 9,26-27.
9. *Apostolic Letter "In hac Suprema,"* August 15,1832: Opera 1,171.
10. *Letter* of September 15, 1852 to the king of Sardinia.

over the marriages of Christians has ever lawfully been handed over to the rulers of the State. If, in this matter, the right of anyone else has ever been violated, no one can truly say that it has been violated by the Church."[11] Further on Leo XIII points out that matrimonial cases "have a relationship and necessary connection with the human affairs that follow from marriage but also concern civil life: those in charge of the State rightly make decisions about these matters." For this reason he desires that there be friendship and harmony between the Church and the State.[12]

Pius XI, as in other things pertaining to marriage, so also in this matter, following the example of Leo XIII, declared: "And if this stability seems open to exception, however rare the exception may be, as in the case of certain natural marriages between unbelievers or among Christians in the case of those marriages that though valid have not been consummated, that exception does not depend on the will of men or on that of any merely human power, but on divine law, of which the only guardian and interpreter is the Church of Christ" (D 3712).

Pius XII, among many other things, has this to say: "the Church and her authority is the guardian and defender of the conditions on which the validity of a marriage depends and also of the impediments and effects of the marital bond (while recognizing the competence of the State concerning the merely civil effects); she has received this authority from her divine Founder and it is present in the highest degree in the person of the Roman Pontiff."[13]

286. *The Council of Trent defined:* Cn. 12: "If anyone says that matrimonial cases do not belong to ecclesiastical judges, let him be anathema" (D 1812). This canon appears, as it now stands, already in the first redaction made on July 20, 1563,[14] although it is listed as number 11; but it does not correspond to any of the condemned propositions which were to be discussed by the theologians. Some Fathers said about this canon: "It is not pleasing, lest we seem to be seeking popularity. And he said that these marriage cases in the early Church did not pertain to the ecclesiastics, lest we irritate the secular powers"[15]; "Take it away"[16]; "it should not

11. Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": ASS 12 (1879-1880) 390-394.
12. Ibid., 398-400.
13. Allocution to the Auditors of the Roman Rota, October 1, 1942: AAS 34 (1941) 338. For the Latin text see S. Tromp: Textus et Documenta, series theol.27, p. 22.
14. CTr 9,639-640.
15. The bishop of *Aurelianensis:* CTr 9,666; those who agreed with him were the bishops of *Ceromanensis* (663); *Venetensis, Suessionensis* (664); *Nemausensis* (667).
16. The bishop of *Aquinatensis:* CTr 9.660); likewise *Vaurensis* (664); *Hyprensis* (669); *Aurelianensis* (714).

be placed under anathema."[17] Some other formulas were also proposed: "it should say matrimonial cases concerning the sacrament;"[18] "If anyone should dare to bring matrimonial cases before a secular tribunal, let him be anathema;"[19] or in this other way: "If anyone says that ecclesiastical laws, by which it is said that matrimonial cases pertain to the Church, are tyrannical, let him be anathema. The same bishop proposed: If anyone says that secular laws concerning marriage are to be preferred to ecclesiastical laws, let him be anathema."[20]

Some Fathers thought that the canon was too broad, because "it is not true that every matrimonial case pertains to the Church, and in the decree it is said that every marriage takes place in the presence of the Church."[21]

On the other hand, others wanted more rigidity and clarity: "It is pleasing as it stands; and it proves from many Councils that matrimonial cases pertain to the ecclesiastical forum. And it is not surprising that Justinian decreed something about marriage, because Justinian with great facility established laws and then with great ease abolished them."[22] "Let it say [that matrimonial cases] in no way pertain [to secular tribunals]."[23] "The canon is pleasing because matrimonial cases pertain to the Church."[24]

Although there were different opinions about this canon, nevertheless it always remained unchanged up to the definitive redaction of all the canons, and so it was approved in the 24th session of the Council.[25]

But the *Regalists* said that this canon is not dogmatic but disciplinary, and that it does not include all matrimonial cases, but only some of them. But in opposition to them Pius VI declared: "It is not unknown to Us that there are some who, attributing too much to the authority of the secular princes and captiously interpreting the words of this canon, have undertaken to defend this: That, since the Tridentine Fathers did not make use of the expression "to ecclesiastical judges *alone*" or "all matrimonial

17. The bishop of *Illerdensis*: CTr 9,666; those agreeing with him were *Eleusensis* (667); *Nemausensis* (667); *Aliphanus, Rossensis, Rapotensis* (676); *Ursellensis* (667); *Yprensis* (669); *Assapensis*, who gave this reason: "because even the seculars have the power to be ministers of the sacrament of matrimony" (716); *Bobbiensis* (734); *Guadiscensis* (792); *Rossamensis* (899) with another five (903-906).
18. *Larinensis:* CTr 9,662; J. Laynez (740).
19. The Patriarch of Jerusalem: CTr 9,666.
20. The bishop of *Civitatensis:* CTr 9,668; the archbishop of *Hyruntinus* proposed this other formula: "If anyone says that the Church erred, when she said that matrimonial cases pertain to the ecclesiastical forum, let him be anathema" (668).
21. The bishop of *Oppidensis:* CTr 9,673.
22. The bishop of *Corosopitanus:* CTr 9,662-663.
23. The bishop of *Columbiensis:* CTr 9,673. The bishop of *Andegavensis* wanted it to say: "that matrimonial cases pertain to the bishops alone" (703).
24. The bishop of *Liciensis:* CTr 9,673.
25. Although the changes mentioned above were proposed, even after the third revision of the canons the Fathers raised hardly any opposition to this canon; CTr 9,743.

cases," they have left to lay judges the power of at least investigating matrimonial cases that are of pure fact. But we know that this captious reasoning and this false kind of quibbling are also devoid of all foundation. For the words of the canon are so general that they embrace and comprise all cases. Moreover, the spirit or purpose of the law extends so widely that it leaves no place for exception or limitation" (D 2598).

And the same Supreme Pontiff condemned the propositions of the Synod of Pistoia, which were directed against this Tridentine canon (D 2659). Pius IX declared in the *Syllabus* that the Tridentine canons that deal with the establishing of diriment impediments are dogmatic (D 2970); these are at least canons 3, 4, 9, 12, which Pius VI refers to in the condemnation of the Synod of Pistoia. Likewise Leo XIII, without any restrictions, understands the meaning of the Tridentine canon 12: "The Council of Trent, therefore, had the clearest right to define that it is in the Church's power to establish diriment impediments of matrimony, and that matrimonial cases pertain to ecclesiastical judges."[26] He says that precisely when he wants to show that civil authority has no power over the marriages of Christians.

287. The same *Council of Trent* in the chapter *Tametsi* on clandestine marriages says that they "are true and valid marriages as long as the Church has not made them null" (D 1813). There it is sufficiently understood (and it is certain from the very long debate that took place at Trent) that authority over marriages pertains to the Church alone, and they were also admitted by the secular authority.

Therefore, from the Council of Trent and from the documents of the Supreme Pontiffs it is clear that the Church alone has authority over the marriages of Christians. Trent's canon 12 is truly dogmatic, although some Fathers desired that the doctrine stated there be transferred to the chapters on the Reformation.[27]

Theological note. The thesis is *theologically certain.*

288. It is proved by theological reasoning. 1. Every marriage of Christians is a sacrament. But the sacraments pertain only to the power of the Church. Therefore only the Church has the power over the sacraments, but the civil authority does not have this power.

2. The Church has power over marriages (this is certain from the pre-

26. Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": ASS 12 (1879-1880) 393.

27. On the dogmatic value of the canons on marriage, see Palmieri, *op.cit.*, note 1.

vious thesis). But this requires that the civil authority does not have the same power. Therefore the civil authority does not have power over the marriages of Christians.

The minor. Since often there may be opposition between the Church and the State, there would also be opposition concerning matrimonial laws; from this there would result serious abuses and danger for souls. For, v.gr., the State could permit mixed marriages with serious injury to the Catholic party. Indeed it is incongruous to suppose that God, in a matter so essential to society as marriage, would will that there be perpetual conflict between the Church and the State arising from the opposition of the use of legitimate power.

3. *The praxis of the Church* proves the same thing. For if the civil power were able to introduce diriment impediments, the Church could not declare marriages to be valid that were forbidden by the State. But the Church has done this often. Therefore with regard to Christian marriages the civil authority has no power.

The major. For the Church cannot act against a right granted by God. But if this civil law were subordinate to the Church, then it would be useless and in praxis null; and no civil authority claims this for itself.

The minor. In the previous thesis we offered many examples, and Leo XIII also mentions several in his Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*" which we quoted above.

289. Proof from tradition. The argument given in the previous thesis holds true also for this thesis, because the texts and the facts show that only the Church has authority over the marriages of Christians.

St. Jerome says expressly: "The laws of Caesar are one thing, those of Christ another; Papinianus commands one thing, but our Paul something else."[28]

St. John Chrysostom, contrasting the laws of the Church with the civil laws concerning divorce, says: "Therefore, what is the law that Paul gives us? *The woman,* he says, *is bound by the law.* It is necessary, therefore, that she be not separated... And do not quote to me laws established by non-Christians, commanding that a certificate of divorce be given, and to break up the marriage. For, on the last day God will not judge you according to those laws, but according to the laws that he has established" (R 1212).

St. Ambrose speaks about the same law of divorce: "Therefore you send away your wife, as done rightly and without any crime; and you

28. *Epist.* 77,3: ML 22,691.

think you can do it because the human law does not forbid it; but the divine law forbids it. You who obey men should fear God. Listen to the law of the Lord to whom even those who make the laws are obedient..." (R 1308).

Thus also St. Augustine and St. Gregory the Great (R 1867, 2299).

290. Objections. 1. St. Thomas says: "Now marriage as fulfilling an office of nature is established by the natural law; as a sacrament, by the divine law; as fulfilling an office of society, by the civil law. Consequently, a person may be rendered an unlawful subject of marriage by any of the aforesaid laws."[29] Therefore according to St. Thomas the civil authority can impose diriment impediments on marriages.

The holy Doctor is speaking either in general about non-Christian marriages or about the impediments that are introduced by the civil authority and approved by ecclesiastical authority. This is evident because St. Thomas himself writes: "Matrimony is not only a sacrament but also fulfills an office; wherefore it is more subject to the control of the Church's ministers than baptism which is a sacrament only; because just as human contracts and offices are controlled by human laws, so are spiritual contracts and offices controlled by the law of the Church." [30] And also: "The prohibition of a human law would not suffice to make an impediment to marriage, unless the authority of the Church intervenes by issuing the same prohibition."[31]

2. The civil authority is competent to introduce impediments that nullify a civil contract. But marriage is a civil contract. Therefore.

I distinguish the major. The civil authority can impose impediments that nullify contracts which fall under its power, *conceded;* also over those that do not fall under its power, such as the marital contract between Christians, *denied. I also distinguish the minor in the same way.*

3. Everything that pertains to the end of civil society is subject to the civil authority. But marriage pertains to the end of civil society. Therefore.

I distinguish the major. If they pertain only to the end of civil society and are not subject to another higher society, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.* De facto the marriages of Christians pertain not only to the end of civil society, but also to the supernatural order, because they are a sacrament. Therefore they are not subject to the civil power. Moreover, although they did not pertain to the supernatural end, if above the civil power there is another power (like ecclesiastical power) which already watches over something that pertains to the end of civil society, then the civil power does not necessarily have to watch over it and to have competence in that area. For, the civil society is an imperfect society, which therefore must always defer to a perfect society, such as the Church is. Therefore everything that pertains to the end of civil society is not simply under the control of that same civil authority primarily and per se.

29. *In 4* d.34 q.unic. a.1 ad 4; *Suppl.* q.10 a.unic. ad 4.
30. *In 4* d.40 q.unic. a.4 ad 2; *Suppl.* q.54 a.4 ad 2.
31. *In 4* d.42 q.2 a.2 ad 4; *Suppl.* q.57 a.2 ad 4.

291. Scholium 1. *On power over mixed marriages.* Marriage between a baptized party and an unbeliever pertains to the Church, because the faithful party is subject to the Church, and a valid marriage cannot be contracted which is not sanctioned by the Church,

And although the non-baptized party per se is not subject to the Church, nevertheless since the authority of the Church is more excellent than the authority of the State, the non-baptized party must cede to the authority of the Church.

292. Scholium 2. *On the power over the marriages of unbelievers.* This question is disputed. For the opinion affirming that the marriages of unbelievers are subject to the civil power, these arguments are usually put forward[32];

1. The marriage of unbelievers is not a sacrament, but a civil contract. Therefore it is subject to the civil power, like other contracts.

2. The Church does not have a direct right over unbelievers. Therefore the civil authority must have this right; otherwise God would have provided poorly for society.

3. There would be many disadvantages if the civil power could not introduce diriment impediments, for it is a matter that pertains to the end of society.

4. There are some decisions of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith in which this right is asserted in favor of the civil power.[33]

Against these arguments there is the following response:

To 1: The marriage of unbelievers is a civil contract inasmuch as it is opposed to the sacrament, *conceded;* inasmuch as it is opposed to a religious contract, *denied.* By the law of nature marriage, as such, is something religious, and therefore subject to religious authority.[34] Indeed, after the coming of Christ there is no other legitimate religious authority except the Catholic Church.

To 2: The Church does not have a direct right, *I bypass the antecedent;* no right, *denied.* All men are subject to Christ, and by the natural law they should be subjected to that religious authority. Indeed, on earth Christ exercises his power through the Church and after his coming he recognizes no other religious authority except his own Church.

To 3: Just because disadvantages arise it does not follow that it is necessary that the civil authority have power over the marriages of unbelievers, because God provides for that sufficiently by conferring power on the Church.

4. The response of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith is a practical solution, not a dogmatic one. Moreover, there is no certainty about the promulgation

32. Among other theologians, in favor of this opinion are: Sánchez, *De matrimonio* 1.8 d.3 n.5; Schatzgrüber, *De Sponsalibus* n.367. See Gasparri, *De matrimonio* 1,169, note 1.

33. September 1821: "Although among unbelievers there is true marriage, still it can only be referred to the office of nature and the community, and therefore clearly it is to be moderated by the natural and civil law. From this it follows that the secular princes, whether believers or unbelievers, have full power over the marriages of their unbelieving subjects, so that namely, having established impediments which are not opposed to the natural or the divine law, the same not only regarding the civil effects but also regarding the marriage bond completely nullify them" (Collectanea, ed. 1893, n.1447, note 1). See Gasparri, who cites many responses (*De matrimonio* 1,240-255).

34. See what we said above in n. 174f.

of this response, since only the written text of the Consulter exists, and it was not included in the Acts.

293. For the opinion affirming that right over the marriages of unbelievers belongs to the authority of the Church, here are the main arguments[35]:

1. Marriage, as such, is not subject to the civil authority, but to the religious. But after the coming of Christ there is no other legitimate religious authority but the Church. Therefore, the marriages of unbelievers are subject to the Church alone.

2. The Church is the authentic interpreter of the natural law. Therefore unbelievers are also subject to the Church, especially in contracting marriages, since they pertain to the natural law.

3. According to Pius VI: "He is mistaken who thinks that marriage, when it is not a sacrament, is only a civil contract, and therefore can be dissolved by the civil authority. The truth is otherwise, for first of all, marriage is not a merely civil contract but it is a natural contract that was instituted and made durable by divine right before any society existed; also it differs greatly from any other merely civil contract because in it sometimes for good reasons the consent can be supplied by the law; but in marriage the consent cannot be supplied by any human authority."[36] Therefore marriage is before society, and civil law has no power over it.

Here is the response to these arguments:

To 1: It is true that the Catholic Church is the only legitimate religious authority, but since it does not exercise its right except over her subjects, she cannot urge that right over unbelievers who, since they have not accepted baptism, have not been constituted as her subjects.

To 2: From the fact that the Church is the authentic interpreter of the natural law, it follows only that she has the right to watch over the civil authority, and in opposition to it to vindicate the natural law, when for example, the State establishes impediments or enacts marital laws contrary to the natural law itself.

To 3: This argument would also be valid against the marriages of the baptized, because society also came before the sacrament.

294. As is easily apparent, arguments for both sides can be made. The Pontifical Documents (see n. 174f.) seem rather to vindicate for themselves the right also over the marriages of unbelievers. The intrinsic arguments perhaps serve better for the contrary opinion. Therefore it is licit freely to have one's own opinion in this matter.[37]

The opinion that says whatever has to do with marriage per se, even that of unbelievers, pertains to the Church, seems to us to be more probable, although for just reasons the Church ordinarily does not insist on her right; nevertheless she does not renounce it.

Since the civil authority tends always to limit and take away the rights of the

35. Perrone seems to favor this opinion (*De matrimonio* 2,439); Otten, p. 467.
36. *Letter* to bishop Agriensem, July 11, 1789.
37. Pesch: "Moreover, as long as the Church has not defined anything, each one is free to follow his own opinion" (n.896). See Gasparri, *op.cit.*, 1,169, note 1.

Church, and already has entered too much into the domain of the Church, the rights of the Church must be vindicated—especially those that pertain to religious things. Therefore, since marriage is something religious, *unless it is positively certain* that the State has some right over it, in no way must this right be ceded to the State. But it is not evident that the State has this power, since it is denied by good teachers and for good reasons. Therefore it seems that this must not be conceded.[38]

295. Scholium 3. *On civil marriage.* What is celebrated before a civil authority is called a *civil marriage.* The various forms of it are: facultative, obligatory, subsidiary.[39]

It is called *facultative* when the civil laws leave it to the free will of the spouses that the matrimonial contract is made before the Church or before a civil judge.

It is *obligatory* if the spouses must get married before a civil tribunal, and no other marriage is recognized unless it takes place before that tribunal.

It is *subsidiary* if it is established for cases in which the Church does not wish to or is not able to permit a definite marriage.

Understood in this way, the matrimonial contract among Christians is null and void. The civil laws in these cases cannot bind anyone in conscience, since they are gravely illicit and opposed to the divine law. Therefore:

1. Obligatory civil marriage, if it is thought to be used for a true marriage, is invalid, and the civil authority does not have the right to impose it.

2. Facultative civil marriage cannot be contracted by Christians; but it will be valid for unbelievers or the non-baptized.

3. Subsidiary marriage is also invalid for Catholics, for it is assumed that it is attempted when the Church does not wish or cannot permit it in the case of marriage.

But if the civil marriage consists only in a *civil record* so that the spouses can enjoy certain civil rights, and obtain the right of protection, not only will it not be illicit, but also it is obligatory to obey the civil authority.[40] But the following should be noted:

1. Assistance of this kind regarding the civil authority should be taken care of not before, but after the marriage has been contracted in the presence of the Church. But if the unjust and illegitimate laws of the State prescribe the contrary, then care must be taken that the true marriage be contracted as soon as possible, for even though the civil service has been recorded, and according to the laws of the State the spouses are considered to be truly married, nevertheless they have not yet been truly joined together, until after the matrimonial contract has been made in the presence of the Church.

2. By this civil record or ceremony marriage is not really contracted, but the civil authority only records that the marriage has taken place so that the spouses may enjoy the civil effects.

38. See Pesch, p. 450.

39. On the question of civil marriage, see moral theology, v.gr., Ferreres-Mondría, *Compendium Theologiae Moralis* 2 n.863.

40. Ferreres-Mondría, *op.cit.*, 2 n.865.

296. The Church has always condemned this abuse of civil authority. Leo XIII, in his letter "*Ingens nobis,*" when treating laws covering civil marriage in some Catholic countries (in particular, France and Italy), said: "The strongest principles of Christianity, and the elementary notions of natural law, would have to be rejected in order to be able to affirm that marriage is a creation of the State, and is nothing else but an ordinary contract and a social convention that is completely civil... Wherefore by Christian right, marriage, as to its substance and the sanctity of the bond, is a contract that is essentially sacred and religious; by its very nature its regulation pertains to the religious authority, not because of delegation from the State or by the assent of kings, but from the divine mandate of the Founder of Christianity and the Author of the Sacraments... Nevertheless, no matter what non-Catholic legal experts or States addicted to autocracy say, we hold as certain that the conscience of Catholics can never really accept a doctrine of this kind, or what is based on a dogmatic error, often condemned by the Church, since it reduces the sacrament to an external ceremony and to the condition of a mere rite... For this reason, in Christian society to secularize marriage is the same thing as to deprive it of its dignity, to inflict injury on the religious faith of subjects, to impose fatal deceptions on the conscience of spouses, because the legality alone of the civil act does not suffice nor can it suffice in order to validate those unions and to produce happy families."

"And the example of Catholic nations is not helpful; for, having been completely disturbed by dreadful conflicts and social uprisings, they were forced to undergo such a reformation, which the doctrines and the works of heterodox authors inspired, or the power of princes has introduced. But this reformation, in addition to the fact that it has generated abundant fruits of bitterness, has never enjoyed a peaceful possession, but it has been constantly rejected by the conscience of upright Catholics and also by the legitimate magisterium of the Church."[41]

Leo XIII in the Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*"[42] and Pius XI in the Encyclical "*Casti connubii*"[43] with the same gravity and integrity have opposed civil marriage.

APPENDIX

ON THE EXCELLENCE OF MATRIMONY AND THE SUPERIORITY OF VIRGINITY

297. From the whole treatise on the sacrament of matrimony its excellence and goodness are apparent, because it was instituted by God in order to procreate children of God in continuation of the divine work of creation. It was elevated by Christ to the dignity of a sacrament, blessed and consecrated by him with a miracle in Cana of Galilee, and chosen by

41. *Letter "Ingens Nobis,"* Junel, 1879: ASS 12 (1879-1880) 4-6.
42. Encyclical "*Arcanum divinae Sapientiae*": ASS 12 (1879-1880) 391.
43. Encyclical "*Casti connubii*": AAS 22 (1930) 569.

him as a symbol of his union with the Church. Therefore the *Gnostics, Montanists* and *Manicheans* were condemned because they said that marriage is evil and an invention of the devil.

But also the *Reformers* falsely so extolled marriage that they judged it to be the most perfect of all states in life. This doctrine was condemned by the Council of Trent: "If anyone says that the married state surpasses that of virginity or celibacy and that it is not better and happier to remain in virginity or celibacy than to be united in matrimony, let him be anathema" (D 1810). *Therefore it is a matter of faith that celibacy and virginity are a state that is better and happier than marriage.*

298. This teaching has its origin in the Gospel itself. For, Christ wanted to be conceived and born of a Virgin Mother, to be protected by a chaste Joseph as his father; he loved innocent young children very much and often recommended virginity. But while showing that the school of virginity is not open to all, he said: *Not all men can receive this precept, but only those to whom it has been given... For there are eunuchs who have made themselves eunuchs for the sake of the kingdom of heaven. He who is able to receive this, let him receive it* (Matt. 19:11f.).

It was surely difficult in the midst of such corruption of paganism to recommend the doctrine of virginity, especially where it was shameful not to get married. However, the Apostles, by their example and, given the occasion, by their words and writings, placed celibacy and virginity before marriage: *I want you to be free from anxiety. The unmarried man in anxious about the affairs of the Lord, how to please the Lord; but the married man is anxious about worldly affairs, how to please his wife, and his interests are divided. And the unmarried woman or girl is anxious about the affairs of the Lord, how to be holy in body and spirit; but the married woman is anxious about worldly affairs, how to please her husband. I say this for your own benefit, not to lay any restraint upon you, but to promote good order and to secure your undivided devotion to the Lord* (1 Cor. 7:32-35). *To the unmarried and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain single as I do. But if they cannot exercise self-control, they should marry... Now concerning the unmarried, I have no command of the Lord, but I give my opinion as one who by the Lord's mercy is trustworthy. I think that in view of the impending distress it is well for a person to remain as he is. Are you bound to a wife? Do not seek to be free. Are you free from a wife? Do not seek marriage* (7:8-9, 25-27). And a little but further on: *If any one thinks he is not behaving properly toward his betrothed, if his passions are strong, and it has to be, let him*

do as he wishes: let them marry—it is no sin. But whoever is firmly established in his heart, being under no necessity but having his desire under control, and has determined this in his heart, to keep her as his betrothed, he will do well. So that he who marries his betrothed does well; and he who refrains from marriage will do better. A wife is bound to her husband as long as he lives. If the husband dies, she is free to be married to whom she wishes, only in the Lord. But in my judgment she is happier if she remains as she is. And I think that I have the Spirit of God (36-40). St. Paul could hardly have place more emphasis on the state of virginity as more excellent than marriage; and at the same time he shows that the alacrity of mind to embrace this more perfect state is not present in all. Indirectly virginity is also recommended in the book of Revelation (14:1-5) where virgins receive great praise and are described as singing *a new song... and no one could learn that song except the hundred and forty-four thousand who had been redeemed from the earth. It is these who have not defiled themselves with women, for they are virgins.*

299. The patristic literature abounds in essays in praise of virginity and celibacy: Saints Cyprian, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Augustine. The theologians of all times have followed them, and they assign to the virgins in heaven a special reward or glory, which they call *the golden crown of virginity.* This doctrine has its foundation in the above-cited passage in the book of Revelation. After he has recounted the goods of marriage, St. Augustine concludes with these beautiful words: "However, all of these are functions of a human office; but virginal integrity and immunity from all copulation by holy continence is the portion of angels, and the preparation in corruptible flesh for perpetual incorruption. All fecundity of the flesh, all conjugal modesty is inferior to this; the one is not in power, the other is not in eternity: free choice does not have carnal fecundity, heaven does not have conjugal modesty. *Certainly they will have something great,* in addition to the others, in that common immortality, namely, those who now do not have something of the flesh in the flesh."[44]

44. *De Sancta Virginitate* c.12f.: ML 40,401. On ecclesiastical celibacy, see Vacandard, *Célibat Ecclesiastique:* DTC 2,2068-2088; Dublanchy, *Chastité:* DTC 2,2319-2331. A more general work, but one that has great merit and usefulness is: Vizmanos, *Las virgenes cristianas* (Madrid, B.A.C., 1949).

TREATISE VI

On the Last Things or on God the Consummator

By Joseph F. Sagüés, S.J.

INTRODUCTION

God, the creator and conserver and cooperator and ruler of all things, is also their consummator inasmuch as he brings them to their preordained ends. But the things that are connected with the end of visible creatures, whether as its previous condition or as a constitutive or as a privation, are said to *the last things*, i.e., the ultimate things—by a word taken from Sir. 7:38: *Remember the end of your life, and then you will never sin* (see Prov. 4:11).

Therefore in this treatise *On the Last Things,* which is also called *Eschatology*—a word derived from the Greek word ἔσχατον, that is, the last thing, the following truths are considered: a) *The end of man,* namely, death and the particular judgment, two realities that are common to all men; glory, hell, purgatory, and these three are different for each person depending on the difference of merits or demerits at the moment of death. b) *The end of the world*, by which are concluded both *the end of the human race,* that is, the resurrection of the dead, the general judgment, and *the end of the material world,* that is, its destruction by fire and its renewal.

This treatise is rightly placed at the end of the study of Theology, so that God, who is presented to us in the other treatises as one and triune, as creating all things and supernaturally elevating rational creatures, redeeming fallen man through Christ, endowing him with his grace through the sacraments, finally may be proposed as perfecting him for his merits by the eternal glory of soul and body. Thus our treatise is also called *On God the Consummator or Rewarder.*

However, the consideration of these last things is very effective. The result is that, when both the hope of future happiness and the fear of punishment are considered, sinners are moved to overcome their evil desires and are turned aside from evil ways, and the eagerness of the just is fostered to undertake works for God and to obey his commandments.

St. Thomas relates the last things to the *resurrection.* Hence he deals with them after the treatise on the sacraments: "after speaking of the sacraments whereby man is delivered from the death of sin, we must next speak

of the resurrection whereby man is delivered from the death of punishment" (*Suppl.* q. 69 at the beginning), so that first of all he considers things preceding the resurrection, then the things accompanying it, and finally the things that follow it. We will follow this order as much as possible so that, for the sake of clarity, we will treat first the end of man, then the end of the human race, and finally the end of the world.

The doctrine on the last things is drawn, as is clear, from Holy Scripture and the divine tradition, under the guidance of the magisterium of the Church. However, the points that are now expressed so exactly by theologians are made clear only gradually in Holy Scripture, so that what is proposed imperfectly in the Old Testament obtains its own real clarity in the New.

For, the general idea at the beginning (v.gr., in the Pentateuch) is that all the deceased are said to descend into "sheol," so that the just are joined with their people; then it becomes more clear, so that, since there are among men both the good and the evil, the judgment of God on them is expected: he will give perpetual life to the good and also resurrection for the body, but for the evil he will give eternal death; indeed, it is also held that the dead justified persons can be in a condition in which they may be freed from their sins by the prayers of the living. Finally, these points are explained more in detail in the N.T, where the things that pertain to eschatology are handed on with suitable clarity.[1]

But also, given the revelation of the New Testament, not all Catholics have understood immediately the correct doctrine in such a way concerning all of it, so that some, however only a few and those being of good faith, do not fall into any error. For, in the first Christian centuries some thought that only an imperfect retribution is given by the dead before the final judgment; others (Millenarists), thought that Christ, after the resurrec-

1. See A. Durand, S.J., *Les rétributions de la vie future dans l'Ancien Testament:* ET 83 (1900) 22-48; F. Schmid, *Der Unsterblichkeits-und Auferstehungsglaube in der Bibel* (Brixen 1902); A. Hulsboch, *De Eschatologie von het boek der Wijsheid:* StudCath 27 (1952) 113-123; G. Perrella, C.M., *La dottrina dell'oltretomba nel Vecchio Testamento:* DivThom(Pi) 12 (1953) 196-204; J. Royer, *Die Eschatologie des Buches Job unter Berüchsichtigung der vorexilischen Propheten* (Freiburg im Br. 1890); R. Tournay, *L'eschatologie individuelle dans les Psaumes:* RevBibl 56 (1949) 481-506; H. Büchers, *Die Unsterblichkeitslehre des Weisheitsbuches. Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung* (Münster im W. 1938); M.J. Lagrange, O.P., *Le livre de la Sagesse, sa doctrine des fins dernières:* RevBibl (1907) 85-104; R. Schütz, *Les idées eschatologique du livre de la Sagesse* (Paris 1935); A. Vacant, *Ame:* DB 1,561-572; L. Atzberger, *Die christliche Eschatologie in den Studien ihrer Offenbarung im Alten und Neuen Testament* (Freiburg im Br. 1890); F. Guntermann, *Die Eschatologie des heiligen Paulus* (Münster 1932); O. Schilling, *Der Jenseitsgedanke im Alten Testament. Seine Entwicklung und deren Triebkräfte* (Mainz 1951); E.F. Sutcliffe, S.J., *The Old Testament and the Future Life* (Burns Oates 1946); M. García Cordero, O.P., *La vida de ultratumba según la mentalidad de los antiguos Hebreos:* Salm 1 (1945) 343-364; Id., *Intuiciones de retribución en el más allá en la literatura sapiencial:* CiencTom 65 (1955) 3-24; A. Meunier, *L'eschatologie de L'Ancien Testament:* RevEcclLiège 4 (1954) 115-120, 180-186.

tion of the just, will reign among them on earth for a thousand years before their definitive beatitude; others (who can be called the Merciful Ones) that deceased Christian sinners, or some of them, will gain heaven after their punishments; others (Origenists) that all those condemned to hell, or at least all human beings there, after their conversion, will enter into glory. These views will be studied in the treatise at the proper place.

The Church, however, having always professed a healthy eschatological doctrine and given the proper occasion, has always taught the same thing. Here we will mention a few documents on this matter.

Symbols of faith. The ones that are in the tradition of the Church, or have been proposed by a Council or by a Pontiff (D 11, 30, 44-45, 188, 75-76, 125-126, 150, 681, 1862-1863), hand on in general these truths: the coming of Christ to judge the living and the dead; the resurrection of the dead; eternal life; perpetual punishment.

Pontiffs. Benedict XII (D 1000-1002) teaches the immediate retribution either of beatitude and indeed by the intuitive vision of God, but after their purification if this is needed, or of eternal punishment; the resurrection; the final judgment. Clement VI (D 1050f., 1072f.) teaches about hell; purgatory; beatitude through the face-to-face vision of God.

Councils. Lateran IV (D 801) teaches the coming of Christ to judge all men; the resurrection of the dead; eternal glory and punishment. Lyons I (D 838f,) teaches about purgatory and in general about suffrages; eternal hell; eternal glory. Lyons II (D 854-859) teaches the coming of Christ to judge; purgatory and in particular suffrages; hell; heaven; resurrection. Florence (D 1304-1306; see 1314-1316) speaks, almost like the preceding Council, about purgatory and suffrages, hell, heaven; but it mentions the vision of God and also as one and three.

They speak in particular: About the eternity of hell, with Vigilius approving (?) the condemnation of the restoration of all things proposed by the Origenists (D 411); Innocent III (D 780). About purgatory and suffrages, Trent (D 1820). On indulgences for the dead, Sixtus IV (D 1398); Pius VI (D 2640-2642). On Millenarism, Pius XII (AAS 36 [1944] 212.

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BOOK I

On the last things of man

CHAPTER I

On death

1. *Death* is the first of the last things of man, which is followed by the particular judgment and, depending on the sentence passed on him, beatitude or hell or purgatory. Hence first of all we have to treat death, and then we will speak about the other points. But the *fact* of death, or that death rules over men, does not need any proof. That it does not belong to the first institution of man is certain from the arguments whereby in the treatise *On God the Sanctifier* it is proved that all men in the sinless Adam were adorned with the gift of *immortality.* Likewise that death is per se a consequence of human nature is certain from the *preternaturality* of the gift, which was proved there.

But that death is now a *punishment of sin* is certain from the reasons whereby in the treatise *On Original Sin* it is denied that "Adam's sin harmed only him and not his descendants... or that, stained by the sin of disobedience, he transmitted to all mankind only death and the sufferings of the body but not sin as well" (D 1512), or that we were deprived of the gift of immortality because of original sin.

Likewise from that it is clear that *the debt of death* is as universal as original sin itself, as is deduced from the arguments by which in the same treatise the parallelism between that sin and death is shown. Furthermore, from the same reasons and from the testimony of the sources about the universal resurrection and from experience there is *at least moral certitude* about the fact of universal death.

But now, having passed over the points that are drawn from death *in its origin,* our task will be to treat *death taken eschatologically.*

ARTICLE I

ON DEATH AS THE END OF MAN'S PILGRIMAGE ON EARTH

Thesis 1. The time of man's probation, or of his pilgrimage on earth, is definitively finished by death in the state of fallen-and-restored nature.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 69, a. 7; 4 CG 92f.; Lercher IV,2[3] n.816-824; Beraza, n.949-1011; Lennerz, n.159-185; A. Michel, *Mort:* DTC 10,2489-2500; J. Pohle, *Tod:* KL 11,1809-1815.

2. Connection. A special question exists concerning death taken *eschatologically,* namely, what its relation is to obtaining or losing the last end of man. With this question, the following points are connected: is the *fact* of death so *universal* that no one (unless perhaps by a rare exception) is exempted from undergoing it, and is there *only one* death for those who de facto die? Therefore we will now treat the first point in this thesis; the other two will be handled later.

The question about *the nature of death* concerns the theologian as such, not as death is understood *physically*, provided it is admitted that the soul does not perish along with the body, but only as it is considered *morally*, that is, concerning its importance with reference to the eternal destiny of man. St. Thomas, like the older theologians, does not handle this thesis explicitly, but rather he suggests it indirectly by dealing with the location of souls after death or by asking about the immutability of the separated soul.

3. Definition of terms. *The time of probation* is the period of time during which a man can either freely tend towards God as his definitive last end by his own meritorious actions, or turn away from him definitively by his evil actions. It is called a *probation* because man is subjected as it were to a test, so that he can choose between the attainment of his last end and its rejection.

The pilgrimage on earth means the time during which a man is as it were *on the way* to the end; it is opposed to the *terminal state* or the definitive state of the end obtained by his merits or lost by his demerits.

Death is taken in the thesis for *the privation of life;* not of *eternal* life or for the state of damnation (Rev. 21:8), nor of *grace* or for the state of mortal sin (Jas. 1:15), but of *natural* death or for the separation of the soul from the body (1 Sam. 15:32; Eccles. 12:7). This *real death,* which is the *only* type considered here, is often preceded by an *apparent death,* a state

in which a man by external signs *seems* to be already dead.[1]

As long as a man does not die *really,* he is thought *to be able,* at least *remotely,* to elicit human acts and so to merit or to gain demerits. But de facto the moment in which he is definitively deprived completely of the use of reason can be assigned equivalently as the end of his life.

It is finished, that is, the definitive fate of man depends so uniquely on the merits or demerits of his mortal life that after death he is not able to merit or to demerit anything more concerning the *attainment* of his end or concerning its loss. Nothing is now being said about his further capacity of meriting after death an *increase* of his reward or his punishment (see n. 19).

Definitively, or immutably forever. But the proof of this essential quality will be completed when we treat below the eternity of reward and punishment.

In the state of fallen-and-restored nature, or in the economy in which human nature exists after original sin. Therefore here it is not a question about the state of original justice.

4. Death is described in Scripture as *the destruction of the earthly tent we live in* (2 Cor. 5:1; see 2 Tim. 4:6; Phil. 1:23), *the despoiling of this tent* (2 Cor. 5:4), *being away from the body* (2 Cor. 5:8), *the putting off of the body* (2 Pet. 1:14), etc.

Men in the pilgrimage on earth are called "wayfarers." In the end state definitively obtained they are the blessed or *comprehensors* (of the end). The damned are in the terminal state of damnation or of the end lost definitively. The souls in purgatory are not still on the way, since they can no longer merit or demerit their end, nor are they in the end definitively obtained; therefore they can be said to be in a middle state, that is, the terminal state of grace, but not yet of glory.

It is disputed, and the question will not now by treated by us, whether the force of our assertion comes *from the nature of the matter*, as some authors say,[1*] based on the reason that the separated soul is physically immobile with respect to the last end obtained or lost, or whether it comes *from the free ordination of God*, so that, having denied that reason, it is thought more probably to be a matter of right,[2] so that God also from his *ordinary* power could establish a terminus of meriting and demeriting before or *after* death.

The sources we are using deal per se with *adults,* so now we are concerned primarily with them. But since nowhere do they exclude from that law the infants who die

1. See J.B. Ferreres, S.J., *La muerte real y la muerte aparente* (Barcelona 1930); M. D'Halluin, *La morte, cette inconnue!*[2] (Paries 1952), on this work see G. Bosio, S.J., *La morte, questa sconosciuta:* CivCatt (1953,1) 630-640.

1* Billot, th.1 § 2 p.36-38; M. Richard, *Enfer:* DTC 5,97. Thus generally Thomists: see Michel, *Mort:* 10,2494.

2. Suarez, *De gratia* 12,15,12-15; Beraza, n.956; Pesch, n.574.

2* Therefore M. Fernández Jiménez, *A propósito de una teoría reciente sobre la suerte de los niños que mueren sin bautismo:* RevEspT 15 (1955) 286-292, rightly refutes M. Laurenge, S.M., *Esquisse d'une étude sur le sort des enfants morts sans baptême:* AnnTh (1952) 150f.169-171, according to whom our thesis is not proved to be about those infants.

before attaining the use of reason, the thesis must also be understood to include them, as Christian tradition holds and always has held.[2*]

5. Adversaries. The defenders of *metempsychosis* (or reincarnation, or *palingenesis*, that is, a new birth); here we will ignore the differences between these groups, but they seem more of less to agree on these points: the soul which departs from the body morally stained, in order to be purified is infused into another body either of men or of animals or even of plants and of inorganic elements, depending on the various theories; this takes place successively from one body to another for different lengths of time depending on the various theories.

This idea, with an unknown origin, was born, it seems, in India and there, taken from Brahmanism into Buddhism, it migrated to Greece; there it was adopted by the orphic religion and it also had adherents like Pythagoras, Empedocles and Plato. Plotinus and in general the *Neo-Platonists* learned it from him and it began to be propagated in the West in the 18th century. In our time it has been accepted by many *Spiritists* and especially by *Theosophism.*[3]

6. Defenders of *apocatastasis* or of restorationism teach a final restoration, that is, that the souls of the damned at some time will be restored to the friendship of God through their definitive conversion.

This idea is attributed by St. Jerome and now commonly to Origen,[4] but others in various ways either defend or excuse him, at least inasmuch as he, who acted honestly and always wanted to be orthodox, disputed about these questions merely hypothetically and at most erred unknowingly.[5] Certainly in the East and in the West it has been accepted by *Origenists* and by many others.[6] Some Fathers are cited who perhaps and at least to some extent admitted the same theory: thus Didymus of Alexandria,[7] Clement

3. R. Hedde, *Metempsychose:* DTC 1574-1591; Lagrange, *Les mystères:* l'orphisme (Paris 1937) 17.80.85.170; P. Siwek, S.J., *La réincarnation des esprits* (Rio de Janiero 1942); L. Roure, S.J., *Spiritisme:* DTC 14,2518f.; J. Brugerette, *Théosophie:* DTC 15,550f.
4. St. Jerome, *Adv. lib. Rufini* 1.1 n.27: ML 23,419; G. Bardy, *Origène:* DTC 11,1547f.; B. Altaner, *Patrologie*[2] (Freiburg 1950) 173; J. Danielou, S.J., *Origène* (Paris 1948) 271-283. But the mind of Origen is less clear relating to the restoration of the devils, at least of all of them (Bardy, 1550f.).
5. F. Prat, S.J., *Origène* (Paris 1907) 100f.; J. Denis, *De la philosophie d'Origène* (Paris 1884) p.344; Bardy, *Les Pères de l'Eglise en face des problèmes posés par l'enfer: L'Enfer*, 226-231, points out that these ideas are mainly in the book *De principiis,* which is known to us only from the version made later and repeatedly revised by Rufinus and from the texts of Jerome that are less trustworthy. On this, see F. Cavallera, S.J., *Saint Jerome. Sa vie et son oeuvre,* 1 (Louvain 1922) 229-278; 2,121-127.
6. J. Tixeront, *Histoire des dogmes,* 1 (Paris 1930) 329; 2,199f.333-336; G. Fritz, *Origènisme:* DTC 11,1574-1580; Bardy, *Les Pères...* 231-236.
7. Bardy, *Didyme l'Aveugle* (Paris 1910) 165-167; *loc.cit.*, 231f.

of Alexandria,[8] Saints Gregory of Nyssa (R 1033),[9] Gregory Nazianzen, Jerome, Ambrose.[10]

Finally, this idea, which the *Anabaptists* and the *Socinians* made their own, is found today in the profession of several *Protestants,* especially, according to Ritschl, of the *Liberals*, and of some others like K. Barth, W. Michaelis.[11]

There are those who think that Origen taught the *successive circulation* of spirits from virtue to sin, to a body, to punishment, to what is good by conversion to beatitude, again to sin, and so forth; or, according to others, he taught a *temporal circulation* so that finally a definitive state of beatitude is obtained,[12] or an *indefinite circulation* through the centuries, according to others.[13] Moreover, Origenists (4th to 6th centuries) seem to have paid more attention to the restorationism of their teacher than to palingenism.[14]

Concerning the mentioned Fathers, who are cited as perhaps favoring Origenism, we will consider them below (n. 173-175).

7. The following agree partially with the above: a) Hirscher, since besides *fully* mortal sins, as proceeding from a state of moral death or corruption, and to be punished with eternal punishments, he holds that there are other sins, which cannot exist with sanctifying grace, but because of which the soul after death is sent to hell, but to be placed in a certain state of probation, so that, if a conversion takes place, it enters finally into heaven, or if there is no conversion, it remains in hell.[15] b) Schell, who says that a soul of a damned person, not guilty of sins against the Holy Spirit, can be converted freely or after a long purgation, or it can will to remain obstinate in sin and so be punished forever.[16]

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8. Tixeront, 1,296.
9. See Altaner, 265; J.B. Schoemann, *Gregors von Nyssa theologische Anthropologie als Bildtheologie:* Schol 18 (1943) 195-198; Bardy, *loc.cit.,* 232. But in opposition, see Danielou, *L'Apocatastase chez Saint Grégoire de Nysse:* RechScRel 30 (1940) 328-347.
10. Petavius, *De angelis,* 1,3 c.7.
11. Richard, 87f.; J. Koestlin: REPT 1^3, 618-622; W. Michaelis, *Versöhnung des Alls. Die Frohe Botschaft* (Gümlichen 1950); see. K. Adam, *Zum Problem der Apokatastasis:* ThQschr 131 (1951) 129-138; S. Fruschione, S.J., *Gli uomini parlano dell'inferno:* CivCatt (1952) 6-8.
12. Bardy: DTC 11,1548-1550; Denis, p.339.
13. Richard, 86f.; Altaner, 173. Danielou remains doubtful about this, 280-283.
14. Richard, *loc.cit.,* 88. But see Lennerz, n. 25.
15. J. Kleutgen, S.J., *Theologie der Vorzeit* 2^2 (Münster 1872) n.293-298.
16. I. Stufler, S.J., *Die Heiligkeit Gottes und der ewige Tod* (Innsbruck 1903) 232-237.

16* *The Supreme Pontiff, to those present at the sixth Convention...of the Association of Lawyers...:* AAS 47 (1955) 64f.: "Per questo spetta unicamente a Dio l'ultimo giudizio sopra il valore de un uomo e la decisione sulla sua sorte definitiva. Egli pronunzia questo giudizio, come trova l'uomo al momento in cui lo chiama nella eternità.

"Nessuna sentenza umana decide in ultima istnaza e definitivamente la sorte di un uomo, ma soltanto il giudizio di Dio, sia per i singoli atti, come per la vita intera. Quindi per tutto ciò in cui i giudizi umani vengono a fallire, il Giudice supremo ristabilirà l'equilibrio, daprima, immediatamente dopo la morte, e quindi, più tardi e più completamente, dinanza a tutti, nell'ultimo giudizio universale."

8. Doctrine of the Church. The eternal fate of souls either for glory or for hell is shown as depending on the fact that, when they die, they are in the state of grace or in the state of mortal sin. But the immutability of that destiny, which is not always stated expressly in the documents, rightly here and elsewhere is supposed to have been proved (theses 6 and 9).

Benedict XII (D 1000): "We define that... *the souls of all the saints* who departed from this world..., *immediately after death* and, in the case of those in need of purification, after the purification... have been, are, and will be in heaven... and have eternal life and rest... Moreover, We define that... *the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin go down into hell immediately after death....*"

Since here the formula "immediately after death" is defined, by that fact it is also defined that precisely *those who die in grace or in sin* immediately enter heaven or hell. Therefore, it is also *implicitly defined* that death is *the moment on which* the definitive retribution depends.

The Council of Lyons II (D 856-858): "We believe... that if, being truly repentant, they die in charity before having satisfied by worthy fruits of penance for their sins of commission and omission, their souls are cleansed after death by purgatorial and purifying penalties... As for the souls of those who, after having received holy baptism, have incurred no stain of sin whatever and those souls who, after having contracted the stain of sin, have been cleansed... are received immediately into heaven. As for the souls of those who die in mortal sin or with original sin only, they go down immediately to hell... to be punished, but with different punishments." *The Council of Florence* says almost the same thing (D 1304-1306).

Here doubtless it is also defined that precisely *those who die in sin* go immediately into hell.

John XXII (D 926) and Clement VI (D 1075) teach the same thing.

Leo X condemned the error of Luther (D 1488): "The souls in purgatory are not sure of their salvation, at least (not) all: nor is it proved by any arguments or by the Scriptures that they are beyond the state of meriting or of increasing in charity."

Pius XII: "A true judgment about the moral state of each man and the decree concerning his definitive fate pertains to God alone. He passes judgment according as he finds a man at the moment when he calls him to eternity...

"No human sentence decides ultimately and definitively the fate of a man, but only the judgment of God, whether for individual acts or for his whole life. Therefore, where human judges may be mistaken, the supreme Judge will restore justice, first of all immediately after death, in a definitive

judgment on the whole life of each man, and then later and more completely, in the presence of all, at the general judgment."[16*]

At Vatican Council I this definition was prepared: "Surely just as those who die in grace certainly obtain... eternal life; so also those who die without it, will never be able to acquire it. For after death, which is the end of our life, we are placed immediately before God's tribunal so that each one can give an account of what he did in the body, and after this mortal life there is no place for repentance unto justification."

"If anyone says that a man can also be justified after death, or denies that the punishment of the damned in hell will not be perpetual, let him be anathema."[17]

9. Theological note. *Defined (implicitly) divine and Catholic faith* (D 1000, 856-858, 1304-1306).

But since the thesis is nowhere defined *explicitly*, theologians in various ways assign it a theological note. For Lennerz it is: *Catholic doctrine, and perhaps it can be said to be defined;* Beraza: "clearly contained in Holy Scripture, in tradition, in the belief of the Church—*it is to be held with divine and Catholic faith*"; Otten: "an absolutely *certain and common* opinion"; Michel: *a matter of Catholic and divine faith.*[18]

10. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) Eternal destiny is decided by the deeds of this life. Matt. 25:31-46: *Come, O blessed of my Father..., for I was hungry and you gave me food... Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire...; for I was hungry and you gave me no food... And they will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life."*

2 Cor. 5:10: *For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each one may receive good or evil, according to what he has done in the body,* that is, what he did with his body and during the time of the body.

Luke 16:19-31 (on the rich reveller): a) Lazarus dies and immediately he is placed in the bosom of Abraham; the rich man dies and he is buried immediately in hell; b) their lot is immutable, because a great abyss if fixed between them.

2) We can work only before death. John 9:4: Christ, speaking about doing his works *while it is day,* or while he is in this mortal life, proclaims a universal principle both for each individual and for the human race: *night comes* (i.e., death), *when no one can work.*

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17. *Schema reformatum constitutionis dogmaticae de doctrina catholica* p.2 c.5 n.6 and cn.6: CL 7,564.567; cf. 517.550.

18. Lennerz, n. 174; Beraza, n. 952; Otten, n. 438; Michel, *Que pense l'Eglise de la "réincarnation"?:* AmCl 64 (1954) 439.

3) Some warnings of Christ, although perhaps they concern directly the second coming of Christ, in the Church are also understood rightly to be about the death of each man: *Watch... for you do not know on what day your Lord is coming... Therefore you must also be ready...* (Matt. 24:42.44; 25:13; Mark 13:35.37; Luke 12:40).

The warning about working during the time of this life, which are in the O.T., suppose in a sufficiently clear way that for the sinner after death there will be no opportunity to do good and to be converted to God (Eccles. 9:10; Sir. 11:20-28; 17:26; 18:22).

11. Proof from tradition. A. *The holy Fathers* not only reject *metempsychosis*[19] and, since from what will be said later they teach the eternity of hell, *apocatastasis,* but they also teach our thesis expressly.

1) *While appealing to the parable of the rich man, they say that after death there is no repentance for the wicked or sin for the just.* Aphraates (R 693): "When Abraham said to the rich man, 'There is a huge abyss between us and you," he shows that after death and resurrection there will be no repentance. The wicked will not see the kingdom nor will they enter into it, nor will the just sin any more in order to come to punishment...." Likewise St. John Chrysostom (R 1200).

2) *They compare life with time:* a) As a time of *sowing.* St. Jerome (R 1364): "...A time for sowing... is now present and the life which we are leading. In this life we are permitted to sow what we will; when this life has passed, the time of working is taken away...." b) *Or in which alone it is possible to merit crowns.* St. John Chrysostom (R 1138): "... For the future let us convert ourselves from the way on which we have erred. For the hour will come when the theater of this life will be dissolved, and after that no one will contend; there is no further business after the end of this life; when this theater has been closed, there is no meriting of crowns. This is the time for repentance and that for judgment."

3) *They say that eternal life can be gained only before death.* St. Fulgentius (R 2268): "But God has given men time to obtain eternal life only in this life, where he desires that there also be fruitful repentance."

4) *They say that only in this life is there a place for fruitful repentance.* St. Cyprian (R 561): "When there has been a withdrawal hence, then there is no opportunity for repentance, no accomplishment of satisfaction. Here life is either lost or kept... To him who still remains in this world no repen-

19. L Bükowski, S.J., *La réincarnation selon les Pères:* Greg 9 (1928) 65-91; Id., *L'opinion de Saint Augustin sur la réincarnation des âmes:* Greg 12 (1931) 57-85; S. Ludwic, *Irenäus und Tertullian gegen die Reinkarnationslehre:* ThGl 7 (1928) 228-235. For the thesis in general, see J.A. Fischer, *Studien zum Todesgedanken in der alten Kirche* (Munich 1934) 122-142.

tance is too late..." (see also R 576, 578).

Similar points are taught by Saints Hilary (R 687), Basil (R 966), Gregory Nazianzen (R 980).

12. B. *Liturgy.* a) *Positively:* The Church shows great concern for the dying and she even gives special faculties to priests on their behalf (and even to excommunicated priests) (CIC 882, see 884 [1917]). b) *Negatively:* The Church does not ask for either the perseverance of the blessed or the conversion of the damned.

13. Theological reasoning. If after death there were an opportunity of obtaining the end, the sacraments of baptism and penance would not be necessary for adults with a necessity of means in order to obtain that end *in this life.*

Natural reason also seems to prove *the moral necessity* of the fact: a) The moment in which the composite of soul and body is dissolved is wisely placed as the end of man's probation, that is, the whole principle of meriting and demeriting ceases to exist, since neither the soul alone nor the body alone, but *the whole man* must tend towards his end by performing meritorious acts. b) If man's probation is not closed by death, the *efficacious* sanction is missing whereby men *in this life* are turned away from evil and are moved to embrace the good.

14. Objections. 1. 1 Pet. 3:18-20: ...*Christ also died for sins once for all... that he might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh but made alive in the spirit; in which he went and preached to the spirits in prison, who formerly did not obey, when God's patience waited in the days of Noah, during the building of the ark...* (see also 4:5f.).

Accordingly, Christ preached in hell to the unbelievers, that they might live in the Spirit. Therefore conversion after death seems to be possible.

I deny the major. This passage, since it is obscure and capable of different interpretations, is improperly made an objection to the thesis, which other very clear texts of Scripture give witness to and are understood in one and the same way in the Church.

Moreover, those who at one time were unbelievers: a) Are not said to have died in unbelief. That being the case, there is nothing opposed to the more common explanation of the passage, that there Christ is introduced as descending into the bosom of Abraham and announcing to the souls detained there the consummation of Redemption and their liberation from prison, so that in particular the unbelievers at the time of Noah are mentioned (as those who seem certainly to be damned) in order to show the great efficacy

of the passion of Christ.[20] b) Also, in a less probable explanation, they can be thought to be those who at the time of the flood were damned; when Christ descended into hell he confirmed their damnation or, fulfilling the office of judge, announced it to them.[21]

15. N.B. 1 Cor. 15:29: *Otherwise, what do people mean by being baptized on behalf of the dead, if the dead are not raised at all?* On this verse, which remains so obscure for us, there are many opinions (over forty). It concerns the use, which Paul, without either approving or rejecting it, offers in his argument in favor of the resurrection. But we know absolutely nothing about the praxis of the neophytes at question here, v.gr., whether by it someone supplies the ceremonies of baptism in himself for a catechumen taken by death before his baptism, thus testifying before the Church that he died in the faith of Christ; or by which someone, while he is being baptized, wishes to make his relatives or friends, who died without baptism, as much as would be possible, to be sharers in his grace; or perhaps by which they receive in themselves a rite, distinct from baptism but related to it like a sacramental, for the dead whose fate is unknown.[22]

16. 2. The soul after death remains free. Therefore it can merit and incur demerits.

I distinguish the major. The soul after death remains free regarding some things, *conceded;* regarding the loss of the last end already obtained, or regarding obtaining what was not obtained, *denied.*

For man lacks freedom regarding these matters: *remotely,* because God has established only the present time for meriting or demeriting, *proximately,* because the blessed are confirmed in goodness and are impeccable (this holds also for the souls in purgatory), but the damned are obstinate in evil and deprived of the grace of conversion. And the ability to turn oneself away from the final end already obtained, or of converting oneself to it when it has been lost, does not pertain to the essence of freedom.

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20. Those who agree regarding the substance (that it means the annunciation of the accomplished Redemption) are: W. Vrede, *Petrusbriefe* (Bonn 1924) at this place; A. Vitti, S.J., *Descensus Christi ad inferes:* VerDom 7 (1923) 111-118; E. Quilliet, *Descente de Jésus aux enfers:* DTC 6,592-595; J. Chaine, *Descente due Christ aux enfers:* DBS 4, 418-467; A. Charue, *Les epîtres catholique*[3]: PirClam 12 (Paris 1951) 462-474.467; G. Philips, *La descente du Christ aux enfers:* RevEccl Liège (1932-33) 144-156, 273-286; regarding this matter and O. Rousseau, *La descente aux enfers, fondement sotériologique du baptême:* RechScRel 40 (1951-52) 273-297. M. Meinertz understands both passages to be about those converted at the time of the flood, *Theologie des Neuen Testaments,* 2 (Bonn 1950) 258; U. Holzmeister, S.J., *Commentarius in Epistolas SS.Petri et Iudae,* 1 (Paris 1937) 295-355, interpreting the passage to be about those who provoked the flood by their sins, but repented before their death, and taking verse 4:6 in a different sense (364-367).

21. J. Frings, *Zu 1 Petr 3,19 und 4,6:* BiblZeitschr 17 (1925) p.86-88; he also (p. 85) interprets 1 Pet. 4:6 differently. Concerning this (p. 80-85), see also the interpretation that K. Geschwind proposes, *Die Niederfahrt Christi in die Unterwelt* (Münster 1911) 97-144.

22. Prat, *La théologie de Saint Paul*[11] 1 (Paris 1925) 162f.; H. Huby, S.J., *Première Epître aux Corinthiens* (Paris 1946) 376-378; E.B. Allò, O.P., *Première epître aux Corinthiens* (Paris 1934) 411-414; C. Spicq, O.P., *Epîtres aux Corinthiens* 11 (Paris 1951) 285; J. Bonsirven, S.J., *L'Evangile de Paul* (Aubier 1948) 316, note 1; J.M. Bover, S.J., *Epistolas de San Pablo*[2] (Barcelona 1950) 176. Other more difficult explanations are proposed by J. Delazer, O.F.M., *Baptismus pro mortuis:* Ant 6 (1931) 113-136; B.M. Foschini, *Those Who Are Baptized for the Dead 1 Cor 15,29. An Exegetical Historical Dissertation* (Worcester 1951), and on this see M.E. Boismard: RevBibl 61 (1954) 461.

17. 3. There are those who die twice because of a miraculous resurrection. Therefore at least for them the time of probation is not finished by death.

I distinguish the consequent. For them the time of probation is not finished by the first death, *conceded;* by the second, *denied.*

Since God knows that they will be returned to mortal life, their fate is not determine by the first death, as is clear, but by the second one, which for them is a definitive death.[23]

N.B. Therefore God does not consider all the good done in life in someone who dies in the state of mortal sin, since his soul, as lacking sanctifying grace, is turned away from God.

18. Corollary 1. *On the moment of the final decision.* There is an opinion, recently proposed (but merely hypothetically) as not improbable, that the soul at the indivisible moment of death, but already like a separated spirit, may elicit a free act on which his eternal destiny depends.[23a] It seems that this theory can in no way be admitted.[24] For, since that moment is indivisible and the soul elicits that act like a separated spirit, this act would be equivalent to a final decision made *after death* or after the state of earthly life; likewise in no way is it proved that for *individual* men by a *special* illumination at the last moment permission is given to choose between God and creatures, although without doubt it is given sometimes or often.

19. Corollary 2. *Merit cannot be increased after death,* as is clear from the arguments of the thesis, for example, from 2 Cor. 5:10. *There it is held:* Regarding *essential* merit commonly as at least *certain in theology.* Regarding an *accidental* reward, *more commonly* with St. Thomas (II-II, q. 182, a. 2 ad 2) against Vázquez who thinks that the blessed can merit accidental rewards both for themselves and for others.[25] Hence the blessed do not merit for us. But if they impetrate something for us, that is from the fact that, while they lived, they merited that they might impetrate

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23. On the condition of the soul after the first death of someone who is to be resurrected and then die again, see Palmieri, § 10,2; Michel, "*Mors et vita.*" *Considerations sur la mort, la résurrection et l'autre vie:* AmCl 61 (19510 17-22.

23a Thus P. Glorieux, *Endurcissement final et grâces dernières:* NouvRevTh 39 (1932) 865-892; Id., *In hora mortis:* MélScRel 6 (1949) 185-216. P.B. Manyà says something similar hypothetically, *De ratione peccati poenam aeternam inducentis* (Dertosae 1947) 16,205-236.

24. A. D'Ales, S.J., *La lucidité des morts:* Et 214 (1933) 314-317; A. Vandenberghe, *De morte, status viae termino:* CollatBrug 36 (1936) 428-454; T. Urdánoz, O.P., *Boletin de Teologia Moral:* CienTom 75 (1948) 133-135; R. Lombardi, S.J., *La salvación del que no tiene fe* (Barcelona 1953) 333-356; Ch.V. Heris, O.P., *Le dogme de l'enfer et la théologie, oc.cit.,* 277-285; A. Zychlinski, *Der wichtigste Augenblick in Menschenleben. Bemerkungen zu Sum. Theol. I-II q.89 a.6:* DivThom(Fr) 31 (1953) 326; Michel, *Les mystères...* 18-21. A fortiori the opinion of Cajetan is rejected unanimously (*In I* q.64 a.2 n.18) that the soul becomes fixed in the first act that it elicits after death and that it thus incurs demerit, not as in the earthly pilgrimage, but as at the end: see Garrigou-Lagrange, *La vida eterna y la profundidad del alma* (Madrid 1951) 81-83; Id., *Thomisme:* DTC 15,959f.; Michel, *Les mystères... 17-19.*

25. Vázquez, *In 1.2* d.216 c.4 n.31; Peter Lombard thought that the angels merited an *essential* reward and that they could advance in merits *until the last judgment* (2 dist.5,11; see S.Th. I, q. 62 a.9 ad 3 and *Suppl.* q. 98 a.6). The holy Doctor himself, *at the beginning,* thought the same way about the increase of merit as an *accidental* reward (*In 2* dist.5 q.2 a.2; *In 4* d.50 q.2 a.1 q.6).

this (*In 3* dist.18 q.1 a.2 ad 2). Therefore the good acts of the blessed, without being meritorious, do pertain to the reward of beatitude (II-II, q. 13 a.4 ad 2). Indeed, even Christ must be said to have merited merely as a wayfarer (*In 3* dist.18 q.1 a.2; III, q. 19, a. 3 ad 1).

But what is the reason for the incapacity of meriting in the acts of the blessed? It is in the lack of freedom required for meriting found in the acts of love necessarily following the vision (see I-II, q. 4, a. 4f.). In the acts that merely accompany the vision, but are based on other knowledge of the blessed, it is: a) According to Suarez, other acts, from the free ordination of God, since from the nature of the matter, merit is not repugnant to them, since they are supernatural and free.[26] b) According to Lugo, other acts, from a lack of moral freedom (but not physical), which is present in the blessed of not choosing the best thing in every situation depending on their powers and the received helps.[27] c) According to Esparza, from the fact that the acts of the blessed lack difficulty, which according to him is always required in order to merit.[28]

N.B. *Statements about the incapacity of the blessed to merit must be said to be valid also for the damned with regard to demerits, while observing due proportion.* Hence they cannot merit an increase of their punishment, either essential or only accidental, although it can be admitted that their accidental punishment, until the day of judgment, but not as a new demerit, can be increased in some measure (see III, q. 59, a. 6; *Suppl.* q. 98, a. 6). Hence the evil acts of the damned, even though they are not demeritorious, do pertain to the punishment of damnation (II-II, q. 13, a. 4 ad 2).

20. Scholium. *On the onceness of death.* Death comes only once to every man (but according to the ordinary law, since from John 11:43f.; 12:9; Matt. 9:18-26; Luke 7:11-16, some resurrected and then died again). It *is implicitly defined* in the documents cited above that heaven is entered *immediately after death*, unless a required purgation precedes it, or the soul goes to hell—and it is *forever.* It is certain: a) From Heb. 9:27f. : That men must die once, as Christ was offered up once. b) The holy Fathers suppose the same thing both negatively, since they do not mention two deaths, and positively, for example, by rejecting reincarnation (see n. 11). c) From more or less the same arguments given for the previous thesis.

26. Suarez, *loc.cit.*, n.17-19.
27. I. de Lugo, *De Incarnat.* disp.26 s.10 n.142; see n.136f. and disp.2 n.24; Pesch, 3 n.463; 9 n.575.
28. M. de Esparza, *De act. hum.* q.31; q.32 a.4.

ARTICLE II

ON THE UNIVERSALITY OF DEATH

21. Given the fact that the *obligation of dying* is inherent in all men as the result of contracting original sin, is the *fact of dying* so universal that no one was ever excused from undergoing it?

A. *Elijah and Enoch.* Since there is a traditional conviction that Enoch (from Gen. 5:24; see. Heb. 11:5; Sir. 44:16) and Elijah (from 2 Kings 2:11f.; Sir. 48:13; 1 Macc. 2:58) are living, although whether they are in heaven[29] or in an earthly paradise[30] or in an unknown place[31] is disputed; but they will come at the end of the world. Likewise, although many have denied that they will die at the end of the world, nevertheless that is more commonly held, in fact to such a degree, according to many authors, that they will be killed by the Antichrist.[32]

Now, however, omitting the question about their coming, since it is to be handled later on, in what concerns their death, Michaud, based on Heb. 9:27 and on the fact that Christ himself died, thought that they had died and, on this supposition, that the scriptural texts raised in opposition must be understood in this way.[33]

Nor have there been lacking those who followed him, or at least considered that opinion as probable, like Perrella (because death is universal and it would be surprising that a privilege was given to those men which Jesus and Mary de facto did not have, and since it is not certain that it concerns something universally proposed by the Fathers and connected with the faith), Grill, Piolanti.[34]

But that they did not die, we hold according to the common understanding of theologians. That being the case, as we think, without doubt they will share the lot of the just of the last generation.

22. B. *Will the just of the last generation die?* This question presents itself because of some texts of St. Paul (1 Cor. 15:51f.; 2 Cor. 5:1-5; 1 Thess.

29. St. Ambrose, *Epist.* 38,7: ML 16,1097.
30. St. Augustine, *Op. imperf. cont. Iul.* 6 c.30: ML 45,1581.
31. St. John Chrysostom, *Hom.22 in Her.* N.2: MG 61,157.
32. See on this, E. Palis, *Henoch:* DB 3,593; E. Mangenot, *Elie:* DB 2,1075f.; F. de Hummelauer, S.J., *Commentarius in Genesem* (Paris 1908) 209; I. Knabenbauer, S.J., *Commentarius in Prophetas minores* 2² (Paris 1923) 583. On Elijah see Spicq, *L'Ecclesiastique:* PirClam 6 (Paris 1946) 821f.; D. Schötz, O.F.M., *Erstes und zweites Buch der Makkabäer* (Würzburg 1954) 40; M. Rehm, *Die Bücher der Könige* (Würzburg 1954) 75; A. Medebielle, *Les livres de Rois:* PirClam 3 (1949) 702. On Enoch see Spicq, 802; H. Junker, *Genesis:* Echter Bibel (Würzburg 1953) 25; A. Clamer, *La Genèse:* PirClam 13 (Paris 1953) 168f.; E. Zolli, *Henoch:* EncCatt 6 (1951) 1404f.; Medebielle, *Epître aux Hébrews:* PirClam 12 (Paris 1951) 352; Bover, *op.cit.*, § 359; Danielou, *L'Ascension d'Henoch:* Iren 28 (1955) 263-266 (on the tradition).
33. H. Michaud, *Le cas d'Henoch et d'Elie:* RevApol 62 (1936) 249f. But Michaud held this as his own personal opinion and as it is contrary to the „traditional" teaching, the editors of the magazine in which it was printed rejected it (see 631-633).
34. G.M. Perrella, C.M.: DivThom(Pi) 13 (1936) 395-398; P.J. Grill, *Die Himmelfahrt des Elias:* BilZeitschr 24 (1938) 246f.; Piolanti, *op.cit.*, p.5.

4:13-18) which seem to suppose that the *just* (obviously it is about these only that he is speaking) of the last generation are not going to die.

Several Greek Fathers *respond to the question negatively:* St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom[35]; from the Latins: Tertullian, St. Jerome[36]; many of the scholastics: Lennerz, Pesch, etc.[37]; recent exegetes more commonly, v.gr., Cornely, Prat, Knabenbauer, Ogara, Huby, Bover, Colunga, Vosté, Spicq, Bonsirven.[38]

The reasons in favor of this opinion are more or less these: Christ "will come again to judge the living and the dead" from the various *Creeds*: *Apostles'* (D 11, 30, 44-45), of *Epiphanius* (D 44), *Athanasian* (D 76), *Nicene* (D 125-126), *Nicene-Constantinople* (D 130). From Acts 10:42 where Christ is said to be *ordained by God to be judge of the living and the dead.*(see 2 Tim. 4:1; 1 Pet. 4:5). From 1 Thess. 4:13-16, where a distinction is made between *we who are alive, who are left until the coming of the Lord* and *those who have fallen asleep,* so that the former together with the latter, *after* these latter have risen, shall be caught up together with them in the clouds with Christ. This is the triumph of Christ over death.

But especially from 1 Cor. 15:51 (see v. 52): *Lo! I tell you a mystery. We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed.* These words reflect the Greek reading which is considered universally as genuine,[39] in preference to the Vulgate reading: *We shall indeed all sleep, but we shall not all be changed,* and in preference to the other reading used quite commonly by the Latin Fathers: *We shall indeed all rise, but we shall not all be changed* (see 2 Cor. 2-4). Indeed: a) "to sleep" signifies, obviously, death. And often by the word in Scripture death is meant (1 Cor. 7:39; 11:30; 15:16; Matt. 9:24; John 11:11). b) Paul would be expressing no mystery, unless he were saying that not all would die.

Moreover, this matter could almost be explained as being like the exemption of the Blessed Virgin from original sin.

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35. St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De hom. opif.:* MG 44,205-208; St. John Chrysostom, *In 1 Cor hom.* 42,2: MG 61,364. See L. Simone, *Doctrina resurrectionis iustorum in epistolis S.Pauli* (Rome 1938) p.49ff.
36. Tertullian, *De resurr. carnis* c.41: ML 2,853; St. Jerome, *Epist.* 59 n.3; *Epist.* 119: ML 22,587f.967f.: see O'Connell, *op.cit.,* 17-19.
37. Lennerz, n. 169; Pesch, 9 n.570.
38. Prat, *loc.cit.,* 1,169; Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in S.Pauli epistulas* 5 (Paris 1913) p.91-95; F. Ogara, S.J., *Los justos de la ultima generación, ¿morirán o no morirán?:* EstEcl 4 (1925) 154-177; Huby, *loc.cit.,* 397-400; Bover, *Teologia de San Pablo* (Madrid 1946) p. 868f.; A. Colunga, O.P., *Un misterio revelado por San Pablo y la historia de una tesis teológica:* CienTom 58 (1939) 161-193; J. Vosté, O.P., *Studia Paulina* (Rome 1928) 60-63; Spicq, *Epîtres...* 291; Bonsirven, *Théologie du Nouveau Testament* (Aubier 1951) 382f. See also Ph. Oppenheim, *1 Cor 15,51. Eine kritische Untersuchung zu Text und Auffassung bei den Vätern:* ThQschr 112 (1931) 92-135.
39. A Vacccari, S.J., *Il testo 1 Cor 15,51:* Bibl 13 (1932) 73-76; P. Brandhuber, C.SS.R., *Die sekundären Lesarten bei 1 Kor 15:51. Ihre Verbreitung und Entstehung:* Bibl 18 (1937) 303-333, 418-438. Recent critical editors generally give this reading: Von Soden, Vogels, Merk, Nestle, Tischendorf, Bover, etc.

23. Many Latin Fathers *respond in the affirmative,* like St. Hilary of Poitiers, St. Fulgentius, etc.,[40] from the Greeks Didymus of Alexandria, St. Cyril of Alexandria[41]; from the theologians, v.gr., St. Thomas (I-II, q. 81, a. 3 ad 1, *Suppl.* q. 78, a. 8), Suarez, Hurter, Ocerín-Jáuregui, etc.[42]; from the exegetes, v.gr., Oecumenius, Hetzenauer, Delatte,[43] etc.

The reasons given for this opinion are: a) The asserted universal resurrection in the *Athanasian Creed* (D 76), *Lateran Council IV* (D 801), etc. b) The asserted transmission of death through Adam to all men in the *Council of Orange* (D 372), *Council of Trent* (D 1512), etc. c) Rom. 5:12 (see Gen 3:19; 1 Cor. 15:22; Heb. 9:27. d) *The Roman Catechism.*[44]

The matter is left undecided, v.gr., by Huarte, Otten, Vandenberghe, etc.,[45] because there are good reasons for both sides.

24. *So what should be said about this?* The reasons for the first opinion can be explained in this way: a) As in the Creeds and in 1 Thess. 4:13-16 (2 Cor. 2-4) they are said to be *living,* or living at the end of the world, who, although they die, immediately rise, or more probably those living at the time when the words were spoken, that is, whether then, v.gr. Paul, etc., or those now, that is, we, in contrast to those who have already died. b) As in particular, by that place in Paul the opposition is in the fact that dead rise before the living die. c) As in 1 Cor. 15:51 (consequently v. 52): *To sleep* is taken for *the state of death* in opposition to a quasi *momentary* death previous to resurrection (see 1 Kings 11:43; Ps. 76:6; Isa. 14:8.18; Ezek. 31:18; 32:27f.; Dan. 12:2; Matt. 27:52). And the mystery consists in the fact that no one can enter into glory without being changed. d) As the triumph of Christ over death is found especially in the glorious resurrection of the just and also in their incorruption. e) As finally such an amazing exception is not to be admitted unless it is solidly proved.

However, regarding the second opinion: Whatever may be the case about the unanimity of the Latin Fathers, about which perhaps there is no certainty, and which, if it does exist, perhaps can be explained from the fact that they knew the reading *we shall all indeed rise* (or we will sleep), *but*

40. St. Hilary, *In ps.69* n.3: ML 9,491; St. Fulgentius, *De fide* n.70: ML 75,702. St. Augustine in this matter is uncertain (see Ogara, 161-164; Lennerz, n.166f.).

41. Didymus of Alex. in St. Jerome, *Epist. 119* 5: ML 22,968-970; St. Cyril of Alex., *In 1 Cor 15,51:* MG 74,912f.

42. Suarez, *De myst. vit. Ch.* D.50; Hurter, 3 n.639; B. Ocerín-Jáuregui, O.F.M., *Historia de la controversia sobre la muerte de los justos de la última generación:* VerVid 1 (1943) 687.

43. Oecumenius, *In 1 Cor 15,51:* MG 118,892; M. Hetzenauer, O.C., *Novum Testamentum* 2 (Innsbruck 1899) p. 367f.; P. Delatte, O.S.B., *Les epîtres de Saint Paul* 2 (Tours 1928) p. 389.

44. *Catech. Rom.* 1,12,6. There some of the historical points are not fully exact; see Prat, 2 p.449, note.

45. Huarte, n.591; Vandenberghe, *De universalitate mortis:* CollatBrug 38 (1938) 174-180; Otten, n.446. Simeone (*op.cit.*) thinks that the question cannot be answered.

we shall not all be changed, still there is no certainty about the unanimity *of all the Fathers in general* about one or the other opinion. On the other hand, the law of death is so universal, that neither Christ nor, as is commonly held, the Blessed Virgin were excused from it. And an exception to that law, which has been expressed in such a universal way, not just of one or two men but of a whole generation, does not seem to be fitting, unless it is solidly proved.

Hence the opinion asserting that the living people of the last generation will die *seems to us to be preferred as more probable.*[46]

N.B. On the death of the Bl. Virgin, which we supposed in the preceding explanation, since it is "*a common opinion* of theologians through many centuries... the only one...that can be said to be *in conformity with the tradition* and the ordinary magisterium of the Church," was stated above (vol. IIIA, treatise II, n.202-212).

25. Scholium 1. *On some circumstances of death.* a) Death is uncertain regarding its moment in time, so that a man cannot promise himself even one future instant of life. Watch therefore, for you know neither the day nor the hour (Matt. 25:13; 24:42-44; Luke 12L19f.40). But out of his kindness God established things so: "But our Lord wanted our last hour to be unknown to us so that it could always be awaited, in order that, although we cannot foresee it, we can constantly prepare ourselves for it," as St. Gregory the Great says.[47] The reason is so that we may live avoiding sins that put us in danger of losing eternal life, and that we may strive to live a life of heroic virtue in order to store up merits in heaven. b) But the hour of death is near, since the life of man is short no matter how long it is, especially given the strong desire of living. Job 14:1f.: *Man that is born of a woman is of few days... He comes forth like a flower, and withers; he flees like a shadow and continues not.* Sir. 18:9: *The number of a man's days is great if he reaches a hundred years. Like a drop of water from the sea and a grain of sand so are a few years in the day of eternity.*

26. Scholium 2. *On Christian reverence for the bodies of Catholics.* How great this reverence should be is shown by the Catholic praxis of burying the dead with maternal rites.[48] Surely those bodies, having

46. This thesis was confirmed recently by an outstanding exegetical dissertation by A. Romeo: "*Omnes quidem resurgemus" seu "Omnes quidem nequaquam dormiemus" (1 Cor. 15,51):* VerDom 14 (1934) 142-148, 250-255, 267-275, 313-320, 328-336, 375-383; see Id., *Nos qui vivimus qui residui sumus (1 Thess 4,13-18):* VerDom 9 (1929) 307-313, 339-347, 360-364.

47. St. Gregory the Great, *Hom. 13 in Evang.* n.6:ML 76,1126.

48. *Rit. Rom.* tit.6. See what St. Augustine says (*Confess.* 9,12: ML 32,776f.) about the funeral of his mother. See also A.C. Rusch, *Death and Burial in Christian Antiquity* (Washington 1941).

been adorned with the sacraments, especially the Eucharist, which were temples of the Holy Spirit, who used them as organs and vessels for all kinds of good works, and in whom there is the hope that they will resurrect in glory—they are worthy of being treated with great reverence. Even natural reason requires this, since those bodies were like a temple for the spiritual soul and since they by far surpass in value all other material things that belonged to our deceased dear ones.

Hence the praxis of *burying* the bodies of the dead, which, even by looking at the whole history of the human race, was used much more often than cremation, and has been so much a part of Christian morals that perhaps not undeservedly it can be traced back to a precept of the Apostles. And at the same time *cremation*, although it is not absolutely evil, has always been vigorously forbidden by the Church, especially in our days under *ordinary* circumstances.

Thus the Holy Office issued a document, *De crematione cadaverum instructio,* reminding us that "this barbarous custom is fully repugnant not only to Christian but also to the natural sense of reverence for the bodies of the dead and to the constant sense of the Church. The Pastors of the Christian flock are exhorted to see to it that the sheep committed to their care are warned about promotion by the enemies of the Christian name of the idea that the cremation of bodies is to be praised and propagated so that, having diverted minds gradually away from the consideration of death and the hope of the resurrection of the body, the way may be prepared for materialism. Therefore, although the cremation of bodies, which is certainly not absolutely evil in extraordinary circumstance, is actually permitted; nevertheless there is no one who does not see that to approve of this in general and as an ordinary procedure is impious and scandalous and therefore gravely illicit. Rightly therefore it has been reprobated several times by the Supreme Pontiffs, and most recently again in the Code of Canon Law published in 1917 (cn. 1203 § 1).[49]

49. AAS 18 (1926) 282f. Likewise see from the Holy Office (D 3188) *Decretum quoad cadaverum crematione*s (ASS 19 [1886] 46) and *Decretum quoad corporum crematione*m (ASS 25 [1892] 63); CIC 1203.1240 § 1-5, 2339; *Rit. Rom.* tit.6 c.3,5. For more on this matter, see E. Valton, *Crémation:* DTC 3,2310-2323; A. Bride, *Sépulture:* DTC 14,1884-1887; C. Righi, *Cremazione o inumazione?:* ScuoCatt 74 (1946) 132-147; 75 (1947) 28-42, 198-211.

CHAPTER II

On the particular judgment and its execution

Thesis 2. Immediately after death the soul of man goes either to heaven, but perhaps first to purgatory if it needs to be purified, or to hell, and in truth definitively. Therefore, it undergoes the particular judgment of God, which is immediately put into execution.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 69, a. 4f.; 1 CG 91; Suarez, *loc.cit.*, d.50 a.2; Beraza, n.1012-1027; Lennez, n.186-231; J. Rivière, *Jugement:* DTC 8,1721-1828 passim, especially 1804-1812; X. Le Bachelet, S.J., *Benoit XII, constitution "Benedictus Deus..."* DTC 12,657-696.

27. Connection. When the pilgrimage of earthly life has ended, since man then is incapable of merit or demerit and therefore of an essential change relative to his last end, it is fitting that immediately after death his definitive condition be assigned to him juridically, according to the nature of his actions during the time of his preceding probation. But that this happens and how it happens is determined in this thesis. We are proposing this thesis as St. Thomas did, who considered the particular judgment, inasmuch as he established for souls a place of refuge or heaven, after a previous purgation if it was necessary, or hell, so that immediately after death each one goes to his final place (*Suppl.* q. 69, a. 1f.; 4 CG 91).

28. Definition of terms. *Immediately after death,* that is, at least before the general judgment. Indeed it takes place without *any* delay, even *physical*, according to the common understanding of theologians and the faithful, who understand in this way the formulas of the sources, according to their obvious meaning.

The soul of man, that is, every human soul, good or bad, whether of an adult or of a child.

Goes to heaven, or to the state of essential beatitude, which will be defined later, either immediately, if it is just in the eyes of God and not in need of purgation, or after the required purgation, if this is necessary. Moreover, since purgatory is temporal and after this earthly life, and since it is a condition necessary to fulfill before heaven, it does not change the assertion of the sources about entrance into heaven immediately after death. Therefore now we are not giving explicit attention to purgatory.

But perhaps first to purgatory if it needs to be purified. From what we have just said it is clear why and in what sense these words relate to the thesis.

Or to hell, or to the state of essential punishment (to be described later),

if the soul is not just before God. But by the word "hell" is indicated also the *limbo of children* (*limbus puerorum*), but this will be treated elsewhere.

And in truth definitively or with the result that this fate is immutable for all eternity. But what others prove here is not something that we have to prove directly at this time.

Therefore... By this concluding adverb it is clearly stated that the assertion, which it immediately precedes, is to be deduced from what went before, since the assignment of a reward or punishment supposes a previous decision of judgment of God. Therefore the express proof of this judgment will be omitted by us.

Judgment is an act of justice whereby a competent authority, having gained knowledge of the case, either absolves or condemns someone based on his merits or demerits.

The particular judgment of God is an act of justice whereby God for each individual person departing this life decrees a reward or punishment according to the merits or demerits of each one. It is distinguished, therefore, from the *general judgment* of the whole human race which will take place at the end of the world.

Which is immediately put into execution, that is, although the judicial sentence is not necessarily carried out per se immediately, nevertheless the sentence passed in that judgment of God de facto is fulfilled *soon*, since this word is understood in more or less the same sense in which the word "immediately" is taken in the previous assertion. Consequently the soul after the particular judgment knows immediately its fate.

N.B. Those things that pertain to the natural condition of a separated soul, namely with regard to its way of acting, etc., since this is more something philosophical, we will leave to the consideration of the philosophers.

Infants dying before having the use of reason, since they lack merits and demerits, are thought not to have to undergo that judgment, except inasmuch as they are assigned a reward or some punishment because of original sin and of course, because of the similarity to adults, immediately after death. Therefore in this thesis no special attention is given to their situation.

29. Adversaries. 1) The following *deny the first assertion,* that is, the immediate retribution of a reward or punishment, and they are thought to deny also *the second assertion,* namely, that there is a particular judgment, since no one is thought to admit that there is a judgment and then that the sentence is not made known to the soul: a) *Thnetopsychists,* saying that the soul together with the body perishes and is raised for the last judgment.

Thus some Arabs in the 3rd century.[1] b) *Hypnopsychists,* saying that the soul is in a state of sleep until the end of the world, like sleep during the night. Thus perhaps (about the saints) Vigilantius,[2] Aphraates (R 688) and many *Nestorians,*[3] and Luther at times considers it to be probable.[4] Many *Adventists*, unless they seem rather to say that the soul dies with the body until the resurrection; to them should be added *Jehovah's Witnesses* and *The Friends of Men.*[5] *Ancipitists,* saying that the soul is uncertain about its destiny until the last judgment: Lactantius (R 646).

2) *These deny the particular judgment* and retribution before the general judgment: a) *Not a few recent Protestants,* the leader being especially Th. Burnet. But the idea that souls after death are in a state of sleep is quite common among them.[6] b) *Some Greek Orthodox authors.*[7]

30. 3) *These defer the execution (at least fully) of the sentence until the final judgment:* St. Justin, saying that after death the souls of the pious are in a better place, but those of the impious in a worse place, waiting for the judgment (R 132), so that then the wicked will be sent to perpetual fire, but the good will obtain a state of immortality. St. Irenaeus, saying that the souls of the just go to an invisible place and after the resurrection they will come "to the vision of God" (R 259). Tertullian, saying "all [other] souls are kept in Hell until the Second Coming of the Lord" (R 351), so that there "are both punishment and refreshment...? in expectation of the judgment," while "no one... departing from the body immediately dwells in the presence of the Lord, except by the privilege of martyrdom."[8]

In general the *Millenarists,* who will be treated later, proposing a kingdom under Christ the King for a thousand years at the end of the world before the definitive ascent into heaven.

Calvin, saying that "the souls of the pious... are admitted to a blessed rest, where with happy delight they wait for the fruition of the promised glory; and thus all are held suspended until Christ the Redeemer appears...

1. Eusebius Caes. *Hist. eccl.* 6,37: MG 20,597.
2. St. Jerome, *Cont. Vigil.* 6: ML 43,344-352.
3. M. Jugies, *Theologia dogmatica christianorum orientalium ab Ecclesia catholica dissidentium* t.5 (Paris 1935) c.9 a.2.
4. Luther, *Epist.,* Jan. 13, 1522 (see Enders, *Luther's Briefwechsel* t.3 p.269f.): "I am inclined to agree with you in the opinion that the souls of the just are sleeping and do not know where they are until the day of judgment... Therefore my opinion about this is uncertain. But it seems probable, with a few exceptions, that all are sleeping in an unconscious state."
5. See A. Tanquerey, *Adventistes:* DTC 1,513; B. Lavaud, O.P., *Sectes modernes et foi catholique* (Aubier 1954) 135-140, 154f., 178-181, 210-213.228.
6. See Rivière, 1727. But many other Protestants admit the particular judgment and reject the idea of sleeping souls: see Knabenbauer, *op.cit.,* p.43.
7. See Jugie, *op.cit.,* t.4 (Paris 1931) n.19-22.
8. Tertullian, *De anima* c.58: ML 2,750; see R 352.

For the reprobate there is no doubt about the same fate, which Jude assigns for the devils, that they are held bound in chains until they are handed over to the punishment that they deserve."[9]

Among the *Greek-Russians* the idea of a *full* retribution deferred to the last judgment, proposed by Photius and propagated by others (Thyophylactus, Simeone Thessalonicensis, etc.), was taught: a) until the Council of Florence by many Greek-Russians; b) in the 16th and 17th centuries quite commonly by Greek authors, and continues even now, as is clear from the works of Messoloras, etc.; but the Slavs, at least since the 18th century, have adhered to Catholic doctrine, while, after the reformation of Comrade Protasov, a few of them expressly teach that delay, but many speak about it in a very obscure fashion.[10]

St. Bernard often taught that deceased just persons immediately after death will obtain immense happiness, but not the beatific vision until the resurrection.[10*]

John XXII, the Supreme Pontiff, followed him almost to the letter, and the *Friars Minor* followed him, as is generally reported.[11] He held that immediately after death some reward is given to the just, like seeing already the humanity of Christ in heaven, and that the wicked are punished in hell in some way; *but before the final judgment that neither the face-to-face vision of God is granted to the blessed nor the punishment of fire to the damned.*

However, he taught this as a private teacher, not as Pontiff, and he held it theoretically or for the sake of debate, thinking that he could be deceived in these matters and permitting others to think differently until the question should be decided authoritatively. Hence he took care to have the matter studied by the Doctors, and frequently summoning debates in his presence on this point, he was prepared to abandon his opinion if it was shown to be against the faith. Indeed, on the day before his death he ordered a declaration of the true doctrine in the presence of all the Cardinals, etc. He said that previously he thought differently about this matter by pondering it and speaking about it. In this way he prepared the way for his successor, Benedict XII, to proclaim a definition of the true teaching.[12]

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9. Calvin, *Institut. Relig. Christ.* 1.3 c.25 n.6f. Moreover in his work, *Psychopannychia* (Strasbourg 1542), he refutes those who say that souls are as it were in a state of perpetual sleep.
10. J. Hergenroether, *Photius* 3 (Regensburg 1869)l Jugie, *loc.cit.*, p.43-84; M. Gordillo, S.J., *Compendium theologiae orientalis*[2] (Rome 1939) 193-197; G. Hoffmann, S.J., *Formulae praeviae ad definitionem Concilii Florentini de Novissimis:* Greg 18 (1937) 340-346.

10* B. de Vergille, S.J., *L'attente des Saints d'après Saint Bernard:* NouvRevTh 70 (1948) 225-244.

11. See however L. Wadding, *Annales Minorum* t.1C p.118.
12. Le Bachelet, *loc.cit.;* N. Valois, *Histoire litéraire de France* 34 (Paris 1915) 551-627; F. Lakner, S.J., *Zur Eschatologie bei Johannes XXII:* ZkathTh 72 (1950) 325-332. See for the history of the controversy also D. Douie, *John XXII and the Beatific Vision:* DonSt 5 (1950) 154-174.

12* On the history and meaning of the Florentine definition, see M. Candal, S.J., *Processus discussionis de Novissimis in Concilio Florentino:* OrChP 19 (1953) 303-349.

31. Doctrine of the Church. It teaches *explicitly* the first assertion, that is, the immediate retribution of reward or punishment; it teaches *implicitly* the second one, that is, that there is a particular judgment, since the assignment of reward and punishment supposes a judgment.

Benedict XII (D 1000): "By this constitution, which is to remain in force forever, We, with apostolic authority, define the following: according to the general disposition of God the souls of all the saints... provided they were not in need of any purification when they died, or will not be in need of any when they die in the future, or else, if they then needed or will need some purification, after they have been purified after death... all these souls, immediately after death and, in the case of those in need of purification, after the purification mentioned above... already before... the general judgment after the Ascension of the Savior... have been, are, and will be with Christ in heaven... and they have seen and see the divine essence with an intuitive vision and even face to face... Moreover we define that according to the general disposition of God, the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin go down into hell immediately after death and there suffer the pains of hell...."

Almost the same thing is taught by the *Council of Lyons II* (D 854-859), the *Council of Florence* (D 1304-1306, 1314-1316).[12*] Similarly the *Council of Lyons I* (D 839), John XXII (D 926), Clement VI (D 1066-1067).

The Council of Trent (D 1821) says that the saints are "reigning together with Christ," and "enjoying eternal happiness in heaven."

The canonizations of the saints testify to the same faith.

Pius XII: "A true judgment about the moral state of each man and the decree concerning his definitive fate pertains to God alone. He passes judgment according as he finds a man at the moment when he calls him to eternity...

"No human sentence decides ultimately and definitively the fate of a man, but only the judgment of God, whether for individual acts or for his whole life. Therefore, where human judges may be mistaken, the supreme Judge will restore justice, first of all immediately after death, in a definitive judgment on the whole life of each man, and then, later and more completely, in the presence of all, at the general judgment" (see n. 8).

In Vatican Council I a definition was prepared (see n. 8).

32. Theological note. *Defined diving and Catholic faith: Explicitly*, regarding the first assertion or the immediate retribution. *Implicitly,* regarding the second assertion, that is, the existence of the particular judgment, since the assigning of a reward or punishment supposes a judgment (D 1000).

According to Pohle-Gierens, Piolanti, etc., the existence of the particular judgment is "proximate to faith"; according to Michel it is "of Catholic faith" (*de fide catholica*).[13]

33. Proof from Holy Scripture. While treating the future retribution of men, and especially the general judgment, and perhaps explicitly it never mentions the particular judgment, still occasionally it refer sufficiently to the immediate *essential* conferring of reward or punishment after death.

Luke 16:19-31: *There was a rich man... And at his gate lay a poor man named Lazarus... The poor man died and was carried by the angels to Abraham's bosom. The rich man also died and was buried in hell.... And he [the rich man] called out "Father Abraham: Then I beg you, father, to send him [Lazarus] to my father's house, for I have five brothers, so that he may warn them, lest they also come into this place of torment....*

Therefore in this parable which, although perhaps it is not about historical persons, is manifestly *doctrinal:* a) Lazarus dies and is carried (*immediately,* from the obvious sense) to Abraham's bosom and therefore to the happiness *then possible* (since no man was gifted with the vision of God before the death of Christ); the rich man dies and is buried *immediately* in the *fire* of hell. b) These things take place *before the resurrection,* according to the conversation of the rich man with Abraham about his brothers who are still living on earth; surely from the obvious meaning, there is no intervening delay after his death.[13*]

N.B. From the Greek text, verse 23 reads: *And he was buried. And being in torment, he lifted up his eyes...* Therefore the meaning is not changed.

Luke 23:43: *Today you will be with me in Paradise.* Therefore, the good thief immediately after death, since nothing is said to the contrary, is thought to become a partaker in the same glory of Christ, although it cannot be from the word "paradise" alone.[14]

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13. Pohle-Gierens, 3 p.656; Piolanti, 19; Michel, *op.cit.,* 33.

13* As is clear from the context, there cannot be any doubt, which Chaine raises, *loc.cit.,* 410 (see also Lagrange, *Evangile selon Saint Luc*[1] [Paris 1927] 445), that he is talking about hell: see L. Marchal, *Evangile selon Luc:* PirClam 10 (Paris 1950) 201-203; Knabenbauer, *Evangelium secundum Lucam* (Paris 1905) 480-483; Bonsirven, *Théologie...* 163; M. Meinertz, *Theologie des Neuen Testament,* 1 (Bonn 1950) 68f.

14. Suarez, *loc.cit.,* q.46 a.11 n.4-8; d.43 s.3 n.2-4; Knabenbauer, *Evangelium* (Paris 1905) 626; Lagrange, *op. cit.,* 591; Marchal, *op.cit.,* 277. See however on the meaning of the word „paradise" among some Fathers, Petavius, *De Deo Uno* 1.7 c.14 n.7-10; I. Ayer de Vuippens, O.M. Cap., *Ou plaça-t-on le paradis terrestre?:* EtFranç 36 (1924) 117-140.

14* D. Petavius, S.J., *loc.cit.,* 1.7 c.13 n.6: "This famous place and especially suited to our question." See Le Bachelet, *loc.cit.,* 674-694; he also says there is no unanimity of the commentators on the interpretation of Luke 23:43.

34. 2 Cor. 5:6-8: *While we are at home* (ἐνδημοῦντες) *in the body we are away from* (ἐκδημοῦμεν) *the Lord; for we walk by faith, not by sight* (οὐ διὰ εἴδους), that is, not by the objectively visible form, and therefore not by intuition (in comparison with 1 Cor. 13:12). *We are of good courage* (θαρροῦμεν) *and we would rather be* (εὐδοκοῦμεν) *away from the body and at home with the Lord.*[14*]

Therefore as is clear from the contrast of ideas, the just, among whom Paul numbers himself, as living, or *while they are in the body, are away from the Lord* and walk by faith, so by death or when *they are away from the body*, they are *at home with the Lord* and *walk by sight* or they see the Lord intuitively. But that transition from bodily life to the vision of God takes place, from the obvious meaning, after death with no intervening delay, and therefore a fortiori before the resurrection: a) from the obvious meaning of the text; b) because the desire to die quickly in order to see Christ would be pointless, if it were to be obtained only after the resurrection; c) because that "being away from the body" would lack meaning after the resurrection.

The following agree with this: Phil. 1:23: *My desire is to depart and be with Christ,* where "to depart" and "to be with Christ" are joined together. 1 Thess. 5:10: *He died* (Christ) *for us so that whether we wake or sleep* (i.e., die) *we might live with him.*

In these Pauline texts he is dealing with knowing *one and the same object,* now by faith and then by sight. But since it would be ineptly supposed that that object of *faith* is only the humanity of Christ, likewise it would be improper to think that only this humanity and not the divinity of Christ is the object of that vision. Moreover, those just are thought to become partakers *in the glory itself of Christ,* and this is a point that should be well noted.

For the particular judgment these texts are usually cited: 2 Cor. 5:10; Heb. 9:27; 2 Tim. 4:8. There are good reasons for that, but not with full certitude, since perhaps in those texts the author is referring directly to the general judgment. Likewise these passages can be understood in the same way: Matt. 18:23-25; 25:14-30; Luke 16:1-8; 19:11-27.

35. Proof from tradition. A. *The holy Fathers.* If an exception is made for Lactantius and perhaps for Aphraates (see n. 29), no Father is cited who denied the particular judgment[15]; actually, they imply it implicitly, when they

15. And it is not right to say that St. Cyril of Alex. (R 2140) did not know about it; for, v.gr., when treating the hour of death he says that then all the thoughts, words and deeds of a man will be up for judgment (*Hom.14:* MG 77,1076). Hence those words of his can be taken to be about total retribution, or also with regard to the body which will be deferred until the last judgment.

suppose that after death souls are assigned to different places, depending on whether they are just or wicked. But that the judgment is put into execution immediately, especially with regard to the essential reward, which is our main concern here, although it is not denied, at least in a way that lacks all doubt, except for the few mentioned in n. 29, is not proposed clearly by all of them.[16]

However, the true doctrine is clearly handed on by many, inasmuch as they teach with correct or equivalent words that the souls of the just immediately after death obtain the vision of God or beatitude, but that the souls of the wicked immediately after death are sent to hell.

a) *They treat beatitude and hell together.* Origen (R 466): "The soul... after its departure from the world, will be rewarded according to its deserts, being destined to obtain either an inheritance of eternal life and blessedness..., or to be delivered up to eternal fire and punishments."

St. Caesarius of Arles (R 2234): "... When the flesh... begins to be devoured by the worms in the tomb, the soul is presented to God by the angels in heaven, and there also, if it was good, it is crowned, or, if it was evil, it is cast into the darkness."

St. Gregory the Great (R 2320): As the just are now in heaven or are glorified, so the unjust now are in hell or are tormented. "For, just as beatitude makes the elect happy, so it is necessary to believe that from the day of their death fire burns the reprobate."

St. Jerome: "... What... will take place for all on the day of judgment, this is carried out for each person on the day of death."[17]

36. b) *They treat beatitude in particular.* St. Ignatius of Antioch: "Permit me to be the food of beasts, through whom I can obtain God."[18] St. Clement of Rome (R 11): "Let us put before our eyes... Peter, who... underwent many sufferings, and having thus born testimony went to his well-deserved place of glory... Paul... passed from the world and was taken up to the Holy place... the women Danaids and Dircae... they kept up the race of faith to the finish and... won the prize they deserved."

St. Cyprian: "...Let us embrace the day (of death)... which having taken us from here... places us in paradise... There a great number of dear ones await us... and a huge crowd desires it... In that place there is such delight in

16. Bardy, *Les Pères...* 175-192, thinks that several Fathers in the first centuries put off the full retribution of reward (except for the martyrs and certain other just persons) and of punishment to the last judgment.

17. St. Jerome, *In Ioel comment.* c.2: ML 25,965; see *Epist.22 ad Eust.* N.41: ML 22,424f. However see Tixeront, *loc.cit.*, 2,342, concerning the damned.

18. St. Ignatius of Antioch, *Ad Rom.* 4; see *Ad Rom.* 7; *Ad Trall.* 13: MG 5,690.694.696. (F.X. Funk, *Patres Apostolici* [Tübingen 1901] 1,257, 261-271.)

the heavenly kingdom...since there is the greatest and perpetual happiness."[19]

St. Ephraem (R 721): "The just are in heaven" (see R 739).[20] St. Gregory of Nyssa: "The spouse has not been taken away from us... No longer through a mirror or through a net or an enigma, but she intercedes for us before God face to face.[21]

St. Gregory Nazianzen: "I do not doubt that the things they see with their eyes are much more excellent than what you now enjoy, namely... the choirs of angels, the heavenly order, the contemplation of glory..., a more perfect illumination of the supreme Trinity, not as now evading a limited mind dependent on the senses, but offering itself to the total mind for perfect contemplation...."[22]

37. c) *They treat hell in particular.* St. Hilary (R 886): "This anger is not capricious..., lest anyone however delude himself about the ease of punishment amid the delay of judgment... For the infernal persecutor receives us, and when we depart from the body, if we have lived badly, immediately we lose the right way. Witnesses for us about this are the rich man and the pauper in the Gospel—the place of punishment received one of them immediately. But the punishment of the dead received him so quickly that his brothers are still on earth. In that place there is no room for postponement or delay...."

St. John Chrysostom: "It is a great calamity to depart from here having a heavy burden of sins... In that place there is judgment... The rich man wept abundantly but it had no effect. How many things were said by those who did not honor Christ, but they were cast into the eternal fire."

St. Augustine: "The evil will have to suffer even more, because after this life they will be received into eternal punishments."[23]

38. But it is not surprising, if, in the doctrine not yet clearly proposed by the Church, there would be place for doubts because of the difficulty of reconciling this doctrine with other certain doctrines (v.gr., the resurrection). Indeed, the case is such, that the same men who deny the true doctrine or are said to call it into doubt: either teach it elsewhere explicitly or implicitly, v.gr., in the doctrine of the descent of Christ into the underworld to glorify the saints, of the intercession of the saints, etc.; or can be supposed simply to teach that the *integral* beatitude, that is, of the body and the soul, is given in the resurrection, or that essential beatitude even with regard to the soul is increased by the resurrection, but they do not doubt about the beatitude already given to them. Hence he would not be easily reprimanded who, v.gr., with Bellarmine would interpret all of

19. St. Cyprian, *De mortalit.* C.26: ML 4,601f.
20. G. Ricciotti, *S. Efrem Siro* (Turin 1925) 176-189.
21. St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Meletio epis.:* MG 46,862. See *In funere Stae. Pulcheriae:* MG 46,870.
22. St. Gregory Naz., *In laudem Gorgoniae sororis suae* n.23: MG 35,815.
23. St. John Chrysostom, *In ep. Ad Eph. hom.* 24,6,5: MG 62,175f.; St. Augustine, *Serm.* 202 c.20: ML 38,1392.

them in a way that is fully Catholic.[24]

a) St. Hilary, who says, as we have seen, that punishment is given immediately to the damned, and that glory is conferred on the martyrs immediately, also says regarding the other just: "... Those departing the body in order to enter the heavenly kingdom through the protection of the Lord are kept faithful, that is, gathered together meanwhile in the bosom of Abraham, ... until the time arrives again to enter into the kingdom of heaven...."[25] But these words are not clear, since it is certain that the bosom of Abraham no longer exists, and since at least some other Fathers say that these words mean heaven.[26]

b) St. John Chrysostom: "If in this life only we have our hope in Christ, we are more miserable than all men... For if the soul remains here and is a thousand times immortal, as it really is, without the flesh it will not receive those ineffable gifts, just as it will not be punished... For if the body does not resurrect, the soul remains uncrowned outside of that beatitude which is in heaven...."[27]

These words, however, which seem to deny that the soul before the resurrection is beatified or punished, are really reconciled with the texts of the Doctor recently quoted about the immediate retribution of the just and of sinners, if he understands the assertion of Paul in such a way that, in wishing to express *the fact of the resurrection,* he as it were denies that *in this order* without it eternal beatitude or punishment can be given; that being the case, he says as it were that *in this order* there will be no future beatitude or punishment, unless there is a resurrection.

c) St. Augustine: "All souls have," he says, "when they depart from this world, their own different receptions. The good have joy, the evil torments. But when the resurrection will have taken place, the joy of the good will be greater and the punishment of the evil more severe, when they are tormented with the body...."[28]

Accordingly, the soul after death has rest or punishment, but greatly increased by the resurrection; therefore to them is not denied, at least clearly, that essential beatitude or punishment is given after death, although it is not at that time to be had perfectly. But is the beatitude of the separated soul like that of the angels, as if the soul would see God as the angels do? Augustine does not venture to solve this problem.[29]

d) St. Ambrose says: "Souls are judged immediately after death; hence "for some there is punishment, for others glory, and still neither the former in the meantime are without injury, nor the latter without fruit." But in the concrete: some souls, like that of St. John the Evangelist, and without doubt the souls of the martyrs, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, and a few other (perfect) just persons of the N.T. obtain glory immediately. b) The souls of the wicked and apostates immediately go to hell and are punished there. c) Christians, whose works are not in accord with the faith are tested by fire, some more

24. St. R. Bellarmine, *De Ecclesia triumphante* 1.1 c.4f. See Le Bachelet, *loc.cit.*, 684-688.
25. St. Hilary, *In ps.* 120,16: ML 9,660.
26. Palmieri, § 8 n.10.
27. St. John Chrysostom, *In 1 Cor* hom.39 n.3: MG 61,336. See Schiwietz, *loc.cit.:* Kath (1914,1) 51f.200-204.408.
28. St. Augustine, *In Io evang.* tr.49 n.10: ML 35,1751f. See *Sermo.* 280 c.5: ML 38,1283.
29. St. Augustine, *De gen. ad litt.* 1,12 c.35: ML 34,483; *Retract.* 1.1 n.2: ML 32,606. See E. Portalié, S.J., *Augustin (Saint)* 1,2244-2247; V. de Broglie, S.J., *De fine ultimo humanae vitae tractatus theologicus:* Pars prior (Paris 1948) p. 82f.

than others, so that those whose good works surpass their sins, or those having venial sins, are punished according to their defects, for some time and when fully purified they obtain some happiness, but not complete happiness before the last judgment; but those whose sins surpass their good works are punished, at least until the last judgment, with the wicked and the apostates.[30]

39. B. *Ancient monuments.* The martyrs think that they will obtain eternal life immediately after their death. It is certain that the cult of the saints was practiced from the first centuries. Ancient inscriptions on tombs testify to the conviction about the eternal life obtained by the saints: "May you live in God and ask. Pray for us your parents," etc.[31]

40. Theological reasoning. The descent of Christ into the underworld generally from the beginning was understood in such a way that the souls of the just detained there are freed from that condition.[32] But no other liberation of the just souls, except for their definitive triumph with the glorious Christ, can be assigned according to Scripture, which after the death of Christ mentions the one definitive destiny of eternal life for the just person already fully purified. Likewise, therefore, after the triumph of Christ every just soul obtains eternal life immediately after death.

Natural reason is in accord with the thesis. Since neither judgment is necessarily had immediately after death, nor is it necessarily put into execution immediately, these two assertions of our thesis then depend on a free decision of God. Hence reason alone can show only their *fittingness*: The time of meriting and demeriting is completed by death; but the merit and demerit of a man depend especially and mainly and essentially on the soul; but the separated soul is suited for accepting the fruit of the Redemption and in concrete for the vision of God. "Therefore there is no reason why, in the punishment or reward of souls, a restoration of bodies is to be expected" (*Suppl.* q. 88, a. 1; CG 91).

41. Objections. 1. Rev. 6:9-11: *I saw under the altar the souls of those who had been slain for the word of God... they cried out with a loud voice, "O sovereign Lord,*

30. St. Ambrose, *De bono mortis* c.10 n.45-48: ML 14,560f.; *In ps 119* serm.20,12: ML 15,1487; *De fide* 1.4 n.8: ML 16,619; *De excessu fratris* 2,94: ML 16, 1341f.; *In ps.41* 7: ML 14,1071; *In ps.119* serm.20,13: ML 15,1487. See J.N. Niederhuber, *Die Eschatologie des heiligen Ambrosius* (Paderborn 1907) p.32-41; A. Largent, *Ambrose (Saint):* DTC 1,950f.; he says that the teaching of the holy Doctor is correct, although perhaps not always clear.

31. See O. Marucchi, *Manuale di Archeologia cristiana* (Rome 1925) part.4 p.223ff.; Th. Ruinart, *Acta primorum martyrum* (Amsterdam 1713) p. 122-133, 196.349.534, etc.; Scaglia, *op.cit,* p.83-89. See also H. Delehaye, *"Sanctus" Essai sur le culte des Saints dans l'antiquité* (Brussels 1927); P. Dorfler, *Die Anfänge der Heiligeverehrung nach den römischen Inschriften und Bildwerken* (Munich 1913).

32. See H. Quilliet, *Descente de Jésus aux enfers:* DTC 6,578-611. The delay of vision for them was not a *personal* punishment, but only because of a human nature not yet perfectly regenerated: see Garrigou-Lagrange, *op.cit.,* 204f.

how long before thou wilt judge and avenge our blood on those who dwell upon the earth?" Then they were each given a white robe and told to rest a little longer, until the number of their fellow servants... should be complete, who were to be killed as they themselves had been.

Accordingly, the souls of the martyrs are under the altar and must rest for some time. Therefore they do not yet enjoy glory.

I distinguish the major. The souls of martyrs... must rest while awaiting the judgment of those who dwell upon the earth, *conceded;* while awaiting definitive glory, *denied.*

The authors do not agree on the meaning of the phrase *under the altar.* But it is sufficiently clear that those souls already enjoy glory from the words "they were each given a white robe"; in the context they are not said to be waiting for glory, but for the judgment of those who are dwelling upon the earth.[33]

42. 2. Matt. 25:34-43 (on the last judgment): *Then the king will say to those at his right hand, "Come, O blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world...." Then he will say to those at his left hand, "Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels...."*

Accordingly, the retribution of reward or punishment is given in the last judgment. Therefore it is not immediately after death.

I distinguish the major. Retribution is given in the last judgment by way of confirmation of the preceding judgment immediately put into execution, *conceded;* by way of a first judgment, *denied.*

Surely the object of the text does not require the conclusion given. And for other reasons Scripture, although it often mentions the last judgment, perhaps in order to deter men more effectively from sin, nevertheless teaches sufficiently, at least implicitly, the particular judgment which is put into execution immediately; this is clear from our proofs above.

But since, based on what must be said about the eternity of the reward and punishment, the sentence of the particular judgment is immutable, this judgment and the universal judgment must be said to be deferred, not according to the substance but only with regard to the manner and the circumstances. But the reason why the universal judgment, in addition to the particular, was instituted will be considered elsewhere, and therefore why it is not useless.

43. 3. In the *Mass for the Dead* the Church prays: "Release the souls of all the faithful departed from every bond of sin, O Lord. Enable them by the help of your grace to escape the avenging judgment, that they may enjoy the happiness of eternal light" (Tract). "O Lord, Jesus Christ, glorious king, spare the souls of the faithful departed from the pains of hell and from the deep pit; free them from the jaws of the lion, and let them not descend into hell to be swallowed up in darkness. May holy Michael, your

33. C. A Lapide, S.J., *Commentaria in Apocalypsim Sancti Joannis* (Paris 1859) 146ff.; E.B. Allô, *L'Apocalypse* (Paris 1921) 85f.; A. Gelin, *Apocalypse:* PirClam 12 (Paris 1951) 614f.

standard bearer lead them into the holy light... Receive the sacrifices and prayers of praise, O Lord, which we offer for the souls of those whom we would remember this day. Grant, O Lord, that they may pass from death to life, which you promised of old to Abraham..." (Offertory).

Accordingly, the destiny of the departed souls after death remains uncertain. Therefore they are neither judged nor given a reward or punishment immediately after death.

I deny the major. For those words can really be understood in other ways, for example: a) According to liturgical custom of composing prayers as it were in a dramatic way (v.gr., "Drop down dew, you heavens, from above, and let the clouds rain the just one"), as if the whole matter would take place in the eyes of the Church, these words, imagining a man as now about to die, are the basis of prayers for his eternal salvation: moreover these prayers can be of assistance to him, namely as foreseen by God, so that he be prevented from going to hell, and, if his soul is in purgatory, for a mitigation of his temporal punishment.[34]

b) But since those words seem to be concerned with souls after death, others prefer to interpret them as referring to purgatory.[35]

But since we think that those very serious words do not really apply to purgatory, we take them rather in the first sense, but so that the departed soul is imagined in an anthropomorphic way even after death, as if it were now to be judged.

N.B. The Church, when praying for the saints "that it may give them honor," does not ask that the essential beatitude be given or increased for them, "but that among us their glory may increase, and that they may everywhere be glorified more. Nor does it seem to be absurd if we ask for an increase of their accidental glory...," which "seems to be increased by the honor that is shown to them...." "Perhaps... also the glory of the body is being sought, which they will obtain on the day of the general resurrection."[36]

4. The devils are not in hell (Matt. 8:28-34; Eph. 6:11f.; 2 Pet. 5:8). Therefore their damnation has not yet been put into execution.

a) *I bypass the major,* since we are considering men.

b) But the demons already suffer their whole essential punishment, although their accidental punishment will be increased by their definitive commitment to hell at the end of the world, as is clear from what was said in the treatise *On the Angels.*

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34. Jungmann, n.119; Suarez, *De paenitentia* 48,5,12; J.C. Martinez, S.J., ¿Que hay sobre el infierno? (Madrid 1936) 181; N. Gihr, *Das heilige Messopfer* (Freiburg im Br. 1919) § 43 n.3.

35. Valencia, *In 2.2* d.6 q.2 punct.8; Benedict XIV, *De sacrificio missae* 1.2 c.9; A. Franz, *Die Messe im deutschen Mittelalter* Freiburg 1904) 222f.; F.X. Hecht, P.S.M., *De offertorio missae defunctorum:* EphLitur 50 (1936) 415-418; L. Eisenhofer, *Handbuch der katholischen liturgik* 2 (Freiburg 1933) p.138f. According to J. Stiglmayr (*Das Offertorium in der Requiemsmesse und der Seelendurchgang:* Kath [1913,1] 248-255) the origin of this antiphon could be from the popular conception in Christian antiquity that the souls after leaving the body and passing through the air encounter devils who try to cast them into the abyss; but the good angels help the soul and they accompany it into heaven, being triumphant in the battle. But, even though the antiphon may have this origin, it could never be taken by the Church with regard to that popular meaning, since it is opposed to dogma. On the probable *literal* formation of this antiphon, see J. Beran, *L'offertorio "Domine Iesu Christe" della messa per i defunti:* EphLitur 50 (1936) 140-147. On the Greek-Russian theory of customs, see Jugie, 4 p.23-31.

36. St. Robert Bellarmine 2,18; Lahousse, n. 303.5.

44. Scholium 1. *Some further determinations of the particular judgment, not all of which enjoy the same certitude.*

1) While in a human judgment there is both discussion of the cause by the examination of witnesses, etc., and then the retribution of reward or punishment, in this judgment there is *only retribution*, and therefore no discussion, because the required knowledge of the case for every judgment is not had from an examination of the case, which of course God does not need since he knows all things.

2) *That judgment consists essentially:* a) *On the part of God,* in his knowledge of the case and in the decree of reward or punishment, not precisely expressed in a sensible way. b) *On the part of the soul,* in the clearest knowledge, by an internal illumination produced in the soul by God, of his merits and demerits and of the sentence corresponding to them.[37]

3) *Generally it is held that the judgment takes place instantaneously, and in fact "at the very instant of death"* so that, when it is said that "he has died," it can also be said "he has been judged." Not before, because "in the instant before death there is still time for meriting and demeriting...." But "at the instant of death he is already outside the pilgrim state of life... and consequently there is no reason why in that instant of death he should not receive from the sentence of God the just retribution of his works...."[38]

4) *The judge doubtless is Christ,* as is generally held, although revelation does not teach that expressly; nor is it just as God, but also as man, since all judgment has been given to him by the Father (John 5:22-27; Acts 10:42). Since from the hypostatic union he is king and therefore judge, it is necessary that he pass judgment on each one, just as he will judge all at the last judgment. But it is necessary to think that he exercises that office from the moment of his death or of the accomplished Redemption (Matt. 18:18).[39]

But the separated soul, since it lacks a corporal organ of ocular vision, does not see *Him;* but it sees Him with an *intellectual vision:* a) Doubtless if the soul is just and fully purified, it sees him both according to his humanity and, since from the moment of death it begins to be beatified, and also according to his divinity. b) Probably, according to Siuri and others whom he quotes, the just soul that is not yet purified, and the damned soul, see him only according to his humanity, since that is asserted by some Fathers, and since the vision of the humanity of Christ, as not denied to the reprobate at the last judgment, is not opposed to the guilt of punishment. But these points should be considered as uncertain.[40]

5) *The judgment is thought to be had at the very place of death,* but not as if Christ descends there from heaven or that the soul to be judged is intellectually brought to heaven. but inasmuch as in the place where the soul departs from the body it understands itself to be rewarded or punished by Christ, so that the judgment perhaps takes

37. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 20,14: ML 41,680.
38. Siuri, 2,1,5; St. R. Bellarmine, 1,2 c.4; Michel, *op.cit.*, 37.
39. See Suarez, *De myst. vit. Chr.* D.52 s.2 n.13-16.
40. St. Gregory the Great, *In Evang.* 1.1 hom.13,3: ML 76,1124; Siuri, *loc.cit.*, 2 n.28f.; Suarez says (*ibid., n.16):* "But whether all souls damned and to be purified clearly see the humanity itself is uncertain, because there is not sufficient evidence to affirm it."

place before the soul in that place leaves the body.[41]

6) *Some intervention of angels, good and bad, seems to be sufficiently evident in the execution of the sentence* from Luke 16:22 (about Lazarus carried by angels to the bosom of Abraham) and from the Roman Ritual: "... Hasten, angels of God, to receive his soul...."[42]

7) Since in that judgment the destiny of the soul is fixed irrevocably, the judgment in that sense can be said to be *final.*

45. Scholium 2. *On the receptacles of souls after death.* According to the common teaching of theologians, the souls are constituted not only in some state of beatitude or damnation or purgation, but *in a definite place,* as is easily deduced from Luke 16:22; Acts 1:25, and it is supposed by the Council of Florence (D 1304-1306) and it is asserted unanimously by the Fathers (St. Augustine, R1829, 1930). Indeed, the Fathers and theologians generally think that they cannot depart from their places, according to the ordinary law, although that they do it by way of an exception is not excluded.[43]

41. Suarez, *ibid.*, n.13-16; Palmieri, § 16. St. R. Bellarmine (*loc.cit.*,c.4) says that these views are uncertain, namely, whether in his humanity immediately, or by his divine power, which is present everywhere, he passes judgment and makes it known to the soul through the angels.
42. See J. Rivière, *Rôle du démon au Jugement particulier chez les Pères:* RevScRel 4 (1924) 43-64; Jugie, *loc. cit.*, 4 c.1 a.3. But the description of the Fathers, sometimes found in their sermons and ascetical books about the guardian angel at the right defending us, and about the devil on the left accusing us, while the soul waits in fear to hear the sentence, not formally but only virtually and equivalently takes place, inasmuch as the knowledge of the soul had at the time about his actions is something like all of these things, except for the hesitation for which there is no place at that one moment of time. For this is a vivid description of the divine judgment presented in a human way in order to promote greater spiritual fruit among the faithful (see Suarez, *ibid.*, n.11).
43. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 69, a. 3; Lépicier, *Dell'anima umana separata dal corpo* (Vicenza 1935) c.1 n.5; St. R. Bellarmine, 1.2 c.8.

CHAPTER III

On beatitude

46. *It is supposed here,* since these things are clear from the whole Christian economy both in teaching and in acting, that: a) God is the last end of the rational creature (Rev. 1:8); and in this order man is destined to a last *supernatural* end. b) Every man in the pilgrim state of life, who elicits acts proportionate to that supernatural end, will finally obtain it.

Also, although the final end and beatitude differ *formally,* since the former refers rather to the formal nature of the final cause, but the latter to a perfect and absolute good, *it is supposed here* that: a) They are in reality one and the same. For the end, since it is a good desirable by reason of itself, if it is the last, it is desired by reason of itself, because by reason of it all other things, at least ultimately, are desired; otherwise, besides it, there would be something in which the appetite would ultimately rest and which therefore would have the nature of a last end, so that—something that is impossible—for one nature there would be several final ends. b) Hence the last end is both necessarily unique and it contains everything good, so that everything can be loved and desired because of it.

Hence if the final cause (*finis qui*) is the intended good, and the end for whom (*finis cui*) is the subject for whom it is intended, and the formal cause (*finis quo*) is the possession of that good, for the *last end* of the creature: a) the final cause (*qui*) is objective beatitude, b) the formal cause (*quo*) is formal beatitude.

47. Likewise *it is supposed*: a) *As at least certain,* that man in this life can obtain some supernatural beatitude, which is the beginning of perfect happiness, but imperfect (Matt. 5; Ps. 119:1), inasmuch as in this life there is something very good and ultimate in the order of grace, though which a man is joined together with his supernatural end, to the extent that it is possible in this life; but per se it is not, at least according to the ordinary law, perfect (Rom. 8:23; Heb. 13:14; 1 Pet. 1:3-5; 2 Tim. 2:1-6; 4:6-8; etc. See D 894, 1000-1001).[1] b) *As at least implicitly defined faith* (D 1545-1547, 1574), that man for the other life both can and must obtain beatitude, which is supernatural, not by the powers of nature, but by his good works through the help of grace.

1. S.Th. I-II, q.5, a. 3; q. 60, a. 2; Lessius, *De summo bono et aeterna hominis beatitudine* (Antuerpiae 1615) 1,9,57-62. However Christ in this life was already blessed, since he was at the same time both wayfarer and comprehensor. Regarding other saints, if perhaps one of them in this life saw God (n.74,1), he cannot be said to be blessed simply because of a lack of perpetuity, which belongs to the nature of beatitude (Suarez, *De fine hominis* 14,3,4).

48. *But to the just is promised as their end:* a) In the documents of the Church: Eternal life (D 30, 76). An everlasting homeland (D 839). Heaven (D 857). The kingdom of heaven and a heavenly paradise (D 1000). The vision and enjoyment of God (ibid.). True beatitude (ibid.). Eternal rest (ibid.). Eternal beatitude (D 1067). The vision of God one and three (D 1305). Glory (D1582). Eternal retribution D 1576). A supernatural end (D 2851, 3005).

b) In Scripture: Life (Matt. 18:8), eternal life (Matt. 25:46 and elsewhere often), the crown of life (Jas. 1), the tree of life (Rev. 2:7). Glory (Rom. 8:18), heavenly glory (2 Tim. 2:10), the eternal glory of God (1 Pet. 5:10). Rest (Heb. 4:3.11). Salvation (2 Tim. 2:19). The crown of justice (2 Tim. 4:8). A kingdom (Matt. 25:34). An eternal house (2 Cor. 5:1). Paradise (Luke 23:43).

They will be in heaven where they will have an abundant reward (Luke 6:23), a treasure (Matt. 6:20); they will enjoy an incorruptible and pure inheritance (1 Pet. 1:3f.), they will be with God (Rev. 21:3), with Christ (Mark 16:19, etc.), with the angels (Matt. 22:30, etc.). They will be in the house of the Father, where there are many mansions (John 14:2), with Christ (John 17:24), as his co-heirs and also of God (Rom. 8:17) or seeing God face to face (1 Cor. 13:9-120 as he is (1 John 3:2). Enlightened by God they will reign forever (Rev. 22:3-5), immortal and physically and morally incorruptible (21:4f.) and impeccable (1 Pet. 3f.).

Therefore it is not surprising if, given these words of Scripture, the Fathers and theologians extol the happiness of the blessed with great praise. Thus St. Anselm says: "... Consider (O my soul) intently how delightful that good is, which contains the joy of everything good; but it is not such as we have experienced in created things, but it differs as much as the Creator differs from the creature... O you who will enjoy this good. And what will there be for him and what will there not be for him? Certainly, whatever he wishes, he will have; and what he does not want, he will not have...."[2]

From these words, therefore, and from others, it is clear that the just person after death will both exist without evil and have only what is good, and so he will be truly happy.

49. Besides the authors mentioned at the beginning of the treatise, of the many who have written expressly about heavenly beatitude, the following should be listed: St. R. Bellarmine, *De aeterna felicitate sanctorum libri quinque* (Rome 1616); D. Bañez, O.P., *De fine ultimo et de actibus*

2. St. Anselm, *Proslogion* c.24-26: ML 158,239-242; St. Augustine: R 1786-1788.

humanis, ed. V. Beltrán de Heredia, O.P. (Madrid 1942) q.1-5; C. Cruysberghs, *De hominis ultimo fine naturali* (Mechlin 1941); Lessius, *loc.cit.;* J.M. Ramírez, O.P., *De hominis beatitudine tractatus theologicus* (Matriti 1942.1943.1947); De Broglie, *op.cit.;* J. Theissing, *Die Lehre Iesu von der ewiger Seligkeit. Ein Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Theologie* (Breslau 1940); E. Krebs, *Was kein Auge gesehen. Unser Leben im Jenseits, unsere Geistesschau und seliges Wiedersehen mit unserem Lieben* (Freiburg 1936); G. Joannes, *La vie de l'au-delà dans la vision béatifique* (Paris 1947); L. Brémond, *Le ciel. Ses joies. Ses splendeurs* (Paris 1925); J.A. Chollet, *La psychologie des élus* (Paris 1924); J. Hertling, S.J., *Der Himmel* (Munich 1952); Lercher, *Ewige Heimat*[2] (Innsbruck 1939); P. Bérnard, *Ciel:* DTC 2,2474-2511; A. Gardeil, *Béatitude:* DTC 2,497-515; A. Michel, *Gloire:* DTC 6,1393-1425; Garrigour-Lagrange, *De beatitudine, de actibus humanis et habitibus* (Rome 1951); K. Schilder, *Wac is de Hemel*[2] (Kamp 1954); P. Lumbreras, O.P.. *De fine ultimo hominis* (Madrid 1954); G. Panneton, *Le ciel ou l'enfer* (Paris 1955).

ARTICLE I

ON THE ESSENTIAL OBJECT OF BEATITUDE

Thesis 3. Supernatural, essential and objective beatitude for the soul is God alone.

S.Th. I, q. 26, a. 3; I-II, q. 2; 3 CG 27-37; Suarez, *loc.cit.,* d.5 s.1f.; Ramírez, 2 n.340-354; Pesch, 3 n.423-429; Lennerz, n.4-20.

50. Connection. The supernatural beatitude described in the sources, which in this order is the last end of the wayfarer, must now be considered, and it will be first of all *in itself,* both on the part of the object and on the part of the subject, and after that *in its properties.* Hence first of all, what is the nature of beatitude *considered in itself?* But since one kind of beatitude can be essential and another kind accidental, we will now treat first *essential* beatitude, and put off the consideration of accidental beatitude until later. But since this beatitude cannot be fully understood unless its *object* is known, it will be considered in the first place. Therefore, since it is supposed that there is an object of beatitude that is both necessary and sufficient, our attention will now focus on that.

51. Definition of terms. Boethius defines *beatitude* as "a perfect state with the aggregation of everything good."[3] It can also be defined simply as: "The supreme good fully satisfying the rational appetite." Therefore the formal reason why the supreme good or the aggregation of good makes a man happy is because it totally satisfies the rational appetite.

Accordingly, beatitude: a) Is *a good proper to a rational nature,* since irrational beings cannot know the supreme good. b) It includes *every good* necessary or useful in order to fully satisfy the rational nature. c) Consequently, it excludes every evil. d) It is *a permanent condition* or state and it is known as such.

Many other definitions of beatitude are proposed, but all of them suppose that it is of such a nature that the soul is rendered fully at rest, and therefore such a beatitude from the common consent of all.[4] Of these, some express it as "the aggregate of all the perfections of man," so that thus it designates "a certain happy state, in which a man has the fullness of good things and the complement of his desires."

But rightly others speak about it as "the supreme perfection of man, whereby he is joined to the perfect and supreme good, or to his last end." For, "although many things pertain to the perfect state of beatitude, still it is necessary that among them something is the greatest, to which the others are referred or from which they flow as from the first source or they are contained in it in an eminent way," since there cannot be a perfect aggregation of many things without their mutual order. "Therefore that supreme and perfect good is called the essence of beatitude, and all other things are like its properties and accidents."[5]

Supernatural beatitude, which is the only one properly given in this order, is that which surpasses the powers of nature and the requirements of nature, while *natural beatitude,* which we are not considering here directly, does not surpass them.

Objective beatitude is the beatifying good itself, while *subjective* or *formal* beatitude is the possessing of the beatifying object as such.

Objective essential beatitude, which is the only kind dealt with in this thesis, is the necessary and sufficient object in order to beatify, while *accidental* beatitude is an object completing beatitude, but it is neither necessary or sufficient for it, or also for the essential object as such (S.Th I-II, q. 3, a. 3).

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3. Boethius, *De consol. Phil.* 1.3 pros.2: ML 63,724.
4. St. Augustine, *Enarr. in ps. 2* n.11: ML 36,72: "The sum and mass of everything good." St. Gregory on Nyssa, *De beati.* or.1: ML 44,1195: "It is a certain comprehension of all those things which are understood under the name of the good; nothing is absent from it of the things that pertain to the desire and longing for what is good." S.Th. I-II, q. 3, a. 2: "Man's supreme perfection"; I-II, q. 2, a. 8: "Happiness is the perfect good, which lulls the appetite altogether"; Suarez, 4,1,5: "The attainment of the ultimate and supreme good, which can be desired by man, and in which the other things are virtually contained, or are referred to it." On the names with which secular authors apply to beatitude, see Ramírez, 2 n.3-11.
5. Suarez, 4,1,1-4.

Both objective and formal beatitude produce one beatitude. For a good fully external to us, or in some way not united to us, cannot make us happy; likewise, the possession only of the beatifying object is truly beatifying. But since both the beatifying thing and its union with us are required together, both are said to be our beatitude; therefore beatitude, *in simple terms,* as one thing is both objective and formal.

Imperfect beatitude, which we said above can be had in this life, is not the fullness, since it does not fully satisfy the appetite, in the way that *perfect* beatitude does. The former is called *the way,* but the latter is the *homeland* (S.Th. I-II, q. 3, a. 2 ad 4; a. 5; q. 5, a. 3). In this treatise we are considering only the *perfect* form, which by antonomasia is called "beatitude."

For the soul. We add this in order to avoid all questions about the nature of beatitude after the resurrection.

God is taken materially or as he exists in himself, so that in the thesis we prescind both from the formal reason under which he makes souls blessed and from the way in which he is attained as the beatifying object.

God alone, that is, God with the exclusion of any creature whatsoever. But that will be made certain, if God is proved to be the object of beatitude who is both necessary and sufficient; for if he is necessary, by that fact others are not sufficient, and if at the same time he is sufficient, others are not necessary.

52. Adversaries. Several philosophers, both ancient and modern, who placed the supreme good or beatitude either in the good of the body or in the good of the soul or in both.

a) *In pleasure.* Thus individual *Hedonism,* whether bestial or unrestrained, Eudoxus , Aristippus, etc., whether scientific and moderated or regulated, Epicurus and many *Humanists.*

b) *In virtue and wisdom.* Thus *Stoicism,* for whose author Zeno the last end of man is "to live in accordance with nature (or according to reason)." Ch. Wolf adopted this view and was followed by Leibnitz; a more or less refined version was taught by Schleiermacher, Wundt and others. *Progressivism* also belongs here; for it the supreme good is continual progress towards greater perfection concerning all parts of human nature and especially with regard to the rational soul.

c) *In the accumulation of the goods of body and soul.* Thus many, especially philosophers like Aristotle, who give preeminence to virtue and wisdom.

d) *In the absence of suffering.* Thus Diodorus, Hieronymus Rhodius; then also some *pessimists*, like Schopenhauer, who hold that positive happiness is impossible.

e) *Social Hedonism*, which Bentham initiated and Hobbes developed; Stuart Mill perfected it and others, like Lotze, Paulsen, etc., taught it. It stated that the final end of human life consists in procuring the greatest possible pleasure for the greatest possible number of men. Spencer and Darwin said that this social hedonism is the last stage in the evolution of individual hedonism, because it manifests perfect harmony between egoism or the egocentric inclinations of the individual and altruism or the promotion of the common good.[6]

No philosopher perhaps places happiness theoretically in riches, glory, power; but in practice not a few men place the supreme good of life in one or other of those things.

53. Doctrine of the Church. In general, the Church supposes that it is one of the basic Christian dogmas that our happiness consists in the possession of God as the object that is both necessary and sufficient.

In particular, God is said to be the object of beatitude in the documents without mentioning any other object. Benedict XII (D 1000): "... by this vision and enjoyment (of God) the souls of those who have already died are truly blessed ...." With these words it is implicitly defined that God is the sufficient object of supernatural beatitude, since from the vision of him alone the soul is said to be *truly blessed.*

The Council of Florence (D 1305): "The souls... are received immediately into heaven and see clearly God himself, one and three, as he is."[7]

54. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 1000, 1305): God is the object of supernatural beatitude. *Implicitly defined faith* (D 1000 and, it seems, 1305): he is the sufficient object. It is at least *certain in theology* that he is the necessary object.

For Muncunill the thesis is *common and certain;* for Mendive *it is certain and among all theologians commonly accepted;* so also for Suarez; for Otten, that God is the necessary object of beatitude is *theologically certain;* that he is the sufficient object is *certain and common.*[8]

55. Proof from Holy Scripture. It does not teach this matter expressly, but it does contain the ideas with which our thesis is in agreement.

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6. Ramírez, *ibid.* n.226-234, 256-260, 277-280, 311-315; see 29-39; De Broglie, *loc.cit.*, c.2f.
7. See also Leo XIII, Encyclical "*Tametsi futura*": ASS 33 (1900) 277; Pius XI, Encyclical "*Ubi arcano*": AAS 14 (1922) 681; "*Divini illius Magistri*": AAS 22 (1930) 50f.; "*Quadragesimo anno*": AAS (1931) 19; etc.
8. Muncunill, n.860; Mendive, 6 tr.10 n.201; Suarez, 5,1,3; Otten, n.476.

1) It presents God, and in fact only God, as the object of beatitude. John 17:3: *And this is eternal life, that they know thee the only true God*...i.e., eternal life here begun by the knowledge of faith, which will be perfected then by vision. Matt. 25:21: *Well done, good and faithful servant..., I will set you over much; enter into the joy of your master.*

2) It presents God as the final perfection of man as to knowledge and therefore as to beatitude, which surely corresponds to knowledge. 1 Cor. 13:8-12: ... *For our knowledge is imperfect...; but when the perfect comes, the imperfect will pass away... For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face...* (see n.69).

3) For the Son of God is the necessary and sufficient object of beatitude, as is per se evident; but the just are partakers in the same beatitude. Rom. 8:17: *And if children, then heirs, heirs of God and fellow heirs with Christ.* John 14:2f.: *In my Father's house there are many rooms:... I go to prepare a place for you... I will take you to myself, that where I am you may be also.*

4) It presents God as one and the supreme good. Ps. 73:21-26: ... *I am continually with you. Thou dost hold my right hand. Thou dost guide me with thy counsel and afterward thou wilt receive me in glory. Whom have I in heaven but thee? And there is nothing upon earth that I desire besides thee. My flesh and my heart may fail, but God is the strength of my heart and my portion forever.*

But these points stand out in the original text: "I am always with you: you have taken my right hand; by your counsel you lead me, and finally (i.e., at the end, after this life) you will receive me into glory (i.e., into the state of glory, or to the vision of the glory of God). What is there for me in heaven besides you? And, if I am with you, the earth does not give me joy. My flesh and my heart fail, but you are the rock of my heart and my part as God forever."

Hence: "Compared with this supreme good, the only thing desirable, all earthly goods are nothing. The only true good is to be *near to God.*"[9]

5) It presents God as the object satisfying the soul; therefore also as sufficient. Ps. 16:11: *Thou dost show me the path of life* (i.e., not the earthly, by which it now lives, but a blessed life); *in thy presence there is the fullness of joy* (i.e., I am full of joy when I see your face), *in thy right hand are pleasures for evermore* (i.e., continually and forever). Ps. 17:15 agrees with the above: *As for me, I shall behold thy face in righteousness; when I awake I shall be satisfied with beholding thy form* (i.e., I will be satisfied

9. *Liber psalmorum* published by the professors of the Pontifical Biblical Institute (Rome 1945) p.142, note at v.25f. See Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in Psalmos* (Paris 1912) 272.

by seeing you, when I awake from the sleep of death).[10]

6) It presents God as the last end of man; therefore as the necessary and sufficient object. Rev. 1:8: *I am the alpha and the omega, the beginning and the end, says the Lord.* Rom. 11:36: *For from him* (God) *and through him and to him are all things.* 1 Cor. 8:6: *yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist;* here we seem to be introduced as grasped by motion towards him.[10a] (See Isa. 43:7; 48:11).

It teaches directly or indirectly that beatitude is not found in the things *of this world,* inasmuch as it says that everything is vanity of vanities (Eccles. 1:2; 12:8); and throughout the book) and inasmuch as it motivates us to reject riches, pleasures, etc. (Luke 6:20; Matt. 16:25f.; 1 John 2:15). But perhaps from these words one can deduce only that beatitude is not to be found in created things, *such as they are in this world.*

56. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers present God as the sufficient object of beatitude and also as the only sufficient one, and therefore necessary.

St. Augustine (R 1591): "You have made us for Yourself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in You"; (R 1743): "[God] is the source of our happiness and the very end of our aspirations... We pursue Him with our love so that when we reach Him we may rest in perfect happiness in Him who is our goal" (see R 1749, 1788).

St. Gregory of Nyssa: "This life is proper and suitable for the intellectual nature, if he is a partaker in God..., to see God is the life of the soul."[11]

St. Gregory Nazianzen: "But God himself... is the highest crown of all intelligible things, to whom every desire is directed and fixed, and in no way does desire reach beyond him... For he is the ultimate of all things that can be desired, and when we attain him all searching will be at rest."[12]

57. Theological reasoning. 1) God is the last end of man. But it belongs to the nature of a last end: that it satisfies the appetite sufficiently, for otherwise something else would have to be desired; and it is so *necessary* that without it the appetite could not be satisfied, for otherwise its pursuance could easily be omitted. Therefore God is both the sufficient and the necessary object of beatitude.

2) God is the object of beatitude: a) *Sufficient,* since, as the supreme

10. See *Liber psalmorum* p.22.24. Knabenbauer at this place, p. 71: "He is filled with joyful hope, the night of tribulation will be taken away; he will see the day of happiness and then he will be satiated by the image of God...."

8a F.M.M. Sagnar, O.P., *A propos de 1 Cor 8,6:* EphThLov 26 (1950) 54-58.

11. St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De infant. praemat. abreptis:* MG 46,174f.

12. St. Gregory Nazianzen, *Or.* 21,1: MG 35,1083. Likewise St. Ambrose, *De offic.* 2,2,5: ML 16,104; Lactantius, *Div. Inst.* 3,12: MG 6,383.

good and containing it in himself eminently or in an unlimited and excellent way, he has everything that can bring happiness to a man. b) *Necessary,* for since the object of the human will is everything good, and the object of the intellect is all being, God, as the supreme good and the supreme being, is the object of those faculties and in fact the principal one. Therefore he is the last object to such an extent that without him these faculties cannot be satisfied.

Therefore if God is the sufficient object of beatitude, no created thing is its necessary object; *if God is the necessary object,* no created thing is a sufficient object. De facto the objective happiness of man is not in riches, in honor, in fame, in power, in the good of the body, in pleasure, in the good of the soul, in any created good, because these goods are unstable or mixed up with evils or partial or at least imperfect, and therefore they cannot fully satisfy the rational appetite.[13]

58. Objections. 1. God is infinite, but man is finite. But an infinite being cannot be the necessary object of the happiness of a finite being. Therefore God cannot be the necessary object of man's happiness.

I distinguish the minor. An infinite being cannot be the necessary object of a finite being as being possessed in an infinite way, *conceded;* as being possessed in a finite way, *denied.*

A man cannot possess God with an infinite act subjectively or in an entitative way; but he can attain him with a finite act (but, obviously, not in a comprehensive way).

2. A finite desire is fulfilled by a finite good. But the desire for happiness in man is finite. Therefore the desire for happiness is fulfilled be a finite good.

I distinguish the major. A finite desire is fulfilled by a finite good both subjectively and objectively, *conceded;* a finite desire only subjectively, but objectively infinite, *denied.*

Of course the subjective act whereby a man desires happiness is a finite entity, but, as responding to an intellect capable of knowing all truth and a will capable of loving all good, it is objectively infinite and therefore can be fulfilled only by an infinite good.[14]

59. 3. Man, as finite, cannot be made happy without a finite object. Therefore God is not a sufficient object.

I distinguish the major. Man without a finite object cannot be made happy essentially, *denied;* accidentally, *I subdistinguish,* suitably, *conceded;* necessarily, *denied.*

God is the object of man's happiness to such an extent that he is fully satisfied even with the absence of all other goods; but in the concrete is made happy by other goods, but in a way that is purely *accidental.* With this distinction of essential happiness from accidental the doubt is easily resolved concerning the object of happiness coming from

13. On this matter, see St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 19,1-10: ML 41,622-636; S.Th. I-II, q. 2, a. 1-8; 3 CG 27-36; Ramírez, n.51-339.
14. See Ramírez, n.338f.

the fact that God, although he is the supreme good, is not the only good, and man in some measure is made happy by the other goods added to the essential object.

4. Man needs many other things, besides God, for his happiness. Therefore it is not God alone.

I distinguish the major. Man needs many things for his essential happiness, *denied;* for his accidental happiness, *I subdistinguish:* those things that are loved because of the last end, *conceded;* which have the nature of a last end, *denied.*

If the beatified person loves some things besides God, he does not love them *as his last end* and therefore as if he needs them necessarily for his own happiness, but *because of the last end,* and therefore without necessarily needing them, if he does not now possess that end.

60. Scholium 1. *How God is the object of happiness.* Since there are in God an essence, attributes, personal relations, how is he the object of happiness? *The material and total* object is according to all those elements, since all of them de facto are attained by the blessed person. But the *essential* object is: a) *As God is,* or according to his essence, leaving to one side his relations, and at the same time either without any attributes, as Scotus seems to think, as distinguishing the attributes from the essence, or according to the attribute of goodness, as Medina seems to think, or according to any attribute apprehended perfectly enough, according to Arriaga, or with all of his attributes, according to Suarez and Pesch. b) *As God is one and three,* or according to the essence with all of its attributes and personal relations, according to Cajetan, Vázquez and Ramírez.[15]

This last opinion seems to be more probable. Certainly the object of supernatural happiness is God as he must be seen according as he is in himself (1 John 3:2); and so it contains everything that is in God.[16]

61. Scholium 2. *On creatures as the essential object of beatitude according as they are in God.* From these points it follows further that creatures pertain to the essential object of beatitude, but not according to their own formal nature and perfection, since as such they are created objects, but inasmuch as they are contained eminently in the perfection of God or are represented in the divine ideas. We say almost the same thing about the free act of the divine will, which, considered as an immanent act of God whereby he wills things outside of himself, is an essential perfection of God and so pertains to the object of beatitude; but it is not looked at as that same act of God, but as freely terminated in the object of creation, since that termination is contingent and therefore outside of the essential nature of God.

15. Scotus, *In 1* d.1 q.2; d.8 q.4; Medina, *In 1.2* q.3 a.5; Arriaga, *De beat.* D.50 s.1f.; Suarez, 5,3; Pesch, 3 n.429; Cajetan, *loc.cit.;* Vázquez, *In 1.2* d.33 c.2; Ramírez, 2 n.359-361.

16. This opinion is expressed in the words of Suarez, Medina, Pesch (*loc.cit.):* but with regard to the matter at hand they seem to exclude the Persons from the essential object, since they think that God without them is the primary and sufficient object of beatitude and therefore that they are only the secondary object. The improbable hypothesis of a natural beatitude consisting in the immediate vision of God, but not as triune, proposed by P. Descoqs, S.J., *Le Mystère de notre élévation surnaturelle* (Paris 1938) p.125-133, was attacked by H. de Lubac, S.J., *Surnaturelle* (Aubier 1946) 439-447, and by De Broglie, *op.cit.,* 186-188.

62. Scholium 3. *On natural beatitude.* That there can be such a thing as natural beatitude is clear from the fact that man could have been created without ordination to a supernatural end, and therefore with an ordination to a natural end, in whose attainment he would obtain some beatitude.[17] Many hold with Aristotle that man can in this life obtain some natural happiness, though imperfect, which would consist in the natural knowledge of God, in the exercise of virtues, with a healthy mind in a healthy body, with the companionship of friends, and possessed on a permanent basis.[18] But all of those things are scarcely ever present at the same time; indeed, even if they were present, they do not merit, according to others, the name of happiness.[19]

17. See S.Th. I-II, q. 62, a. 1; Suarez, 4,3,3f.; see also Pius XII, Encyclical "*Humani generis*": AAS 12 (1950) 570. On the meaning of the ancient theologians on this matter, see F. Elter, S.J., (*De naturli hominis beatitudine ad mentem Scholae antiquioris:* Greg 9 [1928] 269-306), according to whom, until the 17th century all theologians unanimously hold that in the order of pure nature (or without the vision of God) perfect beatitude could in no way be had. He was opposed by V. Cathrein, S.J. (*De naturali hominis beatitudine:* Greg 11 [1930] 398-409 and regarding several authors F. Pelster, S.J., *Zur Frage der Möglichkeit einer 'beatitudo naturalis":* Schol 4 [1029] 255-260; but his work is completed to a certain extent by A. Rossi, C.M. (*De naturali hominis beatitudine:* DivThom(Pi) 6 [1929] 267-279). De Broglie (*De ultimo fine humanae vitae asserta quaedam:*Greg 8 [1928] p. 628-630) holds that man naturally desires *perfect* happiness, but that it *consists in the vision of God,* to which however the human soul is related *without any exigency from itself.*
18. Thus, for example, A. Tanner, S.J., *Theologiae scholasticae* t.6 (Ingolstadt 1626) 2 d.1 q.5 dub.5 n.58ff.
19. Vázquez, *In 1.2* d.12 c.3; Pesch, 3 n.530.

ARTICLE II

ON FORMAL ESSENTIAL BEATITUDE

Thesis. 4. Formal essential beatitude physically consists in acts of vision and of love and of joy.

S.Th. I, q. 12, a. 3; *Suppl.* q. 52; C CG 51-56; Suarez, *loc.cit.*, d.7,9; Lessius, *op.cit.*, 2, 1-15; Pesch, 3 n.433-451; Lennerz, n.15ff.; J.B. Terrien, S.J., *La grâce et al gloire* (Paris 1901) 1,9; Michel, *Intuitive* (*Vision:* DTC 7,2361-2394.

63. Connection. Since from what we have proved it is certain that God is the *essential object* of beatitude, now we raise the question about *formal* beatitude. In what does this consist, or in other words, how is man affected by that object so that he is made blessed? It takes place, obviously, by some union between God and man, not of course a substantial union, like the hypostatic union, since the latter is found only in Christ, but an accidental union, but very different from that which is given on earth between God and the just person, since the latter is not yet perfectly beatified. On the other hand, since the soul is a rational being, it must be a union whereby it is perfected in its highest faculties.[1] Therefore, how is this obtained?

64. Definition of terms. *Formal beatitude* or *subjective* is the possession of the beatifying object as such.

(Formal) essential beatitude, about which *alone* we are concerned here, is the possession of the essential object as such, while *accidental* beatitude is the possession of an accidental object, or also of an essential object not as such.

Vision, not corporeal, but intellectual, with which we are concerned here, is *intuitive knowledge,* or the immediate knowledge of the presence of God as being present.

Therefore through this vision God is perceived: a) as he is in himself, i.e., immediately or without any *objective medium* either *from which* (*ex quo*) or *in which* (*in quo*), that being first known leads to the knowledge of God, as he would be through negations, analogies, etc., not however without a *subjective medium* or a medium *by which* (*quo*), as is the light of glory (*lumen gloriae*); b) and therefore as he is here and now present to the intellect or determining it by himself to produce knowledge of himself.[2]

1. What is to be said in this thesis about perfect beatitude can be applied also to *imperfect* beatitude, but at the same time preserving the necessary proportion (and therefore without the vision of God, as is clear). See Suarez, 6 init.; Salmanticenses, *De beatit.* 6 dub. append.
2. See S.Th. I, q. 12, a. 5; Suarez, *De Deo* 2,18,1-7; Beraza, n.133-143.

This knowledge, as is clear, *is:* a) Not obscure, but clear or that whereby God is distinguished from any other object. b) Not confused, but *distinct* or presenting God according to his essential being, and not merely according to accidental or generic reason. c) Not abstracted or derived from creatures, either such as it is now on earth (Rom. 1:20), or by faith from revelation, or preternaturally by a separated soul, but quidditative, that is, through the essence itself of the object, which it clearly manifest completely. d) But it is not comprehensive, or that whereby both intensively and extensively the whole knowability of the object is adequately exhausted and which belongs to the one God (D 800, 3001).[3]

It is called: a) *Vision,* as perceiving God, almost like the way in which a bodily thing is perceived with the eyes. b) *Intuitive,* because of the clarity whereby God, as physically present, is known. c) *Facial,* because of the exclusion of any objective medium, or one by which God is present face to face, and therefore he is perceived as he is. d) *In himself,* as having for its object, not merely some effect or likeness of God, but God himself. e) *Beatifying,* as connaturally including love and joy, and it is with this threefold act that beatitude is constituted physically.

We leave it to the treatise *On the One God* to provide further insights on the nature of the intuitive vision of God, its possibility and supernaturality, on the "light of Glory" required for it, and on the incomprehensibility of God. Here we will point out this one thing, namely, that even after the resurrection the blessed will not be able to see God, since his is incorporeal, with their corporeal eyes.[4]

65. *Love,* which per se is a tendency of the will towards the good seen absolutely, whether present or absent, but here it is taken as a tendency towards a *present* good. Through it, therefore, God is in the blessed as the object is in the lover, but through a union of the soul with God, not merely affective union, but a real one (given the vision).

Since the blessed wills the good of God and *for the sake of God,* or *because it is good for God,* and *because of himself,* although secondarily, or *because it is good for himself,* for his will is in agreement with the will of God even in the fact that God wants him to be blessed, so the love of the blessed must be said to be a love both of *friendship* and of *concupiscence.*[5]

Joy is the delight of the rational appetite over a loved good already possessed (S.Th. I, q. 20, 1. 2; I-II, q. 31, a. 3). It naturally follows the love of a good already possessed. Moreover, it is in the blessed, as love, both of *friendship* and of *concupiscence,* that is, both of God, or concerning the good of God because it is good for God, and *of his own possession* or be-

3. S.Th., 3 CG 35; Salmanticenses, *De vis. Dei* disp.6. Moreover, the blessed in opposition to the wayfarers are comprehensors, but in the grammatical sense of the Latin word (comprehension in Greek is: κατάληψις) or inasmuch as they have attained God, but not as if they see him comprehensively.

4. S.Th. I-II, q. 12, a. 2; Ramírez 3 n.71-85; M. Cappuyns, *Note sur le problème de la vision béatifique au IX^e siècle:* RechThAncMéd 1 (1929) 98-107.

5. S.Th. I-II, q. 26, a. 4; Suarez, *De fine hom.* 5,3,17; Lessius, *ibid.* 2,5,27.

cause it is good for the blessed person (S.Th. II-II, q. 28, a. 1 ad 3).

Act is taken here as the operation of a higher faculty. Used in the plural, it indicates the threefold act of vision, love and joy; but not *necessarily* that these three individual acts are multiplied, but it seems rather necessary to say because beatitude is never interrupted (D 1000), that those same acts, with which beatitude begins, continue without their interruption or without the succession of those acts.[6]

Physically consists, that is, beatitude *as it actually includes* that threefold act. But in the thesis their relation to either the physical or metaphysical essence of beatitude is not determined.

66. Adversaries. St. Gregory of Nyssa is said to have conceived heavenly beatitude as always progressing in the perception of new perfections of God, but that his essence always remains inaccessible to the blessed.[6*] Theodoretus, Anastasius Sinaita, etc.,[7] said that not the essence of God, but some of his glory is seen by the blessed. *Certain schismatic Armenians.*[8] Especially Gregorius Palamas, bishop of Thessalonica and his followers.[9]

There were not lacking among the Latins (v.gr., Scotus Erigena, Hugo A Sto. Carlo, Alexander of Hales) those who at one time in this matter either erred or at least spoke equivocally more or less that God is seen by the blessed not in himself but in theophanies (or created manifestations), while the University of Paris condemned this proposition: "The divine essence is seen in itself neither by man nor by an angel."[10]

Rosmini taught that God is the object of the beatific vision, as he is "the author of the works outside of himself," or "inasmuch as he has a relation with them (the blessed) as their creator, provider, redeemer, sanctifier" (D 3238, 3240).[11]

But incorrectly, as is clearly evident. Abelard and Arnaldus of Brescia sometimes are said to have denied that the blessed have the vision of God.[12]

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6. J.M. Scheeben, *Mysterien des Christentums* (Mainz 1925) § 93 at the end.

6* *In cant. Cant.* Hom.8: MG 44,401-404; see Ch. Journet, *L'univers de création, ou l'univers antérior à l'Eglise:* RevThom 53 (1953) 443f.

7. Michel, 2366f. See St. Gregory the Great, *Moral,* 18,54,60: ML 76,93.

8. See Benedict XII, *Libellus de erroribus ad armenos:*Msi 35,1396; F. Jansen, S.J., *La cinquième erreur arménienne:* EphThLov 16 (1939) 94-110.

9. Jugie, *op. cit.,* 2 p.47-183; Petavius, *De Deo* 7,7 n.8; G. Hofmann, S.J., *Formulae praeviae ad definitionem Concilii Florentini de Novissimis:* Greg 18 (1937) 344-350.355. Recently V. Losski held the absolute invisibility of the essence of God, *Essai sur la théologie mystique de l'Eglise d'Orient* (Paris 1944).

10. See H.F. Dondaine, O.P., *Hugues de Saint-Cher et la condamnation de 1241:* RevScPhTh 33 (1949) 170-174; Id., *L'objet et le "medium" de la vision béatifique chez les théologiens du XIII^e siècle:* RechThAncMéd 19 (1952) 60-130 (where the prehistory of this condemnation is explained).

11. See Ramírez, *loc.cit.,* n.226.

12. A.R. Motte, O.P., *Une fause accusation contre Abélard et Arnaud de Brescia:* RevScPhTh 22 (1933) 27-46.

67. Doctrine of the Church. Benedict XII (D 1000): The souls of the blessed "see the divine essence with an intuitive vision and even face to face, without the mediation of any creature by way of object of vision; rather the divine essence immediately manifests itself to them, plainly, clearly, and openly, and in this vision they enjoy the divine essence. Moreover, by this vision and enjoyment the souls... are truly blessed...."

With these words, therefore, which obviously are about true beatitude, the following points are taught: a) *An intuitive vision,* and indeed as immediate knowledge of God as being present. b) *The enjoyment of a good already possessed,* which of course includes, as is clear, love and delight or joy.

In particular, *the vision of God*, which the *Council of Vienne* (D 895) supposes; taking it over, the *Council of Florence* teaches that the essence of God, even as triune, is attained (D 1305): and that the purified souls "are received immediately into heaven and see clearly God himself, one and three, as he is."

68. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith*: *explicitly,* regarding the vision and enjoyment (D 1000, 1305); *implicitly,* regarding joy and love, a twofold act that includes enjoyment.

69. Proof from Holy Scripture. A. Vision. 1) 1 Cor. 13:8-13... *For our knowledge is imperfect... but when the perfect comes, the imperfect will pass away... Now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part; then I shall understand fully, even as I have been understood fully. So faith, hope love abide.*

With these words Paul is saying that, opposed to the *knowledge* that we now have *of the things of God,* since they are known mainly by faith, which is both *abstracted* or by faith and by analogy with creatures, and *imperfect* or partial by which only something about God is known or God only under one aspect, and *mediated* or through a mirror, and *obscure* or in an enigma or not directly in itself but as it were included in other truths—opposed to all of this is the *knowledge about God to be had in the final state of perfection* or "when that comes which is perfect." This perfect knowledge is *intuitive,* or *immediate,* that is, face to face, and therefore it is *clear* or about something existing in itself, both *total* and *perfect,* and almost as I am known by God, although not with the same perfection or comprehensively, as is clear, but certainly without any mediating object and of the deity as it is in itself.

Therefore the difference between the two kinds of knowledge is taught;

it is not merely *gradual*, but also *specific*: a) although this knowledge is explained through the different knowledge of a man and a child (v.11), this comparison is given in order to declare, not the difference of both kinds of knowledge, except perhaps under the indefinite reason of perfect and imperfect, but a universal principle—that when the perfect comes the imperfect ceases (v.10); b) and although both kinds of knowledge are compared as the partial with the total, that comparison does not necessarily indicate a difference that is merely *gradual.*[13]

Hence 2 Cor. 5:7: *For we walk by faith, not by sight.* Therefore *sight* (εἶδος) follows faith or the thing in its proper form. These things, although they are directly about Christ, must be understood also to be about the divinity as seen in itself (see n. 34).

2) 1 John 3:2: *Beloved, we are God's children now; it does not yet appear what we shall be, but we know that when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.*

Therefore, according to these words, we shall see, not imperfectly as now, but as he is in himself, or face to face, both God[14] and perhaps Christ, but also according to his divinity, since from that vision we become children of God and similar to God, which of course is not possible from the vision of Christ's humanity alone, and since the vision is presented as the final cause of our perfection, which can come only from God as the last end.[15]

See also Matt. 5:8; 18:10; 22:30; John 17:24; Rev. 22:1-5.

70. B. Love. 1) Love abides always. 1 Cor. 13:8.13: *Love never ends; as for prophecies, they will pass away; as for tongues, they will cease; as for knowledge it will pass away. For our knowledge is imperfect and our prophecy is imperfect; but when the perfect comes, the imperfect will pass away... So faith, hope, love abide, these three; but the greatest of these is love.*

Therefore from these words, although now faith, hope and charity abide in us, still in the state of final perfection, when both faith (2 Cor. 5:7) and hope (Rom. 8:24) and the charismatic gifts cease, love abides always and

13. J. Beumer, S.J., *Tunc autem cognoscam sicut et cognitus sum:* VerDom 22 (1942) 166-173; P.F. Ceuppens, O.P., *Theologia biblica. De Deo* (Rome 1938) 122-125; Ramírez, p. 372-378; Spicq, *op.cit.*, 267; Bonsirven, *L'evangile de Paul,* 328-330. The mirror can indicate either reflex knowledge (Jas. 1:23) and therefore not immediate nor very clear, especially since among the ancients a mirror was made of metal, or perhaps through observation and therefore also mediated and not very clear, but this is improbable from the use of the word ἔσοπτρον: see Ceuppens, *loc.cit.*

14. J. Chaine, *Les epîtres catholiques* (Paris 1939) p.179f.; Vrede, *Johannesbriefe* (Bonn 1916) 184; Ceuppens, 125f.. See the *Roman Catechism* 1,13,7.

15. J. Bonsirven, S.J., *Epîtres de St. Jean* (Paris 1954) 148; Michel, 2363. In any hypothesis (either of God or of Christ) the author is treating the vision of the divinity face to face, says Charue, *op.cit.*, 446.

never ceases.

2) The friendship between God and the blessed is described as a friendship between a bride and a groom; therefore not without love. Rev. 19:7: *Let us rejoice...; for the marriage of the Lamb has come, and his Bride has made herself ready...;* 21:2: *I saw the holy city, new Jerusalem, coming down out of heaven from God, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband....*

See also John 14:21-23, etc.

71. C. Joy. 1) Matt. 25:21: *Well done, good an faithful servant..., enter into the joy* (χαράν) *of your master.* Also, that Greek word can be understood to be about a feast or joyful meal.[16]

2) John 16:22: *So you have sorrow now, but I will see you again and your hearts will rejoice, and no one will take your joy from you.*

3) Beatitude is described as a festive meal. Luke 22:29f.: *As my Father appointed a kingdom for me, so do I appoint for you that you may eat and drink at my table in my kingdom.*

See Matt. 5:12; Rom. 8:18; 2 Cor. 4:17; Rev. 7:17; 14:3.13; 19:7f.; 21:4; 22:1-5; Ps. 42:4.

72. Proof from tradition. 1) *Vision.* St. Augustine (R 1786): "*Now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face.* In this way the holy angels now see... Therefore as they see, so also we are going to see, but we do not see so now."[17]

2) *Vision, joy* (and therefore *love*). St. Cyprian (R 579): "... What will be the glory and how great the joy to be admitted to see God, to be honored to receive with Christ, your Lord God, the joy of eternal salvation...."

St. Jerome: "They shall see... God, which is true joy: ... seeing him is perfect joy."[18]

3) *Vision, love, praise* (therefore also *joy*), St. Augustine (R 1788): "How great shall be that felicity, which shall be tainted with no evil, which shall lack no good, and which shall afford leisure for the praises of God, who shall be all in all!... He shall be the end of our desires who shall be seen without end, loved without cloy, praised without weariness... There we shall rest and see, see and love, love and praise."

St. John Damascene (R 2376): "But those who have done good will shine forth as the sun... with our Lord Jesus Christ, ever seeing him and

16. F. Zorell, S.J., *Lexicon graecum Novi Testamenti*[2] (Paris 1931), see χαρά, 1432f.

17. See P. Dumont, S.J., *Le Surnaturel dans la Théologie de Saint Augustin:* RevScRel 11 (1931) 516-521.

18. St. Jerome, *In Is.* 66,14: ML 24,662. St. Augustine, *Confess.* 10,22: ML 32,793: "This is the blessed life—to rejoice for you, about you, because of you; it is this and nothing else."

being in his sight and deriving unceasing joy from him, praising him with the Father and the Holy Spirit."

73. Theological reasoning. God is blessed by the vision of himself and as a consequence of this by love and joy; similarly the soul of Christ is blessed by those same acts. Granted the fact, therefore, that the vision of God is possible for man as supernaturally elevated, the just man likewise must be thought, since he is an heir of God and a fellow heir with Christ (Rom. 8:17), to obtain his own beatitude by those acts, or as necessarily obtaining it by both the vision and love and joy of God, since that is what comes from the supreme good.

Natural reason proves about the nature of beatitude that it is exceptional *knowledge* of God, but not that it is precisely an *intuitive vision,* which it knows de facto to be given only by faith. Formal beatitude is the possession of the supreme good. But this can be possessed only by intellectual knowledge, which: a) as beatifying, must be exceptional or a knowledge that vastly surpasses the knowledge of God that we have in this life; b) and since it is knowledge of the supreme good, it implies necessarily the love and joy concerning him that is possessed. Therefore knowledge of God belongs to the nature of formal beatitude, and consequently love and joy.

74. Objections. Only a few are given here selected from those that are opposed to the possibility of the intuitive vision of God; other objections will be treated later.

1. John 1:18: *No one has ever see God* (See also Matt. 11:27; Rom. 1:20; 1 Tim. 1:17; 6:16). In these texts it is said that no one has seen God. Therefore the blessed do not see God.

I distinguish the major. No one is said to have seen God of those living on earth, *I bypass the major;* no one of the blessed, *I subdistinguish:* with bodily eyes, *conceded;* with the intellect, *I distinguish again:* comprehensively, *conceded;* otherwise, *I distinguish again:* by natural light, *conceded;* by supernatural, *denied.*

These distinctions are justified: a) From the obvious meaning of the texts which are about wayfarers and (if the inability is expressed) about the natural light; therefore they do not deny per se a non-comprehensive intellectual vision of God. b) From the fact that Scripture teaches the fact of that vision elsewhere.

Moreover, we bypass the major, because perhaps Moses, St. Paul, while living on earth, intuitively, although briefly, saw God (S.Th. I, q. 12, a. 11; II-II, q. 174, a. 4; q. 175, a. 3)); but it is difficult to prove it.[19]

2. 1 Pet. 1:12, ... *the things which now have been announced to you by those who*

19. See E. Hernández, S.J., *La visión de Dios en esta vida:* Manr 12 (1949) 140-150; Huby, *Mystiques paulinienne et johannique* (Paris 1946) 119f.; M.B. Lavaud, O.P., *Moïse et Saint Paul ont-ils eu la vision de Dieu dès ici-bas?:* RevThom 13 (1930) 75-83, 252-256; P. Blanchar, *Experience trinitaire et vision béatifique d'après Saint Jean de la Croix:* AntTh 9 (1948) 293-310. See also R. de la Immaculada, O.C.D., ¿Gozó San José de la visión beatifica en esta vida?: EstJos 7 (1953) 184-197.

preached the good news to you through the Holy Spirit sent from heaven, things into which angels long to look. According to this, angels long to see God. Therefore they do not see him. Therefore neither do the other blessed.

I distinguish the major. They long for it, inasmuch as they *eagerly look at him, conceded;* inasmuch as they do not see him, *denied.*[20]

In this interpretation, *he into whom* would be either Christ, according to St. Bede and others, or the Holy Spirit, according to some others like A Lapide.[21] But it is more probable that the text reads for the words "into whom" (*in quem*) the words "into which" (*in quae*; Greek εἰς ἁ), that is, into the mysteries of the redemption; that being the case, then the difficulty is resolved.[22] Moreover, it is gratuitously asserted that the angels in beatitude are moved by some desire which cannot be fulfilled, since that would mean that they are exposed to some suffering.

75. 3. Exod. 33:11: *Thus the Lord used to speak to Moses face to face, as a man speaks to his friend* (see also Gen. 32:30; Num. 12:8). In these words the phrase "face to face" is applied to the living, who surely must not be thought to have seen God intuitively. Therefore in the case of Paul it is not about the vision of God.

I bypass the major and deny the consequent.

From what was said above, we are not arguing from that phrase alone as such, but from the whole context in which Paul uses it. In the chosen texts the intuitive vision of God is excluded by the context itself, for: a) In Exodus the situation concerns the ocular vision of God appearing in the external form of a man, as is clear from the whole context; in fact the vision of the face of God is denied (v. 18-20). b) In Num. 12:8 the words "face to face" do not appear, but the words "clearly, and not in dark speech," by which a special manifestation (but with bodily sight) of God to Moses is merely compared with other symbols and figures. c) In Gen. 32:30 the author is speaking about a sensible apparition of God and about an ocular vision, as is clear from the context (v. 23-29), in which God is introduced as a man fighting with Jacob.

4. St. John Chrysostom (R 1161): "What God is neither the prophets, nor the angels, nor the archangels have seen... Therefore only the Son sees him, and likewise the Holy Spirit..." (see also R 1123; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, R 822). In these texts it is denied that anyone, besides the Son and the Holy Spirit, sees God. Therefore the blessed do not see him.

I distinguish the major. A comprehensive vision of God is denied to creatures, *conceded;* another kind, *I subdistinguish:* bodily, *conceded;* intellectual, *denied.*

Now since Eunomius taught that God, even in this life, can not only be seen but also perfectly comprehended, some of the holy Fathers, while writing against him, in their arguments spoke in such a way that they seem to deny that even the blessed angels see God; but they only denied that God can be comprehended by creatures.

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20. See Zorell, at the word παρακύπτω 994.
21. St. Bede at this place: ML 93,45; A Lapide, *Commentarius in Epistolam S.Petri* (Paris 1859) 255f. But in fact he almost follows the following opinion, since he understands the text to be about the mysteries of Christ as seen in the Holy Spirit.
22. Vrede, *loc.cit.*, 1,1; Charue, *op.cit.*, 446.

Hence St. John Chrysostom (R 1161) adds: "*No one knows the Father except the Son.* What therefore? Are we all in ignorance? Not at all; but no one knows him the way the Son does... For this says a certain knowledge and comprehension such as the Father has of the Son." Therefore, it only denies to creatures knowledge about God of the same nature as that which the Father has of the Son and the Son of the Father. St. Cyril of Jerusalem: "the angels continually see the face of God in heaven, but each one sees him according to his own order and capability. But the pure vision of the paternal splendor is reserved truly and sincerely to the Son along with the Holy Spirit.[23]

76. Scholum 1. *On unitive ecstasy.* The blessed through vision, love and joy, are so absorbed in God, that, being dead to themselves. they live for God alone and are totally involved in contemplating him, in imitating him by their way of life, in perfectly loving and obeying his will, in the fervent enjoyment of such great goodness. *It is no longer I who live, but Christ who lives in me* (Gal. 2:20).

77. Scholium 2. *On the special union of the blessed with the Person of the Word.* Waffelaert, proposing a theory that is difficult to prove, explains the exaltation of the blessed soul to the vision of God by a special moral union with the person of the Word. By this union he becomes more like God and an adopted son still more like the natural Son and through him also like both the Father and the Holy Spirit," that is, similar to the Father by a *special* union with the indwelling *Holy Spirit,* which the author himself attributes to the just wayfarer. "Likewise habitual grace on earth, as the disposition for union with the Holy Spirit and a bond of the same union, looks, because of the personal character of the Holy Spirit, to first join man, without his merits, with God through charity and sanctity; but the light of glory, as a disposition for union with the Word and a bond of the same union, tends, because of the personal character of the Word, to the supreme manifestation, of the one and triune God, as a reward for merits. Note here also that union with the Word does not replace union with the Holy Spirit, but rather perfects it...."[24]

78. Corollary. *The blessed see the whole God.* It is *defined divine and Catholic faith* that the blessed see God *as to his essence and as to the persons* (Council of Florence, D 1305); 1 John 3:2). All wayfarers having faith desire to see the divine essence and the trinity. Moreover, the essence subsists in the persons, with whom it is really identified. Therefore it cannot be seen without seeing these persons. Likewise it is *at least theologically certain* that they see God *as to all of his attributes* (Benedict XII, D 1000). For, in actuality the divine essence is necessary for every attribute of God and formally existing in God.

23. Michel, 2364-2367. See however Vázquez, *In 1* disp.37 c.1-4; Journet, *loc.cit.* 444; Dondaine, *L'objet...* 73.
24. C.F. Waffelaert, *Disquisitio dogmatica de unione iustorum cum Deo tum in hac vita tum in vita aeterna beata:* CollatBrug 16 (1911) 161-179, 241-253, 313-320; see 15 (1910) 627-636, 673-687; 16 (1911) 5-17.

ARTICLE III

ON THE ESSENCE OF FORMAL BEATITUDE

79. 1) *In what it does not consist.* Since beatitude is a good of the blessed person himself, it is certain among all that it is not God himself, but a *union of the blessed person with God.* But it is not understood in a pantheistic way, whereby the soul and God become one substance either in nature or in person. Nor does that suffice, as is clear, whereby the soul lives, moves and exists in God (Acts 17:28).

For a different reason it cannot be either a penetration of the divinity through its power into the substance of the soul, which in this way is perfected, so that, in virtue of a beatifying love in some sense it is transformed into God,[25] or by the vision and love of God himself, which are uncreated and communicated to the creature.[26] And union through sanctifying grace is not sufficient, since otherwise all the justified would be blessed, either by the light of glory or in general through perfect habits, since they further suppose *an act to which* they are ordained as their *ultimate* perfection.[27]

2) *Beatitude is in the vital act of the blessed,* as the common opinion maintains. For beatitude, as the most perfect state and ultimate perfection of man and the attainment of the last end, supposes an act either immanent to the blessed person himself, since beatitude is eternal *life,* or spiritual, since it concerns a spiritual good. Indeed, since the acts of the blessed regarding the supreme good are vision, love, joy, the *essence* of beatitude must be said to be contained in these acts or in some of them.

80. 3) *Definitions.* Since in this matter some seem to speak about physical essence, and others about the metaphysical essence, the question, at least for the most part, is perhaps only about words, and therefore the state of the question is difficult in which a universal solution is being sought. That being the case, for us the essence: a) in the *physical sense,* is every-

25. Thus Henr. Gandavensis (*Quodl.* 1,3 q.12; 6 q.6 lit y) according to others like Suarez (*De fine hom.* 6,1,1), Lessius (36,2,18-21), Ramírez (3 n.14), while others like Vázquez (*In 1.2* d.8 c.1) and Siuri (36,2,18-21) explain his opinion as being like the common opinion. On the heavenly beatitude among the ancient scholastics, see N. Wicki, *Die Lehre von der himmlischen Seligkeit in der Mittelalterlichen Scholastik, von Petrus Lombardus bis Thomas v. Aquin* (Friburg 1954) 51-201.

26. As thinking in this way are cited from antiquity, v.gr., J. de Ripa (see Capreolus, *In 3* d.14 q.1 a.2 § 1,II), Hugo A St. Victor, *De sapientia animae Christi:* ML 175,849-851 (see Lennerz, *De Deo Uno* n.171), and later F. Bona Spes (see Siuri, *ibid.,* n.22). On these and other opinions, see Ramírez, n.11.13.15f. Concentrating mainly on Ripa is N. Camilleri, *De natura actus visionis beatificae apud theologos post-tridentinos* (Chieri 1944).

27. See Lessius, 2,1,5. St. Bonaventure (*In 4* d.49 p.1 q.4f.) places beatitude both in the act and in the habit, but mainly in the habit.

thing that actually constitutes the thing, so that, if it is taken away, this is now thought not to be able to subsist; b) in the *metaphysical sense,* it is that by which the thing is *primarily* constituted, so that other aspects, even those necessarily associated with it, are seen to be rather either conditions or properties or quasi effects.

81. 4) *The physical essence of beatitude.* It is found in acts of vision, love and joy, since without them beatitude objectively cannot truly exist. For, union with the beatifying object is actually had: a) *By vision,* by which God becomes present to the blessed person and God is attained by the blessed and his total knowing capacity is filled. b) *By love,* by which both the intentional union of vision is fulfilled by a real union with God and the total capacity of the will for loving is satisfied. c) *By joy,* by which the rational appetite rests in the presence of the loved good.

82. 5) *The metaphysical essence of beatitude.* It consists: a) *In the vision alone,* according to St. Thomas and others,[28] since vision is the possession of the last end; since it is an act more perfect than the act of love; because love and joy suppose it. b) *In the love alone of friendship,* according to Scotus and others, so that the vision is merely a previous condition; for, beatitude is the supreme perfection of a creature, but the act of the will is the most perfect act of a creature (1 Cor. 13:13), since it unites the soul with the object through friendship, while knowledge does it only intentionally.[29] c) *In joy concerning God,* according to Aureolus, because the rational appetite is perfectly satisfied by joy.[30] d) *In vision and love and joy both of friendship and of concupiscence,* according to Lessius and others, for all those acts are required for complete union with God and therefore for complete beatitude, because each one of them joins the mind to God in a new way.[31] e) *In vision and the love of friendship taken together,* as joining the soul to God immediately, according to several theologians like St. Bonaventure (only inasmuch as he places beatitude in act), Suarez, etc.[32]

This last opinion seems to be more probable: since both acts are nec-

28. S.Th. I-II, q. 3; q. 4, a. 1-3; 3 CG 25ff.; Cajetan, *In 1.2* q.3 a.4, and all Thomists: see Ramírez, *loc.cit.;* Vázquez, *In 1.2* disp. 11 c.3-7.
29. Scotus, *In 4* d.49 q.4f. Ripalda (*De ente supernaturali,* d.100 s.3) places beatitude in vision and in love, taken either together or separately.
30. Aureolus, *In 3* d.15 q.1 a.3; *In 4* d.49 q.1 a.1.
31. Lessius, 2,5; Jungmann, n.139; Hurter, 3 n.684; Palmieri, § 77.
32. St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.49 p.1 q.5; Suarez, 7,1,29-63 (see J.M. Díaz, *Actitud del P. Francisco Suarez frente a la essencia metafisica de nuestra felicidad:* MiscCom 9 [1948] 294-299; Siuri, 36,4f.; Beraza, n. 1296. On the relation in this matter between St. Thomas and Suarez, see L. Teixidor, S.J., *El P. Suarez u Santo Tomás. Notas criticas:* EstEcl 13 (19240 262-286.

essary, both for the perfect possession of God not only intentionally but also really, and so that the human capacity of knowing and loving may be perfectly satisfied; since the supreme perfection of man consists in both knowing and loving God perfectly. But joy flows from the possession of God and therefore presupposes substantial beatitude.[33]

83. a) But if the metaphysical essence is said to be that predicate which among the essentials is the first and as the *root* of the others, or that by which the blessed person first possesses God, and in beatitude it is *the vision alone*, since from this, as from its root, the love and joy are thought to flow, inasmuch as, without the notion of vision essentially supposing love and joy, when these are present vision is supposed essentially. Hence the vision is rightly said to be beatifying, since it is as it were the *fountain* of the total beatitude. But love and joy do not flow from vision as a property does from an essence or as act from potency.

b) Ioannes de Quidort, wishing to follow St. Thomas, proposed a strange opinion, namely, that the essence of beatitude is, not the direct vision of God, but the consciousness or vision of the possession of God; others, however, (Petrus d'Auvergne, Hervé Nedellec, Ioannes de Poully) refuted him.[34]

33. See S.Th. I-II, q. 3, a.4; q. 4, a. 1f.; Suarez, *In 4* d.49 q.7. But since the joy of friendship either does not differ from the love of friendship or is essentially contained in the latter, in this opinion it is thought to be of the essence of beatitude, but not the love and joy of concupiscence, since this love is always ordained to another action, which is the attainment of the desired object, and this joy is concerned immediately not just with God alone in himself, but concerning the operation by which God is attained. See Suarez, 7,1,36-43; 9,3; Beraza, n.1296.

34. J.P. Müller, O.S.B., *La thèse de Jean Quidort sur la béatitude formelle:* Mélanges Auguste Pelzer (Louvain 1948) 493-511; Id., *Les critiques de la thèse de Jean Quidort sur la béatitude formelle:* RechThAncMéd 15 (1948) 153-170. See also E.M. Kuppers, C.SS.R., *Bienaventuranza y reflexión según los teólogos del siglo XIV:* Strena Raphael Trotta (La Plata 1947) 91-166.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE IMPECCABILITY OF THE BLESSED

Thesis 5. The blessed are actually and by right impeccable.

S.Th. I-II, q. 4, a. 4; Suarez, *loc.cit.*, d.8 s.3; d.9 s.1; d.10 s.1; Salmanticenses, *De beatit.* Disp.4; Mazzella, n.1187ff.; R.J. Gummersbach, S.J., *Unsündlichkeit und Befestigung in der Gnade* (Frankfort a. M. 1933) 94-117; P. Richard, *Impéccabilité:* DTC 7,1275-1277.

84. Connection. Since, from our proof, there is certainty about the essence of beatitude whether objective or formal, now beatitude is taken *simply*, that is, according as it is at the same time both objective and formal, and so we will now treat its properties, namely, its indefectibility and its inequality. But *indefectibility* can be looked at either on the side of the blessed, or whether the blessed person can lose beatitude through sin, or on the side of God, that is, whether God at some time will take his end away from him. Therefore in this thesis the concern is with the *impeccability* of the blessed; in the next thesis the *eternity* of beatitude will be treated.

85. Definition of terms. *The blessed,* that is, those endowed with formal beatitude.

Impeccability, or the impossibility of sinning, is: a) *Consequent* or actual, if it is had merely consequent to the fact (or its prevision) of not sinning. Therefore by itself alone it does not exclude the possibility of sinning. b) *Antecedent* or by right, if before the fact (even as foreseen) the impossibility of sinning already exists in the subject.

We are dealing with both forms, and for them we will give one proof, but in such a way that our primary concern is *antecedent* impeccability. But since this may be *internal* or *external,* according as its reason is either internal or external to the subject, in the thesis we are prescinding from this question, which will be treated briefly in the scholium below.

86. Adversaries. Origen must be said to deny both assertions of the thesis, if, according to what was said above (n. 6), he is said to have thought that rational creatures, as capable either of doing good and of conversion even in hell, or of sinning also in heaven, are for more or less long periods or perpetually, in successive transitions from good to evil and from evil to good.

Origenists, if, from what was said elsewhere, they taught this succes-

sive circulation, by that very fact they denied the impeccability of blessed spirits, that is, *consequent* impeccability.

87. Theological note. Impeccability: a) Consequent is *divine and Catholic faith.* b) Antecedent is *certain in theology.*

88. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1 Pet. 1:3f.: *We have been born anew...to an inheritance which is imperishable, undefiled, and unfading....* But if the blessed could sin, perhaps sometime they would sin, and indeed it would be surprising if, among so many and during the whole length of eternity, some of them were not infected with sin; in that case, either they would lose beatitude (v.gr., by mortal sin), and so it would not be imperishable, or they would not lose it (v.gr., by venial sin), and so it would not be undefiled. Therefore they cannot sin.

Rev. 21:27: *Nothing unclean shall enter it* (the heavenly city), nor anyone who practices abomination or falsehood. With these very emphatic words sin must be excluded, not only actually, as is per se evident, but also *radically* or by right. But if the blessed could sin, sin would not be excluded so radically. Therefore the blessed cannot sin.

89. Proof from tradition. St. Augustine (R 1956): "Therefore the first liberty of the will (i.e., in original justice) was *to be able not to sin,* the last will be much greater, *not to be able to sin";* (R 2012): "Then... it will be granted to us that we cannot ever turn away from the Lord, because we will not be able to desire it. For we will be so certain about the good, whereby we shall always be with the Lord, that we will not desire to leave him, nor will we even be able to desire it."[1]

90. Theological reasoning. 1) Sin whether grave or venial is a great evil. But beatitude excludes all evil *formally,* or by its very concept. Therefore the blessed cannot sin.

2) Beatitude *actually* excludes all evil. But if the blessed could sin, it would be surprising that for all eternity not even one venial sin took place in heaven. Therefore the blessed cannot sin.

3) Beatitude eliminates all anxiety from its concept. But if the blessed could sin, they would perpetually be anxious about the future loss perhaps of beatitude, or its eternal loss because of a grave sin, or its temporal loss

1. St. Augustine, *Contra duas epist. Pelag.* 3,7: ML 44,600: "Here there is a command that we should not sin; there the reward that we cannot sin."

because of a venial sin. Therefore they cannot sin.

91. Objections. 1. Job 4:18: *Even in his servants he puts no truth, and his angels he charges with error.* From these words, therefore, those who serve God can sin. But those who serve God are first of all the blessed. Therefore the blessed can sin.

I distinguish the major. Those who serve God can sin, inasmuch as they are not essentially impeccable, *conceded;* because actually they are always able to sin, *I subdistinguish:* as pilgrims on earth, *conceded;* in heaven, *denied.*

The place of the objection is: a) According to some (Knabenbauer, Pesch, etc.) about the angels considered at the time of their probation, and many of whom fell; therefore their example is proposed to us wayfarers lest we indulge in too much security. b) According to others, like St. Augustine, it is about the lack of justice of every creature, of itself unstable and persevering only by the gift of God, in comparison with the holiness of God who is holy by nature.[2]

We think that both opinions correspond to the quoted text, so that per se it is dealing with our proneness to evil, which the second opinion mentions, and in order to prove it the example of the bad angels is recalled.

Furthermore, the words of the objection are not said by God, but by Eliphaz, who did not always speak correctly (Job 42:7).

2) Job 15:15: *Behold God puts not trust in his holy ones, and the heavens are not clean in his sight.* From these words, therefore, the blessed are not clean. Therefore, they can sin.

I distinguish the major. The blessed are not clean negatively, that is, they are subject to negative imperfections, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.*

The quoted text is so understood that the blessed are changeable inasmuch as they are capable of further perfection, and therefore in that sense they are not clean, inasmuch as they are subject to negative imperfections.[3]

3) The blessed enjoy free will. Therefore they can sin.

I distinguish the major. The blessed are free in reference to loving or not loving God, *denied;* in reference to other things, *conceded.*

We give this solution, which not all authors readily admit, according to the opinion which we prefer, as will soon be explained, about the *internal* root of the impeccability of the blessed. But, even if it were shown that the blessed are *internally* free to sin, at least, according to all authors, they are so ruled by divine providence that *actually* they are never able to sin.

92. Corollary. *The perfect integrity of the blessed soul.* This is the immunity from any kind of concupiscence that could influence him to act in an inordinate way.

93. Scholium 1. *On the root or source of the antecedent impeccability in the blessed souls.* According to all, the impeccability of the blessed is at least as internal

2. Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in librum Iob* (Paris 1886); Pesch, 3 n.457; St. Augustine, *Ad Oros. cont. Priscill.* 10: ML 42,677. See however Gummersbach, p. 102f., note 2.
3. Suarez, 10,1,3; Knabenbauer, 203.

to him as beatitude is internal to him; and the at least necessary reason for this is its perpetuity and therefore the exclusion of sin that would hinder this. But concerning its *quasi proximate* cause, or that by which actually it is immediately obtained, opinions are divided concerning the way of conceiving beatitude, as being of itself imperishable or not.

1) Some, like Scotus, seem to conceive this matter in such a way that the exclusion of sin is obtained, *not by an internal cause,* that is, *either by vision,* since it is in the intellect but sin is in the will, and it does not necessarily imply love, *or by love,* since it does not necessarily flow from vision, *but by an external cause,* or by God who is continually anticipating the will of the blessed so that the will perseveres in the enjoyment of God, and in this way sin is excluded. Thus therefore the will, even in the presence of the seen supreme good remains free, at least regarding its exercise or at least inasmuch as it can suspend the act of love, in the way we explained is anticipated by God, because all sin must be kept away from the blessed.[4]

2) However, the common opinion, in agreement with St. Thomas, explains impeccability uniquely *by a cause internal to the blessed,* namely, so that the will in the face of the seen supreme good is moved necessarily to love, therefore without rejecting it or being able to turn away from that vision. Surely the blessed soul in the face of the good that is the greatest in itself and for the soul, in which therefore there is no trace of evil, lacks indifference of judgment (supposing an object partly good and partly evil) and therefore also freedom; therefore the blessed loves it with the necessity both of specification and of exercise, or inasmuch as it cannot place a contrary act nor suspend the act of love.[5]

94. But the authors of this opinion are in disagreement about the further determination of their concept. a) According to Durandus, the one vision produces impeccability, but not as it is of God alone, but as attaining in the Word all the things and actions pertaining to the blessed soul and all of the circumstances that could move his will to good or to evil; for thus any defect in the practical intellect is avoided, or a speculative error and any other inconsiderateness from which sin could come.[6] But opposed to this opinion is the fact that the vision, being of God and therefore as beatifying, would not exclude sin.

b) According to others, the vision excludes sin, but only by means of the love that it causes necessarily and which forces the blessed not to sin. Thus, according to Suarez, Capreolus and Soto, and according to Medina and Vitoria.[7] But in this opinion, although it well excludes sin, the impeccability itself would seem not to be able to be understood without actual love, so that it would cease if, even given the vision, God should suspend his cooperation with the act of love.

c) According to others, the vision alone by reason of the object, namely, of the supreme good, suffices for impeccability, even setting aside love. Thus with Cajetan,

4. Scotus, *In 4* d.1 q.4; d.49 q.4; q.6.
5. S.Th. I, q.62, a. 8; I-II, q. 4, a.4; q. 5, a. 4. See Gonet, *De ultimo fine hominis,* disp.4 a.4f.
6. Durandus, *In 2* d.7 q.1; d.23 q.1. See S.Th., *De ver.* q.24 a.8.
7. Suarez, 10.1.9; B. Medina, *In 1.2* q.4 a.4; Thus Hurter, 3 n.686.

Suarez and many others.[8] This seems to agree with the reason given above by St. Thomas about the loss of freedom, in the presence of the supreme good, concerning the immediate love of God alone and the love of other things only with reference to God. This opinion seems to be preferable, since vision per se takes away the indifference of the free judgment that is necessary for a choice. But it does not deny that sin in the blessed *de facto* is necessarily excluded when the love of God is present.

N.B. Impeccability, which is metaphysical or physical according as it is opposed to sin metaphysically or physically, in the blessed is: according to some, like Gonet, metaphysical in relation to actual sin and habitual sin; according to others, like the Salmanticenses, it is physical in relation to both sins, and according to some others, like Suarez, it is metaphysical in relation to actual sin, but physical in relation to habitual sin.[9]

95. Scholium 2. *Are the blessed forced to choose what is more perfect?* Since the blessed necessarily love everything that is necessarily connected with the love of God, the question is raised whether, between two things, which are pleasing to God, they necessarily choose what here and now is more pleasing to Him, or can they choose the one that is less pleasing; in other words, there is a question about whether in the blessed there can be any moral imperfections of this kind. According to Lugo, with whom others agree, they are always required, not physically but certainly morally, to choose what is more pleasing to God.[10]

8. Suarez, n.16-24; Salmanticenses, *loc.cit.*, disp.4,1 n.4; Gonet, *loc.cit.*, d.4 a.4.
9. Gonet, *loc.cit.*, d.4 a.5; Salmanticenses, *loc.cit.*, d.4 n.4.17; Suarez, 10,21-24.
10. Lugo, *De incarn.* d.2 s.2 n.24; d.26 s.10 n.142; Pesch, 3 n.463.

ARTICLE V

ON THE ETERNITY OF BEATITUDE

Thesis 6. Beatitude is eternal actually and by right.

S.Th. I, q. 10, a. 3; I-II, q. 5, a. 4; Scotus, *In 4* d.49 q.6; Suarez, *loc.cit.*, 14; Gonet, *loc.cit.*, d.6 a.2; Lennerz, n.25-32.

96. Connection. From what we have proved, beatitude is indefectible on the part of the blessed, that is, because he cannot destroy it through sin. But is it also indefectible from itself, so that *of itself* it cannot be lost or at least *de facto* will never be lost? Certainly the eternity of beatitude and impeccability are intimately connected, inasmuch as the former demands the latter. But the latter does not necessarily produce the former. Therefore what is to be said about the duration of beatitude?

97. Definition of terms. *Beatitude* is taken here in its complete sense, that is, as it is the actual union of subject with a beatifying object.

Is eternal, that is, from the moment that it begins, it continues both without interruption and afterwards it is without end. *Eternity*, therefore, is taken here, not *strictly* or for a duration that is all at once, and essentially excluding a beginning, succession and an end, but it is taken in a *broad* sense as the eternity of hell or simply for a duration that has no end.

Eternal actually, that is, it is asserted that this duration is had without determining further the reason for it.

Eternal by right, namely: a) Not from a mere gratuitous gift of God, but *from its own nature* it demands perpetuity, almost like the human soul. b) It is *intrinsically imperishable,* because it cannot be dissolved, either by an *intrinsic* cause, or by an *extrinsic* cause, whether it is a *created* cause acting *naturally* or an *uncreated* cause operating according to its *ordinary* power or according to the nature of things and natural exigencies. However, according to the *absolute* power of God, like any contingent thing, it could be annihilated by God by the suspension of his conserving power.

Therefore perpetuity is an essential property of beatitude, as theologians commonly teach.[1]

98. Adversaries. Origen and the *Origenists* according to what we said above in n. 6.

1. S.Th. I, q. 64, a. 2; I-II, q. 5, a. 4; Suarez, d.14; Vázquez, *In 1.2* d.21; Gotti, *De beatit.* q.2 dub.7. See however Scotus, *In 4* d.49 q.6.

Scotus is of the opinion that, although perpetuity in one way or another belongs to the nature of beatitude, beatitude is not corruptible *intrinsically,* but it is that way only from the will of God, since the will of the blessed could freely not command the vision nor make use of charity.[2]

Granado denies that perpetuity is so much a part of the nature of beatitude that it cannot exist without it, v.gr., in a blessed soul whom God unexpectedly would destroy.[3]

99. Doctrine of the Church. Beatitude is *de facto* eternal. *Lateran Council IV* (D 801): "...They will rise again... to receive according to their works..., and the others everlasting glory with Christ" (see also D 802).

Benedict XII (D 1000-1001): "We define: that the souls of all the saints..., have eternal life and rest...; and that... in them... the same vision and enjoyment have continued and will continue without any interruption and without end until the Last Judgment and from then on forever."

To the above can be added: the *Creeds* professing faith in "life everlasting," like the *Creeds of Epiphanius* (D 44), of *Damasus I* (D 72), of *Athansius* (D 76); *the Council of Trent* (D 1546, 1582): the object of merit is eternal life.

100. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 801, 1000-1001) concerning *actual* eternity. It is *certain in theology* that perpetuity is at least in some sense pertaining to the nature of beatitude. It is *common and morally certain* regarding its *intrinsic* imperishability.

A. **Beatitude is eternal actually.**

101. Proof from Holy Scripture. It is proved from almost numberless texts, where the matter is stated; here are a few of them.

In positive terms. Matt. 25:46: *The righteous will go away... into eternal life.* 1 Thess. 4:17: *And so we shall always be with the Lord.* 2 Cor. 4:17: *This slight momentary affliction is preparing us for an eternal weight of glory.* Wis. 5:15: *But the righteous live forever.*[4]

In negative terms. 1 Pet. 1:4: *We have been born anew... to an inheritance that is imperishable, undefiled, and unfading.* 1 Pet. 5:4: *You will obtain the unfading crown of glory.* John 16:22: *No one will take your joy from you.* Rev. 3:12: *He who conquers... never shall he go out of it.* Rev.

2. Scotus, *loc.cit.*
3. Granado, S.J., *In 1.2* contr.1 tr.3 d.3; see Beraza, n.1305.
4. See also Matt. 19:25; Mark 10:17.30; Luke 16:9; John 3:15f.; 4:14.36; 6:40; 10:28; 17:2; Rom. 2:7; 6:22; 2 Cor. 5:1; Heb. 9:15; 1 John 2:25.

21:3f.: *And they shall be his people... and death shall be no more* (see 1 Cor. 9:25).

102. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers affirm the eternity of beatitude, while dealing at one time with it alone, and at other times with it and with the eternity of hell.

Theophilus of Antioch (R 176): "Read... the Scriptures..., so that you may obtain the eternal goods of God." St. Basil (R 976): Eternal fire is said to be equal to eternal life; but since the latter has no end, therefore neither the former. St. Augustine (R 1788): In heaven God "will be seen without end... We will be at rest and we will see... Behold what will be at the end without an end." Theodoretus (R 2154): "The munificent benefactor promised that he would give not something perishable or temporal, but the eternal enjoyment of good things...."[5]

103. Theological reasoning. Reason *alone* cannot prove that beatitude is *de facto* eternal, if it prescinds from the second part. But if this is granted, it speaks in this way: Beatitude is eternal *by its own nature.* But God, according to the *ordinary law,* accommodates himself to the natures of things. Therefore beatitude is de facto eternal, since there is no apparent reason for saying that God is not going to act in this matter according to the ordinary law.

B. **Beatitude is eternal by right.**

104. Proof from tradition. St. Augustine (R 1674): *Beatitude cannot be true without being perpetual*: "Since therefore all men desire to be happy, if they truly desire it, they really want to be immortal; for otherwise they cannot be happy... Therefore in no way can life truly be happy, unless it is everlasting" (S.Th. I-II, q. 5, a. 4).

The Roman Catechism (1,13,3). *Beatitude demands perpetuity:* "Happiness is an accumulation of all good without admixture of evil, which, as it fills up the measure of man's desires, must be eternal. He who is blessed with happiness must earnestly desire the continued enjoyment of those goods which he has obtained. Hence, unless its possession is permanent and certain, he is necessarily a prey to the most tormenting apprehension."

105. Theological reasoning. 1) *Beatitude cannot be true without being perpetual.* For:

5. To prove the same truth from ancient Christian monuments, see Katschthaler, n.467.

a) The happy person who would at some point cease being happy: either, being ignorant of that, would have the evil of ignorance in a matter of great importance for him; or, since he could not, as is evident, not think about the duration of his happiness, at least sometimes; or thinking that it is perpetual he would suffer the evil of an error, or having doubts about its perpetuity he would suffer the evil of anxiety, and this would be even more the case as he more intensely experiences the excellence of beatitude.

b) Beatitude having an end: *contrary* to the will of the blessed person, it would bring with it the evil of the loss of the supreme good; *according* to the will of the blessed, or at least without his opposition, it could not be said to be true beatitude, since its end would be desired or received without sorrow.

2) *Beatitude lacks a principle of corruption*: a) An *internal* principle, since all of its element are both *spiritual* (and therefore simple) and *habitual* or of themselves having permanent existence: the soul, grace, the light of glory.

b) An *external* principle, since both the soul, as immortal by nature, and grace and the light of glory, as simply supernatural, depend on God alone; since the light and the intellect, while they exist, both demand the accommodated concursus, and, given this, operate necessarily; since the will cannot hinder the continual infusion of the light into the soul, and given this, the act of the intellect, from the highest level of evidence, is removed from the command of the will, and (something Scotus denies) since for other reasons the will cannot hinder the vision, as necessarily adhering to the supreme good clearly apprehended and whose loss would have the nature of a pure evil, which is not its adequate object. But *God accommodates himself to the natures of things,* so that therefore he conserves those things that are intrinsically imperishable and he cooperates with them necessarily in their actions. Therefore beatitude lacks an external principle of corruption.

106. Objections. A) *Against the first part.* The duration of a meritorious act is finite. Therefore also its reward.

I deny the consequent. The work of the just merits beatitude, *as eternal,* according to the equality of proportion (S.Th. I-II, q. 114, a. 3). 2 Cor. 4:17: *For this slight momentary affliction is preparing for us an eternal weight of glory.* The Council of Trent (D 1582): "If anyone says that the good works of the justified man... do not truly merit... eternal life..., let him be anathema." But Christ merited infinitely with works finite in duration; therefore it is not surprising if the works of the justified man, because of participation in the merits of Christ, are thought to be worthy of merit infinite in duration, especially since an equality of proportion between the work and the reward is sufficient and therefore also to be evaluated from the dignity of the reward.

Moreover, since sanctifying grace is of itself permanent, and de facto always remains in the blessed and since the right of inheritance belongs to that grace, the inheritance must also be perpetual.

Likewise a good work of the justified man merits beatitude condignly. But beatitude without perpetuity cannot be true. Therefore that good work merits perpetuity.[6]

107. B) *Against the second part.* 1. Habitual grace is perishable. Therefore also the beatitude connected with it.

I distinguish the major. Habitual grace is perishable by the absolute power of God, *conceded;* by the ordinary power of God, *I subdistinguish:* in heaven, *denied;* on this earth, *I subdistinguish again:* because of sin, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.*

Grace, like every created thing, can be annihilated by God; but by the ordinary power of God is it imperishable, since it lacks a principle of corruption and therefore it has being that is of itself permanent, and it is perishable only because of sin, inasmuch as because of this a man merits to be deprived of it by God. But sin occurs only in this life.

2. The vision and love of beatitude that cannot be lost is not distinguished from the vision and love that may at some time cease to be. Therefore the vision and love of beatitude do not require perpetuity.

I distinguish the major. The vision and love that cannot be lost are not distinguished from those that can be lost physically and entitatively, *conceded:* morally, *denied.*

For, in the first case they satisfy the appetite, but in the second they do not. For, since the blessed, from what has been said, cannot ignore the duration of beatitude, its eternity is known by him at every moment; in this *intentional* and objective sense, although not *real* and formal, it can be said to be *total and all at once* in each instant (in some way like the eternity of God), so that in this way it can fully satisfy the mind. But a beatitude that is not eternal, or one this is not known as such, would not be without anxiety.

Hence the *physical* value of a created being does not depend on its duration, but its *moral* value is changed specifically by perpetuity. For just as damnation would not be complete, unless it were perceived by the damned as eternal, so neither beatitude.[7]

3. Beatitude can be conjoined, as in the mortal Christ, with sorrow and sadness. Therefore it does not necessarily exclude all anxiety.

I distinguish the major. Beatitude can be conjoined with a sorrow that has to do with essential beatitude, *denied;* with other objects, *I subdistinguish:* if it is not yet obtained *even accidentally, conceded;* otherwise, *denied.*

Anxiety over the duration of beatitude would have an effect on essential beatitude, while the sorrow and sadness of Christ did not affect his essential beatitude but only his accidental.

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6. See Suarez, 14,1,6f.
7. S.Th. II-II, q. 18, a. 3; Suarez, 14,3,5.

108. Scholium 1. *In what elements beatitude is eternal.* Beatitude is eternal in concrete: a) *Regarding the negative element of the exclusion of all evil,*[8] and regarding the *essential habitual principles of beatitude,* namely, sanctifying grace, several infused virtues and the light of glory.

b) Regarding the *acts of vision, love and joy* which it includes. And there is no interruption of them: "the vision and enjoyment," says Benedict XII (D 1000), "will continue... forever," and also even venial sin, which could be the cause of its interruption, is not present in heaven; therefore an angel sent from there to some individual remains in the beatific vision (Matt. 18:10).

Indeed, from these words of Benedict XII it may be concluded further that not only actual beatitude is not interrupted—which is clearly defined there—but that in the blessed, with more probability, the continuing succession of those acts is not given, but that *the exact same acts,* with which the beatitude began, continue on forever, so that in this regard there is a certain assimilation of beatitude to the immutability of God.[9]

Moreover, there does not seem to be either reason or the power that the intellect (and consequently the will, since it is concerned with the supreme good) should move from one act to another, since God presents himself continually to it to be seen and so he draws it to himself without intermission.

c) Regarding *certain accidental perfections always and necessarily,* whether from the nature of things or from the law of God, connected with essential beatitude, v.gr., joy concerning some created goods, the mutual love of the blessed, endowments of the glorified body, etc. Other accidental perfections will not be continuing in exactly the same way, since the blessed will be able, v.gr., at different times to elicit various acts of consideration and joy concerning created things, although perpetually there remains in them both the power of freely choosing those acts and the continuing alteration of these acts by moving from the knowledge of one thing to the knowledge of something else.[10]

109. Scholium 2. *On the security of beatitude.* Security, or *the certain knowledge* of the perpetuity of beatitude, *is required in the blessed for perfect beatitude,* or at least as a necessary condition, as Suarez thinks,[11] or as being of the essence on the part of the subject, as several with Viva think.[12] For just as perpetuity, which is an essential property of beatitude, belongs to it and is necessary for formally beatifying acts, which without it cannot satisfy the appetite, so also security about the perpetuity, which does not belong to beatitude as one of its properties, since the possession of God already of itself is perpetual and completely satisfying the appetite, but *on the part of the subject,* seems to be at least *a necessary condition* of beatitude, or so that the appetite can be completely satisfied.

a) *It is absolutely clear that the blessed de facto are secure about their beatitude.*

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8. Rev. 21:4: *God will wipe away every tear from their eyes....* See Rev. 7:16f.; 14:13; 2 Cor. 5:1-4; Heb. 4:9.
9. Scheeben, § 93 at the end; Palmieri, § 81,1; Michel, *Les mystères...* 24.26.131. But according to Lahousse there is in the blessed an indefinite succession of acts (n.322).
10. Suarez, 14,1,4; Palmieri, § 81,2.
11. Suarez, 14,3,6; *De ang.* 5,7,5.
12. D. Viva, S.J., *De beatit.* q.8; Muncunill, n.928-937; Pesch, 3 n.467. But see Scotus, *loc.cit.*

For evidently they know what they believed in life, that beatitude is perpetual. St. Cyprian: "That stable and firm and perpetual security... The crowd of parents, of brothers desires (us) now to be secure about their safety."[13]

b) This security is required for perfect beatitude. St. Augustine: "For how are the blessed, if they are uncertain?... I do not see how they can be blessed, if they are uncertain about their own beatitude." "The soul cannot be blessed unless it is most certain about its eternity.... For it (the soul) will not be blessed unless it is secure."[14] The appetite would not be completely satisfied, unless anxiety about its perpetuity is excluded completely from the blessed (R 1756).

110. Scholium 3. *On the nature of the duration of the blessed.* The duration of the blessed is not time, but *aevum* (= participated eternity). While *eternity* taken properly belongs to God, a being absolutely immutable, and *time* pertains to a substance either intrinsically or extrinsically mutable, *aevum* pertains to a substance intrinsically immutable, but which either actually or potentially in some sense is changed *because of acts succeeding each other,* like the angels (S.Th. I, q. 10, a. 5). But in the blessed: neither the soul nor the body suffer any change; the vision itself is one and the same uninterrupted act; nevertheless it is a power of successive acts with regard to other things and therefore of some kind of change. Therefore its duration is called "aevum."

13. St. Cyprian, *De mort.* n.3.26: ML 4,585.601.
14. St. Augustine, *De gen. ad litt.* 11,17,22: ML 34,438; *De civ. Dei* 10,30: ML 41,310f. See *De civ. Dei* 12,20; 22,30: ML 41,369f.801; *De Trin.* 13,8: ML 42,1022f.

ARTICLE VI

ON THE INEQUALITY OF BEATITUDE

Thesis 7. Beatitude is unequal depending on the diversity of merits.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 93, a. 3; Suarez, *De Deo* tr.1,2,20f.; Salmanticenses, *De visione Dei* disp.5; Muncunill, n.1043-1047.

111. Connection. The inequality of beatitude is another property of it which, after having considered the other properties, now comes up for treatment. For, given the fact that all the justified deceased persons obtain perfect beatitude, this question presents itself, namely, whether it is unequal in the individual blessed persons, since in this life not all the just led their Christian life with the same perfection. The thesis responds to this question.

112. Definition of terms. *Beatitude*, that is, the essential form taken simply.

Is unequal. The diversity of beatitude is established, not regarding the object or the specifying acts in it, but a *gradual diversity*, however we do it in such a way that we prescind in the thesis from the obscure question of explaining the way in which it can be had.

Depending on the diversity of merits. The glory is given because of the sanctifying grace, to which the right of inheritance is attached; but that grace is proportioned to one's merits; therefore the inequality of beatitude is founded proximately on sanctifying grace, but remotely on the diversity of merits.

Therefore this thesis does not apply to infants, as being incapable of merit, and for all of whom beatitude is equal, but it applies only for adults, for all of whom also the initial grace of baptism must be said to be *per se* equal.[1]

113. *This inequality consists,* as is evident, not in the object, but *in the acts* of vision, love and joy; these acts, as elicited by the finite faculties, can be *gradually* diverse in the different blessed persons: but *primarily* it is *in the vision,* on which, as a previous condition, the other acts depend. But the vision depends proximately, as a physical cause, on the level of the light of

1. See Suarez, *De baptismo* q.69 s.3 n.1-5.

1* Others explain this matter differently, v.gr., Vázquez, *In 1* disp.53 c.4; Toledo, *In 1* q.12 a.7. On the inequality of beatitude among the ancient scholastics, see Wicki, *op.cit.*, 238-255.

glory, which is given variously to each individual depending on the level of sanctifying grace.

In this way the inequality can be explained in relation to the vision (consequently also in relation to the love and joy). The vision can be unequal: a) *Looked at subjectively,* both in its *intensity,* which is wont to be the first inequality in qualities of the same nature, and in its *clarity*, which, other things being equal, depends on the intensity of the knowledge. b) Hence also *taken objectively,* both with regard to the *primary* object or God himself, since God, as being infinite, is exhausted in a knowing way by no finite intellect and therefore by it can be attained more or less perfectly depending on the diversity of the light of glory, and regarding the *secondary* object or the creatures contained in God *as their cause;* many more of them can be seen, and can be seen more clearly, according as God himself is more perfectly attained.

Hence, *the total God is seen but not totally: the total God extensively* or according to all his perfections both absolute and relative; *not totally,* so that this word is taken, not *subjectively* or from the side of the viewer, since he sees God with all the ability he has, or as connoting an *absolutely clear* vision of the thing, since in this way created things are knowable only by God; but *objectively,* or on the side of the object, since the blessed person does not perceive God totally, or perfectly or with regard to his infinite knowability, whether extensively or regarding all possible creatures contained in God virtually, both with regard to all individuals and also with regard to their specifying reasons (S.Th. I, q. 12, a. 7f.).[1*]

114. Adversaries. Jovinianus said that merits and rewards for the just, and demerits and punishments for the unjust, are equal.[2]

The *Reformers* in the 16th century taught that beatitude is conferred not because of merits, but because of the justice of Christ, which is given equally to all believers, and therefore that it is the same for all the justified.[3]

115. Doctrine of the Church. *The Council of Florence* (D 1305) teaches that the souls of those without any stain "are received immediately into heaven and see clearly God himself... though some more perfectly than others, according to the diversity of merits." The vision is presented here obviously for the *total* beatitude, or at least as its principal part, and there-

2. St. Jerome, *Adv. Iovin.* 2,18f.: ML 23,312f.

3. See Knabenbauer, p.129f.

3* See Spicq, *op.cit.,* 365; Cornely, *Epistola ad Corinthios altera* (Paris 1909) 243f. But J.B. Bauer denies that this text has to do with inequality of reward, *Num beatitudinis accidentalis varii gradus Scripturarum testimoniis probari queant:* VerDom 31 (1952) 276f.

fore virtually also for love and joy, since, based on the nature of the matter, the intensity of these depends on the level of the vision.

The Council of Trent (D 1582): "If anyone says that the good works of the justified man... do not truly merit an increase of glory, let him be anathema." With these words doubtless what is per se evident is supposed, namely, that the good works in individuals can be diverse both in number and in perfection. On the other hand, since "glory" in the sources is always taken for beatitude, the indefinite formula "increase of glory" must be taken to refer at least to *essential* beatitude.

116. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith: explicitly* regarding the vision (D 1305); at least *theologically certain* regarding the other acts of beatitude, since they respond to the level of the vision, and in general with regard to beatitude (D 1582), since it is certain that the good works can be in each person diverse both in number and in perfection.

117. Proof from Holy Scripture. Beatitude is said to be given as a reward; but it is of the nature of a reward that it corresponds to work or merits. Matt. 5:12: *Your reward is great in heaven.* 2 John 8: *Look to yourselves, that you may not lose what you have worked for, but may win a full reward.*

The reward is said to be given according to the works; this of course must be understood in the obvious sense not only regarding the fact of the reward or punishment, but also according to their various *levels.* 1 Cor. 3:8: *Each shall receive his wages according to his labor.*

2 Cor. 9:6: *He who sows sparingly will also reap sparingly, and he who sows bountifully will also reap bountifully.* These words, although directly have to do with giving alms, suppose the general principle that the reward responds to the diversity of merits.[3*]

1 Cor. 15:41: ... *For star differs from star in glory. So it is with the resurrection of the dead.* These words are really about the inequality of the glory of the body and therefore about accidental glory; but a fortiori they suppose the inequality of the essential glory, for the former is thought to correspond to the latter.[4]

118. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers explain this matter by appealing often to the texts of Scripture quoted above.

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4. See Cornely, *Prior epistola ad Corinthios* (Paris 1909) 494; Bover, *Las epistolas...* § 125. But Bauer has a different view, *loc.cit.*, 276, following Huby, *Première Epître aux Corinthiens* (Paris 1946) 386.

4* Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in evangelium secundum Mattheum* (Paris 1922) 179f.

Aphraates (R 696). Referring to 1 Cor. 3:8 and 15:41f., *he says that glory is different for different persons:* "Therefore you know that when men enter into life one reward will be more abundant than another, glory more eminent than glory, and one reward more ample than another."

St. Jerome (R 1383): *Different rewards correspond to the difference of virtues:* "Now our work is, according to our different virtues, to prepare for ourselves a different future... If we are all to be equal in heaven, in vain do we humble ourselves here that we may be greater there."

St. Gregory the Great (R 2308): *While referring to John 14:12, says that we can work now in different ways so that then we will be rewarded differently:* "Because in this life there is a difference of works, in the next life without doubt there will be difference of dignities, so that just as here one surpasses another in merit, so also there one will surpass another in retribution." (See also St. Augustine, R 1331).

119. Theological reasoning. 1) A just and wise providence provides that in granting rewards or punishments a proportion should be observed with merits and demerits. But, as we know from experience, the merits of the just are very unequal. Therefore also the rewards will be different.

2) According to the will of God this life is a preparation for the future life, and therefore the perfection of the future life must correspond to the perfection of earthly life. But some conduct this life more perfectly than others. Therefore.

3) Because of the difference of reward men are induced to elicit more perfect acts of virtue (St. Jerome, R 1383).

120. Objections. 1. Matt. 20:1-16: *The kingdom of heaven is like a householder who went out early in the morning to hire laborers for his vineyard. After agreeing with the laborers for a denarius, he sent them into his vineyard.* Then, promising them a just wage, he sent others at the third, sixth, ninth and eleventh hour. And finally he paid all of them. *And when those hired about the eleventh hour came, each of them received a denarius. Now when the first came... each of them also received a denarius. And they grumbled... saying: These last worked only one hour, and you have made them equal to us who have borne the burden of the day and the scorching heat. But he replied to one of them: Friend I am doing you no wrong; did you not agree with me for a denarius?... I choose to give to this last as I give to you. Am I not allowed to do what I choose with what belongs to me?*

Therefore, an equal wage is given to the laborers in the vineyard who worked unequally. But the wage or reward is beatitude. Therefore beatitude is equal for all.

I distinguish the major. An equal reward according to substance is given to the laborers for unequal work, *conceded;* according to the grade or level, *I subdistinguish:*

for equal merit, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.*

Given the fact that the parable is about eternal salvation and about the work for it, from the many explanations[4*] of this parable, here are some, according to which the parable is concerned: a) *About the election and the non-election to glory,* as depending only on the will of God, but not "on the greater or lesser glory of the elect."[5]

b) About objective beatitude or the same for all *according to the object.*[6]

c) About subjective beatitude given equally to all *because of the same labor,* since even only one hour of work of the last laborers is as much as the others did working the whole day.[7]

d) About the subjective beatitude given equally, but not precisely to those working unequally. Namely, the eternal reward does not depend on the antiquity of the call nor on the length or intensity of the labor, since perhaps all are working intensely, but proximately on the grace of God, from which because of its abundance the works turn out to be more worthy and which, however, God according to his will distributes unequally, so that perhaps after having accomplished much in a short time, the worker fulfills a great deal of time, not because of great or lengthy external labor, but because of his interior fervor produced by the reception of more grace.

Hence the words "or am I not allowed to do what I choose" are not just about the reward, but also about the grace freely given by God to the different grades, but on which the merit and the reward depend.[8]

e) About equal beatitude *as to its substance* without a further determination, v.gr., regarding the level or degree.[9] For if, according to St. John Chrysostom, "it is not necessary to scrutinize literally everything that is in the parables, but when we learn the purpose for which they were given, then it is not necessary to inquire further.[10] In this parable the purpose seems to be to teach that glory is given equally to all, whether they come to God earlier or later, and also that perhaps lest the Jews be surprised that also the Gentiles, called to the faith after they were, are given the same reward; but this is done without denying the inequality of retribution of glory depending on the inequality of the merits.

This being the case, therefore, the parable teaches, at least primarily, that equal glory *with regard to its substance* is given to all. The difference according to degree

5. Thus Petavius, *De Deo* 7,11,5. A. Durand, S.J., *Evangile selon Saint Matthieu* (Paris 1927) 366-368, thinks that it is not dealing there with eternal life, but with the vocation by which the Gentiles are admitted at the end of time into the Christian Church under the same title as the Jews who were called and working for centuries. According to D. Buzy, S.C.I., *Evangile selon Saint Matthieu:* PirClam 9 (Paris 1950) 262f., it is not dealing with eternal life, but with the Pharisees, who for a long time worked in the service of God and, having recently been converted from their sins and called later, are now admitted into the kingdom of Christ on an equal level with others.
6. S.Th. I-II, q.5, a. 2 ad 1; *In Mt* 20; Hurter, 3 n.668.
7. Thus Maldonado, *In Mt* 20,8 (Mussiponti 1596) 467f.
8. Suarez, 2,20,18f.; Knabenbauer, 181f.; L. Fonk, S.J., *Le parabole del Signore* (vers. W. Bertini) (Rome 1924) n.187.
9. St. Augustine, R 1502; St. Gregory the Great, R 2308; Katschthaler, n.146, note 5. Lagrange seems to hold the same thing, *Evangile selon Saint Matthieu* (Paris 1927) 385.
10. St. John Chrysostom, *In Mt* hom.64f. 3: MG 58,613.

10* See Journet, *loc.cit.*, 442f.449f.

does not seem to be affirmed here (at least primarily.)

121. 2. All the blessed see the essence of God. Therefore they are equally happy.

I distinguish the major. The blessed see the total essence of God, *conceded;* totally, *denied.*

Therefore there is no obstacle to the fact that all the blessed see the total essence of God, but they do not do so in an equally perfect manner, as we said above.

3. 1 John 3:2: *Beloved, we are God's children now... we know that when he appears we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is.* Therefore the blessed see God as he is. Therefore also totally.

I distinguish the major. The blessed see God as he is, i.e., really and not merely analogically, *conceded;* comprehensively, *denied.*

Comprehensive knowledge of God, since it is impossible for creatures, is foreign to the mind of the Apostle in the quoted text.

4. 1 Cor. 13:12: *For now we see in a mirror dimly, but then face to face. Now I know in part, then I shall understand fully, even as I have been fully understood.* Hence the blessed know God, just as they have been known by God. But they are known by God comprehensively. Therefore they see him in the same way.

I distinguish the major. The blessed see God as they are known, that is, not merely abstractly and mediately, as wayfarers know God, but intuitively and immediately, *conceded;* as perfectly as they are known by God or comprehensively, *denied.*

From what was said elsewhere, the knowledge of the blessed is placed in opposition by Paul to knowledge "in part," not as if the former is comprehensive, but inasmuch as the latter is mediated, partial and obscure (n. 69).

5. God is a simple being. But in the vision of such a being there cannot be degrees. Therefore in the vision of God there are no degrees.

I distinguish the major. God is a simple being, therefore he exists in such a way that the total God is seen, *conceded;* the total God totally, *denied.*

Therefore, if the blessed do not see God *totally* or *comprehensively,* degrees of their vision can be given. Moreover, it is a mystery in the strict sense and therefore impervious to the merely natural light of reason, not only that the beatific vision is intrinsically possible, but that the blessed see the total God, a simple being, but without comprehending him. However, another explanation of this matter, which is not shown to be opposed to reason, was proposed recently (n. 113).

6. From the inequality of beatitude would follow envy among the blessed. But this is not possible in heaven. Therefore.

I deny the major. The blessed, as impeccable, are totally satisfied with the ordinary will of God. Indeed, from the purest mutual charity each one rejoices in the good of all. Moreover, the total capacity for glory of each one (depending on his merits) is filled up completely by the possession of God, so that, desiring nothing further, all are perfectly happy in their own degree of beatitude. For, just as a man of short stature is not saddened because another tall man is wearing a longer coat, and a man having finished his dinner is not sad because someone else eats more, so the blessed person is not sad

because others are given a higher grade of glory

Corollary. *There is no progression in the beatific vision.* The sources affirm this—that it does not increase but that it is eternal perfection already obtained (1 Cor. 13:10). The blessed person is in his final state: "The increase of charity is directed to an end, which is not in this, but in a future life" (II-II, q. 24, a. 7 ad 1). "Therefore every rational creature is so led by God to the end of its beatitude, that from God's predestination it is brought even to a determinate degree of beatitude. Consequently, when that degree is once secured, it cannot pass to a higher degree" (I, q. 62, a. 9).[10*]

122. Scholium 1. *On the proximate source of the inequality of beatitude.* The *moral* source of the inequality is the diversity of merits; but the *physical* source is mainly, according to all authors, a different light of glory in each individual according to the diversity of merits. Cajetan, however, and others, also held that the natural perfection of the intellect has an influence on the diverse perfection of the vision.[11]

But the negative opinion, which is quite common and rightly so, is opposed to this, for: a created intellect, of whatever species or perfection, is *from itself* completely out of proportion to the beatific vision and therefore it does not grasp it unless it is an instrument of God through active obediential potency, which is the same for all intellects that may be different in degree or even in species. The reason for this is that all are equally capable of the light of glory and of elevation. Also, since the reward corresponds, not to the natural perfection of the intellect, but to the merits, it cannot happen that someone having a lesser reward should see God more perfectly and so be more happy.

123. Scholium 2. *On the specific identity of the vision of the blessed.* Is the vision of all the blessed, in spite of it inequality, *of the same species* for all? Siuri and some others deny it.[12] It is more common and more probable that it should be affirmed, for: both the object of vision is the same for all and habitual grace and the light of glory are of the same species in all the blessed, but the beatific vision is proportioned to grace and the light of glory. Also, the specific difference between angels and men is no obstacle to the fact that they, while acting according as they agree in a common rationality, elicit an act of the same species, especially if they produce it not by their natural power, but by a supernatural power.[13]

Therefore, if when essential beatitude is said to be different in various blessed persons depending on the diversity of merits, it is said about the *essential* beatitude, but according as it is opposed to the *accidental,* but not as if the essential beatitude is of a *different species* in the various blessed persons.

124. Scholium 3. *On the relation of grace to glory.* It is certain that sanctifying grace is the necessary disposition for glory, and indeed so that the degree of glory to

11. Cajetan, *In 3* q.10 a.4. Scotus (*In 3* d.13 q.3; *In 4* d.50 q.6) and the Scotists hold that it is at least possible: see C. Frassen, O.F.M., *Scotus Academicus* t.5 (Rome 1900) d.3 a.7 s.4 q.2.
12. Siuri, tr.37 c.4.
13. D. Soto, *In 4* d.49 q.3 a.2; Valencia, 2 d.1 q.5 punct.3.

be obtained corresponds to the degree of grace that the soul possesses at the end of life (D 1582). But in Scripture grace is described further in reference to glory, not as a purely extrinsic means, v.gr., like money for wages, but as its *beginning*, that is, as if both were one and the same reality looked at in two stages of different perfection. Thus, the justified souls are said to have right now eternal life (John 3:16), the guarantee (τόν ἀρραβώνα) of an inheritance (2 Cor. 1:22; 5:5), the first fruits (τήν ἀπαρχήν) of the spirit (Rom. 8:23), then a sonship to be completed (Rom. 8:15.23).[14]

Hence according to St. Thomas, grace is with respect to glory, not a mere disposition of some kind, but its *beginning*, which differs from it not generically or specifically or even numerically, but only as the imperfect from the perfect, as the seed from the tree, or rather as the incipient fruit from the ripe fruit.[15]

But how can this be explained? First of all, grace and glory are not simply identified, since the former is in the pilgrim on his way to heaven (2 Cor. 5:1-3), living in the hope of an inheritance (1 Pet. 1:3f.), fighting to gain a crown (2 Tim. 2:1-6, and since grace is a habit, but glory is an act. But grace ordains a man immediately for union with God (I-II, q. 111, a. 5), makes him fully an adopted son, who therefore without the infusion of another habit is now an heir of God (Rom. 8:16-18; I-II, q. 114, a. 3; III, q. 23, a. 1), so that therefore in heaven, without the need of any other grace, except what he already has on earth and what he keeps, he is ready for beatitude to be bestowed on him.

On the other hand the blessed person, as a partaker of the divine nature through grace, has through it the *remote* principle of a really divine activity, which is the vision of the essence of God. Hence his grace is the same as glory when looked at as the *remote* habit of vision and love; but just as faith accompanies the grace of the wayfarer, but which no longer exists in heaven, so the light of glory accompanies the grace of the blessed. It is distinct from that grace and it does not render the blessed more worthy of the vision, but only *proximately* suited for the act itself of vision. But the grace itself, which belonged to the wayfarer, now elevated by the light of glory for the act of vision and so producing it, is called *consummated grace* (*gratia consummata*).

Therefore in the justified wayfarer grace is like a nature, which unites man with the unseen God through the virtues of faith, hope and charity as through proximate powers; but in the blessed there is the same grace with charity as a proximate power of love, but

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14. Ἁρ(ρ)αβών (arrha) is, according to H. Stephanus (*Thesaurus linguae graecae* [Pqris 1865]) "part of the solution that makes faith with the whole sum to be paid: also for this reason it differs from a pledge or security." Cornely, *Epist. ad Corinthios altera...* (Paris 1892) 48, note; Zorell, 135.174: see ἀρ(ρ)αβών, ἀπαρχή. See also J.B. Frey, S.Sp., *Le concept de "vie" dans l'evangile de Saint Jean:* Bibl. 1 (1920) 50-58; P. Ponnetain, *Grâce:* DBS 3,1122-1124; H. Lange, S.J., *De gratia* (Friburg Br. 1929) n.270; J. Leal, S.J., *La vida eterna en San Juan según Toledo y Maldonado:* archTG 14 (1951) 5-40; J. Pinsk, *L'espérance de la glorie. Spes gloriae.* Essais sur la Glorie de Dieu dans le monde et dans l'homme (Paris 1952); F. Mussner, A.W.H., *Die Anschauung vom "Leben" im vierten Evangelium, unter Berüchsichtigung der Johannesbriefe* (Munich 1952) 144-186. But on Rom. 8:13, see P. Benoit, O.P., *Nous gémissons, attendant la déliverance de notre corps (Rom. 8:23):* RechScRel 39 (1951-1952)267-280, he thinks that there he is not treating the expectation of any completed sonship.

15. S.Th. I-II, q. 69, a. 2; q.111,a. 3 ad 2; q. 114, a. 3 ad 2; II-II, q. 24, a. 3 ad 2. See R. Morency, S.J., *L'union du juste à Dieu par voie de connaisance et d'amour:* ScEccl 2 (1949) 73-76; Id., *L'union de grâce selon saint Thomas* (Montreal 1950) 153-160; A. Stolz, O.S.B., *Glaubensgnade und Glaubenslicht nach Thomas von Aquin:* StAns 1 (Rome 1933) 68-83.

in the place of faith there is the light of glory as the proximate power of vision. Hence the grace of the wayfarer *virtually* contains glory, which consists in an *act,* inasmuch as the same grace in heaven, eliciting through the light of glory the act of vision and through charity the act of love, is consummated.

Consequently, "the wonderful joining together," from the words of Leo XIII, "which is expressed by the word *indwelling,* is a condition only or a state that is different in wayfarers from that by which God embraces the blessed in heaven." Hence through the same grace, as a bond of union, God is present in the justified wayfarer as he is in the blessed; but this grace attains God, not immediately per se, but as a pilgrim on the way through the virtues of faith, hope, charity, but in heaven through the light of glory and through charity, so that God is equally present to the justified wayfarer and to the blessed; however the former because of a different way of attaining Him, as imperfect fruit, but the latter at perfect.[16]

16. Michel, *Gloire:* DTC 6,1320-1425; Sagüés, *El modo de inhabitación del Espíritu Santo según Santo Tomás de Aquino:* MiscCom 2 (1944) 169-190.

ARTICLE VII

ON ACCIDENTAL BEATITUDE IN GENERAL

S.Th. I-II, q. 4, a. 5-8; *Suppl.* q. 95f.; Suarez, *De fine hom.* D.8; 10,2; 11; *De ang.* 6,8; Lessius, *op.cit.*, 2,18f.; Salmanticenses, *De beatit.* Disp.2; Pesch, 3 th.50-55; Michel, *Gloire des élus:* DTC 6,1401-1412.

125. Connection. Beatitude *of itself,* and therefore at least by reason of its own nature, fills the appetite both *substantially*, or inasmuch as it concerns the supreme good in itself really possessed, and *accidentally,* or inasmuch as, besides the possession of God as he is in himself, it offers to the blessed other goods reasonably desirable for him, and frees him from every evil, even the smallest. But the essential beatitude does not fulfill *formally* every desire of the blessed, v.gr., regarding the accidental perfections of the body and the soul.

Indeed, it is not of the nature of *metaphysical* beatitude that, if something substantially happens to him, it also affects him accidentally in the way explained, as is clear in the case of Christ as a wayfarer. For, he enjoyed the beatific possession of God, but he also suffered many evils and many privations of good things.

Therefore now there is a question about the *accidental* beatitude of those dwelling in heaven. Therefore how far this reaches is established by certain conclusions, however not all of them enjoy the same level of certainty. For we are ignorant of many more things than we know about these heavenly realities, which no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the heart of man conceived (1 Cor. 2:9).

126. Definition of terms. *Accidental beatitude,* taken as *objective* and *formal* at the same time, is not said to be accidental, which would be an accident, since also the essential is an accident of the soul, but because it is a perfection added to the essential beatitude and given for its own purpose. It is: a) *Negatively,* the lack of any and even the smallest evil coming from the action of God or of creatures or of their privation. b) *Positively*, any kind of happy possession of the blessed reasonably desirable or coming to him from a created good or even from God himself, but not as an essential object of beatitude.[1]

1. See S.Th. I, q. 95, a. 4; *Catech. Rom.* 1,13,6. In general, everything that does not pertain to the essence could be regarded as accidental beatitude, v.gr., happiness concerning creatures also known from the vision, in fact also the love and joy coming from the vision of God, if one holds that the essence of beatitude consists in the vision alone: see Katschthaler, p.180. However, more fittingly what is commonly attributed to it is everything that is outside of the vision, love and joy *concerning God himself:* see Suarez, *De ang.* 6,8,2.

127. Existence. "Therefore in this matter," says Suarez, "besides the essential beatitude there are in the souls of the blessed some accidental rewards, which are usually referred to under the name of accidental beatitude."[2]

Holy Scripture. The angels, and therefore also the other blessed, rejoice over a sinner doing penance (Luke 15:10), and without doubt they do this with a joy distinct from their essential joy; and they know the multiform wisdom of God spread throughout the Church (Eph. 3:10), which is, clearly, a knowledge that is distinct from the essential (see also Luke 15:7; Matt. 19:29).

Beatitude is described as the kingdom of God to which the blessed belong (Matt. 13:43; 25:34.46; Luke 22:29f.; 1 Cor. 6:9; Rev. 22:4f.; 3:21) with Christ (Rom. 10:16f.). Surely if the inheritance of Christ is the glory which he as man obtained (Luke 24:26), and the justified are glorified with him (Heb. 2:11f.), it is not surprising if the partakers of his glory reign with him. But, if the idea of a happy kingdom on earth indicates a rule with the possession of all desirable things, then it is necessary to believe also that the kingdom of heaven is a kingdom in which the blessed exercise dominion over the other creatures in accordance with the ordination of God, while enjoying *reasonable* pleasure of all kinds.

St. Augustine (R 1788): "How great shall be that felicity, which shall be tainted with no evil, which shall lack no good...."[3]

The basic idea of a beatitude that is in every way complete is that it fulfills reasonably every legitimate desire. But the natural faculties of the blessed, which without sufficient reason would be thought to be changed in their inclination, should be thought, according to their nature but directed by reason, to tend towards created goods, to know them in a way different from the vision of God and consequently to love them and to enjoy them. Therefore.

128. Amplitude. 1) *Negative.* Since beatitude is also freedom from all evil, for the blessed there is no sorrow either of the body or of the soul, no sadness, no fear of sinning (Rev. 21:4),[4] no error or judgment affirming something false, no ignorance or lack of knowledge due to their state. But since they do not know all things, nothing prevents them from making

2. Suarez, *De fine hom.* 11,2,2. See *Catech. Rom.* 1,13,12.
3. See St. John Chrysostom, *Ad Theod. laps.* 1,11: MG 47,291f. The same idea is found in ancient Christian monuments, where heaven is described as a garden, a banquet, etc.: see Katschthaler, p. 157; C.M. Kaufmann, *Handbuch der altchristlichen Epigraphik* (Freiburg im Br. 1917) 198-203; H. Leclercq, *Paradis:* DACL 13,1579-1601.
4. See Rev. 7:16f.; 22:3-5; Luke 6:21; Isa. 25:8; 35:10. St. John Chrysostom, *ibid.; In Hebr hom.* 6 n.4: MG 63,58; St. Augustine, *Enarr. In ps.147* n.6: ML 37,1918.

probable judgments as such, since per se there is no error in these.

2) *Positive.* Since beatitude perfectly satisfies the rational appetite, all *efficacious* desires of the blessed will be fulfilled, as theologians commonly teach; of course an unfulfilled desire, as causing pain, cannot take place in the blessed. St. Augustine: "But all the blessed have what they want; although not all who have what they want are necessarily blessed; but they are necessarily miserable, who either do not have what they want or have what they really do not want. Therefore the blessed person is only someone who has everything he wants and does not desire anything evil."[5]

However, every desire of the blessed is, concerning itself and concerning its circumstances, in accordance with the will of God. Thus it satisfies their desires: a) Regarding the *degree* of beatitude, without desiring any more of it, since their proximate capacity for it is filled according to the will of God. b) Regarding the *time,* since they do not want them to be fulfilled before the time determined by God, v.gr., for the resumption of their bodies.

Their *inefficacious* and *conditioned* desires, v.gr., for the salvation of a friend that is not obtained, are not always fulfilled; but they are not tormented by that, since it is according to the will of God.

129. Inequality. Accidental beatitude, even though it is thought to correspond to the essential, is also *specifically* unequal, since some rejoice over other things and one and the same blessed person is happy now for one reason and then for something else. Surely each person can have special friends—of course with a purely spiritual friendship—in heaven as they did on earth, and therefore joys special to themselves; individuals rejoice specially over the hearing of their prayers, over the fruit that their good works on earth are still producing after their death, over the arrival in heaven of their friends, etc.; and God can reveal something special to some persons.

Because of this perhaps someone, endowed with an essential beatitude inferior to that of others, enjoys some accidental beatitude that these do not have. But since the blessed love their own accidental perfections only because of the God whom they see, they rejoice over them in accordance with the measure of their essential beatitude; therefore these perfections are related only materially to the joy of the blessed and so none of them, of whatever nature its accidental beatitude may be either in itself or depending on a difference of time, has more or less joy from it, nor is it surpassed in this matter by a blessed person on a lower level.

5. St. Augustine, *De Trin.* 13,5-7: ML 42,1020f.; *De civ. Dei* 22,30,1: ML 41,801.

130. The increase of beatitude. Essential beatitude is immutable regarding the degree of vision, love and joy corresponding to the merits. But the accidental beatitude will be increased until the day of judgment, not only with regard to the resurrection of the body, but also from the new objects of joy entering into their knowledge, v.gr., from new facts about the Church militant, and from the new blessed entering into heaven daily, until the number of the elect is complete.[6]

6. See S.Th. I, q. 62, a. 9; St. R. Bellarmine, *De beatit.* 1,5; Lépicier, q.2 a.4 n.5-8; Michel, *op.cit.*, 132f.

ARTICLE VIII

ON ACCIDENTAL BEATITUDE IN PARTICULAR

131. Connection. In the preceding material we have established that an accidental beatitude, in addition to the essential, is given in the blessed; now we will explain more in detail some of the elements of that accidental beatitude, but we will leave to another place (n.295f.) the treatment of the things that pertain to bodily beatitude, although right now we presuppose the resurrection so that we can mention the happiness coming to the blessed even from external material goods.

132. A. *On the goods of the soul in general.* It is necessary to say: a) That in the blessed person all the goods which he had in life, both regarding habits and regarding acts, remain; they remain also inasmuch as they can be reconciled in some way with the perfection of beatitude, whether supernatural goods, like sanctifying grace with all the gifts connected with it and the sacramental characters, or also, as one should think, the natural goods, since beatitude does not destroy the perfection of nature. b) That all the goods are given to him, which are in agreement with his beatitude, or which he can *reasonably* desire, having supposed the order established by God in his works (3 CG 63).

133. B. *On the goods of the intellect in particular.* The intellectual virtues remain in it, both in habit and in act; the intellectual gifts of the Holy Spirit, when in themselves they do not include obscurity, like knowledge, wisdom, counsel, remain, but only according as they perfect the intellect, not according as they are directed to something foreign to beatitude, v.gr., in order to overcome temptations.

But faith does not remain (1 Cor. 13:13; D 1000)—and also at last probably not as a *habit,* since now it is not necessary—since it is obscure knowledge about God not yet seen,[1] and not the other gifts inasmuch as they suppose or complete faith, like the gifts of understanding and prophecy (1 Cor. 13:8-10) and consequently the science of faith or theology, since it proceeds from the principles of faith.[2] But knowledge about the objects of faith remain in the blessed, but as had from the vision through the light of glory, which is a substitute for the habit of faith, and therefore as specifically different from the knowledge of faith.

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1. See S.Th. I-II, q. 67, a. 3; II-II, q. 1, a. 4f.; Suarez, *De fide* 3,9,23.
2. S.Th. I, q. 1, a. 2; Suarez, *De fine hom.* 8,1. But the theological ideas which a man had in this life are thought to remain, but so that he clearly understands the true sense of Scripture, of the mysteries, of theological opinions. See Suarez, *De fide* 8,1,6.

134. *On the knowledge of the blessed.* If, as experience shows, our intellect can consider at the same time several even disparate objects, since its power is not exhausted by its act concerning one object, nothing prevents the blessed from knowing things other than God. But on the other hand, although they see the whole God with regard to his essence, attributes and persons, they are not omniscient (Matt. 26:36).

Therefore what do the blessed persons know besides God? Since it does not seem to be revealed, it is hardly possible to give a positive answer, besides this principle, namely: since beatitude is the sum of all goods and therefore satisfies every reasonable desire, it follows that the blessed know, besides God, everything that is necessary for them to know or that they legitimately desire to know, so that, other things being equal, their knowledge corresponds to the merits of each one according to its extent and its perfection.

They can be thought to know these things in concrete:

a) All the natural and supernatural things they knew during life on earth.

b) Everything that for some reason pertains to them in a special way, v.gr., about friends, children, subjects, about a society perhaps formerly governed by them, about worldly events, acts of worship and prayers directed to them, the needs of their dependents, as is clear from the praxis of the Church appealing to them, as if they were present and could hear.[3]

c) They know the society of the blessed: Jesus Christ, the Blessed Virgin, angels, all the other blessed, especially those associated with them during life on earth; consequently they know everything they need to know in that society.[4] The same thing holds for the souls in purgatory or in hell.

d) They know the universe in its constitution and all the species of things in it.

e) Likewise for the different degrees of glory: they know at least some future free acts, since it is implicitly said to them that not even the angels know the day of judgment, and since the gift of prophecy given to many wayfarers is not thought to be lacking in the blessed, especially since they can use it for the good of others; they know some free decrees of God, and it is advantageous both that the friendship of God be made known to the blessed (John 15:15) and that they defend or console the Church and wayfarers.

But by what means do they know all these things? This is difficult to determine. Probably they know through the knowledge of *vision* formally in God, or by the same

3. S.Th. III, q. 10, a. 2f.; II-II, q. 83, a. 4 ad 2; Valencia, 1 d.1 q.12 p.6. But some particular things are excluded, like the day of judgment, the time of the resurrection, and other things the knowledge of which it is certain has not been communicated to others, besides to the soul of Christ, and perhaps, as can piously be believed, to the Blessed Virgin.

4. See Dionysius Carthusianus, *De mutua cognitione beatorum in patria* (Cologne 1532); E. Meric, *Les Élus se reconnaîtront au Ciel*[3] (Paris 1925); B. Lavaud, O.P., *L'amitié des saints au ciel:* VieSpir 31 (1932) 5-17; Michel, *Vision béatifique et connaissance des autres:* AmCl 64 (1954) 263. St. Augustine speaks about the mutual intimate knowledge of the blessed (*Serm.* 243, al. de divers. 5,5: ML 38,1145): "The thoughts, which now only God sees, will be known to all in that society of saints. No one there wants what he thinks to remain hidden, since no one there thinks evil thoughts."

light and act by which they see God, all of which was just spelled out.[5] Similarly, more probably they have: *infused* knowledge about supernatural objects and new revelations or illuminations,[6] *natural* knowledge either acquired during life here or per accidens infused into them, if some of them lack it at least in part (S.Th. I, q. 67).[7] But in general it is necessary to say that everything, which is advantageous for them to know, but which they do not know by either natural knowledge or vision, is made known to them either by infused knowledge or by revelation.

135. C. *On the goods of the will in particular. Charity remains* in the blessed (1 Cor. 13:8), but purified of all imperfection; but not hope (D 1001) as it is directed to possessing God (S.Th. I-II, q. 67, a. 4), but as to its substance it remains, according to Suarez, since it does not include any imperfection for all acts, but only for acts of desire and those proper to hope.[8]

The infused moral virtues remain as habits, since they are in themselves perfections, which beatitude does not exclude, and as acts, since otherwise they would seem to be superfluous; but not with regard to all acts, since some of them include imperfections, as is evident in repentance and temperance.[9]

The gifts of the Holy Spirit remain: piety, fortitude and fear, inasmuch as they perfect the mind in order to heed the movement of the Holy Spirit, not inasmuch as they are foreign to beatitude (S.Th. I-II, q. 68, a. 6). But it seems that the charisms do not remain, since they are founded on faith and given for the help of others (S.Th. II-II, q. 174, a. 5).

The blessed live for God alone and they seek only his will. Hence they do not grieve over the physical evils of men or of relatives. Indeed, over the sins formerly committed by themselves or by others, although like God they hate them, they do not grieve: a) concerning their own evil, since they are now as though they do not exist; b) concerning the evil *of men*, even of close relatives, since they consider them to be enemies of God, but still they pray to God for their salvation; and if those sinful men do not repent, they want them to be punished, so that the divine justice may be served; hence they do not grieve over their damnation, since they see clearly that God has his reasons for permit-

5. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 20,21: ML 41,691; S.Th. I, q. 12, a. 8-10; q. 57, a. 5; Suarez, *De Deo* tr.1 2,27f.; Valencia, *ibid.*

6. St. Augustine, *De Gen. ad litt.* 4 c.22 n.39; c.24 n.41: ML 34,311-313; S.Th. I, q. 58, a. 7; Suarez, *loc.cit.*, n.19; *De fine hom.* 8,1; Lessius (2,10; 2 19 155) holds that things distinct from God are known in themselves by the blessed and also, while they exist, by the same light but with an act different from the vision of God, but by revelation if they are past or future and depend on the free choice of God or of the creature. Similarly, Vázquez (*In I* d.50) thinks that things distinct from God are seen in God by the blessed only as caused by him. See Palmieri, § 72f.

7. Suarez, 8,2. But St. Albert the Great (*In 3* d.31 a.10) thinks that the acquired natural sciences do not remain in heaven, but that others are infused in their place. See also Lessius, 2,19,157f.

8. Suarez, *De spe* 1,8,5. Since in the blessed there is also the love of concupiscence of God, the habit of hope must be said to remain by all those who hold that it is the principle of that love (see Suarez, 9,3,12; Lessius, 9,19 n. 163), but not necessarily by those who attribute it to charity as its principle (Gonet, *loc.cit.*, d.4 a.2; Esparza, *loc.cit.*, q.4 a.5).

9. Suarez, 10,2,3-7. Thus the blessed person rejoices, v.gr., over the fortitude with which he acted bravely, etc. Likewise the acquired virtues remain in the blessed, since there is no reason to deny it; indeed, if they have not been acquired during life on earth, they will be infused, or perfected if they were imperfectly acquired, since they are perfections of man's will and therefore due to the blessed.

ting it, and that ultimately everything is for the glory of God (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 95).

The blessed do not grieve over the delayed reunion of the soul with the body or of some other efficacious desire. Moreover, sadness is opposed to beatitude, not metaphysically, as is clear in the case of Christ, but certainly physically, and therefore it can be made a part of it only by a miracle.

136. D. *The dowries of the blessed. A dowry* is: in general, a natural perfection or a supernatural one or an adornment; but specifically, it is what is given to the bride either as assistance for the marriage or that it may be accomplished in a dignified manner. Since in the sources the union of the soul with God is compared with matrimony (John 3:29; 2 Cor. 11:2; Eph. 5:32; Rev. 21:2; 19:7; Isa. 61:10), it is commonly asserted that certain dowries are given to the soul, adorning it as a bride of Christ, since its marriage with Christ in heaven, when the soul has been brought into the house of the bridegroom, is made perfect in an indissoluble way (S.Th., *Suppl.* Q. 95, a. 1).

But what are these? Since the dowries are not spiritual gifts that are given to the wayfarer, since they are rather a promise or a pledge but not dowries, since these are given on the day of the giving of the bride or the performance of the marriage, they are something given in the beatitude itself. Hence, according to St. Bonaventure, they are the beatitude itself according as it concerns the marriage of Christ and the soul. But since beatitude is the marriage itself, while the dowry is something disposing for it or ordained to it, it is more commonly held with St. Thomas that the dowry is something habitual, directed to the operation in which beatitude consists.[10]

Although among the ancient authors there was some disagreement in assigning the dowries, *generally three dowries* are mentioned (while leaving aside for now those connected with the body), but they are understood, not as acts, since thus they would be the essential beatitude itself, but as habits or as permanent principles of acts, namely: a) *vision,* or the light of glory as disposing for the vision; b) *Fruition,* as disposing for delight; c) *Comprehension,* taken not strictly or for the comprehensive knowledge of God, but broadly or according as it is a firm hold on the last end whereby the soul rests secure in that state (1 Cor. 9:24).[11]

137. *The aureole of the blessed.*[12] Essential beatitude in the sources is called a *crown,* since this is a sign both of victory on earth with Christ

10. St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.49 a.1 q.5; S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 95, a. 2.5. On the dowries in the ancient scholastics, see Wicki, *op.cit.*, 202-237.

11. S.Th. I, q. 12, a. 7 ad 1; I-II, q. 4, a. 3 ad 3. Also, the dowries are said to correspond to the theological virtues whereby the soul in its earthly life was united with Christ (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 95, a. 5). However, the metaphorical use of "dowry" allows for a great diversity of opinion. See Suarez, *De ang.* 6,7,6-14; Vázquez, *In 1.2* d.17 c.2; Arriaga, *loc.cit.*, 55,1.

12. See C. Gutberlet, *Die Gloriale der Seligen im Himmel:* ThPraktQschr 55 (1902) 749-767; Th. Ortolan, *Aureole:* DTC 1,2571-2575; Journet, *Les privilèges secondaires de l'Eglise glorieuse:* Ang 14 (1937) 114-122.

and of reigning also with Christ in heaven.[13] Hence Christ and the blessed appear as wearing golden crowns (Rev. 14:14; 4:4). Therefore, since the essential reward is called a *golden crown*, the accidental reward, which is very conveniently given for some special victory, is called with a lesser word an *aureole,* which therefore denotes "something added to the *aurea,* a kind of joy, to wit, in the works one has done, in that they have the character of a signal victory" or "an exceptional reward corresponding to an exceptional victory" (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 96, a. 1 and 11). It is certainly a special adornment of the blessed, but its essence is difficult to explain.[14]

Any accidental reward could be called an aureole, but in a more strict sense generally a *threefold aureole* is proposed, namely: a) *Of Virgins,* because of a special victory over the flesh by perpetual virginity. b) *Of Martyrs,* because of their special victory over external enemies. c) *Of Doctors,* because of a special victory over the devil by instructing others about the truths of faith and morals (Dan. 12:3; Matt. 5:19).[15]

One aureole surpasses another, if either the difficulty of the battle is considered in the martyr or the long duration and danger in the virgin or the excellence in the doctor. But the aureole of the martyr seems to surpass the others, because that battle is more fierce in itself and it inflicts more suffering; hence the Church in the commemoration of the saints places the martyrs before the doctors and virgins. *The singular aureoles can differ among themselves,* v.gr., for different martyrdoms. *One blessed person inferior to another* in essential beatitude can surpass him with a better aureole, v.gr., because he suffered more intensely.[16]

N.B. The sacramental character doubtless will increase the accidental glory, since in an indelible way it testifies to the fidelity of the wayfarer towards God.

138. *The joy of the heavenly society.* Behold the inexhaustible fountain of joy: the society of Christ, of the Blessed Virgin, of the angels, of the other saints, all of whom are as it were a new city (Rev. 21:2) and the people of God familiar with God himself (Rev. 21:4), living in the house of the Father (John 14:2), in fact reigning with God (Luke 22:29; Matt. 23:34) and participating in His good like intimate companions

13. See 1 Cor. 9:25; 2 Tim. 4:8; 1 Pet. 5:5; Jas. 1:12; Rev. 2:10; 3:11.
14. An *aureole* is: according to some, the essential beatitude given with a special title of virgin or doctor or martyr; according to others, it is a special joy because of a special victory (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 96, a. 1); according to others, it adds to the joy special honors (Suarez, *De fine hom.* 11,3,4; Pesch, 3 n.509); according to others, it is a certain spiritual sign (Siuri, 39,1,6); according to others, it is something in the body of the blessed (Pohle-Gierens, 3 p.666).
15. Others however explain this matter in a slightly different way. See S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 96, a. 1; Siuri, 39,1,13; Beraza, n.1377. On the areoles in the ancient scholastics, see Wicki, *op.cit.,* 298-318.
16. On the fruits of beatitude that we are not treating, see S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 96, a. 2-4; Suarez, 11,3,5; Gonet, d.5 a.5; Beraza, n.1383-1385; Journet, *loc.cit.,* 122-124: he mentions other privileges: the sacramental characters, joy over a life led in poverty and obedience (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 96, a. 1 ad 2f.), illuminations received from higher angels (p. 124f.).

(Matt. 24:47; 24:23), indeed having Him in some sense as a servant (Luke 12:37), with the great mutual happiness of all, which is also described with the metaphor of a banquet (Matt. 8:11; Luke 22:30).[17]

They are the quasi-visible consummation of the Mystical Body through the communion of saints: some knowing others, loving them ardently, admiring their glory, holiness and beauty. Surely, in some measure they rejoice in the society of the wayfarers, since they perceive those things in the natural order that are opposed to that order, while praising the goodness of God, whether of mercy or of justice. Likewise the knowledge of the damned will be a joy for them, since they see that they have been freed from such great suffering and that the attributes of God shine in imposing them.

139. *On joy from the place of heaven.* The world (heaven and earth) will be a cause of great joy to the blessed, whether because of its beauty, especially after its renewal at the end of time, or because it was the theater of their labors and the exercise of their virtues, knowledge and arts. But that place or seat of the blessed especially will be a joy for them, which is called *paradise* or a delightful place (Luke 24:43), whose delightfulness and magnificence consist in this, that it was purchased with the blood of Christ (from Rev., especially ch. 21f.).

The Roman Catechism (1,13,8) gives this admonition that the faithful be taught about the beauty of heaven: "To enumerate all the delights with which the souls of the blessed shall be filled would be an endless task. We cannot even conceive them in thought. With this truth, however, the minds of the faithful should be deeply impressed—that the happiness of the Saints is full to overflowing of all those pleasures which can be enjoyed or even desired in this life, whether they regard the powers of the mind or of the perfection of the body...."

140. *Heaven is a definite place.* Theologians commonly affirm this and it seems to agree with the nature of the matter. For, even though the vision of God is possible everywhere and always accompanies the blessed, still the society of the blessed seems to demand connaturally a certain place, however Palmieri thinks otherwise.[18]

But revelation does not tell us where heaven is, although it would seem to indicate that it is not on earth (at least before the end of the world), but to be on high (in relation to us).[19]

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17. See St. R. Bellarmine, *De aet. felic. SS.* 4,10f.; H. Dutonquet, *Ciel:* DTC 2,2474-2511; De Broglie, *De fine ultimo* p.43; Vitti, *De futura gloria adipiscenda iuxta S. Paulum:* VerDom 7 (1927) 225-233; Frey, *Royaume de Dieu:* DB 5,1248f.. On the heavenly glory as expressed in antiquity in the figure of temples, see A. Stange, *Das frühchristliche Kirchengebäude als Bild des Himmels* (Cologne 1950).
18. Palmieri, § 82. See P. Bernard, *Ciel:* DAFC 1,531-536. On the analogical notion of place for the next life (heaven, hell, purgatory) Michel writes at length, *Le ciel est-il un lieu?:* AmCl 66 (1956) 153-155.
19. See Pesch, 3 n.502-504. But on the various meanings of the word "heaven" (οὐρανός) in the N.T., see Zorell, 958-960.

CHAPTER IV

On hell

141. Man was created by God simply to serve God alone and to possess him in eternity by intellect and will as his last end. But he must accomplish this freely by keeping the commandments given to him by God and so, by showing obedience to God, to attain him as his end. But it can happen that a man does not freely keep God's commandments, with the result that a man does not obtain his last end and rather makes himself worthy of punishment because of his sin. For this possibility God has established that the sinful man, if he does not duly repent his sins, will be punished with the eternal pains of hell.

Man was not made by God that he should sin, but he did create him in such a way that, contrary to the intention of God, he can freely sin; thus hell for men was not decreed by God *per se* and as the *primary* intention of God as the final end for at least some men, but only *per accidens* and as a consequence of the foreseen sins of men. Therefore man cannot properly be said to have been created for either eternal beatitude or eternal punishment; for he was made simply and per se only for beatitude. However, by his sin he can both refuse that beatitude and merit punishment.

Man de facto sins. Hence he merits punishment. Therefore it is the task of the theologian to consider that punishment, whether because it is from a provident God or because it can be imposed on a man, so that he should investigate its existence, nature and duration.

In addition to the authors already mentioned at the beginning of this treatise, the following also can be consulted, out of the many who have written about hell:

S.Th. I, q. 64; *Suppl.,* Q. 97-99; 4 CG 90.93; *Comp. theol.* c.173-175, 178-180.183; *Quodl.* 7, a. 13; 8, a. 16-18; Suarez, *De angelis,* 18; Lessius, *De perfectionibus moribusque divinis* (Paris 1881) 1.1 c.24-30; Th.A. V. Gerster A. Aeil, O.M.C., *Infernus... iuxta sensum S.Bonaventurae* (Turin 1936); S.V. Patuzzi, O.P., *De futuro impiorum statu* (Venice 1764); Michel, *L'enfer et la règle de la foi* (Paris 1925); Martínez, *op.cit.;* F. Tourrnebize, S.J., *Opinions du jour sur les peines d'Outre-Tombe. Feu métaphorique. Universalisme. Conditionalisme. Mitigation* (Paris 1899); E. Krebs, *Hölle:* LTK 5,116-118; M. Richard, *Enfer:* DTC 5,20-120; P. Bernard, *Enfer:* DAFC 1,1277-1399; J. Hontheim, S.J., *Hell:* CE 7,207-211; G. Bardy, M. Carrougês, B. Lorival, C. Spicq, Ch. H. Heris, J. Guitton, *L'enfer* (Paris 1950).

ARTICLE I

ON THE EXISTENCE OF HELL

Thesis 8. Those dying in mortal sin are subject to the avenging pains of loss and of sense in hell after this life.

St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.44 p.2 a.1; Siuri, tr.18 c.1; Pohle-Gierens, 3 p.667-669; Beraza, n.1070-1076; Pesch, 9 th.37.

142. Connection. Men in the pilgrim state of life either tend to their last end by their own good acts or turn themselves away from it by their evil acts. At the end of that life they are subject to a particular judgment, and will be given immediately their reward or punishment for their good or evil acts. Therefore the question now is: what painful fate awaits those who at the end of their life are guilty of evil deeds? Therefore our object now is to determine the punishments of hell, so that later we may consider in particular their duration and the nature of hellfire; other questions about hell will be handled in the scholiums. St. Thomas treats this matter after he explains the glory with which the saved are adorned (*Suppl.* q. 97f.).

143. Definition of terms. *Those dying in mortal sin*, that is, all those who at the moment of death are guilty of grave sin, not just original sin, but personal sin, and at least one that has not yet been forgiven.

Pain or punishment is an evil inflicted because of sin (S.Th., *De malo,* q.1 a.4).

It is the nature of it that it be: painful, for some fault, contrary to one's will, at least to its nature or as it is the principle of desiring the good, although perhaps not as to reason, or as it is the rational principle of desiring, since someone could love the punishment either freely assumed by himself or imposed by God in reparation for sin (S.Th., *ibid.; In 4* d.21 q.1 a.1 qc.4; I-II, q. 46, a. 6 ad 2). But the punishment can affect someone's possessions, status, office, rights, freedom, body or soul.

Hence, if the matter is carefully considered, punishment is the privation of some good, or something that is not given that should be given, or something already possessed that is taken away, so that it could be defined: *the privation of a pleasant good (spiritual or sensible) inflicted on a rational being because of some fault.* But since punishment is being considered here, not as coming from a creature but as coming from God, it can be defined more fully as: *the privation of a pleasant good inflicted by God on a rational creature because of sin.*

Opposed *to this inflicted punishment* which, obviously, is from an outside source, is the concomitant punishment or that which is connected quasi intrinsically with the fault

itself, for example, the loss of uprightness or the remorse of conscience, etc. (Wis. 5:7; S.Th., *In 2* d.27 q.1 a.2; *De malo* q.1 a. 4 ad 5). Now this matter is not being considered.

144. *The avenging pain* is that which is inflicted per se in order to restore the injured order of justice, or so that the creature will acknowledge the order of justice that he has damaged. It is opposed to *medicinal pain* or that which is inflicted per se and primarily in order to correct a delinquent.

Avenging pain proceeds only from justice and it is adapted rigorously and per se to the fault, and therefore, since it is infallibly fixed according to the fault, in this life it is given for sin only secondarily and improperly. *Medicinal* pain or punishment proceeds only from mercy, and it is not connected with the fault always or according to a certain measure, so that often it is absent from great sinners (Job 21:7; Hab. 1:13).

All punishment: a) As *threatened* can also said to be medicinal (prevenient or exemplary), inasmuch as it prevents the moral order from being injured. b) As actually *inflicted*: either it is mainly as a salutary remedy (of the one punished or of others) although secondarily it may be vindictive, v.gr., a punishment of this life, or it is in vindication of the injured order of justice, although perhaps at the same time it is a remedy of someone who is not punished by it. This is the punishment of the future life, restoring the order of justice, because the punished person acknowledges the holiness and justice of God, either willingly as in purgatory, or unwillingly as in hell (S.Th. I-II, q. 87, a. 3 ad 2).

145. *The pain*: a) *Of loss* is the privation of glory with everything connected with it. It is introduced by the subtraction of the influx of the divine beatifying action; it is therefore formally a *privation.* It corresponds to turning away from the supreme good.

b) *Of sense* is suffering inflicted by an extrinsic instrument. It is introduced by the positive action of God (S.Th., *In 2* d.37 q.3 a.1); it is therefore formally positive; the given definition says only that which per se (although it calls it a pain *of sense*) does not determine its nature. It corresponds to the conversion to a created good (S.Th., *De malo* q.3 a.2).

The worm of pain is deliberately passed over in the thesis, since it is only the *moral* sorrow intrinsically connected with the pain either of loss or of sense, which also can be properly reduced: as it is from the privation of glory, to the pain of loss; otherwise, to the pain of sense. But the ways of speaking about this matter are different, for, according to some, the pain of loss is in the privation of God alone, while the affliction coming from this pertains to the pain of sense. And surely suffering does not pertain to the essential nature *of purely privative pain,* such as the punishment of infants dying without baptism, for whom the pain of loss is, according to the common opinion, a pure privation of God without any suffering.

146. *Hell* (Greek ἅδης, that is, the place of the dead, as in the Hebrew HencH שאול)[1] that is, the place below heaven, taken in the ecclesiastical sense it designates: a) *In general,* the place of the souls after death who are deprived of glory, namely, either the limbo of the fathers, or the place and state of the just before the death of the Lord, or the limbo of the unbaptized children, or purgatory, or the hell of personal sins (of men and of angels). b) *By antonomasia,* the last place mentioned, or the one in which the damned because of grave personal sin are imprisoned (S.Th., *In 3* d.22 q.2 a. 1 qc.2).

But now *hell* is taken, not as a *place,* or according as it is some part of space where the damned ordinarily are kept, but as a *state,* or according as it is a permanent (as will be explained later) penal condition of the damned.

They are subject to. These words indicate the fact of punishment, but for now they prescind from its duration and some other circumstances.

After this life. This aspect is not considered expressly in the thesis, since it is sufficiently brought out by the testimony of the sources, and since it is certain that a definite and equal punishment for sins is not given in this life.

Holy Scripture speaks about hell: 1) *As a place,* calling it a place of torment (Luke 16:28), the place (of Judas) (Acts 1:25), hell (Luke 16:23), the abyss (Luke 8:32; Rev. 9:1-11; 11:17; 17:8; 20:3), the furnace of fire (Matt. 13:42.50), the lake of fire (Rev. 20:10), the lake of fire that burns with brimstone (Rev. 19:20), the lake that burns with fire and brimstone (Rev. 21:8), tartarus (2 Pet. 2:4), gehenna, or the gehenna of fire (Matt. 5:22.29f.; 10:28; 18:9; 23:33).[2]

2) *As a state,* calling it death (Rom. 6:21f.; 8:6; 8:13; 2 Cor. 2:14-16), a second death (Rev. 2:11; 20:6; 21:8), destruction (2 Thess. 1:9; 1 Tim. 6:9), exterior darkness (Matt. 8:12; 22:11-13; 25:30), eternal fire (Matt. 2:41), eternal punishment (Matt. 25:46), destruction (Matt. 7:13; John 3:16; 10:27f.; 12:25; Rom. 2:12; Phil 1:28; 2 Pet. 3:7), the unquenchable fire (Mark, 9:42-47; Luke 3:17), fire and brimstone (Rev. 14:9-14), nether gloom of darkness (2 Pet. 2:17; Jude 13), damnation (Mark 16:15f.), corruption (Gal 6:7), Babylon (Rev. 18; 19:1-3).

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1. See G. Kittel, *Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament* 1,146-149; Gesenius-Buhl, *Hebr. Handwörterbuch* (Leipzig 1915) 796f.; A Vacant, *Enfer:* DB 2,1793.
2. The word "gehenna" comes from the Hebrew גיא הנם , a word that designates the valley of Hinnom (near Jerusalem), where sometimes Israelites had offered their little children to the idol of Moloch, a statue of this god surrounded with fire. The pious king Josias ordered that place to be defiled (2 Kings 16:3; 23:10; 2 Chron. 28:3; 33:6; 34:4f.; Jer. 7:31f.; 19:2-11; 32:35; Josh. 18:16. See St. Jerome, *In Mt* 1.1 c.10.28: ML 26,68; *In Ier.* c.7,35: ML 24,897f.; Kittel, 1,665. Of those nefarious sacred vales that one was a place of abomination and horror; then its name was used by the Judeans to designate the place where the damned are punished by God, "where everlasting horror dwells" (Job 10:22). See Knabenbauer, *In Mt* 5,22 p.269; Spicq, *La révélation de l'enfer:* L'Enfer, 119-122.

147. Adversaries. *The Sadducees* deny the resurrection and spirits (Matt. 22:23; Acts 23:8); in fact, they probably said that the soul perishes with the body.[3] *The Albigensians:* the body is the place to which the soul, which had sinned in heaven, is sent to be purified, so that being purified it may return to heaven.[4] *Many recent non-Catholic philosophers.*[5] *Many libertines* of every age.[6]

148. Doctrine of the Church. Saying that the good after death are rewarded with eternal life, but the evil or those who have died in grave sin, even just one, are condemned to eternal punishment, she thereby established: *implicitly,* that the evil are deprived of eternal life; *explicitly,* that they are handed over to some punishment which, according to the obvious meaning of the words, is distinguished from that privation of God and which positively is inflicted on them.

Benedict XII (D 1002): "Moreover, We define that according to the general disposition of God, the souls of those who die in actual mortal sin go down into hell immediately after death and there suffer the pains of hell."

Therefore, from these words the souls of those dying in mortal sin, *even one* such sin, since the words are in the singular, are punished both *with the pain of loss,* since they are opposed to those who obtain eternal life as stated in the preceding words (D 1000), and *with the pain of sense,* since they are said to be tormented by the pains of hell (in the plural), and also clearly as these are different from the privation of glory.[7]

Nearly the same things are taught by the *Fides Damasi* (D 72), the *Creed of Athanasius* (D 76), *Lateran Council IV* (D 801), Innocent III (D 780).

The Council of Lyons II (D 858): "As for the souls of those who die in mortal sin or with original sin only, they go down immediately to hell, to be punished, however, with different punishments." See *The Council of Florence* (D 1306). Therefore, with these words the punishments are not determined; but, as is clear, they must be understood as they are used in the other documents.

149. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith: implicitly,* with regard to the pain of loss; *explicitly,* with regard to the pain of sense (D 1002; see 858, 1306).[7*]

3. Atzberger, *Die christliche Eschatologie,* n.142.
4. E. Vacandard, Études de critique et d'histoire religieuse 2 (Paris 1914) c.5 p.190.
5. See Richard, 84f.
6. See St. John Chrysostom, *In Rom.* hom.31,4: MG 60,673.
7. Moreover, historically it is certain that here it is decided that these souls immediately after death are not only deprived of glory, but are sent to their punishment (Le Bachelet, *loc.cit.,* 679f.).

7* See Michel, *Les mystères...* 48.52.

It is at least *certain in theology* that a vehement moral sorrow intrinsically follows those pains in the damned man, since he now knows that, because of his own fault, he is both deprived of the beatitude planned for him and he is subjected to the other sufferings.

150. Proof from Holy Scripture.[8] a) It teaches implicitly both pains together. Matt. 25:41: *Depart from me* (i.e., from my presence), *you cursed, into the eternal fire.* Luke 16:22-24: While Lazarus is carried *into the bosom of Abraham...; the rich man... was buried in Hades, and he said, I am in anguish in this flame.* Mark 9:42-47: ... *It is better for you to enter life maimed than with two hands to go to hell, to the unquenchable fire... it is better for you to enter life lame than with two feet to be thrown into hell... it is better for you to enter the kingdom of God with one eye than with two eyes to be thrown into hell* (see Matt. 18:8f.).

2 Thess. 1:9: *The Lord Jesus... inflicting vengeance upon those who do not know God and upon those who do not obey the gospel... They shall suffer the punishment of eternal destruction and exclusion from the presence of the Lord and from the glory of his might.* Matt. 13:40-42: *They will gather out of his kingdom all causes of sin and all evildoers, and throw them into the furnace of fire.* John 15:6: *If a man does not abide in me, he is cast forth as a branch... and thrown into the fire and burned* (See Rom. 2:7-9).

151. b) It teaches the pain of loss. Matt. 7:23: *And then will I declare to them...: depart from me, you evildoers.* 1 Cor. 6:9: *Neither the immoral, nor idolaters..., will inherit the kingdom of God.* There is a similar catalogue of sins of *those who will not obtain the kingdom of God* in Gal. 5:19-22, or of those who *will not have any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ and of God,* in Eph. 5:5. Matt. 25:12: He says to the foolish virgins: *I do not know you.* Luke 14:24: Of those invited to the wedding feast but did not come: *None... shall taste my banquet.*

John 3:36: *He who does not obey the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God rests upon him.* John 5:29: *They will come forth, those who have done good, to the resurrection of life, and those who have done evil, to the resurrection of judgment.* Rev. 21:27: Into the new Jerusalem *nothing unclean shall enter, nor anyone who practices abomination or falsehood.* Rev. 22:15: From paradise (described in ch. 21) this voice is heard: *Outside are the dogs and sorcerers..., and every one who loves and practices falsehood.*

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8. On hell in Scripture, see Spicq, *loc.cit.*, 106-143.

8* Michel, *op.cit.*, 48; Heris, *loc.cit.*, 266f.282; Garrigou-Lagrange, *La vida eterna y la profundidad del alma*[2] (Madrid 1951) 165.

152. c) It teaches the pain of sense. Matt. 5:22: *Whoever says* (to his brother), *"You fool," shall be liable to the hell of fire.* Matt. 5:29f.: *It is better that you lose one of your members than that your whole body be thrown into hell...* See Matt. 10:28. Matt. 22:12: *How did you get in here without a wedding garment?... Caste him into the outer darkness...* Matt. 24:48-51: *If that wicked servant... begins to beat his fellow servants, and eats and drinks with the drunken, the master of that servant will come... and will punish him, and put him with the hypocrites; there men will weep and gnash their teeth* (see Matt. 8:12; 25:30).

Jude 11-13: *Woe to them! For they walk in the way of Cain, and abandon themselves for the sake of gain to Balaam's error... These are the ones... for whom the nether gloom of darkness has been reserved for ever* (see 2 Pet. 2:12-17). Rev. 14:10f.: *If any one worships the beast... he shall be tormented with fire and brimstone...* (see Rev. 14:9-11; 19:20). Rev. 21:8: *But as for the cowardly, the faithless... for murderers, fornicators, sorcerers, idolaters and all liars, their lot shall be in the lake that burns with fire and brimstone, which is the second death* (see Rev. 20:13f.). Likewise, the words of the N.T shed light on these texts in the O.T.: Judith 16:20f.; Isa. 33:14; 66:24.

153. 1. Therefore from these texts it is clear that both pains are assigned to the same persons. For it is certain from Matt. 25:31-46 (see Matt. 13:4-43; Luke 16:19-31; Rev. 20:12-15) that there are only two definitive destinies for men: either eternal life or eternal punishment. Therefore, if it is said simply that the evil will not see the kingdom of God (Luke 14L24; John 3:36; 1 Cor. 6:10; Gal. 5:21; Eph. 5:5), by that very fact they are said to be handed over to eternal punishment. This is also made certain expressly: a) From Matt. 25:41; 2 Thess. 1:8f., where both punishments are attributed to the same individuals. b) From the fact that those who elsewhere are said to be sent to the eternal fire, of them it is also mentioned elsewhere simply that they will not see the kingdom of God. (See Rev. 10:15 and 21:8 with Rev. 21:27; 22:15; 1 Cor. 6:9; Gal. 5:20; Eph. 5:5).

2) *All sinners will suffer those punishments.* This is easily made clear from the quoted texts which, if taken as a group, and often just singly, include absolutely all sinners. Thus, for example, from 1 Cor. 6:9f.: *Fornicators... idolaters... adulterers... homosexuals... thieves...the greedy... drunkards...revilers... robbers;* and from Gal. 5:19-21: *Now the works of the flesh are plain: fornication, impurity, licentiousness, idolatry, sorcery, enmity, strife, jealousy, anger, selfishness, dissension, party spirit, envy, drunkenness, carousing, and the like.* The pain of loss is related to the divine justice, especially as vindictive. Rom. 2:5-6: *But by your hard and unrepentant heart you are storing up wrath for yourself on the day of wrath when God' righteous judgment will be revealed. For he will render to every man according to his works.* Similarly John 3:36; 1 Thess. 1:10; Rev. 14:10.

3) *Any and every individual mortal sin is liable to this double punishment.* It is necessary to conclude this, since Scripture adds no restriction and since in every mortal sin there is the full nature of an offense against God. Matt. 18:8f.: *And if your hand or your foot causes you to sin, cut it off and throw it from you; it is better for you to enter life maimed... than with two hands or two feet to be thrown into the eternal fire. And if you eye causes you to sin...* Therefore, any one and each mortal sin leads per se to hell; not just an external sin, but also an internal sin (Matt. 5:28).

Nevertheless, it is permissible to hope that the grace of repentance and remission will be given to the sinner, who has lived a Christian life, but on a certain occasion sinned because of his weakness.[8*]

154. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers often and explicitly hand on the doctrine about the pains of sinners in hell. A few of the testimonies will be given here.

a) *Often they teach at the same time both the pain of loss and the pain of sense.* St. Clement of Rome (?) (R 102): "For if we do the will of Christ, we shall find repose; but if not, nothing shall save us from eternal punishment, if we neglect His commandments" (see St. Justin, R 115, 121, 124; St. Theophilus of Antioch, R 176; St. Irenaeus, R 239). Tertullian (R 284): "... We will be the same as we now are and not someone else afterwards; being really worshippers of God, we will always be with God...; but the profane... will be in the punishment of perpetual fire..." (see R 290; St. Ignatius of Antioch, R 41).

St. Hippolytus (R 396): "... Since to those who have done well shall be assigned righteously eternal bliss, and to the lovers of iniquity shall be given eternal punishment... and the fire which is unquenchable..." St. Augustine (R 1772): "Death will be eternal, since the soul will neither be able to enjoy God and live, nor to die and escape the pains of the body" (see St. Cyril of Jerusalem, R 837; St. Basil, R 976; St. Cyprian, R 560, etc.).

b) *At one time they teach both eternal fire* (St. Clement of Rome (?), R 106; *Epist. ad Diogn.,* R 100; Minucius, R. 273; Tertullian, R 317), *and exclusion from the kingdom of heaven* (*Martyrdom of St. Polycarp,* R 78; St. Ephraem, R 713; St. Augustine, R 1775f.).

c) *At another time they teach in general about punishment* (see the three last texts: R. 78, 713,1775f.).

155. Theological reasoning. A. Guilt of punishment in general. a) *From the wisdom of God.* It pertains to the wisdom of a legislator and governor, which is what God is, to support his laws with sanctions of reward or punishment and to punish transgressors (S.Th., 3 CG 141). But God does not punish those transgressors in this life. Therefore he does so in the next life.

The minor. Not rarely the wicked lead a life of comfort, while many good people lead a life full of hardships.[9] Therefore.

b) *From the justice of God.* Those who practice virtue for the glory of God cannot be of the same or worse condition in the sight of God as those indulging in vices. But in this life the former often are of the same or worse condition than the latter. Therefore the evildoers are to be punished after their death (1 Cor. 15:16-19, 30-32).[9*]

c) *From the holiness of God.* God cannot keep himself indifferent to virtue and vice, goodness and iniquity, honor given to him and offenses against him. But that would be the situation, if he did not punish sinners. Therefore.

d) *From the honor of God.* It is necessary that the honor of God, violated by sinners, at some time clearly triumph over them. But this does not happen in this life. Therefore.

e) *From the universal and age-old consensus of the human race.* But this consensus about something unpleasant, but denied only by the wicked, shows either the traces of a pristine revelation or the voice of nature promulgating this sanction by the natural law. Therefore.[10]

156. B. Guilt of punishment in particular: 1) *Liable to the pain of loss.* It is right that by separating himself from the love of God, he should also be separated from the blessed fruition of God, or that by separating himself from his end, he should also be deprived of the benefits of that end.

2) *Liable to the pain of sense.* a) In sin there is a distinction, not in reality but logically, of a twofold disorder—a turning away from the end and a turning towards creatures. But the punishment fits the crime. Therefore, it is necessary that sin be punished not only with the privation of the end, but also by creatures.

b) The sanction of the law should be sufficient and known as such. But exclusion from the end, although it is a sufficient sanction, still is not always known as such. Ergo (S.Th. I-II, q. 87, a. 4; 3 CG 145).

Natural reason proves from the same observations, as is clear, that man is to be punished after his sojourn in this life for his demerits; that that punishment is at least

9. St. John Chrysostom (R 1152): "I, who have lived with much study, with many labors and misery, will rise again; and the Greek, the impious man—will he also enjoy the same honor as I do? The bodies of sinners will also rise incorruptible...; but this honor is for them a preparation for punishment."

9* St. John Chrysostom, *In ep. Ad Phil.* c.2 h.6: MG 62,228: "God is just... Hence many who have sinned have remained unpunished; many who lived with virtue, then finally died after they had endured six hundred misfortunes. Therefore if God is just, when will the latter be rewarded and the former be punished, if there is no hell...?"

10. Bernard, 1379f.; Hurter, 3 n.649,5. See St. John Chrysostom, *In ep. ad Rom.* hom.31 n.5: MG 60,676.

exclusion from the last end; indeed, fittingly also that at least *some kind* (whatever it may be) of pain of sense be imposed on him.

157. Objections. 1. A sinner does not deserve to exist. Therefore the punishment due to him is annihilation.

I distinguish the consequent. Annihilation is the punishment due to him, and it is inept, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.*

The disorder of sin by its own nature does not tend towards the destruction of the sinner, but in the loss of the last end, in which therefore there is the greatest and most fitting punishment of sin. The punishment of annihilation, since it is the same for all, would not be just; in fact, it would be considerably less for those who lived for a longer time and sinned more. The wicked would desire that punishment; but a punishment that is desired cannot be a true punishment.

2. Remorse of conscience is a punishment of sin. Therefore it surpasses any other punishment.

I distinguish the major. Remorse is a punishment of sin, *conceded;* it is a proportionate punishment, *denied.*

158. 3. Sanction does not pertain to the concept of a good or bad action. Therefore punishment for a bad action does not make sense.

I distinguish the major. Sanction does not pertain to the *essential* concept of a moral action, *conceded;* to the *integral* concept, *denied.*

Surely all are convinced that, as a matter of justice, those who act rightly should be rewarded, while evildoers should be punished.

4. Punishment for sin should be required, if by it the damaged order of justice could be restored. But it is not restored. Therefore.

I distinguish the minor. The order of justice would not be restored as if what was done would become undone, *conceded;* as if the punishment would not bring it about that the sinner either willingly acknowledges the damaged order and so repenting his sin loves that order, or otherwise he is forced unwillingly to fulfill the order of justice while he fulfills the law of punishment, *denied.*

Punishment brings it about that the sinner retracts his sin and once again by his own will establishes himself in the order of justice, although it does not happen—something that is impossible—that a committed sin is made to be undone. But if the sinner does not repent his sin, at least he acknowledges unwillingly, while he is being punished, the authority of the legislator.

ARTICLE II

ON THE DURATION OF HELL

Thesis 9. The pains of hell are eternal.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 99; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.44 p.2 q.1; Lessius, *op.cit.*, l.13 c.25; Beraza, n.1077-1122; Lennerz, th.4; C. Passaglia, *De aeternitate poenarum deque igne inferni* (Rome 1855); J. Sachs, *Die ewige Dauer der Höllenstrafen neueren Aufstellungen gegenüber prinzipiell erörtert* (Paderborn 1900).

159. Connection. From the preceding thesis it is certain that the damned in hell suffer the pain of loss and the pain of sense. However, many questions can be asked about these punishments. Some of these questions will be treated in the scholiums; one of them, however, will have to be considered now, namely, the *duration* of those punishments or the question about their eternity. This is one of the most difficult mysteries of our religion. St. Thomas considers the eternity of the pains of hell after he has established their existence (*Suppl.* q. 99).

160. Definition of terms. *The pains of hell,* that is, the pain of loss and the pain of sense, which are in hell, as we just proved above. But since the sources treat the duration of both punishments in the same way, we will prove the eternity of the pains of hell in common, or without any further determination. Moreover, since the pain of sense necessarily, as is clear, implies the pain of loss, the eternity of the latter will be sufficiently proved, if just the eternity of the former is proved.

Eternal. Eternity, which for us in this matter, while omitting other definitions, is duration without limits, is: a) *Strict* or unparticipated, proper to God alone, if it is all at once and essentially excludes a beginning, succession and an end (Rom. 16:26; 2 Tim. 1:9; Tit. 1:2). b) *Broad* or participated, that is, what can belong to a creature through participation in God. But this type, since it can be of different kinds, is taken here not in the *improper sense* or merely as a long duration (Gen. 17:8; Ps. 89:37), but in the *proper sense* or as truly excluding limits, although only after it has started.

Are eternal, that is, the punishment of the damned remains essentially the same forever, although accidentally, or in ways to be explained below, it could perhaps be diminished.

161. Adversaries. *Those teaching the annihilation of the wicked.* Thus: *the Valentinian Gnostics* who said that the earthly and the psychics of per-

verse life are to be consumed by fire.[1] Arnobius: the soul of itself is mortal, but for the good it becomes immortal as a reward, while the evil after their punishment are annihilated.[2] *The Socinians* who held that non-Christians will be annihilated with the bad angels.[3] *The Conditionalists* or those defending conditional immortality, who said that a man can freely prepare immortality for himself, but in such a way that otherwise, if he commits evil, he will be reduced to nothing after death, but this takes place only after a certain time of punishment; thus, besides some others, *not a few Protestants,* like Rothe in Germany, Ch. Byse in France, and especially W.E. White in America[4]; many *Adventists:* when the wicked resurrect they will be reduced to nothingness and therefore there is no hell; *Jehovah's Witnesses* and the *Friends of Men* agree more or less with the Adventists.[5]

Those teaching the intervention of the mercy of God to free damned persons from their pains. Thus the *ancient men of mercy* (Catholics) who defended this privilege: a) Some grant it to all men damned in the judgment, or at least to some, who, after a certain time of punishment, are freed from their punishment, depending on the different duration of it according to the gravity of their sins. b) Others grant it to all, who suffer no punishment after their judgment. c) Others grant it to all the baptized. d) Others grant it only to all Catholics, even if later they fall into heresy or apostasy. e) Others grant it only to all who persevere in the Church. f) Others grant it to all who gave alms, who suffer no or only a temporal damnation, and to all those who forgave injuries, since their sins are forgiven because they forgave others.[6]

Those teaching the restoration of the damned by their conversion. *Those defending metempsychosis.* Hirscher and Schell[7] (see above n. 5-7). *Rationalists.*[8] *Spiritualists.*[9]

1. See St. Irenaeus, *Adv. haer.* 1,7,1: MG 7,514; Tixeront, 11,203.
2. Arnobius, *Advers. nationes* 2,14; 2,19f.: ML 5,831f.867f.; Tixeront, 460.
3. L. Cristiani, *Socinianisme:* DTC 14,2532.
4. See Richard, 85; J. Rivière, *Sur l'immortalité conditionelle:* RevClerFr 98 (1919) 283-285. On Protestant errors concerning the future life, see J.C. Sasia, S.J., *The Future of Life according to the Authority of Divine Revelation, the Dictates of Sound Reason, the General Consent of Mankind* (New York 1918).
5. See F.P. Havey, *Adventists:* CE 1,166f.; Lavaud, *op.cit.,* 120-135, 147-150.154, 161-165, 178-180.193, 210-212, 222-228; A Verhamme, *Testes Jehovah:* CollatBrug 48 (1952) 217.
6. See St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 1,21 c.17-24: ML41,731-40; *Enchir.* c.67,112: ML 40,263.284. See A. Lehaut, *L'Éternité des peines de l'Enfer dans S. Augustin* (Paris 1912) 24-40.
7. Among the "main points of doctrine" because of which the works of H. Schell have been prohibited and "worthy of censure is the way in which Dr. Schell, relying on one or other writer of the Alexandrian School, denies the eternity of punishment except for the sin of total obstinacy in this life; and he contends that the opposing opinion is contrary to the thinking of God and the immortal freedom of man" (E. Commer, *Die jüngste Phase des Schellstreites* [Vienna 1909] p.272.
8. On their errors, see P. de Bonniot, *Le problème du Mal* 1,7 c.1.
9. See Roure, *loc.cit.,* 2518f. He also mentions Unamuno as someone who denied the eternity of hell: Q. Pérez, S.J., *El pensamiento religioso de Miguel de Unamuno frente al de la Iglesia* (Santander 1946) 66-74.

162. Doctrine of the Church. *Lateran Council IV* (D 801): "He shall render to each one (i.e., reprobates and elect)... all of them will rise again... to receive according to their works... the ones perpetual punishment with the devil and the others everlasting glory with Christ." The *Fides Damasi* (D 72) and the *Athanasian Creed* (D 76) teach almost the same thing.

Benedict XII (D 1002) teaching that the souls of those dying in mortal sin "go down into hell," "where they suffer the pains of hell," is teaching *implicitly* the *eternal* duration of their damnation, since it is opposed to the beatitude which is defined there *as eternal* (D 1001).

Vigilius (D 411): "If anyone says or holds that the punishment of the demons and of impious men is temporary and that it will have an end at some time, that is to say, there will be a complete restoration of the demons or of impious men, let him be anathema."[10]

The following also teach eternal punishment: Innocent III (D780-781): he teaches that the punishment of actual sin is the torment of "eternal hell." Alexander VIII (D 2291): he condemns the view that a philosophical sin "does not deserve eternal punishment." *The Council of Trent* teaches that penitential satisfaction is not "for the eternal punishment that, together with the guilt, is remitted" (D 1543; 1580); that the just man acting well does not merit "eternal punishment" (D 1575, 1536-1539); that contrition is prepared for "by pondering... the incurring of eternal damnation" (D 1705).[11]

Pius XII: "The revelation and the magisterium of the Church firmly establish that after the end of this earthly life, those who are guilty of grave sin will receive from the Supreme Lord a judgment and an execution of punishment, from which there is no liberation or pardon. God could also

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10. This canon is among those which were published by Justinian against the Origenists and therefore accepted by the synod held in Constantinople under the Patriarch Menna (a.543), and if Cassiodorus is to be believed, they were also approved by Pope Vigilius (Prat, *Origène et l'Origenisme:* Et 106 [1906] 23; Richard, 78; D'Ales, *Origenisme:* DAFC 3,1234; F. Diekamp, *Die origenistischen Streitigkeiten in 6. 'Jahrhundert und das 6 allg. Konzil* [Münster 1899] 46ff.; Pesch, 9 n.624. But from this is it so certain about the pontifical approval, and especially that it is of such a nature that the thesis because of that canon can be said to be *a matter of defined faith (de fide definita)*? Diekamp, 137f. and Richard, 78 think that it can be so designated; but in this matter it does not seem to be *clearly* established, as D'Ales, 1239, rightly points out. Certainly that condemnation was thought to have expressed the faith of the Church, and it put an end to controversies about the eternity of hell, as Bardy says, *Les Pères...* 236.

11. At Vatican I a *Schema Constit. Dogmat. de doctrina catholica* was prepared containing this: Canon 6: "If anyone ... denies that the pains of the damned in hell are perpetual, let him be anathema." See on the same matter, cap.17 (CI 7,567, 517; see 550f.564).

11* *Loc.cit.*, 79: "La rivelatione e il magisterio della Chiesa stabiliscono fermanente che, dopo il termine della vita terrena, coloro che sono gravai da colpa grave suiranno dal supremo Signore un giudizio ed una esecuzione di pena, dalla quale non vi è alcuna liberazione o condono. Iddio potrebbe anche nell'al di là dimettere una simile pena...; ma Egli non l'ha mai accordata, nè mai l'accorderà... Il fatto della immutabilità e della eternità di quel iudizio di riprovazione e del suo adempimento è fuori di qualsiasi discussione... Il supremo legislatore... ha fissato la non mai cessante validità del suo giudizio e della sus esecuzione. Dunque questa durata sensa limite è diretto vigente."

after death forgive that punishment;... but he has never granted it, nor will he in the future... The fact of the immutability and eternity of the judgment of damnation and its execution is beyond any discussion... The Supreme Legislator... has decreed that the validity of his judgment and its execution will never cease. Therefore, its duration remains fixed without any limitations."[11*]

163. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 801).

164. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) *The pains of the damned* in it are called *eternal.* But the word "eternal" there is taken in the proper sense or for duration without limit. Therefore.

The major. Matt. 18:8: *It is better for you to enter life maimed... than with two feet to be thrown into the eternal fire.* Matt. 25:41-46: *Depart from me... into the eternal fire... and they will go away into eternal punishment.* 2 Thess. 1:9: *They will suffer the punishment of eternal destruction.* Heb. 6:2; Jude 7. In the O.T. Judith 16:20f.; Isa. 14:11; 33:14; 66:24; Dan. 12:2.[12]

The minor. Since the use of this word is so frequent, and no limit is ever attached to it, as is clear from the quoted texts, this word should be taken in its proper sense, unless there is some good reason opposed to it, which so far has not been offered.

Matt. 25:46 (the last judgment): *And these will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life.* Thus in the same context and place this word is applied both to life and to punishment. But, as all admit, it is applied to life in the proper sense (St. Augustine, R 1779, 1802; St. Basil, R 976). Therefore also to punishment.

Matt. 25:31-46:... *Come... inherit the kingdom prepared for you... Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire...* It is necessary that in passing a judicial sentence the words be properly understood, especially in a definitive judgment, and one concerning men that will continue forever, and because the time of meriting and demeriting has passed and so there is no possibility of conversion. Indeed, if in that judgment a sentence of acquittal is understood about someone's perpetual destiny, it is necessary to think that a sentence of condemnation also has to do with a perpetual destiny.

2) The punishment of the damned is said to be *for ever and ever.* But

12. This word "eternal" is used in the N.T seventy-one times, so that sixty-four times it is either *about God* (v.gr., Rom. 16:26) or almost always *about eternal life*, either often directly (v.gr., Matt. 19:16; 25:46) or indirectly (v.gr., Heb.9:12; 2 Pet. 1:11); therefore in all of these texts, according to all authors, it has the meaning of a duration without limit; therefore rightly it must be said that in the remaining places, where almost always it has to do with hell, it is used in the same sense.

that word indicates perpetual duration. Therefore.

The major. Rev. 14:9-11: *If anyone worships the beast..., he shall be tormented with fire...; and the smoke of their torment goes up for ever and ever* (see also 19:2f.; 20:9f.).

The minor. Rev. 4:9f.: *And whenever they give glory... who lives for ever and ever..., and worship him who lives* (God) *for ever and ever* (see 5:13f.; 7:12; 10:6; Gal. 1:5; Heb. 13:21).

3) *The end of punishment is excluded:* a) In negative formulas. Mark 9:43f.: *Where their worm does not die, and the fire is not quenched.* The words are repeated emphatically three times in that place (see Isa. 66:24). 1 Cor. 6:9f.: *Do you not know that the unrighteous will not inherit the kingdom of God?* Gal. 5:19-21: *Now the works of the flesh are plain... those who do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God.*

b) In formulas of an unlimited meaning. Luke 16:26 (parable of the rich man feasting): Between the saved and the damned *a great chasm has been fixed, in order that those who would pass from here to you may not be able, and none may cross from there to us.* Rev. 20:14: The torment of the damned is called *a second death.* The damned are said to be: *Cursed* (Matt. 25:41). *Vessels of wrath* (Rom. 9:22). *The wrath of God rests* on them (John 3:36).

165. Proof from tradition. A. In many ways the *holy Fathers* teach the eternity of punishment.

a) *They use almost the same formulas of Scripture.* St. Ignatius of Antioch (R 41): "The corrupters of families will not inherit the kingdom of God... Such a man (i.e., corrupting the faith of God with bad doctrine), for becoming contaminated, will depart into unquenchable fire...." St. Hippolytus (R 396): "... Since to those who have done well shall be assigned righteously eternal bliss, and to the lovers of iniquity shall be given eternal punishment. And the fire which is unquenchable and without end awaits these latter, and a certain fiery worm which dies not...." St. Irenaeus (R 239).

b) *They say that the pains will never be ended in time.* St. Ephraem (R 713): "... The judgment of the sinner will be... most severe, and there will be no end to his torment, nor will he have a moment's rest... because it will continue forever and it will not be ended at any time."

c) *They call the fire eternal and they call the life eternal.* St. Theophilus of Antioch (R 176): "They (the prophetic Scriptures) will make your way plainer for escaping the eternal punishments, and obtaining the eternal prizes of God... To those who by patient continuance in well-doing

seek immortality, He will give life everlasting... But to the unbelieving and the proud... there shall be anger... and at the last everlasting fire shall possess such men." See St. Justin (R 115); St. Cyprian (R 560); St. Basil (R 976); St. Augustine (R 1779, 1802). Hence St. Irenaeus uses an equivalent formula (R 239): "... They will always be damned... These will always enjoy the kingdom."

d) *They contrast the earthly torments and fire of martyrdom to the eternal punishment and fire that will never be quenched. The Martyrdom of St. Polycarp* (R 78): "... The martyrs despised the tortures of the world, thus purchasing eternal life at the price of a single hour. And the fire of their savage torturers was cool to them, for they kept before their eyes the escape from eternal and unquenchable fire." *Letter to Diognetus* (R 100): "You will condemn the deceit and error of the world..., when you fear the real death which is reserved for those who are to be condemned to eternal fire... Then you will admire those who, for the sake of what is right, bear the temporal fire, and you will think them blessed when you come to know that fire."

166. e) *They contrast the temporal duration of vice to the eternal duration of punishment.* St. Justin (R 115): "... We hold this view..., that each man goes to everlasting punishment or salvation according to the value of his actions. For if all men knew this, no one would choose wickedness even for a little, knowing that he goes to the everlasting punishment of fire."

f) *They say that the fire of hell is just as perpetual as the glory.* Tertullian (R 284): "Then shall the entire human race be restored to settle the account for the good or evil it has merited in this world, from then on to be requited for a limitless and unending eternity. And so, no longer will there be death or resurrection again and again, but we will be the same as we now are and not someone else afterwards; being really worshippers of God, we will always be with God, clad in the eternity of our own proper substance which we have put on. But the profane... will be in the punishment of perpetual fire, and they shall have from the very nature of this fire a divine supply, as it were, of incorruptibility."

g) *The idea suggested by Tertullian in the previous citation is mentioned frequently and expressly by the Fathers, that is, that the bodies of the damned will be kept incorruptible as fodder for the eternal fire.*

St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 837): "We shall be raised therefore, all with our bodies eternal, but not all with bodies alike: for if a man is righteous, he will receive a heavenly body, that he may be able worthily to hold converse with Angels; but if a man is a sinner, he shall receive an eternal body, fitted

to endure the penalties of sins, that he may burn eternally in fire, nor ever be consumed...."

Lactantius (R 646): "... Because they (the impious) have sin in their bodies, they will be clothed again with flesh so that in their bodies they can suffer punishment; but that flesh, which God will give to man, will not be like this earthly flesh we now have, but it will be indissoluble and permanent forever, that it may be suitable for the torments and the everlasting fire, whose nature is different from the fire we know..., which, if it is not fed with tinder, is extinguished... The same divine fire with one and the same force... will both burn up the impious and recreate them..., and whatever it takes away from their bodies it will also replace and it will supply eternal tinder for itself...."

St. John Chrysostom (R 1142): "... The bodies of sinners will also resurrect incorruptible...; but this honor for them is a preparation for punishment and retribution; for they will resurrect incorruptible so that they can burn forever."

St. Hilary (R 855): "... A bodily eternity will also be prepared for them (pagans) so that the eternal fuel for an eternal fire may be in them, and that an everlasting retribution concerning them may be exercised for ever and ever."

167. B. *The liturgy prays: In the litanies:* "That you may deliver our souls... from eternal damnation." In the *Canon of the Mass:* "Command that we be rescued from eternal damnation...." And in the *Dies Irae:* "Redeem me from the quenching flame." And the Church does not pray for the damned.

C. *The martyrs* spurned temporal torments in order to avoid the eternal. *The martyrdom of St. Polycarp* (see n. 165 d).[13]

168. Theological reasoning. a) Faith teaches us that the earthly state of life is ended by death with regard to obtaining the last end. Therefore, anyone who dies in sin always remains in punishment and excluded from the last end.

b) For anyone falling into grave sin, salutary repentance, and it must be done while living on earth, is necessary with a necessity of means in order to obtain salvation. But the damned cannot elicit an act of repentance, since they are lacking salutary grace, and since they are beyond the state of earthly life. Therefore they are always without salvation.[14]

13. Perrone, *De Deo Creatore* n.809. See Ruinart, *op.cit.*, p.27 n.3; 34 n.10; 157 n.2; 159 n.3; 168 n.6, etc.

14. Lessius thinks that this reason is not sufficient (13,25 n.166f.). And rightly so if it is taken as proving, not only the fact of eternal punishment, but its *debt*, which of course corresponds not to the defect of repentance, but to the sin itself.

c) Given the fact of grave sin, the Incarnation was necessary in the hypothesis of a condign satisfaction for that sin (which of course God can require). Therefore man alone cannot offer that satisfaction by any punishment, even eternal.

169. *Natural reason certainly proves* that there is at least some punishment after this earthly life. Indeed, it proves, at least with probability, that it is eternal. But does it prove this *for certain?*[15]

The authors disagree about the answer to this question. Perhaps it can be said that reason *alone,* or without any light of faith, does not obtain that clarity of reason whereby every trace of doubt about the eternity of punishment is removed, even if it solves irrefutably all the objections opposed to that eternity.

Now, however, we will attempt to establish this proof, but with these presuppositions: that the human soul is immortal; that it is ordained to God as its last end, but which it has not yet obtained; that it must obtain this end by its own good acts, but it does it freely in such a way that it can make itself unworthy of it by its own evil acts.

1) There is the obvious reason that the state of this earthly life will reach its final end sometime, either by death or in some other way, but in such a way that the designation of this moment depends not on man, as is per se evident, but on the author of nature alone. Therefore, anyone who arrives at that moment in a condition of demerit, by that fact remains excluded because of his guilt; and so he remains in a state of punishment and unable to obtain his last end. Hence God, as is clear, is not held to bring him to the last end that he freely rejected (S.Th., 3 CG 145).

But cannot God, sometime after the loss of the last end, restore the soul again to the state of a wayfarer? For that to happen with uninterrupted succession forever would be especially unsuitable.

But then from that arises this other strong reason for the eternity of punishment, which completes the first one: the fulfillment of the natural law cannot be *effectively* accomplished, unless it has attached to it a *sufficient* sanction. But the temporal loss of the last end is not, clearly, a sufficient sanction. Therefore the fulfillment of the natural law cannot be accomplished *effectively* by the temporal loss of the last end.

170. 3) Another reason can be sought from the nature of grave sin, while recognizing the principle that honor is in the one honoring, and the offense is in the one offended. The punishment to be endured is proportionate to the given offense. But sin, as an injury to divine justice (that is, to the obedience and honor owed to God), is an offense to God. Therefore, since God has infinite dignity, an offense against God *objectively* is simply infinite.

But since we perceive the dignity of God only *as finite dignity,* and therefore as *in a certain respect infinite* or as having more dignity than any creature, even the most perfectly possible creature, the offense against God *is subjectively in a certain respect*

15. See Hurter, 3 n.659; Michel, *L'éternité de l'enfer et la raison:* RevApol 39 (1924) 449-461.513; Bernard, 1378-1392ff.; H. Rondet, S.J., *Les peines de l'enfer:* NouvRelTheol 67 (1940) 415-423; Martínez, 147.

infinite. Therefore it deserves a punishment not simply infinite, but certainly *in some measure infinite* or greater than any punishment which could be owed because of the greatest offense against a creature, even the most perfect.

But no punishment of a creature can be in some respect infinite in *intensity,* since some other greater punishment can always be conceived as possible, and the capacity in a creature of suffering intensively is very limited. Therefore, no other punishment in a certain regard infinite remains, except a punishment of infinite extension or *duration.*

But this reason has these two difficulties: a) That it can also be applied to venial sin, which surely is an offense greater than any offense to a creature. But on the other hand we know that this sin, since it is not *a turning away from the last end,* does not merit eternal punishment. b) That also a brief privation of the last end, as objectively simply infinite and subjectively in a certain respect infinite, seems to be a punishment proportionate to grave sin. But on the other hand we know that man cannot be blessed *physically* by the knowledge alone of the object, but by *joyful* knowledge, which of course as full of joy, for our part, can in no way be said to be infinite, as is per se evident.

171. Objections. A. *From Holy Scripture.* 1. In Matt. 25:31-46 (on the last judgment) not a few things are figurative, v.gr., the dialogue of Christ with men, etc. Therefore the fire also is called eternal in a figurative manner.

I deny the consequent. Those figures do not destroy the main idea, as is clear from what is said about the last judgment and about the sentence pronounced by Christ, about the coming of Christ, about men gathered together, about the separation of the justified from the wicked, about the final sentence, etc. Moreover, if perchance in describing the judgment a figure is used, in pronouncing the sentence it cannot be an improper way of speaking, unless it is without doubt per se so understood. b) But the thesis is proved not just by that text.

2. In Ps. 49:15 it says: *God will ransom my soul from the power of Sheol;* and in Ps. 103:9f.: *He will not always chide, nor will he keep his anger for ever.* Therefore hell is not eternal.

I deny the consequent. In Ps. 49:15 the psalmist expresses certain hope that he will not remain under the dominion of death or in "Sheol," to which all the dead are thought to descend, but which is taken by God as the destiny of the just. Thus also in Ps. 16:10. Ps. 86:13 is understood to be about deliverance from the danger of imminent death: *Thou hast delivered my soul from the depths of Sheol.*

In Ps. 103:9f. the mercy of God is indicated for the people, who are so stubborn, because of their smallness and weakness (v. 14-16). Also in Isa. 57:16: *For I will not contend for ever, nor will I always be angry,* and in Ps. 77:8f.: *Are his promises at an end for all time?* and *he has not shut up his compassion*: here there is the promise, not of conversion for the damned, but of mercy for the people.

172. 3. Damnation is called *destruction* (2 Thess. 1:9), *a second death* (Rev. 21:8). Therefore the damned are annihilated.

I distinguish the major. Damnation is so called as the privation of eternal life, *con-*

ceded; as the privation of natural life, *denied.*

Surely the damned are to be tormented for ever and ever (Rev. 20:10); therefore they live, but *in the lake that burns with fire and brimstone, which is the second death* (Rev. 21:8). See St. Augustine, R 1772.

4. In Acts 3:21 the future *time for establishing all things* is mentioned. Therefore at some time all things will be restored.

I distinguish the major. There is mention of the time of restoring, that is, of the conversion also of the damned, *denied;* of the restoration *of everything that God said... through the mouth of the prophets,* to be completed by Christ when he comes again, *conceded.*

The promises of the prophets will be fulfilled perfectly at the second coming of Christ and then everything that was imperfect will be restored to a perfect condition.[16] See Isa. 65:17: *I create new heavens and a new earth.* Matt. 19:28: *In the new world, when the Son of man shall sit....* 2 Pet. 3:13: Here he deals with the renewal of the material world, and in v. 9f. he urges them to repent.

173. B. *From the holy Fathers.* Some of them seem to have taught that the damned after their punishment are to be converted to God and to be clothed with glory.

a) So few are cited (Origen, Didymus, Clement of Alex., Saints Gregory of Nyssa, Gregory Naz., Ambrose, Jerome), that, although they clearly denied the eternity of punishment, still the consensus of the Fathers for our thesis would be *morally unanimous* and therefore as a patristic argument it would be sufficient. In this hypothesis it would be dealing with a doctrine handed on from the beginning, but not yet affirmed by the magisterium of the Church; that being the case, error was possible for *each* of the Fathers.

b) Indeed, of those few, if perhaps you make an exception for Arnobius who, while he was still a catechumen, wrote some books containing that difficulty, not one *is proved with certainty to have denied the eternity of hell.*

c) On the contrary, those who at times seemed to speak about this matter in a hesitating way, elsewhere clearly propose the true doctrine. Indeed, even in those doubtful places, at least very often, they can be understood in the right sense.

These words of Petavius should also be kept in mind: "Wherefore it is certain that Jerome, and if there are any others among those holy Fathers, who in their writings included those Origenistic teachings, as some kind of moles, they got them from the reading of Origen's works and in order to correct them."[17]

174. d) In particular, Clement of Alexandria, although he says that the punishments after the last judgment force sinners to repentance and that God really does not punish them, but corrects them,[18] nevertheless he never says that the pains of hell are ended, and he says that that repentance of theirs is *in vain,* and elsewhere he teaches a punish-

16. Knabenbauer, *In Act* 3,21; Sachs, p.45ff.
17. Petavius, *De angelis* 1.3 c.8 n.10.
18. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 7,2; 7,16: MG 9,416-541.

ment that is *eternal.*[19]

Didymus, as it seems, clearly teaches the eternity of punishment, with the result that doubts about his mind in this matter are without a foundation.[20]

St. Gregory Naz. also is sufficiently for the eternity of hell (R 980)[21] and without sufficient reason it is supposed at times that he had doubts about this matter.[22]

But Origen, although he does mention eternal fire (R 446), nevertheless established the principle that it is medicinal, inasmuch as "the punishment that is affirmed by the fire of hell is understood to be used as a help."[23] Indeed, he says that Scripture speaks about eternal punishments, so that through fear sinners might be moved to repentance, and that it is not necessary that the medicinal nature of the punishment of hell be proposed to simple people.[24] But although according to some authors, as we have said, he thought correctly about the eternity of punishment, it seems that he did teach the future restoration to glory of rational creatures, at least of men, but that he did it in good faith and only hypothetically (see n. 6; R 468).[25]

St. Gregory of Nyssa also, while at one time asserts eternal punishment (R 1060), at another time he seems he seems to teach restoration (R 1033).[26]

St. Ambrose often proclaimed eternal punishment, but, perhaps, only for non-Christians.[27] But in Christian sinners (perhaps in a more obvious sense) mercy will be joined to justice, liberating them from punishment.[28]

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19. *Cohort.* 10: MG 8,204; R 437. See Richard, 56f.; Tixeront, 1,295f.; Bardy, *Les Pères...* 225f.
20. Didymus, *De Trinit.*, 2,3; 2,7; 2,12; 3,42: MG 39,480.580.669.989; *De Spir. S.* n.47.59: MG 39,1074.1082. See Tixeront, 2,198.
21. See Richard, 69; Pesch, 9 n.630.
22. See Tixeront, 2,199. Petavius (3,7,14), quotes these words of his (R 1013): "For I know a cleansing fire... I know also a fire that is not cleansing, but avenging; either the fire of Sodom which He pours down on all sinners... or that which is prepared for the devil and his angels or that which proceeds from the fact of the Lord...; and the unquenchable fire which... is eternal for the wicked. For all these belong to the destroying power; though some may prefer even in this place to take a more merciful view of this fire, worthily of Him that chastises." But then Petavius concludes: "It is clear that in this place Gregory of Nazianzen doubted about the pains of damned men, whether they would be everlasting; or whether because of the goodness of God they will at some time be terminated." But that hesitation is not about the eternity of hell, but rightly could be understood in this way, namely, whether *all* the mentioned fires are only penal, or also that some of them are intended for the conversion of sinners; and this is a question about which there is a diversity of opinion. See Pesch, 9 n.630.
23. Origen, *De principiis,* 2,10,6: MG 11,238.
24. *Contra Celsum,* 5,15; 6,26: MG 11,1204.1332.
25. See Krebs, *loc.cit.,*117; Tixeront, 1327-1329; Richard, 57-59.
26. St. Gregory of Nyssa, R 1033; perhaps especially in *Oratio quando sibi subiecerit omnia:* MG 44,1314f. See Pesch, 9 n.632. But others, like J. Danielou (*L'Apocatase... loc.cit.*) thinks that his words can be understood in the right sense.
27. St. Ambrose, *In ps.* 1,47: ML 14,946; *In ps.119* serm.8,58; serm.10,11: ML 15,1319.1333.1505; *De Noe* 23,85: ML 14,401; *De fide* 3,13,119: ML 16,584; *De paradiso* 9,45: ML 14,296.
28. *In ps.119* serm.20,29; 22,26: ML 15,1492f.1520; *In ps.37:*ML 14,980f.; *De Iac.* 1,6,26: ML 14,609. See Tixeront, 2,347f.; Niederhuber, *op.cit.,* 115ff.246ff.; Richard, 74f.; Bardy, *loc.cit.,* 213f.

175. St. Jerome, who before the year 394, according to some of his texts, seemed at least not to disapprove of the restoration of the damned,[29] declared later that he repeated that opinion not as his own; and also at almost the same time he defended the eternity of hell.

Then certainly he explicitly rejected that Origenistic opinion, v.gr. (about 395-396), saying (R 1384): "If all rational creatures are equal, and either from virtue or from vice willingly are either raised up or cast into hell, and after many revolutions and infinite centuries there is the restoration of all things, and one dignity for all servants, what difference will there be between a virgin and a prostitute? What difference will there be between the mother of the Lord and (if is difficult even to mention this) the victims of public lewdness? Will Gabriel and the devil be the same? Will the Apostles and demons be the same?"[30]

But later perhaps he thought that Christian sinners are going to be saved, since in the year 406 he taught this: "For whoever believes in Christ with his whole mind, even if as a fallen man he were to die in sin, by his faith he lives forever. Otherwise common death would be owed equally to believers and to non-believers; and all likewise will rise again, some to eternal confusion and others to eternal life because they believed."[31]

In the year 415 he seemed to teach similar things about Christian sinners who are to be saved after their punishment, while the demons and other wicked persons are to be punished forever. "But if Origen says that all rational creatures are not going to be lost and if he attributes repentance to the devil, what about us, who say that the devil and his cohorts and all wicked men and prevaricators will perish forever and that Christians, if they fell into sin, will be saved after their punishment?"[32]

However, this teaching of St. Jerome, which seems to be similar to the teaching of St. Ambrose, is said by other authors to be able to be understood as being *about the justified who have not yet been fully purified.*[33]

176. C. *From reason.* 1. A brief act cannot be punished with eternal punishment. But a sin is a brief act. Therefore.

I distinguish the major. A brief act cannot be punished with eternal punishment, if it is punished by reason of its duration, *conceded;* if it is punished by reason of its malice, *denied.*

The punishment of sin is not measure by the duration of the offense, but by its grav-

29. Tixeront, 2,341. Otherwise O'Connell (*op.cit.,* 150-156), who distances the holy Doctor from this opinion even before 394. See St. Jerome, *In Ecclesiastem* 11,3; 9,7: ML 23,1102, 1084; and see *Epist.* 39,3: ML 22,468 (he teaches the eternity of hell before the year 394).

30. Then in the year 401 he said that he himself at one time had merely reported the Origenistic opinion about the restoration of all things, not as his own opinion, but as that of Origen (*Apol. adv. libr. Rufini* 1.1 n.26f.: ML 23,418f.

31. *Epist.* 119,7: ML 22,983. See also what he wrote about 408-410 (R 1402). See Bardy, *loc.cit.,* 214f.234.

32. *Dial. adv. Pelag.* 1,28: ML 23,522. See Tixeront, 2,341f.; Martínez, 126f.

33. See Pesch, 9 n.631. O'Connell (ibid., 156-176) thinks in this matter about the salvation of dead Christian sinners that there is *no certainty* about the mind of the holy Doctor, whether it is orthodox or not.

33* See Pius XII, *loc.cit.,* 62f.67; Id., *Iis qui interfuerunt VI° Conventui internationali de iure paenali:* AAS 45 (1953) 742-744.

ity, as happens also among men (S.Th. I-II, q. 87, a. 3 ad 1). But sin is an act whereby a man freely turns himself away from his last end or from God.

2. Eternal punishment conflicts with the goodness of God. Therefore it does not exist.

I distinguish the major. Eternal punishment conflicts with the goodness of God falsely understood, *conceded;* rightly understood as it is in God, *denied.*

Goodness, if it is *true* goodness as in God, cannot simply be separated from his justice and wisdom; hence God does not cease to be good, if he punishes someone, even eternally, according to the norms of justice and wisdom. Indeed, the goodness of God itself, but while maintaining his justice, can be the reason for punishing someone eternally, either so that others will be deterred from sin or because of his love of holiness. But that does not prevent God, because of his goodness (but without doing anything opposed to his justice and wisdom) from not punishing some sin either not at all or not according to the rigor of justice.

But it is better simply to deny the major. Therefore, eternal punishment does not conflict with the goodness of God, although it shows his justice rather than his goodness; otherwise also any punishment would conflict with his goodness.

177. 3. The purpose of punishment is the reformation of the delinquent. But eternal punishment is not for the reformation of the delinquent. Therefore it lacks a goal and so does not exist.

I distinguish the major. The reformation of a delinquent is the purpose of medicinal punishment, *conceded;* of vindictive punishment, *I subdistinguish:* the purpose of temporal punishment, *bypassed;* the purpose of eternal punishment, *denied.*

Surely all punishment that God imposes in this life can always be said to be medicinal, even if at the same time it can also be vindictive in a secondary sense; but eternal punishment is purely vindictive. This holds true with respect to the one who is punished; for, all punishment, even eternal, as long as we are in this life, can be said to be medicinal with respect to others, who are moved by it not to sin (n. 144).

Punishment can have this one purpose—that is restores the violator of the law to the moral order, from which he departed, or to the order of the true and the good, which alone should rule instead of error and evil. Punishment obtains that, inasmuch as it forces the sinner to sustain the deprivation of some good and to suffer the imposition of some evil.

But the main purpose of punishment is to expiate a crime so that, especially as a requirement of justice, the sinner may make satisfaction for the violated moral order. *Vindictive punishment* seeks primarily expiation for the crime; but further, as *medicinal punishment,* it seeks to have the delinquent observe the law. For punishment after death, the purpose is *expiation,* while the *medicinal* end disappears completely. God, who could easily move the sinner to avoid all sin, in the last judgment will use the principle of retribution strictly.[33*]

4. But after the judgment eternal punishment, if it is not medicinal, is useless. Therefore it is not imposed.

I deny the major. For it has this purpose: to repair the injured order of justice; to manifest the justice and holiness of God; to increase the glory of the blessed, while they compare their state with the state of the damned (Ps. 58:11); that there may be in the life of a man a perfect sanction of the law.

178. 5. The end intended by God in creating man cannot not be obtained. But that end of man is beatitude. Therefore it cannot not be obtained.

I distinguish the major. An end intended by God *absolutely* cannot not be obtained, *conceded;* intended *conditionally, denied.*

But the formal end (*finis quo*) *absolutely* intended in the creation of man is the glorification of God; this is always obtained in the measure intended by God and by his consequent will, since the damned also proclaim the holiness of God who hates sin, the justice of God who punishes his demerits, the veracity of God who carries out his threats. But the end intended by God *conditionally* is not carried out necessarily, such as the happiness of man, namely, *if he does not keep God's commandments.*

6. A grave punishment is not incurred unless it is known. But many men do not know about the eternal punishment for sin. Therefore, at least by them it is not incurred.

Among men there it is not a mitigating factor for someone condemned to death that he did not know that his crime merited the death penalty.

7. A damned man can be freed from hell, if he can be converted. But he can be converted. Therefore.

I deny the minor. He cannot be converted *supernaturally,* since he lacks the help of grace for salutary repentance which is absolutely necessary for him, nor *naturally* (which in this supernatural order has not value), since he is obstinate in evil.

N.B. God has not revealed to us why he chose this order of things, in which eternal damnation would be possible. But he is the Lord. Could the dominion of God prevent him from choosing an order wherein some persons would sin and consequently not be punished? Furthermore, God does not create those who are damned except to be saved, if they wish to cooperate with grace; but, given their sin, he wills their damnation so that his attributes always may be manifested (Rom. 9:22).

179. Scholium. *No one damned in hell is freed from eternal punishment.* From our proof it is surely certain about the universality of the law of eternal punishment for all the damned, since the assertions of the sources are absolute and do not include any limitations, even implicitly. Hence, although speaking *absolutely* it is not repugnant that someone, excused from the general law, might be removed from hell by God, however *in this order of providence* it is very temerarious, as we believe, to assert the *possibility* of such a liberation, unless the historical facts of such a liberation are produced. But none have been produced.

Surely because of a very famous narration of St. John Damascene, that Trajan was

freed from hell, at the request of St. Gregory the Great,[34] some older scholastics who considered it to be historical because of their great reverence for Damascene, explained it in various ways, in order to reconcile it with the eternity of hell; in general they said, on the hypothesis that it was a true fact, that Trajan had not been definitively damned, but that his final sentence was suspended, or, as St. Thomas says, that he was freed only until the last judgment.[35]

The great ancient scholastics denied the fact itself, which was narrated with amazing diversity; modern critics say that it is a fable.[36] In fact it is opposed to the teaching both of St. Gregory and Damascene, who deny that there is any place for redemption in hell, or even that it is licit to pray for the damned.[37]

Therefore the words "according to the general disposition of God" of Benedict XII (D 1002) are improperly understood to be about liberation from hell, especially since the Pontiff applies the same words also to the blessed, who of course do not fall out of the glory once received (D 1001). Therefore they indicate only the general disposition, inasmuch as it affects *all*, or at most (but very improbably) the possibility of an exception, that someone, as miraculously raised again to earthly life after death, was not handed over immediately after his *first* death to his reward or punishment.[38]

34. St. John Damascene, *De iis qui in fide dormierunt* (MG 95,247-278). But the authenticity of that writing is not completely beyond doubt. See Jugie, *Jean Damascène (Saint):* DTC 8,706; Altaner, *op.cit.*, 476; Gordillo, *op.cit.*, p. 193, note 2.
35. S.Th. (he does not mention this matter in the *Summa*), *In 4* d.45 q.2 a.2 qc.1 ad 5; *De ver.* q.6 a.6 ad 4. See Franz, p. 229f. (on the explanations of the ancient theologians).
36. M. Cano, *De locis theologicis* 1.11 c.2; Suarez, *De myst vit. Chr.* 43 s.3 n.5,10; Siuri, 22,5 n.94-105; Gordillo, c.7 a.2 n.6; H. Grisar, *Die Gregorbiographie des Paulus Diakonus:* ZkathTh 11 (1887) 160; Richard, 99-101.
37. St. Gregory the Great, *Moral.* 34,13: ML76,729; St. John Damascene, *De orthod. fid.* C.4: MG 94,878. Moreover, according to Suarez (ibid. n.6) it seems to be temerarious to say that Christ, when he descended into the underworld, freed anyone from hell; but H. Quilliet thinks that this censure is much too lenient (*Descente du Jésus aux enfers:* DTC 4,614). But that was an excellent occasion for liberation.
38. Hugon, 3 a.8 a.1 n.3. But see Richard, 97,100; Lennerz, n. 210.

ARTICLE III

DIVERSE QUESTIONS ON THE PAINS OF HELL

180. The nature of the pains of the damned. *The pain of loss*, which is a privation, or the removal by God of his beatifying influx, consists primarily in the removal of *essential* beatitude and of all the goods connected with it as such formally or consequently, and secondarily in the removal of all the goods added to it *accidentally.*

Those goods are: a) *Supernatural*: God as the essential object of supernatural beatitude, and therefore the light of glory, the vision and love of God, beatifying joy, familiarity with Christ, the Blessed Virgin, the angels and the other blessed. The heavenly fatherland with all of its delights. The light by which the blessed see the beauty of heaven and the glory of the blessed and the beauty of the natural world. The glory of the body. All the supernatural gifts both habitual and actual (including, as will be said below, also all supernatural knowledge) with the exclusion of the sacramental character, which will remain in the damned for their punishment and ignominy. The sorrow of knowing that others enjoy those goods without doubt will be a consequence of that privation.

b) *Natural*: Beatitude in this order of providence really contains only supernatural goods (regarding their being or their manner) and therefore the damned person by the privation of beatitude does not lose *formally* his natural goods. But, having lost that supernatural beatitude, for other reasons he lacks all the goods which a natural beatitude would bestow on him; however, the natural desire for happiness is not extinguished in him, but since he has turned away from God, it can never be satisfied.

181. *The pain of sense,* which is positive and coming from the outside, is a suffering positively inflicted by God by instruments extrinsic to the damned person. It is called *of sense,* not precisely as affecting the sensible power, which the separated souls and angels do not have, but as produced mainly by a sensible thing. Pertaining to it are: fire, the society of the damned (1 Cor. 6:9f.; Rev. 21:8); the condition of the place; the loss of freedom; vexation in all the senses, which is easily understood from the circumstances in which the damned find themselves.

182. *The pain of the worm.* This is what we call the *moral* punishment coming from the fact that the damned person knows that he is: deprived forever, because of his own fault, of the beatitude that he vehemently desires, and that he is immersed in positive fierce torments.

Hence sorrow, desperation and hatred torment him severely: *towards God,* not indeed as the supreme good, but as the author of so much misery;

towards others whether the *blessed,* as united with God, whom, even his own relatives, he wants to be in hell, or the *damned,* as increasing his sorrow by their presence; whether especially *towards the devils* as his seducers, or *towards his associates in sin; towards every creature* as a work of God; *towards themselves*, the true cause of such great ruin (see Rev. 9:6; Matt. 26:24). Therefore out of desperation they want to cease existing in order to avoid suffering.

But that pain of the worm, since it comes from the pain of loss or from the pain of sense, is reduced to one or the other, according to what was said above in n. 145. Therefore generally only the pain of loss and the pain of sense are mentioned (from which, if it has to do with the punishment of *personal* sin, the pain of the worm is inseparable). We are using this way of speaking.

In his passion did Christ suffer the pain of loss? (Matt. 27:46). Some Catholics, after the Reformers, seem to have affirmed this, at least verbally. But, if the statement is taken *strictly,* it must be rejected as completely *erroneous* (so that it cannot be admitted even analogically), since the pain of loss means the privation of God, the last end, inflicted because of personal sin, while Christ suffered as the beloved Son, not assuming punishment, but offering vicarious satisfaction for the sins of others, nor should he be thought to have been deprived of the beatific vision for one moment of his life.[1]

On some other pains of sense. Many Fathers, with whom not a few older theologians agree, teach that the damned are tormented by some other material things besides fire, v.gr., water, snow, tempests, stinking things.[2] But Suarez says about this: "This opinion, even though it is based on the authority of serious authors, is uncertain... because Christ... expressly warns about the perpetual and irremissible and *quasi unique pain of fire,* but he does not mention other pains coming from snow and water; this is not proved sufficiently from any place in Scripture nor is such punishment shown to be necessary."[3]

More probably the worms of the damned mentioned in Mark 9:48 (Judith 16:21; Sir. 7:17; Isa. 62:64) are not corporeal, as some have thought,[4] but metaphorical and indicating the remorse of conscience.[5] Likewise many think that there will be darkness in hell (S.Th., *Suppl.*q.97, a. 4)[6]; but not necessarily, indeed, as it seems, nor probably, is it deduced from Matt. 8:12; 22:13; 25:30, where the darkness can more aptly be taken

1. See J. Rivière, *Le dogme de la Rédemption dans la théologie contemporaine* (Albi 1948) p.516-518; T. Ortolan, *Dam:* DTC 4,617.
2. St. Bernard, *Serm. de diversis* s.42 n.6: ML 183,664; S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 97, a. 1; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* dist.44 p.2 a.2 q.2.
3. Suarez, *De ang.* 8,12,24.
4. St. Basil, *Hom. in ps.33* n.8: MG 29,371; St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 21,9: ML 41,723f.; St. Gregory of Nyssa: R 1065; Suarez, 8,12,36; A. Lapide, *In Is* 66,24.
5. St. Justin, R 114.
6. St. Gregory of Nyssa, R 1036; St. John Chrysostom, *Hom.9 in 2 Cor.* n.4: MG 61,464f.; St. Augustine, *De cath. rudib.* C.24 n.45: ML 40,342.

for the pain of loss. And it is not certain that the bodies of the damned will be deformed or lacking anything, but they will be integral in all their organs and senses.

183. On the gravity of the pains. This is confirmed sufficiently both from the lost good and from the positive instruments of pain, and from their eternal duration. Furthermore, from the quoted statements of the sources there is clarity about: the place of the torments; the lake of fire; the place where their worm does not die, where there will be weeping and gnashing of teeth; exterior darkness (Matt. 5:22; 8:12; 13:42; Mark 9:42f.; Luke 16:28; Rev. 20:15; 21:8). The Fathers speak in a similar way, saying that those pains cannot be express in any words, that our fire in comparison with that is as it were unreal, that the vision of those pains could produce death.[7]

184. It is very evident that *the pain of loss is much greater than the pain of sense,* because the privation of the last end, as something infinitely good, is the greatest evil. "Mortal sins deserve to be punished by the privation of seeing God, to which no other punishment is comparable" (S.Th. I-II, q. 88, a. 4).[8] Our opinion is common among theologians, while a few early ones may disagree.[9] "The pain of loss," says Pesch, "is the essence of damnation, which alone suffices for damnation, without which there would be no damnation, and to which all other pains are related as mere accidents."

This sorrow comes from the clear knowledge of the loss of such a great good and from an ardent desire for happiness, which always remains in the damned. Hence, although out of hatred they do not want God as their end whom they serve and love, nevertheless they intensely desire him as the object of their own happiness.[10] Of course they lack the knowledge of glory such as the blessed have. But they do not desire that glory as ardently as the blessed do. For, all the knowledge had formerly, whether natural or derived from faith, remains in them, or, if it has to do with unbelievers, obtained there in one way or another, while the damned, when all impediments have been removed, know

7. *Epist. ad Diognetum:* R 100; Minucius F.: R 273; Saints Gregory Naz.: R 114; Gregory of Nyssa: R 1036; John Chrysostom, *Hom. 9 in 2 Cor.* n.4: MG 61,464f.; Augustine, *De cath. rudib.* C.24 n.45: ML 40,342.
8. S.Th. 3 CG 142. St. John Chrysostom, *Ad Theodorum, lapsum* 1,12: MG 47,292: "To lose such great goods involves so much sorrow, affliction and anguish that even if no other punishment were destined for sinners, that alone would impose pain and confusion on the soul greater than all the other torments of hell...." *In Mt* hom.23,8: MG 57,317: "Hell is an intolerable reality, and also its pains. Nevertheless although someone posits a thousand hells, nothing can be said to be such as to be excluded from that glory—to be hated by Christ and to hear from him: I do not know you...." St. Augustine, *Enchir.* 112: ML 30,285: "To lose the kingdom of God, to be exiled from the City of God, to be separated from the life of God, to lack such a great multitude of the charms of God... this pain is so great that no torment we know about can be compared with it."
9. See Siuri, tr.20 c.1 n.7-14. But at least Arriaga (*Disp. theol.* t.3 d.52f.) cited there does not deny it about the damned, but primarily it concerns infants dying without baptism.
10. Pesch, 9 n.643f. See also Garrigou-Lagrange, *op. cit.,*148-156.162; Michel, *Les Mystères...* 63-67.

that they can be happy only with that glory (S.Th., *Quodl.* 8 a.1f.)

In this life we do not suffer from a lack of the vision of God, because it is not a privation, or a good owed to us here, because we do not perceive so clearly the supreme goodness of the seen God, because now we fill up as it were our appetite for happiness with many good things which the damned do not have.

185. On the inequality of the pains. The supremely just judge punishes each one according to his works, and therefore with unequal penalty because of unequal guilt (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 8, a. 5 ad 3). This is a truth of *defined faith* (*de fide definita*) in Lateran Council IV (D 801) and by Benedict XII (D 1002), or *it is at least certain in theology.* Rom. 2:6: *He will render to every man according to his works* (see Ps. 62:13; Wis. 6:6; Matt. 16:27; 2 Cor. 5:10; Rev. 20:12f.). The holy Fathers speak in almost the same way, v.gr., Aphraates (R 697), Saints Ephraem (R 170), Basil (R 965, 976), Augustine (R 1778,1924), Gregory the Great (R 2322). The nature of justice requires that there be a proportion between the guilt and the punishment; but the guilt is different depending on the difference of the precept, of the malice of the sin, of the weakness of the sinner, of the number of sins, of their seriousness.

But this inequality, which, obviously cannot be in duration, but in its intensity or on the degree of punishment, although for us there is no certainty how this comes about: a) Is easily understood *in the pain of sense* (Rev. 18:6f.; St. Gregory the Great, R 2322; S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 97, a. 5 ad 3). b) It is also understood *in the pain of loss*, as the main one: but not with regard to the *privation,* since that allows of no degrees, as is per se evident and commonly held (S.Th. I-II, q. 73, a. 2), but with regard to the *sadness* because of that privation, which with regard to the exigent title of privation is different depending on the gravity and number of sins, and perhaps also depending on the different knowledge, either of glory as lost or the guilt of its loss, with God himself perhaps determining the degree of that knowledge.

186. God punishes less than what is deserved. God does not punish the damned from a sense of vindication, but only to restore the injured order of justice or so that its violators will finally be subject to it in an effective way (S.Th. I-II, q. 87, a. 3 ad 3). Indeed, it is more commonly held against Estius, Sylvius, Gotti, Arriaga and others,[11] that He does not punish the damned according to the rigor of justice, but less than what is deserved. "In the damnation of the reprobate mercy is seen, which, though it does not totally remit, yet somewhat alleviates, in punishing short of what is de-

11. Estius, *In 4* d.46 § 4; Sylvius, *In Suppl. S.Th.* q.99 a.3; Gotti, *De iudicio univers.* q.8 dub.3 § 2; Arriaga (not clearly) t.4 disp.56 s.7 n.56. On the various meanings of this axiom, see Oviedo, *In i.2* tr.9 controv.5 p.6.

served" (S.Th. I, q. 21, a. 4 ad 1; *Suppl.* q. 94, a. 2 ad 2; q. 99, a. 2 ad 1; a. 5 ad 1).[12] This is explained in such a way that God, because of his goodness, does not impose as much punishment for sins as they deserve, but so that he does not take anything away from the punishment imposed by him.[13]

Here it is fitting to observe, for the glory of the Blessed Virgin, "that God because of the Mother of God and in virtue of her merits rewards the elect above what they deserve and punishes the reprobate below what they deserve. This has its foundation in the opinions of the Fathers and the common sense of Catholics that God confers all benefits on mortals through Mary and in view of the merits of Mary: for, since to reward above what is deserved and to punish below what is deserved is a gift of the divine goodness, it is the result of the fact that God confers it through Mary and in view of her merits."[14]

187. On the mitigation of punishments.[15] *Accidental mitigation* is had, if the *temporal* punishment due in any way to sins and not yet endured (Trent, D 1580, 1712, 1715) ceases to be at some time in hell.

a) Scotus and his school, and not a few others like Siuri, Beraza, Martínez, say that the punishment due *to unforgiven venial sins* is remitted in hell. We readily agree with this, since God can forgive a punishment without grace and also eternal punishment in a light matter and deserving only a temporal punishment seems to be beyond what is deserved.

However, others hold with St. Thomas, Suarez, Vázquez, Salas, Lennerz, Billot, etc., that the perpetual punishment of venial sin is not remitted per se, but *per accidens*, since that sin, as connected with mortal sin, is, in the absence of sanctifying grace, irremissible.[16]

b) The punishment owed to *sins forgiven as to their guilt* and to venial and mortal sins will come to an end according to the opinion which St. Thomas seems to prefer or at least tolerates (*In 4* d.22 q.1 a.1 ad 5); Scotus with his school and with many others also holds this opinion.[17] But the punishment does not stop according to Suarez, Capreolus, Vázquz and others.[18]

12. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei,* 21,24,3: ML 41,739; P. Lombard, 4 d.46; St. Albert the Great, *In 4* d.45f.; Suarez, *De pecc.* d.7 s.3 n.15.
13. Suarez, *De grat.* 1,12 c.31 n.14. For an explanation of the matter, see E. Hugueny, *L'enfer et la misérticorde:* RevApol 54 (1932) 516-518.
14. Siuri, tr.23 c.3 n.52, where he cites other authors who say the same thing.
15. On this matter see Michel, *Mitigation des peines de la vie future:* DTC 10,1997-2009; Lennerz, n.127-133; Martínez, c.7; Id., *El libro del R.P. Getino sobre los que se salvan y las penas eternas:* RazFe 107 (1935) 303-316; see *ibid.* 108 (1935) 152-160.
16. Scotus, *in 4* d.21 q.1; see d.15 q.1; Siuri, tr.23 c.2; Beraza, n.1137; Martínez, p. 199-201; S. Th. I-II, q. 87, a. 5 ad 3; *De malo* q.5 a.2 ad 8; q.7 a.10; Suarez, *De vitiis et peccatis* d.7 s.4 n.4,7; *De paenit.* D.11 a.2 n.11-13; Vázquez, *In 1.2* d.141 c.2; Salas, *In 1.2* tr.13 d.15 a.11; Lennerz, n.132; Billot, *De personali et originali peccato*[6] (Rome 1931) th.10 § 2.
17. Scotus, *In 4* d.21 q.1; see d.15 q.1; Siuri, *loc.cit.*
18. Suarez, *De paenit.* d.37 s.2 n.9; Capreolus, *In 4* d.22 q.2 a.3 II; Vázquez, *In 1.2* d.141 c.2. On the various opinions on this matter among the older theologians, see A. Landgraf, *Die Bestrafung lässlicher Sünden in der Hölle nach dem Urteil der Frühscholastik:* Greg 22 (1941) 80-119, 380-407.

188. *Essential mitigation* is had when the *eternal* punishment for unforgiven mortal sins has either some interruption or some diminution in hell.

A few Fathers are cited in favor of some mitigation of this kind, but none of the texts are really clear on this point. Thus, Prudentius seems to concede a paschal respite for the damned, but perhaps he is speaking with a certain poetic exaggeration.[19] St. Caesarius of Arles perhaps concedes the same thing for them on the day of the descent of Christ into the underworld.[20] St. Augustine, while mentioning the opinion of some who think that the pains of hell sometimes are mitigated, does not seem to condemn the idea.[21]

A few older theologians, but not famous ones, like Praepositinus, Gulielmus Altissiodorensis,[22] Gilbertus Porretanus (see S.Th., *In 4* d.45 q.2 a.2 sol.1) and perhaps to some extent P. Lombard,[23] are said to have thought that the damned can be helped by the suffrages of the faithful. Recently G. Milvart, an English priest, contended that the damned are punished by the pain of loss and the pain of sense, but that it is possible to admit that they gradually turn away from their aversion from God and finally are positively converted to Him from evil to good, and that they are drawn to this by the love of God, so that it brings them a certain happiness.[24]

189. So what should be said about this? *There is no mitigation from the prayers of the faithful*, since the Church never prays for the damned; not during the time of St. Augustine,[25] nor during the time of St. Thomas (*In 4* d.45 q.2 sol.1; see I, q. 21, a. 4 ad 1),[26] nor during the time of the Council

19. Prudentius, *L. Cathemerinon* 5 n.125-136: ML 59,827f. See F. Arévalo, *Opera Prudentii,* Prolog. N.184 (1,158): ML 59,708; A. Rössler, *Der kath. Dichter Aurelius Prudentius Clemens* (Freiburg 1886) thinks that he teaches mitigation.
20. St. Caesarius of Arles, *Hom.1 de Paschate:* ML 67,1042f. Buchwald (*Die oratio Fidelium in der Feriaalmesse:* ThPrQschr 85 [1932] 758-765) recalls some traditions in which the damned on certain days enjoy some relaxation of their suffering.
21. St. Augustine, R 1932. See S. Merkle, *Augustin über eine Unterbrechung der Höllenstrafen, in:* Grabmann-Mausbach, *Aurelius Augustinus* (Cologne 1930) 197-202; Petavius, *loc.cit.,* 3,8,15f.
22. Gulielmus Altiss., *In 4* tr.14 q.1.
23. P. Lombard, *In 4* d.45. Also, on the mind of the theologians of that time concerning this matter, see A. Landgraf, *Die Minderung der Höllenstrafen nach der Lehre der Frühscholastik:* ZkathTh 60 (1936) 299-370, according to whom, there are not lacking theologians from the 11th to the middle of the 12th century who, like Lombard, seem to favor or are uncertain in this matter concerning some mitigation, but only for those who are "not exceedingly evil."
24. G. Mivart, a lay professor, explained his opinion in the publication, *The Nineteenth Century* (Dec.1892, 899-919; Feb. 1893, 320-338). He humbly submitted to the condemnation of his articles (a.1893). See CivCatt ser.15,5 (1893) 672-686; 6 (1893) 670-685; 7 (1893) 486; 11 (1894) 101.
25. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 21,24, 1f.: ML 41,736-738.
26. See P. Lumreras, O.P., *Una doctrina inadmisible del infierno:* CiencTom 51 (1935) 116-123. E. Sauras, O.P., (*La misericordia de Dios y los condenados, según la mente de Santo Tomás:* CienTom 52 [1935] 5-39) thinks that St. Thomas in the cited texts can be well understood as speaking about the satisfactory and meritorious value of prayer, but not about its power of impetration, and about denying mitigation from justice, but not from mercy. But by what right is that distinction made—one that the holy Doctor does not make, both in prayer, whose power of impetration is excellent, and between justice and mercy in this matter? See Martínez, p.165, note 29.

of Florence[27] and the Council of Trent,[28] nor during the time of Suarez or Petavius,[29] nor at the present time does she pray for them, as is clear.[30]

An ancient *Mass for whose soul there is a doubt* is mentioned, and some time ago it was quite well known; in this Mass there is petition for a soul so that, if it has not merited glory, at least "the torments might be for it more tolerable."[31]

But it lacks dogmatic worth in this matter, since it was inserted extra-officially and only in some Missals and only for the Roman liturgy (which then was not as universal as it now is); also it is more probable that it was never used in the particular churches, especially since it was omitted in the first official edition of the Missal (in 1570) published by St. Pius V (perhaps because of the interpolations in the Missals which were condemned by the Council of Trent).[32]

Furthermore Palmieri, without mentioning Mivart, says this: "Moreover, a mitigation of this kind does not have a place based on the opinion of those favoring it unless it refers to *the time preceding the last judgment;* namely, when the solemnities of the Church are performed and there are the faithful who pray for the dead; after that, throughout eternity there will be no mitigation of punishments; that is, that alleviation is so slight that it could be contemned even by the damned themselves.[33]

190. *However, mitigation from mercy alone is excluded* by St. Augustine[34] and unanimously by the theologians who reject the opinion of mitigation (in general, whether it is based on suffrages or on God's mercy alone) with grave censures, so that Lennerz, after reviewing some of these opinions, says this: "The common doctrine and praxis of the Church are completely contrary to this teaching (of mitigation), and the disputations, which at one time took place among theologians about this matter, hardly had any influence on the strength of this consensus. In recent centuries no one seems to have proposed this opinion in a serious and positive manner... Hence the minimum, which it seems should be said today about this, is that

27. At the Council of Florence both Greeks and Latins agreed on this matter. G. Hofmann, *Concilium Florentinum.* I. *Erstes Gutachten der Lateiner über das Fegfeuer:* OrChr 16 (1929) 264f.286 lin.2-22; 287f. IV. II. *Zweites Gutachten...:* OrChr 17 (1930) 215 lin.6-11; 222 lin.27-31.
28. The Council of Trent does not approve suffrages except for the justified persons who are not yet fully purified (D 1743), and also its theologians. See CTr 8,730,9; 741,34; 753,17-21; 910,30; 960,35.
29. Suarez, *De paenit.* d.48 s.4 n.14-16; Petavius, 3,8,18....
30. The *Offertory* in the Mass for the Dead (and the hymn *Dies irae*) in no way are understood as prayer for the damned (see n. 43). On the tradition of the Russian Church of not praying except for the souls in purgatory, see M. Niechaj, *Oratio liturgica pro defunctis in Ecclesia Orthodoxa* (Lublin 1933) 270f.
31. Michel, 1998f.; A. Cabassut, *L'enfer d'après les livres liturgiques:* RevHistEccl 23 (1927) 65-70.
32. Cabassut, 69; Michel, 1999; Martínez, *ibid.* See CTr 8,917,5; 921,40-46; note 1; 963,17.
33. Palmieri, § 61 n.4.
34. St. Augustine, *Enarr. In Ps.* 105,2: ML 37,1406.

the negative opinion is certain and that the opposite opinion is erroneous.[35]

a) Holy Scripture states the eternity of punishment, but never its mitigation. Indeed, according to it, the damned *have no rest day or night* (Rev. 14:11). The rich reveller does not find relief in even the slightest coolness (Luke 16:24-26).

b) The holy Fathers are not aware of any mitigation. Minucius Felix (R 273): "Nor is there any limit or end to these torments." St. Hippolytus (R 396): "To those who have done well shall be assigned righteously eternal bliss, and to the lovers of iniquity shall be given eternal punishment... and a certain fiery worm that dies not, and which does not waste the body, but continues bursting forth from the body with unending pain. No sleep will give them rest; no night will soothe them; no death will deliver them from punishment; no voice of interceding friends will profit them....: St. Cyprian (R 560): "An ever burning Gehenna and a devouring punishment of lively flames will consume the condemned, and there will be no means whereby the torments can at any time have respite and end." St. Ephraem (R 713): "...And for a brief instant the pain will not stop from punishing his sin, because it will last forever and at no time will he ever be free from it."

c) The guilt of the damned is not diminished; therefore neither the punishment due to him. The glory of the blessed will never be interrupted; therefore likewise neither the pain of the damned.

35. Lennerz, n. 128-130. Martínez, p.193-198 (see RazFe 107 [1936] 305-309) and Michel, 2004-2006, reviews the opinions of many theologians who firmly reject all mitigation with various censures. Recently Lercher (IV,2[3] n.905, note324) on the opinion denying mitigation says "today it must be said to be certain, and the opposite opinion is erroneous."

ARTICLE IV

ON THE SPIRITUAL CONDITION OF THE DAMNED

191. On the natural knowledge of the damned. It seems that these points should be held: They clearly understand that the one God is their final end and therefore the beatitude of man, and that they have lost that end forever. They do not lack the natural light of reason, nor speculative natural science, in which, for example, they can increase by experience, but they lack practical judgment in order to perform a morally good act (S.Th. I, q. 64, a. 1; q. 87, a. 1). They do not know what takes place among men on earth, except perhaps they learn something from the devils or from the souls newly coming there; this inflicts more accidental pain on them. In general, they are in such a condition of pain that they can hardly think about anything but their own sufferings.

192. On the supernatural knowledge of the damned. They are deprived of all supernatural light. Salmerón, Catharinus, while explaining James 2:19 (*even the demons believe*), admit in the demons and in damned Christians the *habit* of supernatural faith, whereby they place intrinsically supernatural acts. Durandus, P. Lombard and Alexander of Hales held the same thing.[1]

But very commonly *all* supernatural knowledge in the damned is denied and therefore its *habit,* for: a) Supernatural light is given to wayfarers so that they can tend towards the homeland (2 Cor. 5:7; 1 Pet. 1:9), from which the damned have been definitively excluded. b) Supernatural faith is governed by the pious affection of the will in obedience to God and the damned lack this affection (S.Th., *Comp. Theol.* c.174). c) The sacramental character remaining in condemned Christians is not a reason for admitting in them a habit of faith, since the character is not ordained, like the habit, for the performance of good works, and it does not give greater strength to the damned, but rather for them it is a greater punishment. d) But they acknowledge in general and in a confused way the glory of the blessed, but now not from faith and a fortiori through an intuition of their presence, but by a consideration of the mind.

Hence the demons, and consequently also the other damned Christians, believe, but not out of a pious affection of submission to God but only from their own power of

1. Salmerón and Catharinus, *In ep. Iac* 2,19; Lombard, *Sent.* 3 d.23; Durandus, *In 3* d.23 q.9 n.10, but he admits it in the demons, if at one time, he says, they had it. Alex. of Hales, p.3 q.64 memb.7.

understanding and from the evidence of the signs forcing them to admit the truth (S.Th. II-II, q. 5, a. 2 ad 3), that is, with a faith that is not supernatural and infused, but with a natural faith pertaining to acquired knowledge. Therefore James (2:19) is comparing the faith of demons with the faith of sinners in this life, but only inasmuch as both are *objectively* the same or about the same object and both are unformed; but it is not as if the act of believing in both is substantially of the same nature or elicited in the same way.[2]

193. On the obstinacy of the damned. This obstinacy is a *confirmation in evil*, because the will of the damned irrevocably is turned away from God: and because they are not sorry for their sins and especially because they can act only in an evil manner.

Principally, from the doctrine founded on the texts of the sources about death as the end of the earthly pilgrimage, they cannot repent or perform any *salutary* act, since, as already placed outside of the way of salvation, they do not receive the grace necessary for such an act (S.Th., 4 CG 93); for, such grace is given only in order to obtain eternal life and therefore only in the state of earthly life.

Hence the cause of the obstinacy of the damned, inasmuch as they cannot perform *salutary* repentance, can be said to be God "not surely as causing or conserving the malice, but as not conferring grace..." (S.Th., *De malo* q.16 a.5 ad 3; see 4 CG 93).

194. Also commonly theologians, with a few exceptions such as Scotus and Durandus, hold that the damned can elicit only morally evil acts.[3] For, no act is morally good unless in some way it is ordered to God as the last end, and the damned person is turned away from him completely. For, since man in this life freely chooses either the last end or aversion from it, at the end of life he is thought immutably either to adhere to that end and so to what is good, or to turn away from it and so adhere to what is evil.

Indeed, the good acts that are in the damned, such as to believe that God is (Jas. 2:19) and other acts, are good only materially and objectively, but not subjectively, since, if they will something good, they do not will it in a good way.

The damned grieve over their sins (Wis. 5:1-15), but not because they are evil, since in them a will of malice remains, but only because of the pains they suffer (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 98, a. 2). Therefore they grieve without

2. See Siuri, 24,1,2-6; J. Beumer, S.J., *Et daemones credunt et contremiscunt Iac 2,19), Ein Beitrag zur positiven Bewertung der fides informis:* Greg 22 (1941) 231-251.
3. Scotus, *In 2* d.7, who however adds that the demons (whom he is treating there) probably never de facto place any morally good acts; Durandus, *In 2* d.7 q.2. See Suarez, *De angelis* 8,8.

any correction.[4]

Obstinacy is the permitted effect of rejected grace, and not for any other reason. The opinion which says that obstinacy is the *cause* of the eternity of punishment, as if it were the permissive cause of the absence of grace[5] and not otherwise, seems to be less in conformity with the sources, which rather (see thesis 1) bases the eternity of hell on the fact that the time of probation and therefore of mercy and grace (therefore in virtue of the decree of God of not granting grace outside of this pilgrim state of life) no longer exists.[6]

195. *But where does the obstinacy come from?* Since the cause of not doing *salutary* penance is the privation of grace, thus God is the negative cause of the obstinacy, according to what we just said. But what is the cause in the damned of not placing a morally good act which could be done without grace, but only morally evil acts? This is a difficult question that is answered in various ways by theologians:

1) It is a *physical external* cause, namely, God, a) either *positively* or by placing an impediment to acting rightly, because it causes in the will of the damned an insurmountable inclination for evil, from which then proceed his evil acts, according to Aureolus, or it implants hatred for God, which then impedes the ordination of acts towards God, according to Ockham,[7] b) or *negatively,* that is, by a privation of the divine help necessary to act, because he denies to the damned a congruous thought, according to Vázquez, or general concursus, according to Molina.[8]

But, according to these opinions, God would seem to be *the author of sin: positively* in the first two (which therefore are generally rejected) since, although in that way the obstinate do not sin formally, as acting necessarily, that insurmountable inclination to sin, like the hatred of God, is intrinsically evil; *negatively* in these two later opinions, since God, by deliberately denying the help necessary to act well, may be said to will indirectly the omission of the act, which seems to be opposed to the divine holiness.

2) It is a *physical internal* cause, that is, the condition of an angel or of a separated soul, remaining even after the resurrection, so that the will immovably adheres to what it once chose, therefore just as the demons operate in virtue of the first sin to which they adhere and similarly the separated souls in virtue of the sin inhering in them after the

4. St. Gregory Naz.: R 980; Aphraates: R 693; St. Fulgentius: R 2268, where he hints at what is said below (*De fide ad Petr.* 3,36: ML 65,689): "What someone in this life did not do, in the future life he surely will have repentance for his sins, but he will not find forgiveness in the sight of God: because although there will be there a stimulus for repentance, still there will be in that place no further correction of the will...."
5. Thus Thomists. See Billot, *De personali et originali peccato*[7] (Rome 1931) th.7; Michel, *L'éternité de l'enfer et de la raison:* RevApol 39 (1925) 515-524; Id., *Une mitigation des peines de l'enfer est-elle possible?:* AmCl 66 (1956) 459-461; Glorieux, *loc.cit.;* Manyà, *op.cit.,* c.7 n.2.
6. See Stufler, *Die Verstocktheit der Verdammten:* ZkathTh 27 (1903) 256-276; see Id., *Die Heiligkeit Gottes und der ewige Tod* (Innsbruck 1903).
7. Aureolus, *In 2* dist.7 q.1 a.1; Ockham, *In 2* dist.7 q.1 a.1; Quod. I q. 19.
8. Vázquez, *In 1* disp.241 c.4; Molina, *In 1* q.64 a.2 d.2 (he adds to that negation the moral impotence of repentance which is in the damned).

separation from the body. Thus St. Thomas, whom the Thomists generally follow.[9]

This opinion would seem to be confirmed by experience, since even now men are less inclined to abandon a choice once made according as they more clearly understand the reason for that choice; but an angel by one act attains everything that is in his cognitive power, and the separated soul is thought to know in the same way as the angels do.

However, this underlies these objections, which makes them seem less probable: From what we said recently (n. 194), in hell, according to Wis. 5:1-14, the Fathers, St. Thomas and other theologians, repentance, though unfruitful, is present: Why cannot the damned man perform acts of the virtues that do not harm him? Why, given the same knowledge, can he not change his free choice? Why does the damned man, as immovably turned towards creatures, suffer from the privation of God? Why is the dying man, having turned to God by attrition, changed afterwards?

Finally, it would be absurd to say that one and the same act of sin, which a man elicited before death thinking he would be able to retract it, would become physically irrevocable, given his death and without any new act of this man; hence in this opinion it is necessary to hold that a physically irrevocable act is performed either after death (which would be unheard of) or on the way before death (but in this way an act by its nature revocable would be made irrevocable by God, which cannot be admitted) or in the very moment of death in which the soul now decides its own fate in accordance with the manner of a separated spirit, as Glorieux and perhaps Manyà held improbably (since without sufficient reason the terminus of life would be established practically after death.).[10]

196. 3) It is a *moral internal* cause, that is, the obstinacy arises: a) *Positively,* from the miserable condition of the state of the damned man who sees that he is without hope of forgiveness and in guilt (in a detestable condition before God) and in horrendous and eternal pain (of loss and sense)—all of which comes from God, whom therefore he vehemently hates as a tyrant together with everything that pleases God; consequently he avidly desires whatever is contrary to God. Thus therefore he is in a state of *moral impotency* of acting well or from any motive related to God as his last end. b) *Negatively,* from the fact that the will, by its nature very fragile, is left to its own powers, without any moral help from God, with only the general quasi physical influence of God in order to perform acts.

This opinion, which is held by Suarez, Toledo, Siuri, Pesch and many others,[11] seems to us to be more probable: since it both very well explains the moral state of the damned and introduces nothing that can be shown to be opposed to the divine attributes; since in it the *physical* freedom in the damned of acting well is retained; that being the

9. S.Th., *De angelis:* I, q. 64, a. 2; *De malo* q. 16 a.5; *De ver.* Q. 24 a.10; *In 2* d.7 q.1 a.2. On men: *De ver.* q.24 a.11; 4 CG 95; *Comp. Theol.* c.174f.; Cajetan, *In 1* q.64 a.2; Billuart, *De angelis* diss.6 a.1 § 2; Billot, *loc. cit.*, Glorieux and Manyà, *loc. cit.*

10. Glorieux and Manyà, *loc.cit.* Also, these authors must arrive logically at this amazing conclusion, namely, that, according to them, the obstinacy of the sinner is had only with regard to the act placed at the moment of death, but not with regard to the acts of sin committed during his life. See Sauras: RevEspT 9 (1949) 557; T. Urdànoz, O.P.: CiencTom 75 (1948) 134.

11. Suarez, 8 c.11; Toledo, *In 1* q.64 a.2; Siuri, 24,3,49f.; Pesch, 9 n.670.

case, they are not deprived of the means absolutely and necessarily that is sufficient in order to perform a morally good act.

Pesch says about this opinion: "... Therefore one should not criticize this opinion as if it were unheard of and irrational. Moreover, of the various explanations of this difficult matter, anyone can embrace it to whom it seems the best one, provided that by it Catholic dogma is preserved and God is not said to be the positive author of evil acts.[12]

Beraza brings together the opinion of Suarez with that of Molina, without however avoiding the disadvantages of the latter. Stufler posits in the damned a *physical impotency* of acting rightly, since they do not have any motive for loving God either with a love of concupiscence, for now they have no hope, or with a love of benevolence, for they look upon him as their enemy.[13] But the objection can be raised against him that the damned look upon God as good and as the one source of beatitude and therefore they can desire him *physically.* For if God cannot be for him a formal object of love, the damned man would not suffer from the pain of loss.

197. *Are the evil acts that the damned deliberately elicit formal sins?* The answer to this question, which depends on the way of explaining obstinacy, is more commonly in the affirmative, but by others the answer is negative, according as it is affirmed or denied to the damned that there is in those acts the physical or moral freedom which is required for a formal sin.[14] We deny that those sins are formal because of the defect of moral freedom of not sinning that is inherent in the damned.

However, the necessity of sinning which the obstinacy of the damned produces is voluntary in them and therefore a fault, not in itself, but only and inasmuch as they foresaw it in its cause, or in the sin that brought about their damnation (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 98, a. 6 ad 3).

But, according to all authors, those sins *do not impose new sufferings* on the damned, since that would seem to be repugnant to the wisdom and justice of God, either because they are not formal sins, or because—and this is true for every opinion—they take place outside of the state of meriting or demeriting. Moreover, if it is necessary for them to be punished, they are punished in the sins for which the damned merited hell (see S.Th., ibid. ad 3).

However, the obstinacy itself, since in itself or formally it is not a fault, must be said to be formally a punishment, as a consequence of perfect aversion from the end, which the damned are subject to by reason of their status; therefore the obstinacy can be an addition to the pain of loss. That pain is so great that it can be said to be the supreme evil of the damned, so that they can neither merit nor demerit.[15]

12. Pesch, 9 n.670 at the end.
13. Beraza, n.1159; Stufler: ZkathTh 279-283; Id., *Die Heiligkeit Gottes*...150-176. Lercher seems to follow him, IV² n.601.
14. On this matter see H. Tournely, (*De angelis* q.10 a.3 concl.3), who explain it at length and he summarizes each opinion. Some recent authors say that they are formal sins, v.gr., Jungmann, n.70; Hurter, 3 n.661; Pohle-Gierens, 3 p.673; but the following deny it, v.gr., Pesch, 9 668, Lennerz, n.157, because of a defect of moral freedom with regard to sinning; but from a defect of physical freedom Stufler, *Die Verstocktheit*... 286; Id., *Die Heiligkeit... Gottes* n.98ff, and it seems Lercher, n.601.
15. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 98, a. 6; 4 CG 93; II-II, q. 13, a. 4 ad 2; Palmieri, § 64; Garrigou-Lagrange, *op.cit.*, 155.

198. *Does God will the obstinacy of the damned?* God wills that the sinner dying in mortal sin be tormented forever by the pain of loss and the pain of sense, deprived of all salutary grace, and he knows their condition perfectly. But the obstinacy that follows that knowledge is not intended by God but only permitted, almost like sin, since it proclaims the perfections of God.

199. Scholium. *How many damned are there?* Speaking theoretically, everyone who dies in the state of mortal sin. But, although Scripture does not mention it in concrete terms, not considering Satan and his angels, nor, as it seems, Judas (Matt. 26:24; John 17:12; Acts 1:25), still in general the sources quite clearly indicate that the number of damned men is large (see n. 148-154, 162-166). However, nothing certain can be established about the number, so in this matter extreme opinions should be avoided, since a prudent foundation for large or small numbers is lacking. Thus the Church prays (Litany of the Saints): "O God, to whom alone is known the number of the elect living in supreme happiness...." And in general she prays "for the living and the dead" (Roman Missal, Votive Prayers n.35).[16]

For Suarez it is "more probable... that more of them (i.e., those who die in the Catholic Church) will be saved [than damned], being in the law of grace" (Luke 13:24).[17] But of those who do not go to heaven most of them are thought to go to limbo, since many of the dead are found among children who did not have the use of reason.

Corollary. *On preaching about hell.* Christ often spoke about hell and he did it doubtless that we might be prevented from committing the sins meriting it. Surely it was in his mind that this warning was for the men of future generations. Hence the practice of avoiding preaching about these matters is to be strongly reproved, adopted as if it is less suited to the mentality of the modern man.

Pius XII said: "Preaching... about the last things not only has not lost its effectiveness in our days, but now it is especially necessary and urgent. Especially preaching about hell. Without doubt this matter is to be proposed in a dignified and discrete manner. But with regard to the substance of the matter itself, the Church has a sacred duty before God of transmitting it and teaching it without any mitigation, just as Christ

16. See Michel, Élus (Nombre des): DTC 4,2350-2378; M. De Lama, *El número de los que se salvan:* RelCult 30 (1935) 323-346; Martínez: RazFe 107 (1935) 291f.; 108 (1935) 146-148; Hugueny, *L'enfer et la miséricorde:* RevApol 54 (1932) 518-529; Id., *Le scandale édifiant d'une exposition missionaire:* RevThom 16 (1933) 222-228, 533-545; J. Guitton, *L'irrémisible:* VieSpir 49 (1936) 365-390; J.M. Dalmau, S.J., *Del gran número de los que se salvan y de la mitigación de las penas del infierno:* EstEcl 14 (1935) 376-379; E. Boissar, O.S.B., *Note sur l'interprétation du texte „Multi sunt vocati, pauci vero electi":* RevThom 52 (1952) 659f.

17. Suarez, *De praedest.* 6,3,6. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *op.cit.*, 329.

17* *Hortatio ad Parochos Urbis et Concionatores sacri temporis quadragesimalis:* AAS 41 (1949) 185 (the text is in Italian). Theologians agree with him, as is clear, v.gr., Spicq, *loc.cit.*, 143; Garrigou-Lagrange, *op.cit.*, 117: "Hoy se predica poco sobre este asnto (el infierno) y se deja caer en el olvido una verdad tan saludable; no se pienas bastante que el temor del infierno es el principio de la prudencia y conduce a la conversión. En este sentido puede decirse que el infierno ha salvado a muchas almas." 166-170: "Se nos ha preguntado si es útil predicar el infierno en nuestra época. Es cierto que es mejor ir a Dios llevados del amor... Pero el temor es necessario también hoy, como ayer y como siempre para alejarnos del mal...."

revealed it, nor is there any condition of the times that could diminish the rigors of this duty. It binds in conscience all priests, to whom has been committed the task of teaching.... the faithful. It is true that the desire for heaven is a reason more perfect in itself than the fear of eternal punishment; but from that it does not follow that preaching about heaven is more efficacious than preaching about hell in order to turn them away from sin and to convert them to God.[17*]

N.B. But in this matter, as in others that pertain to Eschatology, with Bartmann it is necessary to give this warning: it is necessary in instructing the faithful on all those questions, to which truly no certain answer can be given, that they should be treated with great prudence according to their religious character, or rather not be mentioned at all.[18]

18. B. Bartmann, *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik* 2 (Freiburg in Br. 1921) § 213 at the end p.500.

ARTICLE V

ON THE NATURE OF THE FIRE OF HELL

Thesis 10. The fire of hell is not metaphorical, but real.

S.Th. I, q. 64, a. 4 ad 3; *Suppl.* q, 70, a. 3; Suarez, *De angelis* 8,12; Lennerz, n.98-125; Passaglia, *op.cit.*; Michel, *Feu de l'enfer:* DTC 5,2196-2246; C. Gutberlet, *Die poena sensus:* Kath (1901, II) 305-316, 385-401.

200. Connection. It is certain from what has gone before that the damned are punished with a pain of loss and a pain of sense. Furthermore, it is sufficiently evident from the words of the sources already quoted that fire is to be assigned as the main instrument of the pain of sense. But *what is the nature of this fire?* If only damned men, and also only after the resurrection, were to be tormented by it, there would be no question. But since spirits are also punished by it, it would seem that it is understood in the sources only metaphorically. Therefore, we now propose to determine the nature of that fire.

201. Definition of terms. *The fire of hell* is that thing by which, according to the sources, the damned are tormented (Matt. 15:41).

Metaphorical fire: a) *Taken strictly*, it is the moral suffering coming from the privation of beatitude because of sin. Therefore it is not something *extrinsic* to the damned person as the cause of suffering, but it is *the suffering itself,* whose great intensity is not expressed vividly by any other metaphor than the metaphor of *fire* (that is, as strongly tormenting). Therefore it is the affliction of the soul inhering in the pain of loss, that is, in the privation of beatitude because of sin.

b) *Taken broadly,* it is something *spiritual, extrinsic* to the damned person, spiritually afflicting him as the instrument of God.

202. *Real fire* is, not the suffering itself, but some thing and extrinsic to the damned person as the cause of suffering and it is not spiritual, but corporeal or material, causing suffering in the same way as fire does.

Therefore, it is opposed per se in the thesis to *metaphorical* fire, *whether taken strictly or broadly.* But fire *broadly* metaphorical of itself is excluded, since, as distinct from the damned and extrinsic to him, it would be standing by itself or it would be a *substance* and indeed *spiritual* and consequently intelligent and vital; this therefore would seem to be unsuitable both to be taken as an instrument for tormenting bodies—as it would

be equally difficult to explain—and to be called fire.[1] Hence in practice the question is, and it is so proposed by us, about establishing *real* fire, according as it is opposed to *strictly metaphorical fire.*

But since its nature is almost unknown to us, it is expressed by a formula that cannot be further defined, so that it is called something *corporeal* whether solid or fluid or airy or something of a super-physical composition, which because of its properties is more comparable to earthly fire than some other material thing and therefore whose tormenting is more like the pain of burning than it is like anything else.

But what the older theologians said about the nature of the fire of hell depended at least partially on their understanding of our fire. In no way do we think that that fire is of the same species as our fire, as St. Thomas thought (*Suppl.* q. 97, a. 6). For it differs from our fire: *in duration,* since it is inextinguishable; *in its effect,* since it burns without consuming; *in its nature,* since it burns of itself, without the kindling of matter; *in its purpose,* since it is a punisher of sins; *in its power,* since it torments spirits. "It is therefore fire, but a fire of its own nature," says Knabenbauer.[1*] But, although it is material, its "suffering received in a spirit is spiritual."[2]

203. Adversaries. Besides Calvin,[3] there were *some Catholics.* Origen: the fire is the remorse of conscience from the memory of sins, for "the conscience itself by its own stimulus is agitated and pricked and it becomes an accuser of itself and a witness" (R 463). Thus threats of punishment as corporeal mentioned in Scripture indicate "in a figurative way" "both the vices and the punishments of souls" (R 464). We find this more or less in Theophylactus (11th century).[4]

Catharinus: Fire is a word indicating the supreme torment of the damned from the privation of God.[5] Recently cited for this view are Möhler and

1. Heris, *loc.cit.,* 291; Michel, *Les mystères...* 57f.

1* Knabenbauer, *In Mt 25,41* p.25,41 p.390. Hugo of St. Victor: "This fire signifies the vehemence of eternal punishment, because no element has as much efficacy as fire" (*In Heb.* 10,27: ML 175,629).

2. Suarez, 8,14,43.

3. Calvin, *Instit. Relig. Christ.* 1.3 c.25 n.12. This opinion of Calvin exercised great influence on Protestant theology, so that in our time many Protestants follow it: see Michel, *Feu...:* DTC 5,2216f. He, fully agreeing with the mind of the theologians, does not want to call this fire material, but real, lest he seem to make it like our earthly fire: see *loc.cit.,* 564,68f; *Témérité ou absurdité au sujet du feu de l'enfer?:* AmCl 66 (1956) 157.

4. Theophylactus, *Enarratio in Evang. Mc* c.9 v.44-49: MG 123,546. Scotus Erigena, whose mind on this matter is doubtful, seems to have admitted a material fire, according to F. Vernet, *Erigène:* DTC 5,420f.; see however Richard, *loc.cit.,* 50.

5. Catharinus, *De bonorum premio et supplicio malorum aeterno* (Lyons 1942) 145.

Keel, and Doms should also be counted among them.[6]

There are a few authors, not well known, who are quoted as saying that the fire is real, but spiritual as proposed in one way or another by them[7]; they must be held as adversaries of the thesis, since de facto they deny a material fire and since logically they should say that the fire is strictly metaphorical.

Cajetan says that the fire, as a worm, is not natural but metaphorical, but in such a way that, while the worm is internal, the fire is "an external punishment as vehement as the fire that burns us."[8] Therefore he denies that the fire is *strictly* metaphorical; and he does not necessarily deny that it is something material, but at most that it is *true* fire. But it is not clear, since perhaps he is denying only that it is metaphorical, inasmuch as it has a nature different from our fire. Therefore we do not number him among the adversaries.

Hettinger, sometimes mentioned as an adversary, says only that the Church has defined nothing about this matter.[9]

Hence, if we do not include Origen, Theophylactus and Catharinus, there are few who deny the thesis; indeed, of these few not one is a famous theologian, and most of them are apologists.

204. Doctrine of the Church. *The Sacred Penitentiary* (June 30, 1890). Question: "A penitent approaches a confessor and among other things says he thinks that in hell the fire is not real but is metaphorical, that is, that

6. J.A. Möhler, *Neue Untersuchungen der Lehregegentsätze zwischen den Katholiken und Protestanten*[5] (Regensburg 1909) p.315; Keel, *Die jensitige Welt* part.2 p.49ff. H. Doms, *Zum Problem der Höllenstrafen:* ThQschr 112 (1931) 330-349, proposes a singular theory in which the fire of hell is neither material nor metaphorical from sadness because of sins; see on this, A. Deneffe: Schol 7 (1932) 620. Likewise Rondet, *loc.cit.*, 407-415; Id., *Les peines de l'enfer:* CitNouv (1944) 328-338, following M. Blondel (*L'action,* ed. 1935-1936), proposes a notion of fire—but which he wants to be rejected, if the fire of hell is found to destroy the *reality*—which does not seem to save a material fire tormenting both the body and in a sharp manner the spirit.

7. Thus, v.gr., H. Klee, *Katholische Dogmatik* 2 (Mainz 1845) .436; M.F. Dubois, *Le feu du purgatoire est-il un feu corporel?*: RevClerFr 32 (1902) 282, who is refuted by J. van der Meersch: *ibid.* 33 [1903] 426-428). See Michel, 2215f.2220. W. Breton, O.F.M., *Novissima* (Paris 1933): "it is spiritual like the soul that is punished." Does this author understand it in the obvious sense?

8. Cajetan, *In Evang. S. Mc* 9,43: "The fire of hell is called inextinguishable either because it is perpetual or because (which I prefer to believe) it is of a nature different from the fire that we know... Reasonably it is to be conjectured that just as the worm of the damned is not a natural worm, so also their fire is not a natural fire but both are metaphorical. And the worm is called the intrinsic pain of sense, like an internal biting gnawing away..."

9. F. Hettinger, *Apologie du Christianisme* (vers. J. Lalobe) t.4 (Bar-le-Duc 1870) c.15 p.413. However from that it does not follow that the question about corporeal fire remains free; therefore we are not pleased with what Manyà says, *op.cit.,* 314: "Therefore we do not dare to define something not defined by the Church, but having proposed the various arguments, we leave the answer to the prudent judgment of the reader" (see also 313-320); however, the author did present the arguments later (*Los theologumena ante la critica:* EstFranc 51 [1950] 300), as if by them to say positively nothing about the question of the nature of the fire of hell, but he wanted only to abstain from it. But in the prior place (p.320-323) he proposed the explanation of hellfire as in the created object of sin (v.gr., in riches for the unjust greedy man) always before the eyes of the damned, which is hard to say is not metaphorical.

the pains of hell, whatever they are, have been called "fire" as a way of speaking; for, as fire produces pain greater than anything else, so in the evaluation of the very severe pains of hell there is no image more apt to get some idea of hell. Hence the pastor asks whether it is permitted to leave penitents in this opinion, and whether he can give them absolution. And the pastor says that this does not concern just the opinion of one individual, but is the opinion generally in a country where it is usually said: persuade only children, if you can, that there is fire in hell." Response: "Penitents with this view must be diligently instructed, and the obstinate must not be absolved."[10]

From this document, those faithful do not necessarily deny that in hell there is *extrinsic* punishment for the damned, in fact they do not seem to deny that it is *material,* but only that it is not fire and therefore that it is called fire metaphorically. However, it is said that they are to be instructed (evidently, about the *reality* of fire as here opposed to *metaphorical fire*, that is, as extrinsic and material and true fire) and the obstinate (i.e., those denying that reality) are not to be absolved. That this is the meaning of the response is clear from the words themselves; moreover they could not be understood *prudently* in any other way by the pastor to whom they were sent. Hence, even though this decision is disciplinary and not universal, it is commonly used by theologians for real fire *in the proper sense,* and as manifesting the traditional meaning.[11]

205. The Church has defined nothing about this matter. But from her doctrine it is certain (see n.148: D 856-858, 1002, 1305, etc.) that there is in hell, besides the privative pain or the pain of loss, another *positive* pain or the pain of sense, which therefore is *extrinsic* and therefore not spiritual but *material.* The following speak: Pelagius I (D 160 [ed. 28] about "the eternal fires and the infernal flames," Innocent IV (D 839) about "the flames of everlasting hell," and that punishment is called by Innocent III (D 780) "the torment of eternal hell," as the punishment of actual sin, in opposition to the deprivation of glory as the punishment of original sin." Therefore these words signify real fire in the obvious sense. *The Council of Lyons II* (D 856-858; see *The Council of Florence* D 1305) speaks about "different punishments" with which those dying with grave personal sin or in original sin only are punished. Benedict XII (D 1002) says that sinners are tormented "with the pains of hell," in opposition to those who are rewarded with glory.

But these indicate in the obvious sense a punishment *extrinsic* to the damned, espe-

10. B. Ojetti, S.J., *Synopsis rerum moralium et iuris pontificii* 2[3] (Rome 1911) at the word *Infernus* n.2471.

11. Mendive, *De Deo Consummatore* n.140; Tanquerey, 3 n.1160; ThPrakQschr 44 (1891) 226; Et 50 (1890) 309f.; Richard, 91; Bernard, 1383; Michel, *Les mystères...* 60. Other explanations of this decision, as being proposed in a too subtle manner, it seems should be rejected (see H. Lange: Schol 6 [1951] 89f.; Doms, *loc. cit.,* 323, note 3; Dubois, *loc.cit.,* 282, note 1.

cially since they are speaking: about pains in the plural, about a punishment contrasted with the pain of loss. But that punishment, since from what was said above cannot be spiritual, is *material.* This in the meaning of the Church is *fire*, as is clear mainly from the word *fire,* especially since the Church herself elsewhere expressly mentions "eternal fire" (*Athanasian Creed,* D 76).

206. Theological note. *Certain in theology,* from the *common* consent of the Fathers, theologians and Christian people, so that the contrary is *at least temerarious.*

Thus all theologians speak about this thesis more or less in this way, as these examples show. St. Thomas: "Catholic faith teaches" (*Quodl.* 3 a.23). Hugo of St. Victor: "Truly it is proved by the testimony and authority of the sacred writings and of Catholic truth." Suarez: "It is certain with the certitude of faith."[12]

Beraza calls it "a doctrine in the Church so generally received that it cannot be denied without a note of being temerarious." Billot: "It is an opinion so received in the Church that whoever thinks the opposite cannot escape at least the note of being temerarious." Toledo: "To assert the opposite is an error." Estius: It is common and so ecclesiastical "that it should not be resisted." Mendive calls it "a common opinion at least morally certain... so that it is temerarious to depart from it." Lercher: "It is a traditional doctrine, common, which cannot safely be denied." Heris: It is so taught ordinarily in the Church by the unanimous consent of theologians that the contrary is at least temerarious; Michel agrees with him.[13]

But lest we present too many testimonies, let it suffice to quote these two syntheses. Pattuzzi: "But this opinion (that the fire is metaphorical) some term heretical, others proximate to heresy but everyone at least erroneous and quite temerarious." Jungmann: "As a whole, Catholic theologians agree... having considered the sources of the faith, that it is certain that the fire of hell must be understood in a non-metaphorical sense." Lennerz: "Therefore that in which they agree is that the opinion denying the reality of the fire is at least temerarious; indeed the consensus of the Father and theologians seems, at least for the time after the resurrection, to demand a more severe note."[14]

207. Proof from Holy Scripture. It mentions often the fire of hell. But that fire is real. Therefore.

The major: In the N.T. fire is mentioned at least twenty-three times. Matt. 3:12: *The chaff he will burn with unquenchable fire;* 5:22: *He shall be*

12. Hugo of St. Victor, *De sacr.* 2,16 c.3: ML 176,584; Suarez, 8,12,9; Siuri, tr.20,2 n.29; see n. 32; P. Gasparri, *Catechismus Catholicus* (Rome 1933) p.484: "It is theologically certain, although it is not a matter of faith, that the fire with which the damned in hell are tormented is real and corporeal fire, not metaphorical...."
13. Beraza, n.1164; Billot, *De novissimis* th.4 § 2; Toledo, *In 1* q. 64 a.3; Estius, *In 4* d.44 § 12; Mendive, *ibid.,*; Lercher, 4,2[3] n.902; Heris, *loc.cit.,* 257; Michel, *Les mystères...* 56f.59; Id., *Témérité ou absurdité au sujet du feu de l'enfer?:* AmCl 66 (1956) 156.
14. Pattuzzi, *op.cit.,* 1.2 c.7 n.1; Jungmann, n. 28; Lennerz, n.124. Michel cites the censures of several theologians on this matter, *Feu...*: DTC 5,2208-2212.2218; Martínez, 62-77.

liable to the hell of fire; 13:42: *They will throw them into the furnace of fire;* 18:8: *Than... to be thrown into the eternal fire;* 25:41: *Depart from me... into the eternal fire.* Mark 9:42-49: *Than to go into hell, to the unquenchable fire...* Luke 16:24: *I am in anguish in this flame.* John 15:6: *They are thrown into the fire and burned.* 2 Thess. 1:8: *In flaming fire, inflicting vengeance.* Rev. 14:10f.: *He shall be tormented with fire and brimstone...* (See Matt. 7:19; 13:40.50; 18:9; Heb. 10:27; 2 Pet. 2:6; 3:7; Jude 7,23; Rev. 19:20; 20:9,14f.).

The minor: 1) *From the frequency of the use of the word "fire" and of other words related to it:* that is, it is used in every kind of writing—historical, familial, dogmatic, judicial, prophetic, poetic, almost always when it concerns the pains of hell, and indeed whether by the use of words to express the idea of fire as *real* or inasmuch as they attribute to it both the properties and the effects of real fire. But in the words most commonly used the real meaning is more frequent than the metaphorical, since men are not accustomed to speak metaphorically, per se and much less everywhere and always, about things which they wish to point to as real. Therefore in this case the real meaning should be supposed, since a solid reason for the metaphorical meaning is nowhere indicated either from the context or from the nature of the matter or from the parallel passages.

Rather, the fact is that the reason for such a metaphor is never explained either by a direct declaration of a metaphorical meaning or indirectly by some other indication. Thus, if fire in Scripture were intended for man alone, and then only after the resurrection, everyone would think that that fire is *real.*

2) *Elsewhere a metaphorical meaning is excluded by the nature of the matter,* for: a) It concerns fire tormenting bodies. Matt. 5:29f.: *It is better that you lose one of your members than that your whole body be thrown into hell* (see Matt. 10:28; 18:9; Mark 9:42-49).

b) The fire of hell is compared with the fire of Sodom. Jude 6: *Just as Sodom...and the surrounding cities...serve as an example by undergoing a punishment of eternal fire* (see 2 Pet. 2:6). Likewise, when it is called "Gehenna" or "the fire of Gehenna" (Matt. 5:22.29; Luke 12:5, etc.) it is being compared implicitly with the fire with which in that valley (Hinnom) children were consumed by fire in the worship of Moloch.[15]

c) Parables are explained directly doubtless with the proper terms. But the parable of the weeds (Matt. 13:30-42): *At the harvest time I will tell the reapers, Gather the weeds first and bind them in bundles to be burned,* is

15. See Knabenbauer, *commentarius in Isaiam prophetam* 1 (Paris 1922) 606-608 (Isa. 30:33); 631 (Isa.33:14); Spicq, *loc.cit.,* 3,5.

explained in this way: *Just as the weeds are gathered an burned with fire, so will it be at the end of the age. The Son of man will send his angels, and they will gather out of his kingdom all causes of sin and all evildoers, and throw them into the furnace of fire.*

d) In the words said to the wicked at the last judgment (Matt. 25:41: *Depart from me... into the eternal fire,* fire appears as *something extrinsic* to which the damned man is sent, but no one is said to be sent into *subjective* fire, and therefore it is *something subsisting in itself* and distinct from the damned person and his sufferings; in fact, it is something prepared, not directly for condemned men, but for the demons and therefore also *before men are damned.*

Furthermore, the words of a judicial sentence, especially if it concerns a punishment, must be certain, unequivocal, and therefore they are thought to be taken per se and in their proper sense, unless a clear reason indicates otherwise.

208. Proof from tradition. A. "There cannot be any doubt," says Pesch, "but that the Fathers by a wide margin taught that the fire of hell is material." And Huarte: "Among them it is one and the same thing to speak about hell and about the torment of fire to be suffered there by the damned."[16] Therefore, they mention real fire in various ways.

a) *They compare it with the fire of martyrdom. The martyrdom of St. Polycarp* (R 78): "The fire of their savage torturers was cool to them, for they kept before their eyes the escape from eternal fire." *Letter to Diognetus* (R 100): "... You will admire those who, for the sake of what is right, bear the temporal fire..., when you come to know that (eternal) fire."

b) *They compare it with lightning and with the fire of the mountains.* Minucius Felix (R 273): "...As the fiery flashes of lightning strike the bodies without consuming them, as the fires of Etna, and Vesuvius... burn without being exhausted, so that avenging fire... is sustained by the never ending mangling of their bodies." Tertullian (R 284, 317).

c) *They describe it in terms generally applied to earthly fire.* St. Cyprian (R 560): "An ever burning Gehenna and a devouring punishment of lively flames will consume the condemned." St. Basil (R 958): "I think that the fire, which was prepared for the punishment of the devil, will be separated by the voice of the Lord; and since there are two faculties of the fire, one burning and the other illuminating...."

d) *They say that it torments bodies.* Lactantius (R 646): "Because they committed sins in their bodies they will be clothed again with the flesh so

16. Pesch, 9 n.658; Huarte, n.612. See Petavius, *loc.cit.*, 3,5.

that they can be punished in their bodies; and... that flesh... will be permanent in eternity, so that it can satisfy... the everlasting fire, whose nature is different from our fire... Without any... injury to the bodies it will only burn and afflict them with the sense of pain." St. Cyril of Jerusalem (R 837): "...A sinner... shall receive an eternal body... that he may burn eternally in fire, nor ever be consumed." Thus also in almost the same vein, St. Hilary (R 855).

e) *They compare it with the fire of Sodom.* St. Gregory Naz. (R 1013): "I know a fire... avenging, either that fire of Sodom which he pours down on all sinners...."

f) *They ask how a spirit is able to burn.* St. Augustine (R 1774): "For why may we not assert that even immaterial spirits may, in some extraordinary way, yet really be pained by the punishment of material fire...." St. Gregory the Great (R 2320): "If the devil and his angels, since they are immaterial, are tormented with material fire, why is it extraordinary if souls, even before they receive bodies, can experience bodily torments?"

g) *They say that it is corporeal.* St. Gregory the Great (ibid.). St. Augustine (R 1774): "But that hell... will be material fire, and will torment the bodies of the damned."[17]

209. B. However some Fathers are cited as favoring metaphorical fire or who seem to have had doubts about it; but there were very few and therefore they could not weaken the consent of tradition, in fact they speak with unclear words, and elsewhere indicate in quite clear words that the fire is material.

a) St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1065) teaches corporeal fire, proving the future resurrection or from the fact that, according to Scripture, "just punishments are applied to the condemned—fire and darkness and the worm; all these are the punishments of composite and material bodies." However, elsewhere he says (R 1036): "Even if some one of the punishments in that other world be named in terms that are well known here, the distinction is still not small. When you hear the word fire, you have been taught to think of a fire other then the fire we see... For that fire is never quenched, whereas experience has discovered many ways of quenching our fire; and there is a great difference between a fire which can be extinguished, and one that does not admit of extinction."

But these words, as is obvious, do not deny clearly that the fire is real, but only that it is not like ours, since ours is extinguished, whereas that is inextinguishable.

b) St. Ambrose presents the fire of hell as real, saying: "It is a lake of burning fire":

17. Therefore what he had written (*De Gen ad litt* 12 c.32 n.61: ML 34,481): "It is therefore totally the substance of lower things; but I think it is spiritual, not corporeal," pertain without doubt to what he said later, when he was reconsidering that work, that he "posited it as still an investigation" (*Retract.* 2,24,1: ML 32,640); and this is evident from other places (R 1774; *In Ps* 49 n.7: ML 36,569), where he then clarified those investigations. Moreover, in the objected passage, as is clear from the whole disputation, St. Augustine there calls it something spiritual, which is a quasi medium between corporal and intellectual. However, the holy Doctor does not condemn the opinion of metaphorical fire as a heresy or error (*De civ. Dei* 21,9,2: ML 41,723).

"That perpetual fire, that fire burning without end."

But elsewhere he seems to deny that the flames of hell are material (D 1306): "It is not a perpetual fire of flaming bodies, nor is the worm corporeal. But these are placed so, because just as from much overeating fevers and worms are the result..., so also if someone does not eliminate his sins... but as it were acquires the indigestion of his crimes, he will be burned with real fire and will be consumed by his worms... It is the sadness because of one's sins which produces that fire."

But he says this only once and also as depending on Origen. Therefore his mind is for the most part doubtful.[18]

c) St. Jerome rejects (R 1370) the metaphorical fire of Origen (see R 463): "There are several who say that there will not be future punishments for sins nor torments imposed from the outside, but that sin itself and the awareness of the crime will be the punishment...."

But if elsewhere he seems to speak about metaphorical fire, or merely reports the mind of Origen on this matter, or merely quotes something from him, but as false, or saying: "the fire that is not extinguished is understood by many as the awareness of sins," it must not be thought that he is approving the opinion of Origen, even if there he does not reprehend him; this is especially so since immediately from Matt. 22:13 (about hands, and feet, etc.) he rather attacks him for suggesting an airy body after the resurrection.[19]

d) St. John Damascene does not clearly deny that the fire is material, but only that it is not like ours, since he speaks in an unsuitable way in order to designate metaphorical fire (R 2376): "The devil...wicked... men will be handed over to eternal fire; to a fire, I say, not like our material fire, but such as God knows." Hence he says that it is burning, but not consuming. However elsewhere he seems to understand fire metaphorically as a worm.[20]

210. Theological reasoning. Reason, knowing from revelation that there is in hell both fire and the tormenting of bodies, deduces from its way of speaking that the fire is really distinct from the damned and something existing per se; but not understanding a *spiritual intellectual* being, such as a spiritual being existing per se must be that is suitably ordained to torment bodies, it concludes that the fire is material.

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18. *Enarr. In ps.36* n.26: ML 14,981; *Expos. In ps.118* serm.21,8: ML 15,1505. See much on this in Niederhuber, *op.cit.*, 104-109, who proves that the holy Doctor absolutely taught *material* fire.
19. St. Jerome, *Apol. Advers. lib. Rufini* 2,7: ML 23,429; *Ep. 124* n.7: ML 22,1065; *In Isa* 18 c.66 v.24: ML 24,676f. See Petavius, 3,5,2. According to O'Connell (*op.cit.*, 144-150) the holy Doctor, without expressly interpreting the fire as real, admits, besides the sting of conscience, a punishment *from outside*, but he does not clearly determine its nature. Bardy, *Les Pères...* 154f., 162-164, 159-162, says that Clement of Alexandria follows Origen, that there is a doubt about St. Gregory of Nyssa, and he does not try to exclude St. Jerome completely (after the year 410).
20. St. John Damascene, *Hom. in Sabb.Sanctum* 35: MG 96,640; *Dial. contra Manichaeos* 36,75: MG 94,1541.1573. See S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 97, a. 5 ad 1.

Likewise it is established suitably that in hell there is a *material* punishment of sense (not exactly a punishment of fire) in this way: Punishment is proportioned to the crime. But in the crime there is aversion from God and conversion to creatures, and also man sins constantly in soul and body, so that the body often is the cause of sin and always in some way an instrument of sin. Therefore sin is fittingly punished, as aversion from God by the pain of loss, as conversion to creatures by the pain of sense and indeed by a material pain whereby also the body, being incapable of the pain of loss, can be affected.

211. Objections. "To all the objections which... are made against the literal meaning of Scripture regarding this question," says Suarez, "it can be responded with one word to someone who denies the parity of reason in all the examples that are proposed: both because in no other matter are there so many statements of Scripture, nor such great consensus of the Fathers, of theologians and of all the faithful, and also because neither the circumstances of the wording in the various places of Scripture, nor the reasons or conjectures, which are deduced from them, so indicate the literal meaning according to the propriety of language in other things as they do with regard to fire."[21]

Indeed, for someone to be able to object to the thesis, it is required that fire is taken there metaphorically, not in just any way but in the sense of suffering of the mind coming from *an internal moral cause,* v.gr., from the remorse of conscience. But this use of the word "fire" has not been proved.

1. Mark 9:43.48: *...Where their worm does not die, and the fire is not quenched.* Here fire and worm are understood in the same way. But worm is taken metaphorically. Therefore also the fire.

I distinguish the major. Fire is taken in the same way as the worm, that is, as a torment imposed together with the worm, *conceded;* of torment of the same kind as the worm, *denied.*

The word "worm," per se already understood as a metaphor for the remorse of conscience, is used only once, while the word "fire," or other words related to it, unknown as a metaphor for *the suffering of the mind,* is used in Scripture very often and indeed almost always when it has to do with hell, without any indication of a metaphorical meaning. Moreover, if only one text were about fire, it would be certain that there is *torment* in hell, but not for certain the torment of *fire.* However, some of the older authors understand the word "worm" in the proper sense, as we have already seen (n. 182).

2. The word "fire" often is used in Scripture metaphorically in order to express tribulations of the mind. Ps. 17:3: *You have tested me with fire and no wickedness has been found in me* (see Ps. 66:10; Sir. 2:5). Therefore also when it concerns the fire of hell.

I distinguish the major. Fire is often used in Scripture metaphorically in some way, *conceded;* in the strict sense, *denied.*

In those places the word "fire" is taken metaphorically, not for tribulation considered *passively* or also for the suffering of the *mind* from an internal cause, but for tribulation considered *actively* or also as imposed *from the outside* and as having great

21. Suarez, 8,12,20. See Catharinus, *loc.cit.*

purgative power, v.gr., from some infirmity or other calamity of the mind or the body. But, although sometimes in those places the word "fire" is meant metaphorically, it does not follow that it is always so understood, v.gr., also when it has to do with the fire of hell. Moreover, in the texts cited in the objection the metaphorical meaning is manifest.

N.B. In the words of Mark 9:49: *For every one will be salted with fire,* which are quite obscure and therefore cannot suitably be used to object to the thesis, the word "fire" seems to be understood metaphorically for tribulation taken *actively*, as above, whereby, wishing to escape from hell, it is necessary to be cleansed of evil desires and in this way be made worthy before God, just as in Lev. 2:13 all the victims were to be seasoned with salt. That is so, unless you prefer with others, like Billot and Tanquerey, to think that fire in this text is to be understood properly.[22]

212. 3. Fire prepared for pure spirits, like the demons (Matt. 25:41), cannot be material. But that fire is the fire of hell. Therefore here it cannot be material.

I distinguish the major. It cannot be a material suffering imposed on spirits by fire, *conceded;* the fire itself, *I subdistinguish:* having considered its natural proportion, *conceded;* having considered the decree of God, *denied.*

The suffering of the mind cannot not be spiritual; but from that it does not follow that it cannot be produced by a material cause as an instrument of God. Indeed "it is... fitting punishment for a sinning rational nature that, being bound in some way, it should be made subject to things below itself, namely, bodily things" (S.Th., 4 CG 90).

Objector insists. In the same place (Matt. 25:41.46), eternal fire is opposed to eternal life as the greatest evil to the greatest good. But the greatest evil is the deprivation of God. Therefore eternal fire is the deprivation of God.

I distinguish the major. Fire taken comprehensively or together with the pain of loss is opposed to eternal life as the greatest evil to the greatest good, *conceded;* taken distinct from the other punishments, *denied.*

This does not hinder the fact that there and in other places by the word "fire" the pain of sense and the pain of loss, as inseparably connected with each other, are expressed. And de facto in Scripture by the word "fire" often any kind of punishment is meant (S.Th., *In 2* d.33 q.2 a. 1 ad 1; *Suppl.* q. 97, a. 1 ad 1). But here the pain of sense (or the lesser evil) by the words "into fire..." taken exclusively is expressed, but at the same time as the pain of loss (or the greatest evil) is sufficiently indicated by the words "depart from me."

Objector insists again. In the same place (Matt. 24:46), the justified are said to go into eternal life, but this is not something extrinsic to them. Therefore neither is fire something extrinsic to the damned.

I distinguish the major. Eternal life taken *subjectively* as the vital possession of the beatifying object is not something extrinsic to justified men, *conceded;* taken *objectively* or as connoting the object of beatitude, or also for this itself, or as it were for the place of eternal life, *denied.*

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22. Zorell, see ἁλίζω, 65; Tanquerey, 3 n.1160; Billot, thes.4 § 2. See Lagrange, Évangile selon Saint Marc (Paris 1929) 253f.

As is clear, eternal life can be taken objectively for the object itself of beatitude or at least as signifying that object, which of course is really distinct from the beatified person and so extrinsic to him, or perhaps it is taken for the place of beatitude and therefore it is also extrinsic to the beatified person. But, even if in this case it were taken merely subjectively or as the possession of the object, still a parity would be lacking between the words "they will go into eternal life" and the words "they will go into eternal fire," as is obvious from what was said above in the proof.

213. 4. Luke 16:22-31: The reveller is introduced as raising his eyes, calling out, speaking, indeed, although he is insistent, beseeching eternal salvation for his brothers; all of these things are metaphorical. Therefore also his words "I am in anguish in this flame" are metaphorical.

I deny the consequent. This parable, as clearly doctrinal, shows at least that there is punishment in hell; in fact, there are corporal punishments, since these especially and in the obvious sense are indicated by it, lest otherwise almost necessarily the hearers would be led into error. Therefore, Christ wishes to describe vividly the torments of the damned after the resurrection, which must be endured even in their bodies.

Furthermore, from the metaphorical use of the word "fire" in this place, it could not rightly be deduced that the word is also used metaphorically in texts that are not parables.

5. The fire of hell works on spirits. But material fire cannot work on spirits. Therefore the fire of hell is not material.

I distinguish the major. The fire of hell works on spirits as a principal cause, or by its own power, *denied;* as an instrumental cause, *I subdistinguish:* purely natural, *denied;* elevated preternaturally, *conceded.*

The fire of hell cannot work on spirits as a principal cause or by a power proportioned to itself. But it can work with a power given to it preternaturally by God. Surely, if a soul can suffer from material things because it is united with a body, it should not be held as impossible that it can likewise suffer when it is separated from the body.

214. Scholium 1. *On the way whereby material fire affects spirits.* Although the question is very obscure about the way in which the fire of hell is not extinguished or consumed, much more obscure is the other question about the way in which material fire torments pure spirits and separated souls. "We are raising a questions," says Siuri, "that is most difficult among difficult questions."[23] Hence there are many opinions about this. Therefore, setting aside the view of those who say that "it must be admitted...that it cannot be said by us... what fire can do to a spirit"[24] and setting aside some other ancient

23. Siuri, 21,2,1; Bellarmine (*De purgat.* 2,12) says about the fire of purgatory: "The truest opinion is that it cannot be known in this life how bodily fire works on the immaterial soul." St. Augustine (R 1774): "Why may we not assert that even immaterial spirits may, in some extraordinary way, yet really be pained by the punishment of material fire?"; see *De civ. Dei* 20,16: ML 41,682.

24. This opinion is mentioned by Suarez 8,14,3. See Vázquez, *In 1* disp.243 c.6; Petavius 3,5,11: "Therefore the theologians work very hard at this, while what cannot be investigated they search for eagerly with inexhaustible curiosity."

views generally rejected,[25] some of the more or less probable opinions will be proposed; they have been reduced to four headings, since even in these there is no small amount of variety.

a) Spirits are tormented by fire not as burning, but as detaining or by way of *binding* them to something material, inasmuch as in this way they know that they are tied to something inferior; they see the fire as injurious to them, since it restricts them, and they are hindered from being able to act where and as they wish. This binding affects their intellect and will rather than the substance of a spirit. Thus St. Thomas and other Thomists.

Without doubt St. Bonaventure does not differ much from the above view, adding that the damned man chained by fire conceives horror at his heat; and Scotus does not differ much, according to whom from the definitive sentence of God the spirit, against his own will, is both chained to fire and his intellect is changed so that he must concentrate on the fire rather than be able to consider other things.[26]

What should be said about this? This chaining, as something not belonging to fire naturally but belonging to it as an instrument elevated by God, is in conformity with the words of Scripture (2 Pet. 2:4; Jude 6; Rev. 20:1-3; Isa. 24:21f.; see Tob. 8:3) and of the Fathers (St. Augustine, R 1774; St. Gregory the Great, R 2320). But if the pain of fire were in it alone, it would be the same for all, and the spirit, being united only to the fire, would be able to go where he wished and to act as he wished. If the fire acts as detaining, not as burning, why do the sources constantly attribute this binding precisely to the fire, which by its nature does not bind, and not to some other material thing, as an apt prison for a spirit? Fire would seem to be more suitable for a man than for a devil, since the man, besides the chaining, would suffer the burning in his body and by means of the body also in his soul.

b) Therefore Suarez, besides the chaining, argued that a certain *physical* quality is produced by the fire in the spirits; since it makes them filthy and deformed, it produces pain in them in the purely spiritual order and therefore the pain is greater according as spiritual beings surpass material. Thus others like Arriaga[27] follow this opinion.

But nothing can be thought to render the devil more deformed than his obstinate malice. Moreover, what is the nature of that *physical* quality produced in a spirit by that *material* fire?

215. c) Lessius holds that the fire is elevated by God, just as the intellect is elevated for the vision of God, to burn spirits, not otherwise than fire, by means of the body, burns the soul united to it. Thus also many authors like Siuri, A Lapide, Lugo, Toledo, Petavius, etc.; Billuart and the Thomists, like Soto, whom he says agree with his opin-

25. See Beraza, n. 1184.

26. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 79, a. 3; 4 CG 90; *De ver.* 26, a. 1; Cajetan, *Or. coram Iul. II.* Opusc. T.3; Gonet, *De ang.* D.14 a.2; Garrigou-Lagrange, *op.cit.*, 160f.; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.44 p.2 a.3 q.2; Scotus, *In 4* d.44 p.2. According to D. Soto (*In 4* d.50 a.unica a.2), to the binding is added sadness or suffering which is perceived by the soul united to the body which is burned. Many Thomists hold this view, according to Billuart (*De ang.* Diss.6 a.3 § 2 pct.2); he sees no difficulty with this opinion, although it is uncertain and it is never mentioned by St. Thomas.

27. Suarez, 8,14,41ff.; Arriaga, *De ang.* D.26 s.8.

ion, does not seem to differ from them.[28]

But what is the nature of that elevated fire? For the suffering produced in spirits is not the action itself of the fire, but the subjective suffering resulting from it.

d) Schmid in this matter proceeds in the same way, while, considering the other opinions as insufficient, he proposes one not as positively possible, but as negatively possible or inasmuch as its impossibility cannot be shown, that is, that a spirit can suffer from a body, given a special intervention of God, a truly sensible pain that is at the same time most intense and therefore similar to the pain of burning.

Hence "demons in punishment for their malice suffer the real pain of burning, and this is by fire as a physical instrument of divine punishment." For, as spirits by their locomotive power, although limited, can act on bodies, so bodies can act on them, and so torment them severely, not indeed naturally, unless the spirits agree, but certainly as instruments of God which affect them preternaturally.

This opinion, proposed in this way negatively, is considered by Pesch to be probable, since it has not been proved that sensible pain in a spirit is absolutely repugnant.

Gutberlet agrees with it, but explains it further and more subtly, as if the fire of hell consists of simple material elements that are sufficiently homogeneous with a created spirit and subject to chaotic and very rapid vibrations, whereby through the influx of God they affect a spirit and in this way torment him.[29]

Therefore these opinions, not considering the precise differences of their concepts, are agreed on this: that material fire is elevated by God to be able to affect a spirit; but they do not solve the question positively how that action can be explained.

216. 6. In a matter so obscure "whoever wants to avoid multiplying difficulties," says Palmieri, can be satisfied with the opinion of St. Thomas, at least because of his authority. This opinion, compared with the serious difficulty of any other, has great probability, and scholastic philosophy seems not to have come up with anything better, when it considers the pain inflicted on a spirit. Today other thinkers like Huarte and Verhaar have embraced this opinion.[30]

We prefer to say with Lessius, although we do not explain the matter positively, that material fire as an instrument of God torments spirits by a true immediate physical action on them. For if the soul united to the body can suffer from fire, there is nothing to prevent a spirit from suffering directly from fire, provided that God elevates it.

217. Scholium 2. *On the place of hell.* Since the sources always seem to speak about hell, not merely as a state, but also as the *place* of the damned (Matt. 25:41f.; Luke 16:27f.; Acts 1:24f., etc.), it cannot be denied that some place is destined for their punishment. Thus John XXII (D 926a): "The Roman Church teaches that the souls... of those who die in mortal sin or with original sin only descend immediately into hell; to be punished, though, with different pains and in different places."

28. Lessius, 13 c.30 n.217ff.; Siuri, 21 c.4f.; A Lapide, *In Eccli* 7,19; Toledo, *In 1* q.64 a.3 concl.2; Petavius, 3,5,12f.; Billuart, *loc.cit.;* Soto, *loc.cit.*

29. F. Schmid, *Quaestiones selectae* (Paderborn 1891) q.3; Gutberlet, *loc.cit.,* 385-402. See Pesch, 9 n.665.

30. Palmieri, § 55 n.11; Huarte, n. 617; Van Noort-Verhaar, n.52.

But *where is hell?* The Church has not defined anything about this. Generally the Fathers and theologians locate it in the lower parts of the earth, v.gr., St. Augustine, St. Gregory the Great, St. Thomas (*Suppl.* q. 97, a. 7), Toledo (he considers it a matter of faith), Suarez, Lessius, Siuri, Jungmann, etc. Palmieri thinks that this is more probable from the general sense of men and especially of the Jews, according to whom the wicked descend into *Sheol* (Isa. 14:9; see Num. 16:29-34), and from the words of Christ when he speaks about the rich reveller being buried in hell (Luke 16:23). Against this opinion, which Pohle-Gierens defends from ridicule, nothing of importance from theology or natural science can be objected, as Lercher points out.[31]

218. Scholium 3. *Whether all the damned are in hell.* Concerning the souls of damned men, there is no reason for saying that they sometimes move around outside of hell. However, not all the devils, even though they were damned immediately after their fall (2 Pet. 2:4; Jude 6), are in hell, but at least some of them travel around the earth and tempt men (1 Pet. 5:8f.; Matt. 8:28; 15:22; Eph. 2:2; 6:12). Surely since the angels in reference to men are ministers of God, just as the good angels are assigned to protect men, so it is permitted to the bad angels to harass men to exercise them in virtue (S.Th. I, q. 64, a. 4).

31. St. Augustine, *Retract.* 1.2 c.24 n.2: ML 32,640; see *De civ. Dei* 20,16: ML 41,682; St. Gregory the Great, *Dial.* 1,4 c.42: ML 77,400f.; Toledo, *In 1* q.64 a.4; Suarez, 8,16 n.17-21; Lessius, 13,24 n.149; Siuri, 18,2; Jungmann, n.36, note 1; Palmieri, § 65; Pohle-Gierens, 3 p.669; Lercher, n. 594.

CHAPTER V

On purgatory

219. God made man to serve God alone and to possess Him by intellect and will forever. That is the one thing he desired per se in the creation of man. But since he de facto was going to sin, he prepared hell for those who die in the state of mortal sin. Hence he also willed *per accidens* the damnation of sinners.

But since it could happen that some would die in the state of grace, but so hindered by the stain of sins that they could not obtain glory, what then? God instituted purgatory where those souls would be cleansed of their stains, not however with meritorious works but with purely penal ones. God also willed *per accidens* this penal destiny.

Therefore it also concerns the theologian that he also carefully consider purgatory, whether as it comes from a provident God or as it can happen to a justified man, so that he may investigate its existence and nature and duration.

In addition to the authors already mentioned at the beginning of this treatise, the following can be consulted, from among the many who have written about purgatory:

S.Th., *In 4* d.21 q.1; *Suppl.* q. 71; Gerster A Zeil, *Purgatorium iuxta doctrinam Seraphini Doctoris S.Bonaventurae* (Turin 1932); St. R. Bellarmine, *De Ecclesia quae est in purgatorio:* see *Opera omnia* 2 (Naples 1857) 351-414; Suarez, *De paenitentia* d.45-48.53; B. Bartmann, *Das Fegfeuer. Ein christliches Trostbuch* (Paderborn 1830); St. Catherine of Genoa, *Trattato del Purgatorio* (Genoa 1929); Tito de Ottone, O.M.Cap., *Fede e pietà nel "Trattato del purgatorio" di Santa Catarina de Genova:* CollatFranc (1939) 5-33, 153-163; Michel, *Purgatoire:* DTC 13,1163-1326; H. Lesetre, *Purgatoire:* DB 5,875-879; R. Hindringer, *Fegfeuer:* LTK 3,979-982; E.J. Hanna, *Purgatory:* CE 12,575-582; P. Bernard, *Purgatoire:* DAFC 4,496-528; F.X. Schouppe, S.J., *Le dogme du purgatoire, illustré par des faits et des révélations particulières* (Brussels 1888); L. Rouzig, *Le purgatoire. Pour nos morts et avec nos morts* (Paris 1918); L. Paré, S.J., *Les mystères de l'au-de-la: Que penser du purgatoire?* (Tournai 1936); J.B. McGlaughlin, O.S.B., *Purgatory of the Church Suffering* (New York 1929); P.G. Keppler, *Las benditas almas del Purgatorio,* vers. M. Carceller, S.J. (Madrid 1930); Jugie, *Le purgatoire et les movens de l'éviter, ou le ciel tout de suite après la mort* (Paris 1940); Journet, *Le purgatoire* (Liège 1932); L. Birot, *Les grands dogmes chrétiens: Le purgatoire...* (Marseille 1927); J.A. Chollet, *Nos morts. Au purgatoire, au*

ciel (Paris 1909); Id., *Au purgatoire les âmes, souffrent, jouissent, prient pour nous* (Paris 1904); Id., *La psychologie du purgatoire* (Paris 1924); C. Falletti, *Nuestros difuntos y el purgatorio,* trans. J. Cassou (Barcelona 1939); Rondet, *Le purgatoire* (Paris 1948); F. Potenza, *Il purgatorio* (Vicenza 1948); P. Louvet-G.Rossi, *Il purgatorio secondo le rivelazione dei Santi* (Turin 1946).

ARTICLE I

ON THE EXISTENCE OF PURGATORY AND ON SUFFRAGES

Thesis 11. The souls of the just dying with the stain of sins are cleansed by punishments in purgatory before they enter into heaven. But they can be helped by the suffrages of the faithful.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 72; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.45 a.1-2; Suarez, *loc.cit.,* d.45 s.1; d.48 s.1; Billot, th.5; Beraza, n.1192-1254.1263; J. Lugo, *De sacramento paenitentiae* d.26-27 (Paris 1868).

220. Connection. Supernatural beatitude, as the last end of man, is thought to be obtained by all after the pilgrim state of this life, unless they are hindered from entering it by either original sin or personal grave sin. Therefore it is not proved expressly by us that it is obtained by all the justified, although it is sufficiently proved by the same arguments by which it is shown that those dying in mortal sin are excluded from it. But since it can happen that the justified die with the stain of sins, that is, either with the temporal punishment still to be paid (D 838, 1543, 1580) which, obviously, cannot be done in heaven, or with venial sin which, of course, is not opposed to the state of grace but is opposed to glory; so if that is their situation, what happens to them?

This is the question that must now be studied, to which our thesis responds with a twofold assertion. The first one establishes that those souls, before they enter into heaven, must be cleansed by punishment; but the second asserts that those souls do not necessarily pay that penalty on their own, even though the whole must be paid, but that they can be alleviated in it by the suffrages of the faithful or totally freed from it. In the scholiums below we will handle some other questions that are connected with this twofold assertion.

221. Definition of terms. *The souls of the justified dying* are the souls of those leaving the body in the state of grace and therefore immediately after death destined for heaven.

The stains of sins are: a) The *temporal* punishment owed for forgiven mortal sins or for venial sins not removed before death. b) Perhaps the *guilt* of venial sins not forgiven before death. But since it is not known for certain

whether this guilt is properly forgiven in purgatory, and if that is the case, whether it is formally forgiven in virtue of the punishments or rather in virtue of good acts—this point is not considered directly in the thesis.

Are cleansed by punishments, that is, they are freed from those stains and precisely by suffering. But properly speaking they do not make satisfaction for them, but they are *sufficiently punished,* according to the estimation of divine justice, or they are in a *purely penal* condition, therefore without meriting an increase of glory by a voluntary acceptance of the suffering, thus enduring without any advantage what before they could endure with great merit. But for now we are treating the existence of the punishments, not their nature.

Purgatory is taken here, not as a *place* or for some definite part of space in which the souls to be cleansed are detained, but as a *state,* inasmuch as it is a penal condition of souls, and also continuing until their complete purgation.

The word "purgatory," which is not in Scripture, became common in the West during the 11th century, according to Jugie.[1] But the Greek Fathers mention purgatory, a purgative fire, and use other similar words. Innocent IV asked the Greeks in the year 1254 to call the place of the purgation of souls *purgatory,* according to the traditions (D 838).

Before they enter into heaven. These words are added only for the sake of clarity, so that therefore their assertion, as being very evident, will not be proved explicitly in the thesis.

222. *Suffrage,* which *taken broadly* is any spiritual help given by one Christian for another, and *taken strictly* is the help given by one of the faithful to obtain for another the remission of his temporal punishment; here it is taken in the *strictest sense* or as the help given for the dead souls in purgatory either by the private intercession of individual members of the faithful or by the public authority of the whole Church, in order that the punishment due to them may be remitted totally or at least partially (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 71, a. 1f.).

These helps are: a) Masses, prayers, alms and other acts of piety, which are customarily offered by the faithful for other members of the faithful, according to the norms of the Church (D 856-857, 1304), such as any penal or satisfactory work like fasts, pilgrimages, etc. But the chief one among them is the sacrifice of the altar (D 1743, 1753, 1820).

b) Indulgences (D 1472, 2641f,). Since they are applications of satisfactions and penal works of Christ and the saints, which are in the treasury of the Church, they are not a new kind of suffrage. They are given, not by way of absolution, since the dead, as no longer subject to the Roman Pontiff, cannot be absolved by him, but *by way of suffrage* inasmuch as the Pontiff, as the supreme dispenser, applies to them something from the treasury of satisfactions of the Church.

1. Jugie, *op.cit.*, 4,85. It occurred already in Hildebertus Cenomanensis, *Serm.* 85: ML 171,741.

The faithful mentioned here are children of the Church and also still living on earth, but without any further determination.

Moreover, it is held at least more commonly that the prayers of the angels and of the souls in heaven contribute to the mitigation of their punishments, not by way of merit or satisfaction, but only by way of impetration. Thus the Church prays: "O God... we beseech Thee in Thy mercy to grant that Thy servants and handmaids who have passed out of this life, may partake of everlasting bliss, by the intercession of Blessed Mary ever Virgin and of all Thy saints" (Collect, Third Mass, Nov. 2).

They can be helped, that is, the debt of punishment—which must be paid in full—is remitted necessarily either partially or totally, since in virtue of the suffrages the punishments can be alleviated or taken away completely. But for now both the nature and the conditions of suffrages are not being determined further, on the part of either the deceased or of the one offering the suffrage, that is, their way of operating.

But it should be noted that the two assertions of the thesis, or both the existence of purgatory and the power of suffrages, are explained and proved *together as one,* since they are intimately connected with each other.

223. Adversaries. A. Against purgatory: a) *Waldensians, Albigensians,* according to whom the soul living in heaven was seduced by an evil god and descending to earth it assumed a body, in which it remains until, having been fully purified, it returns to heaven.[2]

b) *Protestants* in the 16th century deny it and do so logically, for, according to them, if a sinner is fully justified by faith, either he believes and so immediately becomes capable of beatitude, or he does not believe and so he must be damned. Therefore, no punishment remains to be endured; for the blood of Christ totally absolves us from that.

In particular, Luther at the beginning (in 1519) held the existence of purgatory as certain, and then, still retaining it, he denied that it could be proved from the canonical books of Scripture (D 1487); in 1530 he published *Retractatio purgatorii* (*Widerruf des Fegfeuers)*; in 1537 in the Schmalcaldic Articles for him it is now a mere mask of the devil.[3] Calvin says that "purgatory is a deadly invention of the devil, which empties the cross of Christ"... "a horrible blasphemy against Christ."[4] Zwingli also denies purgatory.[5] Melanchthon admits medicinal, but not vindictive punishments in the next life.[6]

2. Klee, *Manuel de l'histoire des dogmes chrétiens* (vers. P.H. Mabire) 2 (Paris 1948) 475f.; Vacandard, *loc. cit.;* Christiani, *Vaudois:* DTC 15,2592f.; Vernet, *Albigois:* DTC 1,678. On sects in the middle ages, Bellarmine, *De purg.* 1,2.
3. See Michel, *loc.cit.,* 1264-1267.
4. Calvin, *op. cit.,* 3 n.5 n.6. See also Confessions of reformed faith in Michel, 1270f.
5. Bellarmine, 1.2. Zwingli, *Fidei ratio* (a. 1530) 12: "I believe that the fiction of the fire of purgatory is just as reproachful a thing regarding the gratuitous redemption given by Christ, as it was lucrative for its authors. For if it is necessary to wash away the deserts of our crimes by punishments and torments, then Christ will have died in vain, then grace is worthless."
6. See Bautz, *Das Fegfeuer* p.5-7.

c) *Contemporary Protestants,* especially liberal Protestants, admitting that man can die, without being worthy of hell or immediate glory, but needing some purgation, theorize a state of purgation in which the souls are freely made more perfect by their own actions and they rid themselves of all moral imperfections.[7]

d) *From the Greek-Russian theologians,* while is recent centuries some deny purgatory and others seem hesitant about it, many of those admitting it say that the souls are purified and therefore liberated by the suffrages of the faithful, not by the pains of purgatory, or at least that the latter without the former do not suffice in order to obtain that liberation.[8]

224. B. *Concerning the power of suffrages*: All those denying purgatory: However Luther in 1543 admitted hypothetically the value of prayers for the dead, that is, if they are in a state in which they need help. Among the Protestants admitting it, some deny the power of suffrages; many said that prayers are offered for the dead, but are limited by their own rules.[9] In ancient times Aerius, an Arian, said that they "should not be offered for the sleeping."[10]

225. Doctrine of the Church. a) *Regarding both assertions. The Council of Lyons II* (D 856): "We believe... that if, being truly repentant, they die in charity before having satisfied by worthy fruits of penance for their sins of commission and omission, their souls... are cleansed after death... and to alleviate such penalties the acts of intercession of the living faithful benefit them, namely, the sacrifices of the Mass, prayers, alms, and other works of piety that the faithful are wont to do for the other faithful according to the Church's institutions." The same words are repeated by the *Council of Florence* (D 1304).[11]

The Council of Trent (D 1820): "The Catholic Church... in accordance with Sacred Scripture and the ancient tradition of the Fathers, has taught in the holy councils and most recently in this ecumenical council that there is a purgatory and that the souls detained there are helped by the acts of intercession of the faithful, and especially by the acceptable sacrifice of the Altar. Therefore, this holy council commands the bishops to strive diligently that the sound doctrine of purgatory, handed down by the holy Fathers and the sacred councils, be believed by the faithful and that it be adhered to, taught, and preached everywhere."

This document is directly disciplinary, since it gives a command to the bishops; but indirectly it is also doctrinal, since it indicates the doctrine about purgatory and about the suffrages to be offered by the Church and also as

7. Michel, 1321-1324; H. Michaud, *Objections protestantes contre le purgatoire:* RevApol 66 (1938) 569-575.
8. Jugie, 4 p.137, 143-146; Id., *Purgatoire dans l'Eglise grecorruse après le Concile de Florence:* DTC 13,1326-1352; Gordillo, *op.cit.,* 179-187.
9. Thus Melanchthon did not forbid prayers for the dead, but only without offering Masses for them (*Apolog. Confess. August.* A.24 n.89ff.). See Michel, 1268. According to some prayers should be offered for the dead only privately, or only once or twice; see Bautz, p. 7f.
10. St. Augustine, *De haeres.* 53: ML 42,39f.
11. On Eschatology in this Council, and with respect to the doctrine of the Greeks, see C. Bovee, S.T.L., *Eschatologie op. et Concile de Ferrara-Florence (1438-1439):* SyllExcerpDiss 19 (Louvain 1949) 172-188. On the preceding and on the meaning of its definition, see Candal, *loc.cit.*

something *that must be believed.*

"I steadfastly hold that there is a purgatory and that the souls detained there are helped by the acts of intercession of the faithful" (D 1867).

Almost the same doctrine was taught by the *Council of Lyons I* (D 838) and Leo X (D 1487-1490).

b) *In particular regarding the existence of purgatory.* Benedict XII (D 1000), Clement VI (D 1066-1067), the *Council of Trent* (D 1580).

c) *In particular regarding indulgences.* Sixtus IV (D 1398): "In order to procure the welfare of souls especially during the time when they are more (than ever) in need of the suffrages of others... in virtue of our apostolic authority, we wish, with the treasury of the Church, to come to the assistance of the souls lingering in purgatory... united with Christ by charity... and in the fullness of power...and grant to the extent we can... on behalf of these souls in purgatory who are exposed to fire... they should give during the aforementioned ten-year period a certain sum of money or value for the repair of the church of the Saints... we wish that the same plenary indulgence by way of suffrage be effective for the mitigation and for the benefit of those souls in purgatory for which... they offered the indicated sum of money or value." Leo X (D 1447-1449, 1472); Pius VI (D 2642).

d) *In particular concerning the sacrifice of the Mass. The Council of Trent* (D 1743).

226. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* for both assertions (D 856, 1304).

In particular, *as to indulgences*, the same thing must be said, if they are thought to belong to those other works (by which the faithful earn them) "of piety, which the faithful are wont to do for the other faithful according to the Church's institutions." Otherwise the thesis should be said to be *Catholic doctrine.*

227. Proof from Holy Scripture. 1) *For both assertions.* 2 Macc. 12:36: Since in the tunics of the soldiers killed in the battle against Gorgias sacred tokens pertaining to the idols of Jamnia were found, which the Jewish law forbade them to have, all thought that they had died because of this transgression of the law. Wherefore Judas, *took up a collection to the amount of twelve thousand drachmas of silver, and sent it to Jerusalem to provide for a sin offering. In doing this he acted very well and honorably, taking account of the resurrection. For if he were not expecting that those who had fallen would rise again, it would have been superfluous and foolish to pray for the dead. But if he was looking for the splendid reward that is laid up for those who fall asleep*

in godliness, it was a holy and pious thought. Therefore he made atonement for the dead, that they might be delivered from their sin.

This pericope (v. 43-45) in the critically restored text, which moreover is totally in accord with the Greek text, reads as follows: *And he took up a collection of twelve thousand drachmas* (in the Greek, *two*) *and sent it to Jerusalem to be offered as a sacrifice for sins, acting very well and thinking honorably about the resurrection, because he hoped that those who had fallen would rise again* [*thinking it would be superfluous and vain to pray for the dead*], *thinking that for those who with godliness had fallen asleep there was an excellent reward made ready for them* [*a holy and healthy thought*]; *therefore he prayed for the dead that they might be freed from their sin.*

Hence, omitting the words added in brackets, as at most doubtfully having been added to the text, here is what it says:

1) Judas, the soldiers and the priests thought that those dead soldiers: a) Are not in the bosom of Abraham, since they thought they had to be freed from their sins. b) Nor are they in hell, because having died with godliness (for the sake of God and country), they are thought to have an excellent reward (χαριστήριον: a sign of grace and therefore a reward). c) But they are in a state in which they must suffer some punishments in order to expiate the sin committed in the previous life.

2) That in this state they can be helped by sacrifices of expiation in order to be freed from their punishments.

3) The sacred author approves: a) In general, the way of acting of Judas, which he not only does not condemn, but rather, from the whole context, narrates as something to be praised. b) In particular, the thought of Judas about the resurrection (and also a holy thought) and therefore the main action undertaken because of that thought, that is, that he prayed for the dead (he offered a sacrifice for their forgiveness) that they be delivered from their punishments.

4) Therefore the Jews believed: a) That there is a middle state of expiation between heaven and hell for the souls of some of the pious dead who before death did not make sufficient satisfaction for their sins. b) That they can be helped by the suffrages of the living. c) The sacred author approves of that belief.[12]

From this text nothing is deduced whether concerning the *manner* of expiation, that is, concerning the quantity or quality of the punishment, or concerning their *place.*

Protestants deny, not the probative force of this text, but the canonical status of the

12. See D. de Bruyne-B. Sodar, O.S.B., *Les anciennes traductions latines des Maccabées* (Maredsous 1932) 202; E. O'Brien, S.J., *The Scriptural Proof for the Existence of Purgatory from 2 Maccabees 12,43-45:* ScEccl 2 (1949) 80-108; F. de Fuenteraria, O.F.M.Cap., *El Purgatorio en la literatura judía precristiana:* EstFranc 57 (1956) 8-30. See H.G. Bevenot, O.S.B., *Die beiden Makkabäerbücher* (Bonn 1932) 39f.232f.; M. Grandclaudon, *Les livres des Maccabées:* PirClam 8,2 (Paris 1951) 217f.; D. Schötz, O.F.M., *Erstes und zweites Buch der Makkabäer:* Echter Bible (Würzburg 1954) 99.

book. Therefore Luther says that purgatory cannot be proved from Scripture which is in the canon (D 1487; see 1502). But even if the book were not canonical, that passage would prove at least the common faith of Jews, which, as placed under the special providence of God and taught by the prophets, could not fall universally into such a serious religious error.[13]

The dead Jewish soldiers would seem to have died in grave sin because of the violated law (Deut. 7:25f.). But the proof is constructed only from the reason for acting and from the faith of the Jews, since they think that those who fell with godliness have not or could not have died in the state of grave sin. For perhaps those soldiers acted either because of ignorance or in a minor manner or with the intention of handing over the idols to Judas so they could be melted down; or they thought that they repented for their sin before they died. But since the Jews were not certain about the damnation of those who died, that was enough for them to pray for the deceased, more or less as the case is with us, who also pray for the greatest sinners, since we are not certain about their damnation.

The prayer of Judas would seem to be superfluous, since he expected that they would rise again and therefore the suffrages would help them in the future, since now there was no purgatory. But among the Jews and the first Christians the dogma of the resurrection was so connected with the immortality of the soul that, by admitting the latter, one was thought to admit the former (Matt. 12:21; 1 Cor. 15:19.32), and by denying the latter one was thought to deny the former. Hence (in v. 44) the meaning would be: If Judas thought that the souls perish together with the body and therefore that there is no resurrection, it would seem superfluous to pray for the dead.

228. 2) *For the first assertion.* Matt. 12:32: .. *Whoever speaks against the Holy Spirit will not be forgiven, either in this age or in the age to come.* This formula of Christ would seem to be surprising and inept, especially when he is teaching, unless it indicated the possibility of a future remission of sin. "For who says: I will not marry either in this age or in the age to come, or something similar?"[14] But in the future age mortal sin and eternal punishment are not forgiven. On the other hand, the forgiveness of personal sin, unless God receives repentance from the sinner, is foreign to revealed doctrine. Therefore rightly from that place, mentioning expressly remission alone, we conclude that there is a purgatory in order to atone for the temporal punishment or perhaps also to atone for venial sins.

But in that place it is not taught that sins against the Son can be forgiven in a future age, but only both times in which sins are forgiven. But which sins are forgivable in the future age cannot be deduced from this place but from others.

229. 3) *For the first assertion.* 1 Cor. 3:11-15: *I laid a foundation, and another man is building upon it. The foundation is Jesus Christ. Now if anyone*

13. From the condemnation of Luther (D 1487) it does not follow that the thesis is sufficiently proved by the quoted text, or even that the book of Maccabees is canonical (but that is proved elsewhere).
14. Suarez, 48.1.11; Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in Evangelium secundum Mathaeum* (Paris 1922) 552f.; Meinertz, *op.cit.*, 1,68. But the following think that by this formula only perpetual duration is indicated: D. Buzy, S.C.I., *Evangile selon Saint Matthieu:* PirClam 9 (Paris 1950); Durand, *op.cit.*, 230.

builds on the foundation with gold, silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble—each man's work will become manifest. It will be revealed with fire.... If the work which any man has built on the foundation survives, he will receive a reward. If any man's work is burned up, he will suffer loss, though he himself will be saved, but only as through fire.

Since Paul laid the foundation, that is, the doctrine of Christ, the *builders* are, from the whole context, the preachers of the Gospel (therefore not all the faithful, at least directly, apparently) who build upon Christ: either with gold, silver, precious stones, that is, good doctrine or resisting fire without damage, or with wood, hay, stubble, that is, not bad doctrine, as not contrary to the foundation of Christ which is not destroyed, but vain and to be consumed by fire.

But in the day of the Lord, that is, the day of judgment (Phil. 1:10; 1 Thess. 5:2; 2 Thess. 2:2; 2 Tim. 1:18; 1 Cor. 1:8; 5:5; 2 Cor. 1:15), *fire,* that is, for a different opinion, either judgment or real fire[15] but supposing a judgment, will test all. The one whose work resists fire or will have taught good doctrine will receive a reward for his good work; but the one whose work burns, or who taught vain doctrine, for his vain work *will suffer damage*, since he does not receive that reward, *but he will be saved*, that is, from eternal ruin, but only as it were by fire, that is, either by suffering something, almost like someone who runs through fire to escape it, or inasmuch as, if perhaps it has to do with real fire, he is tormented by it to some extent.[16]

Therefore in the judgment that vain preacher will not be condemned to hell, but he will not be admitted into heaven, until he is first punished for his vain actions.

Hence we rightly deduce further that all Christians, since the same reason applies to them that applies to those teachers, when the Lord comes can be found in the state of grace, but because of their actions they will have to suffer something before they are admitted into heaven.[17]

Therefore the doctrine of purgatory is contained in that passage, maybe not formally, but at least virtually or also implicitly.

15. See Bover, *Las epistolas de San Pablo*[2] (Barcelona 1950) 85.

16. Zorell, see πῦρ, 1167f.

17. St. Augustine: R 1467; S.Th., *In 1 Cor 3* lect.2; Cornely, at this place, p.91; Bover, *Teología...* 873-875; Prat, 2,110-113; Allò, *Saint Paul. Première epître aux Corinthiens* (Paris 1934) 52-67; Michel, 1174-1178; A. Beel, *Docetne S.Paulus dogma purgatorii in 1 Cor 3,11ff?:* CollatBrug 37 (1927) 97-106; Meinertz, *op.cit.* 2,222; Huby, *Première Epître aux Corinthiens,* 111-113. Spicq seems to think otherwise, *Epîtres...* 195. Undeservedly therefore (see. Vitti: Bibl 14 [1933] 476). J. Sickenberger, *Die beiden Briefe des heiligen Paulus an die Korinther* (Bonn 1932) thinks that in this place those preachers building vain things are proposed as fleeing from hell, like those who flee a conflagration by running through the flames. See Landgraf (*1 Cor 3,10-17 bei den lateinischen Vätern und in der Frühscholastik:* Bibl 5 [1924] 140-172) regarding the history of the exegesis of this text.

From the text it is very clear that a state of expiation is given for those dying in grace, but they must be purified of some things. Therefore, although in that place directly venial sins are mentioned, it also concerns the temporal punishment for mortal sins already forgiven, as temporal, just as the punishment is for venial sins.

Unsuitably many Greeks with St. John Chrysostom[18] understand the word "he will be saved" (σωθήσεται) in this way: "he is saved alive," namely so that he may be punished perpetually. For, those teachers, if they had sinned gravely, would not be said to build on Christ; in Scripture that word always, unless it concerns a natural salvation, signifies liberation from hell or from sin (1 Cor. 5:5; 1 Pet. 4:18, etc.); that phrase "as through fire" would lack meaning, that is, for someone remaining in fire to be saved by fire.

Paul is speaking about the universal judgment, after which, according to Catholic doctrine, there will be no purgatory. However: a) From his words those teachers must be cleansed by punishments before their entry into heaven. Therefore it will take place before the judgment, if they die before the coming of the Lord; otherwise, unless perhaps a plenary indulgence is given to them, they can be cleansed either by the annoyances of that time or by pains voluntarily assumed or by the fire of the last conflagration (S.Th., 4, d.47 q.2 a.2 sol.2 ad 5). b) Since for other reasons it is certain that there is a particular judgment, Paul does not treat the universal judgment except as a public manifestation and confirmation of the judgment of God concerning the works of individual men.

230. Proof from tradition. The tradition of the western Church concerning purgatory is not called into doubt even by Protestants.[19] The eastern tradition is very clear: from the already quoted texts; from the fact that the Latins and Greeks never disagreed on this matter, except about the place and about the nature of the pains, about the nature of the atonement, about the probative power of a text.[20] But this shows that the Orientals adhered firmly to the ancient tradition.

A. *The holy Fathers.* a) *For both parts.* It should be noted especially that the Fathers strongly recommend prayers, alms and sacrifices for the deceased. Therefore they assume that they are neither in hell nor in heaven, since the Church prays neither for the damned nor for the blessed. But there is nothing preventing those deceased persons from entering

18. St. John Chrysostom, *In 1 Cor.* hom.9 n.3: MG 61,79.

19. Calvin, *op.cit.*, 3,510: "Before the thirteen hundreds it was already commonly used in order to provide help for the dead. All (the ancients) were caught up in this error. (I say) that in this they did something human, and therefore it is not necessary to imitate what they did."

20. The debates at the Council of Florence showed that the Greeks were in agreement with the Latins on the substance of the dogma, or on this point—that between the blessed and the damned there are some for whom it is necessary to pray that they may be freed from their punishment. Until the 18th century among the Greek-Russsians there were none who dissented from that doctrine; but their opinion does not agree with the Greek-Russian liturgy. See Allatius, *De utriusque Ecclesiae in dogmate de purgatorio consensione* (Rome 1655); D'Ales, *La question du purgatoire au concile de Florence 1438:* Greg 3 (1922) 9-50; Hofmann, *op.cit.:* OrCh 16 (1929) 285-298; 17 (1930) 215-243; Jugie, 4,137-174; Id., *Purgatoire dans l'eglise gréco-russe après le concile de Florence:* DTC 13,326-1352; T. Spacil, S.J., *La dottrina degli orientali separati interno ai "Novissimi":* OrCh 22 (1931) 161-166; Gordillo, *loc. cit.*

into glory except the completion of the temporal punishment due for their sins. Therefore they are in a state of expiation. Here are a few testimonies about this.

St. Ephraem (R 741): "... The dead are helped by the offerings that the living make... If the soldiers of Matathias... by their offerings atoned for the crimes of those who fell in war..., how much more do the priests of the Son atone for the crimes of the dead by their holy offerings... and prayers." St. Epiphanius (R 1109): "For the prayers are useful that are said for them (the dead), although they do not extinguish all their debt."

St. John Chrysostom (R 1206): "Let us weep for these; let us assist them according to our power... How and in what way? By praying and entreating others to make prayers for them, by continually giving to the poor on their behalf... Not in vain did the Apostles order that remembrance should be made of the dead in the dreadful Mysteries... for when the whole people stands with uplifted hands, a priestly assembly, and that awful Sacrifice lies displayed, how shall we not prevail with God by our entreaties for them?"

St. Augustine (R 1513): "The Church prays for the other dead (except the martyrs)." (R 1934): "In the books of the Maccabees we read of sacrifice offered for the dead. Even if it were nowhere at all read in the Old Scriptures, not small is the authority, which in this usage is clear, of the whole Church, namely, that in the prayers of the priest which are offered to the Lord God at his altar, the commendation of the dead has also its place."

b) *For the first assertion.* The purgatorial or emendatory fire remains with those who die with stains of sin.

St. Gregory of Nyssa (R 1061): "For he could not (after his departure from the body) participate in the divinity, unless the purgatorial fire has cleansed the stain away from his soul."

St. Augustine (R 1467): "Cleanse me in this life..., that I may after that stand in no need of the cleansing fire... For all that, though we should be 'saved by fire,' yet will that fire be more grievous than anything that man can suffer in this life whatsoever."

St. Caesarius of Arles was perhaps the first one to say that small sins must be subjected to the fire of purgatory (R 2233): "... If... we are not freed from our sins by good works, we will have to stay in the fire of purgatory until our mentioned small sins..., are consumed. That purgatorial fire will be harder...."

St. Gregory the Great (R 2321): "There must be a cleansing fire before judgment, because some minor faults may remain to be purged away."[21]

N.B. Therefore if some, like Augustine, deny a middle place between heaven and hell, they are dealing with the middle place of the Pelagians, or perhaps also sometimes with purgatory, but taken as a perpetual state. Likewise if some deny that there is a place after death for satisfaction or merit, they are dealing with proper or meritorious satisfaction. Augustine remains doubtful not about the existence of purgatory, since he wrote a book about it called *De cura pro mortuis agenda* (ML 40,591.610), but about some of its circumstances, v.gr., whether there is fire there, etc.[22]

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21. Origen quite clearly teaches purgtory: see Michel, 1193-1196; Spacil, *La dottrina del purgatorio in Clemente Aless. Ed in Origene:* Bess (1919,II) 131ff.
22. See Bellarmine, 1 c.13.15.

231. B. *The following agree with the Fathers:* a) Many *liturgies,* even very ancient ones both in the East and in the West (even schismatic), which have prayers for the dead.[23] b) *The ancient praxis of giving alms* as a suffrage for the dead.[24] c) *Ancient epitaphs* in which: for the faithful departed is requested forgiveness and heavenly rest, mitigation, solace, consolation, peace with the angels and saints; there are prayers for the dead that God will bring them to heaven; the saints are invoked for them; those visiting the graves are asked to pray for the dead: "You who read this, pray for him"; the dead themselves ask for prayers."[25]

232. Theological reasoning. 1) *For the first assertion.* The justified man can die, "and it is not to be doubted," says Palmieri, "that it often happens" that, burdened with stains, whether from grave sins already forgiven, since the due punishment, after the sin has been forgiven, often still remains (D 1542-1543, 1580, 1689-1691, 1712f., 1715), or from venial sins, either forgiven or not forgiven, because of which he was not condemned to hell. But *nothing unclean will enter into it* (the heavenly city) (Rev. 21:27). Therefore that justified man must be cleansed (S.Th., 4 CG 91).

2) *For the second assertion.* The communion of saints brings it about. Certainly the Church, triumphant and suffering and militant, is the one Mystical Body, whose head is Christ and whose members are the faithful located in those three stages and whose soul is the Holy Spirit. But the unity of this body, produced by the Holy Spirit through charity, is so intimate and effective that there is given, as in a natural body but in a much more perfect way, the influx of the Head on the members and of the members among themselves with regard to spiritual goods. Therefore the souls in purgatory, as members of the Mystical Body, experience the influx also of the members living on earth (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 71, a. 2.9).[26]

The logical fittingness for both assertions. The dogma of purgatory: a) Shows the justice and holiness of God, totally opposed to the shadow of sin, and the glory of paradise demanding such cleanliness. It motivates to perform works of satisfaction. It fosters a spirit of repentance. It deters from venial sins, which otherwise would lack a sanction (which would be unworthy of the holiness of God). It encourages thoughts about the next life. In death it is a comfort for repentant sinners, who otherwise could hardly hope that they, as it were by a leap, are to be transferred from a number of faults to heaven.

b) It shows the wonderful union of the Mystical Body. It offers the opportunity to exercise charity on behalf of the dead. It motivates us to show gratitude to the dead because

23. See Palmieri, § 20,2. *Didascalia Apostolorum* 6,23,2f.; see Funk, 1,376; H.B. Swete (trans. E. Vacandard), *La prière pour les trépassés dans les quatre premiers siècles:* RevClerFr 52 (1907) 147-161.
24. J. Kirsch, *Die Lehre von der Gemeinschaft der Heiligen im Christlichen Altertum* (Mainz 1900).
25. H. Leclercq, *Purgatoire:* DACL 14,1978-91; Scaglia, p.7-19; O. Marucchi, *Manuale do Archeologia Cristiana* (Rome 1923) p.226-233.
26. St. Albert the Great, *In 4* d.45 a.4: see Piolanti, *Il corpo mistico e le sue relazioni con l'Eucharistia in S.Alberto M.* (Rome 1939) 133-135; R. Bour, *Communion des Saints:* DTC 3,429-480; L. Porteboeuf, *Les âmes du purgatoire dans le corps mystique du Christ:* VieSpir 33 (1932) 125-140.

of the benefits received from them when they were living; likewise it moves us to repair in some way whatever evil, either positive or negative, we may have inflicted on them during their life.

233. Objections. 1. Ps. 127f.: *For he gives to his beloved sleep. Lo, sons are a heritage from the Lord, the fruit of the womb a reward.* From these words, immediately after death the heritage is given. Therefore there is no purgatory.

I distinguish the major. The heritage is given immediately under certain conditions, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.*

The condition of a due purgation not expressed here is supposed from other texts. Moreover, the Hebrew text says: "Since he gives," therefore it does not deter the time. There the concern directly seems to be, not about death and about beatitude, but about temporal rest and the fecundity of parents; that is, God will give to those whom he favors rest or goods and as a reward to those who love him children or the fruit of the womb.[27]

2. Matt. 25:34-46 (the last judgment): Only the blessed and the reprobates are mentioned. Therefore there is no third state.

I distinguish the consequent. There is no purgatory after the last judgment, *conceded;* before that, *denied.*

From the objection it follows only that after the last judgment there will be no purgatory; this is generally admitted.

234. 3. Rev. 14:13: *Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord henceforth. "Blessed indeed," says the Spirit, "that they may rest from their labors, for their deeds follow them!"* From this text, beatitude is given immediately after death. Therefore there is no purgatory.

I distinguish the major. Immediately after death beatitude is given under the necessary conditions, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.*

That "henceforth" (*amodo*) is understood according to "their labors" and therefore by a previous purgation, if there is some necessity for this. Also, the blessed are said to rest after death from their labors, as either now secure in their beatitude or already experiencing eternal rest in a beginning way, or now being liberated from the vicissitudes of this life (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 71, a. 2 ad 2).

4. Those dying in mortal sin are punished immediately. Therefore those dying in grace also receive glory immediately.

I deny the parity. Since, while one is in the state of mortal sin, no merits are present in a man, the one in that state is ready immediately to pay his penalty. But grace can exist together with guilt of some temporal punishment, which hinders him from immediately entering into glory. Of course God is more disposed to reward than to punish, but this is always according to the order of providence. Good is the result of the whole cause, but evil from any defect.

Hence, similarly the reprobate man receives no reward after death, since he is not worthy of any reward; but the justified man can be deserving of some punishment after death.

27. Knabenbauer, at this place. For more, see St. Augustine, *Enarr. In Ps.* n.8f.: ML 31,1673f.

235. 5. The stains of sins are purged by death itself. Therefore there is no purgatory.

I distinguish the major. The stains of sins are purged after death *ex opere operato, denied; ex opere operantis, I subdistinguish:* as by the works of others, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.*

It is clear that the stains are not purged by death *ex opere operato,* since otherwise the necessity of satisfying by other works would be useless. But they can be purged by death *ex opere operantis* to the extent that they are endured with a Christian heart. Therefore it does not happen *always,* since men often die when they are unconscious or they die without taking care to elicit many acts of virtue, and a fortiori not always *completely,* since the level of the acceptance of death is not always sufficient to pay for the punishment owed.

6. The satisfaction of Christ as infinite purifies souls perfectly. Therefore purgatory is not necessary.

I distinguish the major. The satisfaction of Christ perfectly purifies souls virtually, *conceded;* actually, *I subdistinsuish:* given some punishment of the sinner, *conceded;* otherwise, *denied.*

According to the will of God, the infinite satisfaction of Christ is not applied to us, without some suffering on our part for the sins committed. But since nothing is taken away from the satisfaction of Christ if God at times in this life punishes the just less than they deserve; likewise nothing is taken away from it if, in the next life, he punishes them less than the guilt not yet repaired really deserves.

Just as in this life the satisfaction of Christ is applied to us by means instituted by Christ himself, so also after death, v.gr., by the intercessions of the living faithful. Therefore neither do these derogate anything from the satisfaction of Christ.

236. 7. Both the remission of a light fault and the satisfaction of temporal punishment require the pilgrim state of life. Therefore purgatory is not necessary.

I deny the major regarding the remission of venial sins. For, the justified person can die with venial sin on his soul, which however must be remitted before entry into heaven, although we do not know the manner of that remission (S.Th., *De malo* q.7 a.11).

I distinguish the major regarding satisfaction. Proper satisfaction demands the pilgrim state of life, *conceded;* improper satisfaction or satispassion, *denied.*

Proper satisfaction, since it is a voluntary acceptance of the punishment that can be taken on or rejected, is free and therefore meritorious for the just man; therefore it does not exist after death. But the souls in purgatory, even though they patiently accept their sufferings, cannot escape them, that its, they do not assume freely a punishment they can refuse, and hence that acceptance is not meritorious. Therefore they are not said to be making satisfaction except in an *improper sense*, but they are being punished.

8. Conversion after death is impossible. Therefore purgatory is useless.

I distinguish the major. A proper conversion is impossible after death or a transition from evil to good, *conceded;* an improper one or moral improvement consisting in the removal of the stains of sin, *denied.*

ARTICLE II

VARIOUS QUESTIONS ON THE PAINS OF PURGATORY

237. On the nature of the pains of purgatory. The Church has not defined anything about this matter. But it is rightly generally held, and it is *certain in theology,* that in purgatory there is *a pain of loss,* inasmuch as the souls are deprived of the vision of God for a time and so they suffer very much and without interruption, since because of their sins they do not see God, whom they ardently love and to whom they are attracted by that love; also they have lost many degrees of glory because they have sinned and because they have not made satisfaction for their sins (S.Th., 4 d.21 q.1 a.1 sol.3).[1]

The essence of purgatory is thought to be in this pain of loss. But it differs specifically from the pain of loss of hell both in duration and in the intensity of suffering because of the different sins from which it comes and the way of accepting it (D 1528-1529), and because the soul in purgatory has glory fundamentally based on grace.

238. Likewise it is held by all theologians and faithful of the Church, both in the East and in the West, and therefore, as Bellarmine rightly says, "it is certain" that *in purgatory there is some pain of sense. The Council of Lyons II* (D 856; see *Council of Florence* D 1304) sufficiently indicates this, saying in the plural that "their souls are cleansed after death by purgatorial punishments. In order that they be relieved from such punishments, the acts of intercession of the living faithful benefit them." Surely because of at least some conversion to creatures some punishment must be endured (S.Th., *ibid.).* But it is not certain that *all souls* are affected by that punishment, since it could happen that God, because of the small degree of guilt and for other reasons, sometimes is content with the punishment of a differed glory.[2]

239. *In purgatory* "it is certain," says, Bellarmine, "that there is *the pain of fire,* whether that fire is understood properly or metaphorically, and whether it signifies the pain of sense or the pain of loss."[3] *But that that fire is real fire,* in favor of which without doubt there is the sense of the faithful of the Church, at least in the West, and even

1. Lessius, *op.cit.,* 13,17,94f.; Ortolan, *loc.cit.,* 17-21; St. Catherine of Genoa, *Trattato del purgatorio* (Genoa 1929) p.17; Garrigou-Lagrange, *op.cit.,* 207-214. Perhaps Cajetan is opposed to this in his work, *De confessione* tr.4 q.5; but there he is considering the pain of *infernal* loss which contrition removes completely.
2. See Palmieri, § 26,7. See Bautz, p. 153; Suarez, 46,1,8-12.
3. Bellarmine, 2 10. See Garrigou-Lagrange, *op.cit.,* 215f.

though the Church has not defined anything about it, is said by Suarez to be *certain within the broad range of theological opinion,* by Bellarmine to be "the common opinion of scholars," by Lercher to be "*very probable* and completely *safe,* from which one would disagree only with temerity in the Christian community"; it is "completely probable" according to Palmieri, Katschthaler, Hurter, Pohle-Gierens; and according to Siuri "it is taught by theologians as certain."[4] But these authors do not qualify with a grave censure those who think otherwise.

At the Council of Florence the Latins said that there is real fire in purgatory, but the Greeks denied it and they were not required to abandon their opinion. However, this does not necessarily mean the Latins considered their own teaching to be doubtful.[5] Some Greek Fathers and often the Latin Fathers mention fire, and they seem to mean real fire.[6] Innocent IV (D 838) speaks about "a transitory fire," Clement VI (D 1050) says: "if... you have believed that they will be tormented by fire for a time...."[7]

N.B. a) Some ancients said that the souls in purgatory are tormented by demons,[8] but this is contrary to the common understanding of theologians and without a solid theological foundation, since the work of the devil is not necessary in order to torment those souls, and since it is not fitting that souls, who have already triumphed over him, should be tormented by him.[9] And there is no reason why we should lend credence in this matter to private revelations.

b) Theologians do not deny that there are other pains of sense in purgatory besides fire, which, according to Siuri, "is very probable"[10]; but at the same time there is no certainty about this.

240. On the great severity of the pains of purgatory. This is generally asserted. "By these very great pains they are punished," says Lessius, "and they atone for the pleasures of their past life, enduring suffering and pain a thousand times more grievous than the pleasure they ever perceived

4. Bellarmine, 2 11; Suarez, 46,2,2; Lercher, IV-2[3] n.856; see IV[2] n.609; Palmieri, § 26,5; Hurter, 3 n.672,5; Pohle-Gierens, 3 p.686; Siuri, 5 c.3 n.34; Katschthaler, *loc.cit.,* n.92. See also Michel, *Feu du purgatoire:* DTC 5,2259-2261; F. Schmid, *Das Fegfeuer nach kath. Lehre* (Brixen 1904). But Pohle-Gierens (*loc.cit.*) and Palmieri (§ 26,3) rightly point out that it is not a dogma of faith nor even proximate to faith.
5. Msi 31,485-488; Hofmann and D'Ales, *ibid.*see n.230, note 25; Jugie, 4,126-131.
6. St. Gregory of Nyssa: R 1061; St. Basil, *In Isa* 9:16: MG 30,522; St. Gregory Naz., *Orat.* 39,19: MG 36,357; St. Augustine: R 1467; St. Caesarius of Arles: R 2233; St. Gregory the Great: R 2831. See Michel, 2252-2259. See however F. Segarra, ¿Definiciones "ex cathedra" olvidadas?: EstEcl 6 (1927) 100f. (on the perhaps not absolute force of their testimonies).
7. Also Segarra (*ibid.,* 99-103); Id., *Todavía una palabra sobre definiciones "ex cathedra" olvidadas: ibid.* 7 [1928] 542-552) considering the document of ClementVI as a definition *ex cathedra,* but he held against Straub, S.J., (*Unbeactete Kundgebungen ex cathedra:* ZkathTh 52 [1928] 82-84), that it is not established *for certain* that by that document it is defined that the fire of purgatory is corporeal.
8. See Siuri, 5.4.59-64.
9. S.Th., 4 d.21 q.1 a.1 sol.5; Valencia, *In 3* d.11 q.1 punct.3 ass.4; Bellarmine, 2,13: "This matter is completely uncertain."
10. Siuri, 5 n.36.

from the delights of this world."[11]

But given the fact that the pain certainly is, as we rightly and without proof suppose, *unequal* depending on the demerits of each individual (Rom. 2:6), does it always surpass the greatest sufferings of this life? According to Bellarmine, all theologians admit that the pains of purgatory are *in some way* more than the greatest pains of this life.[12] At least "it is certain that it is greater because of the deprivation of such great good...."[13] But if those pains are considered with regard to the suffering they cause, *do they always surpass the greatest pains* of this life? Theologians disagree about this.

One opinion: certainly both regarding the pain of loss and regarding the pain of sense.[14]

A second opinion: certainly regarding the pain of loss; but not always, apparently, regarding the pain of sense, lest someone because of a frivolous word should suffer a torment more severe than any kind of martyrdom. For, no definition of the Church nor any reason forces us to believe that the least pain of sense in purgatory is greater than any suffering of this life. Hence, although it may be more severe specifically, but perhaps it is not always more severe because of other circumstances, v.gr., of duration, grade of intensity, the multitude of pains, and so forth.[15]

A third opinion: the pain of loss not always; the pain of sense, although considered in itself it may be more severe than any sensible punishment of this world, so that the greatest pain of purgatory surpasses the greatest of this life, but taken in an individual case it could not be such, so that perhaps someone in purgatory suffers less than someone in the world.[16]

241. What about this? It seems to us that what follows should be said about a matter that is so difficult. Since a venial sin, even the smallest, is more serious than every non-sinful evil of a creature, it deserves punishment, and certainly one graver than any temporal punishment that we could imagine. Hence also the punishment, even the smallest, due formally because of any sin is thought not to be able to be compared with any pain of this life taken *by itself alone.*

Therefore since God in the future life rigorously demands that punishment, especially if a man out of his own negligence has not atoned for that

11. Lessius, 13,17,90; St. Augustine: R 1467; St. Gregory the Great, *In ps paenit.* 3,1: ML 79,568; St. Caesarius of Arles: R 2233; St. Bernard, *Serm. In obitu Humberti* n.8: ML 183,518.
12. Bellarmine, 2,14; Palmieri, § 26 n.8.
13. Suarez, 46,3,1.
14. S.Th., *In 4* d.21 a.1 sol.3; Siuri, 5,3,37-48; St. Augustine: R 1467; St. Caesarius of Arles: R 2233; Lessius, 13,17. On the pain of sense, Bellarmine teaches it, 2,14.
15. Suarez, 46,3,1-7; Palmieri, § 26,8; Pesc h, 8 n.604.
16. St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.20 p.1 a.1 q.2; *Breviloquium* p.7 c.2: Gester treats his teaching extensively, p.28-32, 38-42; Billot, thes. 7 § 2 p.105f.. Regarding the pain of loss, Bellarmine agrees, 2,14.

fault, we think that the pains of purgatory, even in the hypothesis that God punishes less than is deserved, always surpass *per se* any pain of the world both with regard to the pain of loss, since the separated soul desires nothing but God, and with regard to the pain of sense because of the prior conversion to creatures rather than the last end. A fortiori the same thing holds true doubtless concerning the temporal punishment due to mortal sins.

But more probably the pain of purgatory gradually is lessened as the debt itself is diminished.[17] Hence, if the debt is small, either because almost the whole amount has already been paid either in this life or in purgatory, this pain whether of loss or of sense could be lighter than at least the greatest pain of this world.

It seems necessary to say this, if only the pain is considered. But if the circumstance is considered that the soul in purgatory enjoys such intense joy and therefore rejoicing endures the pain, almost as the martyrs often endured their torments while rejoicing, we think that the pain of purgatory because of that joy subjectively is very much diminished and becomes of such a nature that it almost cannot be compared with the pains of this life because of the difference between them.

242. How long does the punishment of purgatory last? From Catholic doctrine, which in this matter, according to Siuri, is proximate to faith, it does not continue after the last judgment, since, from 1 Cor. 15:42-53, the justified person will resurrect in a glorified body and since, from Matt. 25:31-46, Christ at the last judgment, at which all are present (2 Cor. 5:10; Rom. 14:10), definitively will send some to heaven and the others to hell.

Thus also St. Augustine (R 1776, 1778). Suarez says: "It is certain that the punishments of purgatory will not be continued beyond the day of judgment."[18] Thus God will see to it by his providence that the justified of the last time, if they do not die, are cleansed in a short amount of time, unless perhaps a plenary indulgence is given to them, since God in other ways can easily supply with severity what is lacking in duration.

"It is certain," Suarez says, "that the duration of the punishments of purgatory are not the same for all who are being cleansed there."[19] But the duration corresponds to the punishment which, since it has not been taken away by suffrages, still remains to be suffered. But that varies, for, as St. Thomas says, "the severity of the punishment really corresponds to the

17. Bellarmine, 2,14 at the end; Palmieri, § 26,8; Suarez (46,4,7) denies that the punishment is lessened. Siuri (5 n.48) with Granado (*In 4* d.20 p.1 tr.2 disp.3 a.5) holds the diminution at least regarding the pain of sense, insisting however that the pain always surpasses any pain of this life.
18. Suarez, 46,4,2f. See Michel, *Purgatoire et Jour du Jugement?:* AmCl 66 (1956) 155f.
19. Suarez, 46,6,4.

degree of guilt, but the duration corresponds to the rootedness of the guilt in the subject; hence it can happen that someone remains longer who is punished less, and vice versa" (*In 4* d.21 q.1 a.3 sol.3).

But the determination of this duration Bellarmine says "is something very uncertain and can be defined only with temerity." The justice of God rightly punishing sin is opposed to a duration that is too short; opposed to one that is too long is his mercy, which established suffrages as a means of lessening the punishments of purgatory. Still it is necessary to say that not all the souls, even without suffrages, are in purgatory until the last judgment (D 1000, 1305).[20]

However, without a solid reason the upper limit of ten (or also of twenty) years is assigned by Soto and by Maldonado,[21] since that is opposed to the damnation imposed on someone by Alexander VII, and since the Church includes in her prayers those who died a very long time ago, celebrating their anniversary also for centuries. St. Augustine sought prayers for his mother twenty years after her death.[22]

20. *Ibid.* 2,9. Suarez, 46,4,5: "It is unbelievable... that the punishments of purgatory regularly continue for all until the day of judgment, even without the suffrages of the Church, both because of what has been said and also because there would be a certain inequality, as if a holy man with minimal guilt should die much before."
21. Soto, *In 4* d.20 q.3 a.2 at the end; Maldonado, *De purgat.* Q.5.
22. Alexander VII (D 2063): "An annual legacy left for the soul (of one deceased) does not bind for more than ten years." St. Augustine, *Conf.* 9,13,37: ML 32,779f.

ARTICLE III

ON THE MORAL CONDITION OF THE SOULS IN PURGATORY

243. The souls in purgatory are sure of their salvation. Leo X (D 1488). Surely they know from the particular judgment their fate. According to the Church "they sleep in peace," and therefore they are sure of their destiny. They know that they believe, place their hope in and love God and embracing his will they bear their punishment patiently; this is not the case for the damned. And God should not be thought miraculously to hinder those thoughts, which are produced in part from faith and in part naturally.

Formerly a few authors, like St. John of the Cross and, apparently, Carthusianus, thought that a punishment was imposed on some souls of doubts about their destiny.[1] However the common opinion rejects this, since the arguments just given pertain to all souls. And private revelations, saying something different, should not be listened to.[2]

244. On the joy of the soul in purgatory. St. Bernardine of Siena says: "Even though those who are in purgatory suffer grave torments, nevertheless their status is better and happier than that of those who are in the world." And St. Catherine of Genoa: "It seems to me that no joy can be found that can be compared with the joy of the pure soul in purgatory, except the joy of the blessed in paradise."

There are many things that can confer the greatest joy on that soul. It is sure of its salvation. It has faith (since it does not yet see God), hope and all the virtues. It knows that it is in grace and therefore is a child of God and very much loved by Him; indeed that it is confirmed in him so perfectly, as being outside of the pilgrim state of life, that it cannot sin even venially or desire anything inordinately, and it willingly bears any torment even for the slightest fault.[3] Hence it loves God intensely, and it does not desire anything unless it is pleasing to God. It desires to see Him; it is in perfect union with Him. In its suffrages it experiences the love of the Mystical Body. Daily by those suffrages and its own suffering it is cleansed more and is made more suitable for heaven. Perhaps it experiences the companionship of its guardian angel or of the other angels.

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1. St. John of the Cross, *Noche oscura* 1.2 c.7 n.7; Dionysius Carthus., *Enarratio in librum Iob* a.27 t.4 (Monstrolii 1897) 460; *De quatuor novissimis* a.46 t.41 (Romaci 1912) 560, where he recounts a certain vision which included that idea, but on the authenticity of this place see S. Autore, *Denys le Chartreux:* DTC 4,445f.
2. See Gummersbach, 154-157.
3. On the opinion explaining that impeccability whether by the immutability of the free choice of the separated soul (S.Th., 4 CG 94; Billot, thes.7 § 3; Garrigou-Lagrange, *op.cit.*, 224f.) or by the moral necessity whereby the soul is attracted to the supreme good, so that it cannot think anything else (Pesch, 9 n.600) or by a special protection of God (Suarez, 47,1,8), see Gummersbach, 125-146.

By these and other circumstances it is made very happy. Hence it is clear that it suffers those pains with great joy, both because it is the will of God and it sees itself being cleansed in the eyes of God and because it knows that it is the means of making satisfaction to God and of obtaining the disposition necessary for the vision of God.[4]

245. On the value of works done in purgatory. 1. *On merit and satisfaction.* The soul in purgatory, although it can freely elicit supernatural acts, nevertheless, since it is outside of the pilgrim state of life, it cannot *merit* or increase in charity (D 1488). Therefore it cannot make *satisfaction,* since satisfaction is a free assumption of suffering in order to compensate for an injury, which God accepts because of the dignity of the person meriting that acceptance. Therefore he takes into consideration both the punishment and its embrace by a free act, so that because of this less punishment is required than otherwise would be required.

Hence the purpose of *satisfaction* is to merit the remission of punishment through the voluntary sufferings of this life that are morally equivalent to that punishment, according to the justice and determination of God.

246. 2) *On passive suffering (satispassio) in purgatory.* Therefore the soul can suffer only *passively,* inasmuch as merely by suffering, or merely undergoing a vindictive punishment, it is paying its debt to divine justice, since after the pilgrim state of life neither the choice of punishment is free, nor, given the acceptance of the punishment imposed by the judge, is any consideration given to his free act in compensation, so that therefore an equality is required between the punishment assigned by God and the compensation.

247. 3) *On impetration in purgatory.* It is certain that the soul in purgatory *can pray,* since it can desire something properly and make its desire known to God. And there does not seem to be a doubt but that the soul can pray for itself, especially since it is occupied only with pious thoughts.[5]

But if *impetration* is a fruit of prayer, *it can without doubt impetrate*—even though it is outside the pilgrim state of life, since impetration is based not on justice as merit, but on mercy (S.Th. II-II, q. 83, a. 16 ad 2) and since otherwise even the blessed could not impetrate—and also so that a greater power of impetrating corresponds to the greater holiness of the soul (S.Th., *ibid.,* a. 11 ad 1). Since that soul is pleasing to God, rightly its prayers are thought to be accepted by God in impetration.

4. St. Bernardine of Siena, *Serm.* 63 a.1,64; St. Catherine of Genoa, c.2: see many excerpts from c.1-14 in Pesch, 9 n.605; *El espíritu de San Francisco de Sales* (vers. F.J. Ysart) t.3 (Barcelona 1948) part 16 c.18; B. Bartmann, *Le gioie del Purgatorio:* ScuoCatt 62 (1934) 257-264; Bellarmine, 2,4; Siuri, 5 n.67f.78; 7 10. Moreover the punishment, although it seems to be rigorous, is the punishment of a friend, whom God as a father chastises, so that he may finally find him worthy to be in his presence and absolutely pure. See Suarez, 47,2,7.

5. See Bellarmine, 2,15. Consequently, they can invoke the saints, although for Suarez (47,2,8) that is very uncertain.

Therefore it can probably impetrate for itself (and doubtless also for others) easing of the punishment, but perhaps not directly, since the Church prays for it so solicitously, but beseeching that suffrages both be offered for it and applied to it by God.

248. Likewise it is held by far more generally after Mediavilla (13th century), while St. Thomas apparently teaches something different (*ibid.* ad 3; a. 4 ad 3), that the soul in purgatory *prays and impetrates for us,* although the Church does not invoke its help and it needs prayers.

For: a) It is with us one body in charity. It is pleasing to God and sharing in merits from Him, just like the blessed, who precisely for those reasons can impetrate. b) The faithful universally invoke them. c) These souls, according to the Council of Vienne, "help us with their suffrages"; according to the Council of Utrecht, "we believe... that they (the deceased)... beseech God for us. d) The Church has attached indulgences to prayers invoking the souls in purgatory.[6]

And there is no reason why ordinarily we should not approach them, as if ordinarily they know our necessities only in general, therefore without their being involved in our affairs, or perceiving our prayers, and it being probable that what we do or petition ordinarily is not revealed to them[7]; for, we know very little about their knowledge and "The souls of the departed may care for the living, even if ignorant of their state; just as we care for the dead by pouring forth prayer on their behalf, though we are ignorant of their state. Moreover, the affairs of the living can be made known to them not immediately, but souls who pass hence thither, or by angels and demons, or even by *the revelation of the Holy Ghost,* as Augustine says in the same book" (S.Th. I, q. 89, a. 8 ad 1; St. Augustine: R 1935). Also, the faithful invoke them for concrete necessities.

249. On the remission of venial sin in the dying justified person. How does a soul leaving the body with venial sin gain *remission* of it *regarding the guilt*, if the remission of the guilt is obtained outside of the sacraments by a *meritorious* act of its remission, but which after the pilgrim state of life cannot be given? On the other hand, the manner in it-

6. Mediavilla, *In 4* d.15; Medina, *De orat.* Q.4f.; Suarez, 47,2,9; *De relig.* Tr.4 1.1 c.10 n.25-28; c.11 n.16f.; Bellarmine, 2,15; Garrigou-Lagrange, *op.cit.,* 257f. Council of the Province of Vienne (a.1858) *Decreta* tit.5 c.16; Council of the Province of Utrecht (a. 1867), *Decreta* tit.5 c.8: CL 5,191.869. Leo X granted an indulgence to a prayer by which the powerful intercession of the souls is invoked: ASS 22 (1889-1890) 743f. See J.B. Walz, *Die Fürbitte der armen Seelen und ihre Anrufung durch die Gläubigen auf Erden*[2] (Bamberg 1933); B. Durst, O.S.B., *Zur Frage der Armenseelen-Anrufung. Die Lehrentwicklung im 13.Jahrhundert und der heutige Stand der Frage:* Kath (1918,2) 73-89, 145-179; Id., *Zur Frage der Armenseelen-Anrufung. Historischtheologische Würdigung der Lehre des hl.Thomas :* DivThom(Fr) 7 (1920) 227-268; Id., *Zur Frage der Armenseelen-Anrufung in der theologischen Summe des hl.Thomas von Aquin:* ThQschr 75 (1922) 63-80 (Alex. of Hales—who was the first to treat this—and St. Thomas deny this. Mediavilla affirms it): Id., *Zur Frage der Armenseelen-Anrufung:* ThPraktQschr 74 (1922) 617-652 (it is deduced as theologically certain that the souls in purgatory pray for us; that it is to be held as more probable that they can know about our invocations). J. Ernst (*Der hl.Thomas und die Anrufung der armen Seelen:* Kath [1916,2] 217-235, 309-327) explains the negative opinion of St. Thomas and, as it seems, he agrees with it; but he firmly insists that it should be treated very carefully by preachers, since it is a controversial question among theologians.

7. However see Bellarmine, 2,15; St. Augustine, *De cura pro mortuis* 13,16: ML 40,504.

self absolutely possible, whereby God remits those venial sins gratuitously and without any subjective act of conversion to Himself, in this order of providence is excluded, and therefore remission by satispassion alone is excluded, even though this suffices to take away the temporal punishment. Hence there are various opinions:

a) Venial sins are always remitted in this life, as Alexander of Hales with some others maintains, by a final grace, even without an act of contrition; they are forgiven "in the very dissolution of the soul from the body," after the full extinction of concupiscence.[8]

But these points are generally rejected as improbable. One and the same grace at the end is not thought to be able to have the formal effect which it did not have before that, and there is no foundation in the sources for asserting that remission by a final grace *without any act of the man.*

b) Those sins are remitted in purgatory because of the good free acts of the soul. Thus St. Bonaventure and recently Schmid.[9] But that less correctly supposes that some kind of accidental merit is obtained in purgatory, while the sources seem to exclude any merit and therefore any real satisfaction for guilt outside of the pilgrim state of life.

c) According to Scotus, venial sins are remitted: either in purgatory, as if to atone for venial sins it is necessary only to assume the temporal punishment for them, or in the very instant of death, that is, either in the last instant before death or in the first instant after death through the preceding merits of the soul.[10] But opposed to this is the fact that the first alternative would suppose that habitual sin consists in punishment, and the second that venial sins can be forgiven without any repentance.

250. d) *More commonly* and *more probably* it is held that those sins are remitted *in the first instant of the separation of the soul from the body* because of a fervent act of love with perfect contrition for all preceding sins. Thus St. Thomas, Suarez, Lugo, and others.[11]

Then the soul could not not be converted to God, since it now hates its guilt because of this love. But this conversion, since it does not take place in the pilgrim state of life, is not meritorious and satisfactory, but it is a true

8. Alex. of Hales, *Summa theol.* p.2 a.107 memb.10; p.4 q.15 memb.3 a.3 § 5.
9. St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.21 p.1 a.2 q.1; see a.1 q.2; see on his opinion, J. Kaup, O.F.M., *Die Tilgung der lässlichen Sünden im Fegfeuer nach Bonaventura:* FranzStud 21 (1934) 26-33. Schmid, *Die Seelenläuterung im Jenseits* (Brixen 1907), who thinks the purificaiton is obtained by successive acts of repentance. Likewise J. Zahn, *Das Jenseits* (Paderborn 1916). And it is not rejected by M.J. Egan, S.J. (*The Two Theories of Purgatory:* IrishTheolQuart [1922] 24-34), for whom also it is not clear that venial sins are not remitted in purgatory.
10. Scotus, *In 4* d.21 q.1 a.1. And this idea is not completely displeasing to Siuri, tr.5 n.74.
11. S.Th., it seems, in *De malo* q.7 a.11; but previously (4 d.21 q.1 a.3 qc.1) he had said that those sins are remitted in purgatory by a punishment in some way voluntary, which would have in virtue of grace the power of expiating all guilt and would be meritorious accidentally or with regard to the remission of venial sin. Suarez, d.11 s.4 n.13-18; Lugo, d.9 a.2 n.35-42; Garrigou-Lagrange, *op.cit.*, 226f.

retraction of sin, removing all attachment to sin, or the intrinsic impediment of forgiveness; therefore this is given either gratuitously or from the right of the just man to eternal life requiring the previous remission of guilt, or because of his preceding merits. However, that retraction does not increase sanctifying grace nor does it remit or diminish the temporal punishment, as it is remitted or diminished by a meritorious act in the pilgrim state of life.

Therefore in several of these opinions it seems possible to be said that those venial sins are remitted not in purgatory, but almost at the moment when the soul appears before the Judge.

251. *On the removal of evil habits in the dying justified person.* Since those habits are not formal sins they are not punished in purgatory. But since they deprive the powers of the soul of stable rectitude, they must be removed before entrance into heaven. Hence the evil habits of the sensitive powers are thought to be destroyed by death itself, since their subject or the sensitive power no longer exists. But the evil habits of the will are thought to be taken away by the contrary act elicited by the soul immediately after the separation from the body, since this act can be very strong in the just soul without any impediment tending to God with all of its power; or it can be taken away by the removal of the conserving influx; or inasmuch as in the first entrance into glory all the virtues, even the natural ones, are infused per accidens and this drives out the contrary habits.[12]

252. Scholium. *On satisfaction in this life for the temporal punishment.* Since the justified man can make atonement in this life for his temporal punishment by voluntary works, it is useful for him to do that (unless he laudably prefers to apply his satisfactions to other souls in purgatory), because he can obtain it by his penitential works and with them at the same time he is meriting eternal life; and now that very modest suffering, because of the dignity of the justified man which God especially considers during his earthly life, is accepted for the great suffering that must be endured in purgatory.

"... In pain assumed (voluntarily) not only the ordination of the pain for the guilt pleases God, but also the order and uprightness, which is in the assuming will; in inflicted pain the ordination of the pain to the guilt pleases Him. Since therefore the pain of penance in this life is assumed, the pain of the dying is inflicted in purgatory, because now is not the time for acting but for receiving. Therefore a little pain in this life satisfies more, and the divine justice is more content with it than with great suffering in the future, and therefore it demands more as it were out of proportion in order to make atonement to Him... For a creditor would rather receive one coin of gold than ten coins of silver; and the present suffering compared with the future is much more precious in the eyes of God, just as gold is to silver in the eyes of men."[13]

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12. See Gummersbach, p. 151-154. Garrigou-Lagrange, *op.cit.*, 228-320, thinks that those habits are erased only gradually in purgatory.
13. St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.20 p.1 q.2; St. John of the Cross, 2,6,6.

ARTICLE IV

ON THE CONDITION OF SUFFRAGES

253. Do suffrages offered by a sinner have value? A work offered by a sinner does not make atonement for him *ex opere operantis* (by the agent's action); therefore a fortiori it does not do it for others. But a work having value *ex opere operato* (from the work itself) or *quasi ex opere operato,* like the Mass, prayers offered in the name of the Church, etc., doubtless have value, since they are thought to come from the Church herself. The same thing is to be held regarding indulgences, so that in order to gain these for the dead the state of grace probably is not required, unless confession or perfect contrition, *as the condition,* is prescribed.

But prayers and other works of the sinner, even as a private person, are thought to be able to impetrate for the deceased, although not from the dignity of the person but from the goodness of God. In fact, those works of a sinner are thought also to make satisfaction for the dead, if the sinner performs them under the command of a just person, since they are thought to take place by the one commanding, for example, if a servant being in sin gives alms at the command of his lord (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 71, a. 3).[1]

254. How do suffrages work? Not *as condignly meritorious,* with which some cannot be exchanged for others.

Certainly they work *as the satisfaction* either of Christ or of the saints or of the faithful, since God accepts those works as if they had been done by the dead themselves in order to take away the punishment. Therefore by this vicarious satisfaction the honor lost by sin is restored by God and as much punishment is remitted as the satisfaction warrants. More probably it is *a promise of God* to accept the satisfaction of the living, so that therefore it has its value not out of pure mercy, but *out of justice* and therefore infallibly.

It also works *as impetration.* Indeed prayer aids the dead also as a work

1. See however Suarez, 48,8 n.16. Likewise whatever good thing is done for the dead, like burial, serves as a suffrage for the dead (2 Sam. 2:5; Matt. 26:12), to cover the body, to accompany the body to the grave, to adorn it, etc., provided these things are done with a desire of interceding for the dead and not merely as solace for the living (S.Th., *Suppl.* 71, a. 11; Bellarmine, 2,19). More probably an external work done at the request of the deceased has value as a suffrage, independently of the will of the doer, and as distinct from the act of the one requesting it, since according to the common opinion every external work, as distinct from the internal act, increases the satisfactory worth, as if someone should give an alms in the name of the one directing him to give it (S.Th., q.71, a. 3; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.45 a.2 q.2). Similarly many think that restitution of some goods, commanded by a dead person while still alive, helps the dead (Arriaga, *De paenit.* d.23 s.6 n.33; see however Suarez, 48,8,19-21.

of atonement, but especially as it is by way of impetration, just like the prayer of the blessed, which, without being satisfactory, helps us and the souls in purgatory. But, in all probability, God then remits the punishment not out of pure mercy, but with the added satisfaction from the treasury of the Church, by which he satisfies the divine justice.[2]

255. a) There is in the tradition of the faithful "*A heroic act of charity* toward the souls detained in purgatory" consisting in the fact "that faithful Christians, whether by the use of some formula or also only mentally, offer to God Almighty for the souls in purgatory all their works of satisfaction, which they merit as long as they live; and also all the suffrages which after death may come to them in any way whatsoever... This heroic act of charity has been approved by the Apostolic See more than once; indeed, in order for it to be more useful to the dead, it has been enriched with indulgences for those who make it. Accordingly...Pope Pius IX... confirmed, increased, and extended it to all of Christ's faithful."[3]

Therefore, having made that act, does God accept it in such a way that the one who elicited it is severely punished (for his guilt of punishment) in purgatory? We think that the answer must be in the negative. Moreover, that act, which is rightly called "heroic" and is born of pure charity, is itself very meritorious.

b) There is also in the praxis of the faithful *the offering of communion* as a suffrage for the dead.[4] But since communion does not seem to be a penal work and therefore a work of atonement, it is thought to help the dead both as impetration and also probably, if there is something of a *special* suffrage for the dead in it, as meritorious congruously.[5]

c) In the offering of suffrages *the total condign merit* from the works goes to the one making the offering; but he is deprived of their atoning value according to the measure with which he applies it to someone else.

256. Who benefits from suffrages? Not the blessed nor the damned, but only the souls in purgatory. And indeed first of all and primarily, as generally is to be presumed from the doctrine and praxis of the Church (D 2630), those for whom they are offered, in fact for them always and

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2. Suarez, 48,5,5. See I. Muscat, C.M., *De virtute satisfactoria operum bonorum in ordine ad alios:* DivThom (Pi) 14 (1885) 337-349.
3. Sacred Congregation of Indulgences: ASS 18 (1885) 337-339. See C. Gennari, *Consultazioni Morali-Canoniche-Liturgiche* t.2[2] (Rome 1902) cons.136 n.1.8-15; G.P. Pighi, *Cursus theologiae moralis* t.3[4] (Verona 1928) n.562f.; Id., *Dell'atto Eroica di carità* (Verona 1904); D. Mannajoli, *L'atto eroica di carità in suffragio delle anime del Purgatorio* (Rome 1932); F. Beringer-P.A. Steinen, S.J., *Les indulgences*[4] (vers. Ph.Mazoyer) 1 (Paris1925) n. 829-831; F.M., C., *L'acte héroique:* AmCl 64 (1934) 681-685.
4. See G. Ferrari, *L'offerta della comunione per i defunti* (Brescia 1944).
5. This congruous merit which perhaps, besides the condign merit, is present in all the good works of the just, "is especially fitting for those works which of their nature are not penal, and which therefore have no or very little atonement value, for example, the reception of the Holy Eucharist for the dead, some alms given to a poor man by a rich man for this intention" (Beraza, n.1268).

infallibly or without the exception of a special case, as is more probable against Cajetan, etc.[6] This seems to be indicated by the praxis of the Church of praying at times *for the dead in general*, like deceased persons, lacking parents and friends who pray for them, have at least the common help of mother Church. But if those for whom the suffrages are offered do not need them, whether these are offered in common or something similar happens, it is more probable that they help others, depending on their greater dignity or necessity.[7]

257. Scholium 1. *On the place of purgatory.* Generally it is held that it is in some corporeal place,[8] according to the more or less common opinion of theologians and the faithful, and indeed, against some who formerly thought otherwise, it is in a certain place for all, which, according to Suarez with whom many agree, is "near the center of the earth"[9]; but according to St. Thomas (4 d.21 q.1 a.1 sol.2) "probably the place of purgatory is twofold: one according to the common law, and so... it is a place below connected with hell...; the other... according to the dispensation, and so some of the punished at times are said to be in different places, either for the instruction of the living or for the assistance of the dead...."

258. Scholium 2. *How many souls go to purgatory?* Like the number of the elect, so the number of the souls going to purgatory *is known by God alone*, so that the Church excludes no soul from her suffrages after death. Hence it is without good reason asserted either that all just souls are included in that number or that many are not included in that number. But this can be said piously: that many souls, at least from among those who, after a devout religious life and being fervent, are in good time strengthened by Extreme Unction and a plenary indulgence at the time of death, go directly to heaven without spending time in purgatory.

259. Scholium 3. *On the way to preach about purgatory.* Exaggerated descriptions are to be avoided and it should be pointed out that the pain of loss surpasses by far the pain of sense. According to the mind of the Council of Trent (D 1820), among ordinary people subtle questions that are not edifying should be avoided; "They should

6. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 71, a. 14; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.45 a.2 q.3; Bellarmine, 2,18; Cajetan (opusc.1 tr.16 q.5) thinks that only those dead are helped by special suffrages and indulgences who here merited to be aided by them. Salmanticenses (*De eucharistia* d.13 dub.6 n.120-123) thinks that the fruit of the Mass does not help the one for whom it is offered unless he was properly disposed for that effect at the end of his life.
7. Suarez (48,8,26) thinks that a suffrage offered for a soul that is in heaven or hell, or some satisfaction that a justified person does not need but which is not applied to others, more probably is placed in the treasury of the Church, and therefore it is not, as others say, applied to other souls according to the decision of God.
8. The Council of Trent (D 1820): "... there is a purgatory and the souls detained there...." Innocent IV (D 838): "...for such a place of purgation... we call it purgatory...." Clement VI (D "... that a purgatory exists to which the souls of those who die in the state of grace descend...." These words seem to indicate a corporeal place.
9. Suarez, 45,2,2-4; Bellarmine (2,6) mentions eight opinions on this matter; Siuri, 5,2; Palmieri, § 19-29; Hurter, 3 n.672,10; Lessius, *op.cit.*, 17,13 n.90: "This opinion is very probable, which the consensus of the faithful readily embraces."

not permit opinions that are doubtful and tainted with error to be spread"; "As for those things that belong to the realm of curiosity or superstition or smack of dishonorable gain," they should be forbidden.

Scholium 4. *On the zeal for helping the souls in purgatory with suffrages.* To help the souls in purgatory with prayers, with the offering of the sacrifice, with satisfactions, with indulgences is very pleasing to God who wants to bring them to himself and make himself known to the souls seeking him, and it is doubtless useful for us to obtain the prayers of those dwelling either later in heaven or now in purgatory.

"Those who have died before our eyes, unless they died contaminated with mortal sin, live for the Lord and remain united with us in faith and charity," says the Council of Vienne. "They help us with their suffrages, and those not yet admitted to see God are expecting to be helped by our suffrages. Let it never happen that they feel that we have abandoned them. From us they do not ask for tears, but the assistance of good works. It was ordered by the Apostles themselves that a commemoration of the deceased be made in the venerable and awesome mysteries... By the prayer of faith we offer an infinite reward, by which the world was redeemed, for the debts of the dead and they are bathed with heavenly moisture. We add prayers, alms and other good works. Pastors and all preachers of the divine word and also the teachers of religion often say how good and holy the thought is to pray for the dead that they may be freed from their sins. This is very pleasing in the eyes of God who loves those whom he punishes. It is good for the souls atoning for their sins, because their liberation will be accelerated; it is good for us, since moved by the pious affection for them of the judge, who demands the last farthing, our memory is sharpened and the horror even of venial sin is either stirred up or increased... Let the praiseworthy use of prayers be preserved and proclaimed, which are recited three times daily in memory of the Incarnation of the Lord, and add to them the Lord's prayer and the angelic salutation offered for the alleviation of the dead."[10]

10. Council of the Prov. of Vienne (1858), Decreta, tit.4 c.16: CL 5,191.

BOOK II

On the end of the world

260. Since in what has been said so far we have treated *the last things concerning man*, we have proved that the time of man's testing is completed by death, after which all men are subjected to a particular judgment, so that immediately, *either* they are given the *reward* of beatitude consisting essentially in seeing God and loving him with joy, *or* they are afflicted with the eternal *punishment* both of loss and of corporeal fire, except for the justified who are liberated, after first being cleansed by the pains of purgatory either of all due punishment or also of the stain of venial sin.

But immediately the question comes to mind about the future of the human race, and also about the fate of the material world. As individual men after the pilgrim state of life obtain definitively their final state, will not also the human race at some time cease in propagating new members, in fact will not the material world in the future either be destroyed or be constituted in a definitive condition? But how will these things take place?

We now have to respond to this question about the end of the world, so that first of all we will treat *the end of the human race,* the second coming of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, the last judgment, the retribution immediately after it of reward or punishment, that is, about excluding chiliasm, and then we will consider briefly *the end of the material world.*

However, all of these last things are so mingled together in the sources and referred as it were to one point in time, that any mention of them seems to connote all the others, for example, if one says *the sign of your coming and of the close of the age* (Matt. 24:3), *the Son of man in his day* (Luke 17:24), *the day... of the Lord* (1 Cor. 3:13), *on the last day* (John 6:39-54), *until the judgment of the great day* Jude 6), etc.[1]

In addition to general works on the last things, the following can also consulted:

Suarez, *De Mysteriis vitae Christi* disp.50.52-58; S. Sigmund, *Das Ende der Zeiten oder das Weltgericht mit seinen Ursache, Vorzeichen und Folgen* (Salzburg 1892); A. Calmet, O.S.B., *Commentaire litteral* t.21 (Paris 1716): *Dissertation sur l'Anti-Christ,* XXVI-LVII; *Dissertation sur la fin du monde, et sur l'êtat du monde après le dernier jugement,* LVIII-LXXXV; *Dissertation sur la résurrection des morts,* LXXXVI- CVIII; F.A. Stentrup, S.J., *Soteriologia* 2 (Innsbruck 1889); F. Tilmann, *Die Wiederkunft Christi nach den paulinischen Briefen* (Munich 19140; Staudinger, *Die letzte Zei. Vom Sinn des Weltgeschehens nach seiner göttlichen Zielsetzung* (Innsbruck 1955).

1. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 20,30,5: ML 41,708: "Therefore in that judgment or concerning that judgment we have learned that these things are going to come: Elijah the Thesbite, the faith of the Jews, the persecution by the Antichrist, Christ as judge, the resurrection of the dead, the separation of the good from the bad, the conflagration of the world and its renewal. It must be believed that all of these things will happen, but by what means or in what order they come about, then the experience of these things will teach us more than now the understanding of man is able to grasp completely."

CHAPTER I

On the second coming of Christ

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 73f. 90; Beraza, n.1390-1425; Pesch, 9 th.41; Pohle-Gierens, 3 p.695-704; M. Heimbucher, *Zeit und Zeichen des Weltendes:* ThPrakQschr 78 (1925) 314-325, 461-474.

261. Connection. Since the last things of the human race stand in close connection with the future second coming of Christ, we will consider this first together with its circumstances and the signs foretelling it. But we have to give this warning: we are dealing here with eschatology, which is thought to be among the most difficult matters contained in the New Testament.

The fact of the coming of Christ. Besides the humble first coming of Christ, it is denied by no one that there is going to be another coming that will be solemn and glorious, and it will be established from documents and arguments

Which offer proof for the last judgment. But here let it suffice to point out the following.

He will come therefore: a) *In the glory of the Father with the holy angels* (Mark 8:38). *In his glory and the glory of the Father and of the holy angels* (Luke 9:26). *With all his saints* (1 Thess. 3:13). b) *On the clouds of heaven with power and great glory* (Matt. 24:30). c) *In flaming fire* (2 Thess. 1:7). d) *Sitting on his glorious throne* (Matt. 19:28). e) And then *will appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven* (Matt. 24:30); this sign is generally thought to be the cross of Christ, either the same wooden cross of the Crucifixion or another formed in heaven in a luminous way.[2]

For it is advantageous: that the author himself of Redemption place a crown on this; that the one crucified on earth enjoy now a glorious triumph over his enemies; that the one who first came in humility should appear again in glory. Rev. 1:7: *Behold, he is coming with the clouds, and every eye will see him, and every one who pierced him...*(S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 90, a. 1f.).

The *advent itself* is called: the coming (Matt. 24:3); the appearance of the Lord (1 Tim. 6:14); the revelation of Jesus Christ (1 Pet. 1:7).

But the day of his coming is called: the day of the Son of man (Luke 17:27); "the day...

2. St. John Chrysostom, *In Matt.* hom.76,2: MG 58,702: "The cross, more bright than the sun: if indeed the sun is made dark and is hidden, the cross will appear; but it would not appear, unless it were by far brighter than the rays of the sun." See Knabenbauer, *In Mt* 24,30 t.6 p.345; Prat, *Jésus-Christ* 2[2] (Paris 1933) 251.

of the Lord" (1 Cor. 3:13); the day of Christ Jesus (Phil. 1:6); the last day (John 6:44).[3]

262. The time of Christ's coming. Even at the beginning of the Church there were not lacking those who assigned the year or at least the epoch for the coming of the Lord.[4] But it is absolutely certain that for us it is: a) Unknown. Matt. 24:36: *But of that day and hour no one knows, not even the angels of heaven, but only the Father.* b) And always will be unknown, since Christ will come suddenly. Matt. 24:27: *For as the lightning comes from the east and shines as far as the west, so will be the coming of the Son of man.* 2 Pet. 3:10: *But the day of the Lord will come like a thief.*

Hence Christ exhorts both present and future men to be vigilant. Matt. 24:42-44: *Watch therefore, for you do not know on what day your Lord is coming. But know this, if the householder had known in what part of the night the thief was coming, he would have watched... Therefore you also must be ready; for the Son of man is coming at an hour you do not expect.*

263. Signs of the coming of Christ. Although the coming of Christ is hidden from us and will take place suddenly, nevertheless, according to Christ's words, in some way it will be able to be foreseen. Matt. 24:32f.: *From the fig tree learn its lesson: as soon as its branch becomes tender and puts forth its leaves, you know that summer is near. So also, when you see all these things, you know that he is near, at the very gates.* Therefore there are some *signs* of his coming, some of which are *negative,* facts which precede his coming, but without showing that he is near, but other signs are *positive,* or facts which take place immediately before the coming of Christ, and from which those living then will be able to judge that his coming is near. They are the following:

1) *The preaching of the Gospel in the whole world.* When the Apostles asked Jesus about his second coming, he said among other things also this (Matt. 24:14): *And this gospel of the kingdom will be preached throughout the whole world, as a testimony to all nations; and then the end will come.* But since in this pericope he talks about the destruction of Jerusalem and the end of the world, the quoted words are rather about this (v.8.14). There-

3. See Luke 17:24.26; John 6:39f.55; 11:24; 12:48; 1 Thess. 5:2; 1 Cor. 1:8; 5:5; 2 Cor. 1:14; 2 Pet. 3:10.12; Phil. 1:10; 2:16. It should be recalled here that in Fundamental Theology the objection was refuted that Christ erroneously thought that the end of the world was imminent (vol. 1, treatise 3, n.36-78).

4. See Hurter, 3 n.694, note; Katschthaler, n. 386, note. Recently, v.gr., Elie Daniel (*Serait ce vraiment la fin des temps? Etude sur les prophéties* [Paris 1927] tried to prove the relative propinquity of the end of the world. Also, the prophecy of St. Malachi about the succession of the Supreme Pontiffs is held to be not authentic; see E. Vacandard, *La prophetie de Malachie sur la succession des Papas:* RevApol 33 (1921) 657-671; I. Puig, S.J., *El fin del mundo* (Buenos Aires 1941) c.11; A. Maury, *¿Hay que tomar en serio la profecía de Malaquias?:* Eccl 11 (1951,1) 723f. On this whole matter, see Heimbucher, 314-325, 471-474.

fore the expression "the whole world," which elsewhere is used also for the Roman Empire (Luke 2:1; Acts 11:28; 24:5; Rom. 10:18; Col. 1:6), must be understood here from the context and from Mark 16:15f. (*Preach the gospel to the whole creation*) to refer to the whole world.

But that preaching must not necessarily be understood to be about the conversion of all, or on the other hand, that no one is converted; but it means to preach the faith to all peoples, and likewise doubtless it refers to professing and living the faith more or less in all nations.[5]

264. 2) *The coming of the Antichrist.*[6] This name designates: a) *broadly,* the one who is Christ's adversary, so that therefore there are many antichrists; b) but by *antonomasia,* someone coming at the end of the world as a bitter enemy of Christ. Both meanings are found in 1 John 2:18-22: ... *As you have heard that antichrist is coming, so now many antichrists have come; therefore we know that it is the last hour... This is the antichrist, he who denies the Father and the Son....* 1 John 4:1f.: *Many false prophets have gone out into the world... and every spirit which does not confess Jesus is not of God. This is the spirit of antichrist, of which you have heard that it is coming, and now it is in the world already.*

Therefore from these words, the adversary of Christ will indeed come; by antonomasia he is called "Antichrist" and the other adversaries of Christ assume the same name.

2 Thess. 2:3-12 agrees with this: *Concerning the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ... we beg you, brethren... Let no one deceive you in any way; for that day will not come, unless the rebellion comes first, and the man of lawlessness is revealed, the son of perdition, who opposes and exalts himself against every so-called god..., proclaiming himself to be God... And you know what is restraining him now so that he may be revealed in his time. For the mystery of lawlessness is already at work; only he who now restrains it will do so until he is out of the way. And then the lawless one will be revealed, and the Lord Jesus will slay him with the breath of his mouth and destroy him by his appearing and his coming. The coming of the lawless one by the activity of Satan will be with all power and with pretended signs and wonders, and with all wicked deception for those who*

5. See St. Augustine, *Epist.* 199,48: ML 33,923.
6. Bellarmine, *De Rom. Pont.* 1.3; Lessius, *De Antichristo et eius praecursoribus* (Antwerp 1615); Th. Malvenda, O.P., *De Antichristo libri XI* (Rome 1604); A. Lemann, *L'Antichrist* (Lyons 1905); A. Arrighini, *L'Antichristo* (Turin 1945); A. Romeo, *L'Antichristo* (Rome 1946); D. Buzy, *Antéchrist:* DBS 1,297-305; Bover, 885-887, 909-916; Vosté, *In epistolas ad Thessalonicenses* (Rome 1917) p.263-288; J. Pieper, *Über das Ende der Zeit. Eine geschichtsphilosophische Meditation* (Munich 1950) c.3.

are to perish....[7]

Therefore from these texts, to which perhaps others could be added,[8] it is certain that before the coming of Christ a great enemy of Christ will appear, who from the whole context is easily identified with the Antichrist to whom John is referring.

Furthermore, from these texts and from the quoted passage from St. John it can be deduced that he is not a mere personification of evil, as some Protestants[9] have held, but a *real* person, but not the devil incarnate or appearing to be a man. Indeed they show that he is an individual human person, as is generally held,[10] since he is distinguished from other antichrists and is called *the man of sin;* although there are not lacking whose who think that he is a *collectivity*[11] or even a series of persons existing from the time of Paul until the end of the world, since in his iniquity he will be especially revealed.[12] However, to these authors this at least can be conceded, that all the adversaries of Christ coalesce into as it were one body with the Antichrist, especially those whom he doubtless will have as followers when he comes (Matt. 24:24).

265. 3) *Apostasy from the Christian faith.* 2 Thess. 2:3...: *Let no one deceive you in any way; for that day will not come, unless the rebellion comes first, and the man of lawlessness is revealed....* From these words, therefore, it is certain that before the coming of the Lord a rebellion will take place that is quite universal; but it will not come from the Roman Empire with its excellent juridical order, as Bellarmine thought while following many of the Fathers, but from the principles of the Christian religion through atheism, materialism, etc.[13]; so that it will be, not from individual men, for the Church will always survive, but more probably from nations which, with the consent of many or of the greater part of the people, will attack the Church and try to destroy it (1 Tim. 4:1; 2 Tim. 3:1). But this

7. See B. Rigaux, O.F.M., *L'Homme du peché dans saint Paul:* EphThLov 6 (1929) 5-22; Id., *L'Antéchrist et l'opposition au Royaume Messianique dans l'Ancien et dans le Nouveau Testament* (Paris 1932). M. Brunec, C.D.B., *Sermo eschatologicus:* VerDom 31 (1953) 13-20, holds that it is very doubtful that John is dealing with the Antichrist in these verses, but rather with those who at the time were disturbing the faithful, especially concerning the proximity of the parousia.
8. Rev. 13: see Allò, *L'Apocalypse* (Paris 1921) 182-186. Dan. 7:7.24f.; 11:36f.; see J. Linder, S.J., *Commentarius in librum Daniel* (Paris 1939) 303.317.467f.
9. See Knabenbauer, at this place, p. 146.
10. Rigaux, *loc.cit.;* Knabenbauer, *loc.cit.*
11. See Rigaux: EphThLov p.10f.
12. Allò, CXIII-CXXI.198-214, 277-279; Buzy, 297-305; Id., *L'adversaire et l'obstacle:* RechScRel 24 (1934) 402-431; Bonsirven, *op.cit.,* 135f.; F. Amiot, *L'enseignement de S.Paul* 2 (Paris 1938) p.211; J. Schmid, *Der Antichrist und die kommende Macht* (2 Thess 2,1-12); ThQschr 129 (1949) 323-343.
13. Bellarmine, 3,5; see Knabenbauer, at this place; Lagrange, Évangile selon Saint Luc[4] (Paris 1927) p.472-474; Pesch, 9,678. Also see F. Puzo, S.J., ¿Un testo escatológico?: EstEcl 19 (1945) 273-334 (especially 329-334).

with more probability can be understood partially as the preparation for the coming of the Antichrist and partly as his own work.

266. 4) *The conversion of the Jews.*[14] The conversion of the Jews has been predicted, which must not necessarily be understood to include each and every one, but a certain number of them, so that it can be said morally that Israel has been converted. Hos. 3:4: *The children of Israel shall return and seek the Lord their God, and David their king.*[15] Rom. 11:25f.: *I want you to understand this mystery... a hardening has come upon part of Israel, until the full number of the Gentiles come in, and so all Israel will be saved, as it is written: The Deliverer will come from Zion, he will banish ungodliness from Jacob....*

St. Augustine: "Concerning the last time before the judgment, it is often found in the words and hearts of the faithful that the Jews will believe in the true Messiah, that is, in our Christ." St. Jerome: "Since this world will pass away and the fullness of the Gentiles will arrive, then also this fig tree will bear its fruit and all Israel will be saved."[16]

The conversion of the Jews will be deferred, according to St. Paul (Rom. 11:25; see also Luke 21:24), *until the fullness of the Gentiles has arrived.* But can the beginning of this happen in the meantime, when the dispersed Jews are settling now in Palestine and building a Jewish State (whatever political form it takes whether orthodox or atheistic or communist)? But if that is the case, is it a sign that their conversion is imminent? Since the Gospel is totally silent about this, we will not attempt to give a response to these questions.[17]

267. 5) *The coming of Elijah and Henoch.*[18] Mal. 4:5f.: *Behold, I will send you Elijah the prophet before the great and terrible day of the Lord comes. And he will turn the hearts of fathers to their children and the hearts of children to their fathers, lest I come and smite the land with a curse.* Sir. 48:10: *You who* (Elijah) *are ready at the appointed time, it is written, to calm the wrath of God....* Matt. 17:10f.: *And the disciples asked him...: Why*

14. See Bover, 887f.; T. Martín de Beláustegui, *La conversión de los judios y el fin de las naciónes* (Barcelona 1922); Theotime de Saint-Just, *La conversion final des Juifs. Le retour des nations au Christ-Roi:* EtFranc 49 (1937) 395-419; R. Thibaut, S.J., *La grande tribulation:* NouvRevTh 55 (1928) 373-376; Ch. Marcault, *Comment Israel reviendra-t-il au Messie* (Paris 1924); A. Colunga, O.P., *El reino de Israel en los planes divinos. A propósito de la instauración judía en Palestina:* CienTom 76 (1949) 353-366; J.M. González Ruiz, *La restauración de Israel en los Profetas:* EstBibl 11 (1952) 174-187.

15. But others explain this text differently: see Knabenbauer, at this place.

16. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 20 29: ML 41,704; St. Jerome, *In Hab.* 3,17: ML 25,1333. See St. Prosper, *De vocat. omnium gentium* 1,21: ML 51,67ff.

17. Colunga, *loc.cit.* See also J. Leal, S.J., *El destino salvador de Israel:* RazFe 143 (1951) 365-374.

18. Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in prophetas,* at this place, 582-587. E. Mangenot, *Elie:* DB 2, 1675f.; L. van den Eerenbeemt, *Elias propheta in novissimis diebus:* VerDom 4 (1924) 259-263; A. Skrinjar, *Elias quidem venturus est...:* VerDom 14 (19240 361-367; A. de Guglielmo, *De reditu Eliae dissertatio exegetica* (Jerusalem 1938); E. Palis, *Hénoch:* DB 3,593f.

do the scribes say that first Elijah must come? He replied: Elijah does come, and he is to restore all things; but I tell you that Elijah has already come.... But these last words are about John the Baptist, as the disciples understood the matter (Luke 1:17).

According to Suarez, "all the Fathers" read these texts of Malachi and Matthew as being about the future coming of Elijah, who also are said generally to assert his coming.[19] Bellarmine when treating the coming of Elijah and Henoch says that "the contrary is either heresy or an error approaching heresy" and Suarez is of the same opinion.[20] Moreover, theologians, even modern ones, generally and rightly mention this coming. But now some exegetes seem to have doubts about it, such as Tobac, Condamin, Van Hoonacker, Allò (regarding Henoch), Huby, Chaine, Meighan, Buzy, Spadafora, Pirot-Leconte, Spicq, Rehm.[21]

The future conversion of the Jews is attributed to Elijah, as we recently heard St. Augustine when he was treating this matter. St. Gregory the Great: "...Hence in the Gospel Truth also says: Elijah will come and he will restore all things (Matt. 17:11). For now the Church has lost the Israelites, whom she was not able to convert by her preaching, but then, when Elijah will be preaching, he will collect as many as he finds, so that he will receive more than he lost."[22]

The coming of Henoch is less probable. Maldonado thinks that Moses will come instead of Henoch. A Lapide and many others explain as more probably referring to Elijah and Henoch this verse in Rev. 11:3: *And I will grant my two witnesses to power to prophesy....*[23] But others deny that interpretation.[24]

268. 6) *Phenomena of nature* (which doubtless will be near to the time of the coming of Christ): a) Heavenly. Matt. 24:29f.: *Immediately after the tribulation of those days the sun will be darkened, and the moon will not give its light ,and the stars will fall from heaven, and the powers of the heavens will be shaken; then will appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven* (see Mark 13:24-26). b) Earthly. Luke 21:25: *And there will be signs in sun and moon and stars, and upon the earth distress of nations in perplexity at the roaring of the sea and the waves, men fainting with fear...* (see Joel 2:30).

19. See Suarez, 55,2 n.4-7. Lennerz (n.273): "The Fathers also clearly teach that Elijah will come at the end of the world."
20. Bellarmine, 3,6; Suarez, 55,2,2.
21. E. Tobac, *Malachie:* DTC 9,1755-1759; A. Condamin: RevApol 34 (19220 108f.; A. van Hoonacker, *Les douze petits prophètes* (Paris 1908) 740f; Allò, *loc.cit.*, XLIVf.131.139-142; Huby, Évangile selon Saint Marc (Paris 1929) 227f.; J. Chaine, *Introduction à la lecture des Prophètes* (Paris 1932) p.241; J.M. Meignan, *Les prophètes d'Israel. Quatre siècles de lutte contre l'idolatrie* (Paris 1950) 144; F. Spadafora, *Elia:* EncCatt 5 (1951) 233; L. Pirot-R. Leconte, Évangile selon Saint Marc: PirClam, *ibid.* 503f,; Spicq, *L'Ecclesiastique,* 822; Rehm, *loc.cit.* See Lagrange, Évangile selon Saint Marc[4] 236f. (these words—9:12f.—rightly understood are not about the second coming of Elijah, but about the coming of John the Baptist).
22. St. Gregory the Great, *Moral.* 35,14,34: ML 76,762.
23. Stentrup, th.160; A Lapide, *In Apoc* 11,3; Palis, *loc.cit.*, 593f.; Maldonado, *In Mt* 17,3.11.
24. Allò, 131.139-142.

But these phenomena, which some, like St. Augustine, are taken allegorically,[25] more commonly both by exegetes and by theologians are understood in a *real* sense, not indeed literally, as if, for example, the stars truly fall, but certainly about real *physical* phenomena—surely only with respect to our earth—of whatsoever kind they may be, v.gr., perhaps consisting in falling meteors.

Moreover, it is difficult to define how and in what measure these phenomena take place and in vain would one attempt to determine the nature of the individual signs of the coming of Christ (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 73).

N.B. a) *The conflagration of the world* at the future end of the world (2 Pet. 3:10) would be placed in a sign and surely in proximate signs of the coming of Christ, if it were certain that it will take place before the resurrection, as some think (this seems to be the more common opinion),[26] but not after it, according to the opinion of others.[27]

b) As in the O.T. any judgment of God (Isa. 66:15-17; Joel 2:1-3; Ps. 97:3), so also in the N.T. *the final judgment of God* is described *as taking place by fire* (1 Cor. 3:13; 2 Thess. 1:8; 2 Pet. 3:12). Is *this fire of the final judgment* metaphorical or corporeal? It is not certain. If it is not identified with the fire of the *conflagration,* it may be taken more easily as *metaphorical,* being used by reason of its glowing and clarity in illuminating and of its subtlety in penetrating and of its ardor in its vindicating efficacy. But if it is identified with the fire of the conflagration as is more probable but without being certain about it, then it should be understood as *real.*[28]

c) Some of the things that we understand about the end of the world along with the common opinion about the last judgment and its signs, Feuillet understands differently, when, for example, he interprets the pericopes in Matt. 21:1-

25. St. Augustine, *Epist.* 199 c.11 n.39: ML 33,919; De civ. Dei 20.24,1: ML 41,697. The following also do not seem to understand this matter in a physical sense: A. Durand (Évangile selon Saint Matthieu 24,29 [Paris 1927] p.440f.) who says that the opinion is not forbidden that these formulas indicate only a reverent fear of nature concerning the coming of the judge; Lagrange (Évangile selon Saint Matthieu 24,29 p.467; Id., Évangile selon Saint Marc 13,24 p.345f.; Id., *L'avénement du fils de l'homme:* RevBibl [1906] 388 who thinks that with these words that it is not signs of the end of the world that is proposed but images by which the intervention of the majesty of God is being expressed. In this he is followed by: Huby, 346; Id., *Apocalypse et histoire:* Constr 15 (1944) 80-100; E. Mangenot, *Fin du monde*: DTC 5,2510; A. Feuillet, P.S.S., *Le discours de Jésus sur la ruine du temple:* RevBibl 56 (1949) 62f. See Prat, *Jésus-Christ* 2 p.251 (he says that this matter is obscure).
26. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 74, a. 7f.; A Lapide, *In 2 Petr 3,7*; Palmieri, § 48 n.3 and he adds: "Whether the fire will begin before the judge comes or at the time of his coming, we can say absolutely nothing with certainty." Katschthaler, p. 420 says: "Before the judgment, in the judgment, after the judgment."
27. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 1.20 c.14.16.30: ML 41,679.682.7-8; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.47 a.2 q.5 ad 1; Suarez, 57,1,6; Pohle-Gierens, 3 p.703; Jungmann, n.177. Huby (*loc.cit:* Constr 15 [1944] 89) however thinks that it can be taken symbolically and also, seemingly, J. Chaine, *op.cit.*, 87.91f.
28. See Michel, *Feu du jugement:* DTC 5,2239,2246.

44, Mark 13:24-27, Luke 21:25-27 totally about the end of the Jewish kingdom brought about by Christ triumphing by his death and resurrection and establishing the new kingdom of his Church to replace the old one.[29]

29. Feuillet, *La venue du règne de Dieu et du Fils de l'homme (d'après luc 17,20 à 18,8):* RechScRel 35 (1948) 544-565; *Le discours de Jésus sur la ruine du Temple:* RevBibl 55 (1948) 487-502; 56 (1949) 61-92; *La synthèse eschatologique de Saint Matthieu (XXIV-XXV); ibid.*, 340-364; 57 (1950) 62-91, 180-211. Similarly Spadafora, *Gesù e la fine de Gerusalemme* (Rovigo 1950); *Escatologia:* EncCatt 5 (1950) 544-548. Brunec, *loc.cit.*, 218-220, 348-351, holds that the sign is only a cosmic disturbance; there will be more about this later.

CHAPTER II

On the resurrection of the flesh

ARTICLE I

ON THE FUTURE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD

Thesis 12. At the second coming of Christ all men will rise again with the same bodies that they had in this life.

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 75-86; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.43 a.1; d.44 q.1 a.1-3; Suarez, d.50; Beraza, n. 142-194; Lennerz, n.283-294; De Broglie, th.15; Michel, *Résurrection des morts:* DTC 3,2501-2571.

269. Connection. In the preceding sections we have treated the second coming of Christ. Now the question is about the resurrection of the dead. Therefore, now that we are going to speak about this, we will establish its fact and universality, the identity of the resurrecting body with the previously living body, and we will do it *with one proof,* since all of these questions are proved by the same arguments.

270. Definition of terms. *At the second coming of Christ,* that is, the coming that will take place at the end of the world, as opposed to his first coming by his incarnation. According to the way the sources speak, it is necessary to think that, at more or less the same time, Christ will come again and the dead will rise; but the time of this event cannot be determined further.

All men, that is, adults, whether good or bad, and infants, whether baptized or not baptized and whether they died outside of the womb or inside the womb.

But not the just of the last generation unless, as is probable, they have also died; nor those who have already resurrected definitively, like the Blessed Virgin and, according to many authors,[1] those who rose with Christ (Matt. 27:52f.), although others reject this view.[2]

Since man is as it were by antonomasia an adult and therefore morally aware of his own acts, the sources in this matter expressly are not wont to mention infants. Neverthe-

1. Suarez, *loc.cit.,* in q.57 a.3 n.14f.; Knabenbauer, *In Mt 27,52f.* P.546. See also H. Zeller, *Corpora sanctorum. Eine Studie zu Matt 27,52-53:* ZkathTh 71 (1949) 385-465. A. Winkelhofer denies that this text is dealing with persons rising from the dead, *Corpora sanctorum:* ThQschr 132 (1952) 30-67.
2. S.Th. III, q. 53, a. 3 (but previously—*Suppl.* q. 77, a. 1 ad 3—he seems to have thought differently); St. Augustine, *Ep.* 164,9: ML 33,712.

less since they (whether they are baptized or not and whether they died outside of the mother's womb or while still inside) they really belong to the human race and therefore they are truly human beings, although they cannot give an account of their actions and, since the sources never exclude them, there is no reason why they should not be included in the statements about the resurrection.

271. *They will rise again.* The fact of the resurrection is asserted, which is the joining together again of the same soul with the *same* body (S.Th., 4 CG 79) in one nature and therefore in one person. Therefore it can also be defined as: *the recalling of the human body to the life that it lost in death.*

Therefore it is not a *re-creation*, whereby God recalls an annihilated being back to life, but a *change,* since it is produced from a presupposed subject. For this reason it takes place only in corruptible beings or in those composed of matter and form. It is a *substantial* change, for since the production (like the being) of an accident, and therefore its corruption, takes place only in a certain respect, the reparation of an accidental composite is also only in a certain respect, and therefore it is not called a resurrection. In a resurrection *the same man* comes to be who had ceased to exist, since otherwise it would not be a resurrection, but the multiplication of men and as it were a new generation.

Thus Suarez defines resurrection from the way the word is used in the theological sources: resurrection is "a substantial change whereby the very same thing is produced again which formerly existed and was corrupted."[3]

Resurrection: looked at *actively,* it is more fittingly called a *resuscitation,* as an action of God calling the dead back to life; *passively* it is said to be *a resurrection of the flesh,* as it is distinguished from the resurrection of the spirit through grace (Col.3:1) and especially lest anyone think that the soul perished together with the body and that the soul also is called back to life with the body (*Roman Catechism* 1,12,2).

272. *With the same bodies that they had in this life.* Therefore identity is required of the resurrecting body with the dead body, one that is *not merely specific*, so that the soul assumes a human body, numerically distinct from what it had before, *but actually numerically the same*, so that the soul takes on the exact same body that it animated previously.

But this assertion about the *numerical* identity required for the Catholic understanding of the resurrection, must be carefully distinguished from another question disputed among Catholics, namely, whether *the same matter* the body contained before is required for this numerical identity, for example, of Peter, whether it suffices that his soul is so united *with any matter whatsoever* so that he retains his same individuation. We are not considering this matter in the thesis, but it will be treated below in a scholium.

3. Suarez, 44,1,1.

273. Adversaries. In ancient times the *Gentiles* (Acts 17:32).[4] The *Sadducees* (Matt. 22:23; Mark 12:18; Luke 20:27; Acts 23:8). Some Christians in the Apostolic age (1 Cor. 15:12), among whom were Hymenaeus and Philetus, who said that the resurrection is past already (2 Tim. 2:16-19). Many Gnostics.[5] Marcion and the *Marcionists.*[6] The *Manicheans.*[7]

Later the Albigensians. According to the *Socinians* only *good persons* resurrect, and also with a *spiritual* body.[8]

Afterwards the *Rationalists and some Protestants.*[9] *Some Adventists* said that the wicked do not resurrect, but are in an eternal sleep.[10]

274. Doctrine of the Church. *Lateran Council IV* (D 801): All the elect and the reprobate "will rise again with their own bodies which they now bear to receive according to their works...." *The Council of Lyons II* (D 859): "All human persons will appear with their bodies before the judgment seat of Christ to render an account of their own deeds." Benedict XII (D 1002) repeats the same words.

The Creeds: Of the *Apostles* mentions (D 11, 30, 41) "the resurrection of the flesh." Of *Epiphanius* mentions (D 45) "the resurrection of the dead"; see also the *Nicene-Constantinople Creed* (D 150). The *Athanasian Creed* (D 76): "At his coming, all men are to rise again with their bodies, and they will give an account of their deeds."[10*]

Pelagius I (D 443), the provincial council of *Toledo XI* (D 540), Leo IX (D 684), Innocent III (D 797) teach almost the same thing.

275. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 801, 859, 1002) and also in the universal sense with which we understand the thesis to include all men.

But if it is objected that this universality is not proposed expressly in the quoted documents, it seems necessary to establish the following: a) It is *defined divine and Catholic faith* that it includes all adults; b) It is *divine and Catholic faith* that it includes all infants who died outside of their mother's womb, since without a good reason the

4. See Tertullian, *De praescript.* 7: ML 2,19.
5. Tixeront, 1,180.202.
6. Tixeront, 209-212.
7. Tixeront, 471-508. On the ancient heretics who denied the resurrection, see C. Schiltz, *La résurrection des corps devant la raison:* NouvRevTh 54 (1927) 281-285.
8. Klee, 2 (Paris 1848) 500; Vernet, *loc.cit.*, 678. On the Socinians, see Christiani, *Socinianisme: loc.cit.*, 2333.
9. See Katschthaler, n.352; Tanquerey, 3 n.1169-1178.
10. Tanquerey, *Adventistes: loc.cit.*, 514.

10* On the inclusion of this dogma, which is very well known, in the symbol of faith and on its connection with the preceding articles and its relation as an effect of the Holy Spirit, see P. Nautin, *Je crois à l'Esprit Saint dans la Sainte Eglise pour la Résurrection de la chair* (Paris 1947) 26f.36-39.

Church should not be thought to exclude these in her faith in the resurrection. For, the formula "the resurrection of the flesh" or "the resurrection of the dead" in the obvious sense asserts the resurrection of all and also with their same bodies. c) For the same reason, it is *divine and Catholic faith* that it includes infants who died in their mother's womb, since there is no reason for making a distinction between these and the former.[11]

However, there were those who, without a solid reason, qualified the thesis about infants only as *certain,* since the sources do not mention them explicitly.[12]

276. Proof from Holy Scripture.[13] It teaches: a) *The resurrection* in particular *regarding the justified,* in a definite way *regarding the good and the evil,* in general *regarding the dead.* But at least this last expression (and the second one from what was said above in n. 275) must be thought to include *all infants*, and also because it applies especially to the justified. In fact, baptized infants are thought to be indicated, where the concern is with the resurrection *of the justified*, especially if adults are not expressly mentioned there. b) *The identity of the resurrecting body* with the dead body, in general from the obvious meaning of resurrection, and at times quite explicitly, as will soon be apparent.

A. *Christ* teaches: a) In particular the resurrection of the just. John 6:54 (see v.39f.): *He who eats my flesh... and I will raise him up at the last day.* Luke 14:13f.: *When you give a feast, invite the poor...: you will be repaid at the resurrection of the just.*

b) In a definite way the resurrection of the good and the evil. John 5:28f.: *All who are in the tombs will hear his voice and come forth, those who have done good, to the resurrection of life, and those who have done evil, to the resurrection of judgment.*

c) In general the resurrection of the dead. He teaches the Sadducees who deny the resurrection: *In the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage... And as for the resurrection of the dead, have you not read...: I am the God of Abraham...? He is not God of the dead, but of the living* (Matt. 22:23-33; Mark 12:18-27; Luke 20:27-40). He confirms the idea of the Jews about the resurrection (Matt. 14:2; 6:14; Luke 9:8): *Martha said to him: I know that he* (Lazarus) *will rise again in the resurrection at the last day. Jesus said to her: I am the resurrection and the life* (John 11:23-25; Matt. 10:28; Luke 14:14).

B. Saints Peter and John announce (Acts 4:2): *In Jesus the resurrection from the dead.* Therefore these words apply at least to the just.

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11. Siuri, 14,2,21. See St. Augustine, *Enchir.* c.84-87: ML 40,272; *De civ. Dei* 23,13: ML 41,776.
12. See J. van der Meersch, *Expositio in quo consistat dogma de resurrectione carnis:* Collat Brug 15 (1910) 458-460.
13. Siuri, 14,2,21. See St. Augustine, *Enchir.* c.84-87: ML 40,272 .F. Nötscher, *Altorientalischer und alttestamentlicher Auferstehungsglaube* (Würzburg 1926).

277. C. St. Paul *teaches*[14]: a) In general the resurrection of the *dead.* Before the Sadducees and the Pharisees he said at the council: ... *With respect to the hope and the resurrection of the dead I am on trial* (Acts 23:6-8; see 26:23).

b) In a definite way the resurrection of the *good* and the *evil.* Before the governor Felix, Paul confesses that Christians have hope for *a future resurrection of both the just and the unjust* (Acts 24:15).

c) In particular the resurrection of the *just,* with formulas that also without doubt include baptized infants. While proposing the resurrection of Christ as the model of our resurrection, he says (Rom. 8:11): ... *He who raised Christ Jesus from the dead will give life to your mortal bodies...* 1 Thess. 4:13f....: *For since we believe that Jesus died and rose again, through Jesus, God will bring with him those who have fallen asleep.*[15]

d) He teaches the resurrection of the just in 1 Cor. 15, where, after proving the resurrection of Christ, he establishes our resurrection with these ideas derived from his resurrection: *If Christ is preached as raised from the dead, how can some of you say there is no resurrection of the dead?* (v.12). *If there is no resurrection of the dead, then Christ has not been raised...* (v.13.15f.). *If Christ has not been raised... then those also who have fallen asleep in Christ have perished* (v.14.17-19). But Christ did rise from the dead, therefore (v.21f.): *As by a man came death, by a man has come also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, so also in Christ shall all be made alive.*

Surely if the dead do not rise (v.26): *If the dead are not raised at all, why are people baptized on their behalf?*[16] (v.30-32): *If... I fought with beasts at Ephesus, what do I gain if the dead are not raised?*

The same body will rise that is buried (v.35-52): *What is sown* (the body) *is perishable, what is raised is imperishable... and the dead will be raised imperishable.*[17]

278. D. *The Old Testament* (S.Th., 4 CG 81). a) In 2 Macc. 7:9-23, the description

14. L. Simeone, *Resurrectionis iustorum doctrina in epistolis Sancti Pauli* (Rome 1938); H. Molitor, *Die Auferstehung der Christen und der Nichtchristen nach dem Apostel Paulus* (Münster 1933); C. Lattey, S.J., *Theses Paulinae: XII. De resurrectione carnis:* VerDom 6 (1926) 281-284, 309-317; Bover, 899-909; Prat, *Théologie de Saint Paul,* 2,437-443; Bonsirven, *L'Évangile de Paul* (Aubier 1948) p. 315-326; Lercher, IV-2[3] n.869-872; L. Cerfaux, *La résurrection des morts dans la vie et la pensée de saint Paul:* LumVie 1 (1925) 61-82; Ceuppens, *Quaestiones selectae ex epistolis S.Pauli* (Turin 1951) 109-139.

15. See P. Magnien, *La résurrection des morts d'après la première épître aux Thessaloniciens:* RevBib (1907) 349-382.

16. The obvious power of the argument is independent of the dogmatic explanation of the passage which is being proposed (on this see n. 15).

17. St. Paul in many other places speaks about the resurrection, v.gr., Acts. 4:2; 17:18.32; 26:8.23; 1 Cor. 6:14; 2 Cor. 4:14; Rom. 8:19.23; 2 Tim. 2:16-19; 1 Thess. 4:13-17.

of the martyrdom of the seven brothers of the Maccabees supposes the belief of the Jews in the resurrection, at least of the just, which the sacred author implicitly approves. The second brother says to the tyrant: *You... dismiss us from this present life, but the King of the universe will raise us up to an everlasting renewal of life.* The third put out his tongue and courageously stretched forth his hands, and said nobly: *I got these from Heaven, and because of his laws I disdain them, and from him I hope to get them back again.* The fourth: *One cannot but choose to die at the hands of men and cherish the hope that God gives of being raised again by him. But for you there will be no resurrection to life.* The mother said to her sons: *The Creator of the world... will give life and breath back to you again.*[18]

b) Likewise in 2 Macc. 12:43f.: About Judas, collecting money for sacrifices for the dead, it is said that: *he acted well and honorably. For if he were not expecting that those who had fallen would rise again, it would have been superfluous and foolish to pray for the dead.*. And in this matter clearly he finds approval from the sacred author.

c) From the O.T. these texts can also be cited: Isa. 26:14; 19:21; Exod. 37:1-14; Hos. 13:13[19]; Dan 12:2, where he is talking about *many*, that is, directly about those who are being considered in the whole context or about those who are being vexed and about those who are suffering persecution; but from that it is licit to conclude to the resurrection of *all*, since the same reason applies to all men.[20]

279. Job 19:25-27: *For now I know that... at the last he will stand upon the earth; and after my skin has been thus destroyed, then from my flesh I shall see God....*

Hence, besides many Protestant authors, some Catholics, among whom some modern ones are often mentioned, as for example, Peters, Szczygiel, Dhorme, Heinisch, Bigot, Dennefeld, Hudal, Junker, think that this passage concerns the restoration of Job by God to his former health and fortune, and so it is about the proclamation by God of his innocence (or perhaps simply about the proclamation in a visible theophany effected by God before his friends, as Beel says), but not about the resurrection, although, as Junker says, by his faith Job has the hope of immortality.[21]

But the Fathers who comment on that passage, like Saints Jerome, Augustine, and

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18. See H. Büchers, C.SS.R., *Das "Ewige Leben" in 2 Makk 7,36:* Bibl 21 (1940) 406-412. On the teaching about the resurrection in the O.T., see C. Larcher, *La doctrine de la résurrection dans l'Ancien Testament:* LumVie 1 (1952) 11-34.
19. St. Jerome, at this place: ML 25,938; F. König, *Die Auferstehungshoffnung bei Osee 6,1-3:* ZkathTh 70 (1948) 94-100.
20. Knabenbauer, *In Dan* 12,2 p.317. See Linder, *op.cit.*, 481f. See also Dan 12:13 (Hebrew text): "And you will rise for your fate at the end of days."
21. N. Peters, *Das Buch Job, übersetzt und erklärt* (Münster 1928); P. Szczygiel, M.S.C., *Das Buch Job* (Bonn 19310; P. Dhorme, O.P., *Le livre de Job* (Paris 1926); P. Heinisch, *Theologie des alten Testamentes* (Bonn 1940) § 43 p.257f.; L. Bigot, *Job (Livre de):* DTC 8,1473f.; L. Dennefeld, *Judaisme:* DTC 8,1484f.; A. Hudal, *Textkritische und exegetische Bemerkungen zu Job 19,25-27:* BiblZeitschr 14 (1917) 214-235; H. Junker, *Das Buch Job* (Wüurzburg 1951) 44f.; M. García, O.P., *Las esperanza de la resurrección corporal en el libro de Job:* CienTom 80 (1953) 1-23; A. Lefèbre, *Job (Le livre de*): DBS 4,1089-1091, who thinks that a certain mystery about the future life is not to be denied there, although the concern is with a temporal restoration. These words indicate a condition (If I myself after death...) according to E. Kissane, *The Book of Job* (New York 1946).

others, likewise many Catholic exegetes and almost all theologians, as for example, St. Thomas, Corluy, Hetzenauer, Knabenbauer, Ceuppens, Lesêtre, Royer, Lagrange, Prat, Ricciotti, Calês, Robin understand this passage as being about the resurrection.[22]

We think that it is more probable, since the solemn words immediately before it and immediately after it seem to bear witness to the hope of some great thing (19:23-24.28-29), while for other reasons, whether from what precedes or from what follows, Job during his earthly life is not thought to hope for some manifestation of divine justice towards himself but only death (10:20-22; 14:13; 16:22; 17:1.13-16; 19:10; 30:19-23).

280. Proof from tradition. A. *The holy Fathers.* It is hardly necessary to cite their testimonies in this fundamental matter, which is proposed by them so explicitly from the beginning, and which, according to St. Clement of Rome (R 13), the Lord continually makes known to us: "Day and night demonstrate a resurrection; the night sleeps and the day arises; the day departs and night returns" (see Minucius Felix, R 272). Hence St. Augustine says: "The resurrection of the dead is the real faith of Christians."[23]

Already at the beginning special works *on the resurrection* were written by St. Justin (?), Athenagoras,[24] Origen,[25] Tertullian,[26] St. Methodius,[27]

22. St. Jerome, *Epist.* 53,8: ML 22,545; St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 23,29,4: ML 41,799; S.Th., 4 CG 79; *In Iob* c.19 1-2; J. Corluy, *Specilegium dogmatico-biblicum* 1 (Gandavi 1884) 278-296; Hetzenauer, *Theologia biblica* 1 (Friburg im Br. 1908) 630-632; Knabenbauer, at this place; Ceuppens, *De resurrectione mortuorum apud Iob c.19 v.25-27:* Ang 7 (1930) 433-459, who cites other and many holy Fathers in favor if his interpretation; Lesêtre, 1064; Royer, *op.cit.,* 138ff.; Lagrange, *Le Judaisme avant Jésus-Christ* (Paris 1931) 353; Prat, *Job* (*Livre de*): DB 3,576f.; G. Ricciotti, *Il libro di Giobbe* (Turin 19240; J. Calês, *Bulletin d'exégèse de l'Ancien Testament:* RechScRel 16 (1926) 547; E. Robin, *Job:* PirClam 4 (Paris 1949) 785 (he at least inclines towards it).

23. St. Augustine, *Serm.* 241,1: ML 38,1133; R 1922: "A Christian should in no way doubt that the flesh will rise again of all the men who have been born and will be born and who have died and will die." See also St. Ignatius: R 74.

24. St. Justin, *De resurrectione:* MG 6,1571-1592; Athenagoras, *De resurrectione mortuorum:* MG 6,973-1024. See A. Casamassa, O.S.A., *Gli Apologisti greci* (Rome 1944) 102-107 (St. Justin) 171-181 (Athenagoras) 192-194, 205-209 (Theophilus of Antioch). L. Chaudouard, *La philosophie du dogme de la résurrection de la chair au IIe siècle* (Paris 1905).

25. Origen, *De resurrectione:* MG 11,91. See M.R. Cadiou, *La jeunesse d'Origène* (Paris 1936) p.117-126. He blames Origen because he is outside the tradition and because he did not correctly teach that the material body as such will rise again. Journet, *Saint Augustin et l'exégèse traditionelle de "corpus spirituale"*: Augustinus Magister (Paris 1955) 883f.889; see also Danielou, *Origène,* 215f.

26. Tertullian, *De resurrectione carnis:* ML 2,791-886; see D'Ales, *La théologie de Tertullien* (Paris 1905) p.150-159; Schw., Über die Auferstehungslehre Tertullians und Identität des Auferstehungsleibes im Besonderen: Kath (1860,I) 299-323.

27. St. Methodius, *De resurrectione:* MG 18,265-330. See I. Forges, *Les idées morales et religieuses de Méthode d'Olympe* (Paris 1929) 191-212.

St. John Chrysostom, Aeneas Gazaeus, St. Gregory of Nyssa.[28]

Hence in addition to other testimonies teaching either the universality of the resurrection (see, v.gr., St. Justin, R 155; St. Irenaeus, R 191; Aphraates, R 694, etc.) or the identity of the body (see, v.gr., Tatian, R 155; St. Cyril of Jerusalem, R 836f.; St. John Damascene, R 2375), now a few others will suffice, in which both assertions are given together.

Tertullian (R 365): "Therefore the flesh will rise again—and indeed all and indeed the same and indeed complete...."

St. Hippolytus (R 365): "We therefore believe that the body also is raised. For if it become corrupt, it is not completely destroyed. For the earth receiving its remains preserves them... And to every body its own proper soul will be given again; and the soul, being endued again with it, shall not be grieved, but shall rejoice together with it... But the unrighteous will receive their bodies unchanged, and unransomed from suffering and disease..., and still with all the ills in which they died."

St. Caesarius of Arles (R 2222): "There will be the resurrection of the dead...; not first of the just and then of sinners..., but one resurrection of all. And if that which fell is said to rise again, therefore our flesh rises in truth... Not... another body for the flesh, but the same corruptible flesh that falls will rise incorruptible; the incorruptible flesh of both the just and the unjust will rise again...."

281. B. The following likewise bear witness to faith in the resurrection: a) *The Acts of the Martyrs* who were strengthened in their sufferings by the hope of the resurrection.[29]

b) *The name of the cemeteries* (κοιμητήριον) or the dormitory, by which Christians designated the place for graves. From that come the expressions placed on many tombs—"he sleeps," "sleeping," "in the sleep of peace." Likewise there are in the catacombs pictures, images, inscriptions on tombs in which there is, for example, Ezechiel raising up dry bones, Lazarus res-

28. St. John Chrysostom, *De resurrectione mortuorum:* MG 50,418-432; Aeneas Gazaeus, *Diologus de animarum immortalitate et corporum resurrectione:* MG 85,872-1003; St. Gregory of Nyssa, *De anima et resurrectione dialogus:* MG 46,11-160; see *De hominis opificio* c.21-27: MG 44,202-230: on his thinking, see Danielou, *La résurrection des corps chez Grégoire de Nysse:* VidChr 7 (1953) 154-171. See on the doctrine of the holy Fathers in this matter, G. Scheurer, *Das Auferstehungsdogma in der vornicänischen Zeit* (Würzburg 1896); J.M. Nielen, *Ich glaube an die Auferstehung des Fleisches. Väterzeugnisse aus den ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten* (Freiburg im Br. 1941). Nautin says that in the tradition the resurrection was referred to the Holy Spirit, *loc.cit.*, 29-36.

29. Ruinart, *op.cit.*, p.150-494. Some Christians, especially the uneducated, feared lest, if the body were destroyed and its remains were dissipated, the resurrection would not take place: see E. le Blant, *Les persécuteurs et les martyres aux premiers siècles de notre ère* (Paris 1893) p.251-269. Likewise the pagans threw the ashes of the martyrs of Lyons to take away from them the hope of the resurrection: see Eusebius, *Hist. eccles.* 5,1: PG 20,433.

urrected, phoenix rising from the ashes, an egg from which a young chick comes forth.[30]

c) *The liturgy of the dead,* v.gr., the *Roman Ritual* has this: "Almighty God... may this cemetery be sanctified so that on the great Judgment Day the bodies resting here after life's span, in union with their fortunate souls, may delight in the joys of life without ceasing."[31]

282. Theological reasoning. 1. Christ comes into the world to restore for us what Adam lost for us by his sin, namely, immortality. But it is also fitting that this immortality should be given to us in the body which with a special connection of its origin, information, earthly life and moral life pertains to the soul.

2) If Christ, the Head of the Mystical Body, rose from the dead, it is necessary that his members likewise rise again.[32] But Christ rose with the same body that he had in his mortal life.

3) It is not fitting that the body restored by the sacraments, a temple of the Holy Spirit, a member of Christ should be submitted to the fate of the bodies of irrational animals.

All of these points, looking *expressly* at the just, to a certain extent apply also to sinners and unbelievers, if for other reasons there is no certainty about their exclusion from resurrection.

283. *Natural reason* can know nothing about the *fact* of the resurrection, such as it is in this order, since regarding the exemplar Christ, regarding its origin from the merits of Christ, regarding its manner and, at least for the just, regarding it terminus—it is supernatural; but it can show the congruity of the *fact as such:*

The whole man merits and demerits; therefore it is necessary that the whole man receive a reward or punishment. The soul is truly, per se and essentially the form of the human body; therefore also with an innate appetite it seeks to inform it and when separated from it it lacks the substantial complement naturally owed to it.

But all of these aspects directly apply to the same body of which the soul is origi-

30. S. Bour, *Epigraphie chrétienne:* DTC 5,341f; Scaglia, p.66ff.; F. Cabrol-H. Leclercq, *Monumenta Ecclesiae Liturgica* 1 (Paris 1902) n. 2776f.2882.3064.4347f.; C. Kaufmann, *Handbuch der altchristlichen Epigraphik* (Freiburg im Br. 1917) s.5-10. Prudentius, *Cathemerinon* 10: ML 59,880f.: "Some have hollowed out stones for themselves—Why do they want beautiful monuments—Except that the thing placed in it—Is not dead, but only sleeping?—Having seen this—The piety of Christians prays—Since they have faith—That they will all continue to live—Who now are detained by a cool sleep."

31. Rit. Rom. tit.8 c.29. See Cabrol-Leclercq, *Le liber Ordinum,* ed.M. Férotin, *Mon. Eccl. lit.* 5 (Paris 1904) col.113.134.392.395, etc.

32. See S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 75, a. 3; St. Gregory the Great, *Moral.* 14,55.68f.: ML 75,1075ff.; A. Capellazzi, *Egli è risorto, noi risorgeremo* (Crema 1927); J. Anger, *La doctrine du Corps Mystique de Jésus-Christ* (Paris 1929) p.4 c.1; A. Janssens, C.I.C.M., *De valore soteriologico resurrectionis Christi:* EphThLov 9 (1932) 225-233. See Rom. 6:5 and 8:10; 1 Cor. 15:20-23; Col. 3:104.

nally the form and which merited along with it. Moreover, the one who falls is also the one who rises; but it is this body that falls; therefore this same body will rise again (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 79, a. 1; St. Epiphanius: R 1088; Tertullian: R 345).

N.B. From natural reasons recently proposed resurrection more probably is *owed naturally* to human nature, according to some authors, as for example, Lessius, T. González, Costa, Rossetti, Feretti, Mercier.[33] But more commonly with St. Thomas, as it seems (*Suppl.* q. 75, a. 3), Suarez and others, this opinion is rejected, since the natural reasons for the resurrection are understood well about its suitability, but not about its necessity.[34]

Furthermore the resurrection, as it is the union of the soul with the body, and therefore setting aside other circumstances that can be present, for example, in the resurrection of the just, it can be said to be natural *by reason of the terminus,* inasmuch as it terminates in the life of nature, like the illumination of a blind person to natural vision (S.Th., *ibid.*), but by the miraculous *nature* of the means, like a miraculous cure.

The further indestructibility of life, it seems, according to Billot, is natural with regard to the substance, "on the supposition that there is a resurrection," inasmuch as now there will be nothing by which the body can be corrupted (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 86, a. 2).[35]

284. Objections. Here we will disregard the difficulties directly attacking the *exact identity of the resurrecting material body* with the dead body, since it will be explained later.

A. *From Scripture.* 1. Job 14:12: *Man lies down and rises not again.* 14:14: *If a man die, shall he live again?* Resurrection is denied with these words. Therefore there is no such thing.

I distinguish the major. Resurrection to earthly life is denied with these words, *conceded;* all resurrection, *denied.*

With those words is denied only a resurrection to earthly life, such as we now have, which is clear from the obvious meaning of the whole context and from v.7-9.[36]

2. Ps. 1:5: *The wicked will not stand in the judgment.* From these words, the resurrection will not touch the wicked. Therefore it will not be universal.

I deny the major. From the Hebrew text (יקמו from the verb קום) the meaning is: *the wicked will not take their place (or they will not stand erect) in the judgment,* that is, before God the judge (whether in this or in the future life), since God turns his eyes away from them, but he looks kindly at the just.[37]

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33. Lessius, *De immortalitate animorum* n.56; T. González, S.J., *Selectae disputationes in universam theologiam* 4 (Salamanca 1686); *De statu naturae purae* s.5 n.74-104; J. Costa Rossetti, S.J., *Philos. moralis*[2] (Innsbruck 1856) th.15-17; A. Feretti, *Phil. Moralis* (Rome 1887) p.88f.; D.J. Mercier, *Psychologie* 2[2] (Louvain 1923) n.290f. Also, it seems, *Catech. Rom.* 1,12,15 and perhaps Hurter, 3 n.704; G. Schiltz (*loc.cit.,* 339-360) attributes the same idea to the holy Fathers and to St. Thomas.
34. Suarez, 44 s.7.
35. Billot, th.10 § 2.
36. Knabenbauer at this place.
37. See *Liber Psalmorum,* published by the professors of the Pontifical Biblical Institute (Rome 1945) p.1; W. Gessenius, *Thesaurus... linguae hebraicae...*[2] (Lipsiae 1853) 3,1204; F.X. Aguirre, *"Non resurgent impii in iudicio" Ps.1,5:* VerDom 6 (1926) 75.

3. Matt. 22:30: *In the resurrection... they are like angels in heaven.* From these words, the just will be like the angels of God. But the angels lack a body. Therefore also the just will not have a body.

I distinguish the major. The just will be like the angels inasmuch as they do not marry, *conceded;* inasmuch as they lack a body, *denied.*

In the context only that is excluded. And the very words "in the resurrection" implicitly affirm this.

285. 4. 1 Cor. 15:50: *Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.* From these words, the body cannot obtain heaven. Therefore there is no resurrection.

I distinguish the major. A sinful body, or also a corruptible body, cannot obtain heaven, *conceded;* a body simply cannot obtain heaven, *denied.*

The text refers to those indulging in the desires of the flesh. Or also he is talking there about a corruptible body, since even the just will not possess glory except in a transformed body (v. 42-54). Surely it is clear from the whole chapter that the resurrection is not excluded.

5. Christ is the model of our resurrection (1 Cor. 15:49; Phil. 3:2). But the reprobate cannot resurrect according to the model of Christ. Therefore they will not resurrect.

I distinguish the major. Christ is the model of our resurrection, that is, of the just properly and strictly, *conceded;* exclusively, *denied.*

The resurrecting Christ is properly and strictly the model of the resurrecting just, inasmuch as they, like him, rise with a glorified body; but he is not exclusively the model of the just, since the reprobate also de facto (but not gloriously) will rise again and therefore in this way, although with an unequal resurrection, they will resemble Him (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 75, a. 2 ad 3).

N.B. The objection from Eccles. 3:19 is explained where the immortality of the soul is treated. If when the number of those resurrecting seems to be restricted in Scripture within certain limits, often it is considering the glorious resurrection, for example, in Luke 20:35f., John 6:40, Rom. 6:5, or perhaps it has to do with the resurrection to the life of grace, as in John 5:25.

286. B. *From reason.* 1. The state of separation is more perfect than the state of union, since the body weighs down on the soul (Wis. 9:15). Therefore there is no resurrection, at least of the just.

I distinguish the major. The state of separation would be more perfect, if the soul were united with a body physically and morally corruptible, *conceded;* if it is united with a body by which it is not hindered in its operations, *denied* (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 75, a.1 ad 4).

An incorruptible body does not weigh down on the soul. In fact, in it the soul has its own substantial complement, by which it can exercise the faculty of sensing, of acting materially on other bodies, of moving itself bodily from one place to another.

2. The body in the proper sense neither merits nor demerits. Therefore there is no reason why it should resurrect.

I deny the consequent. The soul alone in the proper sense neither merits nor demerits; therefore it alone should not be given a reward or punishment. Therefore, since the efficient cause (*principium quod*) of merit or demerit is the whole man, it is necessary that the whole man be given reward or punishment. For the soul with regard to the body is not just like an agent using an instrument, but it is its form, so that the operation is done by the composite and not just by the soul (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 75, a. 1).

287. 3. Punishment is not diminished unless the guilt is removed. But death is the punishment of original sin, which is not remitted for all. Therefore all do not rise again.

I distinguish the minor. The punishment for original sin is to die, *conceded;* it is to be detained by death, *denied.*

The one dying in this sin pays the penalty by the death itself (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 75, a. 2 ad 5).

4. As we are reborn by the grace of Christ, by it we will rise again. But those dying within the mother's womb cannot be reborn spiritually. Therefore they do not rise again.

I distinguish the major. By the grace of Christ received when we are spiritually reborn, we will rise again at the glorious resurrection, *conceded;* simply by it we will rise again, *denied.*

If *the fact itself* of the resurrection is not explained *naturally* (if that were the case, there would be no difficulty), it is necessary to say that it is not by the grace of regeneration, but by the grace whereby it came about that the Word became man and so men are conformed to Him regarding the fact of living and then of rising again (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 75, a. 2 ad 5).

Or perhaps it is better said in a simple way that it is necessary that Christ, coming in order to destroy the death introduced by the sin of Adam, calls back to life also those infants, who die because of that sin, as if Adam had not sinned.

ARTICLE II

ON THE IDENTITY OF THE BODY OF THOSE WHO RISE AGAIN

S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 79; 4 CG 81; Suarez, *loc.cit.*, 44 s.2; Bautz, *Die Lehre vom Auferstehungsleibe...* p.1 s.1f.; Segarra, *De identitate corporis mortalis et corporis resurgentis* (Madrid 1929).

288. Since from the preceding proofs it is certain as *a matter of defined faith* that all men will rise again with *the exact same bodies* they had in this life, now there is a further question about what that identity implies. Does it suffice in order to have the *exact* identity of Peter when he rises again that his soul is joined *with any material* as pure potency, either already existing or newly created, to which it confers the totality of the act and therefore also the individuation, or is it required for a truly exact identity that Peter's soul be joined to the same matter he had before he died?

The question put in this way is purely philosophical or *about the possibility;* but we are considering the theological question or *the fact*, that is, we are asking what exact identity means according to the theological sources.

289. Since the resurrection of the body with the same material that it had before raises some very difficult questions, some have held that the exact identity of the sources is adequately explained if it is said that *the exact same soul is joined together with any matter whatsoever.* Thus in times past Aeneas Gazensis, Petrus de Alvernia, then Durandus, Ioannes Neapolitanus, and finally a few others, like Billot, Van der Meersch, Michel, Hugueny, Vandenberghe.[1] But all of them solve the matter *philosophically* rather than theologically, that is, by looking at the fact established by God according to the theological sources.

290. But this opinion is based on a philosophical system that is very doubtful regarding the requirements *from the nature of the matter* in order to have exact identity. The theologian must per se ask, not about the *possible* manner of this identity, but about the manner of the *fact,* according

1. Aeneas Gazensis, *Theophrastus:* MG 85,973f. (see Tixeront, 3,270f.); Petavius de Alvernia: see Segarra, *Un precursor de Durando: Pedro d'Auvergne:* EstEcl 12 (193) 114-124; Durandus, *In 4* d.44 q.1; see *In 1* d.35 q.3; Ioannes Neapolitanus, *Quodl.* 2 q.6: see Capreolus, *In 4* d.44 q.1 a.2; Billot, th.13 § 2; Van der Meersch, *Quid requiritur et sufficit ut idem homo resurgat:* CollatBrug 15 (1910) 691-694; 16 (1911) 101-104; Michel, *Les fins dernières* (Paris 1929) 38-140; Hugueny, *Résurrection et identité corporelle selon les philosophies de l'individuation:* RevScPhTh 23 (1934) 94-106; A. Vandenberghe, *De carnis resurrectione:* CollatBrug 38 (1938) 361f. On the not totally clear mind of Origen on this matter and on Ockham and Valencia proposing some exceptions, see Segarra, *op.cit.*, 17f., 170-176.

to the theological sources, so that only if they are silent on this matter should he seek per accidens a philosophical solution. This opinion then easily solves all the difficulties in this matter. And it has very much in its favor, since, from the common Christian understanding, the resurrection "takes place according to a wonderful and supernatural plan."[2]

291. That prior opinion does not seem to be in accord with the sources, whose testimonies given above, taken in their obvious meaning, bear witness to the fact that men rise again *with the same matter* that they had before they died. Thus:

The documents of the Church, which say that men rise again with their bodies (D 76, 859, 1000f.), with their own proper bodies (D 801), that the same flesh will rise that we now have (D 684), etc. *Scripture,* whose testimonies quoted above can be understood suitable only in this sense (John 5:28f.; 11:23-25; 1 Cor. 15:35-54, etc.). Especially *tradition,* which is found both in the words of the holy Fathers and in the ancient Christian monuments, in the liturgy and in the respect paid to relics.

Likewise *there is this theological reasoning:* a) That the resurrecting Christ took up again the same body materially that he had while living, since when it was dead it was united to the divinity. b) That the Church venerates the relics of the saints, because they were the temple of the Holy Spirit, living members of Christ, instruments of their merits and therefore that they are materially the same ones to be taken up in the resurrection.[3]

292. Hence the opinion about the identity of the body through the soul alone is commonly rejected by theologians (even by those who defend the uniqueness of the form) in such a way that it is, according to Sylvius and Estius, erroneous; according to Soto and Jungmann it should be rejected[4]; according to Bautz it is a dogmatic error; according to Ramírez it is temerarious[5]; and especially according to Segarra, who, after having carefully investigated this matter, assigns to that opinion a censure which only five

2. St. Bonaventure, *Breviloquium,* 7 at the end. See St. Gregory the Great, *In Ezek* 2 hom.8 n.9f.: ML 76,1063; St. John Chrysostom, R 1141.
3. Council of Trent (D 1822): (the holy Synod mandates that) "... the sacred bodies... which have been living members of Christ and the temple of the Holy Spirit and which are destined to be raised and glorified by him unto life eternal, should also be venerated by the faithful...."
4. See A. Campodarsego, *De resurrectione mortuorum* (Rome 1904) 44; Jungmann, n.228.
5. Bautz, *op.cit,* p.106; Ramírez, *Boletin de teología:* CienTom 31 (1925 275.

of the thirty-five authors who reviewed his study said was too severe.[6]

293. Therefore it should be held *as a true opinion* that the resurrecting body is made out of the same matter that the body had before death. Obscurities in this matter can easily be cleared up:

a) How can the parts of the body, constantly being changed, be gathered together? By the infinite wisdom and the omnipotence of God (Minucius Felix: R 272; St. John Chrysostom: R 1141).

b) Therefore the total material will rise again that belonged to the body throughout life? No, but only that which is required to form a perfect body.

c) But perhaps the same matter belonged to several bodies. It is so; but without doubt it did not belong to many in such a way that all of it belonged to many at the same time, or at least so that God from part of that matter could not form one body without any detriment to the others; for, through the whole life of one body much matter belonged to it, which certainly cannot rise again in one body. Therefore if some matter partially or totally must be assigned to another body, some will be used that at some time during life belonged to the same body.

d) But there are man-eaters or cannibals. Without doubt they are not nourished only by human flesh. Indeed, even if they were, God could bring it about that they will rise again without detriment to other bodies, as was just said above.

294. e) A boy could not say that he will rise again with the *same* body that he had at first, if he is going to die in old age after the *complete* renewal of his body.

Response. Some have doubts about the total renewal of the matter, while others deny it.[7] However, even granting that, although the whole body is changed physically often throughout life, nevertheless, since that change takes place gradually, *morally the same body always remains,* so that the old man can say that he saw something as a child with the same eyes that he now has. Moreover, since all the matter belonging to the body at one time or another cannot be said to be raised, it suffices for the identity of the resurrecting body with the dead body that at least some of the resurrecting matter belonged *physically at some time* to that body.

Furthermore the resurrecting matter will not be generally whatever was had at any moment whatsoever during life, as some have said, but, as it seems certain to suppose in the sources and as indicated by St. Thomas, it will be *physically the same* matter that

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6. Segarra, *op.cit.*, 259-263; Id., *¿Temeraria o algo menos?:* EstEcl 10 (1951) 106-136; Id., *Todavia una palabra sobre 'la identidad del cuerpo mortal y del cuerpo resucitado":* EstEcl 13 (1934) 470-479. On the traditional opinion of St. Thomas, see 4 CG 81; *Suppl.* q. 79, a. 1; 80, a. 5; Van Noort-Verhaar, p. 119-121; A Campodarsego, p.44-48; Segarra, *Observaciones a unas palabras del R.P. Martin, O.P.:* EstEcl 3 (19240 86-89; Id., Todavia una palabra...: *loc.cit.*, 476-478. Others either have doubts about his definitive mind, like D'Ales (*Bulletin de théologie historique:* RechScRel 19 [1929] 566), or they explain it differently, like Hugueny, *loc.cit.*, and U. degl'Innocenti, O.P., *Il pensiero di San Tommaso sul principio d'individuazione:* DivThom(Pi) 45 (19420 35-81. See also M.C.: BullThAncMéd 3 (1937) 677.

7. See Segarra, *De identitate corporis...* 213-222.

was had at the time of death, because God, although he could have arranged things differently, very wisely decreed, since in this way it can surely be said that the same body rises that fell into the grave. This matter can be said to be the same that was in the body through one's whole life, almost as in the same man the matter of the body of an old man can be said to be the same as his matter as a boy, that is, *physically* or *physically-morally the same,* if the renewal of all the matter throughout life does not take place, but otherwise it is morally the same or also, if the time is considered during the period of the last renewal, it is *physically-morally* the same.

That being the case, at any moment of life it can be said: "I believe that when I rise from the dead I will have the same body that I now have," that is, according to the way in which tradition has understood it.[8]

f) What kind of bodies will infants have at the resurrection, whether they died inside or outside of their mother's womb? They will have exactly and materially the same bodies that they had in life, so that, if it is necessary, God will add to their matter in order to form a suitable body. Likewise God will also add matter to the body of adults, if perchance only a little bit of the matter pertaining exclusively to it remains.[9]

8. Segarra, 222-241 n.13.
9. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 80, a. 4 ad 3; 4 CG 81; Suarez, 44,2,7; Segarra, 257f.

ARTICLE III

ON THE DOWRIES OF THE GLORIFIED BODY

295. Since we have already spoken about the fact of the resurrection of both the just and the unjust, now we will consider the glorious qualities with which, flowing forth from the soul, the resurrecting body of the just is adorned, since it is necessary that such great glory of the soul render the body animated by it also glorious.[1]

St. Paul himself, while considering the resurrection, asks himself a question (1 Cor. 15:35); he describes the body in general as *living* in Christ and as conquering death through Christ (1 Cor. 15:22.25), *heavenly* (1 Cor. 15:45-49), *like the glorious body of Christ* (Phil. 3:21; see Rom. 6:5; 8:11), *gloriously changed* (1 Cor. 15:52), *imperishable* and *immortal* (1 Cor. 15:50-54; 2 Cor. 5:4; see Rom. 8:10f.), and in particular with these words he contrasts the glorious body with the mortal body (1 Cor. 15:42-44f.): *What is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable. It is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory. It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body.*

Generally the doctrine about the qualities of the glorious body is based on the last quoted text, namely: *impassibility, clarity, agility, subtlety.* These qualities, as is per se evident, are *preternatural,* since they are not due naturally to a body, but they perfect it in its own order.

It is an article *of Catholic faith* from the ordinary Magisterium that the glorious body is gifted with *immortality,* and it is had not merely as the potentiality of not dying, as in the first parents, but as the *impossibility* of dying (St. Augustine: R 1699, 2013); this is the Church's understanding of the dogmas both of the resurrection and of eternal life. For: *The blessed... cannot die any more* (Luke 20:36). *Those who have done good will come forth to the resurrection of life, and those who have done evil, to the resurrection of judgment* (John 5:29). With these words it is supposed that the whole man is to be judged, and as such he is given the award of eternal life (Matt.25:31-46). Christ, who, being raised from the dead will never die again (Rom. 6:9), is the model or exemplar of our resurrection (Phil. 3:21). Moreover it is certain from the quality of impassibility, which will be explained next, that the resurrected body is immortal.

296. 1. *On the existence of the dowries.* a) *Impassibility* is the dowry that has the effect that the body cannot suffer any corrupting or irksome

1. See S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 80-85; 4 CG 82-89; Suarez, *op.cit.,* d.47f.; Salmanticenses, tr.9 d.5; Gonet, *De ult. fine hom.* d.5 a.2; Lessius, *De summo bono* 3,3-8; Scheeben, *op.cit.,* § 94f.; A. Brinquart, *La résurrection de la chair et les qualités du corps des* élus (Paris 1899); Lavaud, *Les corps dans la gloire:* VieSpir 55 (1938) 113-136; Chollat, *Corps glorieux:* DTC 3,1878-1906; Prat, 1,163-167; Bover, 902-906.

passion. Therefore it does not exclude passions in agreement with the sensing of objects.

It is certain: From 1 Cor. 15:42: *What is sown is perishable, what is raised is imperishable.* This imperishability is doubtless *perfect* and therefore not only impeding death but also any bodily passion. Moreover, such passion would be a beginning of death. From Rev. 7:16: *They shall hunger no more, neither thirst any more; the sun shall not strike them, nor any scorching heat...; and God will wipe away every tear from their eyes* (see Rev. 21:4; Isa. 49:10).

297. b) *Clarity* "with which the bodies of the saints will shine like the sun... But this clarity is a certain brightness flowing into the body from the supreme happiness of the soul, so that it is a certain communication of the beatitude that the soul enjoys, just as the soul itself is rendered happy by a participation in the happiness of God" (*Roman Catech.* 1,12,13.).

Therefore it is a certain brilliance opposed to shame and foulness, so that the body is covered with a certain light that is both visibly gleaming and in every way beautiful, being something like the brilliance of Christ in his transfiguration (Matt. 17:2).[2]

It is certain: From 1 Cor. 15:43: *It is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory;* see 1 Cor. 15:41f.: *There is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon...; so it is with the resurrection of the dead.* From Phil. 3:21: *He* (Christ) *will change our lowly body to be like his glorious body.* From Matt. 13:43: *Then the righteous will shine like the sun in the kingdom of their Father* (see Wis. 3:7; Dan. 12:3).

Glory is an attribute of God, its brilliance making him invisible; Christ as God had it (John 12:41; 17:24) and when transfigured he manifested it in his body (Luke 9:29), therefore not as a mere moral quality of honor, but as a physical property of light.

298. c) *Agility* "by which the body will be freed from the heaviness that now presses it down, and will take on a capability of moving with the utmost ease and swiftness, wherever the soul pleases."[3]

The infirmity of the body is taken away, which now can respond to the direction of the soul in the movements and functions commanded by it (S.Th., 4 CG 86), so that the soul with the body can move just as easily as the soul can move by itself alone (but it cannot at the same time be in

2. See Exod. 34:29f.; St. Gregory the Great, *Moral.* 18 n.77: ML 76,84; St. Augustine, *Serm.* 241,8: ML 38,1138.
3. *Roman Catech.* 1,12,13; Lessius, 3,6.

different places), and therefore it can go to any part of the world with incomprehensible swiftness.

It is certain: From 1 Cor. 15:43: *It is sown in weakness, it is raised in power* (S.Th., 4 CG 86). This *power* (δύναμις) is a property of God and the glorified body becomes a partaker in it, so that in its activity it does not experience any obstacle of the weight by which the flesh is rendered weaker, but it becomes like a spirit.

From St. Augustine: "For we must believe that we will have such bodies that we will be where we want to be and when we want to go there." "Surely if the angels can to do this... Why therefore do we not believe that the perfect and blessed spirits of the saints, by the divine power, can move their bodies to the place they desire and remain where they will?"[4]

The blessed will also be able to move other bodies with the indicated swiftness. Their body, in spite of its agility, will retain some weight, but the soul will freely be able to hinder its action. Will the body, in virtue of its agility, be able to move itself instantaneously without passing through the intermediate space? St. Thomas says No. Suarez says that it is probable.[5]

299. d) *Subtlety* is a dowry "which subjects the body to the dominion of the soul, so that the body shall be subject to the soul and ever ready to follow her desires" (*Roman Catch.* 1,12,13). But since the *perfect subjection of the body to the spirit* requires both other things and that they not impede it in its movement and therefore that together with it it can penetrate other bodies without any injury to itself, subtlety is taken here more strictly as *the power of entering into any place and departing from it without damage to the body,* as Christ departed from the tomb and also entered the Upper Room even though the doors were closed.

Subtlety is a certain "spiritualization" of the body, implying its subjection to the spirit and so including many other things. But since it, thus taken in its full meaning, is contained for the most part in the preceding dowries, now we are focusing on its ability to penetrate other bodies, which is thought to be joined together with *subtlety,* whether as that in which it formally consists, or as physically proceeding from it, or rather morally or as given by God as a manifesting sign of that dowry. However, St. Thomas thinks that the power of penetrating bodies is given to the glorified body "not from the power of subtlety, but from the divine power, which comes to their aid (i.e., the blessed) in all things according to his pleasure" (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 83, a. 2-4).

4. St. Augustine, *Sermo.* 242 c.3 n.5: ML 38,1140; *De civ. Dei* 13,18: ML 41,391; Eadmerus, *De S.Anselmi simil.* C.51: ML 159,269: "But in that blessed life such rapidity... will accompany us that we will be just as swift as the angels of God who move quickly from heaven to earth and back again."
5. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 84, a. 3; Suarez, 48,4,13.

300. "But concerning subtlety," Suarez says, "there is not an explicit text for it in Scripture. However, the matter signified by the word is sufficiently indicated."[6] 1 Cor. 15:44: *It is sown a physical body, it is raised a spiritual body.* A spiritual body (πνευματικόν) is said in opposition to a physical body or psychic

(ψυχικόν), that is, to a body subject to the vegetative life and therefore depending on its functions of nutrition and generation, inasmuch as the spiritual body is informed by a spirit and fully directed by that spirit and helping it to perform the higher activities of the glorified soul.[7]

But since all of these points for the most part are expressed by St. Paul in the preceding words (v. 42f.) and the expression "spiritual body" seems to add something special, "it cannot be explain more appropriately than it is with this property (i.e., the faculty of penetrating)," Suarez says, "as also Chrysostom and Theophylactus there indicate; it is stated even more expressly by Damascene (1,4 *De fide* c.28), where, although under that property of a spiritual body he understands that other things are also included, especially that it is impassible and indefatigable, nevertheless he expressly describes the spiritual body as being subtle. For this means spiritual, as the body of the Lord was after the resurrection, when he entered through closed doors...."[8]

301. 2. *On the excellence of these dowries.* This is clear because: a) They are given through the redemption of Christ. b) By far they surpass the gifts of our first parents, who not only lacked agility, clarity and subtlety, but also immortality and impassibility and integrity, according as these are forever imperishable and cannot be lost, and since they exclude the imperfection of the vegetative, nutritive and generative functions.

302. 3. *On the way of the infusion of these dowries.* The way in which the dowries are conferred on the body and have their effects on it, since it is not stated expressly in revelation, is difficult to explain, since it has to do with preternatural realities, and since we have very imperfect knowledge about these bodies and the mutual relations of soul and body. Generally the dowries are said to overflow from the soul to the body, as will now be explained below.

Theologians generally hold, as Siuri says, "that the beatitude or glory of the body consists in four dowries, namely, impassibility, agility, subtlety and clarity," since with them the body is constituted in a perfect supernatural state in which it can be a fitting instrument of the glorious soul for functions proper to the state of the blessed. Indeed,

6. Suarez, 48,1,7.
7. Zorell, see πνευματικός, ψυχικός , 1089.1477.
8. Suarez, *loc.cit.* See on this Spicq, Épîtres... 288f.; Bonsirven, *Théologie...* 362, and *L'Évangile* 319f.

according to them, the glory flows from the soul to the body, but not as if the body becomes a partaker in the same glory of the soul, since that is impossible, but inasmuch as, given the glory of the soul informing the body, it follows that the body also becomes glorious in the way that is suitable for it.[9]

Furthermore, Granado, claiming that others agree with him,[10] holds that the glory of the body is *physically* from the glory of the soul, that is, by a true influx of emanation; but more probably we think with Siuri, who says that Suarez, Valencia and Lessius agree with him, that this effect takes place only by a certain *moral* causality, inasmuch as the glory of the soul demands a preternatural perfection in the body, by which it is rendered glorious and proportioned to the glorious soul itself.[11]

N.B. Bona Spes, according as he is cited by Siuri, distinguishes the *beatitude of the body* as on the one hand *essential*, which is in the acts of the glorified senses concerning pleasing objects, whereby the blessed are wondrously refreshed, and on the other hand *accidental*, which is in those four glorious dowries. "However the common opinion of theologians," according to Siuri, "says that the beatitude of the body consists in the glorious dowries, while nothing is said about the glorified senses or their acts... I would like to add, perhaps that this common opinion, while it mentions expressly only the glorious dowries as constituting the beatitude of the body, implicitly wanted to include also the perfect exercise of the glorified senses, since the bodily dowries are directed completely to that."[12]

303. Corollary. Therefore by these dowries the blessed body is configured to the glorious Christ (1 Cor. 15:45-49; Phil 3:21).[13] Consummated glory will not be had unless by these dowries with the redemption of the body.

304. Scholium. 1. *On the relation of sanctifying grace to the glorious resurrection.* The resurrection, which can be taken merely as a fact of the reunion of the soul and the body, is understood here in its full sense and as it were by antonomasia, since it is a *glorious resurrection* or the resurrection of the just.

Indeed the distinction we usually make, between death and bodily life and between spiritual death and life, is mentioned in Scripture less often, so that rather in the full sense death signifies both bodily and spiritual death, but life indicates the life both of grace and of the gloriously raised body. Hence the life given to us by Christ, which is both justice and a glorious resurrection (Rom. 5:12-21; 1 Cor. 15:21d.), is opposed to the death bequeathed to us by the sin of Adam which, as is clear, is both physical and spiritual

Therefore, since one and the same eternal life in Scripture is presented as even now given to the just and later to be consummated, that is, it is in a twofold stage of evolution

9. Siuri, 40,1 n.6.9.
10. Granado, *In 3* contr.13 p.3 d.1. Now Hurter, 3 n.703,2.
11. Siuri, *loc.cit.*, n.8.
12. F. Bona Spes, *Theol.* t.4 d.3 dub.2; see Siuri, 40,1,5.
13. See F. Alonso Bárcena, S.J., *El estado de Cristo glorioso según los escritos de S.Pablo:* EstEcl 5 (1929) 138-149, 373-389.

and consummation, the life of grace of the just is introduced as now hidden but gradually evolving to a consummation through a glorious resurrection (2 Cor. 3:18; 4:16; Col. 3:3f.), so that therefore the life of grace affects not only the soul, but also the life of the body as destined to be raised.

Also for this reason the same Holy Spirit, who is said to dwell in the just (2 Cor. 6:16; 2 Tim. 1:14), is presented as going to vivify the bodies of the just in the glorious resurrection (Rom. 8:9-11.23; 2 Cor. 5:4f.; Eph. 1:13f.), so that the participation itself of the Holy Spirit is proposed as begun now and to be completed in the resurrection.[14]

Therefore the life of grace pertains not only to the soul, but it also concerns the body which leads to the glorious resurrection. But by what kind of influx—physical or moral? This has already been decided by us implicitly, since we said that the glory of the soul (which is only consummated grace) produces the glory of the body more probably not physically but morally.

305. Scholium 2. *On the perfection of the glorious body.* Since it is included in the dowries just explained, it is necessary to say that the bodies of the just will be raised in a *perfect* state: a) Regarding *all members and organs.* And one should not listen to Origen[15] who says that those bodies will lack the members they do not need, v.gr., teeth.[16] b) Regarding *the appearance* and *figure.*[17] c) Regarding *a fitting stature,* which doubtless will not be the same for all, but brought to the perfection that would be attained in a normal development.[18] d) Regarding *a suitable age.* Many have thought that those rising again will be with regard to the form of the body of an age neither senile nor infantile, but of an adult age or around thirty years of age, which was the age of Christ, and at which the development of the body ceases and from which the process of decline begins; but there is no certainty about this matter.[19] e) Regarding *sex.* That this is preserved in the resurrection "is certain... from the teaching of the scholastics in 4 d.44, and no Catholic has doubted it," since it pertains to bodily integrity and it is not taken away by sin,[20] although some ancients denied it and said that all those rising will be men.[21] They said this because they appealed to the words "until we all attain... to mature manhood" (Eph. 4:13); however these words properly understood are not about sex, but about the adult and perfect power of the person that will belong to all (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 81, a. 3 ad 3).

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14. See A. Hulsbosch, O.S.A., *Conceptus paulini vitae et mortis:* DivThom(Pi) 21-23 (1944-1946) 35-55; Prat, 1,264-268; Martínez, ¿Es la *inhabitación del Espiritu Santo raiz de la resurrección glorioso?:* EstEcl 14 (1935) 505-639. See Rondet, *Gratia Christi* (Paris 1948) 80, note 7; Lercher, IV³ n.871.
15. Origen in St. Jerome, *Contr. I.Hieros.* 25f.: ML 23,375-378.
16. *Catech. Rom.* 1,12,9; St. Augustine, *Enchir.* 91: ML 40,274.
17. St. Augustine: R 1923; *De civ. Dei* 22,19f.: ML 41,780-783; S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 80, a. 1; Valencia, *In 3* d.11 q.3 p.3; St. Bonaventure, *Brevil.* 7,5; *Centiloquium* 4,3.
18. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 81, a. 2; St. Augustine, *loc.cit.,* 14-16: ML 41,776-778. See Billot, th.13 at the end.
19. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 81, a. 1; 4 CG 88; see III, q. 46, a. 9 ad 4; St. Jerome, *Epist.* 108,24: ML 22,902; St. Augustine, *ibid.* See Segarra, *De identitate corporis...* 248-256.
20. Suarez, 44,3; S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 81, a. 3. See St. Jerome, *Epist.* 108 n.22: ML 22,900; St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 22,17f.: ML 41,778f.
21. See St. Augustine, *ibid.,;* S.Th., 4 CG 88.

306. Scholium 3. *On sensible enjoyment in the blessed.* The dowries do not exclude sensible enjoyment. For since sensation per se and formally does not consist in the change of the organs and therefore does not include an imperfection, it is necessary to think that it remains, and indeed with regard to all the senses in the blessed; for, otherwise there would be no accidental beatitude in the glorified body, if they were not able to hear and use the other senses.[22]

But the glorified body lacks the functions: a) *Of generation* (Matt. 22:30), since its purpose ceases in the resurrection, since the number of human beings predetermined by God has already been obtained; indeed of the senses in general, but only as they imply some corruption. b) *Of nutrition* (1 Cor. 6:13), and in general the vegetative functions, since each person is already fully developed. However, recently De Broglie, after a long study, concluded that nothing prevents us from believing that in the blessed there is vegetative life, even through real eating and assimilation, but with the exclusion of any need for food.[23] But perhaps it is better to confess our ignorance in this matter, since neither the vegetative life (excluding its imperfections) is repugnant in the blessed, nor does a miracle seem to be excluded in order to keep them alive without the vegetative function.

307. Scholium 4. *Is the beatitude of the body essential or accidental?* This seems to be a question about words. Richardus A Mediavilla, Siuri and perhaps St. Bonaventure said that it is essential; for since the body, like the soul, is an essential part of man, the beatitude of the body similarly must be said to be essential.[24]

But with many authors we hold that it is simply *accidental*, since the soul (and therefore man) would be essentially happy, even if the body did not rise again, as now happens before the resurrection, and since also man would be essentially happy, even if the body were not glorified, as is clearly the case with Christ during his mortal life. However, there is nothing to prevent one from saying that the beatitude of the body is essential, not indeed simply, but with respect to the *whole* man.

Hence also it is clear that the resurrection of the body is not required for simply essential beatitude, but only for the essential beatitude of the whole man, that is, in the way just indicated.

308. Scholium 5. *Is beatitude increased after the resurrection of the body?* Not intensively: a) whether *concerning essential beatitude,* since the light of glory, on which the perfection of vision depends and therefore of the love necessarily resulting from it, given the resurrection, is not increased, and also since essential beatitude is located in

22. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 82, a. 3f. (excluding taste, although hesitatingly); 4 CG 86; Ferrariensis, *In 4* CG 4 c.96 (excluding touch); St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.49 p.2 a.1 s.3 q.1 (placing only sight and touch); Lessius, 3,8; Bellarmino (*De aet. Felic. Sanctorum* 4,5-8) who assigns object for both taste and smell. J.F. Brinquant, *La Fête auriculaire dans le ciel, ou la Part speciale de l'ouie à la béatitude éternelle* (Paris 1892).

23. De Broglie, *op.cit.*, appendix IV p.290: "*Wherefore* (unless someone has a better idea) *it seems that the opinion should not be prohibited according to which the bodies of the blessed are going to exercise a true vegetative life,* which (if you please) can also be exercised *by a true eating and assimilation of food,* provided that all *necessity* of food is firmly excluded from that life, according to the unanimous tradition."

24. Richard A Med., *In 4* d.49 a.5 q.1; Siuri, n.3f.; St. Bonaventure, *Cent.* P.4 s.3.

the acts of intellect and will to which the body is related accidentally; b) or *concerning accidental beatitude,* since this is proportioned to the essential, which, as we have said, is not increased. It is certainly increased *extensively,* since then beatitude is also both in the body and more in the soul, as rejoicing about the good of the body and about its own good coming from the union with the glorious body which is not a burden to it. But the joy of the blessed coming from the love of things outside of God is not really therefore more or less, because it loves all things *only because of God,* in love of whom it neither increases or decreases and therefore also not in beatifying joy.

We hold this opinion as more probable, since there is no clear reason either from the nature of the matter or from the sources for thinking that the non-integral vision of God, to be had in the next life, should not be given immediately after death. However, since the same sources describe beatitude as so connected with the resurrection, it is not surprising if some think that the beatitude after the resurrection also increases *intensively.* Peter Lombard did, along with others, and among contemporaries Palmieri (the soul both exists and operates more perfectly, if it is united with the glorious body, than it does in the state of separation), Paladino, Lennerz (not from the nature of the case, but from the will of God *total* beatitude is not given *before the resurrection*), since the *whole* man merited and will be given his reward, and since in this way the importance of the last judgment is made more apparent; and the Church has never defined the contrary.[25] Indeed some of the holy Fathers it seems should be understood in this way, such as St. Augustine.[26] But Bellarmine taught that the contrary opinion is simply more true, Lessius that it is by far more probable, Arriaga as absolutely certain, Siuri as wholly preferable to the other opinion.[27]

But other authors like Siuri teach that *accidental* happiness after the resurrection increases not just in extent, but also in intensity.[28]

309. Scholium 6. *On the body of the damned.* That body is imperishable, inasmuch as it is not dissolved, but it is passible, and therefore it will be in a perpetual state of perishing and dying, as being subject to extrinsic torments, which would cause its death unless God prevented it. It is therefore for it a certain imperishability of continuous

25. P. Lombard, *Sent.* 4 d.49. Others have followed him, like St. Albert the Great (*ibid.,* a.11). St. Bonaventure (*In 4* d.49 p.2 s.1 q.1), St. Thomas (*Suppl.* q. 93, a. 1), who later retracted it (I-II, q. 4, a. 5 ad 5): "After the body has been resumed, happiness increases not in intensity, but in extent." But P. Glorieux, *Saint Thomas et l'acroissement de la béatitude* (Étude *sur la Somme,* I-II, q. 4 a.5 ad 5): RechThAncMéd 17 (1950) 121-125, holds as more probable that this text should be corrected (according to Godefroid de Fontaines) in this way: "not only in intensity, but also in extent," so that therefore the mind of the Angelic doctor may remain constant on this point; but he is refuted by F. Pelster, S.J., *Das Wachstum der Seligkeit nach der Auferstehung. Um die Auslegung von S.Th. 1,2 q.4 ad 5:* Schol 27 (1925) 561-563, Palmieri, § 72,3; F. Paladino, *L'aumento intensivo della beatitudine essenziale* (Agrigentum 1953), Lennerz, n.224f., who says that several authors at the time of Benedict XII and he himself (even after his definition in D 1000-1002) thought it more probable that the blessed after the resurrection would see God more clearly and more perfectly: see Th. Kaeppeli, O.P., *Le procés contre Thomas Walleys, O.P.* (Rome 1936) 87; Le Bachelet, *loc.cit.,* 670.

26. St. Augustine, *De Gen. ad litt.* 12,35: ML 34,483. See Portalié, *loc.cit.,* 2447.

27. Bellarmino, *De beat. Sanct.* C.5; Lessius, 3,2,15; Arriaga, *In 1* d.58 s.3 n.19; Siuri, 42,4,41. See also Suarez, *De fine hom.,* disp.13 s.2 n.4f. On the glory of the body and its influence on happiness according to the ancient scholastics, see Wicki, *op.cit.,* 280-297.

28. Siuri, n. 50.

corruption.[29] Whencesoever the proximate reason for the immortality of the damned is sought, that immortality is connatural to them after the resurrection; for, if this is had, it must necessarily be for a life that cannot be lost.[30]

Even though some thought that the body of a reprobate will be raised with the deformities it had during life,[31] indeed and with the defect of the members that it lacked before death,[32] we think it is more probable that the body will be integral and therefore complete with all the members that the nature of the body requires.[33] But "The bodies of the damned," Pesch says, "from the foulness of the soul will be very foul."[34]

29. St. Augustine, *Epist.* 205 n.14: ML 33,347; S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 86, a. 2 ad 3; Billot, th.14 § 1. On the way in which that can take place, see Suarez, 50,5,12.
30. Billot, *ibid.*
31. St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.44 p.1 a.3 q.2; *Brevil.* 7,5. St. Augustine (*Enchir.* 92: ML 40,27f.) and S.Th., *Quodl.* 7 a.12) leave the matter undecided.
32. Estius, *In 4* d.44 a.10; Valencia, *In 3* d.11 q.3 punct.3, agree with this.
33. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 86, a. 1; *Catech. Rom.* 1,12,11; Suarez, 50,8-10; St. Alphonsus de Liguori, *Dissertazioni teologiche morali* (Naples 1776) diss.5 § 4 n.28.
34. Pesch, 9 n.689, note.

CHAPTER III

On the general judgment

ARTICLE I

ON THE EXISTENCE OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT

Thesis 13. At the second coming of Christ all men living and dead will be judged.

S.Th. III, q. 59; *Suppl.* q. 87-89; 4 CG 96; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.47 a.1 q.1-3; d.48 a.1 q.1-4; Beraza, n.1546-1558; J. Rivière, *Jugement:* DTC 8,172-1828; Lavaud, *Le jugement dernier:* VieSpir 57 (1938) 113-139.

310. Connection. As we have proved, men at the second coming of Christ will rise again. Then what will happen to them? Christ, who at first came to redeem men and to establish his kingdom on earth, will come a second time to complete that kingdom. But that will take place by the judgment of the human race, by which publicly and definitively the good and the wicked will be separated and their eternal destiny will be assigned to them. But now we will consider the existence of this judgment and we will say something about its characteristics below. As we already said, for St. Thomas this fact is like the beginning and center of the whole treatise on the last things.

311. Definition of terms. *At the second coming of Christ.* When the propagation of the human race has been finished, following the termination of its life on earth in a way that is doubtless *preternatural,* Christ will come a second time, while the men of the last generation are perhaps still living, or at least the just (if perhaps they are not destined to die), to raise the dead to life and to judge all men.

They will be judged, that is, by the sentence of the judge the good and the wicked will be separated definitively and both the former and the latter will have their eternal destiny of reward or punishment assigned to them depending on their merits. But this judgment, which is called *general,* differs from the *particular* judgment; the former takes place at the end of the world all at once and publicly, while the latter concerns each one individually at the time of death and in a private way. The sentence of the former is nothing but a public promulgation of the sentence already passed in the particular judgment and it is put immediately into execution.

All men, that is, at least all adults, since the sources deal with them di-

rectly, while the moral condition, in which infants were in their life, does not seem to require a judgment.

The living and the dead. This expression taken from the sources says in general that *all* men are going to be judged, but in particular it can be understood in one of two ways: a) either about those who have already died or are still living, but so that they are valid at any moment in the life of the human race, b) or both about those who have died or will die in the future, and about those who perhaps will not die, since they are the just of the last generation.

312. Adversaries.[1] *Gnostics,*[2] *Albigensians,*[3] *Rationalists.*[4]

313. Doctrine of the Church. *Lateran Council IV* (D 801): "He (Christ) shall come at the end of time to judge the living and the dead and to render to each one according to his works, to the reprobate as well as to the elect." Almost the same thing is taught by the *Council of Lyons II* (D 852), the *Council of Florence* (D 1338).

The Creeds: *Apostolic* (D 11, 30, 41), of *Epiphanius* (D 44), *Athanasian* (D 76), *Nicene* (D 125), *Nicene-Constantinople* (D 150): "He will come again... to judge the living and the dead."

See also Pelagius I (D 443), *Lateran Council* (provincial) (D 502), *Council of Toledo XI* (provincial) (D 540), St. Leo IX (D 681), Innocent III (D 791, 797), the *Council of Trent* (D 1862).

314. Theological note. *Defined divine and Catholic faith* (D 801, 852, 1338).

315. Proof from Holy Scripture. Matt. 16:27: *The Son of man... is to come... and then he will repay every man for what he has done.* 25:31-46: *When the Son of man comes... he will sit on his glorious throne. Before him will be gathered all the nations and he will separate them from one another... Then the king will say to those at his right hand, "Come, O blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom..." Then he will say to those at his left hand, "Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire...."*

Acts 17:31: *He has fixed a day on which he will judge the world in righteousness.* 10:42: *... He is the one ordained by God to be judge of the*

1. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 20,305: ML 41,708: "Therefore no one either denies or doubts that through Jesus Christ there will be a last judgment of the kind announced in the sacred writings, unless someone does not have faith in those writings with some kind of incredible hostility or blindness...."
2. Tixeront, *op.cit.*, 1,202f. On the Valentinian Gnostics, see Tertullian, *Advers. Valent.* c.32: ML 2,587.
3. Klee, 2,509.
4. Katschthaler, n.415, note 4.

living and the dead.

Rom. 14:10: *We shall all stand before the judgment seat of God.* 2 Cor. 5:10: *For we must all appear before the judgment seat of Christ, so that each one may receive good or evil, according to what he has done in the body.* 2 Tim. 4:1: *I charge you in the presence... of Jesus Christ who is to judge the living and the dead.*

1 Pet. 4:5: *They will give account to him who is ready to judge the living and the dead.*

See also Matt. 7:22; 10:15; 11:22-24; 12:36.41f.; 13:4ff.; Rom. 2:16; 1 Cor. 3:13; 4:5; Jude 15; Rev. 20:11ff.

316. Proof from tradition. 1) *The holy Fathers.* This very fundamental truth is described by them in many ways regarding the fact, the manner and the effects. A few witnesses to this will be sufficient.

Tertullian (R 290): *The fact is asserted.* "Now the rule of faith... is that whereby it is believed... that he (Jesus Christ) will come...to take the saints to the enjoyment of eternal life and the heavenly promises, and to condemn the ungodly to everlasting fire" (see R 364).

St. Hippolytus (R 396): *The fact is asserted.* "And being present at his judicial decision, all, both men and angels... the justification will be seen in the awarding to each that which is just; since to those who have done well shall be assigned righteously eternal bliss, and to the lovers of iniquity shall be given eternal punishment."

St. Cyprian (R 579): *The solemnity of that day is described.* "Oh, what and how great will that day be at it coming..., when the Lord shall begin to count up his people, and to recognize the deservings of each one by the inspection of his divine knowledge, to send the guilty to Gehenna... but to pay to us the reward of our faith."

Aphraates (R 694): *All men are to be judged.* "All the children of Adam will be gathered for the judgment and each one will go the place prepared for him...."

St. Gregory Nazianzen (R 1014): *Christ is the judge of all men.* "Believe that... (the Son of God) will come again... to judge the living and the dead."

St. John Damascene (R 2376): "We shall therefore rise again... and we shall stand beside the awful judgment-seat of Christ; and the devil and his demons and... the Antichrist and the impious and the sinful, will be given over to everlasting fire... But those who have done good will shine forth as the sun... into eternal life...."

2) *The ancient Christian monuments* could be added on which the idea

of the general judgment often appears.[5]

317. Theological reasoning. Reason alone cannot prove the fact of the general judgment, since it is preternatural; but enlightened by faith, it shows its fittingness: "a) *On the part of God,* as the way of goodness, wisdom and divine justice, which in this life are often unknown to us, but are there before the eyes of all men and are recognized by them; b) *on the part of Christ,* so that he might be exalted before the whole world, and just as he emptied himself for all, so he will receive the obedience of all and will celebrate a public triumph over his enemies; c) *on the part of men,* that the good and evil works of all, which often in this life remain hidden from men, will be manifested and the just retribution of God will be made known to all."[6]

The *particular* judgment, which certainly is given for each individual person immediately after death, and the *general* judgment necessarily make up one moral unity, so that the latter is like the promulgation of the former and its confirmation. But, when the pilgrim state of life has ceased for the whole human race, then rightly the general judgment occurs, where the public and definitive separation of the good from the wicked will take place.

Likewise, since the retribution is for the soul and the body, it truly is said to be made effective in the general judgment to which the person himself (soul and body) is summoned.

ARTICLE II

ON THE ADJUNCTS OF THE GENERAL JUDGMENT

318. Christ is the judge, as is evident from almost all the testimonies cited recently in the thesis: Acts 10:42; Rom. 14:10; 2 Cor. 5:10; Matt. 16:27; see John 5:22. Tertullian, R 290; St. John Damascene, R 2376. Although the judgment is from God, as the principal cause, the judicial power belongs to Christ the man both as a divine Person and as the Head and as full of grace and because he merited it (S.Th. III, q. 59, a. 3). Moreover, it is fitting that he should preside over the judgment by whose redeeming action we are able to be admitted to heaven (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 90, a. 1).

319. The following assist Christ in his judging: a) The Apostles. Matt. 19:28: *In the new world, when the Son of man shall sit on his glorious throne, you who have followed me will also sit on twelve thrones, judging*

5. Scaglia, 74-83; A. Bouillet, *Le jugement dernier dans l'art des douze premiers siècles* (Paris 1894).
6. Pesch, 9 n.719. See Wis. 5:1-24. On the prophecy of the judgment in Isaiah, see N. Dominquez, *Vaticinios sobre el fin del mundo:* CienTom 51 (1935) 25-38.

the twelve tribes of Israel (see Luke 22:29f.). b) Some of the saints, but it is not certain who they are. 1 Cor. 6:2f.: *Do you not know that the saints will judge the world? And if the world is to be judged by you, are you incompetent to try trivial cases? Do you not know that we are to judge angels? How much more, matters pertaining to this life.*[7]

320. The ones who are to be judged: In general *everyone,* as is clear from the texts quoted for the thesis: Matt. 25:32; Rom. 14:10; 2 Cor. 5:10.

In particular: a) *Adults* certainly, as is clear from the same texts; but the innocent, like the Blessed Virgin, by a judgment not of discussion, but of reward (S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 89, a. 6f.).

b) According to St. Thomas, *children* "who have died before reaching the perfect age will be present at the judgment, not to be judged, but to see the Judge's glory." According to Suarez, innocent infants will be present at the judgment, but not to be judged by evaluation, since they do not have any works; but infants dying without grace will be present in some way to be judged, inasmuch as they see that they are in that state justly.[8]

c) *Angels*—who, according to all, will be present at the judgment—more probably will be judged (1 Cor. 6:3; 2 Pet. 2:4; Jude 6; see Matt. 8L29). This is easily admitted about the judgment, not of *discussion* (of merits and demerits) at least for the good angels, who have not done anything evil, but of *retribution* and indeed of reward for the good angels and of punishment for the bad angels but it is *accidental,* because from this judgment the former receive a special glory and the latter a special confusion, because of the merits or demerits of men towards whom the former acted well and the latter acted badly. But does it affect the *essential* reward or punishment? St. Thomas says No; others like St. Bonaventure and Suarez say Yes.[9]

321. The matter of the judgment. In general the moral life, or all their works whether good or evil (2 Cor. 5:10; see Eccles. 12:14). St. Jerome says: "The conscience and works of each individual, both good and evil, will be revealed to all."[10] In particular: a) Thoughts. 1 Cor. 4:5; *Who will bring to light the things now hidden in darkness and will disclose the purposes of the heart.* b) Words. Matt. 12:36: *On the day of judgment men will*

7. There is no certainty about the way in which those standing by Christ will judge: but perhaps it could be something like this: a) *comparatively,* inasmuch as their good life will be a rebuke to the reprobate; b) *in an explanatory way,* inasmuch as they publicly approve the judgment of Christ; c) *formally,* inasmuch as they can communicate to others the judgment of Christ made known to them.
8. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 89, a. 5 ad 3; see *De malo* q.5 a.3; Suarez, 57,6: see however *De vitiis et peccatis* 9,6,4.
9. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 89, a. 8; III, q. 59, a. 6; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.47 a.1 q.4; Suarez, 57,8. See St. Hippolytus: R 396.
10. St. Jerome, *In Dan.* 7,10: ML 25,532.

render account for every careless word they utter. c) Deeds. Rom. 2:5f.: *On the day of wrath... God's righteous judgment... will render to every man according to his works.* d) Omissions. James 4:17: *Whoever knows what is right to do and fails to do it, for him it is sin.*

Matt. 25:31-46 therefore mentions *the works of charity* forcefully because they are first done by Christ (John 15:12).[11]

In the judgment also the works already atoned for by penance will be made manifest, in order that both that penance and the mercy of God may shine more brilliantly, since those sins now do not confer any shame on the just.[12]

322. The manner of judgment. Probably the manifestation of one's own sins to oneself and to others for each person will happen *mentally.*[13] The sentence will be pronounced *sensibly,* according to Lessius and others, but St. Thomas has a different opinion (*Suppl.* q. 88, a. 2). The first opinion is more probable, since it has to do with a judgment before men gathered together; but it is not absolutely necessary.[14]

In Matt. 25:31-46 the judgment is described in anthropomorphic terms; for, neither will the just contradict the Judge, nor will the reprobate excuse themselves.

323. The place of the judgment. "But regarding the place," Billot says, "this one point is certain: it will take place on this earth: so that the life of the whole human race will have its ending where it had its beginning, progress and end, and there also the glorified Christ is seated as Judge, where formerly he was mocked, humiliated and condemned by a human judge."[15] This is clearly made certain from the texts where they are speaking about the second coming of Christ to the earth (Matt. 24:30; 25:31; Acts 1:11; 1 Thess. 4:15-17).

It is piously thought that the place is *Jehoshaphat,* the valley near Jerusalem, from Joel 3:2: *I will gather all the nations and bring them down to the valley of Jehoshaphat.* But since the word "Jehoshaphat" means "God judges," then perhaps the place of the judgment in the valley of Jehoshaphat is said metaphorically. "It is not necessary," says Palmieri, "that we delay in these investigations, which we will eventually see with our own eyes; therefore in that day we will put aside the answer to this question."[16]

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11. See A. Wikenhauser, *Die Liebeswerke in dem Gerichtsgemälde:* BiblSeitschr 20 (1932) 366-377.
12. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 87, a. 2; Lessius, n.138. But see P. Lombard, 4 d.43 n.4.
13. St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 20,14: ML 41,680. See St. Basil: R 964; S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 88, a. 2; Suarez, 57,9,5; Lessius, 13,22,137.
14. Lessius, n.139.
15. Billot, q.8 p.169.
16. Palmieri, § 53. See Suarez, 53,3; G.M. Perrella, *La valle di Giosafat e il giudizio universale:* DivThom(Pi) 10 (1933) 45-50.

CHAPTER IV

On Millenarism

Thesis 14. All millenarism must be rejected.

S.Th., *In 4* d.43, q. 1, a. 3 qc.1; Suarez, *De myst.vit. Ch.* 50,8; Beraza, n.1538-1545; T. Halusa, *Das tausendjärige Reich Christi* (Graz 1924); Lesetre, *Millénarisme:* DB 4,1090-1097; Bardy, *Millénarisme:* DTC 10,1760-1763.

324. Connection. Since therefore Christ is going to come to the earth and will send definitively the elect to heaven and the wicked to hell, the question can be raised whether between those two facts, namely, both the coming of Christ and the final retribution of the just, he is going to reign gloriously on earth among the just for a certain length of time. Therefore next we will treat the question about *millenarism.*

325. Definition of terms. *Millenarism* or *chiliasm* (χιλιασμός) is the opinion which (setting aside the many differences among its proponents) says this: after the present state of the Church there will be on earth a glorious reign of Christ; it will be filled with joy and will last about a thousand years.

What is included in this definition is the *essential* element in millenarism, which all of its advocates admit more or less. But there are some *secondary* elements, which the chiliasts state in different ways: a) Whether that reign, which doubtless must have its own subjects in this world, will take place between the second coming of Christ and between the general resurrection and the last judgment, as they generally say, and also with the preceding resurrection of all the just or most of them, or without the preceding resurrection but with many of the just still living in their mortal bodies; or rather after the general judgment. b) Whether that reign will last exactly for a *thousand years,* or simply for an undetermined time or rather for a definite time, or perhaps to continue forever.

326. Millenarism: a) *Crass* (or carnal), besides the other joys, this type attributes every kind of bodily pleasure to the happiness of this reign. b) *Mitigated* (or spiritual, subtle) places that happiness in either spiritual joys alone or perhaps also, depending of the various ways of explaining it, in morally good material things.

All, that is, whether crass or mitigated.

Must be rejected, not as if *all* chiliasm is *intrinsically* repugnant, but because de facto it has no foundation in the sources.

327. Adversaries. In such a variety of ways of speaking, it is difficult to separate the defenders of chiliasm into various classes. Therefore, in general, the following can be counted among the adherents of millenarism:
a) *Crass:* Cerinthus, the *Ebionites,* Nepos.[1]

b) *Mitigated,* which at first, as it seems, was taught by Papias, St. Irenaeus, St. Justin, Tertullian and the *Montanists,*[2] St. Methodius,[3] Lactantius (R 647). From the 14th century and following several authors are cited as agreeing with them, among whom are, to mention a few here, Eyzaguirre, Morrondo,[4] Chabauty, Rohling,[5] the *Adventists*[6]; among the modern chiliasts M. de Lacunza stands out because of the great influence he had on later authors, even on Protestants.[7]

The opinion about the future happy state of the Church differs from the much described millenarism and we will say something about that below. Hence the question should be asked whether the individual authors just mentioned, or others cited also as millenarists, teach a *visible* coming of Christ (at least actually and not habitually), since otherwise we think that they cannot be called millenarists *in the strict sense.*

The origin of millenarism, which is difficult to determine, seems to come from Judaism, in whose apocryphal and other writings even before Christ is found the idea of a future time in which men will enjoy material goods of every kind; and often some spiritual goods are said to be added to them. That time, as expressed by various opinions: will commence under the Messiah or without the Messiah; it will touch only Jews

1. Caius in Eusebius speaks about Cerinthus, *Hist. Eccl.* 3,28: MG 20,274f.; see also 7,15,3; *ibid.* 698. On the Ebionites, see St. Jerome, *In Isa.66,20:* ML 24,672; see *In 60,1:* ML 24,587. Nepos was an Egyptian bishop: see Eusebius, *loc.cit.,* 7,24: MG 20,691f.. On the Apollinarists, see St. Gregory Naz., *Epist.* 102,4: MG 37,198; St. Epiphanius, *Adv. haer.* 3,77,36: MG 42,695.
2. On Papias, see Eusebius: R 658; St. Irenaeus: R 260ff.; see Tixeront, 1,278f.; St. Justin, *Dial. cum Tryph.* 80: MG 6,663-670: see L. Laguier, *Le millénarisme de Saint Justin:* RevClerFr 39 (1904) 182-193. On Tertullian and the Montanists, see Tixeront, 1,218.258.
3. St. Methodius, *Conviv. Dec. virg.* 9,1: MG 18,178. On St. Hippolytus (as a non-chiliast), see Pesch, 9 n.704, note.
4. Eyzaguirre, *op.cit.;* C. Morrondo, *La proximidad de la catástrofe del mundo y al advenimiento de la regeneración universal* (Jaén 1922).
5. E.A. Chabauty, Études scripturales, patristiques, théologiques *et philosophiques sur l'avenir de l'Eglise catholique...* (Poitou 1890-1893): see Hurling, 3 n.712; Id., *Chiliastische Ansichten:* ZkathTh 18 (1894) 377-382; A. Rohling, *Die Zukunft der Menschheit als Gattung nach der Lehre der heiligen Kirchenväter* (Leipzig 1907); see J. Schmid-Angerbach, *Ist die Lehre von der ewigen Fortpflanzung eines neuen paradiesischen Menschengeschlechtes nach dem Weltgerichte mit der wahren katholischen Lehre vereinbar?*: ThPrakQschr 75 (1922) 48-63, 217-232.
6. See W. R. Harris, *Mormons:* CE 10,570-574; A. Humbert, *Irvingiens:* DTC 7,2566-2570; Tanquerey, *loc. cit.,* 512-514; J. Schwane, *Chiliasmus:* KL 3,147f. See K. Algermissen, *La Chiesa et le Chiese* (Brescia 1914); C. Crivelli, S.J., *Piccolo Dizionario delle sette protestanti* (Rome 1945) p.149-153, 190-201; R. Janin, *Le Millénarisme et l'église Grecque:* EchOr 27 (1928) 201-210.
7. M. de Lacunza, S.J., *Venida del Mesías en gloria y majestad* (San Fernando-Cadiz ca. 1811). See A.F. Vaucher, *Un célébrité oubliée: Le P. Manuel Lacunza y Diaz, S.J. 1731-1801)* (Colonges-Salèves, Haute Savoie, 1941), where he mentions several other millenarists; F. Mateos, S.J., *Milenarismo mitigado: Méritos y errores de un insigne jesuita chileno:* RazFe 127 (1943) 346-367; B. Villegas, SS.CC., *El milenarismo y el Antiguo Testamento a través de Lacunza.* Dissertatio ad lauream... Valparaiso 1951).

or also the gentiles subject to them or also the just; it will continue for 400 or 1000 or 2000 years or more. Therefore, taught about this by Judaism, and interpreting Rev. 20 incorrectly, some Christians seem to have imbibed the idea of chiliasm, which, as has been said, Cerinthus and others conceived in a material way, but Papias and others in a spiritual way.[8]

328. Doctrine of the Church. a) *Negatively.* The Church in her documents never mentions the millenary kingdom of Christ. Rather, as is clear from the quoted texts on the general judgment, it conceives the second coming of Christ only with regard to judging all men and after their resurrection; and he immediately and definitively confers on them their reward or punishment.

b) *Positively.* The Sacred Congregation of the Holy Office in 1941 gave this directive to Archbishop S. Jacobi (in Chile), when he asked about millenarism, which certain people in his diocese were promoting: "The system of millenarism, even the mitigated form—namely, the teaching that according to Catholic revelation Christ the Lord will come again before the last judgment, whether preceded or not by the resurrection of many just persons, bodily to this earth in order to reign—cannot be taught safely." The following was added to it: "Your Excellency should take great care lest the said doctrine be taught, propagated, defended or recommended under any pretext whatsoever, whether verbally or by writings of any kind."

Therefore these words directly touch on the following: Chiliasm, even the *mitigated form* (therefore a fortiori *crass* millenarism, even though it does not touch on this directly); as it is said to be contained in public revelation; teaching that Christ is going to come: bodily, before the last judgment, in order to reign (therefore it is not denied that Christ for some other reason may appear bodily in this world occasionally for a brief amount of time, v.gr., as he appeared to St. Paul), on this earth, whether preceded or not by the resurrection of many just persons; and it is said that this *cannot be taught safely;* also all propagation of this view is prohibited.[9]

329. Then the same Sacred Congregation in 1944 received this question: "What should be thought about the system of *mitigated millenarism,* which teaches that Chris the Lord, before the last judgment, whether preceded or not by the resurrection of many just persons, will come into this world visibly in order to reign." The response was: "The system of mitigated millenarism cannot be taught safely."

8. Tixeront, 1,41,43, 222-225; S. Rosadini, S.J.: PeriodMorCanLit 41 (1942) 170f.
9. *Estudios* (Buenos Aires 1941) 355; Rosadini, *loc.cit.,* 166-175. See SalTer 30 (1942) 612.

This response, obviously, repeats the preceding one, but it omits the words "according to Catholic revelation" and uses the word "visibly" for the previous "bodily."[10]

330. Theological note. *Crass* chiliasm is considered by theologians to be *heretical,*[11] and rightly so since it is opposed to Scripture (Matt. 22:30; 1 Cor. 15:30; Rom. 14:17).

331. Proof from Holy Scripture. Scripture nowhere speaks about a millenary kingdom; indeed, although it does not reject it expressly, it so joins the general resurrection of the dead and the last judgment, which is followed by the immediate execution of the sentence, with the second coming of Christ, that is leaves no place for a millenary kingdom (see v.gr., Matt. 24:3.27-31 with 25:31-46; John 5:27-29; Matt. 16:27; 2 Tim. 4:1).

And after the judgment there is no millenary kingdom for the just, but an eternal one: Matt. 25:34. After the resurrection on the last day (John 6:39) there will be on the last day the judgment (John 14:48), and the immediate retribution of reward or punishment follows it (Matt. 24—25; 1 Thess. 4:15f.).

332. Proof from tradition. The holy Fathers sharply attack any kind of millenarism. St. Jerome mentions "the fable of a thousand years."[12] St. Augustine, who at first admitted chiliasm, later rejected it.[13]

Moreover, regarding the Fathers who embraced (mitigated) chiliasm, Pesch says this: "Therefore if now one can gather from the sayings of the ancient writers noted for their authority in dogmatic theology, and who taught a more spiritual form of chiliasm, there are two of them: Justin and Irenaeus, mislead by their veneration for Papias, and these two concede that other good Christians think differently. Therefore it has almost no effect on the argument from tradition." Then on this same point Rosadini adds: "These men... do not explain such an age of happiness (surely spiritual) in the same way, and not always in an affirmative way, and, what should be noted especially, they did it while contradicting other ecclesiastical men of great authority."[14]

Regarding the later Fathers Franzelin says this: "After Lactantius, at the beginning of the 4th century, no serious Catholic author up until recent times has mentioned this

10. AAS 36 (1944) 212. See G. Gillemann, S.J., *Condamnation du millénarisme mitigé:* NouvRevTh 67 (1945) 239-241.
11. Suarez, 50,8,4; Lennerz, n.336; Pohle-Gierens, 3 p.720.
12. St. Jerome, *In Isa* 1,18 praef: ML 24,627f.; see 1,17 c.60: ML 24,578f.; *In Jer.* 4,19: ML 24,802; *Epist.* 120,2: ML 22,986.
13. St. Augustine: R 1521; but then R 1768f. Also see Origen, *De princ.* 2,11,2: MG 11,241f.; St. Basil, *Epist.* 263,4: MG 32,979; St. Gregory Naz., *Epist.* 102: MG 37,198; Gennadius: R 2222.2226.
14. Pesch, 9 n.710; Rosadini, 171f.

opinion without at the same time attacking and rejecting it." "Therefore in general, given the constant and firm consensus of the Fathers and Doctors at least from the 5th century up to our own time, there can be no doubt that they rejected this opinion."[15]

333. Objection. However, Rev. 20 seems to favor chiliasm: *Then I saw an angel coming down from heaven... And he seized the dragon... and bound him for a thousand years... and I saw... the souls of those who had been beheaded for their testimony to Jesus... They came to life and reigned with Christ a thousand years. The rest of the dead did not come to life until the thousand years were ended. This is the first resurrection. Blessed... is he who shares in the first resurrection. Over such the second death has no power... and they shall reign with him a thousand years. And when the thousand years are ended, Satan will be loosed from his prison and will come out to deceive the nations... And the sea gave up the dead in it, Death and Hades gave up the dead in them, and all were judged by what they had done. Then Death and Hades were thrown into the lake of fire. This is the second death.*

Therefore, from these words it would seem that the just will be the first ones to rise, who will reign with Christ on the earth for a thousand years, and then all the rest for the last judgment.

However, these points must be denied. The Book of Revelation is very obscure.[16] Hence the text quoted in the objection, in itself being quite difficult, must be understood according to the interpretation, although perhaps less literal and obvious, which is more in harmony with analogy of dogmas or the rule of faith.

Therefore in the kingdom of Christ lasting a thousand year, that is, for a long time before the second coming of Christ, many souls obtain holiness and salvation: this is the *first resurrection.* The wicked, as thus spiritually not rising, are said to be dead. At the end of the world the devil will be allowed to attack that kingdom more fiercely, all the dead rise bodily (this is the *second resurrection*) and after the last judgment the wicked will be committed to the fire: this is the *second death.* This suitable interpretation of the text, proposed long ago by St. Augustine, is very commonly embraced by Catholic theologians and exegetes.[17]

Moreover, in the quoted text it is not said that the future kingdom will be on this earth or after the second coming of Christ.

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15. J.B. Franzelin, S.J., *De divina traditione et Scriptura*[2] (Rome 1882) th.16 p.189-191; Tixeront, 225.
16. St. Jerome, *In Ezek.* 11,38: ML 25,356; St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 20,17: ML 41,683.
17. St. Augustine: R 176f.; S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 77, a. 1 ad 4; Suarez, n.10; Sickenberger, *Das tausendjährige Reich in der Apocalypse:* Merkle Festscrift (Düsseldorf 1922) 300-316; H. Hoepel, *De regno mille annorum in Apocalypsi:* VerDom 3 (1923) 206-210, 237-241; Allò, *op.cit.,* 283-402; Id., *L'Apocalypse et l'époche de la parousie:* Rev.Bibl 24 (1915) 420-427; Lercher IV-2[3] n.290. In no way can Paul be understood as a millenarist: see Allò, *Saint Paul et la "double resurrection" corporelle:* RevBibl 24 (1932) 187-209.

Wickenhauser expressed the opinion, not admitted by others, that the first resurrection is really the bodily resurrection of the martyrs, whereby it is symbolically stated that they will be endowed with some privilege of glory.[18]

334. Scholium. *On the future happy state of the Church.* According to this theory, before the coming of Christ there will be a long period of happy circumstances for the Church. This view is affirmed, along with many non-Catholics, by some Catholics, like Bisping.[19]

This opinion, according to Beraza, is "false and very far removed from Catholic dogma"; according to Lercher, "it is to be rejected as temerarious."[20] However, if it preserves the teaching of Christ about bearing the cross, it does not seem to deserve that censure. But without doubt it lacks a solid foundation: for, the cross of Christ must always be carried (Luke 9:23; 14:25); in the Church there will always be wheat and weeds (Matt. 13:24-30), sheep and goats (Matt. 25:32f.), lambs and wolves (Luke 10:3), good and evil men (Matt. 13:47); in all, even in the just, concupiscence coming from original sin will always be present (D 1515), the fount of many moral evils, and there will always be physical vulnerability.

18. Wickenhauser, *Offenbarung des Johannes übersetzt und erklärt* (Regensburg 1947); Id., *Der Sinn der Apocalypse des heiligen Johannes* (Münster 1911). See as opposed to him, Allò: RevBibl 41 (1932) 304f.; Ceuppens: Ang 26 (1949) 294.
19. See A. Bisping, *Erklärung der Apokalypse* (Münster 1876) 309-321; see Knabenbauer, *Israel. Restauration nach der Weissagung Ezechiels 40-48:* ZkathTh 14 (1890) 266-269. On this opinion, see F. Alcañiz, S.J., *Ecclesia Patristica et Millenarismus* (Granada 1933) 47-55.
20. Beraza, n.1541; Lercher, IV^2 n.623.

CHAPTER V

On the end of the material world

S.Th., *De pot.* q. 5, a. 4-10; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.48 a.2 q.3; Suarez, *loc.cit.*, 58,1-3; Mangenot, 2504-2552; H.M. Biedmann, *Die Erlösung der Schöpfung beim Apostel Paulus* (Würzburg 1940); Michel, *Feu du jugement:* DTC 5,2239-2246; J. de Fraine, *De wereldbrand als wereldeinde:* OnsGeloof 29 (1947) 49-65.

335. Connection. The discussion so far has been about the end of individual men and of the human race. But that gives rise to another question: if men are raised and the judged obtain their eternal destiny either of reward in heaven or of punishment in hell, what will happen to the material world, which men before their death or transformation made use of: will it be annihilated, or will it remain more or less as it now is, or will it be perfected?

336. The world has an end. The world is understood here as the earth with its disposition of natural causes; consequently, what is said about the earth seems also to hold true about those bodies that surround the earth and are related to it in a causal connection, or at least about the airy heaven around the earth, and indeed perhaps the whole starry sky. Therefore, this world, such as it is, will have an end. Matt. 5:18: *Till heaven and earth pass away, not an iota... will pass from the law.*

The consummation of the world will take place through a conflagration of corporeal fire. 2 Pet. 3:7-12: *But by the same word the heavens and earth that now exist have been stored up for fire, being kept until the day of judgment and destruction of ungodly men... But the day of the Lord will come like a thief, and then the heavens will pass away with a loud noise, and the elements will be dissolved with fire, and the earth and the works that are upon it will be burned up. Since all these things are thus to be dissolved, what sort of persons ought you to be..., hastening the coming of the day of God, because of which the heavens will be kindled and dissolved, and the elements will melt with fire.*[1]

According to St. Thomas (*Suppl.* q. 74, a. 8) the fire of the conflagration, besides its

1. A Lapide, *In 2 Pet 3,7-13;* Vrede, *Petrusbriefe* (Bonn 1924) 161-164. C. Ceulemans, *Commentarius in epistolas catholicas*[2] (Mechlin 1925) 179-181: "It is certain that this world will perish by fire, but that the substance of the world will not be destroyed. Some opinions about this are controversial: for example, whether the conflagration will precede or follow the judgment, whether the stars in the heavens are also to be burned and similar things" (see n. 268). Moreover, although from natural reason it is certain that the world eventually will come to its end, nevertheless the end, which it will have de facto, will be preternatural, which is clear from the way of speaking of Scripture, since it speaks about a sudden event (Matt. 24:37; 1 Thess. 5:2). The authors have different things to say about the future fate of the world looked at scientifically: see on the one hand J. M. del Barrio, S.J., *¿Va a la muerte el universo?:* MiscCom 18 (1952) 145-161, according to whom the world is not tending towards death, and on the other hand, Puig, *op.cit.*, according to whom the world is tending towards death.

other effects, as a natural agent will reduce the bodies of men, who may be found still living, to ashes; as an instrument of divine justice, it will torment the wicked, but it will not torment the good unless they need to be cleansed in some measure from their stains.

337. The world will not be annihilated, but it will be renewed.[2] Isa. 65:17: *For behold, I create new heavens and a new earth; and the former things shall not be remembered.* 2 Pet. 3:13: *But according to his promise we wait for new heavens and a new earth...* (see Rom. 8:19-22[3]; Rev. 20:11; 21:1).

But the renovation seems to be in the fact that the creation will be so liberated from the guilt of sin and the bondage of corruption that, in addition to the bodies of the just (Phil. 3:20f.), everything in heaven and on earth in a proportionate way will be glorified (Eph. 1:9f.; Col. 1:18-20), whereby the world, having been changed suitably for the status of the children of God, is established (Rom. 8:19-22).[4]

338. *The holy Fathers* also teach the renewal of the world. St. Cyril of Jerusalem: "For the consummation of this world will take place and when that happens the world will be renewed... This world will pass away so that a more beautiful one can be established... The Lord will change the heavens, not to destroy them, but to make them more beautiful." St. Basil: "Every bodily creature along with us will be changed." St. Jerome: "He (Peter) did not say that we will see other heavens and another earth, but the old and ancient ones changed for the better."[5]

339. *Theological reasoning* shows the fittingness: 1) That the world both disfigured by wickedness is purified and made because of man is to be glorified with man. b) That man can have a home in the world suitable for glorious bodies; that he may rejoice where for the sake of God he cultivated virtues, where he bore labors and perhaps martyrdom; that he might have accidental glory, since he cannot see God with his bodily eyes. c) That Christ may be the perfect summation of all things, even of irrational creatures, and that all things may be ordered to him. d) That all things through

2. There were not lacking those who said that the world is to be destroyed by fire, like some of the Gnostics, especially the Valentinians: see Klee, 2,512f. Philosophy cannot find an answer to this problem, but only theology, which avoids either excessive pessimism or excessive optimism about the future fate of the world: see Pieper, *op.cit.*, c.1-2.
3. Biedermann, *loc.cit.;* F. Trucco, C.M., *Omnis creatura ingemiscit (Rom. 8,19-23):* DivThom(Pi) 12 (1935) 320-326. See however Prat, 1,286.
4. See Cornely, *In Rom 8,19-22* p.424-434; Scheeben, § 96; A. Viard, *Exspectatio creaturae, Rom 8,19-22:* RevBibl 59 (1952) 337-354.
5. St. Cyril of Jerusalem, *Catech.* 15,3: MG 33,871; St. Basil, *In ps.* 44,2: MG 29,390; St. Jerome, *In Isa.* 18,65: ML 24,644f.; St. Augustine, *De civ. Dei* 20 c.14.16: ML 41,679-681.

Christ may be for the sake of God; when the world is renewed, that his diffusive goodness may shine forth, his wisdom peacefully rule all things and everything be subject to his power.

340. *What will the renewed world be like?* In general, such as is suitable for the status of the blessed. Hence, since the blessed, being now incorruptible, do not need vegetables and animals, many have thought that all of these things will be lacking in that future world.[6] But what others hold seems to be more probable, namely, that the organic kingdom of plants and animals agrees with that world, as its complement and for the greater delight of the blessed.[7]

341. When will the renewal of the world happen? It is not certain, since we do not know whether the conflagration will take place after the general judgment, as St. Augustine, Suarez, Jungmann, etc., think, or before the judgment, as St. Thomas, A Lapide, etc., believe (see n. 268). Perhaps it is better to say: "before the judgment, during the judgment, after the judgment." Thus those two prior opinions are reconciled and the renewal of the world is placed, as seems to be more fitting, after the general judgment.

342. Scholium. *On the consummation of the Mystical Body.* When the last judgment is over and the elect have obtained their happiness, the kingdom of heaven and the Mystical Body will have obtained their end; the King and Head is Christ "whose kingdom will have no end" (D 150) and so the prophecies will be fulfilled (Dan. 7:13ff.; Luke 1:32). Then all things will be subject to the man Christ (1 Cor. 15:24-28), singing with a loud voice (1 Tim. 1:17): *To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only God, be honor and glory for ever and ever. Amen.*

6. S.Th., *Suppl.* q. 91, a. 5; St. Bonaventure, *In 4* d.48 a.2 q.4.
7. Stentrup, *op.cit.*, th.167; Bautz, *Das organische Leben auf der verklärten Erde:* Kath (1877,II) 135-158; Suarez, 59,3.

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